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Japanese Energy Policy

IR 739 Dr Hanami

5/19/2008

Robert Silva

Introduction

Abstract

[This paper is about Japanese energy foreign policy. I will begin to look at historical

patterns (theory) of Japanese foreign policy behavior; then determine Japan’s current energy

situation. Second I will be to define Japanese business interactions associated with government

foreign policy; then apply existing theory to determine if Japan is following historical patterns

and which pattern Japan is following ]

The main purpose of the paper is to examine Japanese foreign policy and activities

concerning the oil and the uranium industry. What I hope to derive from the paper is trade

interactions since the cold war is over and the United States is not fighting the communist

menace anymore but is Japan still under influence of the United States foreign policy objectives.

Is the war against communism just transferred from the war against terrorism? Those countries

that are associated with terrorist practices and norms considered states that Japanese should not

do business with. During the cold war, Japan did not assist communist label countries and only

did business with countries that were consider pro liberal practices or anti communist states. Is

Japan still taking foreign policy direction from the United States of America?

The method of the paper is to use existing scholarly articles and books that have already

written about to define historical patterns of Japanese foreign policy behavior and theory. I try to

use as many primary and news sources to gather data about Japanese activity in energy field

which is focused on oil and uranium. The gathering of speech acts and narratives, government

and business documentation and press releases about policy. This is to help discern which

2

direction and possible reasons why they are choosing a certain policy directions and then

compare it to existing theory.

The themes I hope to address with this paper are the interesting interactions that rational

calculations of market activity versus civilization goals of alliances that Japan is associated with.

Is it power seeking, or market rationalization is more important than reaching international

civilization goals, or is it civilization goals more rational and reasonable than the most rationalist

market calculation. The case studies I am looking is the Iranian and Japanese partnership in

regards to oil extraction and refinement and how Japan is integrating into post Soviet bloc

countries such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia because of uranium reserves. How is

Japan dealing with resource scarcity and resource competition while conforming to international

obligation and alliance obligations? These are some of the themes I hope to clarify not directly

but through nuances of Japan’s behavior. Through these cases I hope to discern if Japan is

following historical patterns or branching off on new trajectories.

The outline of the paper, first I will define the theories that have defined past historical

behavioral patterns. Second begin to create ontology of the contemporary Japanese energy needs

and consumption looking at trade partners and countries in the uranium and oil sectors. Third I

will begin to establish ontology about the international energy industry looking at the sectors of

oil and uranium. Within energy sectors I will begin to look at theories of world consumption and

scarcity about each sector. The fourth section of the paper will begin to look at press releases that

define Japanese foreign policy and Japanese behavior in promoting activity in the given sectors

3

of uranium and oil. The last section I will compare data and theory to do analysis to see if

Japanese behavior is following historical patterns.

Theory of Japanese Foreign Policy Behavior

Major theories about Japanese behavior are called Aikido, Gaiatsu, and Multilateralism.

1 Many authors claim that Japan does not really make its own foreign policy but takes its

directives from the United States. In this section I plan on describing some of the theories about

Japanese foreign policy behavior. The first one is called Aikido is about quiet diplomacy the

interactions are low profile and low risk. The characteristics of this theory that the interaction is

flexible the goals are not short term but long term in nature. It is non-aggressive and defensive

in nature focusing more on economic rather than military.2 This allows for changes and actions

not direct related to achieving the goal but it promotes the end goal and not counter-productive.

