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114 JFQ / Spring 1994

CHINAS MILITARYCLASSICSA Review Essay byARTHUR WALDRON

The difference between Westernand Chinese ways of war, ifthere is one, will probably befound in differing emphases on thematerial as opposed to the mentalaspects of conflict. Western militaryhistory is an account of ever largerarmies and technological break-throughs. The Chinese tradition, bycontrast, with technology oftenchanging very little over long peri-ods of time, stresses strategy andpsychological advantage as keys tosuccess. Hence the verdicts of theirtheorists: for Clausewitz war is anact of force; for Sun Tzuas will beseen in some of the translationswar is above all the art of deception.

This difference has more thanacademic importance. The Chineseapproach to warfare has a certain at-tractiveness today as Western war-fare seems to be reaching its limits,chiefly since key technology (that is,nuclear weaponry) makes the sort oftotal war which Clausewitz contem-plated increasingly unthinkable.Those nations that could theoreti-cally destroy the world realize thateven, or perhaps particularly, suchmassive force is of little practical usein achieving the ends of policy. Sostrategic and psychological acumen,traditionally a Chinese forte, lookmore and more relevant.

These are not novel ideas: in-deed some version of them has beenpart of Western military discoursesince at least the period followingWorld War I when the search for away around the Western Front ledthinkers like Liddell Hart to recog-nize the affinity between the revivedWestern interest in the indirect ap-proach and the concepts of Sun Tzu

and other Chinese strategists. But itwas impossible until recently foranyone but a China specialist to gomuch further. The reason was thatfor even the most serious and moti-vated specialist the necessary sourcessimply did not exist. English-lan-guage studies of Chinese warfarewere sketchy and highly technical.The major text, Sun Tzus Art of War,was available in the 1910 translationby Lionel Giles or the 1963 versionby Samuel B. Griffith. And good

though the two translations were,they did not provide enough.

That situation has now changeddramatically. The last few years haveseen a flood of good books on Chi-nese warfare. Within months of eachother three excellent translations ofSun Tzu have appeared, and over thelast several years new versions ofother key texts on war have beenpublished as well as a magnificenttranslation of Three Kingdoms, Chinasgreatest epic on politics and conflict.At last the rich tradition of Chinesethought about warfare is becomingaccessible to the nonspecialist.

The best point of departure forexamining why the Chinese under-standing of war differs in some fun-damental respects to that of the Westis probably the San-Kuo yen-i, anepisodic novel of great length andcomplexity that is available under thetitle Three Kingdoms in a fine transla-tion by Moss Roberts of New YorkUniversity. Composed in the 14thcentury, yet based upon texts and tra-ditions a millennium older, it is thestory of a dividing China at the endof the 3rd century A.D. as the Han dy-nasty neared its end and war ragedover whether to save or replace it.Generations of Chinese have come toknow the characters in the ThreeKingdoms just as well as Westernersonce knew biblical stories or someknow todays sitcoms. There is TsaoTsao, the clever and amoral courtierscheming against his own sovereign,Liu Pei, the loyalist who perishes inwhat he knows is a futile struggle,and most importantly, Chu-ko Liang,the brilliant strategist who gives up areclusive life of study and contempla-tion of nature to serve the dynasty.

Portions of Robertss translationappeared in his 1976 publication ofan abridged version of the novel(which is still a manageable intro-duction though it lacks the sweepand extensive notes of the 1991 edi-tion). While the story is absorbingand full of social and militarydrama, the conflict described differsin many ways from the sort of warfamiliar in the West. There are war-riors to be sure, but less time is spenton their clashes than in comparablewestern works such the Iliad. We re-member the chief characters not so

Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel

attributed to Luo Guanzhong.Translated and with notes by Moss RobertsBerkeley: University of California Press;Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1991.

1,096 pp. $100.00.[ISBN 0520068211]

The Book of Stratagems:Tactics for Triumph

and Survivalby Harro Von Senger

Edited and translated by Myron B. GubitzNew York: Viking, 1991.

397 pp. $24.95.[ISBN 0670839620]

The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China

Translation and commentary byRalph D. Sawyer with Mei-Chn Sawyer

Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.568 pp. $29.95.

[ISBN 0813312280]

Sun Tzu: The New Translationby J.H. Huang

New York: William Morrow, 1993.288 pp. $10.00.

[ISBN 0688124003]

Sun Tzu: The Art of WarfareTranslated and with an introduction and commentary by T. Roger Ames

New York: Ballantine Books, 1993.321 pp. $25.00.

[ISBN 034536239X]

Sun Tzu: Art of WarTranslated by Ralph D. Sawyer

in collaboration with Mei-chn Lee Sawyer

Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.375 pp. $9.95.

[ISBN 081331951X]

Arthur Waldron teaches strategy at theNaval War College and is also an adjunctprofessor of east Asian studies at BrownUniversity. He is the author of The GreatWall of China: From History to Myth.

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Spring 1994 / JFQ 115

much for feats of arms as for theirmoral and intellectual qualities.

Chu-ko Liang is perhaps thebest example, for of his characterthere is no doubt. Although he hasturned away from the world to seekpeace as a simple farmer, he remainsthoroughly loyal to the legitimateHan ruling house, and when askedreemerges to serve it. Of what doeshis service consist? Above all, hisanalysis of strategy. Liu Pei, a loyalistleader, goes repeatedly to Chu-koshermitage. When finally admittedhe finds that Chu-ko Liang is totallyfamiliar with the dynastys situationand pulls out a map to sketch an op-timum counter-strategy. Joining theloyalists Chu-ko serves with greatpersonal bravery, dying on cam-paign. But it was his ability to get atthe heart of strategic questions thatbrought the Han loyalists to himand that has kept his fame brightamong Chinese ever since.

Is there a Western equivalent toChu-ko Liang? To Clausewitz, Napo-leon was the god of war, but Napo-leon never offered a systematic ap-praisal of the strategic situation ascomprehensive as Chu-ko Liang didfor the tottering Han dynasty. Beforerecommending an action Chu-koLiang carefully analyzed its potentialimpact on relations among contend-ing states, and it was this insightabove all that led to his success. Bycontrast Napoleon won through acombination of numerical superiorityand tactical brilliance, levying onearmy after another while graduallybeggaring France, and moving withspeed and cleverness to hit hard, butnevertheless with remarkably little at-tention to a comprehensive strat-egya weakness he shared with ahost of Western military heroes.

This stress on stratagems in oneculture and on material and opera-tional strengths in the other is ar-guably a basic difference betweenChinese and Western warfare. Thevery term strategy is derived from theGreek strategia meaning generalship,and thus conveys the notion ofcommand. Equivalent words in Chi-nesechi, tse, mou, and others com-monly rendered as stratagemhave

no such operational derivation: theyrefer directly to plans, a fact whichunderlines the stress, even very earlyin China, on thought over action.Several recent publications makethis point explicitly, among themCarl-Alrecht Seyschabs The Thirty-six Stratagems: Orthodoxy againstHeterodoxy in East Asian Civiliza-tions and Harro Von Sengers TheBook of Stratagems: Tactics for Tri-umph and Survival. These workstranslate and explicate a recent Chi-nese text on a traditional subject,the Thirty-six Stratagems, a collec-tion of phrases which add up to only138 characters encapsulating variousapproaches to conflictsuch as be-siege Wei to rescue Zhao or lurethe tiger down from the moun-tainthat fascinate some Western-ers while others dismiss them asstrategy by fortune cookie. VonSenger supplies either the story fromwhich each phrase originated or astory which embodies the sense ofeach in a volume which is both in-teresting and culturally informative.

The making of strategy has beenesteemed since ancient times inChina above other military virtues,including ability to fight or developnew or improved weapons. Westernhistory is full of warriors renownedfor bravery and technologies notedfor innovation, from Greek fire toprecision guided munitions. Buthow many stratagems are remem-bered and celebrated? There are ex-amples such as Cannae or Inchon,but they are exceptions. In the Westbattles have been won by the sidethat pushed harder. In China, bycontrast, one finds fewer pitchedbattles and much more staked onthe working of strategy.

