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Electronic Discovery and the Adoption of Information
Technology
Amalia R. Miller*
University of Virginia and RAND Corporation
Catherine E. Tucker
MIT Sloan School of Management and NBER
After firms adopt electronic information and communication technologies, their
decision-making leaves a trail of electronic information that may be more exten-
sive and accessible than a paper trail. We ask how the expected costs of litiga-
tion affect decisions to adopt technologies, such as electronic medical records
(EMRs), which leave more of an electronic trail. EMRs allow hospitals to docu-
ment electronically both patient symptoms and health providers’ reactions to
those symptoms and may improve the quality of care that makes the net impact
of their adoption on expected litigation costs ambiguous. This article studies the
impact of state rules that facilitate the use of electronic records in court. We find
evidence that hospitals are one-third less likely to adopt EMRs after these rules
are enacted. (JEL K41, O33, I12).
1. Introduction
When firms adopt new information and communication technologies(ICTs), they hope to increase profits by reducing communication andarchiving costs. However, they may incur hidden costs among which isan increased likelihood of detrimental evidence being uncovered from anelectronic “paper trail.” To take a classic example, in United States v.Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C 2000), prosecutors used e-mailssent between Microsoft executives as evidence of anticompetitive intenttoward Netscape. In this article, we explore how policies that change in therisks and expected costs of litigation stemming from the existence of anelectronic document trail influence firms in their decisions to adopt newtechnologies.
*University of Virginia and RAND Corporation. Email: [email protected]
We thank Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society Analytics for pro-
viding the data used in this study and the RAND Institute for Civil Justice for support. We
also thank Bill Encinosa, Avi Goldfarb, Patrick O’Doherty, Doug Staiger, seminar partici-
pants at Carnegie Mellon, the Federal Trade Commission, Georgia State, Texas A&M, and
Virginia, as well as the editors and anonymous reviewers ofThe Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization for useful feedback on earlier versions of this article. All errors are our own.
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 30, No. 2doi:10.1093/jleo/ews038Advance Access published November 21, 2012� The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University.All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]
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We ask how the prospect of electronic data being used in the courtaffects the decisions of US hospitals to adopt electronic medical record(EMRs) systems. EMRs allow health providers to store and exchangeinformation about their patients’ medical and treatment histories electron-ically rather than using paper. EMRs can improve patient’s care andreduce administrative costs (Miller and Tucker 2011a), but their effecton expected malpractice costs is ambiguous.
On the one hand, by automating documentation of a patient’s care,EMR systems can help to protect health providers in a malpractice case,by documenting comprehensively and reliably that hospital protocolswere followed. By helping to prevent medical mistakes, such as dosageerrors, EMRs may actually reduce the risk of a malpractice lawsuit beinglaunched by reducing the risk of malpractice and adverse health outcomes.
On the other hand, EMRs include more detailed information aboutpatient care than traditional paper records. Therefore, plaintiff attorneysmay make extensive discovery requests for “relevant” electronic informa-tion in medical malpractice litigation. Plaintiff access to this electronicinformation can increase the probability of malpractice litigation afteran adverse medical event, and also increase the cost of trial and thechance of a negative outcome for the defense. In a case described inVigoda and Lubarsky (2006) and Dimick (2007), surgery left a patientquadriplegic. The patient’s lawsuit initially focused on the surgeon’s com-petence, but it switched to focusing on the anesthesiologist’s competenceafter pretrial discovery, which released EMRs to the patient’s attorneys.These records contained an electronic timestamp that cast doubt onwhether the anesthesiologist was present for the entire procedure. Thisanecdote illustrates the risk to health providers of EMRs being releasedduring discovery. An increase in information can improve patient care andaid rebuttal in court, but it can also increase the chance that the plaintiffs’lawyers will find evidence of wrongdoing.
To analyze whether the threat of increased medical malpractice costsdeter adoption of EMRs, we use panel data on EMR adoption by hos-pitals from 1994 to 2007. To measure the likelihood that electronic datawill be used in medical malpractice trial proceedings, we exploit differ-ences over time in state court procedural rules governing the scope anddepth of general electronic document discovery, or “e-discovery,” in pre-trial proceedings. E-discovery refers to the use of electronic materials inthe discovery stage of court proceedings. These rules increase the likeli-hood of extensive electronic metadata being preserved, such as damagingevidence of timestamps when records were accessed and modified. We findthat the enactment of such state rules decreases the propensity of hospitalsto adopt EMRs by one-third. We check the robustness of this result byadding control variables to the main model and by employing a set offalsification tests.
We then examine which hospitals were most deterred by these proced-ural rules. We find that e-discovery rules hinder adoption more in states
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with more malpractice litigation stemming from allegations that could be
bolstered with data from EMRs. This finding that malpractice concernsaffects technology adoption builds on the literature in health economics
that attempts to assess how the risk of malpractice litigation affects health-care provider choices. The bulk of this research concerns physician
responses to the malpractice environment, and considers location
(Matsa 2007) and treatment decisions (Kessler and McClellan 1996;Dubay et al. 1999; Currie and MacLeod 2008; Avraham et al. 2012).
We also find evidence that smaller hospitals that were most deterred by
these e-discovery rules. This may be because small hospitals find it harder
to cover the fixed cost, such as specialized software and personnel proced-ures, associated with maintaining electronic records if they face a malprac-
tice suit.By showing that the use of electronic data in court cases can inhibit the
diffusion of healthcare IT, we also contribute to a growing literature that
examines the determinants of the diffusion of health care IT in the United
States (Kim and Michelman 1990; Devaraj and Kohli 2000, 2003; Menonet al. 2000; Angst et al. 2008; Miller and Tucker 2009, 2011b). The finding
that the use of electronic data in court appears to deter hospitals from
adopting EMRs has particular policy relevance now, because the 2009HITECH Act offers incentives of roughly $44,000 per physician to pro-
mote EMR adoption.Our findings imply that these are costs, in terms of delayed or reduced
EMRs adoption, from allowing e-discovery in the court. This does not
mean that it would be best to prevent e-discovery. There may be important
benefits from e-discovery in improving the medical malpractice system.For example, e-discovery may identify and penalize truly negligent care.
However, from the perspective of providing incentives that promote the
adoption of new technologies, it is important to clarify the proceduresunder which EMRs can be used in court cases. It may be advantageous
for medical professionals to be well-informed about how much additionalrisk they will expose themselves to, rather than having them perceive those
risks as unquantifiable.
2. Background
2.1 State E-Discovery Rules
The discovery phase of a medical malpractice case starts after the plaintiff
files the lawsuit. During discovery, both the defense and the plaintiff havethe opportunity to obtain relevant information and documents from the
other parties in the lawsuit. The standard for discovery of paper records isgenerally very broad. Documents are “discoverable” if they are likely to
lead to the uncovering of admissible evidence. They do not have to be
necessarily admissible at trial. Requests for discovery are generally statu-torily predetermined requests that must be produced without objection.
