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Jeffrey sachs on nature and economic development: Four critiquesJames O'Connor , Antonio Contreras , José Carlos Escudero & María Pilar GarcíaPublished online: 25 Feb 2009.

To cite this article: James O'Connor , Antonio Contreras , José Carlos Escudero & María Pilar García (1998) Jeffrey sachs on nature and economic development: Four critiques, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 9:2, 113-123, DOI: 10.1080/10455759809358798

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SYMPOSIUM

Jeffrey Sachs on Nature and EconomicDevelopment: Four Critiques

i .

We asked three CNS Editors who live and work in the South tocomment on an article written by economic development guru JeffreySachs for The Economist (June 14, 1997). Sachs is director of theHarvard Institute for International Development and arguably the singlemost important mouthpiece for global capital in the halls of academe.His article, "The Limits of Convergence: Nature, Nurture and Growth,"is a particularly egregious example of "free market" tomfoolery. CNSreaders with research or scholarly interests in world economicdevelopment are encouraged to read the article in toto.

Some of the antinomies and unconscious ironies to be found inSach's article are noted by Antonio Contreras (the Philippines), JoséCarlos Escudero (Argentina), and María Pilar García (Venezuela) below.Sachs' general argument goes something like this: The chances thatpoor countries will catch up with rich countries are small, given therole of geography (climate, etc.) in economic development. WhileSachs recognizes that transport and communications investments canpartly overcome geographical constraints, he argues that geography(etc.) condemns the peoples of tropical Africa, Asia, and Latin Americato permanent misery. Only a head-to-toe remake of tropical economiesalong the lines of Southeast Asian manufacturing export economieswould permit the tropics to import food and other necessities from therich temperate zones for development. Sachs doesn't say that tropicalclimates create lazy people and he does say that an Asian modelwouldn't work unless the North opened its markets to tropicalmanufactures, I hastily add.

In Sachs' account of the wealth and poverty of nations, European,Japanese, and U.S. imperialism play no role whatsoever (nor do

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military technology, arms races, and wars). He conflates"undevelopment's with "underdevelopment," the latter term coined byPaul Baran four decades ago and later elaborated by André Gunder Frank,Samir Amin, and other Marxist and radical development economists.Underdevelopment refers to the process whereby the imperialist Northintegrated the colonial/neo-colonial South into the North's owneconomic structures. The colonies/neo-colonies of the South were rawmaterial/mineral/energy suppliers for the industrialized North, exportinganywhere between one-third to one-half of their GDP and importingneeded consumer goods and capital equipment for their export sectors.Sociologically, underdevelopment meant political rule byexporters/importers, plantation/mine owners, compradors, and foreignimperialist interests — an unholy alliance that suppressed theproduction of manufactured goods both for export and for homemarkets, thus condemning the underdeveloped world to poverty (Japan'scolonies in Taiwan and Korea being the main partial exceptions). TheSouth began to escape from this economic straight jacket only becauseof two World Wars and one Great Depression, during which normaleconomic relations (read "exploitation") broke down and the process of"import substitute industrialization" (ISI) began in earnest. ISI wasitself riddled with contradictions which, finally, led to the growingdomination of transnational corporations and banks and the presentglobalized world of "export-oriented industrialization" (which last yearfell on its face in Southeast Asia, for how long no one knows).

Needless to add, this centuries-long process was anything butpeaceful. Class straggles, national liberation struggles, sub-imperialistrivalries in the larger underdeveloped countries, and other conflictspushed and pulled the South to its present economic address. One wouldexpect a character like Sachs to forego any scrutiny of the premises,values, and goals of "economic development" per se (a task CNS EditorArturo Escobar, for example, has made easier for the rest of us) and alsoto remain studiously ignorant of what CNS Editor Enrique Leff andothers call "ecological development." But Sach's failure to evenmention the "open veins of Latin America" and other regions of theSouth, the genocide against many indigenous peoples, and theecological and social havoc wreaked by Western capitalist developmentdefinitely falls into the category of intellectual crimes andmisdemeanors.