The reason for this contrast isnot an arbitrary cultural difference;the most distinct factor in the tradi-tional Chinese way of thinkingabout war was the sheer scale of thebattlefield. More than two thousandyears ago the Chinese were not con-tending for local power (which mayhave implied control of a state thesize of France), but for control of allunder heaventien-hsia, whicheven in those days was probablymore than a million square miles ofterritory. This area was too large to

be conquered by coercion alone,then or now. So from the beginningChinese military thinkers had toponder problems on a scale thatWesterners have confronted onlyquite recently. China was and is toobig to conquer militarily or rule bydirect coercion. The technique ofcontrolling it had to involve ele-ments other than the purely mili-tary. The belief that operational skillcould substitute for sound strategyjust plausible in Europe, and whichundid Napoleon and doomed Ger-many twice in this centuryneverwas credible in China. Those Chi-nese who were charged with militaryoperations instinctively consideredthem within a complex cultural, po-litical, and moral context.

Therefore ancient Chinese mili-tary works might appear rather mod-ern to the Western mind. Since atleast the beginning of revolutions inmilitary affairs in the early 19th cen-tury there has been a tendency inthe West to assume that increasedpower would make military solu-tions to problems easier. So time andagain we have looked to weapons fordecisivenessbe it rapid-firing guns,tanks, airpower, or current hightech. But with the advent of nuclearweapons and the expansion of po-tential battlefields to a global scale,we may reach a point where decisiveforce is increasingly difficult toachieve. This situation, however, isfamiliar to Chinese whose funda-mental approach to warfare stressesthe limits and hazards of relying tooheavily on force alone.

For guidance on operating insuch conditions, the Chinese regu-larly turned to specialists in ping fa,or the way of warfare, a number ofwhom have ancient texts attributedto them and who are not by anymeans adherents to a single ap-proach. Five ancient works and oneof later origin were collected about1073 in the Sung dynasty as Chinafaced a severe military threat; thiscollection became a standard workand has been influential ever since.Now it has been translated and in-troduced with great skill and clarity

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by Ralph Sawyer, a businessman andscholar, in a tome that should be onthe shelf of every officer with an in-terest in traditional Asian militarythought.

By far the most influential Chi-nese military thinker is Sun Tzu, andthree translations of the text bearinghis name have just been publishedby J.H. Huang (a Chinese philologistnow based in California), Roger T.Ames (a specialist in Chinese philos-ophy at the University of Hawaii),and Ralph D. Sawyer (the translationcan be found in his Seven MilitaryClassics, but a more extensive intro-duction and notes appear in a sepa-rate volume also listed above).

Each translation has a particularstrength: Huang presents the text intwo parallel columns, one unfoldingthe topic and the other giving SunTzus particular insights, that makesthe structure of text clear where itcan be obscured when published asone short paragraph after another.Amess edition is the most attractive,offering Chinese as well as Englishtexts, and an introduction whichwill have particular import for thoseinterested in Sun Tzu as a text ofphilosophy as well as strategy.Sawyer, however, is the only transla-tor of the three to present, in addi-tion to a very fine English version ofthe text, a comprehensive introduc-tion that provides the necessarybackground on Chinese warfare ofthe period. This fills half the vol-umepages which are well usedand is illustrated with helpful battlemaps and charts.

The differences among the threevolumes illustrate different ap-proaches that can be taken to SunTzu. Thus there are certain key wordsin Sun Tzu which are not easy to putinto English but are central to hiswhole approach. Dozens of examplescould be given but a few will have tosuffice.

One is the word kuei, found inthe passage that Griffith translatesAll warfare is based on deception.That sounds like a strong claim, andmany war college lecturers invoke itto argue that Sun Tzu meant some-thing very different than Clausewitz.Ames renders the passage Warfare isthe art (tao) of deceit while Sawyer

translates it Warfare is the way (tao)of deception. Huang, though, takesthe phrase very differently: Militaryoperations entail unconventionalmeans. From Huangs comments itemerges that the root meaning of qui(which others make deception) is to goagainst. The art of war is to goagainst [what is usually done] whichis to say employ unconventional means.Huang buttresses this reading by refer-ring to a Sung dynasty commentatorwho maintains that qui in this pas-sage meant skill in using forces anddid not connote deception.

The same is true of another cele-brated passage that Griffith translatesWhat is of supreme importance is toattack the enemys strategy. HereAmes is pretty much in agreement:The best military policy is to attackstrategies. Sawyer, however, is lessabstract: The highest realization ofwarfare is to attack the enemysplans and Huang more so: So thebest strategy is to crush their plans.Perhaps the most interesting exam-ple of such a word is shih, which isfound in the title of the fifth book.Griffith translates this as energy;Huang makes it combat power; Sawyerrenders it strategic military power;Ames translates it strategic advantage.Each has its warrant, but again thedifferences are revealing.

Huangs combat power (like hisunconventional means) is the transla-tion that sounds most like Westernmilitary language (though it is sup-ported by references to ancient us-ages in the Shuo-wen, I-ching, andother classics). It contains little hintof Chinese philosophy, but rathersuggests something quite familiar inthe West: force or power (either la-tent as in a set crossbow or un-leashed as in a flood able to moveboulders). Sawyers translation issimilar, but Ames, who has writtenextensively on the terms meaning,takes a suggestion from the contem-porary scholar Hs Fu-Kuan that theword was first used to discuss con-tention over advantageous terrain.That is, as Ames reads the text, evena word which might sound intellec-tually congenial to a Westernerthe

rubric under which firepower orthrow-weight might be foundac-quires a rather abstract thrust. One isnot looking simply for power, butrather for circumstanceswhetherterrain, correlation of forces, or psy-chological advantage or disadvan-tagethat are conducive to victory.

In English we would use at leasttwo different terms to express thesetwo aspects of meaning: the one ma-terial, the other intellectual and psy-chological. The Chinese use onlyone, not because they are confused,but simply because they slice realitydifferently. They see the strategic as-pect of shih (choosing terrain or asituation that is advantageous) as in-separable from the physical aspect(combat power). So shih is not some-thing measurable although it has anobjective component. Above all it ispsychological, part of the Sun Tzu-nian understanding of conflictwhich implies that victory and de-feat are ultimately mental states.

Behind this lies a philosophicalbackgroundthe distinctions be-tween the ancient Chinese view of asingle universe and Greek dualism,between the temporal and the abso-lutewhich Ames illuminates in hisfine introduction. Before dismissingall this as too abstract, it is worthnoting that today, perhaps morethan in the past, the American mili-tary is being used in environmentsthat it cannot dominate by sheerforce. Military strategists today musttake the context in which they useforce as seriously as Sun Tzu, andrecognize that the shih of our mili-tary, however we measure it, is theproduct of a successful combinationof inherent strength with an advan-tageous situation.

Similar patterns of difference runthrough all three volumes. Oversim-plified they show that scholars donot agree on whether Sun Tzu essen-tially is a realistwhose fundamentalconcern is the use of force and who isthus largely understandable throughWestern analytical categoriesorwhether the text expounds an ap-proach to war that in its fundamentaldefinitions and assumptions differsprofoundly from the mainstream ofWestern military thought.

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This, of course, is a specific in-stance of a general question: is therea specifically Western way of war? Or,if there have been non-Western waysin the past, do they continue to existtoday? Or is everyone adopting theWestern model as manifested mostrecently in Operation Desert Storm?Even Sun Tzus homeland, the evi-dence would suggest, has adoptedthe Western way. How else are we toexplain the emphasis on weaponsand technology (whether in Pekingor Taipei) on which vast sums ofmoney are being spent?

