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82 JFQ / issue 64, 1 st quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu

The two Koreas have had a longhistory of military confronta-tion, and there is little reasonto expect that relations will

improve in the near future. Over the last fewyears, both the Democratic Peoples Republicof Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea(ROK) have strengthened their armed forces,and as a result of the 2010 North Koreanattacks in the West Sea, this military buildupis likely to continue and may even accelerate.Acknowledging this reality, the best that canbe hoped for is to limit the violence that oftensprings from confrontation, and to continue

to seek ways to resolve confrontation beforethe point of violence is reached.

States in ConfrontationConfrontation may be defined as two

states opposing each other politically, socially,economically, or militarily in an explicitmanner. Outbreaks of military confrontationmake news headlines, but the core issue on theKorean Peninsula is political confrontation,reinforced by social and economic differences.This means that military confrontation willcontinue until the two Koreas have found a wayto eliminate the oppositional aspects of their

political systems; even if that should happen,relations will remain rocky as long as theirsocial and economic systems are incompatible.

Confrontation is not without itsbenefits. When two individuals, groups, orcountries confront each other, they becomeaware of different opinions, values, and waysof doing things. The danger is that confronta-tion will lead to violence or to a defensivehardening of positions rather than to an

MILITARY CONFRONTATIO By K O N G D A N O H and R A L P H H A S S I G

Korean PeoplesArmy soldiers watchPanmunjom JointSecurity Area

Kongdan Oh is a Research Staff Member at the Institutefor Defense Analyses. Ralph Hassig is an AdjunctProfessor of Psychology at the University of MarylandUniversity College. A version of this paper waspresented at the RINSAKonrad Adenauer FoundationInternational Conference on February 15, 2011.

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openness to accommodation. In the caseof the two Koreas, North Korea is the moredefensive and hostile.

That said, it is difficult to argue with theproposition that there is room for only onegovernment on the Korean Peninsula. TheKorean people are a homogeneous race andculture. Many families remain separated bythe political border established at the end ofWorld War II. In the long term, any talk ofestablishing a federation of two separate butequal Koreas makes little sense, especially ifpeople are not free to move from one part ofKorea to the other. Given the dismal history ofNorth Koreas socialism, South Korea is goingto be the more economically successful, andgiven the universal desire for individual free-

doms, it is also going to be the kind of societywhere most Koreans would prefer to live.

The essence of political confrontationis that both Korean governments claim jurisdiction over the entire peninsula. TheSouth Korean government recognizes allpeople who live in North Korea as citizens,and the North Korean government considersthe government in Seoul to be an illegitimateAmerican puppet regime, routinely referringto the persons in authority of that govern-ment as traitors to the Korean nation.

Economic confrontation has its rootsin the incompatibility of centrally managedsocialism in the North and loosely managedcapitalism in the South. Not only are the twoeconomic systems different, but also the eco-

nomic conditions are widely divergent andgrowing more so all the time. In 1990, SouthKoreas per capita gross national product was5 times larger than North Koreas ($5,569 vs.$1,031); in 2000, the Souths per capita grossnational income was 12 times larger ($9,628 vs. $757); and in 2009, it was 18 times larger($17,175 vs. $960).1 Moreover, the economicresources of the two Koreas are different,although complementary, with the Northbeing the logical place for heavy industry andresource extraction and the South being moresuitable for farming and trade.

Underlying socialconfrontation are dra-matic differences in individual freedoms. Inthe North, the Korean Workers Party shapesthe community and is above the law; party

ON THE KOREAN PENINSULAU.S. Air Force (James Mossman)

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FEATURES | Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula

guidance takes precedence over the rights ofindividuals. It was Kim Il-sung who said, Our judicial organs are a weapon for carrying outthe functions of the dictatorship of the pro-letariat2by which he meant dictatorshipof the leader and the party. In the South, theindividual must often defer to the communitybut still retains many rights, and no group

or organization is above the law. The kindof economic and social life South Koreanslead would be completely unacceptable to theleaders of the North. As more North Koreanstry to survive by going into business for them-selves, they often find themselves guilty of ahost of economic offensessuch as Crimesof Undermining the Economic ManagementOrder, including individual commercialactivities (Article 110 of the criminal code)and pocketing money or objects by doingillegal work or transport (Article 120)thatare punishable with prison sentences. 3

Military confrontation is most visiblein the face-off of forces along the Demilita-rized Zone (DMZ), with the Joint SecurityArea at Panmunjom being the closest pointof contact between the two forces. A moreactive form of confrontation occasionallyoccurs along the Northern Limit Line(NLL) that defines the sea border, which isless visible than the well-marked and mined

land border and is also a matter of somedispute.

