Jervis- Cooperation Under Sec Dilemma

8/2/2019 Jervis- Cooperation Under Sec Dilemma

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Trustees of Princeton University

Cooperation Under the Security DilemmaAuthor(s): Robert JervisSource: World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jan., 1978), pp. 167-214Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958 .

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COOPERATION UNDER THESECURITY DILEMMAByROBERT JERVIS*

I. ANARCHY AND THE SECURITY DILEMMAT HE lackofan internationalovereignotonly ermits ars ooccur, ut lso makes t difficultor tates hat re satisfied ith hestatus uo to arrive t goals that hey ecognize s being n their om-mon interest. ecausethere re no institutionsr authoritieshatcanmake and enforcenternationalaws,the policiesof cooperation hatwill bringmutualrewards f others ooperatemaybringdisaster ftheydo not. Becausestates re awareof this, narchy ncourages e-havior hat eaves ll concernedworseoff hanthey ouldbe, even ntheextreme ase nwhich ll stateswould ike to freeze he tatus uo.This is true f themen nRousseau's Stag Hunt." fthey ooperateotrap hestag, heywill all eat well.But f one person efectso chaserabbit-whichhe likes ess than tag-noneof the otherswill get any-thing.Thus,all actorshavethe same preferencerder, nd there s asolution hat ives ach his first hoice: i) cooperatend trap he tag(the nternationalnaloguebeingcooperationnddisarmament);2)chase rabbitwhile others emain ttheir osts maintain high evelof armswhileothers redisarmed); 3) all chaserabbitsarmscompe-tition ndhighrisk fwar); and (4) stay t theoriginal ositionwhileanother hasesa rabbit being disarmedwhile others re armed).1* I am grateful o Robert Art,Bernard Brodie,and Glenn Snyderforcomments, ndto the Committeeon Research of the UCLA Academic Senate for financial support.An earlierversionof thisessay appeared as Working Paper No. 5, UCLA Program inArms Control and InternationalSecurity.1This kind of rank-orderings not entirely n analyst's nvention,as is shown bythe followingsectionof a British rmymemo of I903 dealing with British nd Russianrailroad constructionnear the Persia-Afghanistan order:The conditionsof the problem may . . . be briefly ummarized as follows:a) If we make a railway to Seistan while Russia remains inactive,we gain a

considerabledefensiveadvantage at considerable financial cost;b) If Russia makes a railwayto Seistan,while we remain inactive,she gains aconsiderable offensive dvantage at considerable financial cost;c) If both we and Russia make railways to Seistan,the defensive and offensiveadvantagesmay be held to neutralize each other; in other words,we shall havespenta good deal of money and be no betteroffthan we are at present.On the0043-887I/78/3002-0 I 67$02-40/I? I978 PrincetonUniversityPressFor copying information, ee Contributorpage


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168 WORLD POLITICSUnless achperson hinks hat heothers ill cooperate,e himselfwillnot.Andwhymight e fear hat ny ther erson ould osome-thing hatwould acrificeis ownfirsthoice? he othermight otunderstandhe ituation,r might otbe ableto control is mpulsesifhe saw rabbit,rmight ear hat ome thermemberfthegroupis unreliable.f theperson oices nyof these uspicions,thersremore ikely o fear hat e willdefect,husmaking hemmore ikelyto defect,husmakingt more ationalorhim o defect. f coursenthis imple ase-and in many hat re morerealistic-therere anumberf arrangementshat ouldpermitooperation.ut hemainpoint emains: lthoughctorsmayknow hat heyeek commongoal, heymaynotbe ableto reach t.Evenwhen heres a solutionhat s everyone'sirsthoice,he n-ternationalase s characterizedythree ifficultiesotpresentn theStagHunt. irst,o the ncentivesodefect iven bovemust eaddedthepotent ear hat venfthe ther tate ow upportshe taus uo,itmay ecome issatisfiedater. omatterowmuch ecisionmakersare ommittedothe tatusuo, hey annot ind hemselvesndtheirsuccessorso the amepath.Minds an be changed,ew eaders ancome opower, alues anshift,ewopportunitiesnddangersanarise.Thesecond roblemrises rom possibleolution.n order o pro-tect heir ossessions,tates ften eekto controlesourcesr landoutsideheirwnterritory.ountrieshat renot elf-sufficientusttry o assure hat henecessaryupplies illcontinueoflow nwar-time. hiswaspart f he xplanationorJapan'sriventoChina ndSoutheastsia beforeWorldWarII. If therewere n internationalauthorityhat ouldguaranteeccess,hismotive or ontrol oulddisappear.utsince heres not, ven state hatwouldpreferhestatusuoto ncreasingts rea fcontrol ay ursuehe atterolicy.When here rebelievedobetightinkagesetweenomesticndforeignolicyr betweenhedomesticoliticsf two tates,he uestfor ecurity aydrivetateso nterferereemptivelynthedomesticpoliticsfothersn orderoprovidenideologicalufferone.Thus,

otherhand, we shall be no worse off,whereas under alternative b) we shall bemuch worse off.Consequently,the theoreticalbalance of advantage lies with theproposed railway extensionfromQuetta to Seistan.W. G. Nicholson, "Memorandumon Seistan and Other Points Raised in theDiscussionon theDefence of India," (Committeeof Imperial Defence,March 20, I903). It shouldbe noted thatthe possibility f neither ide building railwayswas not mentioned,thusstronglybiasing the analysis.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 169Metternich'sustificationor upervisinghepolitics f the talian tateshas beensummarized s follows:

Every tates absolutelyovereignn ts nternalffairs.ut his mpliesthat verytatemust o nothingointerferen the nternalffairsfany ther. owever, nyfalse r pernicioustep aken y any tate nits nternalffairsmaydisturb herepose f anothertate, nd thisconsequentisturbancef anothertate's epose onstitutesn inter-ferencen that tate'snternalffairs.herefore,very tate-or ather,every overeignf a great ower-has he duty,n the nameof thesacred ight f independencef every tate, o supervisehegovern-ments fsmallertatesnd to preventhem romaking alse nd per-niciousteps n theirnternalffairs.2Morefrequently,he oncern swithdirect ttack.n order o protectthemselves,tates eekto control, rat east o neutralize,reason theirborders. ut attemptso establish ufferones can alarmotherswhohave stakes here,whofear hatundesirable recedents illbe set, rwho believe hat heir wn vulnerabilityillbe increased.Whenbuff-ersareare soughtn areas empty f greatpowers, xpansion ends ofeed n itselfnorder o protect hat sacquired, s was often otedby

thosewhoopposed olonial xpansion. alfour'somplaint as typical:"Every ime come to a discussion-at ntervals f, say,fiveyears-Ifind heres a new spherewhichwe have gotto guard,which s sup-posed to protect he gateways f India. Those gateways re gettingfurthernd furtherwayfromndia,and I do notknow howfarwestthey re goingto bebrought ytheGeneralStaff."3Thoughthis rocesssmost learly isiblewhen t nvolves erritorialexpansion,t often perateswiththeincrease f less tangible owerand influence.he expansionfpowerusually ringswith tan expan-sion of responsibilitiesnd commitments;o meetthem, tillgreaterpower srequired. he statewilltakemany ositionshat resubject ochallenge.twill be involvedwith widerangeof controversialssuesunrelatedo itscorevalues.And retreatshatwould be seen as normalifmade bya smallpowerwould be taken s an indexof weaknessn-viting redationfmadebya largeone.

The thirdproblempresentn internationalolitics ut not in theStagHunt sthe ecurityilemma:many fthemeansbywhich statetries oincrease tssecurityecrease hesecurityf others. n domestic2Paul Schroeder,Metternich'sDiplomacy at Its Zenith, i82o-i823 (Westport,Conn.:Greenwood Press I969), I26.3 Quoted in Michael Howard, The ContinentalCommitment Harmondsworth,Eng-land: Penguin 974), 67.


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170 WORLD POLITICSsociety,herere everal ays o ncreasehe afetyfone's ersonndpropertyithoutndangeringthers. ne can move o a safer eigh-borhood, ut barson the windows,voiddark treets,ndkeepadistanceromuspicious-lookingharacters.fcoursehesemeasuresarenot onvenient,heap, r certainf success. utno one save rim-inalsneedbe alarmedfa person akes hem.n internationalolitics,however, ne state's ain in securityften nadvertentlyhreatensothers.n explainingritisholicy n navaldisarmamentnthe nter-war period o the Japanese,amseyMacDonald aid that Nobodywanted apan o be insecure."4uttheproblem as notwithBritishdesires,utwith he onsequencesfherpolicy.n earliereriods,oo,Britain ad needed navy arge nough okeepthe hippinganesopen. ut uch navy ould ot void eing menaceo ny thertatewith coast hat ouldberaided, rade hat ouldbe interdicted,rcolonies hat ould be isolated.When Germanytarteduildingpowerfulavy eforeWorldWar ,Britainbjectedhat t could nlybe anoffensiveeaponimed ther.As SirEdwardGrey,he oreignSecretary,ut ttoKingEdwardVII: "IftheGerman leet ver e-comes uperioroours, heGerman rmyanconquerhis ountry.Theres nocorrespondingisk fthis ind oGermany;orhoweversuperiorurFleetwas,no navalvictoryouldbring s anynearer oBerlin." he English osition as half orrect: ermany'savywasan anti-Britishnstrument.uttheBritishftenverlookedhat heGermansnewfullwell: "in every uarrelwithEngland,Germancoloniesnd tradewere . . hostagesorEngland o take."Thus,whetherhe ntendedt ornot, heBritish avyconstitutedn im-portantnstrumentfcoercion.5

II. WHAT MAKES COOPERATION MORE LIKELY?Given his loomy icture,he bviousuestions,why rewenot lldead?Or,toput t ess tarkly,hatkinds fvariablesmeliorateheimpactf narchyndthe ecurityilemma?heworkingsfseveral4Quoted in Gerald Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor (Columbia: University ofMissouri Press i963), i67.5Quoted in Leonard Wainstein, "The Dreadnought Gap," in RobertArt and Ken-neth Waltz, eds.,The Use ofForce (Boston: Little,Brown I971), I55; Raymond Sontag,European Diplomatic History, 871-1932 (New York: Appleton-Century-Croits933),

147. The French had made a similar argument50 years earlier; see James PhinneyBaxter III, The Introductionof the Ironclad Warship (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress 1933), I49. For a more detailed discussionof the securitydilemma, see Jervis,Perception nd Misperceptionn InternationalPolitics (Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress I976), 62-76.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 171canbeseen nterms f theStagHunt orrepeated lays f thePrisoner'sDilemma.The Prisoner's ilemmadiffersrom he Stag Hunt in thatthere s no solution hat s in the best nterestsf all theparticipants;there re offensives well as defensivencentives o defect rom hecoalitionwiththe others; nd, f thegame is to be playedonlyonce,the onlyrational esponses to defect. ut if the game is repeatedn-definitely,he atter haracteristico longerholdsand we can analyzethegame n terms imilar o those ppliedto the StagHunt. t wouldbe in the nterestfeach actor o haveothers eprived f thepower odefect; ach would be willingto sacrifice hisabilityf othersweresimilarlyestrained. ut if the others re not,then t is in theactor'sinteresto retain he power to defect.'The game theorymatrices orthese wo situationsre given below,with thenumbers n the boxesbeingtheorder ftheactors' references.

