Jessop State Theory

7/29/2019 Jessop State Theory

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Strategic SelectivityThis brings us to the other relatively novel term

introduced below; that of`strategic selectivity'.Whereas the concept of 'state project? highlights the

state's character as both a site and an object ofstrategic

elaboration, ''strategic selectivity' brings out the state's

differentia] impact on the balance ofpolitical forces and

the strategies which they can pursue. 9-10

The non-existent essence of the capitalist state I anlamayacalismior, how strategic capacities of states affect their

ability to manage economic crisis, why has the labouer

moement been able to maintain the welfare state in some

countries nbut not others, what has influenced the choice

between neoliberal and neo-corporatist strategies10

Poulantzas is less concerned to disprove

liberal democratic theory than to criticize the

traditional Communist orthodoxy of 'state

monopoly capitalism'. Thus, in opposition to the

argument that the modern state is no more

than a pliant tool of monopoly capital, he

rejects all forms of instrumentalism and insiststhat the state is a complex social relation. The

latter seems to mean two things. First, classes

should not be seen as simple economic forces


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existing outside and independently of the state

and capable of manipulating it as a passive

instrument or tool. For the political influence of

class and class fractions depends. in part on the

institutional structure of the state and the effects

of state power. Secondly, class struggle is not

confined to civil society, but is reproduced within

the heart of the state apparatus itself. He also

argues that the state has an objective function to

perform in maintaining social cohesion so thatcapital accumulation can proceed unhindered

(Poulantzas, 1968: 44-50; 1974: 78-81 and

passim). Thus, Poulantzas criticizes Miliband

for analysing the state in terms of the individual

human subjects who control it rather than in

relation to its structurally determined role in

capitalist society (Poulantzas 1969: 67-78).

Unfortunately, although his criticisms of

Miliband's analysis and

of the capitalist state, He defines the state as

the factor of cohesion but interprets this in

two contrasting ways. Sometimes he suggests

that a sufficient condition of cohesion is thesuccessful organization of a power bloc under

the hegemony of monopoly capital Poulantzas

1970: 72-88; Cutler 1971: 5-15). This suggestion


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completely ignores the fundamental economic

constraints on the effective exercise of statepower

and implies that the state is an instrument of the

power bloc rather than the monopoly sector

alone. Elsewhere, Poulantzas adopts the

reductionist view that the effects of state power are

necessarily circumscribed by the dominance of

cipitalism so that, in the long run, they can only

correspond to the interests of the dominant class

(see especially Poulantzas 1969: 67-78, and 1976b:63-83), This claim implies that it is totally

irrelevant which class controls the state

apparatus, since it must maintain cohesion by

virtue of its objective function. In short, although

he is closely identified with assertions about

the relative autonomy of the capitalist state,

Poulantzas actually oscillates between two

extreme positions. Either he endows the state with

complete independence from the economic base

or he denies it any independence at all. Neither

ofthese positions would be ,;atisfactory on its own

and wgether Ilwy wider his analysis

indeterminate (for further discussion of

Poulantzas, which somewhat modifies this

critique, see chapters 2 and S below).30-31


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Allow for eco causation without committing

ourselves to eco reductionism81

Yani burda demek istedigi how the cap eco

could determine the overall structuralarticulation and dynamoic of the allegedly

superstructural institutional orders of society

aciklanamaz102

93 state is a contingent institutional

ensemble+strategic selectivity of the state, pol-org networks

Analysis of state forms, parliamentarism and corporatism (tripartism as a hybrid mode formed through

the combination of corporatism w parliamentary government) 119

Parliamentarism' can be defined as a distinctive combination of political representation and

state intervention. Representation is secured through the participation of 'citizens' in the policy-

making of an elected government through their exercise of voting and related political rights. And

interventions occurs in the form of legislation or general policies enforced by a permanent rational-legaladministration in accordance with the rule of law. 119

Parliamentarism is also characterized by two main forms ofstate intervention. The first

occurs through the parliamentary enactment and subsequent impartial, rational-legal

bureaucratic enforcement of general legislative codes regulating private and public activities.