Although military confrontation is notactive most of the time, the atmosphere isheated by a war of words. The North Koreanmedia insist that South Korea (as well as theUnited States and Japan, for that matter) is inthe final stages of preparing an attack, and

U.S.ROK military exercises are routinelycharacterized as preparations for war, as inthis statement from 2011:

In the past, the United States and South Koreahave ceaselessly revised and supplemented the plans for a war of northward aggression and per- fected the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle jointmilitary exercises reflecting them as a completedoperation of northward aggression. . . . Recently,North-South relations have come to face anextreme catastrophe and this has led to thecreation of an acute confrontational phase onthe Korean peninsula. 4

In one bizarre example of NorthKorean propaganda, the press even depictsKim Jong-il as being involved in some kind ofwartime conflict:

During the fatherland liberation war [theKorean War] , Chol Ridge served as an impor-tant military place. . . . Whenever MarshalKim Jong Il, another brilliant commander produced by Korea in the 20th century and

son of guerrillas, passes the ridge, the ideaand grit of the Korean Peoples Army hasbeen further hardened. . . . Not escorted bytanks or armored cars, he has passed theridge and crossed rivers for forefronts withouteating or sleeping. By doing so, he has devot-edly tided over the crisis of the country andthe revolution, winning one victory afteranother in the war without gun-report. 5

For its part, the ROK governments ref-erences to North Korea are much less incen-diary, even though it designates the DPRKgovernment and military as an enemy (andformerly as the main enemy).

When states confront each other,they are not necessarily fighting. In fact,most of the time, confrontation is passive.It could even be argued that as long as twoarmies openly face each other, a kind ofbalance exists in that the respective forcesare deployed in such a way that any attack islikely to be met by a successful counterattack.A classic case is the balance of power between

the United States and the former SovietUnion during the Cold War era. Those twoforces were carefully calibrated, with adjust-ments on one side countered by adjustmentson the other. Neither side believed it couldprevail in an all-out war, and neither side hadstrong motivation to change the status quo.

Military forces standing at the ready

can provide a state with certain advantagesapart from serving as a deterrent againstattack. Even when a large standing armydrains the civilian economy, certain sectorsof the economy do benefit from it. Moreover,political leaders who are strong on defensealmost always gain in popularity. And in acontrolled society like North Koreas, thepublic belief that the country is on the brinkof war (as the North Koreans have been told

for decades) helps rally the people to theirgovernment and distracts them from theirdifficult lives. North Korea even uses itsconfrontation with South Korea to get atten-tion from other countries that are concernedabout peace and stability in the region.

If the ultimate goal of military confron-tation on the Korean Peninsula were total victory over the other side while keepingones own losses to a minimum, war wouldbe unthinkable. Unfortunately, even if a full-scale attack would be prohibitively costly, it isalways possible that a small military skirmishcould escalate into the unthinkable war thatneither side wants.

When Military Forces Are NotBalanced

Another danger of military confronta-tion is that a lack of balance or symmetryin forces may lead one state to believe that itholds some military advantage that could beexploited by an attack. A comparison of thetwo Koreas reveals numerous asymmetries,some seeming to benefit the North, othersthe South. What is important is not wherethe benefit lies but where each countrybelieves it lies.