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Therefore, all parties in a lawsuit must respond to discovery requests or
face being found in contempt.In the past decade, many states have adopted rules that govern
“e-discovery.” These rules generally add electronic documents as an add-
itional class of documents that are governed by existing rules on discovery
in pretrial proceedings. This means that such materials fall, without any
room for dispute, into the class of materials that must be automatically
produced without objection in pretrial proceedings. As shown by Figure 1,
these rules are geographically diverse. The rules originate both from stat-
utes and courts. Table 1 summarizes the rules that have been enacted.In the absence of these rules, the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s teams of
lawyers must hash out the use of electronic materials between themselves.
Interviews with medical malpractice attorneys to provide evidence on this
informal and undocumented process suggest that they often reach an
agreement with the other party to exclude electronic evidence from the
discovery process. Lawyers rationalize such behavior by pointing out that
without clarification from the courts about how e-discovery should be
conducted, e-discovery becomes costly and may not produce worthwhile
evidence that offsets these costs. A recent “2008 Litigation Survey of
Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers” (ACTL and IAALS
(2009)) suggested that nearly 77% of the courts did not understand the
difficulties associated with e-discovery and that 87% of the trial lawyers
said that e-discovery increases the costs of litigation.In our regressions, we use an indicator variable to signal the existence of
a state rule. In all cases, we focus on the dates the rules became effective.1
We do not exploit the variation in the wording of the rule. We did check
the robustness of our results to the exclusion of Texas, which appears to
have the least “plaintiff-friendly” rules for e-discovery of the states in our
sample, and obtained similar, if marginally higher, estimates of the effects
of e-discovery rules than before.In 2007, there were sweeping changes to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (effective December 2006) that encompassed electronic meta-
data, such as creation dates and modification dates. Though not directly
applying to state courts, there is the possibility that some state courts may
have used these new rules as a reference. As a robustness check, we
1. Since these rules are generally changes to the court code of civil procedure, there is not a
large gap between the enactment date and the effective date as sometimes it occurs with
changes in state law. Furthermore, while these state rules often formalize and codify the
procedures that have been followed in a prior case, they do represent a discontinuity in
terms of legal practice. This is for two reasons. First, before such rules are enacted, it is
not clear whether in that state practices that have been followed in complex corporate civil
cases apply to all civil procedure. Second, while lawyers who specialize in such areas of
corporate law may be well aware of the issues of e-discovery, the enactment of such rules is
ordinarily attended by both publicity, and offers of workshops and training in matters of
e-discovery by the state bar association, which improve the ability of the broad spectrum of
the legal profession to take advantage of electronic data mining techniques.
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estimate an alternative version of our main specification excluding 2007data with similar results.
We also investigated the origin of the state rules. It would be problem-atic for our interpretation of causal effects if these rules stemmed fromlobbying by large hospitals or medical malpractice litigation experts inthat state. A search of early case law that mentions e-discovery suggeststhat rather than reflecting activity in the health sector, cases instead reflectlitigation practices in the financial sector. Banks and other financial firmswere the first industrial sector to embrace a large number of ICT-typetechnologies that store electronic data. For example, Merrill Lynch’sJonathan Eisenberg noted that in his experience, 98% of the records indiscovery cases involving Merrill Lynch are electronic (Losey 2008). Anexample of this relationship between the presence of financial firms andthe enactment of state-level e-discovery rules isZubulake v. UBSWarburg,217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), where UBS had to pay $29.2 million,partly because they failed to store data properly. Conversations withe-discovery experts suggest that it was the holes in the existing discoverytrial procedure guidelines exposed by Zubulake, which prompted the NewYork courts to issue clarifying procedural rules in 2006.
2.2 Effects of E-Discovery on Malpractice Litigation
The impact of greater use of electronic data in malpractice cases on the netexpected malpractice costs of hospitals is ambiguous. The majority of theEMR policy literature emphasizes that EMRs can document that hospitalprotocols were followed, and consequently provide a more complete and
Figure 1. Distribution of State E-discovery Rules in 2007.
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Ta
ble
1.
Sta
teR
ule
sG
ove
rnin
gE
-dis
co
ve
ry
Sta
teR
ule
Da
teS
ou
rce
De
sc
rip
tion
CT
Co
nn
ec
ticu
tP
rac
tice
Bo
ok,
Su
pe
rio
rC
ou
rt—
pro
ce
du
res
inc
ivil
ma
tte
rsS
ec
tion
13
-9.
Re
qu
ests
for
pro
du
ctio
n,
insp
ec
tion
an
de
xa
min
atio
n;
ing
en
era
l
(se
esu
bse
ctio
n(d
),a
tp
.1
92
of
25
9-p
ag
e.p
df
do
cu
me
nt)
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ec
tive
Ja
nu
ary
1,
20
06
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urt
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en
dm
en
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roc
ed
ure
toa
dd
ress
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we
-dis
co
ve
ry
will
take
pla
ce
IDId
ah
oR
.C
iv.
P.
34
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ec
tive
Ju
ly1
,2
00
6C
ou
rtA
me
nd
me
nts
ad
de
lec
tro
nic
ally
sto
red
info
rma
tion
(ES
I)to
exis
ting
rule
sre
latin
gto
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co
ve
ryo
fd
oc
um
en
ts
ILIll
ino
isS
up
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org
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ize
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er
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pt
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urs
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ate
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CC
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nts
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ctr
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ag
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eto
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qu
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yin
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rdin
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urs
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ess.”
(co
ntin
ue
d)
222 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V30 N2
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Ta
ble
1.
Co
ntin
ue
d
Sta
teR
ule
Da
teS
ou
rce
De
sc
rip
tion
MT
Mo
nt.
R.
Civ
.P
.1
6(b
).S
ch
ed
ulin
ga
nd
pla
nn
ing
,2
6(b
).
Dis
co
ve
rysc
op
ea
nd
limits
,2
6(f
).D
isc
ove
ryc
on
fer-
en
ce
,3
3(c
).O
ptio
nto
pro
du
ce
bu
sin
ess
rec
ord
s,
34
(a).
Sc
op
e,
34
(b).
Pro
ce
du
re,
37
(e).
Ele
ctr
on
ica
lly
sto
red
info
rma
tion
,4
5(a
).F
orm
issu
an
ce
,4
5(c
).
Pro
tec
tion
of
pe
rso
ns
su
bje
ct
too
ra
ffe
cte
db
ysu
b-
po
en
as,
45
(d).
