Pergamon Language Sciences, Vol. 18, Nos 1-2, pp. 277-293, 1996

Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved

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JAPANESE ASPECT AND KINDS OF EVENTUALITIES

William McClure

Department of East Asian Studies, University of Durham Durham DH 1 3TH, United Kingdom

w.t.mcclure@durham.ac.uk

ABSTRACT

Simple predicates in any language are observed to have one of three 'natural' temporal structures: states, changes, or processes, exemplified in English by the predicates: stink, die, and swim. While similar classes obviously exist in Japanese, we find that their manifestation is different. In particular, while English die can have a progressive interpretation, its Japanese equivalent sinu cannot. In this paper, I give formal definitions for each of the 'natural' temporal structures, and I use these definitions to account for the behavior of the English progressive and its nearest Japanese equivalent, the te-iru construction.

KEYWORDS

progressive; aspect; event structure; Japanese; te-iru

INTRODUCTION

The progressive form in English is characterized by the three kinds of behavior exemplified in (1).

(1) Progressive behavior in English a. Not possible ( = Statives)

*J is being intelligent (c.f. J is intelligent) *J is belonging to the club (c.f. J belongs to the club)

b. One kind of entailment pattern (= Activities/Processes) J is running ~ J has run J is being quiet ~ J has been quiet

c. A second kind of entailment pattern (= Achievements/Events) *J is dying ~ J has died *J is winning ~ J has won

These patterns (and others which will be introduced below) are associated with a particular kind of aspectual typology (Vendler 1967, Dowty 1979). In the terms of someone like Dowty, they determine the aspectual categories of states, activities, and achievements. Other people (Verkuyl 1993 for example), refer to these three classes as states, processes, and

277

278 WILLIAM McCIMRI,~

events. In this paper, I argue that these three abstract eventuality types are realized universally, although the realization of each aspectual structure in a particular language is a language specific phenomena. Specifically, I discuss the interaction of general aspectual structures and language specific realizations of the progressive.

ASPECTUAL PHENOMENA

The progressive in Japanese is realized as one interpretation of what is traditionally known as the te-iru form. The gerund of the main predicate combines with some form of the verb iru 'be [animate]'. As originally discussed by Kindaichi (1976), the te-iru form exhibits four kinds of behavior. These are given in (2) with Kindaichi's labels. Note the obvious parallel between Kindaichi's labels as those of Dowty or Verkuyl.

(2) Te-iru behavior in Japanese a. Stative I

te-iru is not possible iru 'be [animate]' aru 'have, be [inanimate]' mieru 'be visible' any potential predicate

C.

b. Activity d. te-iru is progressive oyoide-iru 'is swimming' hasite-iru 'is running' aruite-iru 'is walking' matte-iru 'is waiting'

Achievement te-iru is perfective sinde-iru 'has died/is dead' itte-iru 'has gone/is not here' aite-iru 'has opened/is open' tuite-iru 'has arrived/is here'

Stative IV te-iru is mandatory sobiete-iru 'towers over' nite-iru 'resembles'

At first glance, the te-iru form in Japanese does wildly different things from the English progressive. Stative I and Activity categories actually appear to have straightforward English counterparts, while the Achievement and Stative IV categories look very strange from an English perspective (especially if we equate the te-iru form with the English progressive). Encouragingly, however, we find that the parallel for the Stative I and Activity categories is reflected in other relatively standard classification schemes as well. Time adverbial and compounding tests are given in (3) and (4) (Dowty 1979, Moriyama 1988).

(3) Stative (be intelligent) a. P for three hours

be intelligent for three hours b. Take three hours to P

*take three hours to be intelligent c. Begin to P

?begin to be intelligent d. Continue to P

continue to be intelligent e. Progressive

progressive is bad

JAPANt'SE ASPECT AND KINDS OF EVENTUAIJTIES 279

(3') Stative (iru 'need') a. Sanzikan P 'P for three hours'

sanzikan iru 'need for three hours' b. Sanzikan kakatte P 'take three hours to P

*sanzikan kaktte iru 'take three hours to need' c. P-hazimeru 'begin to P'

?iri-hazimeru 'begin to need' d. P-tuzukeru 'continue to P'

iri-tuzukeru 'continue to need' e. Te-iru

te-iru is bad

(4) Activity (swim) a. P for three hours

swim for three hours b. Take three hours to P

*take three hours to swim c. Begin to P

begin to swim d. Continue to P

continue to swim e. Progressive

is running ~ has run

(4') Activity (benkyoo-suru 'study') a. Sanzikan P 'P for three hours'

sanzikan benkyoo-suru 'study for three hours' b. Sanzikan kakatte P 'take three hours to P

*sanzikan kaktte benkyoo-suru 'take three hours to study' c. P-hazimeru 'begin to P'

benkyoo-si-hazimeru 'begin to study' d. P-tuzukeru 'continue to P'

benkyoo-si-tuzukeru 'continue to study' e. Te-iru

benkyoo-site-iru 'is studying'

So far so good. Interestingly, if we apply these same time adverbial and compounding tests to the predicates in (2c), we find that there are straightforward parallels between English and Japanese achievement predicates, in spite of the perfective meaning of te-iru. Thus:

(5) Achievement (arrive) a. P for three hours

*arrive for three hours b. Take three hours to P

take three hours to arrive c. Begin to P

begin to arrive d. Continue to P

*continue to arrive e. Progressive

*is arriving ~ has arrived

280 WII.I,IAM McCI~IJRli

(5') Achievement (kieru 'go out/extinguish (self)) a. Sanzikan P 'P for three hours'

*sanzikan kieru 'go out for three hours' b. Sanzikan kakatte P 'take three hours to P

sanzikan kaktte kieru 'take three hours to go out' c. P-hazimeru 'begin to P'

kie-hazimem 'begin to go out' d. P-tuzukeru 'continue to P'

*kie-tuzukeru 'continue to go out' e. Te-iru

tuite-im 'has arrived'

If we ignore te-iru, the set of Japanese achievements looks very much like the set of English achievements.