Sachs claims that good economic policies are crucial for acountry's development in three general ways. First, "openness" is"decisive for economic growth." Tell that to all of the ruling classeswho developed their countries behind high tariff and other trade barriers,

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including the ruling classes of post-World War II Japan and East Asia.Second, a prudent fiscal policy is essential for economic growth, saysSachs, thus throwing out the entire corpus of Keynesian, neo-Keynesian, and much post-Keynesian economic thought, the good withthe bad. Third, the rule of law, especially the absence of corruption, isalso a must for growth. Tell that to the establishment in Italy, wherecorruption was endemic and economic growth rapid. Or tell it to thecorrupt machine politicians in the U.S., where in the good old dayseconomic growth was two or three times faster than it has been in the1990s. Or even tell it to East and Southeast Asia, where corruption is anormal part of economic and political life. The fact is that crime andcorruption are inherent in the capitalist mode of production, the successstories as well as the failures. Finally, Sachs states that a successfulcountry must be entering, or well on its way through, the demographictransition (as in East Asia, he says), when birth rates as well as deathrates fall sharply. Nowhere does he even hint that high birth/high netreproduction rates are typical in countries and regions with a largelandless and land poor population (whether in Britain in the 18thcentury or India at the end of the 20th century), hence that term "over-population" disguises a real condition of "over-proletarianization."

The contributions to this symposium suggest the conclusion thatSachs' reputation as a development economist and high-profileeconomic advisor in Eastern Europe and Asia is to some significantdegree based on the fact that his views are more or less the views of thepolitical and ruling classes in the North today, a group for whom anytalk of alternatives to the "free market" (code name for "freedom forcapital") today is increasingly regarded as foolish, and, in the U.S., aspotentially subversive of "national security." — James O'Connor

II.

Reading the article written by Jeffrey Sachs, titled "The Limits ofConvergence: Nature, Nurture and Growth," is a painful experience. Itis painful in the sense that it forces me to accept some of his argumentseven as I find unacceptable the general logic of his discourse. For one, Iagree that there are certain limits to growth which are based on bio-physical and geographical parameters. I also agree that patterns ofgrowth are influenced by initial conditions, physical geography,government policy, and demographic change, as he claims.

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What I find unacceptable is Sachs9 lack of recognition of theenvironment as an arena for the manifestation of outcomes ofdevelopment and maldevelopment, instead of being just a factor whichlimits or influences development, Sachs' discourse is silent on theenvironmental impacts of economic growth and the debilitatingimplications of altered bio-physical landscapes on the socio-culturallifescapes of people in those areas which he refers to as "laggardregions," Sachs is not concerned about the environmental costs of whathe celebrates as good models for growth» For him, these models willhave to be molded in the cast of global capitalism informed by a deepsense of recognition of open, rule-based systems. It is apparent thatSachs9 notion of the bio-physical environment is a unilinear one; it ismerely a domain of factors of production (as, for example, the source ofraw materials) or as an array of factors that restrain growth (forexample, tropical climate as a limit to productivity). He fails torecognize that in most of the South, the environment is a victim of thesame global capitalism that he prescribes. Forests in the interiors ofAfrica, Asia, and Latin America are ravaged by the onslaught ofglobalization, benefiting the more fortunate and geographically endowedeconomies not only outside these areas but also in the wealthy enclaveswithin these economies. The aftermath of this plunder feeds back intopolitical and economic systems and manifests itself in the form ofproductivity constraints. Sachs9 deterministic view of economic growthrestrains the emergence in his discourse of a dynamic andoverdetermined interaction between the environment and development,between ecology and economics. As such, his thesis fails toaccommodate the concept of sustainable development. Despite hiscaution in some places in his text, he remains not only an economicreductionist but also an environmental determinist.

The bio-physical configurations of location, terrain, climate andgeography may indeed serve as limiting factors for the economic growthof much of Africa and the interiors of Asia and Latin America.However, the empirical evidence claimed by Sachs in Ms paper, thoughconvincing in its mathematical and economic rigor, is tragically one-sided and ecologically blind. It fails to consider two glaring realities:first, the economic poverty that resides in the interiors of the Amazon,Africa and Asia is matched by an ecological wealth seen in the richnessof their biodiversity; and, second, this wealth is now being eroded bythe very same globalization which Sachs celebrates. It is ironic thatwhile the tropical areas face the prospect of high labor morbidity due tothe high prevalence of tropical diseases, they also serve as the favoritehunting ground for the bio-prospecting ventures of the pharmaceutical

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companies in search of the ultimate cures for the diseases of modernityplaguing societies that are well-endowed with the "right" governmentpolicies and economically advantageous geographical configurations.

