Joachim Koops • Rafael Biermann

Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World

Politics

ISBN 978-1-137-36038-0 ISBN 978-1-137-36039-7 (eBook)DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36039-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016957764

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988.This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

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EditorsJoachim KoopsVesalius CollegeVrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) & Global Governance Institute (GGI)Belgium

Rafael BiermannInstitute of Political ScienceFriedrich-Schiller-Universitaet JenaJena, Germany

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This Handbook has been in gestation and preparation for four years and is the result of an international cooperation project between 38 scholars and practitioners from 12 countries dealing with relations between International Organizations (IOs). Their knowledge, contributions, and angelic patience throughout this process have made the preparations and completion of this Handbook both a pleasure and an exciting intellectual journey for us. While both of us had been fascinated by, and had been working on, the conceptual, theoretical, and policy-oriented implications of growing relations between IOs, the concrete idea for this Handbook emerged during an international work-shop in Brussels in January 2012. The workshop ‘Inter-organizationalism in International Relations: Theories and Cases’, organized by Joachim Koops and generously funded by Vesalius College and the Global Governance Institute, brought together early career and senior scholars as well as practitioners in order to exchange and formulate generalizable findings about the growing phenomenon of cooperation and rivalry between IOs across different policy fields. The phenomenon of inter-organizational relations (IORs) has fascinated both of us from an empirical and theoretical perspective and we are convinced that a more theory-oriented and systematic approach to studying it could also have important implications for the study of International Relations (IR) itself. Based on the workshop discussions and our own research, we decided that it was time for a Handbook which would hopefully provide an important refer-ence for scholars and practitioners interested in the many diverse issue areas where IOs work together today.

We owe our gratitude to all our contributors and Palgrave Macmillan for making this Handbook possible. Hannah Kaspar, Jennifer Timmins and Samantha Snedden from Palgrave have supported us through this publica-tion with excellent guidance and immeasurable patience. Sven Morgen, a PhD candidate at the University of Jena, provided invaluable help and support by diligently putting the entire book in a coherent format, providing the Index and coordinating repeatedly with the authors. We would also like to thank our respective academic institutions, the Institute of Political Science of Friedrich

vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Schiller University Jena and Vesalius College at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) for their support. Finally, as so often, our thanks and apologies go to our families, who had to deal with our more frantic periods of writing and edit-ing. Their support and understanding greatly helped us to bring this project to a successful conclusion.

Jena Rafael Biermann Brussels Joachim A. Koops

vii

ABBREVIATIONS

AC Andean CommunityACN Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central AsiaACP African-Caribbean-PacificADB Asian Development BankAGTU Austro-German Telegraph UnionAMIS Agricultural Market Information SystemAMISOM African Union Mission in SomaliaAoA Agreement on AgricultureAPEC Asia-Pacific Economic CooperationASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsAU African UnionBCBS Basel Committee on Banking SupervisionBINUCA Bureau Intégré de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en

Centrafrique—United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic

BIS Bank for International SettlementsBONUCA Bureau d’appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la

paix en République Centrafricaine—United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic

CaAC Network around Children and Armed ConflictCAFSAM Crop and Food Security Assessment MissionCAR Central African RepublicCARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief EverywhereCARICOM Caribbean Community SecretariatCBD Convention on BiodiversityCCAC Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate

PollutantsCCCI United Nations Habitat Cities and Climate Change InitiativeCCEMA Climate Change, Environment and Migration AllianceCDM Clean Development MechanismCEMAC Economic and Monetary Union of Central AfricaCEN-SAD Communauté des États sahélo-sahariens—Community of

Sahel- Saharan States

viii ABBREVIATIONS

CFA Comprehensive Framework for ActionCFS Committee on World Food SecurityCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCGPCS Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of SomaliaCICC Coalition for the International Criminal CourtCGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural ResearchCIMIC Civil-Military CooperationCM Committee of MinistersCMC Cluster Munition CoalitionCMF Combined Maritime ForcesCOE Council of EuropeCOMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern AfricaCSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation in EuropeCSDP Common Security and Defense PolicyCSFP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCSO Civil Society OrganizationsCSR Corporate Social ResponsibilityCSTO Collective Security Treaty OrganizationCTC Crime-Terror ContinuumCTCN Climate Technology Centre and NetworkDAC Development Assistance CommitteeDDR Demobilisation, Disarmament and ReintegrationDFID United Kingdom Department for International DevelopmentDPA Dayton Peace AccordsDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping OperationsDPP Directorate of Policy PlanningDRC Democratic Republic of CongoEBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentECB European Central BankECCAS Economic Community of Central African StatesECJ European Court of JusticeECOSOC Economic and Social Council of the United NationsECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesECSC European Coal and Steel CommunityECT Energy Charter TreatyECtHR European Court of Human RightsEDA European Defence AgencyEESC European Economic and Social CommitteeEISF European Interagency Security ForumEJR European Court of JusticeEMS European Monetary SystemEMU Economic and Monetary UnionEP European ParliamentEPIC Economic and Policy Innovations for Climate-Smart AgricultureERC Emergency Relief CoordinatorERT European Round Table of IndustrialistsESDP European Security and Defence PolicyETUC European Trade Union CongressEU European Union

ABBREVIATIONS ix

EUBAM European Union Border Assistance MissionEUCAP European Union Capacity BuildingEUFOR European Union Military ForceEULEX European Union Rule of Law MissionEUTM European Training MissionEU EEAS European Union European External Actions ServiceEUCAP NESTOR Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and

the Western Indian OceanEUNAVFOR European Union Naval ForcesEUTM Somalia European Union Training Mission for SomaliaEWIS European Workshops of International StudiesFAC Food Aid ConventionFAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationFARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of ColombiaFFH Freedom from HungerFOMUC Force Multinationale des États d’Afrique CentraleFSAPs Financial Sector Assessment ProgramsFSB Financial Stability BoardFTOs Foreign Terrorist OrganizationsG20 Group of 20GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and TradeGAVI Global Alliance for Vaccines and ImmunizationGCC Gulf Cooperation CouncilGCOS Global Climate Observing SystemGEF Global Environment FacilityGFCS GFCSGGGI Global Green Growth InstituteGGKP Green Growth Knowledge PlatformGPA Agreement on Government ProcurementGRECO Group of States against CorruptionHIPCs Heavily Indebted Poor CountriesHLTF UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security CrisisHMO Health Maintenance OrganizationIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyIASG Inter-Agency Standing GroupIATA International Air Transport AssociationIATA International Association of AirlinesIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and NumbersICAO International Civil Aviation OrganizationICC International Criminal CourtICCSER UN Special Rapporteurs on the Human Right to Food, and

implementation of the International Covenant on Cultural, Social and Economic Rights

ICG-CAR International Contact Group on the Central African RepublicICG-S International Contact Group for SomaliaICHA International Corruption Hunters AllianceICRC International Committee of the Red CrossICSU International Council for Science

x ABBREVIATIONS

IDA International Development AssociationIDB Islamic Development BankIEA International Energy AgencyIEF International Energy ForumIEOM International Election Observation MissionsIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentIFIs International Financial InstitutionsIFOR NATO Implementation ForceIFPRI International Food Policy Research InstituteIGAC International Group for Anti-Corruption CoordinationIGAD Intergovernmental Authority for DevelopmentIGOs Intergovernmental OrganizationsIGOs International Governmental OrganizationsILO International Labor OrganizationIMF International Monetary FundIMO International Maritime OrganizationINGOs International Non-Governmental OrganizationsINTERPOL International Criminal Police OrganizationIO International OrganizationIOC Intergovernmental Oceanographic CommissionIOLC Inter-Organizational Life-CycleIOM International Organization for MigrationIOPH International Office of Public HealthIORs Inter-Organizational RelationsIPCC United Nations International Panel on Climate ChangeIPE International Political EconomyIPEEC International Platform on Energy Efficiency CooperationIPPG International Policy and Partnerships GroupIPTF UN International Police Task ForceIR International RelationsIRC International Rescue CommitteeIRENA International Renewable Energy AgencyIRO International Refugee OrganizationITC International Trade CenterITO International Trade OrganizationITU International Telegraph UnionJEU Joint Environment UnitJMAP Joint Management Action PlanKFOR Kosovo ForceLAS League of Arab StatesLCETP Low Carbon Energy Technology PlatformMARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from

ShipsMDGs Millennium Development GoalsMESICIC Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the

Inter- American Convention against CorruptionMERCOSUR Southern Common Market

ABBREVIATIONS xi

MISAB Mission interafricaine de surveillance des Accords de Bangui – Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements; Central African Republic

MISCA Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine

MINURCAT Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad

MINURSO Mission des Nations Unies pour l’organisation d’un référendum au Sahara occidental—United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSCA Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique—United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

MINUSMA Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali—United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in HaitiMONUSCO Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République

Démocratique du Congo—United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MSF Médecins Sans Frontières—Doctors Without BordersNAPs National Action PlansNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s DevelopmentNGOs Non-Governmental OrganizationsNIE New Institutional EconomicsNIEO New International Economic OrderOAS Organization of American StatesOAU Organization of African UnityOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human RightsOHR Office of the High RepresentativeOLAF European Antifraud Office—Office Européen de Lutte

AntifraudeOMC Open Method of CoordinationOPCAT Optional Protocol to the Convention against TortureOPEC Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting CountriesOSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in EuropeOT Organization TheoryP-A Principal-AgentPACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of EuropePE Population ecologyPIF Pacific Islands ForumPPPs Public–Private PartnershipsPREM Poverty Reduction and Economic ManagementPTO Private Transnational OrganizationsPTROs Private Transnational Regulatory Organizations

xii ABBREVIATIONS

RDT Resource Dependence TheoryREC Regional Economic CommunitiesSADC Southern African Development CommunitySBN Sustainable Buildings NetworkSCNFS UN Standing Committee on Nutrition and Food SecuritySE4ALL Sustainable Energy for AllSFOR NATO Stabilization ForceSHIRBRIG Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations OperationsSIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation agencySNA Social Network AnalysisSRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-GeneralSSR Security Sector ReformStAR Stolen Asset Recovery InitiativeTAN Transnational Advocacy NetworkTFG Transitional Federal GovernmentTI Transparency InternationalTNA Transnational ActorTVA Tennessee Valley AuthorityUIC Union of Islamic CourtsUN United NationsUNAMID United Nations-African Union Peacekeeping Mission in the

Darfur Region of SudanUNCAC United Nations Convention Against CorruptionUNCCD UN Convention to Combat DesertificationUNCH United Nations CharterUNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade LawUNCSD UN Commission on Sustainable DevelopmentUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUN DPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping OperationsUNEP United Nations Environmental ProgramUNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural

OrganizationUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate ChangeUNGA United Nations General AssemblyUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICE Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of EuropeUNICEF United Nations International Children’s FundUNIDO United Nations Industrial Development OrganizationUNISDR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk ReductionUNISFA United Nations Interim Security Force for AbyeiUNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and ResearchUNLOPS United Nations Liaison Office for Peace and SecurityUNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in KosovoUNMIL United Nations Mission in LiberiaUNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South SudanUNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

AffairsUNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

ABBREVIATIONS xiii

UNPOS United Nations Political Office for SomaliaUN-REDD United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing

Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries

UNSC United Nations Security CouncilUNSOA United Nations Political Office for SomaliaUNSOM United Nations Assistance Mission in SomaliaUNU United Nations UniversityUNW-DPC United Nations Water Decade Programme on Capacity

DevelopmentUPU Universal Postal UnionUS United StatesUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentVOICE Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in EmergenciesWBG World Bank GroupWEU Western European UnionWETU Western Europe Telegraph UnionWFC World Food CouncilWFP World Food ProgramWFS World Food SummitWHO World Health OrganizationWMO World Meteorological Organization

xv

CONTENTS

1 Studying Relations Among International Organizations in World Politics: Core Concepts and Challenges 1Rafael Biermann and Joachim A. Koops1 Introduction 12 Conceptualizing Inter-Organizational Relations: Definitions,

Demarcations, and Core Dimensions 32.1 Defining Inter-Organizational Relations 32.2 Inter-Organizationalism and Regime Interaction 52.3 Features, Forms, and Attributes of Inter-

Organizational Relations 83 The Growth of the Partnering Paradigm and the Formation

of Partnerships 123.1 Actor Proliferation, Task Expansion, and Issue-Linkage 133.2 Issue Duration, Issue Density, and Political Shocks 153.3 Domain Similarity and Organizational Overlap 163.4 Rationalist and Constructivist Accounts of Partnership

Formation 173.5 Multilevel Analysis of Inter-Organizational Formation 18

4 Cooperation, Competition, and the Management of Relations 194.1 Inter-Organizational Cooperation 194.2 Inter-Organizational Rivalry and Conflict 234.3 Managing Inter-Organizational Relations 24

5 The Effectiveness of Inter-Organizational Cooperation 266 Major Theoretical and Methodological Challenges 28

6.1 Fragmentation, Eclecticism, and the Lack of an IR-Focused Lead Theory 29

6.2 Transferability, Induction, and Deduction: Matching Theoretical Insights with Empirical Evidence 30

6.3 Generalizability: From Dyad Case Studies to Large-N Studies 31

xvi CONTENTS

6.4 Accuracy: From Desk Research Through Interviews to ‘Participant Observation’ 32

7 Approach and Structure of the Handbook 32Notes 35Bibliography 37

Part I Theoretical and Conceptual Approaches 47

2 IR Paradigms and Inter-Organizational Theory: Situating the Research Program Within the Discipline 49Christer Jönsson1 Network Theory 512 Regime Theory and the ‘Institutionalist Turn’ 53

2.1 Organizations versus Institutions 543 Theoretical Refinements 56

3.1 Resource-Dependency Theory 563.2 Agency Theory 58

4 The ‘Transnational Turn’ 595 Prospects of New ‘Bisociation’? 61Bibliography 62

3 Organization Theory and Cooperation and Conflict Among International Organizations 67Michael Lipson1 Introduction: Inter-Organizationalism in IR Theory

and Organization Theory 672 International Relations Theories and Inter- Organizational

Relations 682.1 IOR and International Regimes 692.2 Constructivist Perspectives on IOR 71

3 Organizational Theories of Inter-Organizational Relations 733.1 New Institutional Economics 733.2 Organizational Environments and Inter-Organizational

Relations 774 Conclusion: Further Opportunities for Cross-Fertilization 84Notes 85Bibliography 87

CONTENTS xvii

4 The Rational Design of Relations Between Intergovernmental Organizations 97Hylke Dijkstra1 The Design of International Institutions 982 The Design of Relations Between Organizations 100

2.1 Formalization 1012.2 Intensity 1022.3 Symmetry 1042.4 Standardization 105

3 Conclusion: Future Research 107Notes 108Bibliography 109

5 Social Network Analysis 113Matthias Schulze and Florian Ries1 Networks as Actors: Heuristic and Governance Approaches 1142 Social Network Analysis: Core Concepts 115

2.1 Network Position: Centrality 1172.2 Network Position: Subgroups 119

3 Social Network Theorizing: Relational Mechanisms 1193.1 Rationalist Mechanisms 1193.2 Constructivist and Cognitive Mechanisms 1213.3 Advantages and Shortcomings 122

4 SNA and Its Transferability to IORs SNA 1244.1 SNA in IOR Research Designs 1264.2 Challenges 127

5 Future Dircetions for Research 129Notes 130Bibliography 132

6 Resource Dependence Theory 135Rafael Biermann and Michael Harsch1 Resource Dependence Within Organization Theory 136

1.1 A Brief History of RDT 1361.2 Underlying Assumptions 1381.3 Core Findings 1391.4 Shortcomings of RDT 144

2 Resource Dependence Among International Organizations 1452.1 Transferability of RDT to IGOs 1462.2 RDT and IGOs: An Emerging Research Program 147

xviii CONTENTS

3 Conclusions: Future Directions of Research 149Notes 151Bibliography 153

7 Population Ecology: How the Environment Influences the Evolution of Organizations 157Florian Ries1 PE: Theory and Empirical Application 1582 Transferability and Empirical Limits 1613 PE as Conceptual Metaphor? 1654 Conclusions 166Notes 166Bibliography 167

8 Sociological Approaches 169Ulrich Franke and Martin Koch1 Organization Studies in International Relations 1702 Sociological Approaches to Interorganizational Relations 172