Finally, we have the class of Stative IV predicates. It must first be noted that there are very few of these predicates. Second, while it is true that they usually do occur in the te-iru form, it is in fact too strong to say that they must occur in the te-iru form. Third, and perhaps most usefully, if we look at the kinds of tests exemplified in (3) through (5), we find that Stative IV predicates look a lot like achievements and very little like statives. Compare the paradigm for niru 'resemble' in (6) with those of kieru 'go out' in (5') and iru 'need' in (3').

(6) Stative IV (niru 'resemble') a. Sanzikan P 'P for three hours'

*sanzikan niru 'resemble for three hours' b. Sanzikan kakatte P 'take three hours to P

sanzikan kaktte niru 'take three hours to resemble' c. P-hazimeru 'begin to P'

ni-hazimeru 'begin to resemble' d. P-tuzukeru 'continue to P'

*ni-tuzukeru 'continue to resemble' e. Te-iru

nite-iru 'resembles, (i.e. has come to resemble)'

Given the distribution in (6), and given the fact that Stative IV verbs do not actually occur in the te-iru form as a matter of grammar but simply as a matter of usage, it makes more sense to subsume the Stative IV category under the Achievement label. It is, I suppose, also worth noting that this corresponds to the intuitions of many Japanese linguists as well (e.g. Natsuko Tsujimura, personal communication). Given that achievements are change of state predicates intuitively defined by a before and after, Stative IV predicates all seem to be changes where the initial state is not well-defined. Thus, saying that a child resembles its mother (in Japanese) allows for the fact that this is a state of affairs which has evolved over time. Implicitly, there is a pre-resembling state, but it is not at all clear what such a state actually is so it is very hard to talk about. Not resembling is obviously too simple because most people don't resemble other people. If, however, there are three children who all look like their mother and a fourth one is on the way, one might speculate Okaasan-ni niru daroo 'he will probably look like his mother'. Here niru occurs in its imperfect form. Stative IV predicates are thus achievements which look like statives because only their outcome is well-defined. They require the te-iru form because, as we have seen for other achievements, the te-iru form of an achievement refers exactly to this final state.

To conclude this section, I have argued that Japanese has three aspectual classes which, to a great degree, parallel those found in English. With respect to a number of standard aspectual tests, we have found complete parallelism between English and Japanese, and with respect to the progressive/te-iru classification, we have found parallelism with respect to two out of three classes. How can we account for the differing behavior in the third class?

JAPANESE ASPECT AND KINDS OF EVENTUAI,H'IES 281

CROSS-LINGUISTIC COMPARISONS

I argue in this section that there is little or no reason to expect specific aspectual phenomena to translate directly from one language to the next. We have seen evidence for three aspectual classes in both English and Japanese, but it is not necessary for these three classes to be realized in the same way in both languages. Predicates which are given as translations of each other in dictionaries are not necessarily aspectual synonyms. Compare the following examples from Italian and Dutch (McClure 1990).

(7) Blush (Italian vs. Dutch) a. Arrossire (Italian)

*G ~ arrossito per 10 minuti *'G has blushed for 10 minutes' G ~ arrossito in un secondo 'G blushed in one second' *G sta arrossendo ~ G ~ arrosito *'G is blushing --, G has blushed'

b. Blozen (Dutch) J heeft een uur lang gebloosd 'J has blushed one hour long' *J heeft in een uur gebloosd *'J has blushed in one hour' J is aan het blozen ~ J heeft gebloosd 'J is blushing ~ J has blushed'

Given what we have already seen for English, arrossire is an achievement while blozen is an activity. Clearly, the basic lexical meaning of a predicate and its aspectual structure are independently determined. Not surprisingly, such differences are even more pronounced between languages as unrelated as Japanese and English. The Japanese examples in (8a&b) are classified based on the kinds of tests illustrated in (3) through (5), while the predicates in (8c&d) are not even verbal in Japanese. Suki and kirai, like all nouns, conjugate with some form of the copula da, while hosii and tanosii are clearly adjectival in Japanese. They can modify nouns, and they are characterized by a certain kind of inflectional morphology. Note, however, that all of the English glosses are stative verbs.

(8) Japanese vs. English a. Process predicates

siru 'to know' ai-suru 'to love'

b. Change of state predicates wakaru 'to understand' niru 'to resemble'

c. Nominals suki 'to like' kirai 'to hate'

d. Adjectivals hosii 'to want' tanosii 'to enjoy'

Thus, while semantic properties such as blush or love are presumably defined by essentially identical extensions for speakers of any language, the grammatical realization of a particular extension is probably arbitrary (to some extent) and will therefore vary from language to language. The same is true of other kinds of semantic concepts. While we would expect the semantic notion of 'future' to be universally accessible (i.e. the notion of true at some interval of time which follows a contextually determined present moment), it would be unreasonable to expect this semantic notion to have an identical morphological or syntactic realization in any two arbitrarily chosen languages. Similarly for the progressive. Presumably there is some notion of progressing which is universal. The language specific question, then, is how, or even if, that notion is given an overt realization.