The second one is called Gaiatsu foreign pressure on Japan. How much influence does

the Japanese government take into account when making foreign policy decisions? Authors like

Michael Green who wrote the book, Japan the Reluctant Realist, that Japan takes foreign policy

direction from the United States. Japanese foreign policy direction has not change but still

focused on the economy since the ending of the cold war. The major concern of Japan is to

ensure it gets the needed resource to promote economic activity and civil order. The world or the

structure of the international system promotes constraints which causes Japanese foreign policy

1 David Potter and Sudi Sueo Japanese Foreign Policy: No longer Reactive? p.3212 Ibid p. 321

4

makers not to make the most rationalist decision according to market forces but rational in

promoting domestic interests or civilization goals. The constraints of the international system

could be regulative rules such as United Nation mandates and other state’s foreign policy, and

security issues. These issues can sometimes redirect foreign policy when it is not the most

rationalist to the goals of Japan, which is the procurement of resources and commodities. Gaiatsu

is external pressures to have Japan to act in coordination to create a circumstance to contain

possible hostile aggressor states. I think this is derived from old cold war policy of containment.

Multilateralism could be gaining consensus and influencing and building international

coalitions in existing international organizations. Seen historically is using the United Nations

and other international groups to act proactively to promote common interest like global

warming issue. The World Trade Organization could another method of multilateral approach to

interaction with the international system and other states. The goal is to discuss in a transparent

forum to build a universal consensus to address international and domestic issues in a proactive

method.

In the book Japanese Trade Policy Formulation, by Chikare Higashi promotes the

Japanese was using its economic influence to assault the America economy.3 This book was

written in 1983. The counter argument is that the Japanese do not pursue leisure in consumption

but redirects consumption into investments for future development.

3 Chikare Higashi, Japanese Trade Policy Formulation, Praegar, p.15

The major underlying concepts in theories of Japanese foreign policy behavior could be

summed up with the terms proactive and reactionary. The basic theory formula is this, If Japan

and the United States disagree and the Japan acts in American interest.4 The second is the null of

the formula, If United States and Japan disagrees and Japan acts in its own interest. The

implications are that Japan needs to define it image of foreign policy separate from its alliance

with the United States. When conflicts arise and Japan does not follow in its interest which could

be rational calculations of the market when it comes to energy commodities and is following the

security interest of the United States. 5 Is Japan a reactionary decision maker or is Japan

proactive which tries to solve problems before they arise, energy policy should promote which

method Japan leans towards more.

Japanese energy situation

Ninety nine point seven percent of Japan’s energy commodities are imports.6 This

invokes many questions about how much energy commodities does Japan need to run its country

and what energy sources are critical and which ones are abundant. I will begin to explain the

basic energy needs of Japan. How I am going to approach this is describe consumption rates

then domestic production. I will be to look at where Japan gets its energy commodities from.

The focus of the paper is about uranium and oil since oil offers political controversy because of

international common problems such as global warming and resource competition because its

scarcity and uranium because of the international security implications when it comes to refining

and transfer of technology.

4 David Potter and Sudi Sueo Japanese Foreign Policy: No longer Reactive? p.3185 David Potter and Sudi Sueo Japanese Foreign Policy: No longer Reactive?p.3196 Leo Lewis, Japan hot with anticipation after extracting Arctic ‘sorbet’ of natural gas April 15 2008 1-All-round Country edition

6

To begin with Japan’s oil situation, Japan is the third largest consumer of oil in the world.

7 Japan consumes 5.4 million barrels of oil a day. It produces 125,700 barrels of oil a day. The

proven reserves of Japan are 59 million barrels of oil.8 This gives Japan estimate of 12 days of

supply if all oil imports stop coming into Japanese ports. Why oil is important to Japanese

economy because of 48% of Japanese energy source comes from oil.9 The need to secure oil

reserves or switch energy sources is vital because of constraints of the international which would

be market prices. Market prices are subject to production rates, and cost of transportation. What

limits production would be sabotage of production facilities and transportation, resource

competition or international restrictions.

Ninety percent of Japanese oil imports come from the Middle East. The rest of the oil

imports are divided throughout the world. The major import suppliers of Japan are Saudi Arabia

with millions of barrels of oil (MB), United Arab Emirates 387 MB, Sudan, Angola 11 MB, Iraq

15 MB, Qatar 151 MB, Iran 176 MB, Russia 11MB, Azerbaijan, 1 MB, Mexico, China,

Indonesia. Japan has diversified its oil extraction but is still focused on the Middle East.