2.1 Resource Dependency 1722.2 Sociological Neo-Institutionalism 1742.3 Organizational Fields 177

3 Critical Appraisal of Sociological Approaches 1784 Alternative Approaches to Interorganizational Relations 179

4.1 Luhmann’s Systems Theory 1794.2 American Pragmatism 181

5 Conclusion 182Notes 183Bibliography 183

9 Inter-Organizationalism in International Relations: A Multilevel Framework of Analysis 189Joachim A. Koops1 Introduction 1892 A Multilevel Framework for IOR Analysis: General

Overview 1903 Understanding and Applying the Five Levels

of Inter-Organizational Relations 1943.1 The International and Systemic Level: Opportunities

and Constraints 1953.2 The Member State/National Level: Key

Decision-Making Powers 1973.3 The Role of the Individual: Initiators, Facilitators

and Boundary Spanners 201

CONTENTS xix

3.4 The Role of the Bureaucracy 2043.5 The Inter-Institutional and Inter-Secretariat Level 206

4 Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 207Notes 208Bibliography 211

10 The Evolvement of International Secretariats, Executive Heads and Leadership in Inter- Organizational Relations 217Bob Reinalda and Kent J. Kille1 Why International Secretariats and Executive Heads? 2182 Emergence and Relevance of IGO Secretariats and Early IORs 2193 IORs During the League of Nations (1919–45) 2224 IORs in and Beyond the UN System 1945–70 2265 IORs in and Beyond the UN System After 1970 231

5.1 Personal Ambitions in Health and Food 2325.2 Who Provides Leadership? The Joint

Creation of UNAIDS 2335.3 IORs in the North–South Divide of the 1970s 2345.4 IGO Survival Under Change in IORs

in International Trade 2356 The Emergence of Country Clubs and Their Effects on IORs 2377 Conclusion 239Notes 239Bibliography 239

11 The Role of International Bureaucracies 243Rafael Biermann1 Conceptualizing International Bureaucracies 2442 The Relevance of International Bureaucracies

for Inter-Organizational Relations 2483 Theories and Approaches 250

3.1 Principal–Agent Theory 2503.2 Sociological Institutionalism 2533.3 Bureaucratic Politics 2553.4 Organization Theory 258

4 Recommendations for Future Research 261Notes 263Bibliography 264

12 The Principal–Agent Model and Inter- Organizational Relations 271Edith Drieskens and Yf Reykers

xx CONTENTS

1 Parameters 2722 Literature 2743 Shortcomings and Critiques 2774 Transferability to Inter-Organizational Relations 278

4.1 The UNSC as Agent 2794.2 The UNSC as Principal 280

5 Case Study 2826 Conclusion 284Notes 284Bibliography 285

13 Configurations in Inter-Organizational Cooperation: From Dyads to Organizational Fields 289Melissa E. Wooten and Timothy Sacco1 An Open Systems Perspective on Organizations 2902 Organizational Fields 2913 Using Organizational Fields as an Analytical Method 2944 Conclusion 297Note 299Bibliography 299

14 Nested Institutions 303Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis1 Nested Institutions: Conceptual Clarification and Basic

Features 3041.1 Nested Institutions: What Is It About? 3041.2 Issues of Order and Organizational Hierarchy 3061.3 Encompassing and Encompassed Institutions in a 

Nested Environment 3112 Nested Institutions: Summary and Further Research 314Bibliography 315

15 NGO–NGO Relations 319Andrea Schneiker1 Introduction 3192 Different Ways of Conceptualizing NGO–NGO Relations 322

2.1 Network Approaches to Analyzing NGO–NGO Interaction 323

3 Theoretical Approaches to Explaining NGO–NGO Relations 3254 Intra- and Inter-Network Relations and the

Evolution of Networks 3295 Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 331

CONTENTS xxi

Notes 332Bibliography 333

16 Legitimizing Inter-Organizational Relations 337Rafael Biermann1 Conceptualizing Legitimacy and Legitimation 3392 The Legitimation of International Organizations 3423 Legitimation Among Organizations 346

3.1 Subjects and Objects of Legitimation Among Organizations 347

3.2 Legitimation Criteria and Strategies 3493.3 Legitimacy Assessments and the Willingness

to Cooperate 3524 Recommendations for Future Research 354Notes 357Bibliography 359

17 Power in Inter-Organizational Relations 365Hanna Ojanen1 The Centrality and Evasiveness of Power Analyses 3652 Different Forms and ‘Faces’ of Power 3663 Explaining the Neglect of Power in

Inter-Organizational Relations 3694 Inter-Organizational Relations Among

Security Institutions 3745 Injecting Power into the Analysis of

Inter- Organizational Relations 3756 New Avenues for Research 379Notes 382Bibliography 382

18 Assessing Influence Between International Organizations 389Oriol Costa1 Introduction 3892 What Is Inter-Organizational Influence 3913 How Much Influence 3944 What Can Be Influenced 396

4.1 Politics 3974.2 Institutional Development 3984.3 Cognitive and Normative Structures 3994.4 Politics and Spheres of Activity 400

xxii CONTENTS

5 Final Remarks 401Note 402Bibliography 402

19 Trust Among International Organizations 407Philipp Brugger, Andreas Hasenclever, and Lukas Kasten1 Conceptualizing Trust 408

1.1 Ontological Key Features of Trust 4081.2 Rationalist Understandings of Trust as Calculation 4091.3 Extra-Rationalist Accounts of Trust as Risk-Suspension 4091.4 Integrative Approaches 411

2 Trust and Its Relation to Mistrust 4123 Inter-Organizational Trust Across Levels of Analysis 4124 Trust-Building Between Organizations 4145 Consequences of Trust 4166 Measuring Trust Between Organizations 4177 Shortcoming and Avenues for Future Research 418Notes 420Bibliography 422

Part II Policy Areas 427

20 Inter-Organizational Coordination in Peacebuilding 429Joanne McEvoy1 Literature On Inter-Organizational Coordination

In Peacebuilding 4301.1 Different Approaches in Peacebuilding 4301.2 Autonomy Concerns 4321.3 Divergent Organizational Cultures 433

2 IO Cooperation in Peacebuilding Missions 4342.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina 4342.2 Kosovo 438

3 Conclusion 440Notes 441Bibliography 442

21 Regime Complexity and Resource Dependence Theory in International Peacekeeping: The Example of Somalia and the Central African Republic 447Malte Brosig1 Regime Complexity and Resource Dependence 448

CONTENTS xxiii

1.1 Regime Complexity 4481.2 Resource Dependence Theory and Resource

Exchange 4492 The African Peacekeeping Regime Complex 4523 Empirical Case Studies: Somalia and the Central

African Republic 4533.1 Somalia 4553.2 The Central African Republic 461

4 Conclusion 467Bibliography 468

22 Dark Networks: The Terror–Crime Nexus 471Marie Wu and David Knoke1 Review of Research and Theories 472

1.1 Organizational Design and Structure 4731.2 Dynamic Processes 4751.3 Theories and Methods 478

2 Directions for Future Research 480Bibliography 481

23 The Theory and Practice of International Humanitarian Relief Coordination 485Max O. Stephenson Jr.1 The Structure of International Humanitarian Relief 4862 The United Nations and Humanitarian Relief 4893 Theorizing the Humanitarian Relief System 4904 Conclusions 498Notes 499Bibliography 499

24 The Global Governance of Food Security 503Matias E. Margulis1 Mapping the Organizational Dimensions of the Global

Governance of Food Security 5051.1 Nutrition 5061.2 Agricultural Production 5061.3 Agricultural Trade 5071.4 Food Safety 5071.5 Human Right to Food 5071.6 Agriculture and Development 5071.7 Agriculture and Climate Change 508

2 Institutional Characteristics of the Global Governance of Food Security 508

xxiv CONTENTS

3 Inter-Organizational Relationships of Global Governance of Food Security 5113.1 Cooperation 5113.2 Rivalry 516

4 Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 519Notes 521Bibliography 521

25 Inter-Organizational Relations in the Field of Democratisation: Cooperation or Delegation? The European Union, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe 527Andrea Gawrich1 State of the Art 5292 Categorizing the Cooperation Between the EU, the OSCE,

and the CoE 5293 Empirical Steps of Formalization Between the EU, the OSCE,

and the CoE: The Post-Cold War Convergence 5303.1 The EU and the OSCE: Late Formal Acknowledgement

at the Level of Rules of Procedure 5303.2 The EU and the CoE: Intense Practical Cooperation

and Late Joint Statements 5313.3 The CoE and the OSCE: Close Working Connections

and Late IO–IO Formalization 5324 Cooperation or Delegation? Empirical Findings on Inter-

Organizational Cooperation Between the EU, the CoE, and the OSCE in the Area of Democracy Promotion 5354.1 Triadic Cooperation in the Area of Election Observation 5354.2 Capacity Building in the Areas of Good Governance

and Rule of Law: Asymmetric Relations Between the  CoE and the EU 537

4.3 Capacity Building in Constitutional and Legal Matters: Division of Labour at Working Level Between CoE and  OSCE 538

4.4 Lack of Cooperation in the Area of Media Assistance 5395 Theory-Guided Reflection and Concluding Remarks 541Notes 542Bibliography 543

26 The Council of Europe and Cooperation with Civil Society 547André Härtel1 State of Research on IGO–CSO Cooperation 5482 The Multilateral Traditionalism of the Council of Europe 5513 The Council of Europe and Civil Society Cooperation 552

CONTENTS xxv

4 Major Obstacles for Efficient Cooperation 5544.1 Critique of the Council of Europe’s Work with CSO’s 5544.2 The INGO Conference: Pitfalls of 

Over-Institutionalization 5554.3 The Politics of IO–CSO Cooperation 5574.4 A Hardly Conducive Organizational Culture 558

5 Conclusions 561Notes 562Bibliography 564

27 Pushed Toward Partnership: Increasing Cooperation Between the Bretton Woods Bodies 569Andreas Freytag and John J. Kirton1 Open Questions and Main Thesis 5702 The Division of Labor in Theory and Practice 5713 Competing Schools of Thought 5734 Strengthening Collaboration, 2000–07 5745 Equal Partnership, 2008–14 5756 G20 Summit Governance of IMF–WBG Partnership 5777 Conclusion: The Incomplete Partnership 5798 Recommendations for Further Research 580Notes 580Appendix 1: G20 Development of Global Governance, 2008–13 582Appendix 2: IMF/WBG-Related G20 Commitments, 2008–13 584Appendix 3: IMF/WBG-Related G20 Commitments

by Focus, 2008–13 584Appendix 4: IMF/WBG-Related G20 Commitments

by Issue, 2008–13 585Appendix 5: IMF/WBG-Related G20 Commitments

by Institutional Context, 2008–13 586Appendix 6: IMF–WBG-Related G20 Commitments

by Cause, 2008–13 587Bibliography 587

28 Organizational Interactions in Global Energy Governance 591Thijs van de Graaf1 General Overview of the Policy Field and Literature 5922 The Global Energy Architecture and the IEA 5933 An Organization-Set of the IEA 595

3.1 The IEA and OPEC 5953.2 The IEA and ECT 6003.3 The IEA and G8/G20 6023.4 The IEA and IRENA 604

xxvi CONTENTS

4 Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 605Notes 606Bibliography 607

29 The Cooperation of the European Union with Employer and Labor Associations 611Frank Wendler1 Empirical Overview 6122 Research Questions and Findings 6183 Perspectives for Future Research 6214 Conclusions 623Notes 624Bibliography 624

30 IGO Relations in the Anti-corruption Realm and in Promoting Integrity in Public Procurement 627Alexandru Grigorescu1 Anti-corruption and the Study of Inter- organizational

Relations 6272 IGOs Involved in the Anti-corruption Realm 630

2.1 IGOs Spearheading the Adoption of Anti-corruption Conventions 630

2.2 IGOs Raising Awareness and Increasing Knowledge About Corruption 632

2.3 IGOs Using Conditionality to Fight Corruption 6332.4 IGOs’ Investigative Approach to Anti-corruption 6342.5 Transparency and Integrity in Public Procurement 636

3 IGO Collaboration in the Anti-corruption Realm 6384 Possible Future Research Directions 642Notes 644Bibliography 645

31 Relations Between International Organisations in Combating Climate Change 649Katja Biedenkopf1 Introduction 6492 Climate Change as a Global Governance Issue 6503 Inter-organisational Interaction 6514 The Climate Organisational Complex and Its

Inter-organisational Interactions 6544.1 The Organisational Complex and Its Fragmentation 6544.2 Organisational Interaction 6684.3 Interplay Management 672

CONTENTS xxvii

5 Conclusions 672Notes 673Bibliography 674

32 Conclusions 677Rafael Biermann and Joachim A. Koops1 The Balance of Review and Exploration 6782 Major Theoretical and Empirical Findings 6813 Future Research Directions 686Notes 689Bibliography 690

Index 697

xxix

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 5.1 Network graph based on adjacency matrix (For reasons of simplicity and to show as many concepts as possible, this network graph is not based on any empirical observations.) 117

Fig. 12.1 NATO’s intervention in Libya from a delegation perspective 285Fig. 16.1 The politics of legitimation 341Fig. 16.2 The politics of legitimation of international organizations 345Fig. 16.3 The politics of legitimation among international organizations 353Fig. 21.1 UN peacekeepers in deployment 1990–2015 (Source: Data

drawn from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ resources/statistics/contributors.shtml accessed 26 February 2015) 452

Fig. 23.1 The international relief system (Source: Borton 1993, p. 188) 488Fig. 30.1 Network of formal IGO relations in the anti-corruption realm 640Fig. 30.2 Network of formal IGO relations in the open public

procurement realm 641Fig. 31.1 Inter-organisational relations in combating climate change

(non-exhaustive) 671

xxxi

Table 3.1 Thompson’s model of technology and coordination 82Table 4.1 Dimensions of IGO interaction based on Marrett

(1971) and Aldrich (1977) 101Table 5.1 Adjacency matrix 116Table 9.1 Overview of Multi-level analysis approach to

Inter-organizational Relations 192Table 18.1 Measuring the influence of IOs on other IOs 396Table 18.2 Domains of inter-organizational influence 397Table 19.1 Actor constellations 413Table 21.1 2014 peacekeeping missions in Africa by organization 453Table 21.2 International organizations in Somalia 457Table 21.3 International peacekeeping in the CAR 462Table 24.1 Illustrative list of international organizations active

in the global governance of food security 509Table 25.1 Steps of formalization in the cooperation

between EU, OSCE, and CoE 534Table 25.2 Forms of EU, OSCE, and CoE cooperation

in various fields of democracy promotion 542Table 28.1 Main energy-related international organizations,

their objectives, and members 596Table 30.1 IGOs involved in anti-corruption work 637Table 31.1 International Organisations’ Climate-related Activities

and Inter-organisational Relations 656

LIST OF TABLES

xxxiii

CONTRIBUTORS

Katja Biedenkopf is Assistant Professor at the University of Leuven, Belgium. Her research centers on the external effects of European Union environmental and climate policy, global environmental governance, and climate diplomacy. Recent articles in journals include ‘The European Parliament in EU External Climate Governance’ (in The European Parliament and Its International Relation, Stavridis, Stelios and Daniela Irrera (eds.)), and ‘EU Chemicals Regulation: Extending Its Experimentalist REACH’ (in Extending Experimentalist Governance? The European Union and Transnational Regulation, Zeitlin, Jonathan (ed.)).

Rafael  Biermann is Full Professor of International Relations at Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany. His main areas of expertise are international organizations and peace and conflict studies, where he is especially interested in secessionism, mediation, intervention, as well as ethics of peace and reconcilia-tion. His study of European security governance bridges both areas of expertise. He has published peer-reviewed contributions on the Handbook topics in jour-nals such as Review of International Organizations and Journal of International Organization Studies. His dissertation analyzed Soviet policy toward German unification, his habilitation crisis prevention in Kosovo (both in German).

Spyros Blavoukos is Assistant Professor at the Athens University of Economics and Business, focusing on the analysis of international and European institu-tions. He is the co-author of two books and co-editor of two more, the most recent one being The European Union and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Palgrave, 2015). His articles have appeared in international journals including Review of International Studies, West European Politics, Journal of Common Market Studies, European Journal of Political Research, European Union Politics, Cooperation and Conflict, and British Journal of Politics and International Relations.

Dimitris Bourantonis is Professor of International and European Studies at the Athens University of Economics and Business. Among other publications,

xxxiv CONTRIBUTORS

he is the co-author of Chairing Multilateral Negotiations: The Case of the United Nations (2011) and author of a book on The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform (2006). His articles have appeared in Review of International Studies, Journal of Common Market Studies, Cooperation and Conflict, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, as well as three co-edited volumes on The European Union and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Palgrave, 2015), The EU Presence in International Organizations (2011), and Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization (2007).