The second involves the provision of general external conditions facilitating or supporting such

activities without direct control o0ver them. The latter field of intervention could include

Keynesian macro-level demean d management in the field of accumulation or welfare

programmes oriented to the satisfaction of individual social rights. 120

Corporatism can also be defined as a distinctive combinationof political representation and state intervention. In this

case, however, representation is mediated through a system

of public Icorporations Iwhich are constituted on the basis of

their members functions within the division of labour. And

state intervention occurs through these same corporations

and/or administrative agencies formally accountable to


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them. Thus, whereas representation and intervention are

typically institutionally separated in parliamentarybureaucratic

systems, in corporatism they tend to be

institutionally fused. For the formal organs through which

political representation is mediated are also responsible for

intervention.120

Corporations enjoy representational monopolies in relation to their members various

functions. For, in the absence of such compulsoryand non-competitive 'corporatization' of

politics, serious deficiencies in both representation and intervention could occur. 120

he effectiveness of state power depends on the balance of forces in a given situation and is

thus reinforced through the mobilization of support forofficial policies as well as through the

monopolization of the means of coercion. In this context bourgeois domination

presupposes the maintenance of a favourable balance of forces through a mixture of

repression, moral suasion and indoctrination and economic corporative and populr-

democratoc consessions. Strategies fior organizing an adequate social base and discorganizingopposition forces will vary with the stage of capitalism, the location in the world economy, the

form of state and the existing balance of forces. 128-129

pol representation and the form of the state

state power is a form-determined social relation 160.

Along with these formal aspects of the state we must examine its substantive aspects. Here

we have in mind not only the specific policies pursued by the state but also three general

dimensions: first, thesocial bases of support and resistance underpinning the

effectiveness of state power; second, the state project which gives some operational unity

to the state as an apparatus (see chapter 12); and, third, the nature of the begenionk

proiea, if any, around which the exercise of state power is centred. By the social basis of

the state we understand the specific configuration of social forces, howsoever identified as

subjects and organized as political actors, that supports the basic structure of the state

system, its mode of operation and its objectives. This is not at all inconsistent with

conflicts over specific policies as long as they occur within an agreed institutional

framework and an accepted *policy paradigm' setting the parameters of public choice.

Such support is not simply a question of an inter-individual consensus of opinion but depends instead on specific modes of mass integration

which channel, transform and prioritize demands and manage the flow of material

concessions necessary to maintain the 'unstable equilibrium ofcompromise' that underpins

such support. In order to understand the social bases of state power more fully it is

necessary to relate them to the prevailing ihegemonic project' if any) and its implications

for the form and content of politics.


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In broad terms hegemony involves the development of a specific

'hegemonic project' which can resolve the abstact problem of

conflicts between particular interests and the general interest. This

involves the mobilization of support behind a concrete, national-

popular programme of action which asserts a general interest

in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly, advance the

long-term interest of the hegemonic class (fraction), and which

privileges particular `economic-corporate' interests compatible with

this programme, whilst derogating the pursuit of other particular

interests that are inconsistent with it. Normal!) hegemony also

involves the sacrifice of certain short-term interests of the

hcgenlonic class (fraction), and a flow of material concessions to

other social forces mobilized behind the project.It is therefore conditioned and limited by the

accumulation process in the circuit of capital

without, however, being reducible to an

accumulation strategy (for a discussion of their

links to `state projects', see chapter 12 below).

Indeed, as already noted, there is real scope for

dissociation and contradiction between

accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects.161-162

Three aspects of the stateasformneed exploring: forms of representation, forms of intervention, and forms of articulation of thestate considered as an institutional ensemble. All three aspects are crucialin the mediation of the rule of capital. Forms of political representationshape the ways in which the interests of capital in a given accumulation

strategy are articulated and, through the structural selectivity inscribed insuch forms, can privilege some strategies at the expense of others. Differentforms of intervention also have differential implications for the pursuit ofparticular accumulation strategies. Finally, the hierarchical and horizontaldistribution of powers in the state apparatus and the relative dominance ofspecific branches of the state will have significant effects on the exercise ofstate power in the interests of accumulation. There is still much to investigatein these areas of form determination, and Marxist theories could learn a greatdeal here from more orthodox political analyses.