To make that assessment, how-ever, is perhaps to fall into the trapof looking most closely at that withwhich we are most familiar. Theconcepts of war that underlie the useof new weapons which the Chineseare acquiring would be familiar toChu-ko Liang and Sun Tzu. Why?Because they are appropriate to ob-jective conditions, both physicaland psychological, of Chinese war-fare. Nor is their relevance limited.As mentioned earlier, the very quan-tity of firepower now available tothe military has rendered obsolete alot of Western thinking about war,in particular the notion of winningby a preponderance of force alone. Itmay be that the Chinese emphasison stratagemor to put it anotherway, on the autonomy and impor-tance of properly understanding andconceiving of waroffers an intel-lectual context for modern wea-ponry that the Western tradition hasdifficulty providing. That is a ques-tion for military professionals to de-termine. Now, at least, thanks to theworks reviewed here, nonspecialistsin Asian questions will at last have afoundation on which to base thatdetermination. JFQ

FALAISE, THE HIGHWAY OFDEATH, ANDMOGADISHUA Book Review bySTEVE E. DIETRICH

That history repeats itself is de-batable; that history offersglimpses of recurring problemsis undeniable. The parallels betweenNormandy and recent operations arehaunting illustrations of recurringproblems. Martin Blumensons TheBattle of the Generals is a provocativeassessment of the final operation ofthe Normandy campaign in 1944.He argues that had Allied comman-ders not faltered, it would have beenthe final operation of the war.

Blumenson highlights demandson senior leaders in the tactical, op-erational, and strategic arenas. He de-scribes difficulties of command, con-trol, and communications in amultilateral force dominated by bi-lateral agreements. Normandy offerscompelling examples of what occurswhen national objectives are at oddswith coalition planning. And he re-counts disagreement over air supportfor ground operations which revealflawed joint operations. Though theArmed Forces have made great stridesin joint and combined warfare, theimages recalled suggest similar recentchallenges to commanders across the

sands of the Arabian peninsula anddown the alleys of Mogadishu.

Blumenson is one of the last of abreed. His career began as an officialArmy historian serving in the Euro-pean theater during World War II. Hewrote two green books,1 authoredover a dozen other works, and editedThe Patton Papers.2 Hunched over anantiquated typewriter, carefully craft-ing each sentence, Blumenson writesin a delightful style. With flowing butsuccinct prose he packs more infor-mation into a single brief paragraphthan many authors cram into athirty-page chapterand he chal-lenges the reader to think. Conceivedfor a wide audience, The Battle of theGenerals is jargon-free and requires nospecial knowledge of World War II.Documentation is sparse, and seriousreaders will want to refer to bettermaps than those found in the book.

The Falaise pocket is not reallyan untold story. Blumenson himselftold it in Breakout and Pursuit.3 Butgreen book authors were instructedto detail what happened. It seemsBlumenson has written this latestbook to appease that old veteranwho said We dont need you histori-ans to tell us what we did, only weknow that. We need you to tell uswhy we did it. Here he succeeds.

The first third of the book pro-vides one of the best overviews avail-able of World War II Allied opera-

Lieutenant Colonel Steve E. Dietrich, USA,is Chief of the Military Studies Branch atthe U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has published a number of articles onPatton and is currently writing a mono-graph on the M1A1 roll-over program forDesert Storm.

The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the FalaisePocketThe Campaign That

Should Have Won World War IIby Martin Blumenson

New York: William Morrow, 1993.288 pp. $25.00.

[ISBN 0688118372]

Bradley and Patton.

U.S

. A

rmy

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tions in the Mediterranean and west-ern-European theaters prior to the D-Day landings. The middle chaptersdeal with the first two frustratingmonths of the Normandy campaign.In the final third, Blumenson ana-lyzes what happened at the Falaisepocket and critiques the generals. Hisassessment is fresh, almost shocking.

Blumenson portrays a dis-jointed alliance headed by ineptcommanders who were unable toproperly control air forces or eachother. Eisenhower was the overallcommander; Montgomery was theground component commander andalso led 21st Army Group; and,under Montgomery, Bradley was thecommander of First Army until tak-ing over the newly activated 12thArmy Group. Eisenhower assumedground command from Mont-gomery on September 1, makingMontgomery and Bradley equals justsix days after the Normandy cam-paign ended.

To Blumenson the three generalsfumbled badly, especially Mont-gomery. Eisenhower did not inter-vene when he should, Bradley inter-fered where he should not, andMontgomerys involvement was unwelcome to the Americans. Thegenerals erroneously focused their efforts on taking terrain, not defeat-ing the enemy. Patton, who assumedcommand of the Third Army underBradleys 12th Army Group on August 1, was the single comman-

der who grasped what needed to bedone and how to do it, except hewas unable to make his genius feltand was consequently lured astrayby his bungling superiors. As a resultof command problems, Blumensoncontends, thousands of Germanswho should have been captured orkilled in the Falaise gapcreatedafter an enemy counterattack at Mor-tain drove a forty by fourteen-milebulge in Allied lines in August1944escaped with much of theirequipment through a gap that wasclosed too late. Surviving Germantroops later haunted the Allies atArnhem, Huertgen Forest, the Ar-dennes, and elsewhere.4

Blumenson states that Pattonshould have had Bradleys job beforeD-Day. Eisenhowers classmate andsix years Pattons junior at WestPoint, Bradley had been subordinateto Patton in North Africa and Sicily.Eisenhower elevated Bradley overPatton as senior ground commanderfor the invasion of France only be-cause Patton was in disgrace for slap-ping two soldiers in Sicily.5 Inexperi-enced, Bradley was uncomfortable inhis relationship with two old war-riors, Patton and Montgomery. Heknew that he had not earned theirrespect as a commander. Patton,however, could have met Mont-gomery as an equal. The thrust ofPatton and the balance of Mont-gomery would have produced a per-fectly matched team. He concludesthat the Eisenhower-Montgomery-Patton relationship could have en-trapped the Germans in the Falaise

gap bringing a much earlier end ofthe war in Europe. Instead, Allieddiscord caused the war to last ten ad-ditional months.

For the first three months afterD-Day, Eisenhower had remainedwith his headquarters in England.He left Montgomery in commandon the ground. Bradley rarely metwith his temporary superior, a manwhose arrogance he despised. Mont-gomery, failing to take his objectiveof Caen until the end of July, hadhis hands full with the multilateral21st Army Group and exercised littleoperational control over Bradley.Eisenhower found that he was un-able to motivate Montgomery tomove aggressively enough, andMontgomerys insolence nearlypushed him to relieve Britains mostfamous soldier. Lacking coordina-tion, Bradley and Montgomeryfailed to close the gap at Falaise intime. But Bradley halted Pattons ad-vance before it crossed into Mont-gomerys sector where it may haveresulted in a friendly fire incidentwith distant Canadians. Simple coor-dination between Bradley and Mont-gomery or closer involvement byEisenhower could have resolved theproblem and allowed them to knocktwo German armies out of the war.

Earlier, a lack of proper coordi-nation between the Army and theArmy Air Forces resulted in costlyfriendly fire incidents. Bradleyplanned Operation Cobra to breakthrough the hedgerows of Nor-mandy, which had reduced fightingto a slug-fest reminiscent of thetrenches of World War I. In an un-usual operation, Allied bomberswould dump a carpet of bombs on along, narrow strip into the enemylines in front of American troopsnear St. Lo. Two infantry divisionswould rush into the gap created bythe bombing and hold open theshoulders while two armored divi-sions charged through. Bradleywanted the bombers to approach thetarget parallel to his front lines toavoid the possibility of stray bombslanding on friendly troops. Thebombers struck twice in two days,both times attacking perpendicularto the front lines and directly overthe troops, both times dropping

U.S

. A

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(H.H

. D

effn

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General Schwarzkopf and friends.

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bombs short and killing or wound-ing hundreds, primarily members ofthe 30th Division. The controversyover whether Bradley approved theperpendicular approach or the AirForces simply ignored his instruc-tions still rages today.6

Controlling combined opera-tions in Normandy was even moreprecarious. In the British sector,under Montgomerys 21st ArmyGroup, a Canadian army controlleda British corps with both British andCanadian divisions. Montgomeryalso controlled a British army with aCanadian corps consisting of Polishand Canadian divisions. The Ameri-can sector was homogenous exceptfor Leclercs 2nd French Armored Di-vision under XV Corps. Operationsof these units offer examples of chal-lenges to combined command. Dif-ferences in experience, equipment,logistical requirements, organiza-tion, doctrine, training, perceptionsof other nations soldiers, and fur-ther thorny issues reveal themselvesfor analysis. For example, Blumen-son accuses Leclerc of disobeying theattack orders of a U.S. commanderby keeping his forces available forthe liberation of Paris, a national po-litical objective which was at oddswith coalition operational needs. Inthe ensuing confusion, Leclercs for-mations impeded an advancing U.S.unit, possibly preventing a timelyclosing of the Falaise gap.