Malte  Brosig is an Associate Professor in International Relations at the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. He joined the Department in 2009 after he received his PhD from the Centre of European and International Relations Studies Research at the University of Portsmouth. His main research interests focus on issues of international organization (IO) interplay and peacekeeping in Africa. His work has contributed significantly to theory building in IO interplay and regime complexity literature. His articles have appeared in in accredited journals such as African Security International Peacekeeping, European Security, European Review of International Affairs, South African Journal of International Affairs, Journal of International Peacekeeping, and Journal of International Organization Studies. His recently published monograph is Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa: Exploring Regime Complexity.

Philipp Brugger is a research associate at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Tübingen, Germany. His research concentrates on the con-cept and operationalization of interstate and inter-organizational trust, on theoretical approaches to trust building, and on the history and future pros-pects of the transatlantic security community.

Oriol Costa holds a PhD in International Relations from the Autonomous University of Barcelona, where he is an Assistant Professor (interim). He is also a researcher at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals(IBEI). He has conducted research on the interplay between international institutions and the EU, including on the influence of former upon the latter.

Hylke  Dijkstra is Associate Professor (with tenure) at the Department of Political Science of Maastricht University, The Netherlands. He specializes in the design of international secretariats in security affairs. He is author of Policy- Making in EU Security and Defense: An Institutional Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) and his articles have appeared in journals such as Cooperation and Conflict, International Peacekeeping, Journal of European Public Policy, and The Review of International Organizations.

Edith Drieskens is Associate Professor of International Relations at Leuven International and European Studies (LINES), KU Leuven. Her work explores the regional dimension of global governance, focusing on the EU’s

CONTRIBUTORS xxxv

functioning at the United Nations (UN). She is co-editor of Effective Multilateralism: Internal and External Reform Practices (2014) and The Sage Handbook on European Foreign Policy (2015).

Ulrich Franke is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Bremen’s Institute for Intercultural and International Studies (InIIS). Inspired by the philosophy and social theory of Classical Pragmatism, his main research interest is on reconstructing both the core beliefs that guide the action of central figures in world politics—be it representatives of states, international organizations, or else—and their contributions to world order.

Andreas Freytag is Professor of Economics at the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena (http://www.wipo.uni-jena.de/JASG.html) and Honorary Professor at the University of Stellenbosch. Among others, he is also Director of Tutwa Germany (www.tutwaconsulting.com). Freytag holds a diploma from the University of Kiel and his doctorate as well as his habilitation from the University of Cologne. He has published a number of books and articles in first-class peer- reviewed journals on economic policy, international trade policy, development economics, and international policy coordination.

Andrea  Gawrich is Professor of Political Science and holds the chair for International Integration at the Institute for Political Science, Justus Liebig University Gießen. She holds a PhD from the Ruhr-University Bochum, 2002, and her postdoctoral degree (habilitata) from the University of Kiel, 2011. From 2003 to 2012, she was Assistant Professor at the University of Kiel. During that time, she worked as stand-in professor at the Universities of Kiel and Duisburg-Essen. From 2002 to 2003, she was Program Director of the Program Central East Europe at the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin. Her research focus and teaching experience lie in the field of European Integration with regard to EU, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Council of Europe.

Thijs  Van de Graaf is Assistant Professor of International Politics at the Ghent Institute for International Studies, Ghent University. His research inter-ests include international energy politics, global governance, and international institutions. He is co-editor of Rising Powers and Multilateral Institutions (Palgrave, 2015), author of The Politics and Institutions of Global Energy Governance (Palgrave, 2013), and co-author of Global Energy Governance in a Multipolar World (2010). In April 2011, he was a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

Alexandru Grigorescu is Professor of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago. His research on international organizations has appeared in numer-ous journals such as International Studies Quarterly, Review of International

xxxvi CONTRIBUTORS

Organizations, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Global Governance, International Politics, and Ethics and International Affairs. He is also the author of Democratic Intergovernmental Organizations? Normative Pressures and Decision-Making Rules (2015).

Michael F. Harsch is Faculty Fellow at New York University Abu Dhabi and a Non-Resident Fellow at New  York University’s Center on International Cooperation. His research examines international cooperation in promoting security, effective governance, and development in fragile and conflict-affected countries. His book The Power of Dependence: NATO-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management was published in 2015.

André Härtel is Associate Professor and DAAD-Lecturer for ‘German and European Studies’ at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Kyiv, Ukraine. Prior to this, he worked as Lecturer in International Relations at Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Germany, and as Political Advisor at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France. His PhD thesis ‘Westintegration oder Grauzonenszenario? Die EU- und WTO-Politik der Ukraine vor dem Hintergrund der inneren Transformation (1998–2009)’ was published by LITVerlag in 2012. He is interested in the domestic and foreign policies of the countries of the Post-Soviet Space, in democratization, economic transforma-tion, and in the interconnection between global governance and local politics.

Andreas  Hasenclever is Professor of International Relations and Peace Studies at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Tübingen, Germany. His chief research interests include peace and conflict studies with particular reference to the analysis of the democratic peace, regime analysis, and the impact of religious traditions on political conflicts. On these topics, he has authored numerous articles and books.

Christer Jönsson is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Lund University and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. His publications include International Aviation and the Politics of Regime Change (1987), International Cooperation in Response to AIDS (co-author 1995), Transnational Actors in Global Governance (co-editor 2010), and The Opening Up of International Organizations (co-author 2013) along with several articles in leading academic journals.

Lukas Kasten is Research Associate at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Tübingen, Germany. As a peace and conflict researcher, he is especially interested in the concept, causes, and consequences of trust between states, the causes and processes of interstate stable peace, and social sci-ence methodology.

Kent  Kille is Professor in the Department of Political Science and at the Global and International Studies Program at the College of Wooster. He is an expert on international organization leadership as well as on comparisons and connections between the United Nations and regional organizations.

AU1

CONTRIBUTORS xxxvii

Recent publications and projects include From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-General of the United Nations, The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership, IO BIO, Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations (with Bob Reinalda), as well as articles in Global Governance, Journal of International Organization Studies, and Political Psychology.

John J. Kirton is Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the G20 Research Group based at Trinity College at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies in Renmin University of China. He is the author of G20 Governance for a Globalized World (2012).

David Knoke is Professor of Sociology at the University of Minnesota, where he teaches social networks, organizations, and statistics. In 2008, he received the University of Minnesota College of Liberal Arts’ Arthur ‘Red’ Motley Exemplary Teaching Award. Recent books include the second edition of Social Network Analysis (2008 with Song Yang) and Economic Networks (2012).

Martin Koch is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Bielefeld University. His research interests include international organizations and institutions, international relations theory and world society studies. He is currently elaborating on a sociological reconceptualization of international organi-zations in world society and recently co-edited a special issue of the Journal of the German Association for Political Science on international organizations.

Joachim  A.  Koops is Dean of Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), Research Professor for European Foreign and Security Policy at the VUB’s Institute for European Studies and Director of the Global Governance Institute (GGI). His research focuses on inter-organizational relations in the-ory and practice, EU Foreign Policy, and UN approaches to global security governance. Recent publications include The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2015), The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), and The Responsibility to Protect and the Third Pillar (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

Michael  Lipson is Associate Professor of Political Science at Concordia University, Montreal. His research interests focus on the role of international institutions in responding to threats to international peace and security, par-ticularly United Nations peace operations. Recent publications have appeared in Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding and Review of International Organizations.

Matias  E.  Margulis is Lecturer in Political Economy at the University of Stirling. A former Canadian delegate to the World Trade Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and United Nations agencies, his research focuses on global governance, international

xxxviii CONTRIBUTORS

trade, agriculture and food, and human rights. His work has been published in Global Governance, World Trade Review, Globalizations, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Current Opinion on Environmental Sustainability and Geopolitics.

Joanne  McEvoy is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen, UK. Her research interests focus on the role of external actors in peacebuilding and the impact of political institutions, particularly power sharing in deeply divided, post-conflict states. Her most recent book is Power Sharing Executives: Governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland (2015).

Hanna Ojanen is Jean Monnet Professor at the University of Tampere. She holds a doctorate from the European University Institute, Florence. Her previ-ous positions include Programme Director of the Research Programme on the European Union, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and Head of Research, Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Her research interests comprise European security and defence issues and her current research focuses on inter-organisational relations (forthcoming mono-graph entitled The EU’s power in Inter-Organizational Relations).

Bob Reinalda is Senior Researcher at Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. He has published the Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day (2009) and has edited the Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors (2011) and the Routledge Handbook of International Organization (2013). Together with Kent J. Kille, The College of Wooster, he is editor of IO BIO, the Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries- General of International Organizations (see www.ru.nl/fm/iobio).

Yf Reykers is a PhD fellow of the Research Foundation—Flanders (FWO). He is conducting his research at the Leuven International and European Studies (LINES) Institute since October 2013. His research focuses on the relationship between the United Nations Security Council and regional organ-isations in military interventions. His research interests include the fields of comparative regionalism, United Nations studies and peace research.

Florian Ries is a PhD candidate at the University of Jena. His major fields of research are EU foreign and security policy, international organisations as well as inter-organisational relations.

Timothy  Sacco is a graduate student at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, where he studies the sociology of science, organizational sociology, and workplace culture. Tim’s research focuses on interdisciplinarity, research collaboration, and the commercialization of the academic sector. He is currently collecting data for his dissertation, an ethnography following the for-mation of an interdisciplinary research center.

CONTRIBUTORS xxxix

Andrea Schneiker is Professor of Political Science at the University of Siegen, Germany. Her research focuses on non-state actors in international security, especially on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private military and security companies. Her articles have appeared in Millennium, Comparative European Politics, Security Dialogue, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Disasters, and VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations.

Matthias Schulze is a PhD student and research assistant and the Friedrich- Schiller Universität and works at the intersection of International Relations, Sociology and Science and Technology studies. His PhD thesis is titled ‘From Cyberutopia to Cyberwar. Normative change in Cyberspace’. His research areas are Internet governance, cybersecurity, constructivism, and research methods in the social sciences.

Max Stephenson Jr. is Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Tech, and Director of the Virginia Tech Institute for Policy and Governance. His research interests include humanitarian relief and collaborative governance, NGOs, and peacebuild-ing, and the arts and community change. His most recent book (with Scott Tate) is Arts and Community Change: Exploring Cultural Development Policies, Practices and Dilemmas (2015).

Frank Wendler is currently a German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) Acting Assistant Professor at the University of Washington, Seattle. He holds his PhD from the University of Gottingen, Germany, and held postdoc posi-tions at the University of Maastricht, The Netherlands, and Frankfurt am Main, Germany. His research focuses on regulatory policy-making and civil society involvement in the EU, and the comparative analysis of responses to European integration at the level of parliamentary and party politics in the EU Member States.

Melissa E. Wooten is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, where she studies the ways in which racial inequality operates within organizational fields. Recent publications include In the Face of Inequality: How Black Colleges Adapt (2015).

Marie  Wu is a doctoral candidate in the Sociology Department at the University of Minnesota Twin Cities, where she has also earned master’s degrees in History and Sociology. Her dissertation research focuses on the intersection of race mixing and crime victimization in the modern USA.

1© The Author(s) 2016J.A. Koops, R. Biermann (eds.), Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-36039-7_1

1 INTRODUCTION

Are we currently witnessing an ‘inter-organizational turn’ in world politics and in the discipline of International Relations (IR)? An increasing number of schol-ars have, particularly since the early 2000s, examined an expanding number of instances of interaction between international organizations across a broad range of policy fields. While the phenomenon of inter-organizational relations is not a new one and can be traced back to at least the foundation of the League of Nations and its ‘associated organizations’ in 1919, the recent interest in cooperation among major international organizations has its roots in Cold War and post-Cold War developments at both the empirical and conceptual level.1

Chief among those developments have been the sheer growth of International Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), and even more of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the last 100 years and their increasing cooperation, the task expansion of major organizations in order to address a wider and more demanding range of policy challenges as well as the rise of a global policy agenda that has increasingly linked up previously distinct policy fields—hence the emergence of concepts such as ‘sustainable develop-ment’ (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987; UNCED 1992), ‘peacebuilding’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992), ‘human security’(UNDP 1994),

Studying Relations Among International Organizations in World Politics: Core Concepts

and Challenges

Rafael Biermann and Joachim A. Koops

CHAPTER 1

R. Biermann (*)Institute for Political Science, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany

J.A. Koops Vesalius College, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) and Global Governance Institute, Brussels, Belgium

the ‘security-development nexus’ (OECD 2001) or the rise of ‘conditionality’ (e.g. between international monetary policies and development aid, see IMF-World Bank 1989; IMF 2015). These changes, particularly in the field of peace and security in Europe during the 1990s as well as on the African continent and in South-Central Asia during the first decade of the 2000s, led to the promotion of inter-organizational concepts such as ‘interlocking insti-tutions’ (NATO 1991, par. 3) and ‘mutually reinforcing institutions’ (CSCE 1992, par. 23), which were later supplanted by the concepts which are today most widely known as the ‘comprehensive’ or ‘integrated approach’ (Major and Moelling 2009). On the national level, similar concepts, in particular the ‘whole of government approach’, aim at strengthening coordination among government agencies. More recently, the European Union launched its own version of inter-organizational cooperation with the policy-concept of ‘effec-tive multilateralism’, sparking wider interest among European Studies scholars (Wouters et al. 2006; Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Jørgensen 2009; Kissack 2010; Koops 2011; Drieskens and Van Schaik 2014).

These policy concepts, which link issues and thus oblige responsible orga-nizations to manage them, have led to the general expectation and wider calls to increase the cooperation between international organizations in order to maximize collective problem-solving in world politics. In this vein, achieving policy coherence and synergies between governmental and non-governmental organizations has been identified as one of the core challenges of global gover-nance (Ohanyan 2008, p. 99; Karns and Mingst 2010).

Yet, despite the ubiquity of think tank and policy-oriented discussions related to cooperation between international organizations, the analysis of inter- organizational relations from a more theoretical as well as distinct ‘world politics’ perspective has only emerged during the last decade more forcefully. While the first systematic theoretical explorations of relations between organi-zations were carried out in the fields of management science and administra-tion studies from the early 1960s (see in particular Evan 1965; Thompson 1967; Van den Ven 1976)2 and in sociology (Emerson 1962; Guetzkow 1966; Knoke and Rogers 1979; Galaskiewicz 1985), it was only slowly imported into political science and International Relations (IR) through the seminal works of Kenneth Hanf and Fritz Scharpf (1978) as well as Leon Gordenker and Paul Saunders (1978), Cox and Jacobson (1973), Karen A.  Mingst (1987), and Christer Jönsson (1986, 1987, 1993), respectively. Still, despite the growing interest among IR scholars, theory-driven approaches remain dominated by economic, sociological, management science, and (public) administration sci-ence perspectives (see Lipson, this Handbook). Rather tellingly, in the recently published seminal Oxford Handbook of Inter-organizational Relations (Cropper et al. 2008), only one chapter is dedicated to political science approaches—with four pages devoted to IR and foreign aid aspects (Knoke and Chen 2008, pp. 456–459).

It is in this context of growing empirical and policy-oriented interest, but relative lack of a systematic investigation of conceptual and theoretical analysis from a distinct IR or ‘world politics’ perspective that this Palgrave Handbook

2 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

of Inter-organizational Relations in World Politics seeks to fill a gap in the literature. The main aim of the Handbook is to explore the emergence, nature, impact, and core processes of inter-organizational relations in global politi-cal affairs by situating the issue of relations among organizations within the discipline of IR, introducing core theoretical and conceptual approaches and surveying the major issue areas in which organizations cooperate today.

This introductory chapter seeks to set the stage for this Handbook and is structured as follows. The next section will clarify what we mean by ‘inter- organizational relations’ and explore different definitions and dimensions of the concept and empirical phenomenon. This section will also introduce our understanding of ‘international organizations’ and compare and contrast it with ‘regime’ approaches. The third section explains the growth of interaction among international organizations since 1945, pointing in particular to the proliferation of international organizations, their task expansion, issue-linkage, and political shocks as causal factors; the section also elucidates major ratio-nalist and constructivist stimuli for individual organizations to cooperate and discusses the explanatory power of various levels of analysis. Section 4 focuses on cooperation and competition among organizations, ending with some con-siderations about how to manage relations beneficially. Section 5, starting from the insight that studies about the effectiveness of inter-organizational coopera-tion are lacking, offers specific recommendations of how to analyze systemati-cally the effectiveness of partnerships, while Section 6 flags up major theoretical and methodological challenges for students of inter-organizational relations. Finally, Section 7 introduces the approach and structure of this Handbook.

