Japanese airborne SIGINT capabilities / Desmond Ball and

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WORKING PAPER NO .353

JAPANESE AIRBORNE SIGINT

CAPABILITIES

Desmond Ball and Euan Graham

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WORKING PAPER NO .353

JAPANESE AIRBORNE SIGINT

CAPABILITIES


Canberra

December 2000National Library of AustraliaCataloguing -in-Publication EntryBall , Desmond , 1947Japanese airborne SIGINT capabilities .

Bibliography.ISBN 0 7315 5402 7 ISSN 0158 -3751

1. Electronic intelligence . 2.Military intelligence - Japan .I. Graham , Euan Somerled , 1968- . II. Australian NationalUniversity. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre . II

I. Title .

(Series : Working paper (Australian National University .

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre ) ; no .353 ) .

355 .3432

© Desmond Ball and

Euan Graham , 2000

4 - 3 - 01

ABSTRACT

Unsettled by changes to its strategic environment since the Cold War ,

but reluctant to abandon its

constitutional constraints , Japan has moved in

recent years to improve and centralise its intelligence -gathering capabilities

across the board . The Defense Intelligence Headquarters established in

Tokyo , in early 1997 , is now complete and Japan plans to field its

own fleet

of

reconnaissance satellites by

2002 . Intelligence sharing with the UnitedStates was also reaffirmed a

sa key element of

the 1997 Guidelines for

Defense Cooperation . One of

the less conspicuous but most remarkablefeatures o

f

Japan ' s intelligence drive has been the steady development ofan

airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT ) capability thatnow ranks second only

to that of

the

United States in the

Asia -Pacific region .

The Japanese Air

Self -Defense Force (JASDF ) and Japanese MaritimeSelf -Defense Force (MSDF ) together maintain about 16 dedicated SIGINTcollection aircraft , as well as half - a -dozen electronic warfare (EW ) trainingaircraft with some electronic intelligence (ELINT ) capabilities . There areanother 1

3E - 2C Hawkeye and four E - 767 airborne early warning and control

(AEW & C ) aircraft with substantial secondary ELINT /electronic surveillancemeasure (ESM ) capabilities . And there are 1

7 RF -4EJ reconnaissanceaircraft which are equipped with a variety o

f

ELINT /ESM systems . ThisWorking Paper describes these aircraft and their capabilities , and discussestheir SIGINT operations .

Unless otherwise stated , publications of

the Strategic and Defence

Studies Centre are presented without endorsement as contributions to the

public record and debate . Authors are responsible for their own analysis andconclusions .

JAPANESE AIRBORNE SIGINT CAPABILITIES

Desmond Ball and Euan Graham *

Introduction

Unsettled by changes to its strategic environment since the Cold War ,

but reluctant to abandon its constitutional constraints , Japan has moved in

recent years to improve and centralise its intelligence -gathering capabilities

across the

board . The Defense Intelligence Headquarters established in

Tokyo , in early 1997 , is now complete and Japan plans to field its

own fleet

of

reconnaissance satellites by

2002 . Intelligence sharing with the UnitedStates was also reaffirmed a

s

a key element of

the 1997 Guidelines for

Defense Cooperation . One of the

less conspicuous but most remarkablefeatures o

f Japan ' s intelligence drive has been the steady development of

an

airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT ) capability that now ranks second only

to the United States in the Asia -Pacific region .

* * *

Japan has made an enormous investment , sustained over several

decades , in airborne SIGINT capabilities . It is one of about two dozen

countries which maintain dedicated airborne SIGINT -collection systems . It

was also one of

the first , following the United States , the United Kingdom ,

the Soviet Union , and a couple of

other European countries . By the late1950s , the Japanese Air Self -Defense Force (JASDF ) and then the JapaneseMaritime Self -Defense Force (JMSDF ) had initiated acquisition programmesfor airborne SIGINT capabilities . Japan now has the third -largest SIGINTaircraft fleet in the world , after the United States and Russia , but it is moreactive than the Russian fleet .

The JASDF and JMSDF together maintain about 16 dedicated

SIGINT -collection aircraft , as well as half a dozen electronic warfare (EW )

training aircraft with some ELINT capabilities . There are another 13

E - 2C

Hawkeye and four E -767 airborne early warning and control (AEW & C )

aircraft with substantial secondary ELINT /electronic surveillance measure

* Desmond Ball is a special professor and Euan Graham is a PhD candidate in the Strategic

and Defence Studies Centre , Australian National University .

This paper is a revised and expanded version of

Desmond Ball and Euan Graham ,

‘Japanese SIGINT Takes Off , Jane ' s Intelligence Review , December 2000 , pp . 26 - 31 .

2 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

(ESM ) capabilities . And there are 17 RF -4EJ reconnaissance aircraft whichare equipped with a variety of ELINT /ESM systems .

Airborne systems have greater operational flexibility than ground

based systems and are able to monitor very high frequency (VHF) andmicrowave transmissions which are beyond the line -of-sight of groundstations . They are very well suited to Japan 's geostrategic circumstances .They a

re able to monitor low -power high frequency (HF ) and VHF radiovoice communications , and especially the electronic order of battle (EOB ) of

neighbouring countries , which cannot be heard from the Japanese islands . In

wartime , they are less vulnerable than fixed facilities .

However ,airborne systems are very expensive to maintain and operate ,

especially if regular ( for example , daily ) flights are required . The acquisitioncosts a

re greater in the

case of

some aircraft than the

costs of ground stations .

The EP - 3s acquired by

the JMSDF in the early 1990s cost about

Y12 . 67 billion ( or US $ 95 . 5 million in 1992 dollars ) . ' The JMSDF ' S UP - 3D

EW training support aircraft cost Y13 . 61 billion (US $ 155million ) in 1995 .

The E -767 AEW & C aircraft cost even more , but they are equippedwith many expensive systems (such a

s the distinctive rotodomes and

associated radar systems ) not directly involved in SIGINT activities . The lastbatch o

f

five E -2Cs had a programme cost of Y9 . 23 billion each in 1990 ( or

US $ 62 . 4 million ) . The four E -767s cost Y55 billion each , or US $ 2 billion

for

the programme ( including parts , training and simulators ) . " The E -767purchase dominated the JASDF ' s budgets in the early 1990s . '

Airborne platforms are difficult to categorise functionally . They can

be

used to collect strategic and tactical SIGINT , both communicationsintelligence (COMINT ) and ELINT , and to contribute operationally in EW

environments .

JASDF Curtiss C -46D Commando SIGINT Aircraft

The JASDF began planning the

acquisition of

an airborne capability

for strategic and operational SIGINT soon after its establishment , and

decided in the late 1950s to acquire ‘ a number of

Curtiss C -46D Commandoaircraft ( including JASDF 9

1 -1140 ) modified for SIGINT /EW operations .

These were operated by

the JASDF Electronic Warfare Training Unit at

Iruma Air Base , northwest of Tokyo , in the 1960s and 1970s .