Blumenson concludes that forBritish, Canadian, and Americanarmies in Normandy No coherentleadership bound all the parts to-gether to form a unified whole. Forthe often impromptu multinationalforces of todayorganizing rapidlyin response to global crisescoopera-tion among allies is vital to success.The recent disastrous Ranger opera-tion in Somalia highlights one aspectof the problem7 and Bosnia mightprovide parallels to flawed multilat-eral operations in Normandy.

Bradleys squabbles with the air-men during Cobra foreshadowedSchwarzkopfs problems with his aircommanders in Saudi Arabia. Ac-cording to one account, Schwarz-kopf had ordered the Air Force to

strike Iraqi Republican Guard divi-sions with B52 bombers in the firsthour of the war on January 17, 1991.Schwarzkopf was enraged to discoveron January 15 that air planners haddecided not to strike the RepublicanGuard formations until 18 hoursinto the war after enemy air defensesystems had been destroyed.8 In asituation eerily similar to the acri-monious exchanges between Bradleyand his airmen Schwarzkopf accusedthe chief air planner and comman-der of all Air Force wings in south-west Asia of having lied to him.9 Asin Bradleys case, Schwarzkopfsproblem stemmed mainly from amisunderstanding between air andground commanders.

To improve coordination of airand ground operations and to ensureground commanders received appro-priate air support, Schwarzkopf hadhis deputy meet daily with the AlliedForces Central Europe (AFCENT)commander.10 Still, in early Februarythe Army corps commanders bit-terly complained to Schwarzkopfthat the Air Force was not hittingthe targets they had chosen. 11Again, a lack of agreement betweenthe Army and Air Force on how bestto employ available airpower was toblame. The debate continues overwhy the Air Force did not destroy atleast 50 percent of Iraqi ground

forces during the 38-day air cam-paign as Schwarzkopf directed.

A chilling similarity betweenDesert Storm and the Falaise pocketwas the failure of both Allied opera-tions to encircle completely and de-stroy or capture the enemys mainforce. Bradley accused the British ofpushing the Germans out of theopen end of the Argentan-Falaisepocket like squeezing a tube oftoothpaste. Referring to Bradleyscomment as dishonest, Blumensonpoints out that it was Bradley whofailed to close the pocket and laterdefended his actions by arguing thathe preferred to have a solid shoul-der at Argentan to a broken neck atFalaise. Whether the gap couldhave been successfully closed earlier,however, is also arguable.12

James G. Burton, a retired AirForce colonel, sparked a debate inthe Proceedings over the past yearwith an article accusing VII Corps offailing at the end of Desert Storm todestroy the Republican Guard as or-dered, instead pushing them outthe back door. 13 In a subsequentpiece inspired by Burtons charge, aretired Army general insisted thatRepublican Guard soldiers andequipment survived to harass the

Marines raidingBakara Market, Mogadishu.

U.S

. N

avy

(Ter

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itche

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Kurds because Schwarzkopf failed toplan to entrap them.14 Whethercoalition forces could and shouldhave completely captured or de-stroyed the Republican Guard is con-troversial. But the fact is thatSchwarzkopf ordered the destructionof Saddam Husseins elite units andmany escaped.

Blumenson completed this bookbefore the Persian Gulf War. It is in-teresting to ponder whether its publi-cation at that time may have influ-enced the planning or outcome ofDesert Storm. Perhaps a historically-minded planner might have providedfor the entrapment of the RepublicanGuard to prevent an escape compara-ble to Falaise. Perhaps Schwarzkopfmight have been more careful to en-sure the Iraqi escape route was cutbefore agreeing to end the fighting.Blumensons contentious bookshould stimulate a lively debate inthis regard. The Eisenhowers, Mont-gomerys, Bradleys, Pattons, andSchwarzkopfs of tomorrow will bebetter joint and combined comman-ders because of their awareness of re-curring operational problems. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Volumes in the U.S. Army in WorldWar II series published by the U.S. ArmyCenter of Military History (ex-Office of theChief of Military History) are known asgreen books due to the color of theirbuckram bindings. Blumensons greenbooks include Breakout and Pursuit: U.S.Army in World War II, The European Theaterof Operations (Washington: Office of theChief of Military History, 1961) and Salernoto Cassino: U.S. Army in World War II, TheMediterranean Theater of Operations (Wash-ington: Office of the Chief of Military His-tory, 1969).

2 The Patton Papers, vol. 1, 18851940,and vol. 2, 19401945 (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1972 and 1974).

3 Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit.4 Blumenson, Cantigny Discussion, a

paper presented at the conference on Nor-mandy sponsored by the Robert R. Mc-Cormick Tribune Foundation and U.S.Naval Institute at Cantigny in Wheaton,Illinois, on March 24, 1994.

5 Eisenhowers biographer recentlyclaimed that Bradley was selected over Pattonbecause he had more confidence in Bradleysabilities; Stephen Ambrose, Dwight Eisen-hower: Command, Coalition, and Nor-

mandy, the keynote address at the Robert R.McCormick Tribune Foundation and U.S.Naval Institute Normandy Conference.

6 In Battle of the Generals (pp. 12941),Blumenson insinuates that the Army AirForces ignored Bradleys instructions forbombers to strike parallel to friendly lines andlater lied about it. In Breakout and Pursuit (pp.23133), Blumenson highlighted the unsat-isfactory . . . absence of firm understandingand mutual agreement between Bradley andthe airmen. But Geoffrey Perret in WingedVictory: The Army Air Forces in World War II(New York: Random House, 1993) claims thatair commanders convinced Bradley to ap-prove the perpendicular approach and thathe later lied in blaming the Army Air Forcesfor disobeying his instructions and falsified adocument to help prove the case. At the Nor-mandy Conference in Wheaton, Illinois, onMarch 23, 1994, Bradley biographer ClayBlair pointedly stated that Bradley, as a manof honor, was incapable of such dishonestly.There can be no doubt, however, that Bradleyagreed that the second bombing run wouldoverfly his front lines. The Army Air Forces inWorld War II, vol. 3, Europe: Argument to V-EDay: January 1944 to May 1945, edited byWesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1951), an officialhistory, is silent on this subject.

7 Rick Atkinson, The Washington Post,January 3031, 1994.

8 Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The UntoldStory of the Persian Gulf War (New York:Houghton Mifflin, 1993), pp. 10506.

9 Atkinson, Crusade, pp. 10506; seealso Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al., Certain Vic-tory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Wash-ington: Government Printing Office, 1993),pp. 17678.

10 Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Sur-vey, vol. 1, part II (Washington: Govern-ment Printing Office, 1993), pp. 5758.

11 Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus,editors, The Whirlwind War: The United StatesArmy in Operations Desert Shield and DesertStorm (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Mil-itary History, forthcoming), p. 289.

12 In a forthcoming article to appear inMilitary History Quarterly, Carlo DEste sup-ports Bradleys decision that, without majorreinforcements, his forces were spread sothinly that if the gap had been closed theywould have been vulnerable to attack by es-caping German units.

13 James G. Burton, Pushing Them Outthe Back Door, U.S. Naval Institute Proceed-ings, vol. 119, no. 6 (June 1993), pp. 3742.See responses under the same title in theensuing issues.

14 John H. Cushman, U.S. Naval InstituteProceedings, vol. 119, no. 10 (October 1993),pp. 7680.

MUCH MORE THANFROM THE SEAA Book Review byJOHN N. PETRIE

More wealth than most nations com-mand and more foresight than mennormally possess are needed to producea fleet suitable for all occasions.