The North now has a few small nuclearweapons that it repeatedly threatens to

the kind of economic and social life South Koreanslead would be completely

unacceptable to the leaders ofthe North

ROK and Korean Peoples Army soldiersstand guard next to line that separatesNorth from South

ROK and Korean Peoples Army soldiersstand guard next to line that separatesNorth from South

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employ in an all-out war. The South does nothave nuclear weapons but does shelter underthe U.S. nuclear umbrella of more than 5,000weapons.6 One would expect that NorthKorea would view the nuclear balance asdecidedly in South Koreas favor. But that isnot the whole story, for the North can decidewhen and if it wants to use nuclear weapons,whereas the South cannot. Moreover, theleaders of North Korea, especially top mili-tary officers, are probably less concernedabout the consequences of using nuclearweapons than are the Americans.

Conventional forces are unbalanced

in terms of type, quantity, and quality.U.S. forces available to assist South Koreanforces further complicate any calculations ofbalance. The following are estimates. 7

South Korea has fewer active-dutysoldiers than does North Korea (687,000 vs.1.1 million), and fewer tanks (2,700 vs. 3,500),artillery pieces (5,000 vs. 10,000+), and combataircraft (555 vs. 590). South Korea also hasfewer submarines (12 vs. 63) and fewer ships(130 vs. 350), but it has more large ships (44 vs. 8). In terms of quality and training, SouthKorea holds a decided advantage in all weaponssystems (except small coastal combat boats).

How the two forces would fare in various battle scenarios is difficult to say,but in a sustained conflict, especially withthe support of U.S. forces, most observersoutside of North Korea believe the Southwould ultimately destroy the Norths forces,starting with its air force (if it chose to fight).What is important to consider when estimat-ing the likelihood of a North Korean attackis whether the Norths leaders actually see

things this way and whether their outcomecalculations are based on events in a majorconflict or a l imited conflict scenario.

North Koreas special forces are believedto number about 200,000 compared to lessthan 20,000 South Korean special forces.The role of DPRK forces would be to open afront inside South Korea, bypassing the conventional defense lines. Taking these forcesinto consideration, it becomes even moredifficult to predict the short-term outcomeof battle, although in the long term, South

Korean-U.S. forces would almost surelyprevail because special forces can disrupt butnot defeat the South Korean forces. Even ifthey expect that their forces will be bestedby South Korean forces, the North Koreangenerals may believe they hold a short-termadvantage if they use their special forces tostrike quickly and then negotiate for a cease-fire before being hit by the superior SouthKorean-U.S. conventional forces.

North Korean forces are dug in, manyof them in mountainous terrain. Exceptfor the mobility of the forward-based forcesthat would try to penetrate South Koreandefenses, the North Koreans would haveto rely on fighting in place in a defensiveposture. South Korean forces are moremobile, especially considering that theywould enjoy air superiority, but in the initial

phases of combat, South Koreas frontlineforces would be relatively vulnerable to NorthKoreas artillery, and all ROK forces might be vulnerable to DPRK special forces.

North Korea is a country seeminglyalways on the brink of war. Its leaders maytruly believe they are in danger of beingattacked. Given the likelihood that theywould lose a lengthy war, their military policy is offensive in nature, stressing the need toattack a potential aggressor before comingunder attack themselves. This preference for

preemption adds an important destabilizingelement to the balance of forces on the pen-insula. The North Korean media have alsoboasted that their army and people will f ightto the death, lending a dangerous suicidalnote to North Korean threats.

South Korea is filled with high-valuetargets, the best case being Seoul, which iswithin range of North Korean artillery. Inthis sense, the superiority of South Koreaseconomy counts as a wartime militarydisadvantage because the South Koreanswould lose much greater value in the earlydays of fightinghence, the repeated NorthKorean threats to turn Seoul into a sea offire. North Korean cities are smaller, andboth military and civilian facilities are sadlyin need of repair anyway. A good examplewould be North Koreas largest buildingthe

a lack of balance or symmetry in forces may lead one state tobelieve that it holds some military advantage that could beexploited by an attack

South Korean F15Ks with U.S. F16 over Kunsan Air Base during Buddy Wing program

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unfinished Ryugyong Hotelthe destructionof which would be an absolute boon to theNorth Koreans by saving them the cost oftearing it down.