Japanese companies are exploring and finding fresh reserves such INPEX had holding in Iran

and started to create relationships with Azerbaijan. 10 The current scent in the air is for Japan to

its funds and from the Iranian project to developing Iraq oil reserves which Japan receives

7 EIA short term outlook for 20068 These figure are from the EIA and for the year 20069 Hisane MASAKI, Japan Joins the Race for Uranium Amid Global Expansion of Nuclear Power http:// www.japanfocus.org/products/details/162610 Hisane Masaki Oil-hungry Japan looks to other sources http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/IB21Dh02.html

7

approximately 15 million barrels of oil a year.11 The companies that are promoting cooperation

and development of oil importation are Nippon Oil Corporation, Sakhalin project, Exxon Mobil

Corporation.

Japan’s uranium consumption is around 8,000 and 8,500 tons per year.12 Countries that

are major contributors to the Japan’s uranium needs are Canada, Kazakhstan, Australia, USA,

and Niger. Some of the major uranium companies in Japan that are promoting investment in

foreign uranium supplies are Itochu, the Overseas Uranium Resource Development, Sumitomo

and Kansai Electric Power, Tokyo Electric Power and Idemitsu Kosan. 13 Uranium is not

considered a peak fuel because uranium can be extracting out of the ocean and reused and

recycle through special processing.14

International Energy Structure

Oil seems to be the cheapest liquid fuel source and easiest method to promote

development. The question is the infrastructure being built around a technology that is limited by

production rates and finite access to resources to keep infrastructure operating. The need to

define the oil infrastructure is vital because production outputs do affect the speed ability to

create and maintain infrastructure, and promote trade since oil is related to transportation and

transportation is related to trade. Japan began accelerated growth because of the introduction to

11 Ibid. 12 Hisane MASAKI, Japan Joins the Race for Uranium Amid Global Expansion of Nuclear Power http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/162613 Ibíd.14 http://peakoildebunked.blogspot.com/2006/01/207-uranium-from-seawater-part-1.html

8

oil.15 Trade is the key idea that is running the current ideology and practices of the international

trade regime. Development, growth and maintenance of the infrastructure and economy are

based on energy sources that promote transportation, communications, and production. The

table below shows the production rate of oil and rank of countries that produce the most oil. The

table is broken up in rank, overall production rank in the world and how many barrels per day

which is important because it takes some many barrels of oil to keep daily economic activity per

day per state.

Uranium output for the world

Rank 2004 / (billion barrels, 2006) / production 2004 million barrels (mb)16

1. Saudi Arabia 267 billion bb 10.4 mb/d

2. Russia 60 9.3 mb/d

3. USA 21 8.7 mb/d

Crude oil = <5.2 mb/d

4. Iran 132 4.1 mb/d

5. México 13 3.8 mb/d

6. China 8 3.6 mb/d

7. Norway 8 3.2 mb/d

8. Canada 179 3.1 mb/d

9. Venezuela 79 2.9 mb/d

15 Chikara Higashi, Japanese Trade Policy Formulation Praeger 1983 p.216 Hisane MASAKI, Japan Joins the Race for Uranium Amid Global Expansion of Nuclear Power http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/1626

9

10. United Arab Emirates 98 2.8 mb/d

11. Kuwait 104

(Some sources say 48 billion -

The difference is 5% of world reserves) 2.5 mb/d

12. Nigeria 36 2.5 mb/d

13. United Kingdom 4 2.1 mb/d

14. Iraq 115 2.0 mb/d

15. Other FSU

Kazakhstan + Azerbaijan 47 1.9 mb/d

16. Algeria 12 1.7 mb/d

17. Brazil 11 1.5 mb/d

18. Libya 39 1.5 mb/d

19. Indonesia 4 1.1 mb/d

20. Angola 6 0.9 mb/d17

Theories about oil reserves and production

Most recognize theory about peak production in oil is called Hubert’s Peak. M King