STAGHUNT PRISONER'S DILEMMACOOPERATE DEFECT COOPERATE DEFECT

A ACOOPERATE COOPERATEB 4BEE34EFECT 43 DEFECT43We can see the logical possibilitiesy rephrasing ur question:"Given ither f the bove ituations,hatmakes tmoreorless ikelythattheplayerswill cooperate nd arrive t CC?" The chancesofachievinghis utcomewillbeincreasedy: i) anythinghatncreasesincentiveso cooperate y increasinghegainsofmutualcooperation(CC) and/ordecreasing hecosts he actorwill pay ifhe cooperatesandthe ther oesnot CD); (2) anythinghat ecreaseshe ncentivesfordefectingy decreasinghegainsoftaking dvantage ftheother(DC) and/or ncreasinghecostsof mutualnoncooperationDD);

(3) anythinghat ncreases achside'sexpectationhat heotherwillcooperate!76Experimentalvidence or hispropositions summarizednJames edeschi, arrySchlenker,nd ThomasBonoma, onflict, ower, and Games (Chicago:Aldine 973),'35-4'.7The resultsfPrisoner's ilemmagamesplayedn the aboratoryupport his rgu-ment. ee AnatolRapoport nd AlbertChammah, risoner'sDilemma (Ann Arbor:UniversityfMichigan ress 965), 33-50. Alsosee RobertAxelrod, onflict f Interest(Chicago:Markham970), 60-70.


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172 WORLD POLITICSTHE COSTS OF BEING EXPLOITED (CD)

The fearof beingexploited that s, the costof CD) most tronglydrives he ecurityilemma; ne of themainreasonswhy nternationallife s notmorenasty, rutish,nd short s that tates re not as vulner-able as menare n a state fnature. eople are easy o kill,but s AdamSmith eplied o a friendwho feared hat heNapoleonicWars wouldruinEngland, Sir, here s a great eal ofruin n a nation."8 he easierit s todestroy state, hegreater hereason or t either o oin a largerand more secureunit, r else to be especially uspicious f others, orequire large army, nd, fconditions re favorable,o attack t theslightest rovocation ather hanwait to be attacked. f the failure oeatthat ay-be itvenison rrabbit-means hathe will starve, personis likely o defect n the StagHunt even f he really ikesvenison ndhasa high evelof trustnhis colleagues. Defection s especiallyikelyiftheothers re also starvingr if theyknow thathe is.) By contrast,ifthe osts f CD are ower,fpeopleare well-fed r states re resilient,they an afford o takea morerelaxedview of threats.A relativelyow costofCD has the effectf transforminghe gamefrom ne in whichbothplayersmake their hoices imultaneouslyoone inwhich n actor anmake his choice fter he otherhas moved.He will nothave to defect ut of fear hat heotherwill, but can waittoseewhattheotherwilldo. States hat an affordobe cheated n abargain rthat annot edestroyedya surprisettack anmore asilytrust thers nd need not act at the first,nd ambiguous, ign ofmenace.Becausetheyhavea margin f time nd error, heyneednotmatch, r morethanmatch, nyothers' rms n peacetime. heycanmobilizentheprewar eriod r even t the tart fthewar tself,ndstill urvive. or example, hosewho opposed crashprogram o de-veloptheH-bomb elt hat heU.S. margin fsafety as large noughso thateven fRussiamanagedto gain a lead in therace,Americawould not be endangered. he program'sdvocates isagreed: If welettheRussians etthe uper irst,atastropheecomes ll butcertain."'When the costsof CD are tolerable, ot only s securityasier toattain ut,what sevenmore mporant ere, herelativelyow level ofarms ndrelativelyassive oreign olicy hat status-quo owerwillbe able toadoptare less ikely othreatenthers. hus it is easier or

8 Quoted in Bernard Brodie, Strategy n the Missile Age (Princeton: PrincetonUni-versityPress 1959), 6.9 HerbertYork, The Advisors. Oppenh/7eier, Teller, and the Superboinb (San Fran-cisco: Freeman I976), 56-60.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 173status-quotates oact on theirommonnterestsfthey re hard oconquer. ll otherhingseing qual, world f mall tates illfeelthe ffectsf narchy uchmore han world f arge nes.Defensi-ble borders,arge ize, ndprotectiongainstuddenttack otonlyaid the tate, utfacilitateooperationhat anbenefitll states.Ofcourse,fonestate ainsnvulnerabilityybeingmore owerfulthanmost thers,he roblem illremainecausets ecurityrovidesa basefrom hichtcanexploitthers. hen he rice state illpayfor D is ow, t eaves thers ith ewhostagesor tsgoodbehavior.Others ho aremore ulnerable illgrow pprehensive,hichwilllead hemoacquiremorerms ndwillreducehe hances fcooper-ation. hebest ituationsone nwhich statewillnot ufferreatlyifothersxploitt, or xample,ycheatingn an arms ontrolgree-mentthats, he osts fCD are ow); but twillpay highong-runprice f cooperation iththe others reaks own-for xample,fagreementsease unctioningr f heres a longwar that s, he ostsofDD arehigh).The state'snvulnerabilitys thenmostlyassive;tprovidesome rotection,ut t cannot eusedtomenace thers. swewilldiscuss elow,his ituationsapproximatedhen t s easierfor tateso defendhemselveshan o attackthers,r whenmutualdeterrencebtainsecause eitheride anprotecttself.Thedifferencesetweenighly ulnerablend essvulnerabletatesare llustratedythecontrastingolicies f Britainnd AustriaftertheNapoleonicWars. ritain'seographicsolationndpoliticaltabil-ity llowedhertotake fairlyelaxed iewof disturbancesn theContinent.inorwars nd mall hangesnterritoryr nthe istribu-tion fpower idnot ffectervitalnterests.nadversaryhowasouttooverthrowhe ystemouldbe stoppedfter e hadmadehisintentionslear.And revolutionsithin ther tates erenomenace,sincehey ould ot et ffnrest ithinngland. ustria,urroundedby strongowers, as notso fortunate;erpolicy ad tobe morecloselyttunedo ll conflicts.y he imenaggressor-stateadclearlyshowntscolors, ustria ouldbe gravelyhreatened.ndforeignrevolutions,e theydemocraticr nationalistic,ouldencouragegroupsnAustriaoupsethe xistingrder. o it snot urprisinghatMetternichropoundedhe doctrineummarizedarlier, hichde-fended ustria'sighto nterferen the nternalffairsfothers,ndthatBritisheaders ejectedhisview. imilarly,ustria anted heCongressystemo bea relativelyightne, egulatingost isputes.TheBritishavored less entralizedystem.n other ords,norder


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174 WORLD POLITICSto protect erself, ustria ad either o threatenr to harm thers,whereas ritain id not.For Austria nd herneighborshe ecuritydilemma as acute; orBritaint was not.The ultimateost fCD is of ourseoss f overeignty.hiscost anvary rom ituationo situation.he lower t s (for nstance,ecausethe wo tates ave ompatibledeologies,re similar thnically,avea common ulture,r because hecitizens f the osing tate xpecteconomic enefits),he essthe mpact f the ecurityilemma; hegreaterhe osts,he reaterhe mpact f he ilemma. ere s anotherreasonwhyextreme ifferencesn values nd ideologies xacerbateinternationalonflict.It is through he owering f thecosts f CD that heproposedRhodesiansafetyet"-guaranteeinghatwhites ho eave he oun-trywillreceive air aymentor heir roperty-wouldave hepara-doxical ffectfmakingtmoreikelyhat hewhites ill tay. his sless uzzlingwhenwe see hat hewhitesre na multi-personrison-er'sDilemmawith achother. ssumehat llwhites rewillingostayfmost f theotherstay;but, n the absence fguarantees,f

theresgoing o be a mass xodus,ll want obe among hefirstoleave becauseate-leaversillget ess or heir ropertyndwillhavemore roubleinding countryo take hemn).Thentheproblemstoavoid self-fulfillingrophecynwhich achpersonushesodefectbecause e fearsthersregoing o. nnarrowinghegapbetweenhepayoffor eaving irstDC) and eavingast CD) by reducinghecost fthe atter,heguaranteesake t easier or hewhites ocoop-erate monghemselvesnd tay.Subjectiveecurityemands. ecisionmakers ct n termsfthevulnerabilityhey eel,which an differrom he ctual ituation;emust hereforexamine he decisionmakers'ubjectiveecuritye-quirements.10wo dimensionsre nvolved.irst,ven fthey greeabout he bjectiveituation,eople an differbout owmuch ecur-ity hey esire-or,oput t more recisely,bout heprice heyrewillingopaytogain ncrementsfsecurity.he more tates aluetheirecuritybove ll else that s, ee prohibitivelyigh ost nCD),themore heyre ikelyo be sensitiveo evenminimalhreats,ndtodemand igh evels f arms.And f arms repositivelyalued e-10Forthedevelopmentftheconcept fsubjectiveecurity,eeArnoldWolfers, is-cord ndCollaborationBaltimore: ohns opkinsPress 962), chap. o. In thepresentsectionwe assume hat he tate elieves hat ts ecurityan be best erved y ncreasingits rms; aterwe will discussomeoftheconditionsnderwhich his ssumption oesnothold.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 175cause f pressuresrom military-industrialomplex,twill be espe-cially ard or tatus-quoowerso cooperate.ycontrast,he ecuritydilemma illnot perates stronglyhen ressingomesticoncernsincreaseheopportunityosts farmaments.n this ase, henet d-vantagef xploitinghe therDC) willbe ess, ndthe osts f rmsraces that s,one aspect f DD) will be greater;hereforehe tatewillbehavesthoughtwere elativelynvulnerable.The second spect f subjectiveecuritys theperceptionf threat(that s,theestimatefwhetherheotherwill cooperate)." statethat s predisposedosee ither specificthertates anadversary,rothersn general s a menace,willreactmore tronglyndmorequicklyhan statehat ees ts nvironments benign.ndeed,whena state elieveshat notherotonlys not ikelyo be an adversary,buthas ufficientnterestsncommon ithttobe anally, hent willactually elcomen increasen theother'sower.BritishndFrench oreignoliciesn the nterwarearsllustratethese oints. fter herise fHitler, ritainndFrance elt hatn-creasesneachother'srmsncreasedatherhan ecreasedheir wnsecurity.hedifferingolicieshat hese tatesollowedoward er-many anbeexplained ytheir ifferencesn both imensionsfthevariablefsubjectiveecurity.12hroughoutheperiod, rance er-ceivedGermanys more f a threathanEngland id. The Britishweremore ptimisticnd rguedhat onciliationould urn ermanyinto supporterf the tatusuo.Furthermore,n theyearsmmedi-ately ollowing orldWar ,France adbeenmorewillingoforegootheraluesn ordero ncreaseer ecurityndhad hereforeollowedamore elligerentolicyhan ngland,maintaininglargerrmyndmoving uickly o counter erman ssertiveness.s this xampleshows,ne annotasilyayhowmuchubjectiveecuritystatehouldseek.Highsecurityequirementsaketvery ifficultocapitalizena commonnterestndrun hedanger fsettingff piralsfarmsraces ndhostility.heFrenchmayhavepaidthis ricenthe 920'S.Low securityequirementsvoid his rap, utrun herisk fhavingtoofew rmsndoftryingo conciliatenaggressor.Oneaspectf ubjectiveecurityelatedo thepredispositionoper-

11The question fwhen n actorwillseeanothers a threats importantndunder-studied.For a valuabletreatmentalthoughone marredby seriousmethodologicalflaws), ee RaymondCohen,"Threat Perceptionn International elations," h.D.diss. HebrewUniversity974). Amongthe mportantactors,ouched n below, rethelessons rom hepreviouswar.12 Stillthebest reatments ArnoldWolfers,ritainand France Between Two Wars(New York:Harcourt, race 940).


