Policy Review

October 2009

The paper is published with the financial support of the Think Tank Fund of the Open Society Institue-Budapest. The opinionsit contains are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of the OSI TTF.1 By Javakheti we mean the part of Samtskhe-Javakheti region which includes the municipalities of Aspindza, Akhalkalaki andNinotsminda. In the latter two, citizens of Armenian ethnicity make up over 95% of the local population. A total of 210,000people live in Samtskhe-Javakheti, out of which 54.5% are Armenians, 43% – Georgians. The region is also home to smallcommunities of Russians, Ossetians, Greek and Ukrainians: http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti (28.02.2009)

Javakheti One Year after the August War

A r c h i l A b a s h i d z eAssistant Professor, Ilia Chavchavadze State University

Executive Summary

Because of its ethnic composition, Javakheti1 is often considered a politi-cally problematic region for Georgia. This situation is aggravated by se-vere social and economical conditions arising from the relatively harsh cli-mate (cold winters) and economic underdevelopment which dates back tothe Soviet period.

After the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the region once again be-came the focus of political speculation. It was openly said in newspapers andpublic speeches of some politicians that there are anti-Georgian forces in theregion seeking exploit existing problems in order to harm Georgian interests.

The present political analysis focuses on problem areas which were presentin the region long before the 2008 war, including issues relating to the law-enforcement and judiciary systems; employment and migration; disputedchurches and the repatriation of Muslim Meskhetians.

The analysis reveals that despite achievements in some areas, the majorityof problems persist. The paper concludes with recommendations for thecentral and local authorities, and NGOs and international agencies work-ing in the region.

ContentExecutive Summary• Problem descrip-

tion and perti-nence

• Methodology• Javakheti during

the August war• Problems of the

region• Conclusion and

Recommenda-tions

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Problem description and pertinenceSince the August war, the issue of Javakhetihas been regularly covered in the Georgianpress. For instance, in January 2009 the Versianewspaper reported that Russia was encour-aging the Armenian government to becomemore active in Javakheti. According to Versia,Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin dis-cussed a potential Georgian-Armenian armedconflict with the presidents of Armenia andAzerbaijan while hosting them in Kremlin.The newspaper said that Yerevan refused,though it questioned how long Armenia wouldbe able to resist the pressure from Moscow.2

Versia also cited Russian and Azerbaijani outletsas saying that Russia supplied Armenia with armsin December 2008. In newspaper interviews,Georgian military experts presumed that thesearms may be intended for another anticipatedconflict. According to them, there is informationthat the Russian defence minister assured hisAzerbaijani colleague that weapons will not beused against Azerbaijan and that they were givento Armenia for a different purpose.3

In January 2008, the 24 Saati newspaperpublished an article by local analyst AndroBarnov based on a study4 conducted by theCenter for Strategy and Development. Ac-cording to the article, Russia tries to thwartNATO’s efforts to gain a foothold in theCaucasus and to this end will try to fullycontrol Georgia and Armenia by any meansand isolate Azerbaijan from Turkey. Russia

will try to settle the Karabakh conflict andinstead stoke conflict in Javakheti. This willseriously endanger the Baku-Ceyhan pipelineand other regional projects.5

Javakheti is considered by many to be aweak point of the Georgian state, where thechances of another Russian strike are high.The question is: will this region, with itssevere political, economic and social prob-lems, become an Achilles’ heel of the Geor-gian state in the wake of the 2008 war? Butthe present analysis doesn’t aim at assessingoutside threats. The objective is to evaluatethe status of traditional problems in the re-gion based on the trends that have takenshape after the 2008 war.

One of the indirect consequences of the 2008war was the warming of Turkish-Armenianrelations. Although what will result from thisprocess is still unclear, it may have conse-quences for the Javakheti region. If theTurkish-Armenian border is opened, negativeeffects may include the weakening ofGeorgia’s transit function, directly influenc-ing the Javakheti region, e.g. the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway project. Inaddition, the government of Armenia maybecome more active in discussing the prob-lems of the people of Javakheti; for instance,Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan made astatement that he would support grantingArmenian the status of official regional lan-guage in Javakheti.6 On the other hand, the

2 „Putin offers Armenia to start war against Georgia“, Versia, January 28-29, 2009, Agency Medianews. Newspaper KvirisPalitra published a comprehensive article on the same topic on November 9, 2009. Also, see Caucasian Integration, LiberalSeptember 9, 2009.3 „Putin offers Armenia to start war against Georgia“, Versia, January 28-29, 2009, Agency Medianews.4 Full text of the study: http://stand.ge/?page=11&lang=geo&content=1485 Andro Barnov, “Caucasian Geo-politics and Geo-strategy”, 24 Saati, January 17, 2009.6 Sargsyan made this statement during a meeting with Armenian diplomats on September 1, 2009 – see Armenian presidentspeaks about the need of Armenian as regional language, http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=21721&search=javakheti.