The

rapid build - up

of

the

Japanese Air Self -Defense Force after 1955

56 reflected American concerns about the threat of

air

attack from the Soviet

Union and China , and

the

need to protect US strategic bases in Japan . In its

Working Paper No. 353 3

formative years, the United States was heavily involved in equipping theJASDF , training it

s pilots and planning down to the tactical level . ”

The C - 46 Commando was a twin -engined tactical transport aircraftproduced in large numbers b

y

the Curtiss -Wright Corporation during theSecond World War , and provided to the JASDF in the 1950s . It could carry a

payload of9 ,287 kg , and had a range of some 4 ,000 km . The C - 46Ds

configured for the SIGINT role were fitted with nose and ventral antennafairings , as well a

s inboard SIGINT processing and analysis systems . TheJASDF also maintained two C -46As for calibration purposes ; these also hadlimited ELINT /EW capabilities . ”JMSDF E

P - 2J SIGINT Aircraft

The JMSDF ' s 81 Air Training Support Squadron (Kokutai ) of the 31stFlight Group , based at Iwakuni Air Base , near Hiroshima , operated two EP

2J

SIGINT aircraft from themid -1970s until the early 1990s , when they werereplaced b

y

the

much more capable EP - 3 aircraft . “

The EP -2Js were ELINT versions of the

Kawasaki P - 2J

twin -turbopropanti -submarine aircraft , which could carry more than ten tonnes o

f

electronic

equipment , had a cruising speed of about 200 knots (370 km / h ) at an altitude

of3 ,050 metres ( 10 , 000

feet ) , and a range of some 4 ,450 km ( 2 ,765 miles ) . "

The EP - 2Js were equipped with indigenously produced HLR - 105 and

HLR - 106

SIGINT equipment . " 2 These aircraft deployed to Hachinohe AirBase near Misawa , in Aomori Prefecture , for ELINT missions against Sovietfacilities on Sakhalin . 13

JMSDF EP - 3 SIGINT Aircraft

The 81st Kokutai at Iwakuni now has five EP - 3 aircraft , which have

much greater endurance and frequency coverage than the EP - 2Js . The first

EP - 3 (No . 9171 ) flew in October 1990 and was delivered to the JMSDF in

March 1991 ; the second was delivered a few months later ; the third aircraftwas flown in June 1995 ; the fourth was delivered in September 1996 ; and thefifth in September 1998 . " The EP - 3s ( as well as the UP - 3D EW training

aircraft ) have been spotted atGifu Air Base , northwest ofNagoya .

It was reported in 1987 , when procurement of

the first EP - 3 was

funded , that nine aircraft were planned . " More recent accounts state that a

fleet of8 - 10 is still intended .

The EP - 3 aircraft , produced by

Kawasaki Heavy Industries , are

modified P - 3C Orion long -rangemaritime patrol (LRMP ) and anti -submarinewarfare (ASW ) aircraft .With four turboprop engines , and a patrol speed of


376 km /h ( 234 mph), the P -3Cs have a mission radius of 3,834 km (2 ,382miles ). "

The EP -3 SIGINT suite , produced locally by NEC and MitsubishiElectric Corporation (MELCO ), covers the frequency range from VHFthrough to the I/J bands with an ELINT capture range of 370 km (230miles)." According to the JMSDF, the ELINT capability of the EP - 3Cs ismore than five times that of the EP -2Js.18

In addition to the

SIGINT suite , the EP - 3s are

equipped with an

ESM /electronic countermeasure (ECM ) system for self -protection . The firstthree aircraft , produced before 1992 ,were given the Magnavox A

N /ALQ - 78

produced under licence by

Mitsubishi . Housed in a radome under the

port

wing root , the AN /ALQ - 78 system provides warning and bearing of

radar

threats in the

2 - 40 GHz band . " The later EP - 3s are equipped with theAN /ALR - 66 ( V ) 3 system produced b

yMELCO under licence to Litton in

California , and which has improved sensitivity and

direction - finding ( DF)

capabilities . The wing -spans of these aircraft were increased by0 . 82 metres

to accommodate the associated ESM antennas and receivers . ? ' A large ESMpod is hung from th

e

lower face of

the

fuselage . 22 These systems are expected

to be replaced by ‘ a new indigenous system ' ,designated HLR -109 . 23

JASDF EC - 1 SIGINT Aircraft

The

JASDF began developing a new airborne SIGINT capability in the

early 1980s , based on

the J /ALR - 1 SIGINT system produced by Toshiba . It

was originally planned to install this system aboard two C -130H transports ,

but this plan was cancelled for cost reasons . Studies showed that installation

of

the Toshiba system would have required a significant and costly redesign

of

theC -130 airframe . 24 Instead , the system was deployed aboard a Kawasaki

C - 1 transport ,which began operations in 1985 . 25

Under a contract signed in March 1983 , Kawasaki modified a C - 1

tactical transport aircraft (JASDF 78 -1021 ) for

use as“ an ECM training

aircraft ' . 26 The C - 1 is a medium -range (maximum about 3 ,000 km ) aircraft ,

with a high wing to maximise cabin volume , produced by

Kawasaki for

the

JASDF in 1973 - 81 . 27

The EC - 1 first flew on

3 December 1984 , and was delivered to the

JASDF ’ s Air Development and Test Wing at Sayama , in Saitama Prefecture ,

in late January 1985 for evaluation . Between April 1985 and March 1986 , theAir Development and Test Wing conducted about 100 test flights , and in

June 1986 it was transferred to the JASDF ' s Electronic Warfare TrainingUnit at Iruma Air Base . 28

Working Paper No .353 5

In addition to the J/ALR - 1 SIGINT system , the EC -1 aircraft isequipped with a Technical Research & Development Institute

(TRDI)/MELCO J/ALQ -5 ECM system . The aircraft has a large , flat,bulbousnose radome, tail radomes , a blister on each side of the forward fuselage a

ft

of

the flight deck side windows , others on

each side of

the rear fuselage , andtwo antennas beneath the fuselage . ? ' It currently serves with the Y

S - 11s at

Iruma Air Base .

JASDF YS -11E SIGINT Aircraft

The IISS reported in 1999 that the JASDF has 10 YS -11E SIGINT /EWaircraft , forming (together with the E

C - 1 ) two squadrons . 30 The YS - 11 is a

twin -turboprop short -range transport produced by

the Nippon Airplane

Manufacturing Company (NAMC ) in the 1960s , with a payload capacity of

5 . 7 tonnes and a range of about 2 ,320 km ( 1 ,440miles ) . "

Martin Streetly reported in 1983 that the first YS - 11 aircraft configured

for EW operations was delivered on

30 March 1965 , that there were three

such YS -11s operating with the Electronic Warfare Training Unit at Iruma in

1981 , including No . 12 -1163 , that these aircraft were “externally characterised

by

numerous avionics fairings ' , and that ' the JASDF has recently orderedadditional aircraft of this type ’ . se

A fourth YS - 11 ELINT aircraft entered service in April 1985 .

According to a contemporary press account , the role of the new aircraft was

to fly

over the northwest Pacific and the Sea of

Japan and intercept radio and

radar signals emitted from Soviet land bases , airfields , and operationalaircraft and warships in the Soviet Far East . It noted that the YS - 11s wereparticularly valuable in monitoring Soviet radars which cannot b

e effectively

monitored by

the

Chobetsu ' s ground stations . "

The JASDF decided in the late 1980s to upgrade three of

the YS - 11

ELINT /EW aircraft . The modifications featured new turboprop engines to

extend the range of

the aircraft ( to 2 ,670 km ) and to cope with the increasedweight and electrical power requirements o

f

the new electronic systems . The

J /ALR - 1 SIGINT system had by

then been superseded by

the much moreadvanced J /ALR - 2 , which was therefore installed o

n

these three aircraft . The

J /ALR - 2 system was produced by

MELCO , but evidently also involved USsub -contractors (such as Signal Technology Corporation ' s Arizona Operationand Space Center ) . The first YS -11E with the J / ALR - 2 SIGINT system ,

No . 12 -1163 , was rolled out on 12 September 1991 and delivered to the

JASDF on

20 December 1991 . The upgrading also included installation of

the

NEC J /ALQ - 7 ECM system . 34 According to the IISS , three more YS -11E


ELINT/EW aircraft were acquired in 1996 , and another three in 1998 ." Theaircraft also operate out of Chitose , in Hokkaido , when conductingmonitoring operations around the Russian Far East .