Turning now to the specifics of the progressive construction in English and te-iru in Japanese, the situation is difficult because the two constructions have a significant overlap, although they are apparently not synonymous. Te-iru is progressive for a process like oyogu 'swim' and perfective with an achievement such as sinu 'die'. It has been suggested that there

282 WII,I,IAM McCI,URI';

are actually two te-iru constructions, one progressive and one perfective. While there is some morphological evidence for the two te-iru hypothesis from Korean and some dialects of Japanese (c.f. Martin 1975, Dahl 1985, McClure 1993), such a proposal really just replaces one problem with another. Specifically, if Japanese has two te-iru forms, one of which is progressive and one of which is perfective, what it is about Japanese change of state predicates which makes them completely incompatible with the progressive? It is not the case that a predicate like sinu 'die' is perfective under te-iru and progressive under some other construction. Sinu can never have what looks like an English progressive interpretation. When someone is dying, a speaker of Japanese must say something which translates into English as 'J will die soon' or 'J looks like he is going to die at any moment' or even, 'J is very ill'. This, it seems to me, is a much more difficult question, and it is one about which the two te-iru hypothesis says nothing. Why are achievement predicates in Japanese never progressive? Why is a state of affairs which is so straightforward to speakers of English, not directly expressible in Japanese? Where exactly does the difference between the two languages lie?

Presumably it is not because dying in an English speaking country is different from dying in Japan. It is possible, however, that what I have identified as a single cross-linguistic aspectual type (i.e. change of state predicate) is actually two separate types. Thus, some difference in underlying semantic structure may account for the inability of a Japanese achievement to receive a progressive interpretation. Whatever such a difference is, however, it would have to be formulated to allow other adverbial tests to give parallel results in Japanese and English. This is possible but, I think, unlikely. A third possibility is to look at the actual morphemes involved. I have argued above that semantic meaning and linguistic realization are independent. Perhaps the two constructions actually refer to slightly different states of affairs. Beside the differences outlined in (1) and (2), are their other differences between the English progressive and te-iru in Japanese?

In English, it is the be-ing construction which actually marks the progressive interpretation. Presumably the grammar of English requires or at least allows this particular construction when a certain set of truth conditions obtain, i.e. when something is progressing. Note, however, that this construction can have at least one other interpretation: the futurate progressive. Thus:

(lO) Futurate progressive a. J is coming / is going to come / will come tomorrow afternoon b. The sun ??is rising/is going to rise / will rise tomorrow morning

While there appear to be a number of semantic restrictions on the distribution of the futurate progressive (i.e. the action is generally intentional which is why 'the sun is rising tomorrow morning' is funny), one would want to know if there is one be-ing construction or two? Is it the case that progressive meaning and futurate progressive meaning are associated with completely unrelated truth conditions both of which happen to be connected to the be-ing construction? Or is there one set of truth conditions for a single be-ing construction which manages to incorporate both progressive and futurate progressive meanings? If we look at existing analyses of the futurate progressive (Dowty 1979, Landman 1992), we find attempts to define it as a special case of the general progressive. Thus whatever the truth conditions for the be-ing construction are, they are broad enough to allow both a present progressive and a futurate interpretation.

Let us look now at the te-iru construction in Japanese. We have seen that it is progressive with activity predicates and perfective with achievement predicates. We have also seen that achievements are never progressive in Japanese. In (11), we have one further set of facts:

JAPANt,ISE ASPECT AND KINDS ()F I.IVI(N'IUAI.ITII:.S 283

(11) Perfective te-iru a. J-ga hasite-iru

'J is running / J has run' b. J-ga hon-o yonde-iru

'J is reading a book / J has read a book' c. J-ga sinde-iru

'J has died'

The te-iru construction in Japanese almost always allows for a perfective interpretation. In some areas of Japan it is actually this interpretation which dominates even for process predicates. Now, we can say that there are two te-iru constructions, one perfective and one progressive, or we can say that te-iru is basically a perfective construction which can have, under particular circumstances, a progressive interpretation. The question is, what are these c i rcumstances? Obviously, this parallels what others have said about the progressive and futurate progressive in English. The latter is a special case of the former.

In the rest of this paper, I define and attempt to justify a universally accessible set of three formal aspectual structures. I then give a semantics for be-ing and te-iru. As one might expect , it is the language specific constructions which mean different things, but the difference is actually quite straightforward. The contrastive behavior of English and Japanese illustrated in (1) and (2) then follows from the interaction of the language specific constructions and the general semantics for each of the inherent aspectual classes.

A S P E C T U A L SEMANTICS

The semantics for aspect which I propose is strictly composit ional and it is based on the notion of a stative. In this it is identical to the analysis of Dowty (1979).

Statives (the set

In (12), I define ~, the very large set which contains all possible situations.

(12) States (~:) = the set of all possible situations wh~re s e y is a particular situation

In (13a) through (f), I give formal definitions for the relatively standard properties of statives which I assume. As the stative is the basic building block of my semantics, its characteristics are obviously crucial.