The value of individual lives is discountedin a dictatorship like North Koreas. Decisionsabout war and peace, like everything else, aremade by the leaders as they consider what will

benefit them personally. Witness how wellKim Il-sung survived his disastrous decision tolaunch the Korean War and how Kim Jong-ilmade it through the Arduous March periodof the 1990s. The Kim regime might again bewilling to lose millions of its people in a war if itfelt it could improve its own security. In SouthKorea, a government decision that provedcostly to the people would be immediately fol-lowed by a repudiation of the government andquite possibly punishment of its leaders.

The two Koreas have very different mili-tary alliances. The ROKU.S. alliance is solid,and U.S. forces would likely play an importantrole from the beginning of any large-scaleconflict. The relationship that the DPRK haswith China is not a military alliance, and theNorth Koreans probably would not expect theChinese to come in on their side as they didduring the Korean War. This lack of supportdramatically influences their wartime options,forcing them to launch a strong first strike andthen hunker down and hope that the Chinesecan convince the Americans and SouthKoreans to abandon their counterattack.

The two Koreas have differentapproaches to military decisionmaking . Inthe South, the civilian leadership wouldmake the final decisions about warfighting(in conjunction with decisions by Americancivilian and military authorities). In NorthKorea, the top members of the Kim regimewould make the initial decisions without

being held accountable to anyone. However,after the first days of the war, by which timethe Norths communications links mightbe cut, combat would probably be directedby low-level military officers, who would beunlikely to take a strategic view of war orbe concerned about North Koreas interna-tional reputation.

South Koreans are doing well underthe status quo and want only to live in peaceand continue to pursue prosperity. NorthKorea is by nature a revolutionary country:neither the leaders nor the masses can besatisfied with the status quo. The regimehas frequently told its people that reunifica-tion must be accomplished to fulfill thebehest of Kim Il-sung, and soldiers havebeen told that a war is the inevitable wayto accomplish a historic reunification,although perhaps such slogans are simplymeant to boost morale. 8 In any case, mostmilitary provocations come from the Northrather than the South, and North Korea isprobably the state that will decide if andwhen future confrontations take place.

The History of MilitaryConfrontation

Although it has been almost 60 yearssince the Korean War ended, the KoreanPeninsula has witnessed hundreds of smallermilitary actions, the majority of them initiatedby the North (see table 1). Almost withoutexception, these acts of violence have been

unpredictable. North Korea routinely issuesthreats against the South, so much so that theydo not serve as a signal that something is aboutto happen. The North Korean military actionshave absolutely no chance of leading to victoryover South Korea, so they must serve otherpurposes, such as probing military defenses,increasing political tension, blackmailing forrewards, sending a political message, or simplykeeping the South Korean government andmilitary off balance. It is also possible that

some of these military actions are the directresult of frustration felt by Kim Jong-il, forwhen a dictator becomes angry, he can vent his

anger without fear of personal consequences.For the most part, the impact of these

actions has been short-lived, serving more tosolidify the cohesiveness of the South Koreanpeople and gain the assistance of SouthKoreas allies than to weaken the government.At the same time, the actions have hurt thereputation of North Korea in the interna-tional community, although its reputationis already so poor that the ability to inflictfurther damage on it is minimal.

Given the hierarchical nature of NorthKorean governance, it must be assumed that virtually all of the military actions (exceptkidnappings) have been planned or autho-rized at the highest levels of government,and in that sense they can be consideredstate-sponsored provocations (and in mostcases terrorism, because they are not intendedto defeat the South Koreans but only to scarethem). To the extent that the actions aremeant to send a political message to SouthKorea, that message is so general in naturethat it is little more than a political statement:

in South Korea, a governmentdecision that proved costly

to the people would befollowed by a repudiation of

the government and quite possibly punishment of its

leaders

ROK soldier at turret gun of K221A1 smokegenerating vehicle during exercise KeyResolve 2011

U.S. Army (Derec Pierson)

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We dont like you. The attacks in the WestSea (in 1999, 2002, 2009, and 2010) send amore specific message: namely, that NorthKorea claims jurisdiction over that area.However, if the North Koreans think this isthe way to get South Korea to negotiate a newborder agreement, they are sadly mistaken.