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176 WORLD POLITICSceive hreats the tate's iew fhowmany nemiestmust e preparedto fight. state an be relaxed bout ncreasesn another'srms f tbelieves hat here s a functioningollectiveecurityystem.hechances fpeace re ncreasedn a world n which he revailingnter-nationalystems valued n ts wnright, ot nly ecausemost tatesrestrainheir mbitionsnd thosewhodo not re deterredthese rethe sual laims or Concertystem),ut lsobecausef he ecreasedchances hat he tatus-quotates ill engage n unnecessaryonflictout of thequest or ecurity.ndeed, f therewere ompleteaithncollectiveecurity,o statewould want an army.By contrast,hesecurityilemmas insoluble hen ach tate ears hatmany thers,farfrom oming o its id,are ikely o oin n any ttack.WinstonChurchill,sFirst ordoftheAdmiralty,as setting high ecurityrequirementhen e noted:BesidesheGreat owers,hereremanymall tates ho rebuyingorbuildingreat hips fwar ndwhose essels ay ypurchase,ysome iplomaticombination,rbyduress,ebroughtnto he ineagainsts.None fthese owers eed,ikeus,naviesodefendheiractualafetyf ndependence.hey uild hem o astoplay partnworldffairs.t ssportothem.t s deathous.13

It takes reat ffortor nyone state o be ableto protecttselfloneagainst n attack y everal eighbors. ore mportantly,t s next oimpossibleor ll statesnthe ystemo have his apability.hus,state'sxpectationhat llieswillbe availablend hat nly few therswillbe able o oin gainstt salmostnecessaryonditionor ecurityrequirementsobe compatible.GAINS FROM COOPERATION AND COSTS OF A BREAKDOWN (CC AND DD)Themain osts f a policy freactinguicklyndseverelyoin-creasesn theother'srms renottheprice fone'sownarms, utratherhe acrificef thepotentialains romooperationCC) andthencreasen thedangersfneedlessrms acesndwarsDD). Thegreaterhese osts,he reaterhencentivesotry ooperationndwaitfor airly nambiguousvidenceeforessuminghat heothermustbe checked yforce.Warswould emuchmore requent-evenfthefirsthoice fallstates asthe tatusuo-if theywere ess isky ndcostly,nd fpeacefulntercourseidnot rovideich enefits.thiopiarecentlyskedforguaranteeshat heTerritoryfAfars nd Issaswouldnot oina hostile lliancegainstt when tgained ndepend-

13 Quoted in PeterGretton,Former Naval Person (London: Cassell i968), I5I.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 177ence.A spokesmanor heTerritoryeplied hat hiswasnotnecessary:Ethiopia already ad the bestpossible uaranteen the railroad" hatlinks the two countriesnd provides ndispensable evenuefor theTerritory."4The basicpoints re wellknown nd so we can movetoelaboration.First,most tatesmennow that o enter war is to setoff chain ofunpredictablend uncontrollablevents. ven if everythinghey eepoints oa quickvictory,hey re ikely o hesitate efore ll theuncer-tainties. nd if the battlefieldften roduces tartling esults, o dothe council hambers. he statemay be deserted y alliesor attackedby neutrals.Or the postwar lignmentmay rob it of the fruits fvictory,s happened o Japan n i895. Second,the domestic ostsofwars mustbe weighed.Even strong tates an be underminedy dis-satisfactionith heway thewar srun and by thenecessary obiliza-tionofmenand ideas. Memories f suchdisruptions ere one of themainreasons or heera of relative eacethat ollowed heNapoleonicWars.Liberal tatesmeneared hat arge rmieswould ead todespot-ism; conservativeeadersfeared hatwarswould lead to revolution.(The other ide of this coin is thatwhenthere re domestic onse-quences of foreign onflict hatare positively alued,thenet cost ofconflicts lowered nd cooperation ecomesmoredifficult.)hird-turning o the advantages f cooperation-fortateswithlargeanddiverse conomies hegainsfrom conomic xchange rerarelyfeversufficiento preventwar. NormanAngellwas wrongaboutWorldWar I being mpossible ecauseof economic iesamongthepowers;and beforeWorldWar II, theU.S. wasJapan'smost mportantradingpartner. ourth, hegainsfrom ooperationanbe increased, otonlyifeachsidegetsmoreof thetraditional alues uch as wealth, ut alsoif eachcomes ovaluetheother'swell-being ositively. utualcooper-ationwill thenhavea doublepayoff:n addition o thedirect ains,therewillbe thesatisfactionfseeing he other rosper.15Whilehighcosts f war andgainsfrom ooperation ill amelioratethe mpact f thesecurity ilemma, hey an create differentrob-lem. f thecosts rehighenough o thatDD is the astchoiceforbothsides, hegamewill shift o "Chicken."This game differsrom heStagHuntin that achactor eeks oexploit heother; tdiffersromPrisoner's ilemmain thatboth actors harean interestn avoiding

14 Michael Kaufman, "Tension Increases in French Colony," New York Times,July I, I976.15 Experimentalsupportfor this argumentis summarized in Morton Deutsch, TheResolution f ConflictNew Haven: Yale UniversityPress I973), 8-95.


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178 WORLD POLITICSmutual on-cooperation.n Chicken,f you think he other ide sgoing odefect,ou ave ocooperateecause,lthougheing xploited(CD) is bad, t is not as bad as a totalbreakdownDD). As thefamiliarogic fdeterrencehows, he ctormust hen ry o convincehis dversaryhat e s going o stand irmdefect) nd that he nlyway he ther an avoid isasters tobackdown cooperate). ommit-ment,he ationalityf rrationality,anipulatinghe ommunicationssystem,ndpretendingot o understandhe ituation,re mong hetactics sed oreach his oal.The same ogic pplieswhen oth idesare njoyingreat enefitsrom ooperation.heside hat ancrediblythreateno disrupthe relationshipnless ts demands re metcanexploithe ther. his ituation ay ot estable,ince he requentseofthreats ay e incompatibleith hemaintenancefa cooperativerelationship.till, e Gaulle's uccessfulhreatso break p theCom-monMarket nless ispartnerscceded o hiswishes emindsthatthe haredenefitsf ooperations well sthe haredostsfdefectioncanprovide hebasisfor xploitation.imilarly,nereason or hecollapsef he ranco-Britishntente orehan hundredearsarlierwasthat ecisionmakersnboth ides elt onfidenthat heir wncountryould afely ursue policy hatwasagainst heother'snter-estbecause heother ouldnot affordo destroyhehighly aluedrelationship."ecause tatesmenealize hat hegrowthfpositiveinterdependenceanprovidethers ithnew eversf nfluenceverthem,heymay esistuch evelopmentsore hanwould eexpectedfromhe heorieshat tresshe dvantagesfcooperation.GAINS FROM EXPLOITATION (DC)Defectingotonly voids hedangerhat statewillbe exploited(CD), butbrings ositivedvantagesy exploitingheotherDC)Thelower hese ossible ains,hegreaterhe hancesfcooperation.Even relativelyatisfiedtateanbetemptedoexpand ythehopeofgainingmajor alues. hetemptationillbe esswhen he tateeesotherways freachingtsgoals, nd/or laces lowvalueon whatexploitationouldbring. he gainsmaybe low either ecause heimmediatedvantagerovidedyDC (for xample,avingmorermsthan he theride)cannot e translatednto politicaldvantageforexample, ains nterritory),r because hepolitical dvantagetself

16 Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot, and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale(London: Athlone Press I974), 8i, 88, 93, 2I2. For a different iew of this case, seeStanley Mellon, "Entente,Diplomacy, and Fantasy," Reviews in European History,ii (September1976), 376-80.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 179is not highly alued.For instance, statemaynot seekto annex addi-tionalterritoryecausethe atter acksraw materials,s inhabited ypeopleofa differentthnic roup,wouldbe costly ogarrison,r wouldbe hard to assimilate ithout isturbingomestic olitics nd values.A state anreduce he ncentiveshat nother tatehas to attack t,bynotbeing threat o the atter nd byproviding oodsand serviceshatwould be lostwere theother o attempt xploitation.Even where hedirect dvantages fDC aregreat, ther onsidera-tions anreduce henetgain. Victory s well as defeat an setoff n-desireddomestic hangeswithin hestate.Exploitation as at timesbeenfrowned pon by the nternationalommunity,hus educing heprestige f a state hat ngages n it. Or othersmight n the future equicker o seethe tate s a menace o them,making hemmore ikelyto arm, nd to oppose t later.Thus, Bismarck'sttemptsogetotherpowers ocooperatewithhim nmaintaininghestatus uo after87Iweremademoredifficultythewidely-held istrustfhimthatgrewout ofhis earlierggressions.17THE PROBABILITY THAT THE OTHER WILL COOPERATE

The variables iscussed o far nfluencehe payoffsor each of thefour ossible utcomes. o decidewhat odo, the tate as togo furtherand calculate he expected alue ofcooperating r defecting. ecausesuchcalculationsnvolve stimatingheprobabilityhat he otherwillcooperate, he statewill haveto judge how the variables iscussed ofar cton the other. o encourage he other o cooperate, statemaytry omanipulatehesevariables.t can lowertheother'sncentivesodefect ydecreasing hat tcouldgain byexploitinghestate DC)-thedetailswould be similar o thosediscussedn theprevious ara-graph-and it can raisethecostsofdeadlock DD). But if the statecannotmakeDD theworst utcome or heother,oercion s likely obe ineffectiventhe hort unbecause heother anrespond yrefusingtocooperate,nddangerousn the ongrunbecause heother s likelytobecome onvincedhat he state s aggressive.o the statewillhavetoconcentraten making ooperationmoreattractive.ne waytodothis s to decrease hecosts he otherwillpayif it cooperatesnd thestatedefectsCD). Thus, the state ould try o make theother essvulnerable.t was for his eason hat n the ate 950's andearly 960's

17Similarly,a French diplomat has argued that "the worst result of Louis XIV'sabandonmentof our traditionalpolicywas the distrust t aroused towardsus abroad."Jules Cambon, "The Permanent Bases of French Foreign Policy," Foreign Aflairs,viii (January930), I79.