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Javakheti One Year after the August War

fears Javakhetians have long had about Tur-key will probably decrease.

MethodologyThe present study used materials about theJavakheti region published in print and elec-tronic media and the materials provided bythe regional partners of the Caucasus Insti-tute for Peace, Democracy and Development.On June 15, 2009, CIPDD hosted a roundtable where invited experts and civil societyrepresentatives shared their views regardingthe issues discussed in the present analysis.The present study includes views expressedduring the round table event.

Javakheti during the August warThe August war horrified Javakheti societyas much as that of all other Georgian re-gions: everybody’s concern was “Russianaggression”. Despite the fact that the ma-jority of the population condemned Russia’sinvasion, there was disagreement over thecauses of the war. It must be noted thatthis disagreement led to tension betweencitizens of Armenian and Georgian origin.Presumably the reason for this was that themain sources of information for the non-Georgian population were Russian televi-sion channels and internet sites. Consider-ing that before and during the August warthese media channels maintained aggressiveand targeted anti-Georgian propaganda, itis clear how the opinion of the local popu-lation was formed regarding the ongoingsituation. In addition, Georgian TV newswere broadcast on local channels only dur-ing evenings (after the war one of the TVchannels resumed broadcasting only on Au-gust 12), and telephone communication waslimited due to overload.

It should be pointed out that the Russianpropaganda was partly effective: the Rus-sian view of the conflict instilled the fearamong the Armenian population that nexttarget of the Georgian administration wouldbe their region. However, there was another

opinion, according to which Russia wasnamed as reason of war, and the Georgiangovernment was only responding to provo-cation. Many saw the war as an expressionof the global antagonism between Washing-ton and Moscow.

When Russian air forces started attackingand bombing residential buildings, the fearemerged among the Javakheti population thatRussians would launch airstrikes on theclosed Russian military base in Akhalkalaki.Many fled to villages, some left for Arme-nia. The panic was aggravated by misinfor-mation spread by electronic media that Ar-menian youth were forcibly and hastily (atnight) conscripted into the Georgian armedforces and that Georgian-Armenian borderwas closed to young men. Rumors spreadthat Russia was going to deploy its forcesfrom its base in Gyumri, Armenia and opena third front. In fact, Russian helicopterswhich entered from Armenia did fly overthe region several times. Another rumor wasspread that Russian politicians had said onTV that Russian military forces would do noharm to Javakheti population. This createdsome tension between the local Armenian- andGeorgian-speaking populations. Later, localauthorities and state agencies assured thepopulation that the spread of Russian aggres-sion to the region was unlikely.

War-induced emotions declined after FrenchPresident Nicolas Sarkozy and his Russiancounterpart Dmitriy Medvedev concluded acease-fire agreement on August 12, yet dis-cussion resumed, albeit quietly, after Russiarecognized the independence of Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia on August 26. Russia’s disre-gard for the international community andrecognized norms was viewed in theCaucasus as a show of force and a “lessongiven” to the West.

One of the indirect consequences of the 2008war was the warming of Turkish-Armenianrelations. Although what will result from thisprocess is still unclear, it may have consequencesfor the Javakheti region.

Population of Samtskhe-Javakheti is 210, 000, of which 54.5 % are ethnic Armenians, 43 % –Georgians. In the region there are also living small communities of Russians, Ossetians, Greeks andUkrainians.Source: http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti

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Problems of the regionSince 2004 there have been many improve-ments in the Javakheti region: roads arebeing renovated, natural gas distributionnetworks are being built for the first time,and an important rail link is under construc-tion. However, there are many different andlong-established problems. The problem ar-eas that bother local communities the mostare grouped and reviewed below. It shouldbe mentioned that majority of these prob-lems are not linked to the August 2008 war.