(13) Stative properties a. World(to)

Given, s ~ ~, a particular situation, t0(s) = w, the world where s obtains

b. Temporal trace (~) Given, s e ~, a particular situation, ~(s) = i, the interval of time where s obtains

c. Less than or equal to for intervals (_<) Given two intervals, i and i', i < i' iff the least upper bound of i < the least upper bound of i'.

d. Strictly less than for intervals (<) Given two intervals, i and i', i < i' iff the least upper bound of i < the greatest lower bound of i'.

284 WIIJ JAM McCIAJRI,I

e. Subinterval relationship ( ~ Given the intervals i and i', i ~ i' iff the greatest lower bound of i' < the greatest lower bound of i, and the least upper bound of i < the least upper bound of i'.

e' Proper subinterval relationship (c) Given the intervals i and i', i c i' iff the greatest lower bound of i' < the greatest lower bound of i, and the least upper bound of i < the least upper bound of i'.

f. Subinterval property of statives (density) Vs(w, i), Vi' s.t. i' ~ i, 3s'(w, i') s.t. ~(s') = i' & s' = s

In (13a), the function o~ defines a particular world w, the world where we find s. This makes explicit what I believe is commonly assumed in discussions of statives: a stative cannot be interrupted and continue from one world into another. As we will see, it is basically for this reason that a stative cannot occur in the progressive. In (13b), the function x defines a particular interval of time i, the moment or open interval of time where we find s. Every state is therefore associated with a unique world-time pair (w, i).

Relationships between intervals are subject to the properties of time. I assume here that time is a dense partial order defined on the 'less than or equal' relation (<) (see Landman (1991) for details). Given that 'less than or equal' is well-defined for moments of time, in (13c), we can say that one interval is 'less than or equal to' another interval if the least upper bound of the first is 'less than or equal to' the least upper bound of the second (which is to say, the first interval ends before the second one does). This is a broad definition which can refer to a number of configurations between intervals. (13d), however, refers to a much more specific situation. Two intervals are strictly ordered if the first ends before the second begins. Note that while the definitions for 'less than or equal to' and 'strictly less than or equal to' are not parallel in the expected sense, it is still the case that i f i < i', then i < i' as well. In (13e), one interval is a subinterval of another, if the first begins after the second and ends before it, and in (13e'), one interval is a proper subinterval of another, if the first begins strictly after the second and ends strictly before it. Finally, in (13f) we can define the subinterval property of statives, also known as density. Such a property is actually automatic given the other properties in (13). If we say that a situation holds for a particular interval in a particular world, we also want the situation to hold at every subinterval of that interval (in that world). The conjunct s = s' means that both s and s' are in the extension of the same predicate. This ability to look inside a situation and find what is in some sense a smaller version of the predicate is known as density.

In (14), I define what I call a maximal state. Unlike the definitions in (13), the definition in (14) is specific to my semantics. It is also crucial.

(14) Maximal state Vs(w, i), s is a maximal state iff Vi' s.t. i c i', -,3 s'(w, i') s.t. x(s') = i' & s' = s

A maximal situation is one which is not a subinterval of any other identical situation. It is in some sense a largest situation, and like a least upper bound or a greatest lower bound, it is unique. For the purposes of my semantics, what I refer to as a basic situation is also the largest dense interval where the situation obtains without interruption. What this means is that the inside of a particular situation is inaccessible to the aspectual semantics, and its effect is to force the semantics to look at the largest possible manifestation of a single situation and not some arbitrarily chosen part of it. For the purposes o f my semantics, statives do not have parts. They are internally dense but nevertheless unanalyzable wholes, and as such they are all uniquely characterized.

JAPANESF ASPECT AND KINDS OF I'IVF~NTUAI,ITIES 285

Given the definition of density in (13f) and the definition of maximality in (14), we might now want to redefine statives as shown in (15).

( 1 5 ) Statives (~) [c.f. (12)] x = set of all possible situations where s(w, i) e X is a unique (dense and maximally large) situation

Changes (the set x~

Turning now to changes, a change of state is intuitively defined by two states, one before and one after a moment of change. The set of all possible changes is therefore represented by the Cartesian product of the set of all situations with itself.

(16) Changes (x) x = ~ × x (the Cartesian product of x with itself) is the set of all possible changes where c = <s(w, i) s'(w', i')> e x is a single change whose onset is s and whose results is s'

This is obviously a huge set. Pairs such as <W is not here, W is here> (meaning 'arrive') may be thought of as natural changes, while <I love J, J is American> is a weird but nonetheless possible kind of change of state. Note that some changes may actually be defined by only the passage o f time. If I tell a small child to stay still, not moving from one moment to the next may be a very real change of state (because the child should have moved). In contrast, a change defined by two states which are identical with respect to their temporal trace or where the first actually follows the second seem to violate our most understanding of what a change is. I would therefore modify the definition in (16) to rule out these kind of changes, leaving us with what might be called 'natural' changes or more traditionally, achievement.

(17) Changes (x) X = ~ x x (the Cartesian product of x with itself) is the set of possible changes where c = <s(w, i) s'(w', i')> e x and c is an a c h i e v e m e n t iff i < i'.