Hubert a geophysicist predicted that United State’s oil reserves would meet the half way point of

exhaustions.18 Hubert’s prediction did come true during the decade of the 1970’s. Hubert is

17 http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0922041.html18 http://www.princeton.edu/hubbert/the-peak.html

10

predictions forecasted that the world oil supply will meet its peak within five years.19 The fact the

oil is depleting and is not infinite. The people promoting alternative energy sources are not just

activist but European leaders. The fact oil promotes transportation and has a direct influence on

the liberal economic system because it was cheap and easy transport and use.20 This had led the

way for think tanks to promote alternative sources of energy. 21The cost is creating a new fuel

infrastructure has been a barrier to entry for most new fuel sources. Oil is going to be the fuel

source to promote development in the developing world because it is still considered the

cheapest. Hubert’s predictions are based on basic ecological processes, or consumption is

greater than natural oil creation. The oil cycle takes millions of years to go through its process

while it takes months and years to extract and consume oil, thus it will deplete because the speed

of consumption is greater than the speed of replenishment.22 The more oil reserves are discovered

the more oil will be used to build new infrastructure and activity this explains the acceleration in

economic activity and more rapid depletion of new reserves.23 I do not think scientist do not

agree with Hubert’s theory of depletion of reserves, but disagree when the oil is going to meet its

peak, because data to measure oil reserves could be unreliable and maybe there exists more

reserves that we have not found.24

Uranium

19 Ibid.20 Erika McDonald Hubert's Peak http://www.cleanhouston.org/energy/features/huberts_peak.htm21 The Hubbard peak for world oil http://www.hubbertpeak.com/summary.htm22 Erika McDonald Hubert's Peak http://www.cleanhouston.org/energy/features/huberts_peak.htm23 Ibid.24 Ibid.

11

Uranium is sought after because it helps the creation of electricity and transportation.

Transportation sector is limited to military uses. Electricity is associated with transportation,

communication and production and uranium can be a chief an energy source that creates

electricity. Total world consumption of Uranium is 66,000 tons of metal per year,

with approximately 20,000 tons coming from stockpiles, recycling of spent fuel and weapons

decommissioning, see below.25

Uranium is consider quite cheap still and efficient 7 grams of uranium can create as much

energy as 3.5 barrels of oil and 17,000 cubic feet of gas or 1,780 pounds of coal.26 The cost of

uranium per pound is estimated around 103 US$. 27 One pound is equal to 457 grams or 227.5

barrels of oil which can equate in this current market around 22,750 US$ or 115,700 pounds of

coal which equate in a estimated price around 5300 US$. The cost in uranium is the building of

the infrastructure and building the power plant and maintenance and disposal or used uranium to

produce the electricity. The reason for possible price increase in uranium could be because the

world production only produces 40,000 tons per year and the world demand is 65,000 tons per

year. The estimate global reserve of uranium is around 4 million tons in discovered reserves. The

need to create infrastructure to promote extraction and transportation is needed. The table below

is to rank the top producers of uranium and how many tons are produce per year per country.

25 http://www.peakoil.org.au/peakuranium.htm26 Hisane MASAKI, Japan Joins the Race for Uranium Amid Global Expansion of Nuclear Power http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/162627 http://neinuclearnotes.blogspot.com/2007/03/uranium-price-to-peak-around-103-pound.html

12

The Uranium producers in 2006

2006 Annual Uranium Production

(WNA 2007)