2 CONCEPTUALIZING INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS: DEFINITIONS, DEMARCATIONS, AND CORE DIMENSIONS

In this section, we provide a concise overview of the main definitions, elements, and forms of inter-organizational relations (IOR). We also seek to draw com-parisons, where appropriate, between different strands of the management and administrative studies literature, sociological approaches and regime theory.

2.1 Defining Inter-Organizational Relations

On the most basic level, inter-organizational relations can be defined as the interaction between two or more organizations (Biermann 2011, p.  173; Koops 2013, p. 72). They take place in various configurations, ranging from dyads and triads to organizational fields and networks (Wooten and Sacco as well as Schulze and Ries, this Handbook). Scholars investigate the interaction among (inter)governmental organizations, among non-governmental organi-zations and among both types, including public–private partnerships (PPPs). Organizations might also be ‘nested’ into one another, for example embed-ded in other broader and encompassing organizations, and interact within that organization (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, this Handbook).3 Today, interaction occurs across the entire spectrum of issue areas in global governance.

STUDYING RELATIONS AMONG INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD... 3

‘Inter-organizationalism’, or the study of IOR, ‘is concerned with under-standing the character, pattern, origins, rationale, and consequences of such relationships’ (Cropper et al. 2008, p. 4). Inter-organizational relations are par-ticularly relevant when different actors converge in a given policy field and seek to address a policy problem jointly. In this sense, the study of inter- organizational relations is also concerned with the processes and dynamics of achieving ‘policy coordination’ between organizations in order to tackle a particular problem in world politics more effectively. Such relationships can be formal or informal and interaction can be direct or indirect or a combination of both (Biermann 2009, p. 7; Lomi et  al. 2008, p. 314). In this light, depending on the theoretical perspective or discipline, IOR have also been referred to as ‘partnerships’ (e.g. UN-regional organization partnerships), ‘inter-agency relations’ (between dif-ferent agencies or programs within the UN system), ‘alliances or joint ventures’ (from a management science and business studies perspective), ‘networks’ (from a sociological or network perspective), or indeed as ‘regime complexes’ (from a regime perspective when formal organizations manage a regime, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the non-proliferation regime).

An important aspect to keep in mind is that inter-organizational rela-tions take place at and across different levels (see chapter 9 by Koops, this Handbook). Interaction might take place on the international and the national level as well as across both levels. It can be both horizontal and thus heterar-chical (among principally equal and autonomous organizations, such as among international organizations or national ministries) or vertical and thus hier-archical (such as among ministries and their subordinate bodies). Our focus here is on the international level and thus on horizontal interaction among principally autonomous international organizations. The absence of hierar-chy and authority is a distinctive feature of interaction among international organizations. We are particularly interested in interaction between member states and their organs on the plenary and the working level, between inter-national secretariats, and between individuals representing member states or secretariats (especially ‘executive heads’). These boundary-spanning activities focus mainly on information processing and external representation. They vary in terms of centralization and might lead to establishing formal intra- and inter- organizational units organizing cooperation on a more permanent basis. Boundary spanners are pivotal in partnering efforts (see Biermann’s chapter on international bureaucracies, this Handbook). Due to the ‘open systems’ char-acter of international organizations, their interaction is embedded in structures and processes on the international level and thus influenced by developments and changes at the international system level. Thus, in order to fully under-stand inter-organizational relations, it is important to open the ‘black box’ of IOR, to examine the individual organizations cooperating and to assess the complex channels of interaction across the different levels, their institutional design as well as the variety of resources exchanged.

In order to achieve more clarity when it comes to definitions of inter- organizational relations, it is essential to explain what we mean by ‘international

4 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

organizations’ in the first place. While we, in line with inter-organizationalism so far, predominantly focus on IGOs in this Handbook, we see a strong need to explore more vigorously relations between International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs, see Schneiker in this Handbook) as well as between IGOs and INGOs (Härtel as well as Wendler, this Handbook). We are aware that in some issue areas networking primarily takes place among IGOs (such as in international finance), whereas in other areas NGOs play a major role, with multiple NGOs often coordinated by a lead or focal IGO (such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in refugee crises).

IGOs are defined as organizations ‘composed primarily of sovereign states, or of other international organizations. IGOs are established by treaty or other agreement that acts as a charter creating the group’ (Union of International Associations 2015).4 IR scholars of international organizations have added the further qualification that intergovernmental organizations have ‘actor-like qualities’ and resources (Hurd 2011, pp. 17 and 23; Reinalda 2009, p. 9; Cox and Jacobsen 1973, p. 7; Simmons and Martin 2002, p. 193) and at least a minimum degree of autonomous decision-making power embodied in its cen-tral institutions that are distinct from (though often dependent on) its member states (Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970, pp. 12–14; Jupille and Caporaso 1998, p.  27; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Indeed, since an inter-organizational perspective presumes at least some degree of ‘actorness’ of international orga-nizations and their staff, our definition of IGOs also follows those authors who add the requirement of ‘physical presence’, ‘brick and mortar headquarters’, and a permanent secretariat (Wallace and Singer 1970, pp.  245–47; Judge 1978; Archer 2001, p. 2; Reinalda 2009, p. 5). In this sense, we subscribe to the traditional definitions of IGOs as ‘formal technical and material organi-zations with physical equipment, machines, emblems, letterhead stationary, a staff [sic], an administrative hierarchy and so forth’ (Duverger 1972, p. 68).

2.2 Inter-Organizationalism and Regime Interaction

Our view on international organizations needs to be sharply distinguished from the broader umbrella concept of ‘institutions’, which has entered the IR theo-retical mainstream in the late 1970s and early 1980s via the research agenda on ‘regimes’ (Brown et al. 1977; Keohane and Nye 1977; Young 1980; Krasner 1983a). As Rittberger et al. (2012, p. 5) have argued, ‘international organiza-tions are a specific class of international institutions. In particular, two types of international institutions can be distinguished: international regimes and international organizations’. The concept of ‘regime’, which was introduced as a deliberate conceptual move away from the study of formal organizations, was defined in Stephen Krasner’s (1983b, p. 2) seminal edited volume as a set ‘of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making proce-dures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of interna-tional relations.’ Students of regimes were less interested in brick and mortar organizations, but rather in the ‘networks of rules, norms, and procedures

STUDYING RELATIONS AMONG INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD... 5

that regularize the behavior’ of actors in international affairs (Keohane and Nye 1977, p. 19). An increasing emphasis was placed on how regimes would facilitate the adoption, promotion, and implementation of international con-ventions, treaties, and long-term cooperation between states through shared principles and institutionalized norms. Formal brick and mortar international organizations no longer mattered per se in world politics, but only in so far as they contributed, alongside states and international law, to the promotion of a regime. In this context, ‘regimes’ also became synonymous with the term ‘social institutions’ (Haas 1983, p. 26). In the 1990s, the IR term ‘institution’ more and more superseded the regime concept (Simmons and Martin 2001, p. 194). ‘Institutions’ were often treated as ‘synonymous with regimes’ (Mearsheimer 1994/1995, p. 8). Confusingly, the same authors also applied the term ‘inter-national institutions’ to both formal organizations [such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the UN] and immaterial norms or principles (Mearsheimer, op.  cit., p.  6; see also Koremenos et  al. 2004; Gehring and Oberthür 2009). This drew heavy criticism, and the ‘organizational turn’ (Ellis 2010) we witness today in IR starts from a clearer demarcation of organiza-tions and regimes.

As a general rule, in this Handbook—unless otherwise explicitly defined by the contributors in their respective chapters—we mean by ‘institutions’ internal organs of formal organizations and refer to international organizations when we mean formal Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). International insti-tutions, in contrast, should be seen as an overarching umbrella term for both regimes and formal organizations. The main difference between international organizations and regimes is that international organizations possess a certain degree of actorness (Rittberger et al. 2012, p. 5).5

This conceptual demarcation, however, should not distract from the fact that theoretical insights and analytical tools associated with the regime research agenda can also be useful when analyzing the relations between formal inter-national organizations. Analyses of ‘regime complexes’, in particular, which are constituted by overlapping regimes (Raustiala and Victor 2004), provide some important insights for the study of relations between formal IGOs. Concepts such as ‘overlap’ offer a useful basis for bridging the current divide between the two approaches.

Indeed, unlike the formal IOR approach, a regime perspective allows to broaden the range of cases considered within inter-organizationalism. Thus, while the study of relations between IGOs begins with the interactions between the League of Nations and other IGOs,6 a regime complex approach could, for example, cover the rivalry between the Austro-German Telegraph Union (AGTU) formed in 1850 and the Western Europe Telegraph Union (WETU) formed in 1855 (Richardson 2015). While the rivalry between both regimes provides both an early and rich case of overlapping and competing compe-tences, the fact that both Unions lacked a permanent secretariat means that the case would fall through the analytical filter of a strict definition of IOR based on the requirement of a formal secretariat. Conversely, the general tendency of

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regime theory to downplay the role of formal organizations and the bureau-cratic and secretariat level means that many processes of inter-secretariat rela-tions go unnoticed.

The area in which cooperation among inter-organizationalism and regime research is most fruitful is where IGOs do affect one another meaningfully without interacting physically. Regime theory follows a broader and argu-ably vaguer understanding of ‘interaction’ (or what scholars more accurately sometimes call ‘interplay’), which focuses on how rules and norms of over-lapping regimes and their conventions, treaties, and agreements affect one another (Young 1996; Stokke 2000; Underdal and Young 2004; Gehring and Oberthür 2009). For regime theory, the understanding of ‘interaction’ is largely immaterial or ideational, diverging from common-sense understand-ings of physical interaction. This neglects the more actor-oriented focus of IOR. Alexander (1995, p. 5) warns that it ‘dilutes the concept [of interaction, the authors] to the point of making it almost meaningless’ since almost every behavior is ‘interaction’ in this sense. However, IOR researchers are beginning to recognize that organizations do often impact one another without direct physical contact, and that this dimension cannot simply be negated (Joachim et al. 2009; Joachim and Schneiker 2013). Conversely, more recent work on ‘institutional interaction’ or ‘institutional complexity’ has also aimed at mov-ing regime complex research closer toward approaches that emphasize the role and effect of international organizations within regimes, thereby facilitating ‘communication among scholars and practitioners from various disciplines’ (Oberthür and Stokke 2011, p. 3).

One major causal factor generating interplay among organizations with-out requiring physical interaction is domain expansion. According to the bureaucratic politics approach (Halperin 1974) and to resource dependence theory (Levine and White 1961), domains delimit the scope of an organiza-tion’s functional and geographic responsibility. Organizations might unilater-ally expand into the domain of others and impact another organization with little or no coordination. This might be accidental and even unintended or not (Koops 2012a, p. 72). When organizations expand their domains by dupli-cating another organization’s mandates or tasks, they affect the relevance of the other organization, stimulating domain conflicts which might be expressed in more or less vocal charges about the encroachment and infringement of domains. Thus, the development of the European Union’s Battlegroups from 2003 onwards directly contributed to the demise of the UN’s Standby High Readiness Brigade in 2009, since member states belonging to both orga-nizations diverted resources from the UN Brigade to the EU battlegroups (Koops 2007, 2011). Similarly, the European Union’s regional trade agree-ment approach to African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries had an adverse effect on the regional integration efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that the EU, according to Muntschick (2012), pro-moted with full knowledge of the negative indirect inter-organizational effects. Similar arguments have been advanced on the global-regional level: scholars,

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such as Vinod Aggarwal and Edward Fogarty (2004), have raised the point that the EU’s pursuit of institutionalized trade cooperation with other regional organizations might come into conflict with global World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, thereby indirectly undermining the WTO and its trade regime (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004).

However, there might also be a more or less explicit domain consensus. The Eastern enlargement policies of NATO and the European Union during the 1990s and early 2000s had a mutually reinforcing effect on the reforms of prospective member states, without any formal coordination having taken place between both organizations (Schimmelfennig 2003). Furthermore, organizations might impact one another by the simple virtue of their ‘pres-ence’ in an organizational environment. In fact, the ‘population ecology’ approach assesses the impact of relations between organizations in terms of niche overlaps’ effects on survival (Ries, this Handbook). While most contri-butions in this Handbook focus on direct interaction in the common-sense notion, some authors do discuss such indirect effects organizations might have on one another, such as legitimation (Biermann, this Handbook). While keep-ing both versions of ‘interaction’ distinct, we advise to join forces with regime scholars to explore synergies between IOs and regimes interacting in this non-material sense.

Overall, while this section sought to provide definitional clarity on the meaning and scope of inter-organizational relations, in this Handbook we aim at advancing an open-minded approach allowing conceptual plurality and the possibility of relaxing, on a case-by-case basis, some definitional frames. The goal is to test the explanatory power of alternative theoretical perspectives. Our main focus is on those organizations that actively and deliberately pur-sue cooperation, often via institutionalized arrangements, in order to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. This perspective stresses intentionality, power, and control. However, we also pay attention, and indeed would like to stimu-late approaches which investigate the voluntary mutual adjustment of organi-zations inspired by the activities, structures, or ideas of other organizations, intentionally or not. This understanding of interaction is both more inclusive and elusive.

2.3 Features, Forms, and Attributes of Inter-Organizational Relations

After having clarified the basic definition of inter-organizational relations, this section outlines the main features, forms, and attributes of IORs researchers should keep in mind when examining the interaction between IGOs.

2.3.1 Material Versus Immaterial RelationsClosely linked to our discussion of the usage of the term ‘interaction’ in inter- organizationalism and regime theory, inter-organizational relations can take the form of material or immaterial, for example ideational or norm-based,

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relations. This is closely linked to the broad conceptualization of resources in resource dependence theory, which perceives resource exchange as the core activity of inter-organizational relations and distinguishes material (tangible) and symbolic (intangible) resources (Biermann and Harsch, this Handbook). In other words, interaction can be based on physical relations, such as meet-ings between the staff from two organizations, the signing of a cooperation agreement, or joint projects in the field. Interaction can also be based on non- material exchange, such as relying on another organization’s reputation and legitimacy or forming an organizational identity via inter-organizational dis-course. Closely related, Cropper et al. (2008, p. 11) distinguish between ‘inter-active relationships, for instance, in the exchange of information or resources’ and ‘non-interactive relationships’ when organizations ‘share particular attri-butes, such as status, identity [or] cognitive structures.’

Indeed, various EU scholars have pointed out that the EU’s evolution as an international actor and the promotion of its international identity was inspired by a UN-focused inter-organizational discourse, based on the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ (Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Jørgensen 2009; Tardy 2009; Koops 2011). Similarly, despite the absence of physical interaction throughout the Cold War, regional organizations and even collective defense alliances such as the NATO ensured that its founding treaties contained ample legitimizing references to the global role of the United Nations (Yost 2007; Kaplan 1998, 2010). When exploring relations between IGOs, both material and ideational or normative dimensions need to be kept in mind.

2.3.2 Degrees of FormalizationRelations between two or more IGOs can develop along a continuum of for-mal or informal channels of interaction (see also Dijkstra in this Handbook on formalization). Formal relations are based on at least a minimum level of insti-tutionalization. One-off or ad hoc relations often occur at the beginning of an inter-organizational life cycle (IOLC) or are deliberately pursued when formal channels are blocked or the open pursuit of cooperation is politically sensitive. This has been in particular the case in EU-NATO relations since 2004 where for-mal cooperation channels have been paralyzed (Reichard 2006; Kupferschmidt 2006; Biermann 2008, 2015; Varwick and Koops 2009). Relations are often institutionalized via a variety of instruments, such as memoranda of under-standing, joint declarations, liaison arrangements, or joint working groups. An important question to explore is the extent to which a high degree of institu-tionalization might facilitate or hinder the effectiveness and efficiency of inter-organizational cooperation. While IORs in general appear to exhibit a tendency toward institutionalization, practitioners increasingly criticize the inefficien-cies produced by the multitude of hardly productive gather- all coordination meetings (see also Härtel, this Handbook). Furthermore, depending on the level of analysis—member state, bureaucratic, or individual level—informal interaction might be the preferred strategy for ‘getting things done’. In this light, staff members at the secretariat level sometimes deliberately cooperate

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across organizational boundaries ‘below the member state radar’, increasing their own autonomy by avoiding political interference from key member states (Biermann 2015). Thus, we need to explore systematically under which condi-tions institutionalization might yield more favorable outcomes than informal relations and vice versa.