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180 WORLD POLITICSsomeAmerican efensenalysts rgued hat t would be good forbothsides ftheRussians eveloped ardenedmissiles. f course, ecreasingtheother's ulnerabilitylsodecreases he tate's bility o coerce t, ndopens the possibilityhat heotherwill use thisprotections a shieldbehindwhich o engage n actions nimical o the tate. ut by sacrific-ing some bility o harm heother, he tate an increase hechances fmutually eneficialooperation.The state an also try o increase he gains thatwill accrueto theother rommutual ooperationCC). Although he tatewill ofcoursegain if t receives shareofany new benefits,ven an incrementhataccrues ntirelyo the otherwill aid the state y ncreasing he ikeli-hood that heotherwillcooperate.18This line of argument anbe continued hrough he nfinite egres-sions that game theory as made familiar. f the other s readytocooperate hen t thinks he tatewill, he tate an increase he hancesof CC byshowing hat t splanning o cooperate.husthe tate houldunderstatehe gains t wouldmake f t exploited heother DC) andthe costs t would pay if theother xploitedt (CD), and stress rexaggerate he gains t wouldmakeunder mutualcooperationCC)and thecosts twouldpay if there s deadlock DD). The statewillalsowantto convince heother hat t thinks hattheother s likelytocooperate.fthe other elieves hese hings,t will see that he statehasstrongncentivesocooperate,nd so itwillcooperatenturn.Onepoint houldbe emphasized. ecausetheother,ike thestate,maybedriven odefect ythe fear hat twillbe exploitedf t doesnot, hestate houldtry o reassuret thatthiswill nothappen.Thus,whenKhrushchevndicatedhis willingnesso withdraw is missiles romCuba, he simultaneouslytressedo Kennedythat "we are of soundmindand understanderfectly ell" thatRussia could notlaunch asuccessfulttack gainst heU.S., and thereforehat herewas no rea-son for theU.S. to contemplate defensive, re-emptivetrike f itsown.19There is, however, danger. f the other hinks hatthe statehaslittle hoicebutto cooperate,t can crediblyhreateno defect nlessthe stateprovides t with additionalbenefits. reat advantages fmutualcooperation,ikehighcostsofwar, provide leverforcom-

18 This assumes,however,that these benefits o the other will not so improve theother's power position thatit will be more able to menace the state in the future.19Walter LaFeber, ed., The Dynamics of World Power; A DocumentaryHistoryofUnited StatesForeignPolicy 945-I973, II: EasternEurope and the Soviet Union (NewYork: Chelsea House in associationwithMcGraw-Hill I973), 700.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 181petitiveargaining.urthermore,or state ostress owmuch tgainsfrom ooperationmay be to imply hat t is gainingmuch morethantheother nd to suggest hatthebenefitshouldbe distributed oreequitably.Wheneachside s ready o cooperatef texpects heother o, nspec-tiondevices an ameliorate hesecurity ilemma.Of course, ven aperfectnspectionystemannot uarantee hat heotherwill not aterdevelop ggressivententionsnd the militarymeans to act on them.Butby relievingmmediateworries nd providingwarningof com-ingdangers,nspectionan meet significantartof thefeltneedtoprotectneselfgainst uture hreats,nd somake currentooperationmorefeasible. imilarfunctionsre served ybreaking p one largetransactionnto series fsmaller nes.20 t eachtransactionachcanseewhether heother ascooperated;nd its osses, ftheother efects,willbe small.And sincewhateither ide wouldgain byone defectionis slight ompared o thebenefits fcontinued ooperation,hepros-pectsof cooperation re high.Conflicts nd wars amongstatus-quopowerswould be much more commonwereit notforthefactthatinternationaloliticss usually series fsmall transactions.How a statesmannterpretsheother's astbehavior nd how heprojectst intothe futures influencedyhis understandingf thesecurity ilemma ndhis ability o place himself n theother's hoes.The dilemmawill operatemuchmorestronglyf statesmen o notunderstandt, nddo not ee that heir rms-sought nly o secure hestatus uo-may alarmothers nd thatothersmay arm,notbecausetheyrecontemplatingggression,utbecause hey ear ttack romhefirsttate.These two failures f empathy re linked.A statewhichthinkshat heother nows hat twants nly opreservehe tatus uoand that tsarms aremeantonlyforself-preservationill concludethat heother idewill react o ts rmsby ncreasingtsowncapabilityonly f t s aggressivetself. incethe other ide s notmenaced, hereisno legitimateeason or t toobject othefirsttate'srms;therefore,objection roves hattheother s aggressive.hus, thefollowing x-changebetween enator om Connally ndSecretaryfStateAchesonconcerningheratificationf the NATO treaty:

Secretarycheson:Thetreaty]s aimed olelytarmed ggression.Senator onnally:n otherwords, nless nation . . contemplates,meditates,rmakes lans ooking owardggressionr armed ttackon anotheration,t hasno cause o fear his reaty.20 ThomasSchelling, he StrategyfConflictNew York:OxfordUniversityressi963), I34-35-


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182 WORLD POLITICSSecretarycheson: hat scorrect,enator onnally,nd t seems omethat nynationwhich laims hat his reatys directedgainst tshouldbe remindedf theBiblical dmonitionhat The guilty leewhen omanpursueth.'Senator onnally: hat s a verypt llustration.What had in mindwas,when State r Nation asses criminalact,for nstance,gainst urglary,obody utthosewhoare burglarsorgettingeady o be burglarseedhave nyfear ftheBurglary ct.Is that ot rue?Secretary cheson: he only ffectthe aw] wouldhave [on aninnocenterson]would be forhis protection,erhaps,y deterringsomeonelse.He wouldn't orrybout he mpositionf thepenalties

on himself.21The other ideofthis oin s thatpartof theexplanation ordetentesthatmostAmerican ecisionmakers ow realizethat t s at leastpos-siblethatRussiamay fearAmerican ggression;many hink hat hisfear ccounts or range f Soviet ctions reviouslyeenas indicatingRussianaggressiveness.ndeed,even 36 percent f military fficersconsider heSovietUnion'smotivationso be primarily efensive. essthan wenty ears arlier, fficersadbeendivided verwhether ussiasoughtworldconquest ronlyexpansion.22Statesmen ho do not understandhesecurityilemmawill thinkthat hemoney pent s theonlycostofbuildingup their rms.Thisbelief emoves ne mportantestraintn arms pending. urthermore,it s also ikely o eadstateso set heir ecurityequirementsoohigh.Sincethey o notunderstandhat ryingo increase ne'ssecurityanactually ecreaset, theywill overestimateheamount fsecurityhatisattainable; heywill think hatwhen ndoubt hey an"play tsafe"byincreasingheir rms.Thus it is very ikely hattwostateswhichsupporthe tatusuo butdo notunderstandhesecurityilemmawillendup, fnot na war, hen t least n a relationshipfhigher onflictthan s required ytheobjective ituation.The belief hatan increase n military trengthlways eads to anincreasen securitys ofteninked o thebelief hat heonlyroute osecuritys throughmilitarytrength.s a consequence, wholerangeof meliorativeolicieswill be downgraded. ecision makerswho donot believethatadopting moreconciliatory osture,meeting he

21U.S. Congress, Senate, Committeeon Foreign Relations, Hearings,North AtlanticTreaty, ist Cong., st sess. 1949), I7.22 Bruce Russettand Elizabeth Hanson, Interestand Ideology (San Francisco: Free-man I975), 260; Morris Janowitz, The Prolessional Soldier (New York: Free Pressi960), chap. I3-


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SECURITY DILEMMA 183other'segitimaterievances,r developing utual ains romooper-ation an ncreaseheir tate'security,illnotdevotemuch ttentionorefforto hese ossibilities.Onthe ther and, heightenedensitivityo the ecurityilemmamakes t more ikelyhat he tatewilltreat n aggressors thoughtwere n insecureefenderf the tatusuo. Partly ecause f theirviews bout he ausesfWorldWar ,theBritish ere redisposedobelieve hatHitler ought nly herectificationf egitimatend im-ited rievancesnd hat ecurityould est egained y onstructingnequitablenternationalystem.s a resulthey ursued policy hich,although ell designedo avoid he danger f creatingnnecessaryconflictith status-quoermany,elped estroyurope.

GEOGRAPHY, COMMITMENTS, BELIEFS, AND SECURITY THROUGH EXPANSIONA final onsiderationoesnot asily it nthematrix e havebeenusing, lthoughtcan be seen s anaspectfvulnerabilitynd ofthecosts fCD. Situationsaryntheeaseor difficultyithwhich llstatesansimultaneouslychieve highdegreefsecurity.he influ-ence fmilitaryechnologyn this ariablesthe ubjectf thenextsection. ere wewant o treat he mpactfbeliefs,eography,ndcommitmentsmany fwhich an be consideredobe modificationsofgeography,incehey ind tatesodefendreas utsideheir ome-lands). n the rowdedontinentfEurope,ecurityequirementserehard omesh. eing urroundedypowerfultates, ermany'srob-lem-ortheproblemreatedyGermany-waslways reatndwasevenworsewhenher elationsith oth rance nd Russiawere ad,such sbeforeWorldWar . In that ase, ven status-quoermany,if he ouldnot hangehepoliticalituation,ould lmost avebeenforcedoadopt omethingike heSchlieffenlan.Becausehecouldnothold ff oth fher nemies,hehad to bepreparedo defeatnequicklynd then ealwith heothern a more eisurelyashion.fFrance r Russia tayedutofa warbetweenhe ther tate ndGer-many,hey ould llowGermanyodominateheContinenteven fthatwasnotGermany'sim). They hereforead todenyGermanythis bility,husmakingGermanyess ecure. lthough ermany'sarrogantnderraticehavior,oupled ith he esireor nunreason-ably ighevel f ecuritywhichmountedo he esireo scape romhergeographiclight),ompoundedheproblem,venwiseGermanstatesmenouldhavebeenhardput ogain high egreefsecuritywithoutlarmingheir eighbors.


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184 WORLD POLITICSA similar ituationrose for FranceafterWorld War I. She wascommittedoprotecting er allies n EasternEurope, commitmentshecouldmeet nlyby taking heoffensivegainstGermany. utsince

therewas no way toguarantee hat rancemight ot ater eek expan-sion, France hat ould successfullyaunch n attack nresponseoaGermanmove ntoEastern uropewould constitutepotential angerto German core values. Similarly, United Statescredibly ble tothreaten etaliation ith trategicuclearweapons f theSovietUnionattacksWestern urope lso constitutesmenace, lbeit reduced ne,tothe Soviet bilityo maintain hestatus uo. The incompatibilityfthese ecurityequirementss not complete.Herman Kahn is correctin arguing hat heUnitedStates ould have Type II deterrencetheabilityo deter majorSoviet rovocation)without ainingfirst-strikecapability ecause he xpected oviet etaliationollowingnAmericanstrike ouldbe great noughto deter he U.S. from ttacking nlesstheU.S. believed twould suffernormous eprivationfor nstance,the oss of Europe) if tdidnotstrike.23imilarly,heFranco-Germanmilitary alancecould have been such thatFrancecould successfullyattackGermanyfthe atter'srmieswere mbroilednEastern urope,but ould notdefeat Germany hatwasfree o devote llherresourcesto defending erself. ut thisdelicate alance s veryhard to achieve,especiallybecause statesusuallycalculateconservatively.herefore,such solution snot ikely o be available.For the UnitedStates, heproblemposed by theneed to protectEurope s an exception. hroughoutmostof itshistory,hiscountryhas beenin a muchmore favorable osition: elativelyelf-sufficientand secure romnvasion,t has notonlybeen able togetsecurityela-tively heaply, utbydoingso,didnotmenace thers.24utambitionsand commitmentsave changedthissituation.After heAmericanconquest f thePhilippines,neither heUnited tates orJapan ouldassure rotectionor heir erritoriesymilitaryndnavalmeanswith-out compromisinghe defenses f the other.This problemwouldplagueAmerican nd Japanese tatesmenown to I94I."25 Further-more, o theextent hatJapan ouldprotect erself,he could resistAmerican hreatsogo to war ifJapandid notrespect hina's nde-

23Kahn, On ThermonuclearWar (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity ress i960), 138-6o0 It should be noted that the French example is largely hypothetical ecause Francehad no intentionof fulfillingher obligationsonce Germanybecame strong.24Wolfers (fn. 9), chap. I5; C. Vann Woodward, "The Age of Reinterpretation,"AmericanHistorical Review, Vol. 67 (October i960), i-i9.25 William Braisted,The United StatesNavy in the Pacific,1897-1909 (Austin: Uni-versityfTexas Press1958), 240.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 185pendence. hese complicationsereminor omparedo those hatfollowedWorldWar I. Aworld owerannot elpbuthave he bil-ity o harmmany thershat s outofproportiono the thers'bilitytoharm t.Britainad been bletogain ecurityithout enacingthersoagreateregree han heContinentalowers,hougho lessernethantheUnited tates. ut he cquisitionfcoloniesnd a dependencenforeignrade acrificederrelativenvulnerabilityf being n island.Once shetook ndia, hehad to consider ussia s a neighbor; he atterwasexpandingnCentralAsia, thusmaking t muchmoredifficultorboth ountrieso feel ecure. he need to maintain eliable ea lanes toIndia meant hatno state ouldbe allowed o menace outhAfrica nd,later, gypt.But theneed to protect hese wo areasbrought ew fears,new obligations,nd new security equirementshat conflicted iththose f otherEuropeannations. urthermore,nce Britain eeded aflow f imports uringbothpeace and wartime, he required navythat ould prevent blockade.A navy ufficientor hat ask ould nothelpbutbe a threat o any other tate hathad valuable rade.