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In addition to these formal aspects of the state system we must also examineits substantive aspects. As well as the specific policies implementedby the state apparatus there are two more general determinations: the socialbases of support for and resistance to the state, and the nature of thehegemonic project (if any) around which the exercise of state power is centred. By the social basis of the state we understand the specific configuration

of social forces, however identified as subjects and (dis)organisedas political actors, that supports the basic structure of the state system, itsmode of operation, and its objectives. This support is not at all inconsistentwith conflict over specific policies as long as such conflict occurswithin an agreed institutional framework and accepted policy paradigmthat establishes the parameters of public choice. It should be noted thatpolitical support of this kind is not reducible simply to questions of consensusbut depends on specific modes of mass integration which channel,transform, and prioritise demands, and manage the flow of material concessionsnecessary to maintain the unstable equilibrium of compromisewhich underpins such support.19 It should also be noted that the socialbases of the state are heterogeneous and the different social forces will vary

in their degree of commitment to the state. At the same time there willbe considerable variation in the mix of material concessions, symbolic rewards,and repression directed through the state to different social forces.These variations in support and benefit are typically related to the prevailinghegemonic project (if any) and its implications for the form and content ofpolitics.In broad terms hegemony involves the interpellation and organisation ofdifferent classrelevant(but not necessarily classconscious)forces under the political, intellectual, and moral leadership of a particular class (orclass fraction) or, more precisely, its political, intellectual, and moral spokesmen.The key to the exercise of such leadership is the development of aspecific hegemonic project which can resolve the abstract problem of conflictsbetween particular interests and the general interest. In abstract termsthis conflict is probably insoluble because of the potentially infinite rangeof particular interests which could be posited in opposition to any definitionof the general interest. Nonetheless, it is the task of hegemonic leadershipto resolve this conflict on a less abstract plane through specific political,intellectual, and moral practices. This involves the mobilisation of supportbehind a concrete, nationalpopularprogramme of action which asserts ageneral interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advancethe longterminterests of the hegemonic class (fraction) and whichalso privileges particular economiccorporate

interests compatible with thisprogram. Conversely those particular interests which are inconsistent withthe project are deemed immoral and/or irrational and, insofar as they are stillpursued by groups outside the consensus, they are also liable to sanction.Normally hegemony also involves the sacrifice of certain shortterminterestsof the hegemonic class (fraction), and a flow of material concessions forother social forces mobilised behind the project. It is thereby conditionedand limited by the accumulation process.160-162


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But it should be emphasised here that hegemonic projects and accumulationstrategies are not identical even though they may overlap partiallyand/or mutually condition each other. While accumulation strategies aredirectly concerned with economic expansion on a national or internationalscale, hegemonic projects can be concerned principally with various noneconomic

objectives (even if economically conditioned and economicallyrelevant). The latter might include military success, social reform, politicalstability, or moral regeneration. Moreover, while accumulation strategiesare oriented primarily to the relations of production and thus to the balanceof class forces, hegemonic projects are typically oriented to broader issuesgrounded not only in economic relations but also in the field of civil societyand the state. Accordingly hegemonic projects should take account of thebalance among all relevant social forces, however these may be organised.It is in this sense that we can refer to hegemonic projects as concerned withthe nationalpopularand not simply with class relations. Lastly, given thedifferentiation between the value form and the form of the state as well asthe differential scope and content of accumulation strategies and hegemonic