a) Work of law-enforcement and judicialsystems

Certain distrust towards the law-enforcementand judicial systems arose among theregion’s ethnic Armenian population afterseveral civil activists were detained. In Janu-ary 2009 Gregory Minasyan, director of anAkhaltsikhe youth center and SargisHakobjanyan, chairman of the CharlesAznavour Society, were detained. Both wereaccused of spying and forming illegal armedgroups7 . The arrests sparked protests not onlyamong the local Armenian community, butalso among the Armenian Diaspora of vari-ous countries. The form of arrests causedthe most public outrage: law-enforcementexecutives arrested Minasyan at the youthcenter, during a class, and Hakobjanyan was

arrested at a local cemetery, during a fu-neral. The next day, locals, mainly youngpeople, held a small protest rally, thoughmost Javakhetians chose to wait for the trial.

The local community reviewed differentversions regarding the reasons for the ar-rest of Minasyan and Hakobjanyan. Somelinked it to their active involvement in thecampaign surrounding disputed churches.Others expressed the opinion that the ar-rests were used by the central Georgiangovernment to divert attention from thesevere economic and social problems to the“traditional problem” of Javakheti– thedemand for autonomy.

Public opinion linked the arrests of Minasyanand Hakobjanyan with the resonant arrestsof Gurgen Shirinyan (member of the Javakhkorganization) and Vaagn Chakhalyan (of theAkhalkalaki Youth Organization) in July2008. These persons have been accused oforganizing an explosion near the house ofthe chief of Akhalkalaki police and laterarrested on charges of illegal acquisition andpossession of weapons. Chakhalyan’s trialwas accompanied by an active informationcampaign, with the participation of nation-alist organizations from Armenia and theDiaspora.

The local community attributed the arrestsof Shirinyan and Chakhalyan to an allegedconflict between the local chief of police,Samvel Petrosyan, and the detainees, andwas largely distrustful towards the role oflaw-enforcement and the judicial systemwith regard to the matter. In January 2009Chakhalyan made an official statement inwhich he spoke about the violation of hisrights by the court and political persecu-tion. In particular, he said the Ministry ofJustice refused to register his French law-yer and that inadequate translation wasprovided by the court. The human rightsombudsman reacted to the matter and inhis statement drew attention to the prob-lems posed to the French attorney.8 In April2009 Chakhalyan was sentenced to 10 yearsin prison.

It should be pointed out that the Russianpropaganda was partly effective: the Russian

view of the conflict instilled the fear among theArmenian population that next target of the

Georgian administration would be their region.However, there was another opinion, according

to which Russia was deemd responsible for thewar, and the Georgian government was only

responding to provocation. Many saw the war asan expression of the global antagonism between

Washington and Moscow.

The problem areas that bother localcommunities the most are not linked to the

August 2008 war.

7 In March 2009 the detainees were released from custody with one year conditional sentence and on the security of GEL2,000. Georgian Pirveli information agency http://pirweli.com.ge/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20670&Itemid=528 For details, see statement of the human rights ombdusman of Georgia: http://www.ombudsman.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=979

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Javakheti One Year after the August War

b) Disputed churches

The issue of disputed churches in Georgianterritory is an especially sensitive one inrelations between the Georgian OrthodoxPatriarchate and the Armenian ApostolicChurch and has an added political dimen-sion.9 Armenian print media frequently coverthe issue by highlighting what they call themisappropriation of Armenian churches byGeorgia as an illustrative example of op-pression of Armenian community and cul-ture in Georgia. Armenia openly demandsthat the Norashen church in Tbilisi and theSurbnishan church in Akhaltsikhe be handedover to the Armenian Chuch. Disputedchurches are property of the Georgian state.However, because of the particular sensitiv-ity of the issue, the government of Georgiaavoids solving the problem without the con-sent of the the Georgian Orthodox Church.

The disputed churches, as a result of certainincidents, periodically come to the public’sattention. One significant occurence took placein December 2008 during the visit of Arme-nian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan to Geor-gia. Together with several Georgian officials,Sargsyan and the Armenian delegation entered

Norashen, which is non-operational and lockedshut. This incident provoked outrage in na-tionalist media outlets in both Georgia andArmenia. Some stated that Georgian and Ar-menian officials “broke into” the church and“broke open its doors”. One Georgian news-paper published an article according to whichafter the August war Armenia has becomeespecially active and is seeking to exploitGeorgia’s difficulties in order to settle churchdisputes in its favor10 . Georgian opposition MPJondi Bagaturia demanded the resignation andtrial of Environment Minister Goga Khachidzeand Minister of State for Diaspora Issues IulonGagoshidze over the “break-in” at the church.11

The head of the Georgian Church, PatriarchIlia II, proposed an initiative to create anArmenian-Georgian committee on disputedchurches. The prime ministers of both coun-tries approved the initiative, though somegroups in Javakheti said this was an effortto stall a resolution.