A related roblem s raisedby thefact hatdefending he status uooftenmeans protectingmore than territory.onterritorialnterests,norms, nd the structuref the internationalystemmust be main-tained. f all status-quoowers gree n these alues nd interprethemin compatible ays, roblemswill be minimized. ut thepotential orconflicts great, nd the policiesfollowed re likely o exacerbate hesecurity ilemma.The greater he range of interestshathave to beprotected,he more ikely t is that national ffortso maintain hestatus uo will clash.As a French pokesman ut t in I930: "Security!The term ignifiesmore ndeedthanthemaintenance f a people'shomeland, revenoftheir erritorieseyond he eas. t also means hemaintenanceftheworld's espect orthem, hemaintenance ftheireconomicnterests,verythingn a word,whichgoestomakeup thegrandeur,he ife tself,f thenation.""When securitys thought fin this ense,t almost utomaticallyas a competitiveonnotation.tinvolves ssertingne state'swill overothers, howing high degreeof eadershipfnotdominance,nddisplaying pricklyemeanor. heresulting ehaviorwill almost urely lashwiththatof otherswhodefine heir ecurityn the sameway.The problemwill be almost nsoluble f statesmenelieve hat heirsecurity equires hethreateningr attackingf others. Thatwhich

26 Cambon fn. I7), I85.


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186 WORLD POLITICSstopsgrowingbeginsto rot," declareda minister o Catherine heGreat.27 orecommon s thebelief hat ftheother ssecure,t will beemboldened o actagainst ne'sownstate's nterests,nd thebelief hatin a war t will notbe enoughfor hestate o protecttself:t mustbeableto take hewar totheother's omeland. heseconvictions ake tverydifficultor tatus-quotates o developcompatibleecurity oli-cies,for they ead thestate o conclude hat ts securityequires hatothers e renderednsecure.In other ases, A country ngaged n a war of defensemightbeobliged or trategiceasons o assume heoffensive,"s a Frenchdele-gate to an interwar isarmamentonference ut it.28 hat was thecaseforFrance n I799:

The Directory'solitical bjectives ere ssentiallyefensive,or heFrenchwanted nly oprotectheRepublic romnvasionnd preservethe ecurityndterritoryf the atelliteegimesn Holland, witzer-land, nd taly. rench eaders ought o new conquests;heywantedonly o preservehe arlier ains f theRevolution.heDirectorye-lieved, owever,hat nly militaryffensiveould nable henationoachievetsdefensiveolitical bjective.y nflictingapid nddecisivedefeatspon ne or moremembersfthe oalition,hedirectorsopedtorupturelliedunityndforcendividualowers o seek separatepeace.29It didnotmatter o the urroundingtates hatFrancewas not attack-ingbecause he wasgreedy,utbecause he wanted obe leftnpeace.Unlesstherewas somewayherneighborsouldprovideFrancewithan alternate oute o hergoal,Francehad togo towar.

III. OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND THE SECURITYDILEMMAAnother pproach tartswith the central ointof the security i-lemma-thatan increasen one state's ecurityecreases hesecurityof others-and examines heconditionsnderwhich thispropositionholds.Two crucialvariables re involved:whether efensive eaponsandpolicies an be distinguishedrom ffensivenes, ndwhether he27 Quoted in Adam Ulam, Expansion and Co-Existence (New York: Praeger i968),5. In I920 the U.S. Navy's General Board similarlydeclared "A nation must advanceor retrocede n world position." Quoted in William Braisted,The United StatesNavyin the Pacific, 909-1922 (Austin: University f Texas Press I971), 488.28 Quoted in Marion Boggs, Attemptsto Define and Limit "Aggressive"Armamentin Diplomacy and Strategy (Columbia: Universityof Missouri Studies, xvi, No. i,I94'), 4I.29 StevenRoss, European Diplomatic History,1789-i815 (Garden City,N.Y.: Double-day i969), I94.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 187defenserthe ffenseasthe dvantage.hedefinitionsrenot lwaysclear, ndmanyases redifficulto udge, ut hesewovariablesheda great ealof ight n the uestionfwhethertatus-quoowers illadopt ompatibleecurityolicies. ll thevariables iscussedo farleave heheart f he roblemntouched.utwhen efensiveeaponsdifferrom ffensivenes, t spossible or stateo make tselfmoresecurewithout aking thersess ecure. ndwhen hedefenseasthe dvantagever heoffense,large ncreasenone state'securityonly lightlyecreaseshe ecurityfthe thers,ndstatus-quoowerscanall enjoy high evel fsecuritynd argelyscape rom he tateofnature.OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCEWhenwesay hathe ffenseas he dvantage,esimply ean hatit s easier o destroyheother'srmy nd take ts erritoryhan t stodefend ne's wn.When hedefense as the dvantage,t s easiertoprotectnd tohold han t s tomove orward,estroy,ndtake.feffectiveefensesan be erecteduickly,n attacker aybe able tokeep erritoryehas taken n an initial ictory.hus, hedominanceofthedefense ade t very ard orBritainndFrance opushGer-many utofFrancenWorldWar . Butwhen uperiorefensesredifficultor n aggressoro mprovisenthebattlefieldnd must econstructeduringeacetime,hey rovideo directssistanceohim.The securityilemmas at its mostviciouswhencommitments,strategy,r technologyictatehat heonlyroute o securityiesthroughxpansion.tatus-quoowersmust hen ct ikeaggressors;thefact hat heywouldgladly gree oforegoheopportunityorexpansionnreturn orguaranteesor heirecurityas no implica-tions or heir ehavior.ven fexpansionsnot oughts a goal nitself,herewill be quick nddrastichangesn thedistributionfterritoryndinfluence.onversely,hen hedefense as the dvan-tage, tatus-quotatesanmake hemselvesoreecure ithoutravelyendangeringthers.30ndeed,fthedefense asenough f an advan-tage nd f he tatesre froughlyqual ize, ot nlywill he ecuritydilemmaease o nhibittatus-quotatesromooperating,ut ggres-sionwill benext oimpossible,hus enderingnternationalnarchyrelativelynimportant.f statesannot onquerachother,hen he

30 Thus,whenWolfers fn. O), I26, arguesthat status-quotatethat ettles orrough quality f powerwith tsadversary,atherhan eeking reponderance,aybeable toconvinceheother o reciprocatey showing hat t wants nly o protecttself,notmenace heother, e assumes hat he defense as an advantage.


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188 WORLD POLITICSlackofsovereignty,lthoughtpresentsroblemsfcollectiveoodsin a number f areas, o longer orcestateso devoteheir rimaryattentionoself-preservation.lthough,fforce erenotusable, herewouldbe fewer estraintsn theuse of nonmilitarynstruments,these re rarelyowerfulnough othreatenhevital nterestsf amajor tate.Twoquestionsfthe ffense-defensealancean beseparated.irst,does he tate ave ospendmore r ess han nedollar ndefensiveforceso offsetachdollar pent y he therideonforceshat ouldbe used oattack?f the tate asonedollar ospend nincreasingtssecurity,houldtput t nto ffensiverdefensiveorces?econd, itha givennventoryfforces,s it bettero attackr to defendIs therean incentiveostrike irst rto absorbheother's low?Thesetwoaspectsreofteninked:feachdollar pent noffenseanovercomeeachdollar pentndefense,nd fboth ideshave he amedefensebudgets,hen oth re ikely obuild ffensiveorcesndfindt attrac-tive oattackatherhan owait or he dversaryostrike.These spectsffecthe ecurityilemmandifferentays. he firsthas tsgreatestmpactnarms aces. f thedefense asthe dvantage,and f he tatus-quoowers ave easonableubjectiveecurityequire-ments,hey anprobablyvoid narms ace.Althoughnincreasenoneside's rmsndsecurityillstill ecreaseheother'security,heformer'sncrease illbe argerhan he atter'secrease.o ifone ideincreasests rms,he theranbringts ecurityack pto ts reviouslevelbyadding smallermount oitsforces. ndifthefirstidereactsothis hange,ts ncrease ill lsobesmallerhan he timulusthat roducedt. Thusa stable quilibriumill bereached.hiftingfrom ynamicso statics,ach sidecanbe quite ecurewithforcesroughlyqual othose f he ther.ndeed,f he efensesmuchmorepotenthan he ffense,ach ide anbewillingohaveforcesmuchsmallerhan heother's,nd can be indifferento a widerange fthe ther'sefenseolicies.The second spect-whethert is bettero attack r to defend-influenceshort-runtability.hentheoffenseastheadvantage,state's eactiono internationalension ill increasehechances fwar.The incentivesorpre-emptionnd the reciprocalear fsur-prise ttack"nthis ituationavebeenmade lear yanalysesfthedangershat xistwhen wo countriesavefirst-strikeapabilities.31Theresnoway or he tateo ncreasets ecurityithout enacing,

31 chellingfn. 0), chap.9.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 189or ven ttacking,he ther.venBismarck,ho nce alled reventivewar committinguicide rom ear f death,"aid that no govern-ment,f t regards ar s inevitableven f t doesnotwant t,wouldbe sofoolishs to eave othe nemyhe hoice f time nd occasionandtowait or hemomenthichs most onvenientor he nemy."32In anotherrena,he ame ilemmappliesothe olicemanna darkalley onfrontingsuspectedriminal hoappears o be holdingweapon. hough acismmay ndeed e present,he ecurityilemmacan account ormany fthe ragichootingsf nnocenteople n theghettos.Beliefsbout he ourse f war nwhichhe ffenseasthe dvan-tagefurthereepen he ecurityilemma.Whentherere ncentivesto strikeirst,successfulttack illusually o weakenhe theridethat ictory illbe relativelyuick, loodless,nddecisive.t is inthese eriods hen onquests possiblend attractivehat tateson-solidateowernternally-fornstance,ydestroyinghe eudal arons-and expand xternally.here re everalonsequenceshat ecreasethe hance f cooperationmong tatus-quotates.irst,warwill beprofitableor hewinner. hecostswillbe owandthebenefitsigh.Ofcourse,oserswill suffer;hefear f osing ould nduce tatesotry oform tableooperativerrangements,ut he emptationfvic-torywill makethisparticularlyifficult.econd, ecausewars areexpectedobe both requentnd hort,here illbe ncentivesor ighlevels farms,ndquick ndstrongeactiono theother'sncreasesin arms. he state annotffordowaituntil heres unambiguousevidencehathe thersbuildingewweapons.ven arge tateshathave aithntheirconomictrengthannot ait, ecausehewarwillbe over eforeheir roductsanreach he rmy. hird,whenwarsarequick, tates illhaveto recruitllies n advance.33ithout heopportunityorbargainingnd re-alignmentsuring heopeningstagesfhostilities,eacetimeiplomacyoses degree f thefluiditythatfacilitatesalance-of-powerolicies.Because lliancesmustbesecureduring eacetime,he nternationalystems more ikely obecome ipolar.t s hard osaywhether arthereforeecomesmoreor less ikely, ut thisbipolarityncreasesension etween hetwocampsndmakest harder or tatus-quotatesogainthebenefitsfcooperation.ourth,fwars refrequent,tatesmen'serceptualhresh-oldswillbe adjustedccordinglyndtheywill be quicktoperceive

32 Quoted n Fritz Fischer,War of Illusions (New York: Norton 975), 377, 46i.33George Quester, Oflense and Defense in the InternationalSystem (New York:JohnWiley977), I05-06; Sontag fn.5), 4-5.