The set o f all possible changes is represented by X, the Cartesian product of the set of situations with itself. A pair o f states is a well-formed achievement if and only if it is composed of two states which are well-ordered in time. By the definition in (13d), this means that the onset of a change must conclude before the result begins. Note, however, that there is no restriction on the interval which may exist between these two states. There is no requirement that the two states which define an achievement are right next to each other or even as close as possible. Further, while each state involved in a change is characterized by a unique world-time pair, the change itself must be realized over at least two moments in time. As such, it may also be realized in two different worlds. Changes, unlike states, can be interrupted, and they can continue from one world into another.

Before turning to processes, it is important to look closely at the definition of a change. In particular, what is the temporal trace of a change? A change is represented by two states <s, s'> which are strictly ordered in time. According to (13d), this means that the onset state ends before the resulting state begins. Such a definition allows for temporal gaps between onset and result so that a change of state might be temporally represented as in (18a) or as in (18b).

(18) Change of state (c = <s, s'> where s < s') a. Contiguous (time -->)

. . . . . s . . . . . ) ( . . . . . s ' - . . . . . . >

b. Non-contiguous (time -->) . . . . . s . . . . . ) -, s ^ - , s' ( . . . . . s ' - . . . . . >

286 WII,I,IAM McCLURt,I

While it is typically the case that a change is defined by two states which are 'very close' to each other as is represented in (18a), there have always been problems with such a definition because of changes which have 'middles' where neither state obtains. Thus, run from the bank to the post office is presumably defined by an initial state where someone is at the bank and a final state where they are at the post office. But what about when they are in the street running from one place to the other? In spite of the fact that running from the bank to the post office actually takes time, the change is treated in grammar as it is instantaneous. Run from the bank to the post office is an aspectual achievement. 'It took an hour to run from the bank to the post office' is fine, and 'J is running from the bank to the post office' must entail that 'W has not yet run from the bank to the post office' (on a single reading).

What we have is a conflict between perception and grammar. Running from place to place takes time, but such events are treated in the grammar as if they are instantaneous. I would argue that such a conflict is represented exactly be the temporal structure in (18b). The change is semantically represented by the initial and final states, while the change itself is actually omitted from the aspectual representation. The change actually occurs in the gap between the two states. On closer inspection, even normally discussed changes such as appear, die, or arrive are really characterized by a beginning, an ending, and a gray area in between. A death is often a long drawn out affair, characterized by a straightforward beginning (being alive), an obvious ending (being dead), and an in-between period when things are less than clear.

Given this understanding of a change of state, how do we define the temporal trace of a change? The two states used to represent a change are not actually part of the change itself. Two states can indicate that a change has occurred. They give us the temporal boundaries of the change, and they are useful points of reference because they are static and observable. It is therefore possible to get at the aspectual semantics of change without actually looking at the question of change itself. A change is represented by its beginning and ending states, but the change itself, whatever it is, actually occurs in the gap between the two states. As such, the temporal trace of a change is defined by the gap between those two states. This understanding will be crucial when we look at the progressive below. The progressive is true when the change is occuring, so the progressive is true in the interval defined by this gap.

processes (the set m

Turning finally to activities, one could argue that a stereotypical process is an open-ended set of linked steps or stages. Swimming is a series of strokes through the water and running is a series of steps. We can now see, however, that moving from one step to the next is a kind of change. As such, a process is really a set of changes. Less stereotypical processes such as work or build are also composed of steps or stages, although they are not necessarily of the same type. It is not the case, however, that a process is a completely unstructured set of changes. With swimming, for example, it is important that the steps (whether they be full strokes, half strokes, or quarter strokes) are well-ordered with respect to time. One cannot finish swimming a lap before one has begun it. Similarly for the less homogeneous processes such as build or work. Building entails putting together the various pieces of, say, a house. Laying each brick is a change as is hammering in each nail. While the various changes are not all of the same type, presumably they are still ordered with respect to time. One cannot put up the roof before one has constructed the walls. Further, the achievements of a real activity must be properly linked. Each step of an activity is defined as an achievement where achievements are pairs of temporally ordered states. Two achievements are properly linked if the final state of the first achievement is identical to the initial state of the second achievement (i.e. the achievements must be linked head-to-tall). Again, it would be odd to swim all the left-handed strokes and then go back and swim all the right-handed strokes. Even if the various strokes are ordered in time, it would be weird because they are not ordered in space. In (19), a process is defined as a set of changes. Such a set defines a proper activity only when certain additional requirements are met.

JAPANESt( ASI)I(CT ANI) KINDS OF EVEN'IUAI,ITll(S 287

(19) Processes (I-I) 11: 9~ ~ x , a function from the real numbers into the set of achievements, defines the set of possible processes where p = { <s 1 (w 1, il) s 2(w 2, i2)> 1,

<s3(w3, i3) s4(w4, i4)>2...<Sn-l(Wn-l, in-l) Sn(Wn, in)>m... } = {c 1 c2 ...Cm...} ~ I-I is a single process, and p is an activity iff [1] Vn, in-1 < i n & [2] Vm, [Cm-1 = <Sn-1 Sn>m-1 & Cm = <Sn+l Sn+2>rn]

Sn = Sn+l & [3] 30 s.t. VSn Sn+l e p, 0(Sn) = 0(Sn+l)

A process is a function from the real numbers (or some other sufficiently large potentially infinite set) into the set of achievements. A process is an open-ended set of achievements. A process is a well-formed activity if the individual changes are: [1] ordered in time and [2] linked head-to-tail. In addition, the third clause of (19) requires that every state of a process have at least one 0-role in common. An activity must be manifested through a particular individual. This is not an aspectual requirement as such and serves only to link the aspectual semantics with its proper syntactic representation. It has no consequences for the semantics of the progressive I define here. Consistent with the temporal trace of a change, the temporal trace of a process is defined by the least upper bound of its first state and the greatest lower bound of its final state (if the process has stopped). Again, the bounding states are not part of the process itself.