Du
ties
inre
sp
on
din
gto
su
bp
oe
na
Eff
ec
tive
Fe
bru
ary
28
,
20
07
Co
urt
Ad
ds
as
ava
lidm
att
er
for
pre
tria
lc
on
fere
nc
es
the
rea
ch
ing
of
ag
ree
me
nts
on
e-d
isc
ove
ry,
limits
dis
co
ve
ryo
fE
SI
tha
t
wo
uld
be“u
nre
aso
na
bly
bu
rde
nso
me
or
exp
en
siv
e,”
or“u
n-
rea
so
na
bly
cu
mu
lativ
eo
rd
up
lica
tive
,”a
dd
sa
sa
va
lid
ma
tte
rfo
rp
retr
ial
co
nfe
ren
ce
sth
ere
ac
hin
go
fa
gre
em
en
ts
on
e-d
isc
ove
ry.
Allo
ws
inte
rro
ga
torie
sto
be
an
sw
ere
db
y
sp
ec
ifyin
gth
eE
SI
fro
mw
hic
hth
ea
nsw
er
ma
yb
eo
bta
ine
d.
Ad
ds
ES
Ito
exis
ting
rule
sc
ove
rin
gp
rod
uc
tion
of
do
cu
-
me
nts
.A
dd
sa
ne
xe
mp
tion
fro
mn
orm
al
sa
nc
tion
sfo
rfa
ilure
toc
oo
pe
rate
ind
isc
ove
ry,
for
ES
I“lo
st
as
are
su
lto
fth
ero
u-
tine
,g
oo
dfa
itho
pe
ratio
no
fa
ne
lec
tro
nic
info
rma
tion
sys-
tem
”A
dd
sE
SI
tola
ng
ua
ge
go
ve
rnin
gsu
bp
oe
na
s.
Allo
ws
su
bp
oe
na
sto
co
ve
rsa
mp
ling
of
ES
I.E
SI
mu
st
be
pro
vid
ed
as“ke
pt
inth
eu
su
al
co
urs
eo
fb
usin
ess
”o
ro
rga
niz
ed
an
d
lab
ele
d“to
co
rre
sp
on
dw
ithth
ec
ate
go
rie
sin
the
de
ma
nd
.”
Ifsu
bp
oe
na
do
es
no
tsp
ec
ifyfo
rm,
ES
Im
ust
be
pro
vid
ed
“in
afo
rmo
rfo
rms
inw
hic
hth
ep
ers
on
ord
ina
rily
ma
inta
ins
it,o
rin
afo
rmo
rfo
rms
tha
ta
rere
aso
na
bly
usa
ble
.”
Exe
mp
tsE
SI
fro
mso
urc
es
tha
ta
ren
ot
ac
ce
ssib
leb
ec
au
se
of“u
nd
ue
bu
rde
no
rc
ost”
NC
Ru
les
for
Su
pe
rio
rC
ou
rtJu
dic
ial
Dis
tric
t1
5B
:R
ule
6—
Dis
co
ve
ry
Eff
ec
tive
Ju
ly1
,2
00
6C
ou
rtR
eq
uir
es
ES
Ito
be
pro
vid
ed
ina“re
aso
na
bly
usa
ble
”fo
rm
NH
Su
pe
rio
rC
ou
rtR
ule
62
.(I
)In
itia
lS
tru
ctu
rin
gC
on
fere
nc
e
(se
esu
bse
ctio
n(C
)(4
))
Eff
ec
tive
Ma
rch
1,
20
07
Co
urt
Ad
ds
as
ava
lidm
att
er
for
pre
tria
lc
on
fere
nc
es
the
rea
ch
ing
of
ag
ree
me
nts
on
e-d
isc
ove
ry
NJ
Pa
rtIV
Ru
les
Go
ve
rnin
gC
ivil
Pra
ctic
ein
the
Su
pe
rio
r
Co
urt
,T
ax
Co
urt
,a
nd
Su
rro
ga
tes
Co
urt
s,
Ru
le1
:9.
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bp
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s,
Ru
le4
:5B
.C
ase
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nt;
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nfe
ren
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le4
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d)
Electronic Discovery and the Adoption of Information Technology 223
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Ta
ble
1.
Co
ntin
ue
d
Sta
teR
ule
Da
teS
ou
rce
De
sc
rip
tion
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le4
:23
.F
ailu
reto
Ma
ke
Dis
co
ve
ry;
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nc
tion
s
Do
cu
me
nts
of
do
cu
me
nts
.S
pe
cifi
es
tha
tth
eE
SI
mu
st
be
ina
form
or
form
sin
wh
ich
itis
ord
ina
rily
ma
inta
ine
do
rin
afo
rmo
r
form
sth
at
are
rea
so
na
bly
usa
ble
.A
dd
sa
ne
xe
mp
tion
fro
m
no
rma
lsa
nc
tion
sfo
rfa
ilure
toc
oo
pe
rate
ind
isc
ove
ry,
for
ES
I“lo
st
as
are
su
lto
fth
ero
utin
e,
go
od
faith
op
era
tion
of
an
ele
ctr
on
icin
form
atio
nsyste
m”
NY
Un
iform
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ilR
ule
so
fth
eS
up
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ea
nd
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tyC
ou
rts,
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om
me
rcia
lD
ivis
ion
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pre
me
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urt
,
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le8
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on
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ltatio
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rio
rto
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limin
ary
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d
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ce
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nfe
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s
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ec
tive
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ary
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ou
rtR
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uir
es
me
etin
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nc
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ing
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tatio
no
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ta
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se
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tion
pla
n;
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ide
ntifi
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va
nt
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ta;
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the
sc
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e,
exte
nt
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;(i
v)
an
ticip
ate
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itia
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lloc
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;(v
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tific
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resp
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da
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rva
tion
;(v
iii)
co
nfid
en
tialit
ya
nd
privile
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issu
es;
an
d(i
x)
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sig
na
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TX
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.1
96
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Uta
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en
era
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is-
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ry:
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terr
og
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rtie
s:.
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34
.
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du
ctio
no
fd
oc
um
en
tsa
nd
thin
gs
an
de
ntr
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n
lan
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rp
urp
ose
s:
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37
.F
ailu
re
tom
ake
or
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op
era
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co
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ry;
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nc
tion
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urt
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nt
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om
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dd
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orm
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ilure
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rate
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u-
tine
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oo
dfa
itho
pe
ratio
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ne
lec
tro
nic
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tion
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m”
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urc
efo
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ctm
en
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ws/r
ule
s:
K&
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ate
sL
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-Dis
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ve
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na
lysis
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gy
Gro
up“C
urr
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ave
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ac
ted
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ove
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tob
er
20
08
.D
esc
rip
tion
of
ea
ch
rule
ba
se
do
na
ctu
al
rule
or
sta
tute
text.