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190 WORLD POLITICSambiguousvidences ndicatinghat thersre ggressive.hus, herewillbemore ases f status-quoowersrminggainstachothernthencorrecteliefhat he thershostile.When hedefenseas the dvantage,ll theforegoings reversed.The statehat earsttack oesnotpre-empt-sincehatwouldbe awastefulseof tsmilitaryesources-butatherrepareso receivenattack. oing sodoesnotdecreasehe ecurityf others,nd severalstatesando itsimultaneously;he ituationill thereforee stable,and status-quoowers illbe abletocooperate. henHerman ahnargueshat ltimatumsarevastlyoodangerouso givebecause . .they requite ikelyo touch ff pre-emptivetrike,"34e ncorrectlyassumeshat t s alwaysdvantageouso strike irst.Mores nvolvedhan hort-runynamics.hen hedefenses dom-inant,wars re ikely o become talematesndcanbewon only tenormousost. elativelymall ndweak tatesanhold ffargerndstrongernes, rcandeterttackyraisinghe osts fconquestoanunacceptableevel. tates henpproachqualitynwhat hey ando toeachother. ike the 45-caliberistolntheAmericanWest, ortifica-

tionswere he great qualizer"n some eriods.hangesnthe tatusquo are essfrequentnd cooperations more ommon hereverhesecurityilemmastherebyeduced.Manyof these rgumentsan be illustratedythemajorpowers'policiesn theperiodsrecedinghe woworldwars.Bismarck's arssurprisedtatesmeny howinghat he ffenseadthe dvantage,ndbybeing uick, elativelyheap,ndquite ecisive.allingnto com-mon rror,bserversrojectedhis atternnto he uture.35heresult-ing xpectationsadseveralffects.irst,tatesoughtemi-permanentallies.nthe arly tagesf he ranco-Prussianar,NapoleonII hadthoughthat herewouldbeplentyf time o recruit ustriaohisside.Now, thers ere otgoingorepeathismistake.econd,efensebudgets erehigh ndreacteduite harplyo ncreasesn theotherside.t snot urprisinghatRichardson'sheoryfarms aces itshisperiodwell.Third,most ecisionmakershoughthat henext uro-34Kahn (fn. 23), 2II (also see I44).35 Fora general iscussionf suchmistakenearning rom hepast, ee Jervisfn. 5),chap. 6. The importantnd stillnot completelynderstood uestionof why thisbelief ormedndwas maintainedhroughouthewar s examinedn Bernard rodie,War and Politics (New York: Macmillan973), 262-70; Brodie,Technologicalhange,Strategicoctrine,nd Political utcomes,"n KlausKnorr, d.,HistoricalDimensionsof National SecurityProblems (Lawrence: UniversityPress of Kansas i976), 290-92;and DouglasPorch, The FrenchArmy nd the Spirit f theOffensive,900-14," inBrianBondand Ian Roy, ds.,War and Society (New York: Holmes& Meier i975),II7-43.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 191pean war would notcostmuchblood and treasure.36hat s one reasonwhywar was generally een as inevitable nd why mass opinionwasso bellicose. ourth, ncewar seemed ikely, herewere trong ressuresto pre-empt. oth idesbelieved hatwhoevermovedfirst ould pene-trate he other eep enough o disruptmobilization nd thusgain aninsurmountabledvantage. There was no suchbelief bout heuseofnavalforces. lthough hurchillmade an ill-advisedpeech aying hatifGerman hips do notcomeoutandfightntime fwartheywillbedug out ike rats n a hole,"37 veryone new that ubmarines, ines,and coastalfortificationsade this mpossible. o at the start f thewar each navy prepared o defend tself ather han attack, nd theshort-runestabilizing orces hat aunched the armiestowardeachotherdid not operate.)38 urthermore,ach side knew thatthe othersaw the situation he same way,thus ncreasing he perceived angerthat he otherwouldattack, nd giving ach added reasons oprecipi-tate war fconditionseemed avorable.n the ongand the hort un,therewerethusbothoffensivend defensivencentiveso strike. hissituationasts ight n thecommon uestion boutGermanmotivesnI9I4: "Did Germany nleash he war deliberatelyo become worldpowerordid she support ustriamerelyodefend weakening lly,"thereby rotectinger own position3 To someextent, hisquestionis misleading. ecauseof the perceived dvantage f theoffense, arwas seen as the bestroutebothtogaining xpansion nd to avoidingdrastic oss of influence. here seemedto be no way forGermanymerelyo retain ndsafeguard erexisting osition.Of course hewar showedthesebeliefs o have beenwrongon allpoints. renches ndmachine unsgavethedefensen overwhelmingadvantage. he fightingecamedeadlocked ndproducedhorrendouscasualties.t madeno senseforthe combatantso bleedthemselvesodeath. f theyhad knownthepowerofthe defense eforehand,heywould have rushed or heir wn trenches ather hanfor heenemy'sterritory.ach sidecould havedonethiswithoutncreasingheother's

36 Some were not so optimistic.Gray's remark s well-known: "The lamps are goingout all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time."The GermanPrime Minister,BethmannHollweg, also feared the consequences of the war. But thecontrollingview was that t would certainlypay for the winner.37Quoted in MartinGilbert,WinstonS. Churchill, II, The Challenge of War, I9I4-I9I6 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 971), 84.38Quester (fn. 33), 98-99. Robert Art,The Influenceof Foreign Policy on Seapower,II (Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers in International Studies Series, I973),14-i8, 26-28.39Konrad Jarausch, The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg'sCalculated Risk, July 914," CentralEuropean History, i (March i969), 50.


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192 WORLD POLITICSincentiveso strike.War might avebroken utanyway,ust s DDisa possibleutcomefChicken,ut t east hepressuresftimendthe ear f llowinghe ther oget he irstlowwouldnothave on-tributedothis nd.And,had both idesknown he osts f thewar,they ould avenegotiated uchmoreeriously.he obviousuestioniswhy he tates idnot eek negotiatedettlements soon s theshape fthewar became lear. chlieffenad said that f his planfailed, eace hould esought.40he answers complex,ncertain,ndlargelyutsidef he cope four oncerns.utpart fthe eason asthehope ndsometimesheexpectationhat reakthroughsouldbemade ndthedominancefthe ffensiveestored. ithouthat ope,thepoliticalndpsychologicalressuresofight o a decisive ictorymight avebeen vercome.Thepoliticsfthe nterwareriodwere haped ythememoriesfthe reviousonflictndthe eliefhat ny uture arwould esembleit.Politicalndmilitaryessonseinforcedachothernamelioratingthesecurityilemma. ecausetwas believedhat heFirstWorldWarhad been mistakehat ouldhavebeen voided y killfulon-ciliation,oth ritainnd, o a lesser xtent,rancewerehighlyensi-tive othepossibilityhat nterwarermany asnot realthreatopeace,nd lertothedangerhat eactinguicklyndstronglyoherarms ould reatennecessaryonflict.ndbecause ritainndFranceexpectedhedefenseocontinueodominate,hey oncludedhattwas afe o dopt more elaxedndnonthreateningilitaryosture.41Britainlsofelt essneed omaintainightlliance onds. heAllies'militaryosturehen onstitutednly slight angeroGermany;adthe atter een ontent ith he tatusuo, t wouldhavebeeneasyfor oth ides ohave elt ecureehind heirines ffortifications.fcourse heGermans erenot ontent,oit snot urprisinghat heydevoted heirmoneynd attentionofinding ays ut of a defense-dominatedtalemate.litzkriegactics erenecessaryftheywere ouseforce ochangehe tatusuo.The initialtages fthewar on theWesternront lsocontrastedwith heFirstWorldWar.Onlywith henew ir rmwere hereny40 Brodie fn. 8), 58.41 President oosevelt nd theAmerican elegates o theLeague of NationsDis-armament onferencemaintained hat the tank and mobileheavyartillery ad re-establishedhe dominance f the offensive,husmakingdisarmament oreurgent(Boggs,fn.28, pp. 31, io8), but thiswas a minorityosition nd may not even havebeen believed y theAmericans. he reducedprestigend influence f the military,and the high pressureso cutgovernmentpending hroughouthisperiodalso con-tributed o the owering f defense udgets.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 193incentiveso trikeirst,ndtheseorces ere ooweak ocarry ut hegrandioselans hat ad beenboth reamednd feared.he armies,still hemain nstrument,ushedodefensiveositions.erhapsheallies ouldhave uccessfullyttacked hile heGermans ere ccu-pied nPoland.42utbeliefn thedefense asso great hat hiswasnever eriouslyontemplated.hreemonthsfterhe tart fthewar,theFrenchrimeMinisterummedp theviewheldby lmostvery-onebutHitler: n theWesternront heres"deadlock.wo Forces fequal trengthndthe nethatttackseeinguch normousasualtiesthat tcannotmovewithoutndangeringhe ontinuationfthewarorof he ftermath."43he Allieswere aughtna dilemmahey everfullyecognized,et lone olved. n the nehand, hey advery ighwar ims; lthoughnconditionalurrenderadnotyet een dopted,theBritishad decided romhe tart hat heremoval fHitlerwasa necessaryonditionorpeace.44n theother and, herewerenorealisticlansor instrumentsor llowing heAllies o impose heirwillonthe theride.The British hief fthe mperial eneraltaffnoted,The French aveno intentionfcarryingut noffensiveoryears,f atall"; theBritish ere nly lightlyolder.45o theAllieslookedo longwar hatwouldwear heGermansown,ause iviliansufferinghroughhortages,ndeventuallyndermineitler. herewas ittlenalysiso upporthis iew-and ndeedtprobably asnotsupportable-buts ong sthe efense asdominantndthenumbersoneachsiderelativelyqual,what lsecould heAlliesdo?To summarize,he ecurityilemma asmuch esspowerfulfterWorldWar thanthadbeen efore.nthe ater eriod,he xpectedpower f thedefensellowed tatus-quotates opursue ompatiblesecurityoliciesndavoid rms aces. urthermore,igh ensionndfear fwardidnot setoff hort-runynamicsywhich achstate,tryingoincreasets ecurity,nadvertentlycted omakewarmorelikely.heexpectedigh ostsfwar, owever,edtheAllies obelieve

42 Jon Kimche, The Unjought Battle (New York: Stein i968); Nicholas WilliamBethell, The War Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September1939 (New York: HoltI972); Alan Alexandroff nd RichardRosecrance,"Deterrence n I939," World Politics,XXIX (April I977), 404-24-43 Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly, eds., Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries,I937-I940 (New York: McKay i962), I73.4 For a shorttime,as France was falling,the BritishCabinet did discuss reachinganegotiated peace with Hitler. The officialhistory gnores this, but it is covered inP.M.H. Bell, A CertainEventuality Farnborough,England: Saxon House I974), 40-48.45 Macleod and Kelly (fn. 43), I74. In flat ontradiction o common sense and almosteverything heybelieved about modern warfare,the Allies planned an expedition toScandinavia to cut the supplyof iron ore to Germanyand to aid Finland against theRussians.But the dominantmood was the one describedabove.