2.3.3 Frequency, Quality, and Duration of InteractionImportant indicators for determining the ‘maturity’ of inter-organizational relations are the frequency, duration, and intensity of interaction. According to Biermann (2008, p. 161), mature dyads have at least four characteristics: ‘(1) regular intense contacts; (2) formal and informal rules of behavior; (3) regular channels of cooperation of varying formalization; and (4) long-term orientations as opposed to ad hoc cooperation.’ While good working relations between ‘executive heads’ are of crucial importance for initiating and main-taining inter-organizational relations (Varwick and Koops 2009, pp. 115–117; Reinalda and Kille, this Handbook), regular exchange between secretariat staff at working level is vital for deepening mutual understanding of the counter-part’s organizational culture and modus operandi (Biermann on the bureaucra-cies, this Handbook). While frequency of interaction can be an indicator for a strong inter-organizational relationship, the quality of exchanges, the level of preparation and participation, and the strategic focus of meetings as well as their output are crucial (Gawrich, this Handbook).

Moreover, inter-organizational relations may vary in terms of duration. Two or more organizations might cooperate on a specific project or program for a specified, restricted time period. Jones and Lichtenstein (2008, p. 232) argue that these temporary inter-organizational projects ‘exist for a limited period of time designated by a pre-established end point in order to carry out pre- specified goals; when these goals are completed, the project organization liter-ally dissolves’. Similarly, the management literature refers to ‘action-sets’ when multiple organizations form a temporary partnership that ends once the collec-tive goal is achieved (Wooten and Sacco, this Handbook).

While most examples of an IO project approach in the inter-organizational literature can be found in business alliances or PPPs, the concepts of tem-porary inter-organizational projects and action-sets can also be applied to world politics. For example, cooperation in humanitarian crises or disaster relief is often strongly project-oriented (Moynihan 2005; Stephenson, this Handbook). Joanne McEvoy discusses action-sets in peacebuilding in this volume, specifically in Bosnia and Kosovo. The cumulative effect of repeated concrete inter-organizational projects might lead to more institutionalized long-term cooperation by inspiring shared understandings within and among organizations (Jones and Lichtenstein 2008, p. 233). Yet, the precise condi-tions for success or failure still need to be explored further.

2.3.4 Secretariat and Field PerspectivesOrganizations cooperate among the Secretariats and in the field, where head-quarters often exist at various regional and local levels (e.g. in UN operations).

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The former we might call the institutional level, the field the operational level. Secretariats interact closely with the member states, need to maintain a political focus, and are engaged, inter alia, in negotiating various kinds of agreements, exchanging information and personnel, forming working groups, and holding joint meetings. They are concerned with the politics of inter-organizational relations and with the institutionalization of relations—including formal con-tractual relations, coordination mechanisms, and rules and norms of coopera-tion. In the field, the operational perspective dominates. It is about finding and promoting practical solutions for joint problems, which inspires cooperation even if the political level is at odds (Biermann 2015). Overall, the intensity of cooperation might diverge on the Secretariat and the field level, and the amount of field-level cooperation varies strongly among organizations.

First contacts are often made on an ad hoc basis at the field level. Depending on the degree of (perceived) success and inter-organizational learning, interac-tion can either trigger a deepening of inter-organizational relations or mutual alienation, leading to inter-organizational rivalry. The joint ‘Troika’ missions in the context of the Greek debt crisis since 2010, organized by staff from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB), gave rise to both strong learning at field and headquarters level, but also revealed fundamental differences in approaches, which were caused both by differing organizational cultures at field and Secretariat levels as well as by political pressure exerted by member states (Koops and Tolksdorf 2015). Thus, the output of cooperation among organi-zations is influenced by the political preferences of actors at different levels of the inter-organizational relationship. The inter-organizational feedback loop between formal agreements at member state and Secretariat level, implementa-tion in the field and readjustment again at the Secretariat level deserves closer investigation. Obviously, there are both Secretariat-driven and field-driven cooperation patterns and top-down as well as bottom-up processes of interac-tion. The efficiency and effectiveness of the interplay between the institutional and operational levels affect a partnership’s overall impact.

2.3.5 Goals of Inter-Organizational CooperationScholars and practitioners can refer to IOR either as an ongoing process, an end in itself or, indeed, as a first step and means to broader ends. First, inter- organizational relations can be understood as an ongoing multifaceted pro-cess involving a variety of actors who are addressing complex issues over time. In this most widely adopted view, IOR begin with initial formation dynam-ics, are increasingly formalized and deepen in scope and intensity over time. They require careful strategic management (Klijn 2008; Tjemkes et al. 2012) and improving interventions (Gray 2008) in a context of absence of clear hierarchies and ‘top-down’ coordination. Thus, from this perspective, most dimensions of inter-organizational relations relate to processes of relationship formation, coordination, joint implementation, partnership adjustments, and improvements (in the best-case scenario) or to rivalry formation, conflict epi-sodes, and dissolution (in the worst-case scenario).

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Second, inter-organizational cooperation can also be viewed as an end in itself. ‘Partnering’ (or ‘teaming’) has become ‘an emerging norm of good gov-ernance in international affairs’ (Biermann 2011, p. 174). It is a good thing and itself to be promoted. Many official documents and pronouncements treat cooperation and coherence as a policy objective in itself (de Coning and Friis 2011, p. 244). Indeed, much of the policy-oriented debate during the early 2000s on the ‘comprehensive approach’ follows such a notion. This becomes problematic in so far as too much energy might be spent on achieving coor-dination without considering what a partnership should or could achieve bet-ter collectively rather than separately. This ‘end in itself ’ perspective is also a widespread paradigm (or temptation) among scholars guiding research, despite Keohane’s (1984, pp. 79–80) early insight that cooperation is not always supe-rior, neither from an effectiveness nor from an ethical point of view. Unless we clearly investigate the added value of partnering, we risk decoupling normative imperative from empirical reality. Linking research questions on how coordi-nation can be improved with the wider issue of whether (or how) improved coordination could lead to more effective outcome and impact would help alleviate this concern.

Third, and in contrast to the previous perspective, inter-organizational rela-tions can be understood as means or tools to broader ends. Cooperation among organizations aims at improved problem-solving in a given issue area, includ-ing the added value achieved through merging complementary competences and avoiding costly duplication in order to free resources for other activities (Smithers 1979). While this perspective is most obvious from a ‘global gover-nance’ perspective, it is difficult to implement given the self-centeredness of many organizations. Researching goal attainment also raises a wide range of methodological challenges, which we discuss below. So far, there have been very few studies that systematically analyze whether an inter-organizational response to a particular problem yields in fact a more effective outcome ‘on the ground’ than a disjointed approach. More studies focus on the adverse and negative effects of lack of coordination than on the positive effects in terms of measurable impact.

3 THE GROWTH OF THE PARTNERING PARADIGM AND THE FORMATION OF PARTNERSHIPS

Why do we see the growth of inter-organizational partnerships worldwide? And why do organizations start interacting? Both questions are interlinked, yet distinct. The first question assumes a growth which much of the literature implies, but rarely investigates empirically so far. Even though we still lack a macro-historic study investigating how (much) the cooperation among the almost 250 intergovernmental organizations existing today has evolved over time, preliminary research results suggest that inter-organizational relations have indeed markedly increased. Seemingly, the incentives to cooperate have grown, both on the system level of global governance and on the unit level of

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individual organizations, which leads us to the second question, which is far more investigated in the current research.

Subsequently, we will focus on the first question while discussing the second briefly thereafter. Thus, first we reflect on several system-level factors, which stimulate the rise of contemporary inter-organizational relations in global poli-tics, before considering those unit-level factors which inspire individual orga-nizations to cooperate, focusing on rationalist and constructivist explanations and pointing to the need for cross-level analysis (see also the chapter 9 by Koops in this Handbook).

The key argument is that several global changes have stimulated interna-tional organizations to cooperate, in particular the proliferation of IGOs since the 1960s (or what we call actor proliferation), the expansion of their domains (task expansion), the magnitude of the challenges they face today (issue density), and the increasing inclination to link issues and thus the organizations respon-sible for them (issue-linkage). Growing issue density and duration, coupled with system shocks, have further motivated networking. The result is a grow-ing ‘domain similarity’ (Van de Ven 1976, p. 32; Biermann 2008, p. 156) or overlap among organizations, for example several organizations operating in the same domain and addressing similar policy issues.7 IOR and regime schol-ars regard overlap as the sine qua non for inter-organizational cooperation. If that is the case, then actor proliferation, task expansion, issue density, and issue-linkage are the sine qua non for overlap.

Overall, we intend to highlight the formation phase of what we might term the ‘inter-organizational life-cycle’ (IOLC). Following the literature on intra- organizational life cycles, we mean the evolution of an inter-organiza-tional relationship from initial formation to possible maturation, transforma-tion, demise and dissolution, pertaining both two dyads and entire networks (Biermann 2008, p. 144; Koops 2013, pp. 78–80). In this light, the IOLC covers all major evolutionary processes and stages of relationship development between partner organizations (Jap and Anderson 2007, p. 262; see also Smith Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Lomi et al. 2008).8 While we have to keep in mind that durations might strongly vary (see our discussion of temporary projects above), that the sequence of stages might diverge across cases and that vectors of cooperation and rivalry might reverse, such a process-oriented perspective tracing relational dynamics over time is helpful to avoid snapshot analyses and recognize the interrelatedness of cooperation episodes across time.

3.1 Actor Proliferation, Task Expansion, and Issue-Linkage

On its most fundamental level, linkages between international organizations are first and foremost a result of the sharp increase in the number of IGOs since the nineteenth century. As Charles Kegley (2008, p. 163) put it, ‘a global trend in world politics is the spectacular growth of IGOs.’ In response to increasing international challenges, the number of IGOs grew from a mere 37 in 1909 to 154  in 1960 and a peak of nearly 380 IGOs in the mid-1980s (see also

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Archer et al. 2001, p. 271; Claude 1966, p. 4). By 2014, the number of IGOs declined to a total of 266 (Union of International Associations 2014, p. 25). This decline has been attributed, inter alia, to the post-Cold War dissolution and demise of organizations (such as the Warsaw Treaty Organization) and to mergers of formerly independent IGOs [such as the incorporation of the West European Union (WEU) into the European Union]. Yet, despite the recent relative decline in numbers, the rise of IGOs in absolute terms during the last 100 years remains one of the most important changes in world politics. Indeed, Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst (2010, p. 56) have argued, ‘the proliferation of actors in global governance has made it imperative to study interorganiza-tional relations’ in the first place. The major reason is that, as Christer Jönsson points out in this Handbook, ‘the proliferation of international organizations entails increasing interplay and overlap’ (see also Raustiala and Victor 2004, p. 278; Shanks et al. 1996), a topic to which we turn to in the next chapter.

A second system-level factor inspiring inter-organizational cooperation is observable, in particular, since the end of the Cold War structure of IR.  It ended the rather rigid division of labor between international organizations. Existing organizations sought to expand their functional scope—both in order to address newly emerging challenges and to prove to their stakeholders (e.g. member states) their continuing relevance. Thus, the NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the long-dormant WEU, and the European Union all strove to expand their functional scope into the emerg-ing field of ‘military crisis management.’ As a comprehensive analysis of staff growth in international organizations between 1950 and 2001 has highlighted, the significant increase of IGO staff over these decades is also an indicator of the significant ‘task expansion’ of individual IGOs (Vaubel et al. 2007, p. 276). Thus, the driving forces behind the growth of inter-organizational relations cannot only be linked to the numerical growth of IGOs, but also to the signifi-cant task expansion of most organizations—meaning that more organizations are addressing the same or similar policy challenges (Smithers 1979, p. 18).

Third, we also witness a period where challenges such as global financial crises, pandemics, climate change, refugee crises, or peacebuilding endeavors seem to increasingly exceed the resources of individual states or organizations, necessitating an orchestrated response. This task intensification stimulates resource pooling and provision as well as division of labor, allowing actors to share tasks and responsibilities (Biermann 2008). For example, the number and nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War era have placed substantive strains on the UN peacekeeping system, pushing the UN Secretariat into cooperation with regional organizations (Koops and Tardy 2015).

Closely connected, the post-Cold War era has increased awareness that different policy fields are closely linked and can only be tackled holistically. Naturally, issue-linkage requires from all involved actors to close ranks. Thus, the idea of a ‘security-development nexus’ has inspired ‘hard’ security organi-zations to link up with development actors (see OECD 2001; Picciotto 2004; Chandler 2007; Koops 2008). Likewise, the idea of ‘sustainable development’

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has linked those organizations focusing on economic growth to organizations focusing on developmental and environmental policies (Hopwood et al. 2005; see also the chapters by Margulis and Biedenkopf in this Handbook). And as international monetary and development policies have become more deeply intertwined, the IMF, the World Bank Group, and regional development banks are tasked to coordinate more closely (see Freytag and Kirton, this Handbook). Perhaps most comprehensively, the concept of ‘human security’ today explic-itly links the dimensions of ‘economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, communal security [and] political security’ under one umbrella concept (UNDP 1994, pp. 24–25), while securi-tization of further policy fields such as energy further expands our comprehen-sive understanding of security today.

Issue-linkage has led to an expectation that organizations active in these fields cooperate. Governance concepts such as the ‘comprehensive approach’, the ‘integrated approach’, ‘joined-up’ approaches or ‘whole-of-system’, ‘holis-tic’ or ‘network’ approaches guide these endeavors. While these concepts have had important internal repercussions, requiring coordination among institu-tions within a government or organization, they have—of particular interest for the main theme of this Handbook—also strong external repercussions: requiring coordination or at least de-conflicting of policies of major interna-tional organizations and states engaged in these fields.

3.2 Issue Duration, Issue Density, and Political Shocks

Political shocks have been another system-level factor inspiring inter- organizational relations. While the Second World War prompted a first period of organizational formation in the late 1940s and 1950s (such as the creation of the UN, NATO, and the EC), the end of the Cold War ushered in a second phase of organizational formation and, even more, transformation. Biermann (2008) has identified ‘exogenous shocks’ as one major causal factor stimulat-ing the growth of organizations in general and of inter-organizational coop-eration, in particular. Shocks such as the World Wars, which can also occur at the regional level, can be defined as ‘a dramatic change in the international system or its subsystems that fundamentally alters the processes, relationships, and expectations that drive nation-state interaction’ (Diehl and Goertz 2001, p. 221).9 Shocks ‘may radically reorder relations between states, such that pre-vious impediments to cooperation are removed.’ They may ‘break down the barriers to the adoption of new policies’ and ‘place issues or policies on the global agenda’ (Diehl et al. 2007, p. 438). Similarly, the EU studies literature refers to structural changes, material as well as normative, in the international environment as ‘opportunities’ opening avenues for cooperation among inter-national organizations and other actors. According to Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (2006, p. 24), ‘opportunity denotes the external environ-ment of ideas and events—the context which frames and shapes EU action or inaction’, including both singular events such as the end of the Cold War

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or 11 September 2001 but also more long-term changes such as ‘economic interdependence’.

These concepts can be applied to inter-organizational relations (Biermann 2008, pp. 160–161; Jørgensen 2009; Varwick and Koops 2009; Koops 2011). Material and ideational change, especially when occurring in great rapidity, can facilitate the onset of interaction between organizations through the removal of previous barriers for cooperation. This road into cooperation is particularly open in settings of high issue density and issue duration. Biermann (2008) refers to Wallander and Keohane (1999, p. 31) who argue that states create institutions in environments of high issue density and issue durability. Issue density pertains to the number and importance of issues arising within a given policy space; issue duration refers to the length of time an issue remains unre-solved. Such settings exert strong pressure on international actors to act jointly since the scale of the problems preclude unilateral action as well as inaction, prompting states and organizations to engage in joint problem-solving. More specifically, Biermann (2008) argued that the end of the bipolar Cold War structure at the international level and the outbreak of the Balkan wars on the subregional level in the first half of the 1990s prompted the autonomy- guarding European security institutions to start cooperating seriously to end the Balkan wars. Likewise, the end of the Cold War and regional crises in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa spurred inter-organizational cooperation on the African continent (Cleaver and May 1995; Franke 2008, 2009; Gelot 2012) and between the United Nations and regional organiza-tions (Graham and Felicio 2006). More recently, the global financial crisis which turned into the Euro crisis triggered increasing cooperation among the international financial institutions (Freytag and Kirton, this Handbook) as well as between the IMF and regional organizations (Koops and Tolksdorf 2015).

