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Statistical Analysis of Phished eMail Users, Intercepted by the APWG/CMU Phishing Education Landing Page. Jason Hong, PhD Carnegie Mellon University Wombat Security Technologies May 2010. User Education is Challenging. Users are not motivated to learn about security - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/1
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratoryhttp://cups.cs.cmu.edu
Statistical Analysis of Phished eMail Users, Intercepted by the APWG/CMU Phishing Education Landing PageJason Hong, PhDCarnegie Mellon UniversityWombat Security Technologies
May 2010
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 2
User Education is Challenging Users are not motivated to learn about security Security is a secondary task Difficult to teach people to make right online
trust decision without increasing false positives
“User education is a complete waste of time. It is about as much use as nailing jelly to a wall…. They are not interested…they just want to do their job.”
Martin Overton, IBM security specialist http://news.cnet.com/21007350_361252132.html
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 3
But Actually, Users Are Trainable
Our research demonstrates that users can learn techniques to protect themselves from phishing… if you can get them to pay attention to training
P. Kumaraguru, S. Sheng, A. Acquisti, L. Cranor, and J. Hong. Teaching Johnny Not to Fall for Phish. CyLab Technical Report CMUCyLab07003, 2007.
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 4
How Do We Get People Trained? Solution
– Find “teachable moments”: PhishGuru
– Make training fun: AntiPhishing Phil, AntiPhishing Phyllis
– Use learning science principles
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 5
PhishGuru Embedded Training Send emails that look like a phishing attack If recipient falls for it, show intervention that
teaches what cues to look for in succinct and engaging format
Multiple user studies have demonstrated that this is effective
Delivering same training via direct email is not effective!
Subject: Revision to Your Amazon.com Information
Subject: Revision to Your Amazon.com Information
Please login and enter your information
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 9
APWG Landing Page Taking the “teachable moment” concept
one step further Provide education (instead of 404) when users
click on real phishing links and arrive at real phishing sites that have been taken down
P. Kumaraguru, L. Cranor, and L. Mather. AntiPhishing Landing Page: Turning a 404 into a Teachable Moment for End Users. CEAS 2009. http://www.ceas.cc/papers2009/ceas2009paper37.pdf
http://education.apwg.org/
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 10
How the Landing Page Works Brand owner or phish site takedown provider
identifies phish site ISP or registrar is asked to redirect disabled
phish site to APWG redirect page Consumer receives phishing email and clicks Consumer is shown APWG education message
instead of 404 page– Page available in many languages– Automatic redirect to appropriate language based
on browser language code to happen soon
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 11
APWG Landing Page
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 12
Landing Page Data Collection APWG server logs all requests to landing page
– Time stamp– IP address (to determine country)– Language (will redirect to page in user’s language)
We’ve asked sites to embed info in redirect URL to track how people end up on landing page– Original URL taken down– Brand code (optional)
CMU CUPS Lab and Wombat Security Technologies have been analyzing the data
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 13
Lots of noisy data! 20 months of data (Sept 2008-April 2010) 840K hits on 15,000 unique redirected URLs But this data contains lots of noise
– Brand monitors checking up on sites to make sure they stay down
– Random web crawlers– People testing landing page– Incorrectly redirected sites
We used heuristics to filter out most of the noise
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 14
Filtering Out the Noise We filtered the data set by removing:
– Hits that don’t identify the original phishing site (brand)– Hits that seem to be for testing only
• URLs appearing only once• IPs that hit multiple URLs per day• IPs that hit same URL for more than a month
– Hits from bots (e.g., specific IPs, 'bot', 'plurk', etc)– Hits from wonderdogsoftware (server misconfiguration
that linked to homepage) Filtering not perfect
– Some noise remains– Improperly redirected sites don’t get counted
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 15
Filtered Data 201,084 hits
– estimate of actual would-be phishing victims visiting landing page over 20 month period
1285 unique URLs redirected– Note that this is URLs, not domains
Number of hits per URL varies a lot– URL with most hits after filtering had 17,911 hits– Monthly mean hits per URL typically 100-300– Monthly median hits per URL 2-7
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 16
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 17
Analysis of Time Monitoring time period of each observed URL may
give us insights into length of phishing campaigns Time observed for each URL is number of days
between first observation and last observation Limitations
– Our first observation is time when site was redirected; we don’t know how long it was live before being redirected
– Some URLs are observed across month boundaries– Once browsers start blocking URL we may not have hits– Some redirects are removed after a period of time
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 18
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 19
April 2010Top 20 countries hit landing page United States
11,159 Canada
3,819 United Kingdom
1,790 Netherlands
725 Germany
650 Spain
600 France
470 Japan
452 Australia
449 India
417
Singapore 292
Mexico 238
Egypt 212
NA 184
Russian Federation 184 Austria
174 Sweden
145 China
137 Brazil
126 Norway
101
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 20
Analysis of Brands 7 brands have requested brand codes Only 2 have shown up in logs April 2010 brand data
– Brand 1• Total Hits: 2715• Total unique URLs: 52
– Brand 2• Total Hits: 370• Total unique URLs: 3
We supplied each brand with a report showing list of their URLs and number of hits for each
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 21
Ongoing Work Will soon be posting monthly reports at
http://education.apwg.org/ Redirecting landing page automatically
to show correct language (soon) Encouraging more brands to redirect to
landing page– If you sign up for a brand code we can provide
you with monthly brand reports– [email protected]
Continuing to automate log processing, report generation, report distribution
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 22
For more information
Learn how to participate in the initiative:http://education.apwg.org/
View the landing page: http://education.apwg.org/r/en/
http://wombatsecurity.com
CyLab Usable Privacyand Security Laboratory
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/
CyLab Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory http://cups.cs.cmu.edu 24
Other countries that sometimes make top 20 Italy Romania Czech Republic Finland Ireland India EU Turkey Belgium Switzerland Colombia Israel
Morocco Saudi Arabia Argentina Indonesia Thailand Tunisia Poland Greece Korea Chile Pakistan