JMSDF EW Training Aircraft

The JMSDF has acquired eight aircraft for EW training support – threelong-range UP -3D Orions, a UP -3C Orion , and five Learjet U - 36A je

t

aircraft . These are equipped with a wide variety of ESM and ECM systems ,

and comprise a substantial reserve ELINT /EW capability .

The five Learjet U -36As were converted by

Shin Maywa Industries to

serve as fleet training support aircraft for

the JMSDF , beginning with U -36A9201 in November 1985 and U - 36A 9202 in late 1986 , and then 9204 -9206

in the early and mid -1990s . The U - 36As have an operating speed of 590 -770

km / h and a range of 1 ,960 - 4 , 165 km (depending on altitude ) . " Flown by

the

814 Squadron at Iwakuni , they are used for anti -ship missile simulation and

ECM missions . They are equipped with a long - range ocean surveillanceradar , a large underbelly radome housing a scanning antenna , an AN /ALQ - 6

jammer , and an AN /ALE - 43 chaff dispenser .

The three UP - 3D EW training support aircraft (Nos .9161 -9163 ) wereordered from Kawasaki in 1994 - 96 and delivered in 1997 - 99 . 37 The singleUP - 3C aircraft (No .9151 ) , delivered in February 1995 , was initially reported

to be a ' flying testbed ' for the JMSDF , but is also reportedly used as an EWtrainer and calibration aircraft . It has an elongated antenna pointing forwardfrom the nose . In addition to their primary mission systems , these aircraft arealso equipped with the AN /ALR - 66 ( V ) 3 ESM system installed o

n all recentJMSDF P - 3C Orions .

Rear Admiral Makoto Yamazaki , Director of

the Logistics Department

of

the JMSDF ' s Maritime Staff Office , noted in 1996 that the UP - 3D EWtraining support aircraft have sufficient capability and flexibility to support a

wide range of

post -Cold War 'duties ' :

The UP - 3D is an electronic warfare training support aircraft , of whichone was programmed fo

r

each year from fiscal years 1993 through

1995 . The training support aircraft presently possessed by

theMSDF is

the U - 36A , which is used actively in the

electronic warfare training of

the fleets . However , this aircraft is basically designed for jamming theradar o

fa single ship and is not capable of jamming radar nor the

communications ofan entire unit . The UP - 3D has been designed to

create a highly composite electronic warfare environment and to

support air

defense training of

surface ships more effectively .

Working Paper No.353 7

The above equipment was programmed in the transitory period

immediately after the end of the Cold War and was presupposed tofollow previously established duties without alteration . However , inthe future , it is necessary to consider equipment which can deal with awider variety of duties based on the new NDPO [National DefenseProgram Outline ) while using the existing technology of aboveequipment as a basis ."

JASDF E- 2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning Aircraft

The JASDF now has the

second -most -extensive AEW & C capability in

the world . The aircraft are used to greatly extend warning of intrusions into

Japanese airspace , and would serve asa powerful ‘ force multiplier ' for the

JASDF in air

defence contingencies . Although they are known more for theirradar /rotodome configurations , their SIGINT collection , analysis and

exploitation capabilities are substantial .The JASDF currently has 13 E - 2C Hawkeye E - 2C aircraft ,operated b

y

its

6015 AEW Squadron , whose home base is with the Northern Aircraft

Control and Warning Wing atMisawa on Honshu Island . This is the largest

E - 2C force outside the US Navy . The first eight were acquired between 1982and 1984 , and the other five in 1992 - 93 .

The E - 2C AEW aircraft have a length of

17 . 6 metres , a wing -span of

24 . 56 metres , a payload capacity of 6 ,000 kg , a cruising speed of 600 km / hr ,

anda maximum range of2 , 550

km or

an endurance of

more than six

hours .

They have a crew of

five , comprising the pilot and co -pilot on the flight deck ,

and three staff of

the Combat Information Center . 4° Operating from landbases (rather than aircraft carriers , for which they were designed for the USNavy ) , the airframes have a

n expected service life of

40 years . The

operational readiness of

the JASDF ' s Hawkeye fleet ,which completed morethan 6

0 ,000 flying hours (without an accident ) in October 1999 , is extremelyhigh . 41

The

air

defence of

Japan had been the

JASDF ' s highest priority since

its

foundation in the 1950s . By the mid -1970s , the JASDF had five squadrons

ofF -1043 Starfighters and two squadrons ofF -4EJ Phantoms , and was just

beginning to introduce itsF - 15 Eagles ,which would equip eight squadrons

by the late 1990s . It had built a network of28

fixed radar sites interlinked

through the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE ) air

defence

network across the country to provide constant surveillance in most of

theairspace ' , but these had limited range against aircraft intruding a

t

low

altitudes , and had 'insufficient electronic warfare capabilities ’ . The need for


an AEW capability for

long -range surveillance and early detection of

offensive air attacks was accepted by defence planners . There was also

considerable pressure from the United States for procurement of a substantial

AEW capability .The eventual decision to acquire a

n airborne early warning capability

was prompted by

the Belenko affair in September 1976 , when the defecting

Soviet fighter pilot flew his

MiG - 25 from Chuguyevka (about 120 milesnortheast o

f

Vladivostok ) across the Sea of Japan and landed at

HakodateAirport , some 9

0 miles southwest of

Chitose , in Hokkaido , without being

intercepted by

Japanese fighter aircraft . 43

The Grumman E - 2C was selected rather than the Boeing E - 3 becausethe Sentry was too expensive , exceeded required capabilities , and could b

e

used on only a limited number of

Japanese runways , whereas the E -2Cscoulduse almost any airfield . * *

The operational concept for

the E -2Cs was to provide ' threecontinuous surveillance points over Japan ' s air and sea lanes ' – the areaaround Hokkaido , the Sea o

f

Japan , and the East China Sea – as well as a

capability to be 'scrambled ' with JASDF fighters to investigate intrusions

into Japan ' s airspace . With only the eightHawkeyes acquired in 1982 - 84 , thiswas not possible . Only two 'points ' could b

e

covered : the northern part of theSea o

f Japan and the Sea of

Okhotsk west and north of

Hokkaido , and thecentral sector over the main breadth o

f

the Sea of Japan . Twelve aircraft were

necessary to cover the East China Sea aswell . 4s

Although based at Misawa , the E -2Cs also operate from Gifu , and

during special missions , and especially when more intensive electronicsurveillance o

f

orth Korea is required , they also deploy to Nyutabaru AirBase in Miyazaki Prefecture and Tsuiki Air Base in Fukuoka Prefecture ,

Kyushu . 46

The first eight Japanese E -2Cs were originally equipped with theAN /APS - 125 radar system , but the next five carried the AN / APS -145 radar .

The first eight were re -fitted with the AN /APS -145 later in the 1990s . Withthe aircraft flying a

t9 ,150 metres ( 30 , 000 feet ) , the AN /APS -145 is able to

detect targets as

small as

cruise missiles at ranges over 185 km , fighter

aircraft at ranges up to 370 km , and larger aircraft up

to 465 km away . The E

2Cs are also equipped with some 30 other electronic devices ,which combine

to give a picture of

targets , tracks and trajectories , and signal emissions , all

duly processed . " The passive ELINT /ESM systems are located on the nose

and tail , and on the tips of

the tailplane for lateral coverage . The principal


ELINT/ESM system on the E -2Cs is the AN /ALR -73 Passive DetectionSystem (PDS ), which can detect the presence of electronic emitters at rangesup to twice that of the radar system - typically in excess of 600 km .“8 As aGrumman official has described :

If the radar represents the eyes of the Hawkeye then the PassiveDetection System is it

s

ears . With a monitoring envelope greater thanthe radar , the completely passive system provides the operators with a

bearing to the emitter , its type , and the classification of

the platform .