Source: Samtskhe-Javakheti Regional Development Agency, http://sjrda.org/eng/

The issue of disputed churches in Georgianterritory is an especially sensitive one inrelations between the Georgian OrthodoxPatriarchate and the Armenian Apostolic Churchand has an added political dimension

9 “The issue of so-called disputed religious buildings is a significant one, and concerns the return of not only Armenian, butalso Catholic, Muslim and Jewish properties” – Report of the Georgian Human Rights Ombudsman on state of human rightsin Georgia, 2008, II half, http://www.ombudsman.ge/uploads/reports/saxalxo_damcvelis_angarishi__2008_ii__naxevari.pdf10 Sakartvelos Respublika newspaper December 17, 2008 http://www.opentext.org.ge/08/sakartvelos-respublika/235/235-18.htm11 Akhali Taoba newspaper January 13, 2009.

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c) Employment and Migration

Unemployment is a severe problem in theregion. Since the Soviet period, much ofthe population has been engaged in sea-sonal migration, seeking work mainly inRussia. According to a local newspaper,every year approximately 20,000 residentsseek seasonal jobs in Russia and Arme-nia, and during 1990-2008 a sum total ofup to 100,000 people migrated to otherregions of Georgia and foreign coun-tries.12 The region is not threatened withdepopulation, however, as birth rates arehigh locally.

The recent extreme deterioration of Geor-gian-Russian relations has made it difficultfor Georgian citizens to move to Russia. Asa result, many Javakhetians decided to ob-tain Armenian citizenship and seek Russianvisas with their Armenian passports (thoughquantitative data on this matter are contra-dictory and inaccurate). Armenia accepts dualcitizenship, though many Javakhetians areunaware that after acquiring Armenian citi-zenship they lose Georgian citizenship andmaintain only the right to live in Georgia. Itis expected that this may cause severe ten-sions in future.

After the withdrawal of the Russian militarybase in Akhalkalaki in 2007, the main con-sumer of local products, potatoes, was gone(the base consumed ca. 500 tons per year).13

There are no prospects for this demand tobe replaced. Ongoing large-scale projects inthe region partly help in solving the prob-lem of employment, though they are also asource of disappointment and new protests,as project implementors often prefer to bringtheir own workers instead of employing lo-cals. Despite the ongoing gasification androad rehabilitation programs, which are verypopular, the population is still disappointed,because they are not involved in thoseprojects.

The issue of employment is directly con-nected to the qualification of the localworkforce, which is less competitive in alabor market created by international projects.This situation has served to highlight thelack of professional education in the region.

The economic development of the regionand solving of the problem of unemploy-ment is closely connected to the region’sinvolvement in important transit projects.Particularly important is the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku railway project,

Source: Samtskhe-Javakheti Regional Development Agency, http://sjrda.org/eng/regional-plan/

12 Akunk newspaper, January 2009.13 In connection to the issue, see the article “Harvest is in storage, the population – in debt” in the local Samkhretis Karibchenewspaper, http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti

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Javakheti One Year after the August War

which was inaugurated on July 23, 2008 inKars. According to the plan, the project willbe finished in 2009 and trains will startrunning from 2010. Construction was tem-porarily halted during the August war.14

This project will create new economic op-portunities for the local community, thoughlocal attitudes towards this project are di-vided. New prospects of economic devel-opment create positive views among people,but some think that the railway is purely amilitary and political project that seeks toisolate Armenia. Some fear that there is apossibility of introducing additional Geor-gian military forces under the pretence ofprotecting the new railway; others fear thatTurkish and Azerbaijani employers will ig-nore the local Armenian workforce andbring in “their own people”.