1. Canada 9862 tons

2. Australia 7593

3. Kazakhstan 5279

4. Niger 3434

5. Russia 3400 (18)

6. Namibia 3077

7. Uzbekistan 2270

8. USA 1692

9. Ukraine 800 (18)

10. China, 750 (18)

11. South Africa 534 (3)

12. Czech Rep. 359

13. India 230 (18)

14. Brazil 190

15. Romania 90 (18)

16. Germany 50 (7)

17. Pakistan 45 (18)

World Total 3965528

28 Top 20 Uranium Producers for 200613

Theories about Uranium reserves and depletion

The question is does Uranium have a peak like oil? According to Japanese Atomic

Research Institution had perfected a method to extract uranium from sea water.29 The claim is

that there is potential reserve of 4.5 billion tons of uranium in the oceans of the world. The

process to capture uranium take approximately 240 days, but the limited of extraction is about

how many devices are employed during a cycle.30 The next possible solution is creating artificial

uranium through breeder reactors. The breeder reactor takes the output of the fissile material

during the nuclear process and then creates an output that can be use a future fissile material. It is

like a recycling process.31 There are many processes to the reprocessing of uranium it changes

the molecular state of uranium but through another process fuel can be made. It is a process that

promotes a recycled product that can be reused. These process do not promote an infinite supply

of energy resource but allows does promote a potential cornucopia of electrical energy through

electricity.

Iran and Japan’s historical relationship

29URANIUM FROM SEAWATER (PART 1) http://peakoildebunked.blogspot.com/2006/01/207-uranium-

from-seawater-part-1.html Saturday, January 07, 2006 207

30 Ibíd.31 http://www.3rd1000.com/nuclear/nuke101g.htm

14

Iran and Japan has been working together in the petrochemical industry. 32 Petrochemicals

are the use of oil in the fabrication of goods such as plastics and other chemical products.33 It was

1979 Japan and Iran was working out a joint own company to refine oil into petrochemicals in

Iran. This project was called the Iran Japanese petrochemical company. The Japanese invested

close to 2 billion dollars of Japanese capital into the venture.

The background to the interaction with Iran; the oil suppliers to Japan began to reduce

shipments of oil by 1 million barrels a day which is significant reduction to Japanese energy

demands in context in the era.34 This promoted the Japanese to look for alternative partnerships

to access oil reserves to meet resource consumption needs. This behavior corresponds with the

concept of Official Development Assistance that Japanese promote development of need

resources in less develop countries which the Japanese government have been pursuing.

The crux to this situation is that the Iranian had ties with Soviet Union, because Iran was

going through a revolution. The other aspect is the United States nationals were taken hostage

by the revolutionary government of Iran, which the Shia movement had strong communist

undertones in their ideology. The advancement of Soviet troops in the neighboring Afghanistan

in Kabul created tensions for the Japanese.35 The problem was Japan had almost finished 85% of

the project, when the Secretary of the State Cyrus Vance, criticized the Japanese being

insensitive to the United States.36 This was done in a foreign capital and in public to draw 32 Michael M Yoshitu Iran and Afghanistan in Japanese Perspective Asian Survey Vol.21 No.5 May 1981 pp.501-514 University of California Press p.501-50233 Virtual Chembook http://www.elmhurst.edu/~chm/vchembook/325petrochem.html34 Michael M Yoshitu Iran and Afghanistan in Japanese Perspective Asian Survey Vol.21 No.5 May 1981 pp.501-514 University of California Press p. 511

35 Ibid. p.51236 Ibid. p513

15

international pressure. The United States wanted to put sanctions against Iran for transgressions

in the month of December in 1979 veto by the Soviet Union in January 1980. This was the same

time the Japanese firms and Iran were discussing oil contracts. The Japanese did not to give up

investment, future oil resource and they had thousand national living in Iran that could be

subjected to reprisals.37

How the situation was resolve Japan began to receive the needed shipments of oil from

Kuwait, Qatar and Mexico. The Japanese refused to purchase Iranian oil above market price, and

had fears that Iran would fall under Soviet influence, or be annexed.

This falls under certain past foreign policy objects of Japan to support America foreign

policy objectives, even though it goes against economic needs of Japan. When the Soviet

influence became apparent in the region, then it became a security issue, and a cold war issue

about containing Soviet influence and not promoting states that lean towards Soviet alignment.

The main argument of the Japanese was because of the Iranian price for the oil was too high and

the Japanese had reserves to sustain and other options.