Sachs argues that tropical development is practically impossible iftropical states pursue agriculture as a starting point. He then boldlyprescribes an economy driven by the service and manufacturing sectors.He also posits that instead of tropical agriculture feeding the temperateareas, temperate agriculture will eventually feed the tropical areas. Hepraises the shift from crop agriculture to palm oil plantation agriculturein Malaysia, and celebrates the realistic foreign exchange rates inSoutheast Asia and the stable economy of Thailand. But recent eventsin the region put Sachs' arguments in a bind. The "realistic exchangerates" of Southeast Asia went haywire when the supposedly "stableeconomy" of Thailand turned out to be a bubble. The model of shiftingfrom agronomic and horticultural crops to plantation agriculture inMalaysia was copied with impunity in Indonesia, whose agriculturalpolicy led to the unbridled opening of forest lands by deliberate burning,which eventually caused the massive forest fires in Sumatra andKalimantan that today cover much of Southeast Asia. The pollutioncoming from the haze, according to experts, will cause untold healthrisks which may lead to the high prevalence of labor morbidity, even ingeographically endowed, tropical-disease free Singapore.

What makes me uncomfortable about Sachs' prescription for an"open, rule-based" global capitalist system based on "shared principlesthat cover nearly the whole earth" in dealing with the "laggard regions"with their "acute and unresolved problems of tropical development" issimply this: Who will set the rules and how will these beimplemented? The political economy of globalization, whether marketor statist in orientation, is hardly driven by philanthropy or thegoodness of the hearts of finance capitalists, investors, and politicalelites. Sachs' discourse fails to establish the connection between growthin the politically and geographically fortunate areas and economicretardation in the "laggard regions," and the political dynamics whichattend such connections. This is uncharacteristic of a treatise thatprescribes a global economic system, one which recent events haveshown to be so linked that investor behavior in Hong Kong easilycauses a domino effect influencing behavior in almost all major stockmarkets from Tokyo to New York.

More importantly, he also fails to take into account other variablesin human existence, such as world-view, religion, culture, and the desirefor autonomy of "being," either as individuals or as communities.Ultimately, this is the bottom line of my discomfort. After all is said

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and done, I will never be comfortable with a thesis that puts mysituation and of others like me in a "box," labels it as "laggard,"perorates on the geographical misfortunes I am supposed to have beencursed with, and, like a typical colonizer, prescribes an outsider-constructed model as my way to salvation. As a person from the South,I feel objectified and disempowered by this discourse. — AntonioContreras

The fact that, as Sachs says, a global capitalist system covers theworld for the first time in history does not mean that the fates ofdifferent strata of humankind within it are similar or even convergent,this latter forecast purportedly justifying Sachs9 optimism. Sachsbelieves that a few elements of geographical determinism are crucial inexplaining history, and that the workings of the market, both worldwideand within nations ("an open society") are the best tools for correctingimbalances, both nature — and society — generated. I will rely onhealth and nutrition data and try to prove that both Sachs9 optimism andthe remedies he proposes are not justified, and that many of the latterare even harmful ("iatrogenic," as physicians would say).

Although health — as measured by fairly solid data on mortality,by sketchy data on morbidity and by unreliable data on nutrition —appears to be by far the best in "homo sapien" history, manydiscrepancies appear in the Sachs explanatory model. Sachs implicitlypostulates that commodity wealth is associated with good healthindicators, i.e., that as wealth (measured by GDP) rises, healthimproves. Not so. Countries with a weak state and little or no stateplanning (as contrasted with the detailed planning of capitalistenterprises) and reliance on market mechanisms, in fact, cut a poorfigure when it comes to health indicators, despite high healthexpenditures. The U.S. is the world's outstanding example of this: Ithas the highest health expenditures (both per capita and as a percentageof GDP) in the world, yet a mediocre place in the ranking of healthindicators. In countries with a stronger state and a weaker market, theexpenditures/health results ratio comes out better, e.g., Canadacompared with the U.S. and continental Western Europe with respect toCanada. Cuba, which probably represents much of what Sachsabominates in terms of societal models, whose per capita healthexpenditures are perhaps one-twentieth of those of the U.S., has healthindicators which are similar to those in the U.S. Then there is the case

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of the former USSR, which went from a situation of deterioratinghealth conditions in the final Communist years to the current debacle(in the long-run we are all dead but some of us die earlier as a result ofthe application of Sachs' remedies). Argentina has the highest per capitahealth expenditures in Latin America and is being hailed as a goodpractitioner of IMF and World Bank policies. Yet, in relative terms, itshealth indicators are losing ground to poorer countries that rely more onpreventive medicine and put more controls on the operation of themarket in the health area.