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easily “provable” paper trail for the defense. EMRs may prevent mistakesby standardizing care and patient histories. However, there are numerousreasons to think that the admission of EMRs into discovery may increase
the expected malpractice costs of the hospital.The presence of electronic data makes it more likely that a mistake, if it
were made, would be recorded. For example, metadata captures when andwhether physicians refer to a patient’s history. This is a change from thecurrent paper-based systems, where failure to obtain past clinical history
has had to be judged based on a comprehensive review of the individualcase files. Blumenthal et al. (2006) discuss the concern that widespread useof electronically stored information (ESI) in medical malpractice casesintroduces ambiguity in the definition of a legal “medical record” and
extends the scope of discovery.2
ESI also opens the possibility that even if the initially alleged error or
negligence did not occur, the plaintiff could data mine the electronic in-formation until it found another piece of data that might indicate a mis-take (Terry 2001). Hospitals may also fear that in the course of discoveryfor a single malpractice case, the electronic information will reveal a
system-wide error in the EMR system’s clinical guidelines and alertsthat would affect a large class of patients, thereby amplifying the riskrelative to paper documents.
Requests for ESI may cause problems for defendants because the meta-data contained in the electronic record can give the impression that med-
ical records have been tampered with. This is a particular point ofvulnerability for defendants in court. One example, given to us by anindustry insider, was the case of a radiologist in Arizona who prior to adeposition accessed the patient’s record to review its contents. By doing
so, they inadvertently created a timestamp which suggested that the recordhad been “modified” just prior to the deposition. In Arizona, the absenceof clear rules meant that this inadvertent electronic data were not admittedas evidence, but legal experts say that under new state rules, this electronic
evidence of possible “tampering” could be used effectively by the plaintiffto have medical evidence dismissed. Electronic timestamps may also revealinappropriate corrections to a medical record, inaccurate data entry, andunauthorized access.
Further, if there are informal practices in a hospital, which go againstofficial protocol, they will also be recorded. For example, in some hos-
pitals when nurses are called away in an emergency from making regularchecks on patients recovering from surgery, they can “correct” paper re-cords after the fact to indicate that they had made the checks. That is notpossible with EMRs. Similarly, Williams (2009) reports a case where the
2. This extension goes beyond the medical record information that hospitals are required
to provide to patients upon request under the Privacy Rule of the 1996 Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (AHIMA e-HIM Work Group on Defining the Legal
Health Record 2005; AHIMA e-HIM Work Group on e-Discovery 2006).
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focus of a medical malpractice suit was the fact that a nurse made entriesto an electronic record after the patient had died. If the patient records hadbeen in paper, there would have been no way of knowing for sure whenthese entries were made.
More generally, there is anecdotal evidence that e-discovery is viewed asa burden for medical providers. For example, at the IQPC’s 3rd ObstetricMalpractice Conference, held on November 10–11, 2009 at the SwissotelChicago, one session described e-discovery as “an aggressive enemy lurk-ing at the door of every hospital in the United States” and “a friend of theplaintiff’s bar,” explaining that “a wealth of digital information can ac-cumulate about a patient that is housed outside an organization’s legalmedical record. Attorneys in search of additional information pertinent toa lawsuit may view this data as containing digital Easter eggs waiting to bediscovered.”3
The existing academic literature has come to mixed conclusions.Feldman (2004) quotes survey evidence that shows that in 41 malpracticecases, there were no reported cases where an “automated record” hinderedthe defense process. He also discusses quotes from survey participants thatsuggest positive legal outcomes, such as “I know of three cases where theanesthesia record directly contributed to the anesthesiologist being dis-missed (from the suit).” Lane (2005) points out that it would be unwise toconclude from anecdotal evidence that electronic systems do not increasemalpractice exposure, because Feldman (2004) ignores the additionalrisk created by additional data stored in the electronic record. To try tounderstand how “malpractice risk” and adoption of EMRs may correlate,Virapongse et al. (2008) sent surveys to 1140 physicians in Massachusettsbut, after controlling for demographics, did not find a significantrelationship.
3. Data
We use technology data from the 2008 release of the HealthcareInformation and Management Systems Society AnalyticsTM Database(HADB). To control for time-varying hospital characteristics, we matchedthe HADB data with the American Hospital Association (AHA) surveyfrom 1994 to 2007. We study the initial EMR adoption decisions using theHADB–AHA-matched samples of 3599 hospitals that had not adoptedEMRs before 1994. The hospitals in our data were generally larger thanthe hospitals we could not match in the AHA data. On average, they had7530 when compared to the 2717 average annual admissions of thehospitals for which the HADB data did not contain information on IT
3. The full session description is available at http://www.iqpc.com/Event.
aspx?id¼222598.
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adoption.4 Therefore, our estimates should be taken as representative onlyof larger hospitals. Looking ahead, in Section 5, we show that smallerhospitals respond more negatively to the presence of e-discovery laws.Thus, it seems likely that by omitting smaller hospitals, we are understat-ing the average impact of the potential for the use of electronic data in thecourt on EMR adoption.
Table 2 describes the main variables in our regressions, including themultiple control variables that we use to control for hospital-level hetero-geneity. Appendix Table A1 reports summary statistics for the initial yearof the sample, separately for hospitals in states that did and did not adopte-discovery rules by 2007. On average, the two sets of hospitals appearquite similar.
We measure adoption of EMRs by whether a hospital has installed orhas entered into a contract installing an “enterprise EMR” system.Installing EMRs in a hospital setting may take many years, so we defineadoption by whether or not the hospital has contracted with a EMRsvendor to set up an EMR system in that year. This is because it is thedecision to choose to install an EMRs, which will be influenced by thepotential of electronic data in litigation rather than the EMRs’ completiondate. Enterprise EMRs software provides the software skeleton thatunderlies other potential add-ins, such as clinical decision support, a clin-ical data repository, and order entry. EMRs software can therefore pro-vide the electronic metadata, such as timestamps, file modification dates,and user access details, which increase the amount of information avail-able to lawyers in a medical malpractice case when compared to paperrecords. Of the 3599 hospitals in our sample, 1400 hospitals adoptedEMRs during the sample period between 1994 and 2007 and 2199 hadnot adopted by the end of 2007.5 The average annual adoption rate ofEMRs among hospitals that had not previously adopted the technologywas 3.3%.