Additional questions have arisen with regardto the project since prospects of a warmingof Turkish-Armenian relations emerged. How-ever, experts say that since the matter isextremely delicate and will likely take a longtime to resolve, it is doubtful that it canpose any serious threat to the railwayproject.15 On the contrary, this developmenthas diminished the “anti-Armenian” imageof the project.

d) Education

Most problems in the field of education arerelated to the lack of knowledge of the statelanguage among locals. This is one of thebiggest barriers to civil integration. The non-Georgian population is cut-off from country’spublic life. The majority of Armenian youthcite their lack of knowledge of Georgianwhen they refuse to join the military.16

Even though the state and international or-ganizations focused attention on this prob-lem long ago, progress towards its resolu-tion has been very slow. Despite some ac-tions by the Ministry of Education and Sci-ence (e.g. development of new methodologyand handbooks for teaching Georgian lan-guage designed especially for minorities),

secondary/high schools cannot provide in-struction of the Georgian language at thenecessary level. Consequently, graduates fromArmenian- and Russian-language schools donot possess the minimum required level ofGeorgian language knowledge. PeriodicallyGeorgian and international organizations or-ganize Georgian language learning coursesfor adults, though these programs are notregularly provided and cannot ensure a break-through. The Ministry of Education andScience is trying to reach better resultsthrough introducing bilingual methodology,though due to the lack of resources this onlytakes place in several schools of the region.

Another significant problem is the weakmotivation for learning Georgian among thelocal population. Akhalkalaki andNinotsminda Districts form what is essen-tially an Armenian-speaking language envi-ronment where local Georgians are also flu-ent in Armenian. On the other hand, be-cause the Russian military base was thecenterpiece of the local economy for yearsand the majority of population is engagedin seasonal migration to Russia, the Russianlanguage is also traditionally strong. Themajority of local population do not see areal need to study Georgian, and the strength-ening of state efforts in this direction areperceived as a step towards assimilation.However, in recent years, as the strengthen-ing of Georgian state becomes apparent, therehave been signs that more people recognizethat knowledge of Georgian language im-proves chances for success in social andeconomic life, and thus there is an increasedinterest in studying Georgian.

Many Javakhetians are unaware that afteracquiring Armenian citizenship they loseGeorgian citizenship and maintain only the rightto live in Georgia. It is expected that this willcause severe tensions in future.

The issue of employment is directly connected tothe qualification of the local workforce, which isless competitive in a labor market created byinternational projects.

14 Versia newspaper, August 20-21, 2008.15 Akhali Taoba newspaper, September 8, 2008.16 For details see the article “Conscription under way” in Samkhretis Karibche newspaper, http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti

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Language is also a problem in terms ofobtaining a higher education. Lack ofknowledge of Georgian leaves practicallyno chances for the youth of the region toenroll in Georgian universities. In 2008heated debates took place (including in par-liament) about whether or not to makeentrance examination in Georgian languageless difficult for non-Georgian applicants.The dominant opinion was that this kindof leniency would further weaken motiva-tion for learning the Georgian languageamong the youth.17 Meanwhile, the stateensures certain measures which makeeasier for minorities to enroll in Georgianuniversities: they are can take the exami-nation in their mother tongue in skills andcertain subjects.

The majority of ethnic Armenian youth nev-ertheless prefer to receive higher educationin Armenia. There is a 70 person quota forstudents from Javakheti at Armenian univer-sities. According to existing data, 186 and314 students from Georgia enrolled inYerevan universities in the years 2004 and

2008, respectively. After graduation manychose to stay and work in Armenia. SomeJavakhetian Armenians view this as part ofan effort to “banish” Armenians from theregion.18

Two Georgian higher education institutionsfunction in Akhalkalaki: Akhalkalaki Col-lege and the Tsodna Institute, which accom-modates ethnic Armenian students as well.Joint study brings Georgian and Armenianyouth closer. Some in the Armenian com-munity are demanding the establishment ofa joint Georgian-Armenian university inAkhalkalaki.

e) Issue of Repatriation of Muslim Meskhetians

The issue of repatriation of MuslimMeskhetians19 , exiled by Stalin to CentralAsia in 1944, is one of most acute prob-lems facing the region. However, it shouldbe mentioned that this problem doesn’t con-cern Javakheti that much, as Muslims wereexiled mainly from nearby Akhaltsikhe andAdigeni Districts (Meskheti) and they seeksettlement exactly in these areas.