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194 WORLD POLITICSthat o saneGermaneaderwould un he isks ntailedn anattemptto dominateheContinent,nddiscouragedhem rom isking arthemselves.

Technologynd Geography.echnologyndgeographyre he womain actorshat eterminehetherhe ffenser thedefenseastheadvantage.s Brodie otes,On the acticalevel, s a rule, ew hysicalfactorsavor he ttackerutmany avor hedefender.he defenderusually asthe dvantagefcover. e characteristicallyires rom e-hind ome ormf shelter hilehisopponentrossespenground."46Anythinghatncreaseshe mountfground he ttackeras ocross,or mpedes isprogresscrosst, r makes immore ulnerablehilecrossing,ncreaseshe dvantageccruingo thedefense. hen tatesare eparatedybarriershat roducehese ffects,he ecurityilemmais eased, ince oth anhave orcesdequate or efense ithouteingabletoattack.mpenetrablearriers ould ctually revent ar; inreality,ecision akers ave osettle or gooddeal ess.Bufferonesslowtheattacker'srogress;hey herebyivethedefenderime oprepare,ncrease roblemsf ogistics,nd reducehenumberfsol-diers vailable or hefinal ssault. t theendofthe 9thcentury,Arthur alfour otedAfghanistan'snon-conducting"ualities.Solong s tpossessesew oads,ndnorailroads,twillbe mpossibleorRussia o make ffectiveseofhergreat umericaluperioritytanypointmmediatelyital othe mpire."heRussiansalued uffersorthe ame easons;t snot urprisinghatwhen ersiawasbeing ividedintoRussian nd Britishpheresf influenceomeyearsater, heRussiansoughtssuranceshatheBritish ould efrainromuildingpotentially enacingailroadsn theirphere.ndeed, ince ailroadconstructionadicallylteredhe bilitiesfcountriesodefend hem-selves ndto attackthers, any iplomaticotes ndmuch ntelli-gence ctivityn the ate 9th enturyenterednthis ubject.47Oceans,arge ivers,ndmountainangeservehe ame unctionsbufferones.Beinghard ocross,hey llowdefensegainstuperiornumbers.he defenderasmerelyostay nhis sideofthebarrierand ocanutilizellthemenhe canbring pto t.Theattacker'sen,however,ancross nly few t a time,ndtheyrevery ulnerable

46 Brodie fn. 8), I79.47 Arthur alfour,Memorandum,"ommitteen Imperial efence,April 0, I903,pp. 2-3; see thetelegramsySir ArthurNicolson,n G. P. Gooch and HaroldTem-perley, ds.,BritishDocuments on the Origins of the War,Vol. 4 (London:H.M.S.O.1929), 429, 524. Thesebarriers o notpreventhepassageof long-rangeircraft;uteven n theair,distance sually ids thedefender.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 195when oing o. f all states ere elf-sufficientslands,narchy ouldbe much ess f problem. small nvestmentn shore efensesndasmall rmy ould e sufficientorepel nvasion. nly ery eak tateswouldbe vulnerable,nd onlyvery arge nescouldmenace thers.As noted bove, heUnited tates,ndto a lesser xtent reat ritain,havepartly een bleto escape rom he tate f nature ecause heirgeographicalositionspproximatedhis deal.Althougheographyannot e changed o conformo borders,or-ders an nddo change oconformogeography.orderscross hichanattacks easy end obe unstable.tatesiving ithinhem re ikelytoexpand r be absorbed.requent ars re almost nevitableinceattacking ill often eem hebestwayto protect hat ne has.Thisprocess ill top, rat east low own,when he tate'sorderseach-by xpansionr contraction-aineofnatural bstacles.ecurity ith-out attackwill thenbe possible. urthermore,hese inesconstitutesalient olutionso bargainingroblemsnd,to theextent hat heyare barrierso migration,re ikely o divide thnic roups, herebyraisinghe ostsnd oweringhe ncentivesor onquest.

Attachmentoone's tatend ts andreinforcenequasi-geograph-ical aid to thedefense. onquest sually ecomesmoredifficulthedeeperhe ttackerushesnto he ther'serritory.ationalismpursthe efendersofight arder; dvancingot nly engthenshe ttack-er's upplyines,ut akes im hroughnfamiliarndoftenevastatedlands hat equire roopsor arrisonuty. hese tabilizingynamicswillnotoperate, owever,f thedefender'sarmateriels situatednear tsborders,r fthepeople onot are bout heirtate,utonlyabout eing nthewinningide. n such ases, ositiveeedback illbeat work nd nitial efeats ill be insurmountable.48Imitatingeography,enhave ried o create arriers.reatiesmayprovideordemilitarizedones n both ides f theborder,lthoughsuch oneswillrarelyedeep noughoprovidemore hanwarning.Eventhiswas notpossiblen Europe, ut the Russiansdoptedgauge or heirailroadshatwasbroaderhan hat ftheneighboringstates,herebyomplicatinghe ogistics roblemsfanyattacker-includingussia.Perhapshemost mbitiousnd at least emporarilyuccessfult-temptso constructsystemhatwould id thedefensesf both ideswere he nterwaravaltreaties,s they ffectedapanese-American

48 See, for example,the discussionof warfareamong Chinese warlords in Hsi-ShengChi, "The Chinese Warlord Systemas an International System," n Morton Kaplan,ed., New Approachesto InternationalRelations (New York: St. Martin's i968), 405-25.


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196 WORLD POLITICSrelations. s mentioned arlier, heproblemwas that heUnitedStatescould not defend hePhilippineswithout enying apan he ability oprotect er home islands.49In I94I thisdilemmabecame nsolublewhenJapan ought o extend ercontrol oMalaya and theDutchEastIndies. f thePhilippines ad been nvulnerable,hey ouldhave pro-videda secure asefromwhichtheU.S. could nterdict apanesehip-ping between hehomeland nd theareas he was trying o conquer.)In the 920's and early930's each sidewouldhavebeenwilling o granttheother ecurityor tspossessionsnreturn or reciprocal rant,ndtheWashingtonNaval Conferencegreements eredesigned o ap-proachthisgoal. As a Japanese iplomat aterput it, their ountry's"fundamentalrinciple"was to have"a strengthnsufficientor ttackand adequate for defense."50hus, Japan greed n I922 to acceptanavy nly hree-fifthss large s that f theUnited tates, nd theU.S.agreednottofortifytsPacific slands."' Japanhad earlier eenforcedto agree not to fortifyhe islandsshe had taken fromGermany nWorld War I.) Japan'snavywould not be large enoughto defeatAmerica's nywherether han lose othehome slands.AlthoughheJapanese ouldstill ake hePhilippines,otonlywould they e unabletomove farther,uttheymightbe weakened noughby their ffortstobe vulnerableocounterattack.apan, owever, ained security.nAmerican ttackwas renderedmore difficultecause the Americanbases were unprotectednd because,until 930, Japanwas allowedunlimited umbers f cruisers, estroyers,nd submarineshatcouldweaken heAmerican leets itmade tswayacross heocean.52The othermajordeterminantftheoffense-defensealance s tech-nology.Whenweapons rehighly ulnerable,heymustbe employedbefore hey reattacked. thers an remain uite nvulnerablen theirbases.The formerharacteristicsre embodiedn unprotected issilesandmanykindsof bombers.It shouldbe noted hat t is notvulner-ability erse that scrucial, utthe ocation f thevulnerability.omb-ers ndmissiles hat reeasy odestroynly fter aving een aunchedtoward heir argets o not createdestabilizing ynamics.) ncentivesto strike irstreusually bsent ornaval forces hat rethreatenedySome Americandecisionmakers, ncludingmilitaryofficers,houghtthat the bestway out of the dilemma was to abandon the Philippines.

50 Quoted in EltingMorrison,Turmoil and Tradition:A StudyoftheLife and TimesofHenry L. Stinson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin960), 326.51 The U.S. "refusedto considerlimitations n Hawaiian defenses, ince these worksposed no threatto Japan." Braisted (fn. 27), 6I2.52 That is part of the reason why the Japaneseadmirals stronglyobjected when thecivilian leaders decided to accept a seven-to-tenatio in lightercraft n I930. StephenPelz, Race to Pearl Harbor (Cambridge: Harvard University ress I974), 3.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 197a naval attack. ike missiles n hardened ilos,they re usuallywellprotected hen in theirbases. Both sides can thensimultaneouslyeprepared o defend hemselvesuccessfully.

In groundwarfare nder omeconditions,orts,renches,nd smallgroupsof men in prepared ositions an hold off argenumbers fattackers. ess frequently, few attackers an storm hedefenses. yand large, t is a contest etween ortificationsnd supportingightweapons ntheonehand, ndmobilityndheavierweapons hat learthewayfor he ttack ntheother.As theerroneous iewsheld beforethe two worldwarsshow, here s no simplewaytodetermine hichis dominant. [T]hese oscillationsrenot smooth ndpredictableikethoseof a swinging endulum.They are uneven n bothextent ndtime. ome occur nthecourse f a singlebattle rcampaign, thersnthe course fa war, stillothers uring series fwars."Longer-termoscillationsan also be detected:The earlyGothic ge,from hetwelftho the atethirteenthentury,withtswonderfulathedralsnd fortifiedlaces,was a period uringwhich heattackersn Europegenerally et serious nd increasingdifficulties,ecause he mprovementn thestrengthffortressesut-ran theadvance n thepower f destruction.ater,with hespreadof firearmst the nd of thefifteenthentury,ldfortressesost heirpower o resist. n age ensuedduringwhich he offenseossessed,apartfrom hort-termetbacks,ew advantages. hen,during heseventeenthentury,speciallyfter bout 66o, nduntil t least heoutbreakfthe Warof theAustrianuccessionn 1740, the defenseregainedmuchof theground t had lost sincethegreatmedievalfortressesad proved nable o meetthebombardmentf thenewandmore umerousrtillery.53Another cholarhas continued heargument: The offensiveainedan advantagewith new forms fheavymobileartilleryn the nine-teenth entury,utthe stalematef World War I created he mpres-sionthatthedefense gainhad an advantage; he German nvasionin World War II, however, ndicatedthe offensiveuperiorityfhighlymechanized rmies n thefield."'54The situation odaywithrespect o conventionalweaponsis un-53John Nef, War and Human Progress (New York: Norton i963), I85. Also seeibid., 237, 242-43, and 323; C. W. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages (Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress I953), 70-72; John Beeler, Warfare n Feudal Europe,

730-1200 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress I971), 2I2-I4; Michael Howard, Warin European History (London: OxfordUniversityPress I976), 33-37.54Quincy Wright,A Study of War (abridged ed.; Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress i964), I42. Also see 63-70,74-75.There are important exceptionsto these gen-eralizations-the American Civil War, for instance,falls in the middle of the periodWright says is dominatedby the offense.