The range to the emitter can be determined with triangulation . “ 9

In May 1997 , the JASDF contracted with Grumman for modificationand enhancement o

f

its

13E -2Cs with the Update II Mission Suite , at a cost

of

US $400 million , in order to maintain both the operational readiness of thefleet and it

s interoperability with US and NATO E -2Cs . " When the decisionwas made to acquire the four E -767 AEW & C aircraft in the early 1990s , theJASDF also considered the future roles o

f

the Hawkeyes . In April 1993 ,

General Isao Ishizuki , the Chief of

Staff of

the

JASDF , argued that together

the E -2Cs and E -767s would provide a flexible threat -warning capability . Hesaid that :

The E - 2C will be used for

low

altitude early warning of threats . [ They

will ] not necessarily have a maritime role only , but will be operateddependent o

n the threat . . . A solely maritime role will be

inappropriate . "

In June 1999 , E -2Cs from Misawa accompanied F - 15 fighters fromHyakuri Air Base to Guam to participate in Exercise Cope North Guam ' 99

with the US Air

Force . This was the

first occasion in which the JASDF haddeployed fighter aircraft outside Japan . The exercise involved training in a

ircombat tactics ,airborne ai

r

control , and 'electronic combat ’ . S ? According to a

Japanese press account , the deployment to Guam permitted more realistic EW

training , 'using strong radio waves that cannot be allowed in Japan ' . " A

second joint exercise involving JASDF F -15Js and E - 2Cs , Exercise Cope

North Guam ' 00 , took place in Guam on

30 May - 3 June 2000 . 54

In December 1998 , the Board of Audit reported that the United Stateshad failed to deliver important 'communication components 'which the JapanDefense Agency (IDA ) had ordered for the JASDF ' s Hawkeyes in 1996 . "

The JASDF announced in August 1999 that because of shortage of spare

parts , it plans to maintain only eight E -2Cs , gradually withdrawing the otherfive aircraft from active service . "


JASDF /Boeing E- 767 Airborne Warning and Control AircraftBy th

e

time the government agreed to the procurement of

the

second

batch ofE - 2Cs in the late 1980s , it was already clear that a much better

airborne early warning and control capability was required than the

currentgeneration o

f Hawkeyes could provide . By

the late 1980s , Japan ' s air defencesituation had deteriorated considerably . The deployment to the Soviet FarEast o

f

Tu -22M Backfires equipped with AS - 4 Kitchen air - to - surface missiles

(with both nuclear and conventional warheads , and ranges of

300 -460 km

depending on

the altitude at launch ) meant that missile attacks could be

launched against Japan from bombers beyond the detection range of

the E

2Cs . Moreover , the

E -2Cs lacked the ability to operate as

airborne control

centres . 57

There was also a lot ofUS pressure on Tokyo to purchase a substantial

AEW & C capability . The US government was concerned about burdensharing issues and the 1 ,000 mile SLOC defence agreement ' , but the strategicrequirements were ‘entangled with US -Japan trade issues ' , as any AWACSpurchase would involve expensive off - the -shelf purchases from the UnitedStates . " Members o

f

Congress were insisting that Japan acquire a minimum

of

12

to 14 AWACS aircraft , hopefully the Boeing E - 3 Sentry AWACS

(which would also involve tanker requirements ) . 59

However , some Japanese officials remained unpersuaded about thenecessity fo

r

such a large capability . In May 1991 , as Tokyo vacillated ,

Boeing closed the production line for its

707 aircraft , which provided the E - 3

airframe , but proposed to Tokyo a 767 AWACS design . Although the

767

aircraft is more expensive than the 707 , it has a longer range , the

wide -bodyconfiguration provides much more floorspace , and it can use most Japanese

airfields . º - Japan has no air- to - air

refuelling capability .

The government decided to procure an initial two E -767s in December

1992 , and placed the order in November 1993 . A second pair was ordered in

1994 . The first two deployed to Hamamatsu Air Base , in ShizuokaPrefecture , in March 1998 , and the other two in January 1999 . After a year o

f

‘operational testing ' , they entered service with the

JASDF in May 2000 . 03

By

the time they were ordered , the AWACS aircraft were reckoned by

JASDF officers to be among the highest hardware priorities . In particular ,

there was an expressed requirement for 'AWACS that has a range that can fly

to the Spratlys ' . 0 *

The E - 767 AWACS combines the 767 -200ER airframe with the APY

2 radar and a suite of

modern electronic systems . The 767 aircraft are

48 . 5

Working Paper No . 353 11

metres long , have a maximum take - off

weight of

175 ,000 kg , a maximumcruising speed o

f

more than 800 km / h , a service ceiling of12 ,000 metres , a

range of8 ,300 to 9 ,200 km unrefuelled , and an endurance of8 - 12 hours

depending on

the distance to the area of

operations . With refuelling , theendurance is extended to 22 hours . They carry a crew o

f two pilots and 18

mission specialists . "The A

N /APY - 2 radar , which is mounted in a 9 . 1 metre diametercircular radome above the aircraft fuselage , was developed for the E - 3

AWACS . It provides 360° coverage , operates at about 10 GHz in the E / F

bands , and at operating altitudes can detect targets more than 320 km (200

miles ) away . When functioning in a passive mode , it is used to detect and

track in -band ( E / F band ) jammers , and to process ECM data for electronic

counter -countermeasures (ECCM ) purposes . "

The E -767s are also equipped with the AN /AYR - 1 advanced ESM

system , produced by

Boeing in the

mid -1990s for

upgraded E - 3 AWACSaircraft , which intercepts , analyses and identifies both radar and radio signals .

Antenna elements ,which are housed in two large blisters on

either side of

the

aircraft , just aft of

the cockpit , as well as nose and tail -mounted arrays ,

provide 360° coverage . It is able to intercept radar emissions at ranges in

excess of

800 km .

In peacetime , the

E - 767s are used for ' information gathering ' (ELINT

collection ) as well as training activities . In crisis and conflict situations , theoperational concept fo

r

the E -767s is to deploy the four aircraft to the

closest

airfield and use them to maintain a continuous airborne early warning ,

surveillance and control capability in any area of

operations out to 1 ,000 nm .

The JASDF ' s E -767s are designed to cooperate closely with United

States Air Force (USAF ) AWACS , and to provide intelligence to US forcesoperating near Japan , as outlined in th

e

updated guidelines for

bilateralcooperation . It has been suggested that the USAF and the JASDF might sharecertain airborne warning and surveillance tasks , such a

s , in the case of

the

Korean peninsula , the USAF ' s E - 3 aircraft based at Kadena in Okinawa

would cover the western side while the JASDF ' s E -767s would patrol theeastern side . The primary mission equipment aboard the E -767s wasdeveloped for the JASDF b

y

the USAF ' s Electronic Systems Center at

Hanscom Air Force Base in Massachusetts , and was tested before delivery by

a detachment of

the USAF ' s 66th Test Squadron . The Joint TacticalInformation Distribution System (JTIDS ) allows the JASDF ' s E -767s to

exchange data with US and NATO E - 3 AWACS aircraft . A USAF E -767


AWACS team is based at Yokota Air Base to support the JASDF E -767programme .