Prospects of Future MilitaryProvocations

Political confrontation on the KoreanPeninsula continues, and North Koreasfortunes continue to decline. It is not realisticto expect that the North Korean regime willmeekly accept its dismal destiny and witheraway. Instead, it will maintain efforts to reverseits political and economic fortunes whilekeeping a dictatorial hold on its people. Theuse of its military forces for domestic socialcontrol and as a way to get the attention of theinternational community is a natural way forthe self-styled military-first regime to pursueits goals. The historical pattern of alternatingprovocations with requests for talks will surelycontinue. Talks will in turn be used to solicit

the North Korean regime willmaintain efforts to reverseits political and economicfortunes while keeping a

dictatorial hold on its people

Table 1. PostKorean War Military Actions on the Peninsula in Descending Order of Seriousness

Event Details and YearsOpen attacks by North Korean airplanes against Republic of Korea (ROK) or U.S. airplanes or ships

(1965, 1968, 1969, 1999, 2002, 2003); torpedoing of theCheonan (2010), artillery at-tack on Yeonpyeong (2010)

Commando raids against the Blue House (1968); on the east and west coasts (1968, 1969, 1975, 1980,1981, 1985)

Submarine incursions 1996, 1998

Military inltration across demilitarized zone (DMZ) 1969, 1970, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1992, 1995North Korean intrusions across military demarca-tion line

1996, 1997

Assassination missions against ROK authorities 1974, 1983

Tunneling under DMZ discovered in 1974, 1975, 1978, 1990

Airplane hijackings 1958, 1969, attempted in 1971; Korean Air Lines bombing in 1987

Kidnappings and boat hijackings too frequent to list; according to the ROK government, 3,835 South Koreans have beenabducted since the end of the Korean War, with 517 still held in North Korea

Sources: Various, including Dick K. Nanto,North Korea: Chronology of Provocations, 19502003 , Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated March 18, 2003); estimates of South Korean abductfrom South Koreas Ministry of Unication, cited by Yonhap News Agency, October 4, 2010.

ROK soldier stands in readyfighting position at PanmunjomJoint Security Area

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aid and political support for the regime. Anobvious alternative behavior would be forNorth Korea to steadfastly pursue a peaceful,nonthreatening international policy, but whilesuch a policy would elicit far more aid andsupport than a provocational one, it would risklosing the regimes control over its people, andin North Korea as everywhere else, domestic

politics trumps international politics.Past evidence suggests that Kim Jong-il,

like his father, is a rational decisionmaker,although the younger Kim is sometimesmoved by his emotions. Little is known aboutthe designated successor Kim Jong-un. Hisyouth and inexperience, and the alreadyprominent role given to the top generals,suggest that the military may exert moreinfluence on decisionmaking in the futureeven while remaining under the control ofthe party. While the military has outsideinterests in the form of foreign trading com-panies, it is probably less in touch with andless concerned about international relationsthan are the government and party, and maytherefore be less likely to take into accountlong-term consequences of conflict.

In the next few years, several factorsare likely to prompt Pyongyang to engage infurther provocations. For one, it is likely thatKim Jong-ils decisionmaking powers aredeclining along with his health, leading tomore risky behavior. Common symptoms of

cognitive decline include stereotyped think-ing, impairment of judgment, greater relianceon earlier personality traits, and difficultyin checking impulses. In a dictatorship likeNorth Koreas, a complicating factor is thatthe people around Kim hesitate to correct orrestrain him for fear of being reprimandedor punished for their interference. Also, it

can be difficult for them to know whether ornot to intervene because a leader in declin-ing health may have some good days andsome bad days, even though he is not clearlyincapacitated. 9

Another factor that may make theNorth Korean leadership more dangerous inthe years ahead is the likelihood that contend-ing factions in the power structure, jockeyingfor a favorable position with Kim Jong-un,may attempt to prove their loyalty by initiat-ing aggressive actions. Moreover, the regimeslongstanding promise to make the year 2012 amaterially lucrative celebration of the found-ers birth may force it to risk more provoca-tions in order to blackmail the internationalcommunity into granting foreign aid.

And then there is the undeniable factthat weapons continue to become more lethal.Any nuclear weapons that the North Koreansmay possess should be considered usable.North Koreas continued progress with missiledevelopment makes it possible to delivernuclear weapons over a longer distance. As

for the special forces, transportation andweaponry (for example, torpedoes on smallsubmarines) will continue to be developed,making these forces more lethal as well.