We focus on how the expected malpractice costs associated with EMRsaffect hospital adoption decisions, because the EMR system ishospital-wide. However, malpractice cases may not be hospital-wide.Litigation resulting from hospital care may be directed at the hospital;at the physician and other members of the medical team as well as the hos-pital; or at individual members of the medical team. Therefore, thehospital adoption decision may reflect not only its direct perception ofthe negative consequences of electronic data being used in the court foritself, but also the negative consequences faced by its physicians, if the
4. Also, we do not have information on hospitals that were in operation during the sample
period but that were closed before 2007, but this represents <1% of the AHA sample. Two
hundred and four hospitals in the matched sample first appear in the AHA data after 1994.
5. Nonadopting hospitals are included in the sample for all years with available AHAdata
and contribute 29,729 of the hospital-year observations. Hospitals that adopt during the
sample period are observed for an average of 8.8 years and contribute the remaining
12,377 observations.
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hospital worries that this could interfere with employing high-caliberphysicians.
4. Results
We first examine the aggregate impact of rules that clarify the use ofe-discovery in the pretrial stages of medical malpractice suits on adoptionof EMRs. As described in Section 2.1, these rules increase how muchelectronic information a plaintiff’s lawyer may receive automatically aspart of pretrial disclosure. As such, the rules are expected to magnify theimpact of electronic information on the litigation process.
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Full Sample
Variable Mean (SD) Min Max
Adopt EMR 0.033 (0.18) 0 1
Adopt business intelligence software 0.0083 (0.091) 0 1
Adopt financial data warehousing software 0.0067 (0.082) 0 1
E-discovery rule 0.11 (0.31) 0 1
Years opened 34.3 (34.4) 0 190
Staffed beds 182.9 (174.9) 3 1875
Admissions (000) 7.53 (8.12) 0.0030 98.2
Inpatient days (000) 42.7 (48.2) 0.0040 582.0
Medicare inpatient days (000) 19.2 (21.1) 0 476.9
Medicaid inpatient days (000) 8.43 (14.3) 0 302.8
Births 896.9 (1257.0) 0 16463
Total inpatient operations (000) 2.26 (2.87) 0 83.1
Total operations (000) 5.88 (6.64) 0 213.4
Emergency outpatient visits (000) 23.5 (21.8) 0 290.1
Total outpatient visits (000) 112.5 (147.2) 0 2935.9
Total payroll expenses (USDm) 35.7 (52.1) 0.037 1116.5
Employee benefits (USDm) 8.19 (12.7) 0 294.5
Total expenses (USDm) 85.0 (125.2) 0.095 2393.8
Length of stay 1.01 (0.078) 1 2
No. of doctors 15.5 (65.0) 0 2067
No. of nurses 219.4 (279.2) 0 3325
No. of trainees 19.0 (82.2) 0 1347
Nonmedical staff 608.7 (769.2) 0 12,054
PPO 0.64 (0.48) 0 1
HMO 0.56 (0.50) 0 1
Member hospital system 0.48 (0.50) 0 1
Speciality hospital 0.036 (0.19) 0 1
Nonprofit 0.60 (0.49) 0 1
Gross state product (USDtr) 0.38 (0.37) 0.014 1.81
Gross state product per capita (USD000) 32.5 (4.99) 20.9 58.8
EMR-related malpractice payouts (USDm) 0.26 (0.11) 0.022 0.92
EMR-unrelated malpractice payouts (USDm) 0.18 (0.072) 0.041 0.81
Cap punitive 0.55 (0.50) 0 1
Cap noneconomic 0.36 (0.48) 0 1
Joint + several liability 0.79 (0.41) 0 1
Contingency fee 0.39 (0.49) 0 1
No. of observations 42,106
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We model hospitals as maximizing an objective function that includes
net revenues and patient outcomes, including potential costs associatedwith malpractice lawsuits. Hospitals choose to adopt EMRs, if the net
benefits are positive. We model adoption of EMRs as an irreversible,
absorbing state and exclude hospitals that have previously adopted
from the sample. Examining the past years of HADB data confirms thatthere are no observations where a hospital divests itself of an EMR system
without seeking a replacement. We use a discrete-time hazard model since
our survival time data are discrete (the year of adoption). Discrete survival
time models can be estimated using standard binary choice methods, if thepanel is limited to time periods for each firm when it is still at risk of the
event (Allison 1982). We use a probit specification to model adoption
decisions. Our results are robust to using a linear probability model,
a logit specification, or a Cox proportional hazards model (AppendixTable A2).
We model the probability that a hospital i in state j adopts EMR in year
t as
ProbðAdoptEMRijt ¼ 1jE-discoveryRulejt,XijtÞ
¼ �ðE-discoveryRuleijt,Xijt, �Þð1Þ
E-discoveryRulejt, our key variable of interest is an indicator for the
presence of an e-discovery rule in that state in year t. Xijt is a vector ofhospital characteristics in year t as described in Table 2, which affect the
propensity to exchange information, g is a vector of unknown parameters,
and � is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution.Robust standard errors (SEs) are clustered at the state level. This allows
for the potential correlation within states over time and between hospitals.
This robustness is especially important for our study because the policy
variation occurs at the state level (Bertrand et al. 2004). Clustering errors
at the hospital level produces similar estimates but they are somewhatsmaller for the main variable of interest.6 This suggests that clustering
at the state level provides a more conservative and appropriate test for
the impact of the state-level policies we study.Table 3 reports our initial results. Column (1) reflects the results of our
initial panel specification that includes the full set of state and year fixed
effects. Here, the presence of a rule that facilitates e-discovery is associated
with a statistically significant 0.24 reduction in the latent variable captur-
ing the net value of adoption of EMRs. At the sample mean, this translatesto a marginal effect of e-discovery rules lowering the likelihood of adopt-
ing EMRs by 0.011 each year. This represents a large (one-third) decrease
relative to the average propensity to adopt 0.033 each year. These
6. Double clustering at the state and hospital level produces comparable estimates that are
significant at the p< 0.01 level.
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Ta
ble
3.
Ho
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230 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V30 N2
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estimates are identified from within-state variation in adoption ratesaround the time that state e-discovery rules are put in place.
In Column (2), we add a full set of hospital- and state-level controlvariables to capture differences in hospital characteristics over time.This means that we can control explicitly for changes in hospital charac-teristics that may be correlated with the rules. For example, if states thatwere more likely to enact an e-discovery rule also had hospitals that werelikely to adopt earlier, because they were growing, then the potential foronly small hospitals to have not adopted after the enactment of the rulecould give rise to a spurious negative correlation between the enactment ofthe rule and adoption in the state. However, adding all of these controlvariables leaves the key effect of the e-discovery rule largely unchanged.
Many of the coefficients on the hospital-level control variables are in-significant. Being a speciality hospital, a nonprofit hospital, a member of ahospital system, having higher employee benefits, having longer averagepatient length of stays, more emergency room visits, and relatively fewertrainees and nurses are all linked with hospitals that are more likely toadopt EMR.