The current Japanese Policy goal on the use of oil is to reduce the use of oil by 80% by

the year 2030. 38 This is to reduce the current uses of oil by 80%. This can be look at two ways

to reduce overall consumption of oil to 9.6% of the all of consumption or reduce the current 5.4

million barrels of oil per day to approximately to 1.29 million barrels a day. This would require a

shift of energy sources and conservation on Japans part. The current situation of Japan now in

2008 what is Japan to do with the current situation with rising prices in oil and competition for

37 Ibid. p.51138 Japanese Atomic Energy www.jaea.go.jp/04/turuga/tief5/images/TIEF5-S1_4E.pd slide 5

16

oil to develop new infrastructures and economies. In the past Japan went to undeveloped sources

an offered financial assistance to acquire goods.

The current situation I am looking at in Japanese energy foreign policy is about Iran and

Azedegan oil field. This could be considered an echo from the past when Japan and Iran was

working on a joint petrochemical plant. This oil field is claim to the second largest know reserve

in the world. The problem is that Iran is again the focus of international controversy with its

non-compliance with the International Atomic Energy Association and the accusations of

promoting terrorism in Iraq, or promoting war. Currently Japan receives 14% of its oil from

Iran.39 The problem with this is Japan is funding Iran giving them the ability purchase goods

from the international market, which the goal is quarantine Iran, so any thing that can help

development of a nuclear fuel cycle and to fund military operations. The second problem is the

Japanese funds for oil had been associated with an exchange triangle or commodity chain. The

exchange triangle is Japan buys oil from Middle East oil suppliers, the oil suppliers invested in

Europe and America and then America and Europe buy manufacture goods from Japan and

Japan buys oil from the middle, and the cycle repeats.40 The problem Iran does not promote this

relationship because they are not integrated trade partners and not members of the World Trade

Organization. Plus Europe and America does not want Iranian nationals investing in America

and European markets thus creating a greater influence in their economies and the world. The

goal is to stop Iranian soft and hard power because they are deemed a threat to international

tranquility because they do not follow international norms. 39 Calev BenDavid Why Iranian oil is the fuel propelling Olmert's visit to Japan February 25, 2008, Monday 

40 J Kaoru Sugihara and Ja Allan, Japan in the Contemporary Middle East, Routledge 1993 chapter 117

Japan was seeking to develop the Azedegan oil field in Iran it had a 90% percent claim

through a development company name INPEX.41 As seen in 1979 Japan withdrew from the

project because of international pressure, such as they did with Azedegan project cited “The

project has been handled fully by Iranian experts as the Japanese company, INPEX42, under US

pressure, declined to invest in the huge project.” 43 The question what is the Japanese motivation

connected with its long term goals and or Giaiatsu pressure stemming from possible security

issues in the international system.

As stated in Japanese foreign policy is that Japan is moving away from oil as a source of

energy and investing in a large reserve does not meet long term goals. Plus Japanese foreign

policy has been known to be flexible. The old cold war concept of containment does come into

play here, as Japanese did in the past with communist nations did not promote development

through foreign aid and investment, because the notion of economic power can equate into

military power. -The question that is raised is all economic issues are becoming military

potential issue?- Does the Japanese decision not develop the second largest oil reserve in the

world to have 90% claim was the most rationalist decision for the Japanese to make in a pure

market perspective or own foreign policy goals. As stated in Japanese energy policy is that they

41 BC Monitoring Middle East – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring  March 6, 2008

42 INPEX homepage states mission statements http://www.inpex.co.jp/english/43 BC Monitoring Middle East – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring 

March 6, 2008

18

will maintain a good reliable partner with the United States, which this could be interpreted as

economic and security partner. Through a realist perception to maintain a relative advantage over

Iran in economics and limit the ability for Iran to gain soft and hard power does promote security

but does interfere with other pressuring issues of human rights of citizens. From a realist

perception if Japan did go through with the Azedejan Project it would secure oil reserves and

affect the relative economic influence of Europe and the United States, plus reduce dependency

on current trade partners. Japanese policy has known to be long termed and has worked around

domestic issues to conform to international alliances objectives. The decision could be

interpreted to conform to Japanese stated foreign policy objectives. This also conforms to the

Japanese belief about using economics over military in interstate relations. If the stated long

term goal of Japan is to move away from oil to uranium then the Japanese is complying with own

stated goals.