In 2008 the Georgian parliament extended thedeadline for submission of requests for repa-triation for Meskhetians until July 1, 2009. Sincethe law “on repatriation of persons forcedlybanished in 1940-1950 from Georgian SSR by

Most problems in the field of education arerelated to the lack of knowledge of the state

language among locals. Even though the stateand international organizations focused attention

on this problem long ago, progress towards itsresolution has been very slow.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kars_Baku_Tbilisi_railway_line

17 “Akhali Taoba”, June 25, 2008.18 ���� ���� �������� ���� ���������� �������� �������������� ����� ������� ��� � ��!��� "##$%&&'''()����(��*+&,-*�./#(�0$�1���234.56-'0782�9:�5;-==?5@��-@+0�#�+�2�19 The name of this ethno-confessional group is itself a sensitive issue and subject of political controversy. The 1944 banishmentwas marked with religious discrimination: among those deported were Muslims of different nationalities. Presently, the majorityof this group identify themselves as Turkish. In research and international materials they are referred as “Meskhetian Turks”,however, there are also some who identify themselves as Georgians.

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Javakheti One Year after the August War

the former USSR” went into effect, 2,00020

requests have been submitted to the repatriationagency, while the number of requests submittedto Consulates in Azerbaijan has reached15,00021 . These are mainly Muslim Meskhetiansliving in Russia and Azerbaijan. According tomost experts, the total number of the membersof this dispersed ethno-confessional group informer Soviet states, Turkey and other coun-tries reaches 300,000. The chairman of the Vatanorganization (the strongest organization, whichdefends rights of Muslim Meskhetians),Suleiman Barbakadze, attributes the lack ofrequests to the lack of information among thegroup. According to him, approximately 90,000Meskhetians in different countries seek repa-triation to Georgia.

Meanwhile, the aforementioned law on repa-triation only enables repatriation without anymaterial assistance or restitution of propertyfor repatriates. Thus, the prospect for theirreturn is closely linked to their capability toobtain needed property for living in Georgia.This in turn decreases the number of thosewith a realistic outlook on repatriation.

Residents of the region are negative towardsthe repatriation process, but recently the levelof concern has decreased. After the law cameinto effect, only a small number of MuslimMeskhetians managed to buy houses andsettle in Georgian villages. This has notcaused an overall increase of tensions in theregion, but there have been conflicts betweenlocal and newly settled young people. Com-munities of certain Georgian and practicallyall Armenian villages are against the repa-triation of Muslim Meskhetians. In thesevillages Meskhetians are denied the right tobuy property and settle.

Repatriates face serious problems in termsof legal status, economic capacity and so-cial and cultural adaptation. For example,

Meskhetians who have returned from Rus-sia are in a very difficult situation: theystill have Russian passports and their vi-sas for legal stay in Georgia have ex-pired. Thus, they are subject to deporta-tion. Many seek seasonal jobs in Turkeyand have to buy visas or pay bribes whencrossing the Georgian border. The major-ity of those deported cannot speak Geor-gian, which seriously hinders their inte-gration into Georgian society. However,their children often study in Georgianschools, which does create better pros-pects for their integration.

Conclusion and RecommendationsThe present study does not aim at assessingand predicting external threats. Whether ornot external forces will try to destabilize theregion depends on the position and actionsof the international community. Therefore, itis more reasonable to address the issue oftraditional problems of the region and di-recting resources and efforts towards theirresolution.

It should be pointed out that recently thestate has intensified its efforts to support thedevelopment of the region.22 Several infra-structure projects are being implemented (e.g.gasification of villages). According to DavidTkeshelashvili, minister of state for regionaldevelopment and infrastructure, plans for2009 include the improvement of the watersupply of Samtskhe-Javakheti, gasification,and improvement of school and kindergarteninfrastructure.23 Also, the region’s local bud-get will be significantly increased.

The issue of repatriation of Muslim Meskhetiansdoesn’t concern Javakheti that much, asMuslims were exiled mainly from nearbyAkhaltsikhe and Adigeni Districts (Meskheti) andthey seek settlement exactly in these areas.

20 „New deadlines are set for submitting applications for Muslim Meskhs”, Civil.ge, 17 July 2009 http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=21531&search=21 http://www.regions.ge/Samtskhe-Javakheti&newsid=60&year=2009&position=news_category22 It should be pointed out that the National Concept on Tolerance and Civil Integration adopted in May 2009 addresses andincludes many of the problem issues discussed above. The action plan defines the particular actions which should be imple-mented by 2014 in the following fields: education and state language, media and access to information, political integration andcivil participation, social and regional integration, culture and preserving ethnic identity.23 The process of gasification has started in Akhaltsikhe. The city will get gas within a month and a half and villages will begradually connected to the system. 32-kilometer pipeline is being built by the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation and “NewEnergy”. Source: http://www.1tv.ge/ReadMore.aspx?LanguageID=1&Location=3929 Source: http://www.1tv.ge/ReadMore.aspx?LanguageID=1&Location=1989 (28.02.2009)

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However, many of actions are spontaneousand uncoordinated. In fact, there is no strat-egy based on complex research and there isa lack of reliable data concerning the re-gion. There are talks about the success ofprojects implemented, but detailed informa-tion regarding these projects is often notaccessible to the public.