Several comments are in order about this definition. First, like Verkuyl and unlike Dowty, I have made no distinction between achievements and accomplishments. Intuitively, an achievement is a moment in time defined by an instantaneous switch from one state to another. In contrast, an accomplishment is a process which culminates in some kind of final state. Win and recognize are examples of achievements while read a book and build a house are accomplishments. While I agree with the duel nature of a predicate like read a book, I do not believe that it is an example of a unique aspectual class. Rather, it is a case of ambiguity. In a particular utterance, read a book is going to refer to a discrete event or to a process. It is not, however, going to refer to both possibilities at the same time. Note that such ambiguity is very common in English (at least). Read a book is two ways ambiguous while predicates such as run, skip, and continue are actually three ways ambiguous as we see in (20).

(20) Lexical ambiguity (run) a. Stative

This train runs between Paris and Milan b. Achievement

J ran to the store c. Activity

We ran around the park all afternoon

The definitive feature of a change of state predicate is a final state. This state is recognized as final because it is not followed by anything else. What has preceded, however, is not important. It may be a process or a state.

The definitive feature of a process is the fact that it does not have a well-defined final state. In this it is like a simple stative which does not have a well defined final moment. Although it is obviously not the case the most processes are unbounded (as it is not the case that most states actually go on forever either), one cannot identify the final state until the process has actually stopped. Bennett (1981) was the first to propose a process structure which is infinite in that it does not have a final state but is at the same time finite because it is bounded by an open interval. Others (e.g. Lascarides 1991) are careful to distinguish between the end of a process (which appears when it stops) and the culmination of a process (which actually results in an accomplishment). While these characterizations capture the reality that most processes do come to conclusions within a finite amount o f time, I do not agree that

288 WII~I~IAM McCIS IRE

boundedness should be a definitive feature of the aspectual structure of a process. Running and walking do not have inherent boundaries. If one could live forever, one could surely walk the whole time as well. Rather, that simple processes are bounded is a contextually induced presupposition. People don't live forever, so they can't do things forever either, and a process which has stopped is obviously bounded. I would argue, however, that it is the interaction of aspectual structure and the semantics of tense which makes this happen. If we assume that tense has scope over aspect, even if a process is potentially infinite (in the abstract), if it completely realized in the past (i.e. in the real world), it must be bounded (in the real world).

As such, the process defined in (19) is not bounded. Processes, like states, are defined over open intervals of time. This parallel is good because, while processes are not dense in the strict sense of a stative, they are nonetheless characterized by a kind of subinterval property which parallels that of statives. Compare (21 a) which is copied from (13e) above and (2 l b).

(21) Subinterval properties a. Of statives (density) [c.f. (13e)]

VS, Vi' s.t. i' c_ ~(s), 3s' s.t. x(s') = i' & s '= s

b. Of processes Vp = { c I c2...Cm... }, Vi' s.t. i' ~ x(p) and i' is pragmatically large enough, 3p' s.t. z(p') ~ i' & p' = p

Thus, every subinterval of a stative is identical to the stative itself. This is known as density. Processes have a similar, slightly coarser property. Only a subinterval of a process which is pragmatically large enough will actually contain a predicate identical to the process itself. Returning to swimming, if we compare a half stroke with five or six strokes, the first is definitely not a swimming while the second probably is. The minimum length of the subinterval necessary to recognize the predicate is determined by the nature of the process in question. Swimming laps obviously entails an interval which is at least one lap long, while moving contains tiny, instantaneous steps and can be true over a very small subinterval. If processes contained an inherent endpoint, the parallel with statives would be impossible because the endpoint would necessarily be completely different from the rest of the process.

The basic aspectual structures defined so far are summarized in (22). These three structures are taken from the complete definitions found in (15), (17), and (19).

(22) Basic aspectual structures stative = s, a particular situation change = c = <s s'> process = p = {<Sl $2>1 <s3 s4>2...<Sn-I Sn>m...}

The basic unit for all of these structure is the stative. Changes are defined as pairs of statives, while processes are open-ended sets of changes. Single statives and processes are potentially unbounded while changes are finite. Finally, given the restrictions on individual stative predicates, only stative predicates must exist in a particular world during a particular interval of time. In contrast, achievements and activities are not limited to a single world because each of their constituent states may obtain in a different world.

BE-ING VS. TE-IRU

In the last part of this paper, I turn finally to a comparative analysis of the English be-ing form and the Japanese te-iru form. Given the aspectual structures defined in section 4, how are these defined and why do we find exactly the entailment patterns we find in the two

JAPANESE ASPECT AND KINDS OF EVF~NTUAI.I'[IES

languages? I end the paper with an account of the futurate progressive, and I look at why there can be no such thing as the futurate progressive in Japanese.