In sum, the motivation for North Koreato engage in active confrontation continuesand may even increase, and the resources thatcould be employed in those confrontations are

becoming more deadly. Without the Cold Warconstraints that China and the former SovietUnion indirectly placed on North Korea, theregime could indeed engage in rogue behav-ior. The years ahead may be the most dangeroustime for the two Koreas since the Korean War.

Dealing Quickly with Provocationsand Conflict

In the short term, Seouls goal must beto limit Pyongyangs propensity for resort-ing to military force. The basic principles fordiscouraging bad behavior are well known.According to the law of effect, desirableresponses (by a person or a state) followed byrewards will tend to occur again under similarcircumstances; undesirable responses that areignored will eventually disappear (becausethey are not worth the trouble of making);and undesirable responses that are followedby punishment will quickly disappear.

Provocations (undesirable responses)should be followed immediately by a punish-ment that is appropriate in strength and

Table 2. Fates of Socialist Dictators

Leader Country Fate

Jnos Kdar Hungary Deposed 1988; died 1989

Erich Honecker East Germany Deposed 1989; arrested for corruption and manslaughter

Gustv Husk Czechoslovakia Deposed 1989; expelled from party 1990; died 1991

Todor Zhivkov Bulgaria Deposed 1989; expelled from party; arrested for embezzlement

Wojciech Jaruzelski Poland Deposed 1990; charged with crimes committed while defense minister

Nicolae Ceaus escu Romania Deposed 1989; executed

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character to the nature of the bad behavior(punishment to fit the crime). The punish-ment should be strong enough to materiallyreduce the chances that a similar provocationwill be launched in the future. How strongthe punishment needs to be is always a matterof guesswork, but past experience can provideguidelines. It is known, for example, that

condemnation from the United Nations hasno effect on North Korea and thus does notcount as punishment; sanctions resolutionsare likewise largely ineffective. Threats offuture punishment are absolutely useless.

The usual recommendation is tosupplement punishment for bad behaviorwith rewards for good behavior (sticks andcarrots). Unfortunately, in North Koreascase, history suggests that the kind of rewardsthe international community offersfood,money, medicinewill be siphoned off by theNorth Korean elites, thereby strengtheningthe regime without changing its nature orhelping the North Korean people. If this is thecase, such rewards may temporarily reducethe likelihood of provocations but will havethe opposite long-term effect. At the very least,proffered rewards should be subject to with-drawal so that if the regime resumes its badbehavior, it will no longer enjoy the benefitsit received for good behavior. For example,food aid can be easily ended if the regime isusing it for its own benefit, but money receivedfrom the South Korean businesses in Kaesong

cannot be stopped without putting an end tothe Kaesong project. Not surprisingly, work atthe Kaesong Industrial Complex was not sus-pended even while North Korea was attackingSouth Korea in the West Sea.

Reward and punishment principles weredeveloped and refined in psychology laborato-ries. In the real world, it is not so easy to makeimmediate and appropriate responses to provo-cations, especially when those provocationscan come at any time, in almost any form, andfrom almost any direction. It costs too muchto be ready to respond immediately to all

possible attacks, so delayed responses must beaccepted as a practical alternative.

The principle of strong and immediatepunishment encounters another obstacle in theform of the danger of military escalation. If themilitary response to a provocation is immedi-ate counterattack, it will be difficult for NorthKorea in turn to quickly respond because mili-

tary decisions will have to be made on the spot.That is, the North Koreans will encounter thesame response problems as the South Koreans.In any case, the international community islikely to consider an immediate South Koreancounterattack as a justifiable response to NorthKorean provocations. However, if the SouthKorean military response is delayed, it becomesretaliatory in nature and may not only drawinternational criticism but may also be treatedby North Korea as a separate attack (that is, aprovocation) to which a new response will haveto be made.