Frank Uhlig brings a lifetime ofexperience to this book. His re-search started when, at the ageof seventeen, he joined the Navy asthe Nation was engaged in the great-est maritime struggle the world hasknown. Since then he has beendeeply involved in recording andanalyzing the way navies fight. Ifone were to advertise for an author-ity to write a book such as HowNavies Fight the qualifications woulddescribe Uhlig. Consequently, thiswork is a superb piece of history andanalysis presented in elegant butsimple prose. It examines whatnavies do and provides a history ofthe U.S. Navy at war. The accountspans three centuries of naval com-bat in every ocean and on the lakesand rivers of three continents.

Beginning with American andFrench navies and privateers operat-ing against the British in 1775 andculminating with Desert Storm, HowNavies Fight offers readers an unvar-nished account of what the Navy hasdone, how it has done it, why it hasdone it, and whether it was donewell. Along the way we learn thingsabout allies, enemies, and in a couple

Captain John N. Petrie, USN, is director ofresearch and professor of national securitypolicy at the National War College. His article, Dealing with Anarchy, appears in this issue of JFQ.

How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navyand Its Alliesby Frank Uhlig, Jr.

Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994.455 pp. $34.95.

[ISBN 1557508534]

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of cases about friends who fought oneanother. The analysis is clear and con-cise which is rare in such literature.

But How Navies Fight offers morethan it claims. A careful reading willreveal how navies operate with theirsister services. Naval missions neces-sarily rely upon and routinely sup-port other services simply becausenavies rarely fight alone. In this re-spect Uhlig has produced a clandes-tine primer on joint operations.

What comes across is that thecritical business of navies is notwidely heralded operations. Fightingon, over, and under the oceans in-volves more than projecting powerashore From the Sea, though suchoperations are undoubtedly an im-portant part of it. How Navies Fightcaptures the unglamorous but abso-lutely critical dimensions of navalwarfare in the broadest sense. Itdeals with ensuring national securityand successfully conducting opera-tions both in and from a maritimetheater if deterrence fails. Uhligsconclusions come down to basic, yetoften unrecognized facts. SinceAmerica gained its independence theNavy has regularly performed fivewartime missions: strategically mov-ing troops, acquiring advancedbases, landing forces on hostileshores, mounting blockades, andmastering the seas.

A rightsized force and the mixedblessing of a peace dividend meansnot expecting to have anything inexcess. Without knowing thespecifics of the next war, the lessonsof history found in this book canserve as a guide for balancing mar-itime forces. After spending my ca-reer in frigates and destroyers it wasno surprise to learn that the Navyhas never had enough small combat-ant ships when war broke out. I alsoknew that we have always lackedsealift vesselswhich we are now ac-quiring faster than any other type ofship. But now I have also come to re-alize that we may be short of am-phibious ships as well. That potentialshortage is especially worrisome con-sidering the average age of our am-phibious force. Many ships are near-ing or are at the end of their effectiveperiod of service. Fortunately, a newvessel is far more capable than any

two that it may replace; but it canonly be in one location at a time.Today the loss of one amphibiousship could remove enough capabilityto make a planned operation inexe-cutable or at least ill-advised.

Some relief is gained by the in-creased and improved use of near-term prepositioned ships carrying ageneric units equipment. Theseships allow forces to be airlifted intotheater and fall in on identical gearto that on which they have trained.

A consistent dilemma madeclear by chronicles of combat opera-tions is that airlifting moves the firstpart of a force faster, but by the timethe whole unit is airlifted it couldhave all been moved faster, cheaper,and with greater integrity by sea. Sodecisions on lift turn on how quicklyforces need to arrive, adequate air-fields with sufficient ramp space andmaintenance, the character of thetransportation infrastructure, andthe availability of port facilities andsealift. Most situations can be ex-pected to require both airlift andsealift, and few if any will require

only airlift. But we must rememberthat neither airlift nor sealift are use-ful in an assault on hostile shores.

That brings up the question ofnaval gunfire support. Modern five-inch gun batteries are exceptionallywell suited to this mission; but thereare not as many of them as wewould like. Previous conflicts haverepeatedly proven that even largercalibre guns were essential to diffi-cult fire support missions. Thoseguns are gone. Hardened targets andbridges are tough to engage withfive-inch ammunition. The OliverHazard Perry class ships have a su-perb 76 mm gun. But it is not theoptimum gun for fire support mis-sions and raises the question of howto kick the door open for opposedamphibious landings. Precision mu-nitions delivered by attack planescan pick up some slackbut that ismore expensive and less flexiblethan fire support afloat. And thesemissions will have to compete forpriority with a complex target listwhich can only be carried out byprecision munitions.

In World War II pre-assaultbombardment grew longer as the

U.S. Navy (Ron Wimmer)U.S. Navy (Ron Wimmer)

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conflict went on, with some fire mis-sions lasting days. In the PacificJapanese defenders pulled out ofrange of naval gunfire thus surren-dering the advantage to engagingforces when they were most vulnera-ble, crossing the beach. This was agreat tribute to the effectiveness ofbombardment. This and more is re-vealed in Uhligs analysis of the warin the Pacific. In the near future wewill have a smaller force which ne-cessitates minimizing casualties.Both shore bombardment and firesupport need closer looks.

Though we can expect that al-lies will make the facilities for ad-ministrative off-load of ships andaircraft available it is not a given. Anenemy may try to either seize keytransportation nodes or make themuntenable. Not every potential allyhas airfields which can receive C5sor ports which can accommodateroll-on/roll-off ships. A smaller,more sophisticated force as adver-tised in the Bottom-Up Review needsto remember that the theater of warwill define the options for entry.Sometimes the only way in will beacross a defended shore.

Finally, in crossing hostileshores we should anticipate that seadenial forces will attempt to inflict aheavy toll. If an enemy can makethe likely cost of an operation ap-pear unacceptable, domestic politi-cal considerations could allow himto win without firing a shot. Todaysforce has been designed to minimizethe effectiveness of most sea denialforcesbut mines will continue tobe a significant threat.

Conducting a blockade is te-dious and frequently finds too fewships attempting to cover too muchsea room. It is a naval operationcharacterized by days of boredom in-terrupted by a few minutes of in-tense danger which then quickly re-turns to boredom. Over the years awide variety of applications and in-novations have been made to fulfillthe blockade mission. The classic op-eration used by Union forces to closeConfederate ports in the Civil Warvaried little from the maritime inter-diction as conducted by coalition

forces in Desert Storm. But U-boatcampaigns in the Atlantic, U.S. sub-marine operations in the Pacific, theCuban missile crisis quarantine, Op-eration Market Time in Vietnam, thecurrent embargo on the states of for-mer Yugoslavia, and the Haitian em-bargo all represent the mission ofblockade in naval warfare. It is afunction unlikely to fade into his-tory during our lifetimes.

Progressive changes in technol-ogy have caused many aspects ofnaval combat to adapt over theyears. For example, mastery of thelocal sea once meant a small area at-tendant to an ongoing operation.The area involved has been ex-panded to cover the operating radiusof new weaponry and sensors, andincludes air superiority and access tohostile shores. In Desert Storm coali-tion forces needed maritime superi-ority throughout the Red Sea, Per-sian Gulf, and maritime approachesto both. Six carrier battle groups,two battleships, several cruisers, anamphibious ready group, scores offrigates and destroyers, many minewarfare ships, logistics support ships,and several submarines were com-mitted to the fight. While it was as-sumed that they enjoyed total com-mand of the sea, Uhlig makes thecase that they did not.

Remarkably, the Navy did notdo a good job in mastery of the seasin combata primary mission. U.S.and coalition forces swept the Iraqinavy into the dustbin of history, andallied air superiority was unchal-lenged after the first few days ofcombat. But mines sowed in theshallows off Kuwait and hardenedbatteries along its coastemplacedduring Iraqs six-month occupationin anticipation of an assaultconsti-tuted formidable sea denial forces.There were numerous, though ap-parently insufficient, mine counter-measures ships in theater, and clear-ing mines along a heavily defendedshore could have been difficult.While a successful assault on theKuwaiti coast was possible, a navaldemonstration proved to be the bestuse of amphibious forces. It drew offIraqi attention as the left hook ma-neuver out-flanked them in thedesert. This plan forced Saddam to

capitulate but circumstances in thefuture might not allow us so muchflexibility.