Sachs does not mention the health and ecological iatrogenicoutcomes of globalization. The consumption of some commoditiespromotes health (improved housing and communications, for example);some are dubious (exposure to the media, to small doses of certain softdrugs); some are actively harmful to health, and would call for a muchgreater state intervention, which would, in Sachs' terms, make societiesless "open." Among these: consumption of cigarettes which is nowgreatly increasing worldwide, and creating epidemics of certain diseases,the most important, but by no means the only one, being lung cancer;the "automobilization of the world," with more accidents and variousdiseases which result from air pollution; the "emerging diseases" whichare caused, at least in part, by the invasion of new ecological niches andby planetary warming; of new diets which are harmful for the geneticmakeup of "homo sapiens" (in general, most of the products of the fastfood industry); the increased malnutrition which results from anincreased commodification of more expensive types of foods; theintroduction in the biosphere of new Pharmaceuticals with little or nopharmacological justification, and of new chemicals which areinsufficiently tested; and the absolute increase in the number of poor(and sometimes also of the relative number), especially in thosecountries which have followed Sachs' recipes most closely. The currentincreases of the rates of tuberculosis and malaria have been linked tothis. In more general ecological terms, many of the harmful byproductsof the societies which Sachs advocates do not make their appearance inthe extremely brief time perspective which glorified public accountantstake into account, but in the timespan which has to consider thesurvival of "homo sapiens" as a species: damage to the ozone layer, tobiodiversity, global warming, and business induced geneticmanipulations.

So much for health and ecology. Using Sachs' historicalperiodization and some of the variables he finds relevant, a temperatezone having a close access to navigable water among many otherelements (e.g., a militant religion and an early respect for profit)

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obtained an early lead by Invading the rest of the world and shaping itfor its purposes. The basic tools they used were a cohesive society,superior technologies, and (inadvertently) the microorganisms whichthey carried with them as stowaways. Plunder and slavery allowed themto prosper even more, and attempts to break away from the world theyhad fashioned were ruthlessly and In general successfully prevented.Even the attempts of Isolated countries to achieve relative independencethrough democratic means were crushed (in Latin America since 1950:Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua). The Chinese attempt to secedesucceeded In 1949, paradoxically providing the basis for a society whichSachs praises today. (Moral: if you wish to be applauded by Sachs5

disciples in 40 years5 time, carry out a Communist revolution now.)The "successful" countries' latest problem Is a surplus of capital and adecrease in profits which they have so far succeeded In transferring tothe "unsuccessful" ones via foreign debt.

Let Sachs ponder the following fact, which challenges certain typesof geographical determinism, at least in the health and nutrition areas:the greatest mortality, morbidity and nutrition differential in theWestern Hemisphere lies In the 50-mile width of the WindwardPassage, separating eastern Cuba from northwestern Haiti, countries asgeographically similar and politically different as it is possible to find.— José Carlos Escudero

IV.

Trying to prove the ideological claim that capitalism is the be-alland end-all of economic systems, Jeffery Sachs makes a lot of crudegeneralizations, defends a version of geographical determinism, andpromotes a biased and "subjective" way of thinking about the causes ofeconomic wealth and poverty. He reintroduces a type of Malthusianismto explain the relationship between development and demographicgrowth and, despite his strictures against geographical determinism,introduces geographic factors such as location and climate to explainpoverty and underdevelopment in tropical countries»

Sachs ignores the impact that a diversity of natures and nurtureshave on trends of economic growth. Although he attempts to generalizehis theses to all poor countries, particularly tropical countries, hefocuses mainly on Asia and Africa, practically ignoring Latin Americaand the Caribbean. He also neglects Amazonia, a large part of which istropical rain forest within the borders of diverse countries such as

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Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. I wonder if this neglect is due to thefact that its inclusion would contradict his main thesis.

Gross generalizations such as "...other things being equal, poorercountries tend to grow faster than richer ones" are a statistical illusion.Any statistician knows that the smaller the starting base number, thegreater the effects of change, measured in percentage terms. More, Sachsdoes not recognize the fact that it is more difficult for a large countrysuch as Brazil (with significant tropical climates) to achieve economicdevelopment than for a small one which, as in the cases of the majorityof countries he mentions, have received significant financial help fromthe U. S. in order to become showcases for capitalism (especiallyimportant in the Cold War era). In Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, forexample, the U.S. invested heavily to showcase capitalism.