Column (3) of Table 3 reports the results of a specification where wecontrol directly for changes in other laws that may affect medical mal-practice costs. These changes may be problematic for the interpretation ofthe results in earlier columns, if they are correlated with the enactment ofe-discovery. Our data on state-level tort reforms are based on an updatedversion of Avraham (2006), which documents changes in state-level regu-lations that affected caps on medical malpractice payouts, the use of con-tingency fees, and the allocation of liability. We include separate controlvariables for limits on punitive and economic damages.
The addition of tort reform has an insignificant impact on the estimatedcoefficient for e-discovery rules. The e-discovery coefficient is �0.233. Themarginal effect at the sample mean is �0.011, or a one-third decrease inthe propensity to adopt, as in Columns 1 and 2. The reforms themselvesare generally unrelated to adoption of EMRs.
Column (4) of Table 3 reports the results of a specification in which wecontrol for differences in the level of the installed base of EMR in theprevious year for that state. This directly addresses the concern that ourresults are an artifact of states that pass these rules having many earlyadopters, meaning that after the rule is passed, there are few hospitals leftwho actually would benefit from adopting EMRs. Although the laggedinstalled-base variable itself has a positive and significant relationship withEMR adoption, its inclusion has a negligible impact on the main estimateof interest.
Two additional robustness checks are reported in the last two Columnsof Table 3. Miller and Tucker (2009) document the importance of privacyregulation as a driver of EMRs adoption. Column (5) shows that control-ling for the presence of state-level privacy laws limiting the disclosure ofpersonal medical information by hospitals does not alter the estimated
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impact of e-discovery. Column (6) shows that the main effect also remainsnegative and significant after allowing for separate linear time trends inEMR adoption for states that pass e-discovery rules during the sampleperiod.
4.1 Timing of Rules
To address the possibility that the enactment of e-discovery rules iscorrelated with unobserved trends in technology adoption in that state,in Table 4, we report results from a falsification exercise in which we use a“false” adoption date for state e-discovery rules. For each state with ane-discovery law, we create three “false” e-discovery rules passed 1, 2, and 3years before the actual enactment date. The idea of doing such a falsifi-cation test is that if our estimates are reflecting some change in the timetrend of adoption behavior in the states that enact rules but that is notrelated to the actual rule, then the placebo will pick up some of this timetrend. For easy comparison, we report the estimate from our main model(Column (4) of Table 3) in Column (1). In Column (2), we report estimatesfrom a model that includes the true e-discovery adoption date, as well asthe false dates in each of the three preceding years. The lack of a relation-ship with the false law suggests that the changes in adoption followede-discovery rules rather than preceding them.7
Column (3) of Table 4 builds on these estimates to investigate the dy-namic impact of e-discovery rules on EMR adoption. The main finding ofColumn (2) is repeated in that there are no significant pre-trends leadingup to the law. There are also no significant differential trends followinge-discovery rules either. The lack of any significant coefficient for rulesstarting 1, 2, or 3 years after the actual enactment date suggests that thelonger term effects of the rule on adoption rates resemble the immediateeffects. This implies that the total impact on adoption accumulates overtime, but the annual reduction shows no systematic pattern of increasingor decreasing magnitude. Column (4) provides additional evidence for theconstancy of the incremental impact by reporting the estimated impact ofthe e-discovery rules on a sample that excludes data from Illinois andTexas, the two states with e-discovery rules in place by 2000.8
4.2 Different Technologies
Table 5 investigates how e-discovery rules affects different types of tech-nology. Column (1) repeats the previously reported main estimate for
7. In other estimation, when we measure separate impacts of each of the false rules in
isolation, we obtain negative point estimates that are both smaller than the main estimate
(ranging from �0.0395 to �0.0562) and statistically insignificant.
8. The immediate negative impact of the e-discovery rule on adoption is consistent with
anecdotal evidence from changes in medical malpractice insurance premiums for physicians
in Illinois around the time its rule was enacted, as reported in the Medical Liability Monitor.
Premiums increased for one insurer by 28–40% (depending on specialty and region) over the 2
years that ended after enactment, but by only 8–12% over the following 2 years.
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adoption of EMRs. Column (2) shows a similar negative impact ofe-discovery rules on the adoption of a related technology, ComputerizedPhysician Order Entry (CPOE) systems. These systems can record anddisseminate instructions for patient treatments and often include safetyfeatures, such as error checking and clinical decision support tools (such asautomated warnings for potential drug interactions). As with EMRs, theincreased record-keeping associated with CPOEs has been identified as apotential risk in malpractice cases where e-discovery is present (Greenbergand Ridgely 2011). The reduction in CPOE adoption provides further
Table 4. Dynamic Effects and Timing of Rules
Variable Main Placebo
rules
Placebo
rules
Exclude
early rules
(1) (2) (3) (4)
False e-discovery rule: 3 years before �0.0242 �0.0234
(0.102) (0.101)
False e-discovery rule: 2 years before �0.0206 �0.0206
(0.144) (0.145)
False e-discovery rule: 1 year before 0.124 0.124
(0.112) (0.112)
E-discovery rule �0.235** �0.301** �0.313*** �0.273*
(0.109) (0.131) (0.112) (0.162)
False e-discovery rule: 1 year after 0.0617
(0.190)
False e-discovery rule: 2 years after �0.151
(0.173)
False e-discovery rule: 3 years after 0.111
(0.0967)
Observations 42,106 42,106 42,106 36,814
Log likelihood �5571.9 �5570.9 �5570.5 �4935.9
All estimates in this table are from models that include the full set of state and year fixed effects as well as the full
set of hospital control variables (years opened, staffed beds, admissions, inpatient days, medicare inpatient days,
Medicaid inpatient days, births, total inpatient operations, total operations, emergency outpatient visits, total outpa-
tient visits, total payroll expenses, employee benefits, total expenses, length of stay, number of doctors, number of
nurses, number of trainees, nonmedical staff, PPO, HMO, hospital system member, specialty hospital, and non-
profit), state control variables (gross state product and gross state product per capita), lagged installed base of
EMRs, and tort law control variables (punitive cap, noneconomic damages cap, joint and several liability, and
contingency fee limits). SEs clustered at the state level. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
Table 5. Effects on Different Hospital Information Technologies
Variable EMR CPOE Financial data
warehouse
Business
intelligence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
E-discovery rule �0.235** �0.258** 0.150 0.191
(0.109) (0.119) (0.159) (0.196)
Observations 42106 46252 46180 47252
Log likelihood �5571.9 �4267.7 �2024.1 �2231.9
All estimates in this table are from models that include the full set of state and year fixed effects as well as the full
set of hospital, state, and tort law control variables (listed in Table 4), and lagged installed base. SEs clustered at
the state level. **p< 0.05.