To support assumptions about Japanese switching from oil to uranium as stated in

documents that define Japanese energy foreign policy. “Japan will send a big delegation of

around 100 government officials and business people to Kazakhstan on April 29-30 in a bid to

secure uranium supply amid an intensifying global race for the key nuclear fuel.”44… “Japanese

firms, Kansai Electric Power Co. and trading house Sumitomo Corp. are planning to start

uranium test production in Kazakhstan within this year.”45 This document is about a year before

the Azedegan decision was made, this was occurring in April 10, 2007 and the Azedegan

decision was made in March 10 2008. The Japanese foreign policy statement was created in

June of 2006. This does support a notion that Japan is following a pattern set done in a goal; the 44 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitor April 10, 2007 Tuesday

45 Ibid.19

exploration of uranium and expand its use and begin to decrease the use of oil. The problem is

terrorism influencing the supply of oil in which increase demand, which is followed by an

increase of price because of scarcity. 46 This could be a motivation of Japan in the short term to

develop oil reserves that have not been tapped into. Like in the 1980’s oil shortage and Iran

became off limits because of security issues, Japan had reserves and began to seek other

supplies. In this situation Japan began to look at Malaysia and Indonesia to meet need short term

oil needs.47

Conclusion

The question what is the pattern of Japanese behavior, I would argue that the Japanese are

proactive with their stated goals. As seen in the past, Japan is quick to give Official Development

Assistance to countries with undeveloped energy reserves, and is quick to joint ventures to

develop reserves. When security issues come up and it is needed for Japan to enforce

international mandates, they do act in a reactionary manner, but always keep their long term

objective in mind. Could Japan be considered a reactive state, I would argue they are not because

they seek to overcome obstacles before they arise, they do not seem to be consumed by the

moment. Can their foreign policy be considered Aikido, or Gaiatsu? The Japanese foreign policy

behavior does not change the world but does influence the world by promoting development and

trade, is sculpted by external actors I would argue no, but it is influence by the constitutive rules

of the structure, the limitation of resources of Japan, and the scarcity level of the world

resources. The realist perception of Japanese behavior could be that they do not develop states

46 Russell Hotten The Daily Telegraph (LONDON) April 22, 2008 Tuesday OIL World warns Opec as prices rocket

47 Malaysian oil plan gets partners http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6697969.stm20

that are not promoting the same civilization goal as them, this would be to promote relative

power and limit the country’s ability to create a military and promote reach but I think this is not

a stated goal but a result of economic policy but Japan does not want to hinder all states but the

ones that could be perceived as hostile. The Japanese foreign policy appears to be proactive in

nature but has the flexibility to overcome obstacles as they appear, but stays on the track to meet

long terms goals.

Book Review

Japan’s Reluctant Realism by Michael Green

21

The book was easy to read it was laid out to promote an understanding for each subject covered.

The major themes covered in the book are Identity, Domestic institutions and foreign policy,

relations with China, Korea, Russia Southeast Asia, and Finance. The book was written in 2001.

The overarching themes in the book were United States influence on the trajectory on Japanese

foreign policy, that economic is the primary subject, and Japanese foreign policy has no new

direction.

There was an interesting discussion about internationalizing the Yen and lessons from the Asian

crisis, which were that there needs to be more monitoring of movement of capital, technical

assistance to strengthen financial sectors in countries that need strengthening and IMF resources

to deal with future crisis. The way to make this work is through frameworks in the international

system, thus either International government organizations to promote proper financial flows.