This was better than the situa-tion in Vietnam where America andthe South Vietnamese only appearedto control the local waters for differ-ent reasons. Political intimidationKhrushchev had warned that ablockade would have grave conse-quencesparalyzed our will. It pre-vented us from interdicting war ma-terial delivered by sea to NorthVietnam. As a consequence the Navyand Coast Guard undertook a block-ade of South Vietnam (OperationMarket Time) which, though effec-tive, largely intercepted and ha-rassed vessels of the nation we weresupposed to be assisting. But whenMarket Time forced Hanoi to divertsupplies to the Cambodian port ofSihanoukville for overland infiltra-tion to their forces in South Viet-nam, political concern over widen-ing an already unpopular warprevented effective interdiction. Itwas not until the 1970 coup in Cam-bodia that Sihanoukville was closed.By then the Ho Chi Minh Trail wasoperating every night and air inter-diction efforts had only marginalsuccess. So an enemy with no realnaval or air power was able toachieveas a result of our politicalcautionwhat it could never havedone tactically. In Vietnam we nevertried to attain mastery of the localsea even though essentially unchal-lenged after early August 1964.

Other naval warfare functionswhich arise are less essential to vic-tory at sea but are typical of navalactivity. Among them are commerceraiding, naval raids ashore, fleets inbeing, cutting lines of communica-tions, cruises against enemy raiders,protection of shipping, bombard-ment, fire support of troops ashore,movement of forces, scouting, com-munications intelligence, navaldemonstrations, evacuation of en-dangered troops, operations in aid offriendly governments, rescue ofcivilians, and troop support and airwarfare functions where airfields areinsufficient or unavailable. In a

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world where no major adversary hasyet emerged, we should anticipatethe Navy being called upon to per-form a number of small but danger-ous missions. They will undoubtedlyinclude operations similar to thoseidentified above. It will be surprisingif a year passes without the Navy ex-ecuting a rescue mission in supportof an American embassy or provid-ing relief to victims of a natural dis-aster. The Navys role in non-com-batant evacuation operations hasnow sadly become an art form.These extremely dangerous opera-tions have been consistently exe-cuted without fanfare and withoutfriendly casualties.

How Navies Fight is nearly flaw-less but it could benefit from the in-clusion of additional maps. In par-ticular, maps should accompany thediscussions of operations in thePhilippines after the Battle of LeyteGulf as well as in the region fromthe Bay of Bengal to the Gulf ofThailand.

Overall this book is readableand thought-provoking. If Potterhad not written Sea Power, then thiswork by Uhlig would likely be thestandard text for naval sciencecourses of the future. But its value ismore than academic. It informs theuninformed and moves knowledge-able readers to question assumptionsabout naval combat and the Navyscontribution to warfare. In danger-ous and uncertain times it is usefulto question assumptions.

This book should be read bynewly promoted general officers ofthe Army and Air Force who want tounderstand the relationship betweentheir services capabilities and thoseof the Navy. JFQ

AUSTRALIA ANDTHE GULF WARA Book Review byALAN L. GROPMAN

Of the many books that haveappeared in the aftermath ofOperation Desert Storm, thetwo reviewed here look at opera-tional and geostrategic aspects ofAustralias experience in the conflict.The Gulf Commitment by DavidHorner is largely a campaign historywhile Australias Gulf War, an anthol-ogy edited by Murray Goot and Rod-ney Tiffen, is an analysis of Aus-tralias overall role in the war. Thelatter is a more valuable contributionto the literature on the war sinceAustralias part was limited to the ac-tivity of the three naval vesselswhich participated in the U.N. em-bargo of Iraq, while the geopoliticalimpact of the war had far greaterconsequences for Australia.

Australias Gulf War is also im-portant in understanding the domes-tic political and foreign demandswhich coalition warfare places on acountry like Australia today. It couldalso serve as the model for a similarbook about America in the PersianGulfone that treats such diverse is-sues as the moral, political, ethical,

and strategic factors of the conflictand their effect on minorities, themedia, and long-term strategic inter-ests. Such a comprehensive book re-mains to be written.

A few years before the Gulf War,Australia revised its defense policyduring what was still a bipolar, ColdWar world. After serious study underthe ruling Labor Party, Australiaadopted a course which called forself reliance within an allianceframework with much greater em-phasis on regional associations. Mili-tarily, the policy demanded defensein depth of the homeland, replacinga forward defense strategy. Aus-tralias response to Iraqs invasion ofKuwait would seem to have violatedthis new policy, given the end of theCold War and the swift dispatch ofRoyal Australian Navy (RAN) shipsto the Gulf in 1990 (along with dis-cussions about sending additionalnaval or possibly air assets to thearea). But apparently the Gulf Warand participating in it did notchange Australian policy as not longafter the conflict a strategic planningdocument iterating it was issuedwith a statement that there is noreason to rush into a major overhaulof our defence policy.

Australias Gulf War questionsthe relevance of defense policy inthe face of that experience whileDavid Horners The Gulf Commitmentdoes not. Horner provides an intro-ductory chapter in which the shiftin policy is discussed and an attemptis made to place the Australian rolein the Gulf in context but he fails tomake a case. Leaders go to war forcomplex purposes and Australia, likethe other members of the coalition,went into the Gulf for various rea-sons although that region fell out-side the scope of the new defensepolicy. Prime Minister Robert Hawketold parliament that the Gulf com-mitment was proportionate to theinterests we have at stake and to ournational interests. It is also a practi-cal commitment. But the politicaldimension of Australias Gulf Warcommitment is better treated in Aus-tralias Gulf War and includes consid-eration of that nations association

Alan L. Gropman teaches military history atthe Industrial College of the Armed Forces.He recently lectured at Australian servicecolleges on the role of U.S. airpower in thePersian Gulf War.

The Gulf Commitment:The Australian Defence Forces

First War by David Horner

Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne UniversityPress, 1992.

238 pp. $ 24.95.[ISBN 0 522 84511 8]

Australias Gulf Waredited by Murray Goot and Rodney Tiffen

Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne UniversityPress, 1992.

304 pp. $ 24.95.[ISBN 0 522 84463 4]

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with and belief in the U.N. approachto collective security, relations withthe United States, and a need forprecedent-setting action to defeatIraqs aggression against Kuwait.

After examining the strategicbackdrop Horner details the efforts ofthe Australian military in the Gulf.Following internal discussion and aconversation between Prime MinisterHawke and President George Bush,the Australian cabinet authorized thedispatch of two sophisticated guidedmissile frigates and a slower but tech-nologically advanced supply ship tothe Gulf. They deployed with a com-bined complement of six hundredmen on August 13, 1990.

Because Iraq had a large airforce and surface-to-surface missiles,the Royal Australian Air Force(RAAF) assisted in training the RANcrews in air and missile defense byrunning hundreds of simulated at-tacks on the ships. RAAF F111s, F/A18s, P3Cs, helicopters, and trainers(the last simulating Exocet missiles)flew more than 400 hours in prac-tice attacks. Lear jets flown by con-tractors towed targets to sharpen theskill of RAN gunners. Since the navydetermined that the supply ships airdefenses were inadequate for the re-gion, the Royal Australian Army dis-patched a detachment from an airdefense regiment to ensure thesafety of ship and crew.

The mission was to prevent theimport or export of all commoditiesand products to or from Iraq orKuwait, but the initial rules of en-gagement issued by the governmentwere too tame to permit the ships toeffectively carry out this role. After agood deal of message traffic back andforth the ships were permitted to actaggressively, first firing warning andthen disabling shots at vessels whichfailed to yield and also boardingships which might be carrying for-bidden materials. Australian frigatesdid fire warning shots at suspectedships and also boarded several.