3.3 Domain Similarity and Organizational Overlap

As a result of actor proliferation, task expansion, issue-linkage, and political shocks, organizations have moved into the same policy space, or in organi-zational ecology parlance, compete in an increasingly crowded environment for visibility, resources, and survival (Ries, this Handbook). This in turn poses serious challenges for inter-organizational coordination or at least for avoiding duplication and outright competition. Quite plainly, the more organizations exist, the more they expand their scope of activities and the more the issues they address are perceived as interdependent the more overlapping compe-tences we should expect inspiring cooperation and rivalry (Biermann 2007; Hofmann 2009, 2011; Jupille et al. 2013).

‘Domain similarity’, which, as already introduced, implies several organi-zations operating in the same domain and addressing similar policy issues, is similar, but not identical to organizational overlap. Domain similarity is the term used in IOR studies of management and sociology; overlap is preferred in the regime interaction and international organization literature.10 Domain

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similarity corresponds to two dimensions of organizational overlap, namely functional overlap when organizations pursue the same or very similar tasks and mandates and geographic overlap when organizations are active in the same regions. There are two other, but interrelated dimensions of overlap: overlapping membership when states are members in several cooperating orga-nizations and overlapping resources when organizations share the same or sim-ilar resources (see also Smithers 1979, pp. 25–26; Biermann 2007; Hofmann 2007, 2009). The emergence of overlap can spur organizations both to com-pete and to seek cooperation. If there is not at least one dimension of ‘overlap’ between organizations (most commonly functional and geographic overlap), then the onset of meaningful interaction between organizations is unlikely.

Thus, overlap might inspire both, cooperation and rivalry. The result is domain consensus or domain conflict (Biermann and Harsch, this Handbook). We do not know yet, however, when overlap leads to cooperation and when to rivalry. The options of organizational choice and forum shopping are major factors inspiring rivalry (Biermann 2007; Jupille et al. 2013). As early as in the mid-1960s, the growth of international organizations in Europe with overlap-ping membership prompted the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe to complain about a ‘disorderly jungle of intergovernmental organizations, work-ing largely in isolation and frequently in competition’ (Smithers 1979, p. 14). In fact, Smithers warned member states already in 1966 in a confidential com-muniqué entitled Duplication and Co-operation Between Organizations about ‘the imperious necessity to make some progress in the long and arduous task of giving a more coherent structure to the growth and development of inter-national organizations’ (cited in Smithers 1979, p. 30).

3.4 Rationalist and Constructivist Accounts of Partnership Formation

Beyond system-level explanations, there are unit-level explanations helping to understand why individual organizations start cooperating in specific sce-narios. Following Joachim et  al. (2015), we might discern rationalist and constructivist accounts. Rationalist accounts so far highlight resource depen-dence. As introduced in this Handbook by Biermann and Harsch (see also the chapters by Jönsson and Lipson in this Handbook), resource dependence theory has been developed by management scholars and sociologists inter-ested in understanding and explaining the onset and formation of for-profit and non-profit organizations. In its most basic form, the concept posits that organizations, following a utility-maximizing rationale, enter into relations of exchange because they need to access the resources of other organiza-tions (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Resource dependence particularly inten-sifies ‘in periods of scarce or declining resources’ (Aiken and Hage 1968). While business alliances or joint ventures are the most obvious examples in the field of business and economics (Evan 1965), cooperation between secu-rity organizations—in need of expertise, resources and legitimacy-providing

STUDYING RELATIONS AMONG INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD... 17

support—has been identified as one prominent case of resource dependence in IR (Biermann 2014; Harsch 2015). Ranging from the case of the EU’s access to NATO assets and capabilities under the ‘Berlin Plus arrangements’ of 2003 to the United Nation’s longstanding cooperation with regional organizations in peacekeeping (Koops and Tardy 2015) or the African Union’s cooperation with the European Union (Brosig, this Handbook), resource dependence is a powerful concept for explaining the initiation and maintenance of coopera-tion between organizations. Yet, the dependence on another organization’s resources might also have negative effects on the demandeur’s autonomy and power relationship vis-à-vis the resource supplying partner. ‘Autonomization’ (Koch 2006) might be the result, if the influence of the partner organizations is perceived as too strong. Thus, resource dependence stimulates both coop-eration and conflict.

Constructivist accounts stress ideational and normative factors facilitating or hindering cooperation. Research so far focuses on similar organizational cul-tures and normative frames and personal affinity or friction (Reinalda and Kille, this Handbook). This Handbook explores further factors: mutual attributions of (il)legitimacy (Biermann) and inter-organizational trust, particularly among boundary-spanning personnel (Brugger, Hasenclever and Kasten). For the lon-gevity and stability of inter-organizational partnerships, these factors help to institutionalize and habitualize inter-organizational relations up to the stage of ‘taken-for-grantedness’. More research is needed, though, to identify further factors, such as path dependence (Joachim and Schneiker 2013) or the ‘dual consensus rule’ (Biermann 2015), facilitating and undermining cooperation and exploring their interrelatedness under conditions of multicausality.

3.5 Multilevel Analysis of Inter-Organizational Formation

If we aspire to explain the life cycle of inter-organizational relations, we need to consider factors located on all the levels of analysis relevant for inter- organizational relations: individuals (especially, but not only high-ranking boundary spanners), the different member states and their domestic settings, the international bureaucracies including inter-institutional (e.g. inter- secretariat) relations, all of which are influenced by system-level factors of the international environment such as ‘opportunities’ and shocks (Koops, this Handbook). When assessing factors promoting or hindering inter- organizational relations, ‘opening the black box’ of organizations and investigating cross-level processes provides greater clarity.

Thus, as highlighted in the chapter by Bob Reinalda and Kent Kille, con-tacts are often forged by senior leaders or ‘executive heads’ (Cox 1973) at headquarters or field level. For example, the initial preparations for the far- reaching EU-NATO ‘Berlin Plus Agreements’ were advanced by the excel-lent relationship between NATO’s Secretary-General George Robertson and the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana (Varwick and Koops 2009). In contrast, the impetus for the formalization of relations between the United

18 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

Nations and the European Union in the area of military crisis management came from a member state, namely Italy (on behalf of the EU Presidency), and from an individual, Kofi Annan, the UN’s Secretary-General at the time. Yet, the initial motivation for this institutionalization was less due to a desire to establish a far-reaching partnership, but rather more mundanely the aim of Silvio Berlusconi to secure a high visibility ‘photo opportunity’ with the UN Secretary-General (Koops, this Handbook). Thus, we should be prepared to assess factors on all levels of analysis if we want to understand the formation of particular partnerships.

4 COOPERATION, COMPETITION, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF RELATIONS

Most research on inter-organizational relations focuses on the actual processes of interaction, once initial contact has been established. Scholars have tried to shed light on how organizations structure their relationships on the strengths and weaknesses of partnerships and how to improve coordination. One of the most frequently addressed and important issues (both for theory, but in particular for policy-oriented application) has been the balance of ‘coopera-tion vs. rivalry’ between international organizations. In the following section, we outline some of the core concepts, which draw on research strands and advances made within the sub-fields of inter-organizationalism and regime theory. Interaction can take the form of direct or indirect, material or immate-rial processes. While inter-organizational research has focused on direct physi-cal ‘cooperation and rivalry’ between organizations, considering both material and immaterial processes, research on ‘interplay’ or ‘regime complexity’ has focused on the indirect and immaterial interconnections between different normative and legal frameworks in the form of ‘synergy and conflict’ or ‘dis-ruption’ of treaty frameworks (Oberthür and Gehring 2011, pp. 31–32; Haas et al. 1993). Yet, despite these differences, important insights can be gained from both approaches.

4.1 Inter-Organizational Cooperation

The literature on ‘cooperation’ is truly interdisciplinary in scope. Depending on the level of analysis and actor-focus, ranging from cooperation between firms to cooperation between groups to cooperation between political entities, a wide range of studies have emerged in the fields of economics, psychology and anthropology, sociology and political science, respectively (Smith et  al. 1995). In IR, the cooperation literature has been dominated by authors and approaches linked to regime theory. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of theorists base their definitions in one form or another on Robert Keohane’s seminal work After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (2005 [1984]; but see also Axelrod 1984 for an equally influential definition). The most popular and applied part of his definition relates to

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intergovernmental cooperation: ‘intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a pro-cess of policy coordination’ (pp. 51–52).

However, lesser known is Keohane’s definition of cooperation one paragraph before, which is broader and does not only focus on coordination between states but includes individuals and organizations: ‘Cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations  – which are not in pre- existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as “policy coordination”’ (Keohane 2005 [1984], p. 51, emphasis added).

This basic definition can be easily applied to the realm of inter- organizational relations. ‘Policy coordination’ implies adjustments of policies in order to pur-sue joint gains. Interests might be pursued autonomously or through coopera-tion, depending on the cost–benefit calculus of actors who are perceived as utility maximizers by rational institutionalist, or on normative considerations as sociological institutionalists add (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Cooperation is more likely, according to Keohane, in dense policy spaces or, put differently: the more interdependence exists the more cooperation we see.

For Keohane, the act and process of cooperation also imply that there is, instead of a condition of pre-existing harmony of goals between two actors, a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests. Thus, there is a situation of actual or potential conflict between actors and their policies. Cooperation is always accompanied by potential conflict that needs to be overcome or, ‘without the specter of conflict, there is no need to cooperate’ (Keohane 2005 [1984], p. 54). Joseph Grieco (1990, p. 22) follows this line by defining inter-national cooperation as the ‘voluntary adjustment by states of their policies so that they manage their differences and reach some mutually beneficial out-come.’ In other words, the default condition between two organizations is not ‘harmony’ but potential or actual conflict that needs to be actively overcome through a variety of trust-building initiatives and policies. Thus, ‘rivalry is more widespread than the cooperation rhetoric of organizations make us believe’ (Biermann 2008, p. 155). Consequently, policy concepts such as ‘interlocking institutions’ or ‘mutually reinforcing institutions’ might be slightly misleading. Cooperation between organizations is not an automatic or almost natural incli-nation of organizations to cooperate, but rather a significant challenge, which requires serious efforts.

In the management studies and sociological literature on inter- organizational relations, cooperation is more frequently referred to as ‘collaboration’, which denotes both a process and particular form of an inter-organizational relation-ship. Lotia and Hardy (2008, pp. 368–371) distinguish different perspectives highlighted in the literature:

– the management of uncertainty and the promotion of a joint competi-tive advantage11

20 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

– resource exchange or the process of ‘joining together otherwise auton-omous organizations for joint production, provision or allocation of resources or activities’ (Akinbode and Clark 1976, p. 102)

– networking, in particular the quest of organizations to increase their centrality within networks

– a process aimed at gaining legitimacy and political credibility, and – joint ‘problem solving’ in order to achieve outcomes that would have

been impossible to achieve by the organizations separately, a process complicated by vested interests, power imbalances and conflicts of interest.

As outlined above, one of the most frequent stimuli for cooperation is the need to access material or immaterial resources other organizations hold. Resources can range from personnel, equipment and financing to knowledge, expertise, procedures or legitimacy-providing speech acts. Cooperation can even take the form of co-locating staff in order to facilitate coordination, exchange informa-tion, and build trust. Indeed, the practice of deploying in an ad hoc fashion ‘liaison officers’ at each other’s headquarters and in the field has evolved into the creation of full-fledged liaison offices in strategic cities (see Koops, this Handbook), prompting some analysts to refer to the emergence of ‘liaison diplomacy’ (Orsini et al. 2013, p. 28).

More generally, Rafael Biermann (2008a, p.  165) distinguishes between three categories of inter-organizational cooperation, which we, following Alexander (1995), might modify as follows:

First and most basically, information sharing and mutual representation between organizations, facilitated by institutionalized mechanisms such as con-ferring observer status to one another or creating liaison mechanisms; this is the sine qua non of cooperation and varies widely, driven by strongly diverging degrees of willingness to pass on sensitive information. Second and more ambi-tiously, coordination of policies, when organizations adapt their own policies to the preferences of other organizations either via deliberately concerting goals, strategies, or activities based on physical interaction in order to achieve mutu-ally beneficial outcomes or by simply taking the activities, structures, or ideas of other organizations into account when taking unilateral action, intentionally or not. Third and most far-reaching, joint decision-making among organiza-tions in the case of common projects or programs that might require a division of labor and delineation of responsibilities. Here, we see not only the poten-tially greatest joint gains but also most serious autonomy concerns and fears of undue dependence.12

Cooperation mechanisms thus vary in terms of intensity (and the associated relative loss of autonomy), level (Secretariat or field), and formalization. In the more recent literature on inter-organizational relations in the field of peace and security, the implicit assumption is that cooperation can move along a scale of intensity and durability from light informal or ad hoc cooperation at one end of the spectrum to heavily formalized and institutionalized cooperation on

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the other. Thus, within the life cycle of inter-organizational processes, ad hoc interaction on the ground might be followed by formal agreements, declara-tions, and memoranda of understanding, which may lead to more coherent cooperation on the ground, joint training and planning, periodic joint lessons learned, and even detailed inter-organizational action plans at inter-secretariat level (Novosseloff 2012; Koops 2012a; Pietz 2013; Tardy 2015, p. 30). Yet, even though a high level of institutionalization is an indicator for the matu-rity and density of a relationship, it nevertheless is not a reliable indicator of successful cooperation (see below). Future research needs to focus more on assessing the causal links between the degree of institutionalization and impact on the ground.

Finally, the literature on inter-organizational relations seeks to identify facili-tating conditions that enable cooperation across the IOR life cycle. A major gap in research so far relates to identifying and isolating the key factors influencing the formation and maintenance of cooperative relations. In this Handbook, we subsequently investigate

– resource needs at the organizational level, as mentioned above (see Biermann and Harsch’s contribution)

– preferences of member states, in particular the powerful ones, at the member state level (Koops’ contribution)

– the role of power, influence and (a)symmetry between member states and organizations (Ojanen’s and Costa’s contributions)

– the role of personalities, in particular executive heads (Reinalda and Kille’s contribution)

– psychological factors such as ‘trust’ among boundary spanners (Brugger, Hasenclever and Kasten’s contribution)

– the openness of organizations to cooperate and the affinity of orga-nizational cultures and norms, which might lead to the creation of epistemic communities

– processes of legitimation among organizations, in particular the quest to connect to legitimate others, for example through emulation of organizations perceived to be successful (Biermann’s contribution, also Costa’s), or what has been more generally referred to as ‘attraction theories’ (Smith et al. 1995, p. 18), pointing to the relevance of social learning and socialization.

Factors which need further exploration but are not systematically covered in our Handbook are the international system factors mentioned above, such as exogenous political shocks or major crises that open up ‘opportunities’ for cooperation, but also the impact of third parties, including other organi-zations and their interaction, on partnership formation; the path-dependent impact of previous instances of cooperation and the inter-organizational learn-ing dedicated to furthering cooperation (Crossan et  al. 1999; Nooteboom 2008; Joachim and Schneiker 2013); the compatibility of organizational designs and the impact of institutionalized structures and frameworks, includ-

22 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

ing contractual relations (Van de Ven 1976, p. 25; Smith Ring 2008); the role of discourse and inter-organizational speech acts; and decision rules (Biermann 2015).

4.2 Inter-Organizational Rivalry and Conflict

Following Keohane, we should expect not only complementary but also con-flicting motives when organizations cooperate. Cooperation and coordination would not be needed, if harmony would be the default position between two entities. Instead, rivalry and the resulting competition and conflict are ubiqui-tous among autonomous organizations (Smithers 1979). Yet, studies on the factors that cause inter-organizational relations to deteriorate or to end are less prevalent (Smith et al. 1995, p. 16). Rafael Biermann (2008) identified the inherent strive of organizations for autonomy and visibility and asymme-try among partners (further explored in Biermann 2014, 2015), instances of unclear division of labor and divergent organizational cultures as major causes for rivalry. Joachim Koops suggests the concepts of ‘differentiation, autono-mization, and decoupling’ for analyzing inter-organizational competition and rupture (2012b, pp. 174–79). His concept of differentiation (p. 174), which ‘refers to an organization’s active effort to build up its own image, identity and reputation’, resonates with the organizational sociology literature which refers to the ‘differentiating’ effect of reputation-building: ‘reputation dynam-ics encourage organizations to distinguish themselves from their peers either substantively or by advancing claims to uniqueness, often despite minimal out-ward differences’ (Deephouse and Suchman 2008, p. 62). From an IR perspec-tive, processes of differentiation can also be linked to the constructivist concept of ‘othering’ (Waever 1995) or in Alexander Wendt’s (1994, 1995) terms, ‘negative identification’—implying that organizations advance a discourse that distinguishes them and demarcates them clearly from other organizations. These processes can then eventually lead to ‘autonomization’—for example, the ‘process in which IGOs can change or increase their status of autonomy and are able to decide and act without interference from other actors’ (Koch 2006, p. 431) —and eventual ‘decoupling’ (see also Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008, p. 81).