JASDF RF-4EJ Reconnaissance Aircraft

For tactical ELINT operations , the

JASDF has equipped 17 RF-4EJ

Kai reconnaissance aircraft with ELINT pods produced by

MELCO andbased o

n

the Analyseur Superheterodyne Tactique (ASTAC ) systemproduced b

y

Thomson -CSF in France . The pods are capable of detecting ,

analysing and locating modern threat radars in a dense electromagnetic

environment . ' The great advantage of the pods is that they provide a

substantial ELINT capability with minimal modification required of

the

aircraft , thus allowing retention of

the RF -4EJ ' s multi -role fightercapabilities . They are operated by the 5014 Air Reconnaissance Squadron a

t

Hyakuri Air Base , northeast of Tokyo , which also maintains an ELINT

ground processing station .

A decision to order 14 RF - 4E Phantoms from McDonnell Douglas wasapproved b

y

the Japanese Cabinet in October 1972 , as a replacement for the501 " Squadron ' s RF -86F Sabres . " These were delivered to the JASDFbetween November 1974 and June 1975 . They were unarmed , and were fittedfor photographic reconnaissance rather than ELINT collection . The 1

3

surviving aircraft were upgraded in the early 1990s , with a new radar

(AN /APG -172 ) , digital avionics , an infra -red surveillance system , and a new

J /APR - 6 radar warning system . Twin aft -facing radomes for this system weremounted o

n the fin tip

and forward -facing antennas on the wingtips . They

were also fitted for carrying the Westinghouse AN /ALQ - 161 advanced multimode ECM pod , which has a wide range o

f

modules and re -programmable

software ,making it capable of

quickly countering new threats .

However , the JDA had realised by 1989 that 'the inventory ofRF - 4E is

inadequate in number ' , and the JASDF decided to convert 17F -4EJ fighters

into reconnaissance aircraft and to equip them with the ASTAC ELINT /ESMsystem . In addition to Hyakuri Air Base , the RF -4EJs also operate out of

Chitose .

The ASTAC ELINT /ESM system is made up of

microscan receiversfor high - resolution measurement o

f signal parameters and interferometers for

providing DF with accuracy better than 1° , across the frequency band from

0 . 5 to 40 GHz . The design enables incorporation of enhanced processing

capabilities and extension of

the frequency coverage . 74 From an altitude of

40 ,000 feet , it provides instantaneous coverage of

an area of

164 ,000 square


nauticalmiles on the ground , and is able to intercept airborne radar emissionsout to a distance o

f

some 520 nauticalmiles . 75

The pods also contain a UHF data - link for

air - to - ground transmissionof

the intercepted ELINT data to the ground processing station , which

'enables a very rapid build - up of the electronic order of battle of

the observed

area ' . Data are also stored in a recording system in the pod for 'post - flight

analysis ' . ? ?

JGSDF LR - 1 Liaison and Reconnaissance Aircraft

The Japanese Ground Self -Defense Force (JGSDF ) currently operates

ten

LR - 1 liaison and reconnaissance aircraft . " These are modified MU - 2M

twin -turboprop short -take -off -and -landing (STOL ) utility transport aircraft ,

produced by

Mitsubishi in the 1970s and 1980s . These aircraft have a cabinlength o

f

about 3 . 2 metres , a cruising speed of

about 500 km / h , and a

maximum range of2 ,700 km . " They are based at Camp Utsunomiya , Tochigi

Prefecture .

Airborne SIGINT Operations

A fleet of

several dozen SIGINT aircraft , comprising more than half a

dozen quite different types of

aircraft and associated SIGINT systems ,

together with the inherent operational flexibility of

aircraft and a body of

highly trained operators , provides Japan with capabilities for

undertaking a

wide variety of

SIGINT operations , both on

a regularly scheduled basis and

expeditiously as close monitoring of particular events is required . The range

and payload capacities of

the EP - 3 and E -767 aircraft permit missions to be

undertaken at

substantial distances from Japanese territory . Both the JASDFand the JMSDF are now able to undertake radio reconnaissance patrols , and

to engage in electronic warfare , in a broad area from the Bering Sea and theAleutian Islands in the north to th

e

Spratly Islands and the South China Sea ,

and from the Sino /Russian littoral to the mid -Pacific Ocean . Airborneactivities are regularly undertaken to intercept signals emanating from

Russia , North Korea and China , as well as from aircraft intruding intoJapanese airspace and from ships in surrounding waters .

( i ) Collection of

Electronic Order of Battle (EOB )

The most routine activity ofthe

Japanese airborne SIGINT aircraft ,

conducted almost continuously , is the collection of

data about electronic

emitters in adjacent countries , and its compilation into an electronic order of

battle (EOB ) for

Japan ' s region of primary strategic interest . The EOBconsists of

the location of

each detected signal emitter and the parameters of

the signals , such as

the frequency (wavelength ) , strength , pulse rate , pulse


repetition frequency (PRF ), scan rate , antenna pattern (beam width ), antennagain , antenna polarisation , pulse width and pulse shape , and the transmissionschedules , and catalogued for expeditious identification of subsequentlyintercepted signals .80

In peacetime and crisis situations , monitoring of the EOB is animportant 'warning indicator '. Changes in important elements of the EOB ,especially the communications and other electronic emissions integral to orclosely associated with command and control centres , military bases ,

airfields, and naval ports , reveal much about deployments , movements , andalert levels , and hence about likely actions. In conflict situations , the quality

of the EOB is amajor ingredient in the success of EW operations .

Electronic reconnaissance for production and monitoring of EOB data

is the principal task of some of the YS -11E , the EP- 3 and the RF -4EJ aircraft,and is a common task of the E -2C and E -767 early warning and controlaircraft . Both the JASDF and JMSDF must have compiled EOB about theRussian Far East and North Korea of extraordinary precision , detail, andthoroughness .

( ii) Ocean Surveillance

Japanese defence planners have emphasised that Japan is an island

nation dependent on imports of food , energy and raw materials for

its

survival . An active maritime surveillance posture provides forewarning of

threats against Japanese territory and merchant shipping . The JDA hasdeclared that ‘inasmuch a

s Japan takes an exclusively defense oriented

policy , it is highly important to conduct at all

times warning and surveillanceactivities in territorial waters and adjacent sea areas , and the airspaceabove ' . 81

SIGINT activities remain the

principal component of

ocean

surveillance . The main straits controlling access to and from the Sea of

Japan

(Tsushima , Tsugaru and Soya ) are monitored continuously by

both ships and

land -based coastal surveillance units . The 1977 defence White Paper outlined

an operational requirement for

the

MSDF ' s fixed -wing anti -submarineaircraft ‘ o

f patrolling the seas around Japan ona daily basis - when the

necessity arises - at ranges of

about 300 nautical miles from the Pacific coast

and 100 -200 nauticalmiles from the Sea of Japan coast ; and of deploying one

squadron to each of

the ocean and coastal sea lanes when the necessity for

ship protection arises ' . 82 In May 1981 , prime minister Zenko Suzuki gave a

further commitment to ' strengthen our defense capability in order to defend


several hundred miles of surrounding waters and the sea -lanes to a distanceof 1,000 miles '.Long -range patrol and surveillance is chiefly the responsibility of the

JMSDF 's substantial fleet of P -3C Orions.8%Daily surveillance flights arecurrently conducted over the waters around Hokkaido , the Sea of Japan andEast China Sea .84

The P -3C's ESM systems (the AN /ALQ - 78 in earlier aircraft and theAN /ALR -66 (V ) 3 in later ones ) are at least as important as their active radar(the AN /APS -115 ) in detecting and identifying vessels. The EP-3s perform a

more specialised function , depending entirely on their passive COMINT andELINT systems fo

r

identification of

emitting platforms .