The role played by the market in the production of economic andsocial inequality, particularly the role of international trade, isdisregarded by Sachs. His suggestion that the existence of openeconomic policies explains the success of industrialized economies cannot be sustained. Otherwise, the GATT would not face such strongopposition from the European Community and the U.S. would cease toestablish economic barriers and advantageous treaties to protect its owneconomy.

One of Sachs' biased arguments is the deterministic and"subjective" interpretation of the favorable and unfavorable factors thatexplain economic development. The author implies that a temperateclimate is better for development than a tropic one. It seems obviousthat a tropical climate is not the best climate for capitalist agriculture,but it could be favorable for tourism, for example. Also, consider theexisting association between tropical rain forests and biodiversity. Ifbiodiversity is expected to play an important environmental andeconomic role for sustainable development, why does the author stresssoil quality (for example) only from the standpoint of present-dayproductivity? Why doesn't he also focus on the future economicpotential of tropical habitats, for bioengineering and for green industrygenerally? In contrast to the discursive role that internationaldevelopment agencies assign biodoversity and environmental factors forsustainable development, Sachs addresses only economic-productivefactors, strictly defined. The reason must be that the core of his analysisis traditional economic growth and not sustainable development. Also,if we assume that tropical rain forests have potential economic valuebecause of their environmental characteristics, the kind of approach thatSachs takes necessarily leaves out, for example, the developmentdilemma that might face tropical countries when deciding between

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expanding their agricultural frontier versus preserving their forests.Further, the role of appropriate technologies in increasing agriculturalproductivity, and the lack of interest in industrial countries in helpingto create these technologies, is (intentionally?) left out by Sachs,

When we focus on tropical Latin America, the set of conditions forcoping with development and globalization are very diverse, and manyof them do not fit Sachs9 scheme. Let's focus on Venezuela, which is atropical, coastal, non-agricultural capitalist oil economy, with a highpopulation growth rate and almost a million square kilometers ofterritory. As in many of the large tropical countries of Latin America,given Venezuela's low population density, its current problem is notarable land, but rather land distribution and land tenure. A smallminority owns the majority of the arable land. On the other hand, ascontrasted with other large tropical countries of the region, what does itmatter that Venezuela has poor soils if its main source of income isnon-agricultural?

To summarize some of Venzuela's favorable relevant features fordevelopment: It is not a poor country since it has a lot of naturalresources; it is not an agricultural economy and does not depend onagriculture for development; it is a large coastal country (more that2,000 kilometers of coast); it has a very low population density; it is acapitalistic economy that has adopted strong economic neoliberalpolicies during the last five years. From the above characterization, thequestion is why Venezuela seems to have so many favorable factors fordevelopment, yet has a zero or negative rate of economic growth for thelast five years? Moreover, after several years of popular protest,Venezuela finally signed an agreement with the IMF and thegovernment took control of the economy and imposed drastic neoliberaleconomic policies. Those policies increased poverty and stimulatedsevere socio-political conflicts instead of contributing to politicalstability, social equity and development. Should we agree with Sachs,then, that the cause for Venezuela's lack of development is its locationin the tropics or is it because its rate of population growth is still high(although declining)? Or is it because endemic tropical diseases havereappeared?

The affirmation that "plagues and infectious diseases" will continuein the tropics and hinder development underestimates the role oftechnology and socioeconomic factors and forgets that many of thosediseases are not only due to geography but to lack of development. Forinstance, in Venezuela, diseases considered as endemic in the tropicssuch as malaria and yellow fever were kept in control during the 1960s

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and 1970s through effective medical campaigns. With the deteriorationof the economy in the 1990s, they have reappeared.

What I gather from Sachs' article is the opposite of what he wantsto prove: I conclude that within capitalism it is impossible to achieveconvergence between poor and rich countries and that the reasons havemore to do with political economy than with geography ordemography. In Sachs' article, there is no hope for tropical countries.The only role left to them is to act as a sort of "reserve trained laborarmy" to most advanced capitalist countries, foreseeing the "migrationof great flows of migrants" to the industrial countries as the ultimatedisaster. He uses deterministic and biased arguments to justify theincreasing gap between the rich and the poor countries and leaves outthe relevance of such external factors and issues of equity such as theunfair external debt and the unequal economic trading conditionsdenounced by the Economic Commission for Latin America in itsreport, "Development with Equity."

Unfortunately, the fact that Sach is a professor of InternationalTrade at Harvard University and the director of the Harvard Institute forInternational Development makes his pseudo-scientific arguments moreappealing to decision-makers involved in designing internationalpolicies for development, globalization, poverty and development. —María Pilar García

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