The Australian contingent was in-deed smallthree ships as opposed toabout 180 from the United States (in-cluding six aircraft carriers)and onlyone of 17 national naval forces which

participated in the blockade. Yet theirsymbolic value far exceeded the mili-tary capability provided by theseships. Australia, a nation that sold Iraqwheat and other commodities, helpedto enforce Saddam Husseins diplo-matic, political, military, and eco-nomic isolation, and also made a po-litical statement at great cost in termsof trade which counted for muchmore than its military contribution.

Other Australian military ele-ments did become involved. Eventu-ally the first three vessels were re-placed, one frigate by a guidedmissile destroyer, and mine-clearingdetachments were sent to the area.In addition, some ground and seaforce personnel who had been previ-ously seconded to American andBritish units served in the Gulf. AfterDesert Storm, 75 Australian service-men served in northern Iraq to aidKurdish refugees. However, anythought the Hawke governmentmight have had of sending RAAFcombat units (with F111s, RF111s,or F/A18s) was checked in part be-cause of constrained resources, butmainly because of strident opposi-tion from the left wing of the rulingparty. The convener of the centre-left faction . . . told the Prime Minis-ter that he would face a party roomrevolt if the government tried to in-crease Australian forces in the Gulf.

The ships on duty in the Gulffrom September 1990 to March 1991acquitted themselves with a greatdeal of skill and pride. Horner con-cludes that in the Gulf War Australiademonstrated . . . support for therole of the United Nations in protect-ing small countries, and in generalshowed that Australia would pull itsweight internationally. However, thecommitment also contributed toAustralias security by improving theefficiency and battle-worthiness ofthe ADF [the Australian DefenseForce]. The Gulf Commitment is agraphic account of value to militaryprofessionals. While its purpose islimited, it fulfills that goal admirably.

In Australias Gulf War Goot andTiffen present a broader canvas. Thebook opens with a brief explanationby Minister for Foreign AffairsGareth Evans on the strategic reasonsfor entering the war. Evans denies

that Australia followed the lead ofthe United States in the Gulf, butrather claims that it was acting onlyin its own interests. Next the caseagainst Australian participation ismade by two members of the leftwho make too much of the blundersby the American government in suc-coring Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq warand failing during the Reagan andBush administrations to rein in Sad-dam Husseins tyranny. The reality ofthe August 2, 1990 invasion and Sad-dams unignorable threat to SaudiArabia were facts that had to be dealtwith, and prior mistakes were no jus-tification for inaction in the face of agreat menace. The authors, more-over, argue that continued economicsanctions and diplomacy versus theuse of force would have worked toeject Iraq from Kuwait, surely a naivesentiment given Saddams past andpresent actions. But this is not to saythat this chapter does not score de-bating points on the effects of theGulf deployment on Australiasdemocracy, and on its relationshipwith its neighbors, none of whom re-sponded similarly. These two leftistsalso provide an example of the edi-tors approach to viewing issues fromall sides.

As a tie breaker, the collectionincludes a chapter on the politics ofAustralian involvement by a neutraljournalist who makes the point thatAustralias long commitment to theUnited Nations weighed heaviest onthe minds of the Hawke government,and not George Bushs requests.

The next five chapters focus onthe home front. One treats experi-ences of Arab-Australians (the major-ity of whom are Lebanese and Chris-tian) and their trial at the hands ofnative Australians. Another dealswith the experience of Jews in theface of increasing anti-semitism alsoat the hands of native Australians.Both articles point out that attackson Arab and Jewish institutionsbrought Arabs and Jews closer asboth communities condemned at-tacks on any ethnic group or facility.

Another chapter covers thelargely impotent peace movement

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that tried unsuccessfully to use theGulf War to drive a wedge betweenAustralia and the United States. Theauthor argues that despite a nation-wide effort by peace groups the warleft the Australian people more in fa-vour of the United States, the ANZUSalliance and joint [U.S./Australian] fa-cilities than they were before.

Probably the most useful chap-ter in Australias Gulf War treats thenews coverage. Every type of mediais richly considered, and the author,one of the books editors, knows thisterritory well. He is most critical ofthe anti-war and anti-American bi-ases in the state-funded AustralianBroadcast Company. He is evenmore disparaging of the extremelyheavy use made by Australian televi-sion of American network coverage.

The last chapter in this section ison polls. The author, book co-editorMurray Goot, is an expert on polling,and he writes an exceptionally de-tailed chapter on the successes andfailures of polling during the build-up and war phases. He found that alack of money hampered both thefrequency and detail of polls. Never-theless, support for the war went upafter the fighting began, with 75 per-cent of Australians eventually favor-ing involvement.

Three chapters then deal withthe impact of the war on Australianforeign policy. The first details Aus-tralias historical involvement in theMiddle East, including its ties to Is-rael, pro-Israeli Prime Minister, ex-tensive trade ties with many Arabcountries, and the effects of its mid-dle eastern policy on Jewish votesand campaign contributions.

The second chapter delineatesAustralias (especially the LaborPartys) close connection to theUnited Nations. It was through thisattachment, argues the author, thatPrime Minister Hawke was able toovercome anti-American sentimentin his party. In 1945 Australias thenMinister for Foreign Affairs H.V.Evatt, a Laborite, was present at thecreation of the United Nations andalso played a major role in draftingthe Charter and later served as presi-dent of the General Assembly. Nor-man Makin, also a Laborite, was thefirst president of the U.N. SecurityCouncil. The chapter concludes withthis judgment: The importance ofthe U.N. factor in selling the Gov-ernments Gulf policy to the Partycannot be exaggerated.

The final two chapters assert thatAustralias participation in the Gulfdemonstrated that the force structuredeveloped for a self-reliant defensepolicy was ill-suited for distant forceprojection. A force structure moresuited to the old forward defenseforce structure was needed. But Aus-tralia has not questioned its forcestructure, at least not publicly. Enter-ing the Gulf War, moreover, also vio-lated that part of Australias defensepolicy that called for greater atten-tion to regional concerns. Its neigh-bors were much more anti-Americanthan Australia, much less pro-UnitedNations, and resolutely uninvolvedin the Gulf War. Therefore, Australiamay have wounded itself regionallyas it tried to promote the idea that itis an Asian country not completelytied to America and its aims.

Australias Gulf War is a thought-ful book with a serious end, and itdeserves attention by readers onboth sides of the Pacific. JFQ

Puma helicopter hovering over HMAS Darwin.

U.S. Navy (John Bouvia)

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Cumulative Index (19931994)I S S U E S 1 4 : C O N T R I B U T O R S


Andre, David J.

A Reflection on We Were Soldiers

Once. . .And Young [Off the Shelf]

no. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 11922

Barlow, Jason B.Interservice Rivalry in the Pacificno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 7681

Builder, Carl H.Roles and Missions: Back to theFuture [Out of Joint]no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 3237

Chiarelli, Peter W.Beyond Goldwater-Nicholsno. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 7181

Chilcoat, Richard A.Army Prepositioning Afloatno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 5157

Clapper, James R., Jr.Challenging Joint MilitaryIntelligenceno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 9299

Coglianese, ChristopherOperation Weserbung and theOrigins of Joint Warfareno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 10011

Cole, Ronald H.Managing the SchwarzkopfAccount: Atkinson as Crusader[Off the Shelf/Review]no. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 12327

Collins, John M.Where Are Special OperationsForces?no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 716

Crigler, T. FrankThe Peace-Enforcement Dilemmano. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 6470

Cronin, Patrick M.Rethinking Asian Alliances[Off the Shelf/Review Essay]no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 11923

Cropsey, SethThe Limits of Jointness[Out of Joint]no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 7279

Dietrich, Steve E.Falaise, The Highway of Death,and Mogadishu[Off the Shelf/Review]no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 11720

Dixon, Anne M.The Whats and Whys ofCoalitionsno. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 2628

Doughty, Robert A.Reforming Joint Doctrineno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 4047

FitzSimonds, James R.Revolutions in Military Affairsno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 2431

Fogleman, Ronald R.Reengineering DefenseTransportationno. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 7579