The EP - 3s

conduct regular electronic reconnaissance flights over the

main maritime approaches to Japan . For example , one is responsible for thesouthern part o

f

the Sea of

Japan , opposite North Korea , and along thewestern coastline o

f

Honshu from Akita to Shimane prefectures . According

to Admiral Satoshi Takemura , commander of

the JMSDF base atMaizuru ,

Kyoto Prefecture , 'general surveillance is handled by

an EP - 3 patrol plane ,

which monitors the region ' . 8

( iii ) Sovereignty Intrusions

The airspace surrounding Japan is monitored around -the - clock by

ground -based radar stations , while the critical approaches are patrolled daily

by

E - 2C Hawkeyes , and the E -767s are now available for AEW & C

operations further afield . The ESM systems aboard the E -2Cs and the E -767sare the first to detect approaching aircraft , and provide identification .

During the Cold War , the JASDF was concerned principally withintrusions into Japan ' s air defence identification zone (ADIZ ) b

y

Soviet

aircraft . JASDF interceptors were frequently scrambled in response to flightsby both Soviet combat aircraft ( fighters and bombers ) and reconnaissanceaircraft . In the 1980s , as shown in Table 9 . 2 , the Soviets conducted more than300 surveillance flights around Japanese airspace a year . These activitiesbegan to decrease in 1988 , although the JDA reported a

n increase in Russianflights close to Japanese airspace during 1998 - 99 . 80 Since the end of the ColdWar , the JASDF has also scrambled to intercept Chinese and North Koreanjet aircraft . The first occasion involving Chinese jets occurred o

n

24 August

1995 , when JASDF fighters scrambled as

the Chinese aircraft nearedJapanese airspace close to th

e

disputed Senkaku Islands . * 7 And in the case of

North Korea , the JASDF ' s E - 2C Hawkeyes patrolling over the Sea of Japan

on

24 March 1999 , when 'suspicious ' North Korean boats were found inside


the Japanese ADIZ , detected four North Korean jets (probably MiG -21s ) andvectored two F - 15J fighters tomeet them .88

( iv ) Telemetry Collection

The north Pacific is the

most active area in the world in terms of

missile test launches and telemetry interception operations .During the ColdWar , the Soviet Union regularly launched dozens of inter -continental ballisticmissiles (ICBMs ) per year in development and operational tests into splash

down areas around the Kamchatka peninsula . The United States developed an

amazing array of

ground -based , satellite -borne , ship -borne and airbornesystems for interception o

fthe telemetry transmitted from themissiles back to

the Sovietmissile development facilities . The most expensive andmost secretprogramme involved the Rhyolite geostationary SIGINT satellites . The mostsophisticated US airborne system is code -named Cobra Ball , and involvesRC -135 aircraft equipped with a

n Advanced Telemetry System , which aresometimes stationed a

t Kadena , Okinawa . ” Although designed for

interception of Soviet ballistic missile telemetry , the Cobra Ball aircraft also

monitored Chinese missile launches and , more recently , North Koreanlaunches . In March 1996 , for example , a Cobra Ball aircraft monitoredChinese missiles fired into Taiwan ' s shipping lanes , and soon after monitoredNorth Korean tests . In May 1997 , a Cobra Ball aircraft monitored the NorthKorean test o

fan anti -ship cruise missile . 92 In June 2000 , ITAR -TASS

reported that an RC -135 was deployed to Kadena in anticipation ofa second

test of

China ' s Dong Feng - 31 ICBM . ”

Japan began its own airborne operations to monitor regional ballistic

missile development programmes in the early 1990s , initially using EP - 2JSIGINT aircraft and then the EP - 3s . Since the late 1980s , the JDA had beenincreasingly concerned about North Korea ' s ballistic missile programme ,

based on Scud - B and Scud - C technology . On 29 May 1993 , the North

Koreans conducted the first test launch of

the Nodong - 1 medium -range

ballistic missile (MRBM ) , which splashed into the Sea of Japan west of theNoto peninsula , on the mid -west of Honshu . An EP - 2J SIGINT aircraftintercepted the telemetry signals transmitted from the missiles back to

technicians in North Korea . "

On 31 August 1998 , when North Korea test -fired its

new Taepodong - 1

intermediate -range ballistic missile (IRBM ) in a trajectory which passed overJapan and into the north Pacific Ocean , the telemetry was intercepted b

yan

EP - 3 SIGINT collector . ” The recordings of

this telemetry were taken first to

the Electronic Data Analysis Department at Iwakuni , and then transmitted to

the Electronic Information Support Unit assigned to the

JMSDF Fleet


Command at Yokosuka , Kanagawa Prefecture , and then to various JDAsections .

(v ) Electronic Warfare Training

Both the JASDF and JMSDF have extraordinary capabilities forproviding training in ELINT collection and EW operations . Their exercisesand simulations are as realistic as possible , using ELINT collection flights toupgrade EOB tables and inform EW training .

The JMSDF 's EW training capability , with the five Learjet UA - 36As,the UP-3C and the three UP - 3D aircraft , is especially strong . In particular , theability of the UP -3Ds ' to create a highly composite electronic warfareenvironment ', as Rear Admiral Makoto Yamazaki noted in 1996 , is extremelyimportant in exercising the a

ir

defence of

JMSDF battle groups . ”

( vi ) Monitoring Special Events

Airborne systems have the flexibility and responsiveness to deploy

rapidly , and at

short notice , and can be fitted with the most appropriateequipment fo

r

the occasion , for monitoring crises or other special events .

This is especially the case with the EP - 3s , which have the range to undertake

collection operations with substantial times - on - station at

distances beyond

those reachable by

other platforms .

Until the beginning of

the 1990s , the crises which warranted theimmediate deployment o

f

airborne SIGINT assets generally involved theSoviet Union . The JASDF ' s YS -11Es were procured primarily fo

roperations

against Soviet radio and radar sources . The E - 2C service began withcoverage o

f

the northern part of

the Sea of

Japan and around Hokkaido ,

monitoring Soviet electronic activity from Vladivostok north through

Sakhalin and east through the Kuril Islands . The JMSDF ' s EP -2Js were alsoused mainly to monitor the electronic emissions from Soviet activities . Sincethen , however , Japan ' s listening aircraft have been flown to monitor activitiesinvolving China and North Korea much more frequently . During the Chinesemissile firings into Taiwanese sealanes in March 1996 , for example , JMSDF

EP - 3s and JASDF E - 2Cs maintained virtually continuous stations over the

southern part of

the East China Sea , from where they could interceptelectronic signals emanating from a large area in China , extending beyondZhejiang and Fujian provinces , as well as from Taiwanese naval and a

ir

defences . Six

months later , in October , up to six E -2Cs were deployed on

Okinawa to monitor a joint Hong Kong -Taiwanese flotilla of

civilianprotesters sailing in the vicinity o

f

the Senkaku Islands disputed among

Japan , China and Taiwan . ”


Since 1993, when suspicions arose about North Korea's nuclearweapons development which provoked a major international crisis , Japan 'sintelligence -collection aircraft have responded to numerous unusual, aberrantor potentially dangerous North Korean actions . During the 1993 crisis , theJMSDF and JASDF mounted wide-ranging electronic reconnaissance flights ,involving EP -3, RF -4E , YS -11E and E-2C aircraft .99On 9 July 1994 , whenPyongyang announced the death of President Kim Il-sung, E -2C , EP- 3 andYS-11E aircraft were dispatched for flights along the North Korean peninsulato monitor North Korean a

ir activity in order to discern any unsettling

behaviour . 100

When North Korea launched its Taepodong - 1 IRBM on 31

August 1998 , not only was an EP - 3 used to intercept the missile telemetry ,

but from around 15 August ELINT collection systems were also deployed to

the Sea of Japan ( including the

Aegis -equipped Myoko DDG destroyer ) .