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evidence of a decline in clinical IT adoption following the enactment ofe-discovery rules.
In contrast, in the spirit of our previous falsification tests, in the nexttwo columns of the table, we report estimates from different placebo testusing alternative technologies that are unlikely to affect pretrial discovery:Financial Data Management Software and Business IntelligenceSoftware. These technologies, while used in hospital record-keeping, donot produce data that is part of a legal medical record. We found nosignificant effects from state e-discovery rules on these technologiesand the point estimates are positive. This suggests that the main resultin Table 3 is not being driven by a spurious negative correlation betweene-discovery rules and healthcare IT adoption more generally.
5. Heterogeneous Effects of E-Discovery Rules
5.1 E-Discovery and Different Types of Malpractice Cases
This section explores how the effect of the e-discovery rule is mediated bythe size and nature of the medical malpractice payments associated withpractitioners working in that state. Our hypothesis is that higher malprac-tice payments by practitioners translate into greater financial risk to hos-pitals from malpractice, either because hospitals themselves face increasedfinancial exposure in medical malpractice suits or because hospitals com-pete for physicians and would need to compensate them for increasingtheir exposure to electronic data in malpractice cases. We use data fromthe national practitioner databank of all medical malpractice payments.9
The files are the universe of all claims paid in the United States, but do notinclude information on complaints and litigation that did not result in apayment.10 We use payments from the previous year to predict adoption,avoiding the potential reverse causality that could otherwise run fromadoption of EMRs to malpractice payments.
Using the three-digit allegation claim category code, we determinewhether each payment is potentially related or unrelated to EMRs.Claims related to EMRs are from mistakes that might be prevented ordocumented by EMRs. An example of a claim that could be theoreticallysupported by electronic metadata in an EMR is a “failure to monitor” apatient sufficiently. An example of a claim that could be theoreticallyprevented by EMRs is a claim of a “wrong dosage” being administeredby a nurse, since EMRs theoretically remove the uncertainties introducedby a physician’s handwriting and idiosyncratic use of unit abbreviations.Other claims in the first category include a “failure to diagnose,” whereeasy access to a patient’s previous medical history may make diagnosis
9. Downloaded from http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/.
10. The practitioner databank is the most comprehensive source of malpractice payments,
with full coverage of practitioners and inclusion of both settlements and verdicts. The Jury
Verdict Research data exclude settlements and the Physician Insurer Association of America
Data Sharing Project contains only �12% of the claims.
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easier, but a failure to use the history would also be documented and could
be used in the court. The second category of claims are those that are not
likely to be affected by EMRs. An example is “Surgical or Other Foreign
Body Retained.” It is unlikely that the presence of an EMRs would affect
the likelihood of a surgeon leaving behind a piece of operating equipment
within a patient, and if the surgeon is unaware he or she has done so, it
would not be in the EMR.The results in Table 6 show how the presence of an e-discovery rule is
mediated by the average payment in that state for a medical case for each
of these claims classes. To ensure comparability, we use a state-specific
mean standardized and centered measure of the average payment data.11
The average size of claims that are associated with practices that might be
related to EMRs has a statistically significant negative interaction with the
presence of a law. The sizes of the estimates imply that increasing the value
of EMR-related claims from its mean to a value 1 SD above the mean
increases the e-discovery coefficient by�50% (from�0.214 to�0.325). In
contrast, unrelated claims have statistically insignificant effects on the
estimated impact of an e-discovery law. This suggests that when a hospital
is in a state where there are large medical malpractice payouts for lawsuits
that would be documented by EMRs, a rule facilitating e-discovery would
be incrementally negatively correlated with adoption. These separate ef-
fects are confirmed in Column (3) where a single model is estimated with
both types of payouts and interactions. As pointed out by Ai and Norton
(2003), care is needed when evaluating the significance of interaction terms
in nonlinear models. Results from a linear probability model, however, are
reassuringly similar.Column (1) of Table 6 reports both a positive correlation between mal-
practice payments and adoption of EMRs in that Column and a negative
estimate of the effect of the interaction between e-discovery rules and
malpractice payments. Though this is just a correlation that may be sub-
ject to the usual confounds, one interpretation is that having an EMR
system in place can be an advantage for hospitals in documenting their
compliance with standard practices. However, this benefit is eliminated
when e-discovery rules put all electronic information by default in the
hands of the plaintiffs.In Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6, the interaction terms between
e-discovery rules and other types of malpractice payments are statistically
insignificant. However, consistent with the relationship in Column (1),
there is a positive relationship between EMR adoption and malpractice
cases stemming from allegations that might have been prevented by EMRs
in Column (3). For unrelated allegations, there is no such association.
11. We created the re-scaled variables by subtracting out the average payment amount in
the state over the entire sample period and then dividing by the state-specific standard devi-
ation across all payments in the sample period.
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5.2 Which Hospitals Are Affected by E-Discovery Rules?
We now consider how hospital characteristics may affect the correlations
between hospital EMRs adoption and the presence of e-discovery laws.
We find evidence that the most statistically significant moderator along
various dimensions is hospital size. Table 7 provides a summary of our
results. The three columns summarize specifications that include inter-
actions with an indicator variable that measures whether or not the hos-
pital has a below median number of total admissions, expenses, and
nonmedical staff. In all cases, we find a negative interaction with whether
a hospital is small by that measure and whether a state has an e-discovery
rule in place. The largest interaction by size is the interaction with the size
of the support staff. To control for the Ai and Norton (2003) critique, we
also estimated a linear probability model with similar results.We speculate that this result may reflect the costs and difficulties asso-
ciated with preparing electronic data for discovery for civil trial. There is
anecdotal evidence that some hospitals with EMRs attempt to gain con-
trol over this risk by engaging in costly activities, such as retaining dupli-
cate paper records in order to provide supplementary evidence in the case
that timestamps are unreliable, or purchasing expensive customized soft-
ware modules to limit the content included in the legal medical record.
Hospitals that do not employ large enough legal and IT teams may be
therefore placed at a relative disadvantage, if EMRs are brought into the
discovery process. Losey (2008) urges institutions that face substantial
e-discovery risks to establish an internal e-discovery preparedness and
response team, consisting of one or more outside attorneys who specialize
in e-discovery as well as representatives from the legal team, IT depart-
ment, key business departments as well as records and compliance units.