This follow along with Japanese belief of development of institutions and helping the

development happen through expertise consulting. This could be attributed to Japanese idealism

according to the author.

The book was full of case studies supporting notions about Japanese foreign policy behavior.

Interview

I had the chance to speak with Professor Tsygankov about Russian and Japanese relations and

some parts of Central Asia. The main points of the interview were about the territory dispute and

22

how this hindered and created tensions between Russia and Japanese. The Sakhalin Island

dispute and upcoming new projects, that included the joint building of nuclear facilities and the

possible far east pipeline that would be close to Japanese homeland.

He gave me a couple of policy papers about Japanese foreign policy from think tanks that mostly

explain about primordial myths, and Waltz assumption about mutual assured destruction.

The interview was informative, but most of information I could not really use for the paper but

did give more insights about Japanese trade relations and certain projects. It did support the

notion that Japan works hard in developing needed relations to promote development of energy

reserves in other countries.

The interview was about fifteen minutes.

Bibliography

Books

1. J Kaoru Sugihara and Ja Allan, Japan in the Contemporary Middle East,

Routledge 199323

2. Glenn D Hoo Harukyo Hasegawa, Japanese Response to Globalization Palgave 2006

3. Chikara Higashi, Japanese Trade Policy Formulation Praeger 1983

4. Jun Morikawa, Japan and Africa African World Press Theron NJ 1997

5. Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism Palgrave 2001

6. Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy for the 21st Century from Economic Superpower to What Power? St. Anthony’s Series 1998

7. Thomas Berger, Japan in International Politics Lynne Rienner Publishers

8. Nakao, The Political Economy of Japan Money University of Tokyo Press 1995

Websites

1 Mitsubishi Motors www. _motors_delivers_ele.html

2 CIA Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html

3. International Energy Association Key World energy Statistics2007

4. Japanese Atomic Energy www.jaea.go.jp/04/turuga/tief5/images/TIEF5-S1_4E.pd

5. Virtual Chembook http://www.elmhurst.edu/~chm/vchembook/325petrochem.html

6. Japanese Nuclear Energy Policy in 2007 Shunsuke KONDO, ChairmanJapan Atomic Energy Commission Government and industries to follow

7. INPEX homepage states mission statements http://www.inpex.co.jp/english/

8. Malaysian oil plan gets partners http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6697969.stm

Journals Articles

1.Iran and Russia in 'Strategic Alliance' Author(s): Adam Tarock Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, (Jun., 1997), pp. 207-223 Published by: Taylor &amp; Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993220

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2.Three Years on a Path to Nowhere: The Hashimoto Initiative in Russian-Japanese Relations Author(s): Alexei V. Zagorsky Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, (Spring, 2001), pp. 75-93 Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia

3.Japanese Foreign Policy: No Longer Reactive? David Potter and Sudo Sueo Nanzan University

4. Michael M Yoshitu Iran and Afghanistan in Japanese Perspective Asian Survey Vol.21 No.5 May 1981 pp.501-514 University of California Press

5. Mira Wilkins Japanese Multinationals in the United States: Continuity and Change, 1879-1990 The Business History Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, (Winter, 1990), pp. 585-629

News Articles

1. The Jerusalem Post February 25, 2008, Monday  Why Iranian oil is the fuel propelling Olmert's visit to Japan Calev BenDavid

2. Uzbek agency seeks to draw Japanese firm in uranium prospecting BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring April 30, 2007 Monday

3. Russell Hotten The Daily Telegraph (LONDON) April 22, 2008 Tuesday OIL World warns Opec as prices rocket 4. Kazakhstan uranium deal, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitor April 10, 2007 Tuesday

5. Azedegan Iranian oil field BC Monitoring Middle East – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring  March 6, 20086. http://peakoildebunked.blogspot.com/2006/01/207-uranium-from-seawater-part-1.html

7. Petroleum Economist November 1, 2006 Competition heats up for uranium; Central Asia Pg. 26(1) Vol. 73 No. 11 ISSN: 0306-395X

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