The frequency ofE - 2C patrols over the

southwestern sector of

the Sea of

Japan was also increased , thus enhancing both radar and ELINT coverage . 102

An EP - 3 SIGINT aircraft , together with a P - 3C LRMP aircraft , flew to

the area west of

Tsushima Island in December 1998 to monitor a small - scalenaval firefight in which South Korean patrol boats , supported b

y

fighter

aircraft , sank a North Korean submersible vessel which the South Koreanshad found attempting to land espionage agents near the southern port city o

f

Yosu . ' ' s In April 1999 , when the 'suspicious 'North Korean boats were found

in the ADIZ , the E -2Cs again used both radar and ELINT systems to locatethe boats aswell as guard against North Korean fighter intervention . "

( vii) Warfighting

The JSDF can reasonably expect to be well served by

its

airborne

SIGINT systems in the event ofits

involvement in conventional hostilities inthe northwest Pacific o

r

the East Asian littoral . They should be able to

establish and maintain control of

the electromagnetic spectrum , providingtimely intelligence for strategic and operational planning , as well a

s

electronic intelligence to support EW operations , including ECM for

both

offensive purposes and protection of

JSDF forces .

The JSDF would enter any

such hostilities with the

mostcomprehensive and detailed EOB data . It would almost certainly have thelargest airborne SIGINT fleet , including some of the most advanced types

(such as

the

EP - 3s and E - 767s ) , equipped with the best SIGINT and EW

systems , and operated by very well -trained SIGINT /EW personnel .


Table 1:Airborne SIGINT Systems

Aircraft No Base Range (km ) Comments

YS - 11E | 10 2,320- 2,670Iruma AirBase

2 E-P3 5 Iwakuni 7, 760

Operated by

JASDF Air

| Electronic Research Unit .

Equipped with J /ALR - 2 SIGINTsystem .

Includes serial numbers 12 -1162 ,

12 -1163 , 02 -1159 , 92 - 1157 , 12

1161 , 82 -1155 .

Operated by

No . 81 Air SupportSquadron , JMSDF .

Serial numbers 9171 -9175 .

First delivery March 1991 .

Replaced two P - 2J SIGINT

aircraft .

8 - 10 aircraft planned .

Operated by

JASDF 501 " AirReconnaissance Squadron .

Operated by

JASDF 6015 AirWarning Squadron .

3 | RF-4EJ | 17 1 ,700Hyakuri Air

Base

Misawa AirBase

13

2 ,550E - 2C

Hawkeye

5 8 ,300 - 9 ,200E - 767 | 4

AWACSHamamatsu

Air Base

EC - 1 3 ,000Iruma Air

Base

7 UP - 3D 3 Iwakuni 7 ,670

18 | UP -3C1 Iwakuni 7 ,670

First two delivered in March 1998

(Nos . 64 -3501 and 64 -3502 ) ;

second pair in early 1999 .

Equipped with J /ALR - 1 SIGINTsystem .

First test flight in 1985 .

JMSDF EW training aircraft .

Serial numbers 9161 -9163 .

Delivered 1998 - 99 .

JMSDF EW training aircraft .

Serial number 9151 .

Delivered in February 1995 .

JMSDF ECM training support

aircraft .

Operated by 81 Air Support

Squadron .

Serial numbers 9201 , 9202 , 9204 ,

9205 , 9206 .

JGSDF liaison and reconnaissanceaircraft .

Delivered in the 1970s and 1980s .

5 Iwakuni 1 ,960 - 4 , 165UA - 36ALearjets

10

LR - 1 10

2 ,700Camp

Utsunomiya


Table 2: Soviet/Russian Military Aircraft Activities around Japan ,

1983 - 93

Year No . of flights

315

345

354

347

320

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

295

260

240

210

176

149

Source : Japan Defense Agency,Defense of Japan (Japan Defense Agengy,Tokyo , various issues).


Figure 1: Japanese SIGINT Aircraft Bases

Sea ofOkhotsk

RUSSIA

CHINA

Rama

reMisawa( E - 20 )NORTH

KOREA Sea of

Japan

SOUTH

KOREA

Iruma

MEC - 1 , YS - 11E) .

TOKYOHyakuri

( RF - 4EJ)

Iwakuni

( EP- 3 ) Hamamatsu

( E - 767 )

PACIFIC OCEAN

500

i bilometers soo

kilometres


Figure 2 : Curtiss C -46D (91-1140 ) Commando SIGINT Aircraft

0011-

16

Source : Streetly ,World Electronic Warfare Aircraft , p . 43 .


Figure 3: Kawasaki/ JMSDF EP - 3 SIGINT Aircraft (No. 9171)

Source : Japan Defense Agency : <http://www . jda. go. jp /JMSDF /data /equip /gallery / img /link /ep

301 _ m .jpg > .


Figure 4 : Kawasaki/JASDF EC - 1 (78 -1021) SIGINT Aircraft ,Gifu AirBase, 7 September 1988

Source :Norio Aoki: <http://www .usiwakamaru .or. jp/~strgzr/aircraft /index _ e. htm> .


Figure 5:NAMC /JASDF YS - 11EA (12 -1163 ) SIGINT Aircraft

Source : Lambert (ed.), Jane 's All

the Worlds Aircraft , 1994 - 95 , p .237 .


Figure 6 :NAMCIJASDF YS - 11EB (92 -1157) SIGINT Aircraft ,

Chitose Air Base

LS11

-26

Source : Hidehiro Takahashi : < http : / /www .geocities . co . jp /SweetHome /2998 / 92 -1157 .jpg > .


Figure 7: NAMCIJASDF YS -11E (12 -1162) SIGINT Aircraft,

Chitose Air Base

:

Source : Hidehiro Takahashi: <http://www .geocities .co. jp/SweetHome /2998/12-1162.jpg>.


Figure 8:NAMCIJASDF YS11E (82 -1155) SIGINT Aircraft ,

Chitose Air Base

9911

-CB

"

S91

Source : Hidehiro Takahashi : < http : / /www .geocities . co . jp /SweetHome /2998 / 82 -1155 .jpg > .


Figure 9: NAMC/JASDF YS -11E (02 -1159) SIGINT Aircraft

YS- 11EB1

59

Source : Akira Sahara : < http : / /www .linkclub . or . jp / ~ strange /jsdf /jmsdf /JMSDF05 .htm > .


Figure 10 : Kawasaki/JMSDF UP -3D (No.9161 )

Source : Japan Defense Agency :< h

ttp: / /www . jda. go . jp / JMSDF / data/equip /gallery / img/ link/ up -3d01 _ m . jpg> .


Figure 11 : Shin Maywa / JMSDF Learjet U -36A ECM Training Aircraft(No. 9202 )

Source : Japan Defense Agency:<http://www . jd

a. go. jp / JMSDF /data /equip /gallery / img / link / u - 36a01 _ m . jpg > .


Figure 12:Grumman/JASDF E -2C Early -Warning Aircraft(No . 34 -3460),Misawa Air Base

Source : Atsushi Tsubota: <http://www .people.or.jp/~Atsubo /DATA1/E2.htm>.