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198 WORLD POLITICSclear.Untilrecentlytwas believed hat anks nd tactical ir powergavetheattackern advantage. he initial nalyses f the 1973 Arab-Israeliwar indicated hatnew anti-tanknd anti-aircrafteaponshaverestoredheprimacy f thedefense. hese weaponsare cheap,easy ouse,and candestroy highproportionftheattacking ehiclesandplanesthat resighted.t thenwouldmakesensefor status-quopower o buy otsof 20,000 missiles ather hanbuya fewhalf-milliondollartanks nd multi-millionollarfighter-bombers.efensewouldbe possible venagainst largeand well-equipped orce;states hatcareprimarilybout elf-protectionould notneedtoengage n armsraces.Butfurtherxaminations f the new technologiesnd the his-toryof theOctoberWar castdoubt on theseoptimisticonclusionsand leaveus unableto render ny firmudgment.55Concerning uclearweapons, t is generallygreedthatdefensesimpossible-a triumph ot of the offense, ut of deterrence. ttackmakes no sense,notbecause t can be beatenoff, utbecausethe at-tackerwill be destroyedn turn. n terms fthe questions ndercon-sideration ere, heresult s theequivalent ftheprimacy fthe de-fense. irst, ecuritys relativelyheap.Less thanone percent f theG.N.P. is devoted o deterring direct ttackon the UnitedStates;most of it is spenton acquiringredundant ystemso provide lotof nsurancegainst heworst onceivableontingencies.econd,bothsides can simultaneouslyain securityn the form of second-strikecapability.hird, ndrelated otheforegoing,econd-strikeapabilitycan be maintainedn theface of wide variations n the other ide'smilitary osture. here is no purelymilitary easonwhy each sidehas to reactquickly and stronglyo the other's ncreases n arms.Any spending hattheotherdevotes o trying o achievefirst-strikecapability an be neutralized y the state's pendingmuch smallersumson protectingts second-strikeapability. ourth, here re noincentiveso strike irstn a crisis.Important roblemsremain,of course. Both sides have intereststhatgo wellbeyond efense f thehomeland. he protectionftheseinterestsreates onflictsven if neither ide desires xpansion. ur-thermore,he shift romdefense o deterrence as greatlyncreasedthe mportancendperceptionsfresolve. ecurity ow rests n eachside's beliefthatthe otherwould prefer o run high risksof totaldestructionather hansacrificets vital nterests. spectsof the se-

55 Geoffreyemp,Robert faltzgraff,nd Uri Ra'anan, ds.,The OtherArmsRace(Lexington,Mass.: D. C. Heath I975); James oster, The Futureof ConventionalArmsControl," olicy Sciences, No. 8 (Spring 977), I-I9.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 199curity ilemmathus appear in a new form.Are weaponsprocure-ments sedas an index of resolve?Must theybe so used? If one sidefails o respond o theother's uildup,will itappearweakand therebyinvite redation?Can bothsidessimultaneouslyave imagesofhighresolveor is therea zero-sum lement nvolved?Although theseproblems re real, they re not as severe s those n theprenuclearera: there re many ndices f resolve, nd states o not somuch udgeimagesofresolve n the abstracts ask how likely t is that he otherwill standfirm n a particular ispute. ince states re most ikelytostandfirm n matters hichconcern hemmost, t is quite possiblefor both to demonstrateheirresolveto protect heirown securitysimultaneously.OFFENSE-DEFENSE DIFFERENTIATIONThe other major variable that affects ow stronglyhe securitydilemmaoperates s whetherweaponsand policiesthatprotect hestate lso provide he capability orattack. f theydo not,the basicpostulate f the security ilemmano longerapplies.A state an in-crease ts own securitywithoutdecreasing hat of others.The ad-vantageof thedefense an onlyameliorate he security ilemma.Adifferentiationetween ffensivend defensive tances omes closetoabolishingt. Such differentiationoes not mean, however, hat allsecurity roblemswill be abolished. f the offense as theadvantage,conquestand aggressionwill still be possible.And if the offense'sadvantages great nough, tatus-quo owersmayfind t too expen-sive to protect hemselvesy defensive orces nd decideto procureoffensive eaponseventhough hiswill menaceothers. urthermore,stateswill stillhavetoworry hat ven f theother'smilitary ostureshowsthat t is peacefulnow, it may develop aggressivententionsin thefuture.Assuming hatthe defense s at leastas potent s theoffense,hedifferentiationetweenthem allows status-quo tatesto behave inwaysthatare clearly ifferentrom hoseof aggressors.hree bene-ficial onsequences ollow.First, tatus-quo owerscan identifyachother, hus aying hefoundationsorcooperation. onflicts rowingout ofthe mistaken elief hattheother ide is expansionist ill beless frequent. econd, status-quotateswill obtainadvance warningwhenothers lan aggression. efore state an attack,t has to de-velopand deploy ffensiveeapons. fprocurementftheseweaponscannotbe disguised nd takes fairamount ftime, s it almost l-ways does,a status-quotatewill havethetimeto takecountermeas-


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200 WORLD POLITICSures. t need notmaintain high evelof defensiverms s longasitspotentialdversariesreadopting peacefulosture.Althoughbeing oarmed hould ot,with he ne mportantxceptionoted e-low, larm thertatus-quoowers.)tateso, nfact, ay pecial tten-tion oactionshat hey elievewouldnotbe taken y a status-quostate ecause hey eelthat tates xhibitinguchbehaviorre ag-gressive.husthe eizure rdevelopmentftransportationacilitieswillalarm thersmore fthese acilitiesaveno commercialalue,andthereforeanonlybewanted ormilitaryeasons.n i906, theBritishejected Russian rotestbout heir ctivitiesn a districtofPersia yclaiminghat his reawas"only f [strategic]mpor-tancetotheRussians]ftheywishedoattack he ndian rontier,rtoputpressureponusbymaking sthinkhatheyntend oattack* "156it. The samenferencesredrawnwhen statecquiresmoreweaponsthan bserverseel reneeded ordefense.hus, heJapanesepokes-manatthe1930 Londonnavalconferenceaidthathiscountry asalarmedytheAmericanefusalogiveJapan 70percentatio inplace f 6opercentatio) nheavyruisers:As ong sAmerica eldthat enpercentdvantage,t waspossibleorher oattack. o whenAmericansistedn sixtyercentnstead fseventyercent,he deawouldexist hat heyweretryingo keepthatpossibility,nd theJapaneseeople ouldnotaccept hat."57imilarly, henMussolinitoldChamberlainn January939 thatHitler's rmsprogram asmotivatedydefensiveonsiderations,hePrimeMinisterepliedhat"Germanmilitaryorces erenowsostrongs tomake t mpossiblefor nyPower r combinationfPowers o attack ersuccessfully.Shecouldnotwant nyfurtherrmamentsordefensiveurposes;what hen idshewant hem or?""5Ofcoursehesenferencesanbewrong-as heyre speciallyikelyto be because tatesnderestimatehedegree owhich heymenaceothers.59ndwhen heyrewrong,he ecurityilemmasdeepened.Because he tate hinksthasreceived oticehat he thers aggres-sive,tsownarms uilding illbe lessrestrainednd thechancesfRichard Challener,Admirals, Generals,and American Foreign Policy, i898-i9I4(Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress 1973), 273; Grey to Nicolson, in Gooch andTemperley (fn. 47), 414-57Quoted in James Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press I966), 49. American naval officersgreed with the Japanesethat aten-to-sixatiowould endangerJapan'ssupremacy n her home waters.5 E. L. Woodward and R. Butler,eds., Documents on BritishForeign Policy, i9i9-I939, Third series, III (London: H.M.S.O. 1950), 526.59Jervis fn. 5), 69-72,352-55.


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SECURITY DILEMMA 201cooperation ill be decreased. ut the dangers f incorrectnferencesshouldnotobscure he main point:whenoffensivend defensive os-tures re different,uchof theuncertaintybout heother'sntentionsthat ontributesothe security ilemma s removed.The thirdbeneficial onsequence f a differenceetween ffensiveand defensive eapons s that f all states upport he status uo, anobvious rms ontrol greementsa ban onweapons hat re useful orattacking. s President oosevelt ut it in his message o the GenevaDisarmament onferencen 1933: "If all nationswill agree whollyto eliminate rompossession nd use theweapons which make pos-sible successfulttack, efenses utomaticallyill become mpregna-ble, and thefrontiersnd independence f everynationwill becomesecure."60 he fact hat uch treaties ave beenrare-the Washingtonnaval agreementsiscussed bove nd the nti-ABM reatyan be citedas examples-shows ither hat tates re notalwayswilling o guaran-tee the securityf others, r that t is hard to distinguish ffensivefromdefensive eapons.Is sucha distinctionossible?Salvadorde Madariaga, heSpanishstatesmanctiventhedisarmamentegotiationsf the nterwar ears,thought ot: "A weapon s either ffensiver defensiveccording owhichend of it you are lookingat." The FrenchForeignMinisteragreed (althoughFrenchpolicydid not alwaysfollowthisview):"Every rm can be employed ffensivelyr defensivelyn turn....The only wayto discoverwhether rmsare intended orpurelyde-fensive urposes r areheld in a spirit faggressions in all cases toenquire ntothe ntentionsf thecountryoncerned." omeevidencefor hevalidityf this rgumentsprovided ythefact hatmuchtimein theseunsuccessfulegotiations as devoted o separatingffensivefromdefensive eapons. ndeed,no simple nd unambiguous efini-tion spossible ndinmany asesno judgment an be reached.Beforethe American ntryntoWorldWar I, WoodrowWilsonwantedtoarmmerchantmennlywithguns in theback of the ship so theycould not nitiate fight,utthis xpedientannot e applied o morecommon orms farmaments."Thereare several roblems. venwhen a differentiations possible,a status-quo owerwillwantoffensivermsunder nyofthree ondi-tions. i) If theoffense as a great dvantage verthedefense, ro-tectionhrough efensiveorceswill be tooexpensive.2) Status-quo

60 Quoted in Merze Tate, The United tates ndArmamentsCambridge: HarvardUniversityPress I948), io8.61 Boggs (fn. 28), I5, 40.


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202 WORLD POLITICSstates ay eed ffensiveeaponsoregainerritoryost n the peningstages fa war. tmight epossible,owever,or state owait oprocurehese eapons ntilwar eemsikely,nd heymight e neededonlynrelativelymall umbers,nlesshe ggressorasable o con-structtrongefensesuicklyn the ccupiedreas.3) The statemayfeel hattmust e preparedo take heoffensiveither ecause heother idewillmake eace nly f t oses erritoryr because he tatehas commitmentso attackf theothermakeswar on a third arty.As noted bove, tatus-quotateswith xtensiveommitmentsreoftenforced o behave ike aggressors. ven when they ack such commit-ments, tatus-quo tatesmustworry bout the possibilityhat f theyare able to hold off n attack, heywill stillnot be able to end thewarunless heymove ntothe other's erritoryo damage ts militaryforces nd inflict ain. Many Americannaval officersfter he CivilWar,for xample, elieved hat onlyby destroyinghecommerce ftheopponent ould theUnitedStates ringhimtoterms."62A furtheromplications introducedythefactthat ggressor