289

Segments

Intuitively, an eventuality is progressing if it has begun but is not yet complete, but how do we know that an eventuality has begun or not? I argue that the progressive is a relationship between the parts of an eventuality. The progressive is true when some but not all of those parts have occurred. Having defined general semantic structures for statives, achievements, and activities, I now define the well-formed pieces of each eventuality type. I call these pieces segments. A segment e is basically any continuous and proper subset of the situations in a well-formed aspectual structure. The well-formed segments of all three aspectual types are defined in (23).

(23) Possible segments of each eventuality type (e e P) a. Stative s

b. Change <s s'> E~ {s, s'}

c. Process {<s 1 s2> <s3 s4>...<Sn-1 Sn>...} e= any continuous subset {<Sp...Sq> } of {<Sl s2> <s3 s4>...<Sn-1 Sn>...} where 1< p < q < n

Statives do not have segments while changes have two, the initial and final states. Any continuous subset of the states in a process is a segment of the process.

A particular segment is defined by a proper subset of the states in the basic aspectual structure. Recall from (14) above that each situation of an event structure is defined to be maximally large. This means that single situations do not have internal parts which are semantically accessible and they cannot be interrupted. The same is true of the statives which compose segments. As such, stative predicates do not themselves contain segments. While all statives must contain sub-predicates equivalent to the main predicate (guaranteed by the subinterval property of stative predicates), none of these sub-predicates can define a segment because none of them is maximal. Every sub-predicate sits inside the predicate itself. For the purpose of the aspectual semantics, statives do not have parts.

Given this understanding of a segment (as a proper subset of the situations which define a particular eventuality), a final segment is any segment which contains a final state. Intuitively, a final segment is all of the eventuality from a given point to the end. In (24), we see that only achievements actually have unambiguously final segments.

(24) Final segments of each eventuality type (final E e P) a. Stative s

final e = ¢ b. Change c = <s s'>

final e e {s'} c. Process p ={<s 1 s2> <s3 s4>...<Sn-1 Sn>...}

final e = ¢

As statives do not have segments, they clearly do not have final segments. Activities are represented by open-ended sets of states. As such, they never have final states, and by extension, they never have final segments. In (24b), however, the segment s' is both a final state and a final segment.

290 WII,I,IAM McCI,URF,

English be-ing

With the definitions in (23) and the notion of final segment given in (24), we now have enough structure to define truth conditions for be-ing and te-iru. I begin here with English. Intuitively, the English progressive is used when an eventuality is begun but is still incomplete. The progressive is basically an imperfective construction. In terms of sets of situations, an eventuality is in progress during a given interval of time if some but not all of its situations have been realized during that interval of reference. (25) gives my truth conditions for the progressive in English. The bracketed numbers used throughout this discussion are for reference only.

(25) The Progressive (English) PROG(P) = 1 during the interval i iff [1] 5z s.t. e ~ P & x(e) < i & [2] -~[VE* s.t. ~* ~ P, z(~*) < ~(E)] & [3] re ' [[re* s.t. e* ~ P, x(e*) < x(e')] ~ x(e') > i]

One line at a time, the definition means the following. The progressive is true during the interval i if [1] there is a segment E of a predicate P which is manifested before i, the interval of evaluation; [2] it is not the case that this segment is later than all other segments of the predicate (i.e. e is not a final segment), and [3] any segment which is a final segment is manifested after the interval of evaluation. The progressive is true for a particular interval of time if during that interval the eventuality has begun but is not yet complete.

How does the definition in (25) interact with the eventuality structures posited for each of the aspectual classes to predict the distribution and behavior of the progressive? First, English statives are never felicitous in the progressive because a stative contains no segments. The condition in line [1] is never satisfied. Activities do not have well-defined final states by definition so final segments are also impossible to identify. If conditions [1] and [2] are satisfied, the universal in line [3] is always well defined, and the progressive of an activity is true in an interval whenever the temporal trace of a non-final segment exists in that interval. Given the subinterval property of activities in (21b) above, the minimum length of the manifested segment is pragmatically determined. It must, however, be long enough for us to recognize the activity. As such, it is (21b) which gives us the fact that the progressive of an activity entails the perfective. The manifested piece is perfective while the entire predicate is progressive, but (21b) guarantees that the manifested piece and the entire predicate are indistinguishable from each other. Finally, as achievements are defined by sets of only two states, possible segments are few. Lines [l&2] of the definition in (25) are satisfied by the two states which define an achievement, but the progressive holds only if the temporal trace of the earlier state is completely manifested during the interval of evaluation, while the later state is not. This means that the upper bound of the interval of evaluation must intersect the gap between the two states. For the initial state to be completely realized and the final state to be completely unrealized, the interval of evaluation must divide the gap into two. The gap, of course, represents the interval where the change, itself directly not represented in the aspectual semantics, is actually occurring. As such, the progressive of an achievement is true exactly when the change is occurring.

Japanese te-iru

The English progressive is therefore true when part but not all of an eventuality is manifested. As states do not have parts, the progressive is never felicitous. Achievements and activities, on the other hand, may occur in the progressive but only under specific circumstances. In contrast to this, I believe that the te-iru form is basically a perfective aspect, requiring the manifestation of all final segments. In this it is intuitively the opposite of the be-ing construction. Truth conditions for the Japanese te-iru construction are given in (26). Again, the bracketed numbers are for reference only.