However, rivalry is complex, as is cooperation. A plethora of causal fac-tors interact. Overlap might turn into rivalry when organizations expand into other’s domains and scenarios of institutional choice and forum shopping arise (Biermann 2007; Alter and Meunier 2009; Jupille et al. 2013). Frequently, the exercise of various forms of power (Ojanen, this Handbook) and influence (Costa, this Handbook) helps to explain rivalry. Many of the factors which inspire cooperation also inhibit cooperation when they are absent (e.g. lack-ing system-level stimuli for cooperation, an insufficient openness to cooperate, no pressing resource needs) or negative (resistance of major member states to allow inter-organizational cooperation, perceptions of illegitimacy, a mismatch of organizational cultures and designs, personal discord or distrust among key

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boundary spanners, and previous negative experience with cooperation). Apart from the theoretical chapters in Part I of our Handbook, the surveys of major policy fields and individual case studies of Part II (such as the contributions by Gawrich, Grigorescu and Härtel) contain ample evidence demonstrating the validity of those factors.

While the inter-organizational literature has explored to some extent rivalry and the factors contributing to its rise, more research is needed on when these factors lead to the demise of a partnership and under which conditions rivalry is contained or managed in order to maintain an effective partnership. This last point is related to the policy-oriented issue of ‘managing inter-organizational relations’ in order to improve partnerships.

4.3 Managing Inter-Organizational Relations

As the previous discussion highlighted, most processes related to inter- organizational relations occur in the context of cooperation or rivalry. Hence, an important aspect of IOR research—both at the conceptual and practical level—relates to the management of inter-organizational relations. Which poli-cies and initiatives exist to improve or facilitate partnerships once they have been formed? The IR literature still lags behind the much more advanced and sophisticated research undertaken in the field of business and management studies (Lewin 1951; Gray 2008; Tjemkes et al. 2012) and regime interplay (Oberthür and Stokke 2011). Studies of alliances and joint ventures, in par-ticular, have provided detailed insights on ‘alliance design’ and ‘alliance man-agement’ aimed at increasing cooperation, efficient processes, and the overall impact of a partnership (see in particular Tjemkes et al. 2012, pp. 59–99).

Barbara Gray’s (2008, pp.  668–683) excellent work on ‘intervening to improve inter-organizational relationships’ outlines eight ‘overarching tasks’ through which inter-organizational relations can be managed and improved: visioning; convening; process design; reflective intervening; problem structur-ing; conflict handling; brokering; and institutional entrepreneurship. While visioning, convening and process design relate to the strategic management and design of inter-organizational relations from the start (e.g. key stakehold-ers of the IOR should focus on the ‘big picture’ and long-term view of the partnership’s purpose, aims, and intended outcomes), reflective intervening and problem structuring are more focused on frank analyses of the many con-flicts that may emerge during the evolution of an IOR. Techniques of conflict handling and brokering (often in the form of mediation by an internal or ide-ally external agent) need to be applied when open conflicts have erupted. In this light, recent alliance management theories also refer to ‘conflict manage-ment’ techniques and ‘response strategies’ promoting ‘organizational justice’ aimed at preventing or reducing conflicts at the individual, group of bureau-cratic levels (Tjemkes et al. 2012, pp. 85–87).

Finally, referring to insights from institutional theory, Gray’s emphasis on ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ entails that norms, agreements, and ‘cognitive

24 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

shifts’ that facilitate inter-organizational institution-building are advanced by leading executives and day-to-day managers (Gray 2008, pp. 682–683). In this light—particularly with reference to identity-based conflicts—it is crucial to keep in mind that inter-organizational partnerships not only require the compatibility of organizational identities, but also the creation and institutionalization of new common identities (Koot et al. 2003). As mentioned above, the core task then becomes to manage IORs in such a way that the establishment of inter-orga-nizational epistemic communities is promoted. In other words, strong profes-sional and identity-based cooperation between key personnel leads to an increased awareness of common interests. The more boundary spanners succeed in deepen-ing mutual knowledge, understanding, and trust, the more successful and stable cooperation can become. Examples of activities that contribute to this end include

– the deliberate promotion of the ‘alumni effect’ (Koops 2008) —for example recruiting top executives from other organizations in order to facilitate cooperation and understanding among partners,13

– the organization of regular high-level and mid-level staff trainings and ‘education days’,14

– the creation of joint Steering Committees to regularly update each other, exchange views, forge common strategies, and implement spe-cific projects,15

– the posting of liaison staff at each other’s Secretariats and in the field in order to stimulate information exchange, coordination, and learning,16

– the creation of permanent Liaison Offices, which increasingly play the role of a quasi-diplomatic presence,17

– regular ‘inter-organizational lessons learned’ and best practice exer-cises,18 or

– processes of negotiating and implementing inter-organizational agree-ments both on the strategic level and on the operational level.19

Yet, beyond these more ‘heavy-handed’ institutionalization mechanisms, most day-to-day management is far less formalized and visible (Biermann on bureau-cracies, this Handbook). What is often still lacking are strategies for regular evaluation, monitoring, and ‘corrective measures’ (Tjemkes et al. 2012, p. 95). Since profitability is the main driving force of joint ventures and alliances in the field of business and management, there is a stronger emphasis on timely and regular interventions than in partnerships between IGOs in world politics. Yet, with the increasing awareness among top officials, more sophisticated inter- organizational management techniques may emerge. Research about this aspect of the IOLC needs to focus in particular on the micro-level of bureaucratic interaction (see also Oberthür and Stokke 2011) and requires in particular participant observer studies. Overall, it is important to keep in mind that inter-organizational management ‘demands substantial investments, during both the formation and management stages’ (Tjemkes et al. 2012, p. 87). It is therefore not too surprising that this aspect has received less attention (and resources) in relationships between IGOs than business-oriented joint ventures.

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5 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION

As alluded to above, inter-organizational relations have sometimes been viewed—particularly in the field of international politics—as an end in itself. In this perspective, evaluations often only scrutinize ways to improve cooperation mechanisms or policy coherence. However, a more impact-oriented analysis needs to reach beyond these confinements and assess the actual effectiveness of joint endeavors ‘on the ground’. In this light, evaluating inter-organizational effectiveness relates not only to assessments of the level of cooperation or rivalry, network density, or the management of incompatibilities, but should make a theoretically informed, methodologically sound and empirics-based effort to assess the effects of inter-organizational cooperation. Here, past and current research on IOR in world politics remains at its weakest. While a wide range of studies evaluating inter-organizational relationships have been conducted in business management and in the administrative sciences, comparable studies in IR remain scarce (first treatments are Jørgensen, et al. 2011; Jørgensen and Laatikainen 2013). Yet, even in management science, ‘considerable confusion’ still exists about evaluation. Not only is evaluation itself complex, but it is also

‘difficult to determine with any precision what specific outcomes result from an IOR and what outcomes might have occurred in the absence of an IOR. The problem is compounded by the prevalence of different theoretical perspectives for explaining IORs […] Furthermore, the problem is complicated by questions about the appropriate level of analysis’. (Provan and Sydow 2008, pp. 691–692)

There is a rich history of studies in management and sociology on measuring organizational effectiveness, which thrived especially in the 1960s and 1970s (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967; Goodman and Pennings 1977); since the 1990s ‘renewed attention’ has been paid to the topic (Sheehan 1996; Herman and Renz 1997; Forbes 1998; Kaplan 2001; Scott 2001). Many of the challenges of measuring causality were already discussed in the early publications. Within IR in general, however, there is a paucity of studies systematically investigat-ing effectiveness (or performance), even though research debating the chal-lenging issues of methodology (Hegemann et al. 2013) and, more specifically, the effectiveness of international organizations (Gutner and Thompson 2010; Weaver 2010) is gaining ground.20 IOR scholars are advised to pay close atten-tion to the sophisticated methodological debates within the regime effective-ness literature, specifically their insight that measuring impact (for us: in how far cooperating organizations can solve problems effectively in world politics) is extremely challenging, in contrast to merely measuring organizational output or (more ambitiously) outcomes (Young 1999, 2001; Helm and Sprinz 2000; Hovi et al. 2003).

It is beyond this article to delve deeply into the rich literature on mea-suring effectiveness. However, when investigating the effectiveness of inter- organizational cooperation, four insights should be kept in mind.

26 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

First, effectiveness compares oughtness (what should be) with reality (what is). It measures ‘how well an organization is doing, relative to some set of standard.’ (Scott 1998, p. 351) These criteria vary among various stakeholder groups and researchers who compete to legitimize or delegitimize organiza-tions and thus empower or disempower them. According to Scott (1998, p. 356), ‘we must be willing to state clearly what criteria we propose to employ, recognizing that whatever they are and whoever espouses them, they are always normative conceptions, serving some interests more than others, and likely to be both limited and controversial.’

Second, a partnership ‘can be both effective and ineffective depending on what components are being evaluated’, be it structures and processes, specific projects and programs, or norms and rules guiding the partnership (Campbell 1977, p. 19). Thus, mutual representation in joint meetings might work per-fectly well, while simultaneously information sharing is hampered, or one proj-ect is seriously in trouble while another is functioning well (see Gawrich, this Handbook).

Third, while the goal attainment approach measuring the degree of accom-plishing specific goals set by the organizations themselves or by others pre-dominates the literature (Sheehan 1996), one should be aware that identifying the goals organizations pursue when partnering might be difficult. They are often ‘ambiguous, partially noncomparable and inharmonious.’ (Starbuch and Nyström 1983, cited in Forbes 1998, p. 186; more comprehensively Hannan and Freeman 1977) Goals often change over time. Actual goals might devi-ate from declared ones, up to the point where organizations construct images of ‘surface conformity’ (Deephouse and Suchman 2008, p. 60) in order to legitimize devious behavior. Before embarking on a goal attainment study, one might therefore consider viable alternatives such as the ‘competing values’ or ‘multiple constituency’ approaches investigating the competing criteria of relevant stakeholders (Forbes 1998). Unfortunately, they have so far hardly entered IR research.

Fourth, a distinction can be made between evaluations that focus on the ‘structure’ of IORs and on the ‘outcomes’ of IORs, each requiring different indicators (Provan and Sydow 2008, pp. 697–705). Structural indicators focus on the extent to which organizations are structurally connected. These indi-cators can range from ‘density’ (e.g. number of ties between organizations) to ‘multiplexity’ (e.g. variety of tasks carried out within one IOR).21 In this view, most recurrent aspects of IORs discussed in this introduction (such as trust, inter-organizational learning, legitimacy, or institutionalization) can be evaluated against specific metrics. Whereas these indicators can easily be trans-ferred to IORs in world politics, outcome indicators from management studies for joint ventures or strategic alliances which focus on economically benefi-cial outcomes such as innovation, financial performance, and survival but also include operational learning and relational aspects (see Tjemkes et al. 2012, pp. 100–115) are more difficult to transfer. In order to assess how well a joint project and the associated resource pooling achieves the goal, it is designed for

STUDYING RELATIONS AMONG INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD... 27

or in how far dysfunctions undermine cooperation evaluations relying on coun-terfactual analysis might be needed (e.g. how both organizations would have fared had they not cooperated).22 In other words: Is the impact of cooperation larger than the sum of both individual organizations’ uncoordinated impact? This goes beyond the ‘coordination bias’ (e.g. cooperation is always preferable to non-cooperation) prevalent in much of the literature.

Joint impact assessments by the cooperating organizations themselves (as currently carried out by the EU and UN in the field of peacekeeping) are an important tool to safeguard and, if needed, increase inter-organizational effectiveness, but only if it is carried out free from political constraints and in a transparent manner geared toward continuous inter-organizational learning (Weaver 2010).23 While many chapters in this Handbook seek to address the issue of evaluating inter-organizational relations and outcomes, we advise to pay more attention to such self-evaluations and, more generally, to systemati-cally investigate the effectiveness of inter-organizational partnerships, applying more sophisticated research designs than still prevalent in IR and international organization scholarship.

6 MAJOR THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

The previous discussion of key aspects and concepts of inter-organizational relations highlights that theory-oriented and policy-oriented research on IOR has made significant advances, but also that it still faces considerable theoretical and methodological challenges. Indeed, as noted at the beginning of this chap-ter, the history of theory of inter-organizational relations is a history of lagging behind the sheer speed of empirical developments on the ground. Starting from the first occurrences of regime overlap and competition between the AGTU formed in 1850 and the WETU formed in 1855 (Richardson 2015) as well as their eventual relations with the International Telegraph Union (ITU) since 1865 (Lyall 2011; Fari 2015) to the relations of the League of Nations with its associated organizations, the challenge of relations between international organizations in world politics emerged in earnest with the cre-ation of the United Nations in 1945 and its subsequent relations with other organizations. Particularly the tensions between the UN’s universal claim and regional organizations dominated inter-organizational life during the Cold War. While several scholars focused on the tensions between ‘universalism vs. regionalism’ (Claude 1956), IR scholars studying international organizations nevertheless noted the general absence of studies on inter-organizational rela-tions (see Jönsson, this Handbook). It was only with the end of the Cold War and particularly in the field of security studies that sustained scholarly interest emerged, spurred by the obvious problems emanating from lack of coordina-tion (and outright competition) between international organizations such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE, and the EU in the field of crisis management. Yet, while theory-guided research in IR only emerged during the last decade,

28 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

a rich history of scholarship in management science, business and administra-tion studies, and sociology means that a significant body of knowledge can be drawn on and imported to analyzing the political phenomenon of inter- organizational relations in international affairs. Importing rich findings from these neighboring disciplines brings both advantages and risks. Advantages include the availability of advanced conceptualizations of scholars who evalu-ated, as we have seen, relations between firms, companies, alliances, and orga-nization sets. Disadvantages include a sheer volume of attempts of theorizing without systematic dialogue between the sub-disciplines and with (economic) assumptions that might not be directly applicable to relations between IGOs, where the role of power and member state interests is far more pronounced and the coherence-inducing pressures or motivations of ‘profitability’ of an alli-ance are less prevalent or entirely absent. Yet, as this introductory chapter has also highlighted, the dialogue between IR and neighboring disciplines can be enriching and can contribute significantly to the advance of a distinct, mid-tier IR theory of inter-organizational relations. On the path toward this goal, the following sections outline some of the main theoretical and methodological challenges IOR scholars need to tackle.

6.1 Fragmentation, Eclecticism, and the Lack of an IR-Focused Lead Theory

While the current field of inter-organizational studies (and hopefully the con-tent of this Handbook) underlines an impressive array of differing perspectives and interdisciplinary richness, the down-side is a high level of fragmentation and the lack of a coherent theoretical framework. Since there is no specific IR theory of inter-organizational relations, scholars interested in theory-building need to refer to insights from disciplines that have engaged with this phenom-enon for much longer.

Yet, even in management studies, where IOR research has had its longest tradition, scholars have noted ‘a fascinating and sometimes confusing world in which different schools of thought, several methodological approaches, and distinct foci in terms of […] modes of cooperation, and international patterns lay out the complexity against which one has to understand interorganizational networks and alliances.’ (Osborn and Hagedoorn 1997, p. 261) Given the fact that an IR-centered approach to inter-organizational relations in world politics seeks to draw not only on management studies’ insights, but also advances made in sociology, organization theory, administration science, transaction cost economies, network theory as well as existing approaches in political sci-ence and global governance, it becomes clear that any endeavor to establish a middle-ground theory of inter-organizational relations will encounter the con-siderable theoretical challenge of fragmentation and an overwhelming plurality of sub-approaches.