Gordon, John, IVJoint Power Projection: OperationTorchno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 6069

Gropman, Alan L.Australia and the Gulf War [Off the Shelf/Review]no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 12325

Gropman, Alan L.The Military Cost ofDiscrimination[Off the Shelf/Review]no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 12325

Hammond, Grant T.Paradoxes of Warno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 716

Hazlett, James A.Do We Need An InformationCorps?no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 8897

Henderson, David S.Army Prepositioning Afloatno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 5157

Herrly, Peter F.Southern Italy: StrategicConfusion, OperationalFrustrationno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 7075

Hoar, Joseph P.A CINCs Perspectiveno. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 5663

Hooker, Richard D., Jr.Operation Weserbung and theOrigins of Joint Warfareno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 10011

Huntington, Samuel P.New Contingencies, Old Rolesno. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 3843

Jeremiah, David E.Whats Ahead for the ArmedForces?no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 2535

Johnson, Dana J.Unity of Control: Joint AirOperations in the Gulfno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 8899

Keaney, Thomas A.Surveying Gulf War Airpowerno. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 2536

Kelso, Frank B., IIThe Wave of the Futureno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 1316

1804OTS 10/7/97 2:54 PM Page 126


Kim, TedLogistics: The Way Aheadno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 3844

Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr.Assessing the Bottom-Up Review[Commentary]no. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 2224

Kupiszewski, Robert B.Joint Education: Where Do We GoFrom Here?no. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 6370

Larson, Charles R.Cooperative Engagementno. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 8287

Lewis, William H.United Nations Peacekeeping:Ends versus Meansno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 4857

Libicki, Martin C.Do We Need An InformationCorps?no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 8897

Linn, Thomas C.The Cutting Edge of UnifiedActionsno. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 3439

Mariner, Rosemary B.A Soldier is a Soldierno. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 5462

McDowell, DennisTheater Missile Defense: A JointEnterpriseno. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 8087

McPeak, Merrill A.Ideas Countno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 2224

Mears, Gary H.Logistics: The Way Aheadno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 3844

Miller, Paul DavidA New Mission for AtlanticCommandno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 8087

Mundy, Carl E., Jr.Complementary Capabilities fromthe Seano. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 1721

Mundy, Carl E., Jr.Thunder and Lightning: JointLittoral Warfareno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 4550

Oakley, Robert B.An Envoys Perspectiveno. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 4455

Owens, Mackubin ThomasVietnam as Military History[Off the Shelf/Review Essay]no. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 11218

Owens, William A.Living Jointnessno. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 714

Petrie, John N.Dealing with Anarchyno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 1723

Petrie, John N.Much More Than From the Sea[Off the Shelf/Review]no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 120123

Pfluke, Lillian A.Southern Italy: StrategicConfusion, OperationalFrustrationno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 7075

Poole, Walter S.Chiefs from Across the Estuary [Off the Shelf/Review]no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 12325

Pudas, Terry J.Preparing Future CoalitionCommandersno. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 4046

RisCassi, Robert W.Principles for Coalition Warfareno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 5871

Rosen, Stephen PeterService Redundancy: Waste orHidden Capability?no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 3639

Rostow, Eugene V.Is U.N. Peacekeeping a GrowthIndustry? [Commentary]no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 100105

Sewall, John O.B.Implications for U.N.Peacekeepingno. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 2933

Sewall, John O.B.United Nations Peacekeeping:Ends versus Meansno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 4857

Skelton, IkeTaking Stock of the New Joint Erano. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 1521

Stanton, James P.Europe, Forward Presence, and theFutureno. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 4753

Steele, William M.Joint Education: Where Do We GoFrom Here?no. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 6370

Strain, Frederick R.The New Joint Warfareno. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 1724

Sullivan, Brian R.On the Other Side of the InterwarYears [Off the Shelf/Review]no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 12527

Articles published in Joint Force Quarterly are listed in the Air UniversityIndex to Military Periodicals. In addition,brief abstracts of selected articles appear in Current World Affairs: A Quarterly Bibliography.

Sullivan, Brian R.Russias Military Past [Off theShelf/Review]no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 12527

Sullivan, Gordon R.Projecting Strategic Land CombatPowerno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 812

Summers, Harry G., Jr.Revisiting the Gulf War [Off the Shelf/Review Essay]no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 11822

Trainor, Bernard E.Jointness, Service Culture, and theGulf War [Out of Joint]no. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 7174

van Tol, Jan M.Revolutions in Military Affairsno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 2431

Vlahos, MichaelBy Our Orthodoxies Shall YeKnow Us [Out of Joint]no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 10810

Waldron, ArthurChinas Military Classics [Off the Shelf/Review Essay]no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 11417

Webb, Willard J.The Single Manager for Air inVietnamno. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 8898

Wettering, Frederick L.Dealing with Anarchyno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 1723

Willmott, H.P.Grave of a Dozen Schemesno. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 8291

Willmott, H.P.Guadalcanal: The NavalCampaignno. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 98106

Winnefeld, James A.Unity of Control: Joint AirOperations in the Gulfno. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 8899

Wolfowitz, Paul D.Managing the SchwarzkopfAccount: Atkinson as Crusader[Off the Shelf/Review]no. 3 (Winter 9394), pp. 12324

JFQ

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WWII Campaign Medals

The back cover reproduces the European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign medal(above left) and the Asiatic-Pa-cific Campaign medal (aboveright), both of which were autho-rized for service in World War II.The former medal was awarded tomembers of the Armed Forceswho served in Europe, Africa, andthe Middle East between Decem-ber 7, 1941 and November 8,1945. The obverse shows combattroops under fire coming ashorefrom landing craft with a plane inthe background. The latter medalwas awarded to those who servedin Asia and the Pacific betweenDecember 7, 1941 and March 2,1946. The obverse shows forceslanding in the tropics with a bat-tleship, carrier, submarine, andaircraft in the background. The re-verse side of both medals has anAmerican bald eagle with thedates 19411945 and thewords United States of America.

JFQ

P O S T S C R I P T


A NOTE TO READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is publishedfour times a year for officers of theArmed Forces. One copy is dis-tributed for every two officersassigned to joint billets and onecopy for every four majors/lieutenant commanders andlieutenant colonels/commandersacross all the services.

Copies are distributed to thefield and fleet through respectiveservice channels. Corrections inshipping instructions, quantities received, and addresses from units,installations, and bases should be directed to the appropriate activitylisted below.

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SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is availableby subscription from the Govern-ment Printing Office (see the orderblank in this issue). To order for oneyear, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)on the order and mail with a checkfor $22.00 ($27.50 foreign) or pro-vide a VISA or MasterCard accountnumber with expiration date to theSuperintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Penn-sylvania 152207954, or FAX theorder to: (202) 5122233.

CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomessubmissions on all aspects of jointand combined warfare from mem-bers of the U.S. Armed Forces as wellas from defense analysts and aca-demic specialists from both thiscountry and abroad, including for-eign military personnel. There is nostandard length for articles, but con-tributions of 3,000 to 5,000 wordsare appropriate. Other submissions,however, to include letters to the editor, items of commentary, andbrief essays are invited. Reproduc-tions of supporting material (such as maps and photos) should be sub-mitted with manuscripts citing thesource and indicating their availabil-ity; do not send originals.

To facilitate editorial review, provide two copies of the manuscripttogether with a 150-word summary.Place personal or biographical dataon a separate sheet of paper and donot identify the author (or authors)in the body of the text. Follow anyaccepted style guide in preparing themanuscript, but endnotes ratherthan footnotes should be used. Boththe manuscript and the endnotesshould be typed in double-space withone-inch margins.

If possible submit the manu-script on a disk together with thetypescript version to facilitate edit-ing. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disksin various formats can be processed,WordPerfect is preferred (disks willbe returned if requested). Further information on the submission ofcontributions is available by calling(202) 4751013/DSN 3351013, oraddressing queries to the ManagingEditor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN:NDUNSSJFQ, Washington, D.C.203196000. JFQ

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