JAPANESE ASPECT AND KINDS OF EVENTUAI,IT1ES 291

(26) The Progressive (Japanese) PROG(P) = 1 during the interval i iff [1] 3es.t .e~ P & z ( ~ ) < i & [21 -,[rE* s.t. E* ~ P, x(~*) < x(~)] & [31 Ve' [[re* s.t. e* ~ P, z(e*) < x(e')] ~ "~[x(e') > i]

The Japanese progressive is true during the interval i if [1] there is a segment e of a predicate P which is manifested before i, the interval of evaluation; [2] it is not the case that this segment is later than all other segments of the predicate (i.e. e is not a final segment), and [3] all segments which are final are also manifested at the time of evaluation or in the past. The progressive is true for a particular interval of time if the eventuality has begun and, if possible, is also complete. The only difference between (25) and (26) is the status of the final segments in line [3]. In English, final segments cannot be realized during the relevant interval. In Japanese, all possible final segments must be realized during the interval.

Like its English equivalent, the definition in (26) interacts with the structures defined for each aspectual type in a straightforward fashion to derive the necessary distributions. Again, statives never occur in the te-iru form because no segment is ever defined. Line [1] is never satisfied. Activities, then, do not have well-defined final segments by definition so they can never be complete. The universal in line [3] is always well-defined, and the te-iru form of an activity is felicitous in an interval whenever the temporal trace of a pragmatically long enough non-final segment exists in that interval. Japanese activities in the te-iru construction are felicitous under exactly the same conditions as their English equivalents. It is therefore not a surprise that an English activity in the progressive and a Japanese activity in the te-iru form refer to identical states of affairs in the world. Finally, as achievements are defined by sets of only two states, possible segments are again limited to two. Lines [l&2] of (26) are satisfied by the two states which define an achievement, and te-iru holds if the temporal trace of both states is manifested during the interval i. Te-iru of an achievement is possible only when all final segments have been realized. Given the structure of an achievement, this means that the gap which represents the change must be completely realized (since the gap precedes the final state). As such, it is not a surprise that the te-iru form of an achievement is perfective. The analyses in (25) and (26) can therefore account for the basic puzzle presented in (1) and (2) at the beginning of this paper. While the English progressive and the Japanese te-iru form may look very different, they are in fact quite similar.

Other issues

What then of the futurate progressive in English and the perfective te-iru in Japanese? This contrast also follows directly from the definitions in (25) and (26). While the first two lines of (25) and (26) guarantee than an initial segment occurs sometime in the past, the manifestation of the complete event is restricted by the '>' symbol in line [3] of (25). As the end of the eventuality is always in the future, it is simply a matter of making the initial existential into some kind of intensional operator, putting the entire event into the future. One common way of doing this is to allow 'planning' stages at the beginning of an eventuality. Thus, planning to do something qualifies as having started the event. Such an approach explains the volitional restriction on the subject of a futurate progressive because an inanimate object cannot plan to do anything. In Japanese, however, the eventuality in question is restricted by the '-,[z(e') > i]' conjunct in line [3] of (26). It makes no sense to turn the initial existential into an intensional operator because te-iru can be felicitous only when the outcome of the event is not in the future. Line [3] of (26) guarantees that the te-iru construction can never have a futurate interpretation.

In contrast, however, note that the definition in (26) may be interpreted in such a way that the entire thing is perfective. Basically the conjunct '-~[x(e') > i]' means something like 'not in the future' which means in the present or in the past. It can also be confirmed that by the definitions of '>' and '>' in (13c&d), -,[x(e') > i] formally entails both i > x(e') and i _> x(e'). As such, (26) entails the definition in (27).

292 WILLIAM McCLURE

(27) Perfective te-iru [c.f. (26)] PROG(P) = 1 during the interval i iff [1] ~ s . t . e ~ P&x(E)< i& [2] ",[re* s.t. e* e P, z(e*) < "c(e)] & [3] re' [[V~* s.t. e* e P, ~(e*) < "c(e')] ~ z(E') < i]

In (27), the last conjunct of line [3] now means that for all segments which are final, they must be realized in the past. The entire relationship is placed into the past. We therefore predict that the te-iru form of any Japanese predicate, achievement or activity, should have a perfective interpretation. This, as we have already seen, is exactly the case in Japanese.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, I believe that the contrasting behavior of the English be-ing construction and the Japanese te-iru form as defined in (25) and (26), respectively, points to a larger difference between the two languages. Given that the imperfective/perfective distinction is basically binary, it should not come as a complete surprise that the 'in-between' construction in a given language actually falls on one side or the other. When we compare English and Japanese, I believe we find that the English be-ing is basically an imperfective aspect while Japanese te- iru is basically perfective. This is of course confirmed in English by the futurate progressive and in Japanese by the progressive/perfective ambiguity which characterizes the te-iru form of activities in Japanese.

The analysis given here also supports the idea of a unified semantics for underlying aspectual classes. These universal structures then interact with language specific constructions to produce language specific results. This is, I believe, an intuitive and interesting approach to the problems of tense and aspect in natural language. In this paper, I have proposed one analysis of aspect based on the notion that all eventualities are constructed from particular sets of states. I have looked specifically at the interpretation of the progressive in Japanese and English, but the analysis given here can be extended to a wide range of problems relating to tense and aspect including the behavior of time adverbials, the Imperfective Paradox (which, by the way, is a non-issue in Japanese), and the interaction of quantifiers and aspectual phenomena.

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