Even though core scholars in IR have praised and advocated ‘eclectic theo-rizing’ (Katzenstein and Sil 2008) and have argued for ‘problem-driven rather

STUDYING RELATIONS AMONG INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD... 29

than paradigm-driven research’ (p. 110), the plethora of approaches risks to produce constant ‘reinventions of the wheel’ by ambitious theory-minded scholars. The only option left is to try to establish connections between differ-ent research traditions and paradigms and to test common threads and recur-ring conceptual tools (such as, for example, resource dependence theory). Yet, it is also important not to fall into the trap of mistaking often-cited paradigms as the analytical strongest. Furthermore, IR scholars interested in pushing for-ward a theory-guided research agenda on inter-organizational relations should not only import concepts and insights from other disciplines, but must also match these developments with established concepts in their own discipline. Major IR theories related to ‘cooperation’ between states, institutions, and regimes, as well as the resurgence of formal IO studies (or the pathologies of bureaucracies) offer important starting points for a two-directional interdisci-plinary dialogue. This also means that revisiting classic IR texts might reveal insights for inter-organizational studies that were previously missed (such as Keohane’s cooperation definition that also applies to organizations). Finally, more recent conceptual innovations in IR, such as theories of interregional-ism, regime complex theory, and ‘global governance’ studies offer promising avenues within the IR discipline that could further be explored for a mid-tier IR theory of inter-organizational relations. Among those three, it is in particu-lar the global governance perspective (and the perennial quest for ‘coherence’ between the manifold actors and issues) that might be most promising for exploring further the theorization of IORs in world politics (see Karns and Mingst 2010, pp. 55–59 or Betts 2011, p. 5).

6.2 Transferability, Induction, and Deduction: Matching Theoretical Insights with Empirical Evidence

As alluded to above, the fragmentation and plurality of inter-organizational research also pose issues of transferability of insights from one discipline to the other. Studies from a management and alliance/joint venture perspective offer excellent insights into why organizations tend to cooperate in the first place, how resources are exchanged, and how the life cycle of an alliance might be evaluated. Similarly, studies emanating from sociology can provide the IR scholar with important perspectives on the interaction between organizations and their environment from an ‘open-system’ perspective and allow for more emphasis on organizational culture or bureaucratic processes. Yet, by virtue of their own disciplinary focus, these studies focus more on commercial orga-nizations or firms and incentive structures, processes, and opportunities for ‘intervention for improvement’, which are decisively different from the highly politicized field of IR.  The main difference of course revolves around the influence, power, and behavior of member states, as well as particular policy challenges related to global governance. Thus, the issue of ‘transferability’ of insights from case studies of neighboring disciplines needs to be kept in mind. Yet, transferability issues also arise in the case of distinct cases studies within the

30 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

realm of IR. In other words, to what extent are insights from one comprehen-sively assessed dyad (e.g. EU-NATO) applicable to another dyad in a different policy field, such as IMF-World Bank relations. Here, only time and systematic exploration of large comparative studies will tell.

A further methodological problem arises out of the different mixes of inductive and deductive methods. As a relatively young research field that rou-tinely draws on insights from other disciplines, studies often fluctuate between approaches of cherry-picking particular existing insights or concepts in order to match them with appropriate (but isolated) instances of empirical develop-ments. Conversely, empirical examples that could prove or disprove certain theoretical claims still remain too limited and some issue areas (such as security studies) remain overrepresented, while other areas are less explored. Admittedly, this is a problem we have also faced as editors of this Handbook, but hope to at least remedy to a certain extent with the broad approach advanced here. There is still a tendency to pick selectively core concepts from neighboring disciplines and match them in a limited manner with empirical evidence. What is needed is more engagement with hypotheses and assumptions that provide general insights beyond the particular sub-concept or specific case study under scrutiny.

6.3 Generalizability: From Dyad Case Studies to Large-N Studies

Closely connected, the field of inter-organizational studies still suffers from limited generalizability. The bulk of research consists of isolated case stud-ies of dyads (e.g. two organizations cooperating or competing) with a clear gap of comparative studies, in particular large-n studies. Thus, insights often remain restricted to the particular dyad under observation and lack generaliz-able value. Here, scholars and authors are urged to collaborate in order to form research consortia that could systematically assess and theorize large numbers of inter-organizational relations among a variety of configurations across time. Network theory might be the obvious candidate for such an undertaking, but a systematic testing of assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses is only possible with a large sample of empirical cases.

A second dimension linked to generalizability relates to imprecise hypoth-eses and assumptions that lack any predicting power. For example, one of the most important concepts for explaining IOR formation remains the concept of ‘domain similarity’ or ‘overlap’. The consensus view is that domain similar-ity is a fundamental precondition for IORs to emerge. Yet, the concept itself and studies focusing on it have not explained fully under which conditions domain similarity and overlap either lead to cooperation, rivalry or, indeed, mutual neglect. Overlap in itself has no generalizable explanatory power, other than the fact that without a minimum of overlap the onset of relations is not possible.

In a similar vein, the ubiquitous mantra of ‘coordination is necessary’ is not matched by enough counter-studies that could examine under which

STUDYING RELATIONS AMONG INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD... 31

conditions cooperation between organizations should not be pursued or which precise dynamics and conditions might lead to ‘partnership termination’.

6.4 Accuracy: From Desk Research Through Interviews to ‘Participant Observation’

Finally, from a methodological point of view, the study of relations among IGOs is a young and emerging research field that can import conceptual insights from other disciplines, but needs to engage more systematically and more widely in field research. Desk research can only get us to a certain point and often skews the focus. Most studies relying exclusively on desk research overemphasize formal procedures, declarations, institutions, and cooperation documents. Yet, these aspects are often only the tip of the iceberg. Informal relations between main officials, day-to-day practices, and less than rational maneuvers by key players at headquarters, in the field levels and among mem-ber states often shape inter-organizational processes and outcomes. It is there-fore vital for anyone seriously interested in inter-organizational relations to engage as ‘participant observant’ or at least to conduct extensive interviews with senior officials across the most important levels. In this context again, a widening of the database, for example including surveys among IOR officials, and going beyond dyads is most beneficial. Yet, as the chapter by Christer Jönsson highlights, the most accurate and insightful studies result from partici-pating (on a temporary basis) in organizations themselves, evaluating internal documents, interviewing boundary spanners, and undertaking field visits. This points once again to the value of collaborative research teams and projects.

7 APPROACH AND STRUCTURE OF THE HANDBOOK

As mentioned at the beginning, with this Handbook we seek to bring together a broad spectrum of scholars, many of whom have long-range experience in researching inter-organizational relations, in order to explore the field of inter- organizational relations from a distinctly political and IR perspective. In order to ensure the overall coherence and focus of the Handbook, all authors received an author memo providing guidance on the overall goals of the Handbook and its individual parts, on the overarching questions we seek to answer and on the structure and thrust of each chapter. An intense review-process took place which, we find, was demanding but highly productive and stimulated growth within this research community, both across issue areas and disciplines. While this Handbook will still not be able to offer answers to all the questions and challenges outlined above, the contributors and we as editors hope that this book will provide a stimulating starting point for scholars interested in joining the collective efforts of investigating a topic that has moved into the center of global governance today.

The Handbook is divided into two major parts, which are in turn further divided into six sections. Abstracts for each chapter help to orient readers. The

32 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

first part presents major theoretical and conceptual approaches to the study of inter-organizational relations. It is sub-divided into three sections: theo-ries and methods; levels, actors, and configurations; and core concepts. The first section (A) starts with two chapters providing an overview of the con-ceptual evolution of the field. Christer Jönsson seeks to situate the topic in the wider discipline of IR, while Michael Lipson presents the wide-ranging array of theoretical approaches either already applied in inter-organizationalism or worthwhile employing, considering theories both from IR and (primarily) from organization studies. Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 then examine one by one those theories and approaches which are either already widely used to explain inter-organizational relations (resource dependence by Rafael Biermann and Michael Harsch, social network theory by Matthias Schulze and Florian Ries and sociological approaches by Ulrich Franke and Martin Koch) or deserve more attention (population ecology by Florian Ries and rational design by Hylke Dijkstra).The authors were asked to present the main parameters of the theory or concept, introduce the relevant literature, discuss shortcomings and controversies, explore the transferability of these theories, insofar as they originate from institutionalism in general or from other disciplines, and pro-pose promising avenues for future research. These chapters should provide the reader with a good overview of the main perspectives suitable for applying core insights to an IR-focused approach to IOR.

In the second section (B), we focus on levels on analysis, the main actors in inter-organizational relations and configurations. After a general introduction on multilevel frameworks of analysis (Joachim Koops), the Handbook explores the role of individuals, especially executive heads (Bob Reinalda and Kent Kille) and international bureaucracies (Rafael Biermann) when organizations cooperate. Further chapters offer a model of how to transfer the principal- agent model to IORs (Edith Drieskens and Yf Reykers); discuss various inter- organizational configurations ranging from dyads to organizational fields and networks (Melissa Wooten and Timothy Sacco); introduce the phenomenon of nested institutions (Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitrios Bourantonis); and assess the specificities of NGO-NGO relations (Andrea Schneiker). The authors were asked to discuss the relevance of this level, configuration or type of partnership for inter-organizational relations, based on the relevant literature and empiri-cal findings so far, examine the added value and the drawbacks of taking this specific perspective, introduce the major theoretical approaches available to research the object of study, explore the transferability of these theories, inso-far as they originate from research not focusing so far on inter-organizational relations in world politics, and propose avenues for future research. Since we did not include a chapter on methodology—methods diverge strongly depend-ing on research focus—many authors offer concluding remarks on appropriate quantitative and qualitative methods useful to investigate their topic.

The third section (C) explores core concepts for studying inter- organizational relations, some of which are presumed to have a major causal impact on cooperation and conflict. Many of them originate from research

STUDYING RELATIONS AMONG INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD... 33

beyond inter- organizationalism. Chapters are devoted to the role of legitimacy assessments among organizations (Rafael Biermann), power (Hanna Ojanen), influence (Oriol Costa), and trust (Philipp Brugger, Andreas Hasenclever and Lukas Kasten). The authors were asked to introduce the concepts based on the available literature, explore the transferability of those concepts to inter- organizational relations, evaluate their relevance for understanding inter- organizational relations, discuss the added value and the drawbacks of investigating inter- organizational relations with this focus, and propose ave-nues for further research.

Part II of the Handbook tries to survey inter-organizational relations in major issue areas of global governance, in particular peace and security, human rights and democratization, as well as trade, finance, and environment. Most of the chapters are designed to map inter-organizational cooperation in the policy area they focus on. The primary goal is empirical stocktaking, though theory application is also present in several studies. The authors were asked to provide an overview of networking within the policy field or among the actors concerned, present major research findings, discuss variance within the policy field or configuration, and propose areas of future research. Thus, the section on peace and security contains chapters on inter-organizational relations in peacebuilding (Joanne McEvoy), among terrorist and organized crime groups (David Knoke and Marie Wu), among humanitarian relief orga-nizations (Max O. Stephenson, Jr.), and in food security (Matias Margulis), supplemented by a case study that applies regime complexity and resource dependence theory to peacekeeping in Somalia and the Central African Republic (Malte Brosig).

Section B covers human rights and democratization, featuring chapters on the democratization efforts of the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the Organization of American States (Andrea Gawrich) and on the Council of Europe’s cooperation with civil society organizations (André Härtel). Section C on trade, finance, and environment includes chapters discussing the increas-ing cooperation among the Bretton Woods bodies (including the G7/8, Andreas Freytag and John J. Kirton) and in global energy governance (Thijs Van de Graaf), the EU’s increasingly dense cooperation with employer and labor associations (Frank Wendler), inter-organizational cooperation in fight-ing corruption and promoting integrity in public procurement (Alexandru Grigorescu) and climate change (Katja Biedenkopf). Our concluding chapter seeks to draw together the main findings and consolidates the suggestions for future research.

Taken together, we hope that this broad collection of theoretical and empir-ical contributions written by scholars from a unique range of disciplines, policy fields, and countries will provide a helpful resource for all those interested in the growing phenomenon of inter-organizational relations. We also hope it will convey some of the excitement and enthusiasm of the expanding scholarly community interested in exploring cooperation among international organiza-tions in world politics.

34 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

NOTES

1. While the beginnings of the history of international organizations are commonly traced back to the Congress of Vienna and the establish-ment of the Rhine Commission, the beginnings of inter-organizational relations can be traced back at least to the Versailles Treaties and the creation of the League of Nations as well as a wide range of other international organizations, which were associated with the League and created in close coordination. Thus, the International Labour Organization, which was founded in 1919, was supposed to coordi-nate closely with the League.

2. Based on Selznick’s (1949) classic study on the Tennessee Valley Authority.

3. This pertains especially to the EU, which aspires to speak with one voice within other organizations. In some instances, the EU has been granted an observer status, in others even full membership within another intergovernmental organization. Thus, for example, as a full member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) besides the EU member states, the EU interacts with the WTO institutions within that organization (see Bourantonis and Blavoukos 2010; Jørgensen and Laatikainen 2013).

4. The following is further explored in the Handbook chapter by Biermann on international bureaucracies.

5. It should be noted, though, that regimes often arise out of interna-tional treaties which might establish small secretariats to oversee treaty implementation. For a discussion of the interconnectedness of IGOs and regimes see Rittberger and Zangl (2006, pp. 6–8).

6. To our knowledge, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine which is seen as the first IGO with a permanent secretariat did not have formal or informal relationships with other IGOs during the first 100 years of its existence.

7. We will discuss the differences between both terms below. 8. One of the most advanced and detailed analyses of inter-organizational

life-cycle stages focuses on the strategic management of alliances. Brian Tjemkes et al. (2012) identify seven stages: alliance strategy formula-tion, alliance partner selection, alliance negotiation, alliance design, alliance management, alliance evaluation, and alliance termination.

9. On the role of ‘exogenous shocks’ in generating change and integra-tion see Haas (2004, p. XXV).

10. We hesitate to give up the term domain similarity, not only because the term overlap is broader (as we argue subsequently), but also because the management literature has come up with further terms centering around ‘domains’ exhibiting significant explanatory power such as domain conflict, domain consensus, or domain violation (Biermann and Harsch, this Handbook).

STUDYING RELATIONS AMONG INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD... 35

11. This rationale drives in particular strategic alliances and joint ventures (Dacin et al. 2007).

12. Similarly, David Law (2007, pp. 53–57) outlines three forms of coop-eration, ranging from the exchange of information and staff (first-order cooperation) through the dependence of one organization on the authority of another (second-order cooperation) to joint planning and training, co-development of programs and joint funding (third-order cooperation).

13. Thus, the EU’s recruitment of NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana in 1999 stimulated mutual understanding, contact and the EU’s adop-tion of NATO’s best practices, including its organizational design; fur-thermore, the EU’s recruitment of the former Head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, to the EU External Action Service’s top job in 2015 is likewise supposed to facili-tate cooperation between the EU and UN in peacekeeping.

14. The UN and NATO hold every second year regular ‘education days’ to inform each other about their respective organizational procedures, approaches and ways of doing things; similar initiatives exist between the UN and EU.

15. The UN-EU Steering Committee has met every six months since 2003, alternating between Brussels and New York; similar arrangements exist between the UN and AU, between the EU and the Council of Europe on their ‘joint programmes’ and, albeit more dysfunctional, between the EU and NATO in the ‘Berlin-plus’ formats.

16. For example, the EU Commission regularly sends for two years staff to Washington to liaise with the IMF (Koops and Tolksdorf 2015).

17. Such as the UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security in Brussels that seeks to reach out to NATO and the EU on a permanent basis, or the IMF Europe Offices in Brussels and Paris which liaise with all organiza-tions, governments, and civil societies in Europe.

18. Thus, the UN and the EU carried out such exercises previously with respect to their peacekeeping operations in the DR Congo and Chad in 2003 and 2008.

19. Such as the regular Framework Agreements between the World Bank Group and the EU on Single- and Multi-Donor Trust Funds, stipulat-ing in detail the procedures and rules for co-financing, visibility mea-sures, amount and quality of information exchanged, consultations, supervision and verification, suspension and termination, dispute reso-lution, etc.

20. Helpful is also the recent literature on measuring the effectiveness of peace operations (Diehl and Druckman 2015).

21. These analytical tools for studying network properties are further dis-cussed by Schulze and Ries, this Handbook.

22. On counterfactuals in effectiveness research. See the debate among Helm and Sprinz (2000) and Young (2001).

36 R. BIERMANN AND J.A. KOOPS

23. For a discussion of the link between organizational learning and effec-tiveness, see Denton (1998).

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