Human rights and the transparency of thegovernment remain problematic issues. Ac-cording to existing data, there are more fre-quent cases of short-term detentions underdubious motives of local journalists andmembers of NGOs by the police. Journalistsand NGOs complain about difficulties inobtaining public information.

The lack of sources of information accessibleto minorities is connected with the lack ofknowledge of the Georgian language, as wellas with the deficiency of central and localinformation channels.24 Some important mea-sures have been taken in recent years toaddress the problem,25 though the existenceof free media which would serve as a forumfor discussing local problems is of vital im-portance. Also, it is important improve thequalifications of local journalists.

We base following recommendation on prob-lems and trends discussed above:

Human rights and good governance:• Adequate attention should be paid to the

reported facts of human rights violations;ensure fair and equal realization of basicrights (to central and local governments,NGOs).

• Support integration of the MuslimMeskhetians through information cam-

paigns and improvement of conditionslocally (to local government, internationalorganizations and NGOs).

Realization of economic rights:• Support employment of the local

workforce; commence retraining programs(to central and local governments, inter-national organizations).

• Better inform the population regardingongoing rehabilitation projects and em-ployment options (to local government).

Education, media and cultural rights:• Increase the focus and effectiveness of

Georgian language courses for citizensand for those employed in public service(to central and local governments, inter-national organizations).

• Take measures to raise the qualificationsand motivation of Georgian languageteachers (to central and local govern-ments).

• Increase the volume and diversity of theinformation accessible to the region’spopulation. Namely, central and local TVchannels should increase geographicalcoverage; free media should be developedin the region (to central and local gov-ernments, international organizations andNGOs).

• Provide the public with comprehensiveand unbiased information regarding theproblems of churches and other objectsof cultural heritage trough public discus-sions and information campaigns (toNGOs and media)

24 The present study does not cover the media landscape of the region. Regarding this issue see CIPDD, Georgia’s regionalmedia-map, Tbilisi and newspapers outside the capital, 2007.25 Regions.ge is the first internet resource in Georgia which provides information on events in the various regions of thecountry. Fourteen regions have their own sites which link to the website, including Samtskhe-Javakheti’s Samkhretis Karibcheare already available on the website. Source: http://rustavi2.com/news/news_textg.php?id_news=30446&pg=1&im=main&ct=0&wth=

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Javakheti One Year after the August War

The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) is a public policy think-tank,specializing in the broad area of democracy development. CIPDD was founded in 1992 in Tbilisi,Georgia. It is a non-governmental and not-for-profit organisation. It advocates policy goals such as thedevelopment of a vibrant and diverse civil society, effective and accountable public institutions based onthe rule of law and an integrated political community. CIPDD seeks to contribute to the implementationof these goals through producing relevant and high-quality public policy documents, and encouraging apluralistic and informed public policy debate in Georgia. CIPDD’s expertise is especially strong in thefollowing focal areas: issues related to ethnic and religious minorities, local self-government, civil so-ciety development, media, political parties, civil-military relations and reforms in the security sector.

Address: 72, Tsereteli Ave, 2nd floor0154 Tbilisi, Georgia

Tel: +995 32 35 51 54 Fax: +995 32 35 57 54E-mail: info@cipdd.org

www.cipdd.org

CIPDD’s recent publications

• Assessment of Reform in Education System

• The Reform of the Georgian National Education System and Non-Georgian Schools

• Labour Migration from Georgia and Bilateral Migration Agreements: Needs andProspects

• How Much Has the World Changed? Implications for Georgia's Policies

• Administrative Arrangement of Local Self-Government: Civil Society View

• Georgia’s Forest Sector

• Problems of Pluralism in Georgian Media

• After August 2008: Consequences of the Russian-Georgian War

• Effects/Impacts of Media: Leading Televisions and Election Campaigns in Georgia

• Security Sector Reform in Georgia 2004-2007