If a delayed South Korean counter-attack on North Korea seems likely to escalate violence, the South, the more exposed ofthe two to attacks, might end up receivingmore punishment than it delivers. One waySouth Korea could sidestep this dilemma is torespond asymmetrically. This is in fact whatSouth Korea did after the attacks on the ROKnavy ship Cheonan and on forces stationedon Yeonpyeong Island, for which it was notprepared to make an immediate militaryresponse. Instead of delivering a strong

counterattack, the government initiatedeconomic sanctions and information warfare,although these responses were uncertain anduncoordinated.

North Korea is a military-orientedstate primed for war. Launching a militaryattack on North Korea (apart from a defensiveresponse) is playing to its strength. On theother hand, North Korea is perennially poor,and its leaders feel the need to keep theirpeople ignorant and under control. SouthKorean responses in the form of economicpunishment and information warfare may bemore useful in discouraging North Koreanattacks than bombing a few military installa-tions, and these nonkinetic forms of responsewould be less likely to trigger further militaryaction on the part of the North Koreans. Infact, such responses may confront the NorthKorean leaders with their own dilemmabecause the generals would be less concernedabout South Koreas economic sanctions orinformation warfare responses than wouldthe political leadership, so the North Korean

decisionmakers might be divided in their rec-ommendations for subsequent action.

Moral considerations should also guidedecisions about how to respond to NorthKorean provocations. The use of counterforceresults in military and civilian casualties, butthe victims are not the people who ordered theinitial attack. If the response is economic, North

Korean leaders will be hurt less by economicsanctions than the people, but the resultingwidespread economic hardship can also helpalienate the people, thus weakening the leadershold on power. Better yet, bombarding NorthKoreans with information that could weakenthe regime will not hurt anybody except thosewho are part of the leadership structure.

Discouraging Provocations in theLong Term

Military provocations are not maderandomly. In North Korea, as in other states,military action is initiated, in the final analysis,in order to achieve political goalsin this case,survival as a dictatorial state, a goal that hasnot changed since before the Korean War. Bythis calculation, in order to eliminate militaryconfrontation, it would be necessary for thenature of North Korean politics to fundamen-tally change. In the United States, the Obamaadministration has endorsed behavior changerather than regime change. The South KoreanSunshine Policy under Presidents Kim Dae- jung and Roh Moo-hyun was explicitly based

on the idea that engagement with North Koreanleaders would change their behavior in thedirection of opening and reform.

It is doubtful if Kim Jong-il or his fatherhas ever seriously considered instituting politi-cal reforms or dramatic economic reforms. Thefate of former socialist dictators (see table 2) andtheir reforming successors provides the clearlesson that reforms sweep away whoever is inpower. With these examples before him, KimJong-il has not heeded Mikhail Gorbachevsfamous advice to Erich Honecker in 1989 thatlife punishes those who delay. Gorbachevhimself disappeared from political life, as didmost of the first generation of reformers. KimJong-il has delayed, and he remains in power.

Rather than hoping that the Kim regimewill commit political suicide, it seems morerealistic to promote a change in regime, eventhough this policy is not politically popularin South Korea or the United States. In orderto weaken the regime, any aid or engagementwith the North Korean people that goesthrough the leadership and strengthens that

condemnation from theUnited Nations has no effect

on North Korea and thus doesnot count as punishment; sanctions resolutions arelikewise largely ineffective

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leadership should be viewed with skepticism.Likewise, any political or economic rewardsoffered to North Korea in return for nucleardisarmament carry the danger of strengthen-ing the current regime. It could be argued thata North Korea without nuclear weapons isalmost as dangerous to foreigners as a NorthKorea with nuclear weapons. The NorthKorean people would arguably be better offif their government gave up the weaponsin return for the economic aid that wouldundoubtedly follow from such a decision, butit is doubtful if the government would want itspeople to become economically comfortableenough to turn their attention to politics. Soit is highly unlikely that the Kim regime canbe tamed. Kim and his supporters will takewhatever is on offer while at the same timeresisting political and economic change.