Such costly and complex organizational requirements may deter smaller
hospitals more. In addition, hospitals that face the prospect of e-discovery
Table 6. Different Types of Medical Malpractice Claims Mediate the Effect of
E-discovery Rules on Hospital Adoption of EMRs
Variable (1) (2) (3)
E-discovery rule �0.214** �0.200** �0.208**
E-discovery rule*EMR-related
malpractice payouts
�0.111*** �0.102*
EMR-related malpractice payouts 0.0458** 0.0489**
E-discovery rule *EMR-unrelated
malpractice payouts
�0.0777 �0.0120
EMR-unrelated malpractice payouts �0.00987 �0.0219
Observations 42106 42106 42106
Log likelihood �5567.9 �5570.7 �5567.3
All estimates in this table are from models that include the full set of state and year fixed effects as well as the full
set of hospital, state, and tort law control variables (listed in Table 4), and lagged installed base. SEs clustered at
the state level. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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would need to invest in additional storage and IT management systems toprevent unintentional data loss.
6. Conclusion
This article documents how the presence of state e-discovery laws affectsthe adoption of EMRs. On the one hand, it seemed possible that the use ofelectronic records might facilitate a hospital’s defense, by providing abroader and more robust standard of documentation. On the otherhand, it seemed possible that the increase in the breadth of evidence andthe possibility of “data-mining” by the plaintiff’s lawyers might increasehospitals’ perception of the potential for negative consequences of elec-tronic medical data being used in the court.
Our empirical analysis suggests that state rules that clarify the use ofelectronic evidence in discovery are associated with a one-third decrease inadoption of EMRs by hospitals. The implication of this finding is thatthere may be previously ignored welfare effects from the risk and expectedcost of litigation on the spread of certain new technologies that storeelectronic data. Although we have focused on the adoption of healthIT, this deterrence effect may be present in other sectors of the economywhere companies make choices about converting records from paper toelectronic methods of storage.
There has been a substantial federal push to ensure widespread adop-tion of EMRs, providing financial incentives of approximately $44,000 perphysician under the 2009 HITECH Act. However, such policies have as ofyet not addressed this issue of the potential use of electronic data in mal-practice cases when designing incentives. Our research suggests that hos-pitals’ concerns about the use of electronic data in malpractice cases maylimit the effectiveness of such financial subsidies. If the efforts to promoteadoption of EMRs are to be effective, they should be coupled with efforts
Table 7. Which Hospitals’ Adoption is Affected by E-discovery Laws?
Variable (1) (2) (3)
E-discovery rule �0.153 �0.159 �0.149
(0.103) (0.107) (0.121)
E-discovery rule*low admissions �0.221***
(0.0853)
E-discovery rule*low total budget �0.196**
(0.0779)
E-discovery rule*low nonmedical staff �0.228**
(0.0925)
Observations 42,106 42,106 42,106
Log likelihood �5568.4 �5569.1 �5568.2
All estimates in this table are from models that include the full set of state and year fixed effects as well as the full
set of hospital, state, and tort law control variables (listed in Table 4), and lagged installed base. SEs clustered at
the state level. **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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to streamline and guide the use of electronic data in court proceedings, toreduce hospitals’ perceived costs from malpractice claims enabled byEMRs.
Several limitations are worth noting. First, we only study the effect ofe-discovery rules on the adoption of EMRs, not how they are actuallyused. It is possible that hospitals that fear litigation end up not fully usingtheir EMRs, for fear of future data mining. If this is the case, then ourestimates may understate the extent of the problem. Second, when a stateenacts an e-discovery rule, the local medical and legal press commonlypublish articles that address issues of e-discovery and the potential coststhey entail. We recognize that, therefore, our regressions measure theeffect of the enactment of an e-discovery law (and the attention that sur-rounds the enactment) as opposed to the pure causal effect of an unpub-licized change in the wording of the law.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Summary Statistics in 1994 by E-Discovery Rule in 2007
No rule Rule
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Adopt EMR 0.011 (0.10) 0.017(0.13)
E-discovery rule 0 (0) 0 (0)
Years opened 35.2 (34.6) 37.2 (36.7)
Staffed beds 189.1 (168.3) 206.4 (198.2)
Admissions (000) 6.89 (6.89) 7.07 (7.49)
Inpatient days (000) 42.5 (44.5) 50.1 (58.0)
Medicare inpatient days (000) 19.3 (20.1) 22.3 (24.8)
Medicaid inpatient days (000) 7.99 (13.3) 10.7 (20.2)
Births 875.9 (1205.0) 920.3(1226.6)
Total inpatient operations (000) 2.24 (2.67) 2.28 (2.82)
Total operations (000) 5.29 (5.86) 5.09 (5.58)
Emergency outpatient visits (000) 20.5 (18.8) 20.5 (18.9)
Total outpatient visits (000) 83.7 (100.5) 86.8 (110.5)
Total payroll expenses (USDm) 25.8 (32.6) 29.4 (42.5)
Employee benefits (USDm) 5.83 (8.00) 6.55 (10.1)
Total expenses (USDm) 60.0 (78.6) 64.6 (91.4)
Length of stay 1.01 (0.086) 1.01 (0.100)
No. of doctors 10.2 (42.3) 13.7 (51.3)
No. of nurses 198.1 (234.3) 205.4 (256.4)
No. of trainees 16.1 (70.3) 22.7 (87.1)
Nonmedical staff 559.7 (642.9) 612.7 (783.0)
PPO 0.57 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49)
HMO 0.45 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50)
Member hospital system 0.40 (0.49) 0.36 (0.48)
Speciality hospital 0.030 (0.17) 0.046 (0.21)
Nonprofit 0.63 (0.48) 0.61 (0.49)
Gross state product (USDtr) 0.27 (0.27) 0.34 (0.21)
Gross state product per capita (USD000) 28.1 (2.92) 30.4 (4.19)
EMR-related malpractice payouts (USDm) 0.18 (0.065) 0.20 (0.057)
EMR-unrelated malpractice payouts (USDm) 0.12 (0.049) 0.16 (0.052)
Cap punitive 0.35 (0.48) 0.52 (0.50)
Cap noneconomic 0.37 (0.48) 0.042 (0.20)
Joint + several liability 0.64 (0.48) 0.92 (0.28)
Contingency fee 0.40 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49)
No. of observations 1092 2303
The sample for this table excludes the 204 hospitals (of the 3599 hospitals in our analytical sample) that appear only
in AHA surveys after 1994.
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Table A2. Robustness to Alternative Estimation Models
Linear probability model Logit model Cox proportional
hazards model
(1) (2) (3)
E-discovery rule �0.0157*** �0.526*** �0.498**
(0.00457) (0.169) (0.254)
Observations 42,106 42,106 42,106
All estimates in this table are from models that include the full set of state and year fixed effects as well as the full
set of hospital, state, and tort law control variables (listed in Table 4), and lagged installed base. SEs in parenth-
eses. *p<0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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