projects, there is obviously room for some dissociation or inconsistency betweenthem in specific conjunctures. In general it would seem obvious thataccumulation and hegemony will be most secure where there is a close con congruencebetween particular strategies and projects. But this is not the same as saying that accumulationneeds to be the overriding objective of a hegemonicproject. Other cases worth exploring would occur where an accumulationstrategy is successfully pursued in the absence of hegemony, where the pursuitof an arbitrary, rationalistic, and willed hegemonic project undermines the conditions for accumulation, and where demands of continuing accumulationassociated with a particular strategy override the requirements of theprevailing hegemonic project.What exactly is involved in a successful hegemonic project? I wantto suggest that the realisation of a hegemonic project ultimately dependson three key factors: its structural determination, its strategic orientation,and its relation to accumulation. The structural determination of hegemonyinvolves the structural privileges inscribed in a given state form (includingits forms of representation, intervention, and internal articulation), for someforces and their interests at the expense of other forces and interests. Thisaspect is sometimes referred to as the structural selectivity of the state. Atstake here is the form of political struggles and the implications of form forthe strategic relations among different political forces. Within these objectivelimits there is nonetheless some scope for shorttermvariations in hegemonyat the level of political practices. These could include periods of unstablehegemony, dissociation between hegemony over the power bloc and that

over the popular masses, crises of hegemony, and even shorttermshifts ofhegemony in favour of subordinate classes such as the petty bourgeoisie orthe working class (or social categories such as the military, bureaucrats, orintellectuals). But the structural selectivity of the state form means that thesevariations are essentially shorttermand that hegemony will return in thelong term to the structurally privileged class (or class fraction), provided thatits strategic orientation and relation to accumulation prove adequate. This


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proviso is crucial. For, although a stable hegemonic position depends on theformdeterminationof the state, it is not reducible to structural determination.In addition to the aspect of structural determination, attention must alsobe paid to the development of a hegemonic project which successfully linksthe realisation of certain particular interests of subordinate social forces

to the pursuit of a nationalpopularprogramme which favours the longterminterests of the hegemonic force. The conquest of hegemony involvesthree areas of political, intellectual, and moral leadership. First, it involvesthe integration of various strategically significant forces as subjects withspecific interests and the repudiation of alternative interpellations and at attributionsof interest.20 Second, it involves the formulation of a general nationalpopularproject whose realisation will also advance the particulareconomiccorporateinterests perceived by subordinate social forces.Finally, it involves the specification of a policy paradigm within whichconflicts over competing interests and demands can be negotiated withoutthreatening the overall project.

It is quite possible for subordinate classes and/or social categories rootedin nonclassrelations to develop alternative hegemonic projects. But theywill always remain vulnerable to the dissolution of any such hegemony asattempts to implement such projects run up against obstacles grounded in existingeconomic and political forms. It is for this reason that the conquest ofideological hegemony must be coupled in the long term with the reorganisationof a new form of state that offers structural privileges to the hegemonicforce in question. More generally it should be emphasised that there is noneed for the social forces mobilised behind a given hegemonic project tobe directly interpellated as class forces (even though they may well have adefinite class belonging and/or also have a clear class relevance). Indeed itis quite normal for hegemony to be associated with the repudiation of anantagonistic class discourse and an insistence on the primacy of individualand/or pluralistic bases of social organisation. In this sense we might suggestthat pluralism is the matrix within which struggles for hegemony occur.Third, it should be emphasised that there is no compelling reason toexpect that hegemonic projects should be directly economic in character orgive priority to economic objectives. But it is important to recognise thatsuccessful pursuit of a hegemonic project will depend on the flow of materialconcessions to subordinate social forces and thus on the productivity of theeconomy. It follows that those hegemonic projects will prove most successfulwhich, other things being equal, are closely linked with an appropriateaccumulation strategy or, in the case of a socialist hegemonic project, anadequate alternative economic strategy.