The first part of North Koreas oft-stated

two-part solution to conflict on the KoreanPeninsula is for South Korea to reject all outsideinfluences and settle Korean affairs by our ownefforts, which is to say, in a political contestbetween the Norths one-party system and theSouths multiparty system. The second part ofthe solution is for the United States to relinquishits hostile attitude and make a bold switchoverin its relations with North Korea, includingrecognizing North Koreas sovereignty, pledg-ing nonaggression, and not obstructing itseconomic development. 10 North Korea hasmade more specific demandsfor example,that a peace treaty be signed officially ending theKorean War and that the NLL be redrawnbutit is difficult to believe that any agreements, largeor small, would change the longstanding natureof the Kim regime. Rather, the regime wouldsimply come up with new demands.

The incompatibility of the political,economic, and social systems of the two Koreasis a continuing threat to peace and stabilityon the peninsula. Military confrontation is anextension of political confrontation. Until the

North Korean political system changes, SouthKoreas best hope for peace is to limit the Northsemployment of its forces in active engagements.

When North Korea attacks SouthKorea, punishment should be meted outquickly and in proportion to the attack. Inmaking more delayed responses, South Koreashould play to its strengths, which are eco-nomic, political, and social in nature. Thus,after making an immediate military response,South Korea should follow up with economicsanctions and information attacks thatwill have a potentially long-lasting, punitiveimpact on North Koreas leaders.

The Kim regime in Pyongyang livesby the sword and, since the Korean War, hasthrived by the sword; it will die by the ballotbox. South Korea should not simply respondto North Korean attacks but should worktoward the day when the North Korean people

are free to change the nature of their politi-cal system. This is a battle that South Koreashould wage constantly, not simply waiting forNorth Koreas next military provocation.

Given the nature of politics in ademocracy, leaders find it difficult to pursuelong-term policies that have little chanceof immediate success because the elector-ate wants quick results. The South Koreangovernment has sometimes been pushedinto announcing impending actions againstNorth Korea that it might prefer not to take.Then after public attention has dissipated,these plans are cancelled. A good example isthe governments reversal of plans to resumepropaganda broadcasts beamed across theDMZ to North Korea. The public also expectsto be completely protected from harm, but thehard reality is that North Korea will almostcertainly continue to provoke South Koreamilitarily, and more lives will be lost. This isnot the fault of the South Korean government;rather, it is the cost of living in a dangerousneighborhood. JFQ

N O T E S

1 1990 statistics from Eui-Gak Hwang, TheKorean Economies (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1993), 120; 2000 statistics from Yonhap NewsAgency, December 20, 2001, citing South KoreasNational Statistical Office; 2009 statistics fromYonhap News Agency, January 5, 2011, citing

Statistics Korea.2 Kim Il-sung, For the Implementation of

the Judicial Policy of Our Party, in Kim Il-sung,Works 12 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Pub-lishing House, 1983), 182.

3 The full text of North Koreas criminalcode was published by Yonhap News Agency,December 8, 2004. Some articles of the codehave since been revised, but apparently not thosecited here.

4 Un Chong-chol, Offensive Exercises forNorthward Aggression under the Signboard ofDefense Training under the Rubric ExtremelyDangerous Commotion of Provocation, WhichBrings Fiery Clouds of War to the Korean Penin-sula, Nodong Sinmun (electronic edition), KPMWeb site, March 1, 2011.

5 Moving Story Associated with Chol Ridge,KCNA, October 6, 1999.

6 Donna Miles, U.S. Declassifies NuclearStockpile Details to Promote Transparency, May3, 2010, U.S. Department of Defense Web site,available at .

7 Estimates from various sources, includingthe International Institute for Strategic Studies,The Military Balance, 2008 (London: InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies, 2008), 387391.

8

The Mt. Paektu Gunstock Will NeverForgive It, Chosun Peoples Army , June 16, 2010.9 Jerrold M. Post and Robert S. Robins,

The Captive King and His Captive Court: ThePsychopolitical Dynamics of the Disabled Leaderand His Inner Circle, Political Psychology 11, no.2 (1990), 331351.

10 For example, U.S. Urged to Adopt Policyof Peaceful Co-existence with DPRK, KCNA,January 17, 2005; DPRK FM Spokesman onU.S. Rumor about Dialogue, KCNA, January15, 2003.

ROK marines fire K9 Thunder155mm self-propelledartillery systems during fire-support coordination drill atYeonpyeong-Do

U.S. Marine Corps (Kentavist Brackin)

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