Finally, it is worth noting that hegemonic projects also have a crucialrole in maintaining the substantive unity of the state apparatus as a complexinstitutional ensemble. Even where there is a welldefineddistribution offunctions and powers within the state system and it is organised in a formal,rationallegalmanner, it is still necessary to translate this formal unityinto substantive unity. Consensus on a hegemonic project can limit conflictswithin and among the various branches of the state apparatus and provide


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an ideological and material base for their relative unity and cohesion inreproducing the system of political domination. The fundamental problem ofarticulating certain particular interests into a general interest favourable tocapital (and discouraging the assertion of other particular interests), occurswithin the state apparatus as well as in the economic domain and civil society.Thus it affects not only the representation of economic and social interests inside the state but also

the sui generis interests of political categories suchas bureaucrats, deputies, the police, and judges. Indeed the problem ofavoiding a merely particularistic reproduction of competing and contradictoryeconomiccorporateinterests and securing some coordination and cohesionof the state apparatus becomes more pressing with the expansion of thatapparatus and the extension of its activities well beyond formal facilitationof capital accumulation to include a wide range of social reproduction anddirective activities. In the absence of a modicum of substantive as well asformal unity, however, the state is deprived of the relative autonomy it needsto act as an ideal collective capitalist in relation to accumulation and/or tosecure social cohesion more generally in its promotion of nationalpopulargoals. In this sense we can argue that the relative autonomy of the state

is bound up with its substantive unity (a concept preferable to that of classunity), and that both depend on the exercise of state power according to aspecific hegemonic project.

Some Implications of the Concept of Hegemonic ProjectSo far I have implied that hegemony is typical or normal in capitalist societies,that hegemonic projects somehow manage to secure the support ofall significant social forces, and that the hegemonic force itself is bound inthe long term to be an economically dominant class or class fraction ratherthan a subordinate class or nonclassforce. In each case these implicationsare misleading or false. Accordingly, in this section I want to specify thearguments more carefully and draw out some of the fundamental theoretical

problems posed by the analysis of hegemony in terms of hegemonic projects.Let us begin with the question of whether such projects gain the support ofall significant social forces.To suggest that hegemony wins almost universal support is misleading.

Alternatively, this formulation creates far too large a residual category ofstates characterised by a crisis of hegemony (and thereby implies that hegemonyis far from typical of capitalist societies). The problem can be clarifiedby distinguishing between one nation and two nations hegemonic projects.Thus one nation strategies aim at an expansive hegemony in which the supportof the entire population is mobilised through material concessions andsymbolic rewards (as in social imperialism and the KeynesianWelfarestate projects). In contrast, two nations projects aim at a more limitedhegemony concerned to mobilise the support of strategically significant sectors

of the population and to pass the costs of the project to other sectors (asin fascism and Thatcherism). In periods of economic crisis and/or limitedscope for material concessions, the prospects for a one nation strategy are restricted (unless itinvolves a perceived equitable sharing of sacrifice), andtwo nations strategies are more likely to be pursued. In addition, where thebalance of forces permits, such strategies may also be pursued during periodsof expansion and may, indeed, be a precondition of successful accumulation.In both cases it should be noted that two nations projects require containmentand even repression of the other nation at the same time as they involve selective


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access and concessions for the more favoured nation. Recent workon the Modell Deutschland provides particularly interesting illustrations of atwo nations strategy (c.f. Hirsch, 1983).Once we distinguish between one nation and two nations hegemonicprojects, there would seem less reason to question the normality of hegemonyin capitalist societies. But a number of problems still remain. In the first

place the distinction is in certain respects pretheoretical,i.e., it is basicallydescriptive in character and requires more rigorous definition of its variousdimensions and preconditions. As with the more general concept of hegemonyand the attempt to clarify it through the introduction of the notion ofhegemonic project, this definitional task poses serious difficulties concerningthe appropriate level of theoretical abstraction and simplification. Whilequestions of form can be discussed in isolation from specific historical cases(as in discussion of the commodity form, money form, or wageform),it isdifficult to discuss hegemony, hegemonic projects, or one nation strategieswithout reference to specific examples and the substance of particular political,intellectual, and moral discourses. The solution must be sought in the

combination of a formal analysis of discursive strategies (drawing on linguisticsand similar disciplines) 21 and specific references to concrete differencesand equivalences established in pursuing particular hegemonic projects (andtheir corresponding patterns of alliance, compromise, truce, repression, andso forth). In short, while it is possible to give indications about the natureand dynamics of hegemony at a general theoretical level, it is only throughreference to specific projects that significant progress can be made.. 206-212

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Jessop State Theory