Figure 13: JASDF E -767 Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft(No. 64 -3502 ), Hamamatsu Air Base

WWW

COOK

Source : Atsushi Tsubota : < http : / /www .people . or . jp / -Atsubo /DATA1 /E767 .htm > .


Figure 14 : Comparative E - 2C and E -767 Operational Areas

Shadedareasrepresentlow-altitudecoverageby 28radarsitesthroughoutJapan

Operational range

of E -2Cs(example of operations

by three E-2Cs )

Examplesarebasedon theassumptionthatE-2Cswillbeoperatedona fixedbasis,whileE-767swillbeoperatedonamobilebasisdependingon thesituation

CHINA RUSSIA

NORTHKOREA

SOUTHKOREA

Operational

range of

E-7678

PACIFIC OCEAN500

kilometres

Source : Japan Defense Agency ( JDA ), Defenseof Japan 1993, p.112.


Figure 15 : JASDF RF -4EJ Reconnaissance Aircraft

RF-EJ

Source : Akira Sahara: <http://www . linkclub .or. jp/~strange/jsdf/ jasdf/rf4ej .JPG >.


Figure 16 : JGSDF LR -1 Liaison and Reconnaissance Aircraft

1.

9107A

91022

SU

Source : Norio Aoki : < http : / /www .usiwakamaru . or . jp / - strgzr /aircraft / index _ e . htm> .


Figure 17 : E - 2C ELINT Coverage , East China Sea Deployment

117 125E

31°N

Hangzhoun

PACIFIC

OCEAN

600kmCHINA

27°N

Fuzhou

Quanzhou

Zhangzhou

Taiwan Strait

Taipei

Xiamen

TAIWAN

Shantou

100 200 300 km


Notes

1 Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Defense of Japan 1992 (Japan DefenseAgency , Tokyo, 1992 ), p .259 .

2 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ), Defense of Japan 1995 (Japan DefenseAgency , Tokyo , 1995 ) , p .285. See also Eiichiro Sekigawa and MichaelMecham , 'Japan Eyes New Programs, But Pays fo

r

AWACS Now ' ,

Aviation Week & Space Technology , 21March 1994 , pp. 62 - 3 .

3 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) , Defense of Japan 1989 (Japan Defense

Agency , Tokyo , 1989 ) , p .316 ; and Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) ,Defense

of

Japan 1990 (Japan Defense Agency , Tokyo 1990 ) , p .289 .

4 Tetsushi Kajimoto , ‘ASDF Takes Delivery of AWACS Planes ' , Japan

Times , 26 March 1998 , pp. 1 , 3 ; and 'First Two 767 AWACS Delivered to

Japan ' , Defense News , 30 March - 8 April 1998 , p . 33 .

5 Eiichiro Sekigawa and Michael Mecham , 'Japan Eyes New Programs ,

But Pays For AWACS Now ' , Aviation Week & Space Technology , 21

March 1994 , pp. 62 - 3 .

6 Martin Streetly ,World Electronic Warfare Aircraft (Jane ' s PublishingCompany Limited , London , 1983 ) , p

p. 42 - 3 .

7 John Welfield , An Empire in Eclipse : Japan in the Postwar American

Alliance System ( The Athlone Press , London , 1988 ) , pp . 110- 11 ,354 ; and

Joseph P . Keddell , The Politics of Defense in Japan :Managing Internal andExternal Pressures ( M . E . Sharpe , ArmonkNY , 1993 ) , pp . 41 - 2 ,172 .

8 Leonard Bridgman ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1941

(Sampson , Low , Marston & Company , London , 31st edition , June1942 ) , pp . 158 - 60 ; and Derek Wood , Jane ' s World Aircraft RecognitionHandbook (Jane ' s Information Group , Coulsdon , Surrey , 4th edition ,

1989 ) , p .257 .

9 ibid .

10 'Japan ' s Navy Weighs E - 3 , Additional E -2Cs for AEW Mission ' ,

Aviation Week & Space Technology , 11 May 1987 , p . 59 ; and MartinStreetly , 'Japan ' s SIGINT Islands ’ , Jane ' s Defence Weekly , 20 August1991 , p .236 .

11 John W . R . Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1978 - 79

(Macdonald and Jane ' s ,London , 1978 ) , pp .119 - 20 .


12Martin Streetly , “Japan ' s SIGINT Islands ', Jane's Defence Weekly , 20August 1991, p. 23

6; and Martin Streetly , State of Japan ' s EW ' , Jane ' s

Defence Weekly , 27 July 1991 , p . 144 .

13 Jeffrey T . Richelson , Foreign Intelligence Organizations (Ballinger ,

Cambridge MA , 1988 ) , p .257 .

14 Paul Jackson ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the

World ' s Aircraft , 1998 - 99 (Jane ' s

Information Group , Coulsdon , Surrey , 89th edition , 1998 ) , p .282 .

15 ‘Japan Navy Weighs E - 3 , Additional E -2Cs for AEW Mission ' ,

Aviation Week & Space Technology , 11May 1987 , p . 59 .

16 Paul Jackson ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the

World ' s Aircraft , 1997 - 98 (Jane ' s

Information Group ,Coulsdon , Surrey , 1997 ) , pp. 289 - 90 .

17 Martin Streetly , “Japan ' s SIGINT Islands ' , Jane ' s Defence Weekly , 10

August 1991 , p .236 ; Martin Streetly , 'State of Japan ' s EW ' , Jane ' s

Defence Weekly , 27 July 1991 , p .144 ; and Air Force Magazine , October1997 , p . 66 .

18 'Japan ' s Navy Weighs E - 3 , Additional E -2Cs for

AEW Mission ' ,

Aviation Week & Space Technology , 11May 1987 , p . 59 .

19 Norman Friedman , The Naval Institute Guide toWorld NavalWeapons

Systems , 1997 -1998 (Naval Institute Press , Annapolis MD , 1997 ) , p .538 ;

and Bernard Blake ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems ,

1995 - 96 (Jane ' s Information Group , Coulsdon , Surrey , 7th edition ,

1995 ) , p .584 .

20 Friedman , The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons , 1997

1998 , pp.541 - 3 ; and Blake ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Radar and Electronic Warfare

Systems , 1995 - 96 , p .567 .

21 John W . R . Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1998 - 99 (Jane ' s

Information Group , Coulsdon ,Surrey ,89th edition , 1998 ) , p .283 .

22 Kenichi Watanabe , 'Japan : MSDF Improves P - 3C Navigation

Precision ' , Wing , 11 March 1998 , p . 7 , in FBIS -EAS - 98 -103 , FBISTranslated Text ,Daily Report , 13 April 1998 .

23 Friedman , The

Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Systems , 19971998 , p .543 .

24 ‘Industry Observer ' , Aviation Week & Space Technology , 2 July 1984 ,

p . 13 .


25Martin Streetly , 'State of Japan 's EW ', Jane's Defence Weekly , 27 July1991 , p .144;Martin Streetly, “Japan 's SIGINT Islands ', Jane 's DefenceWeekly , 24 August 1991, p .236 ; and Streetly , World Electronic WarfareAircraft , p .74 .

26 John W .R. Taylor (ed .), Jane 's All theWorld ' s Aircraft , 1987 - 88 (Jane ' s

Publishing Company , London , 1987 ) , p .178 .


Publishing Company , London ,72nd edition , 1981 ) , pp. 143 - 4 .

28 Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All theWorld ' s Aircraft , 1987 - 88 , p . 178 .

29 ibid . , pp. 178 - 9 .

30 The International Institute for Strategic Studies ( IISS ) , The Military

Balance 1999 -2000 (Oxford University Press ,Oxford , 1999 ) , p . 193.

31 John W . R . Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1965 - 66

(Sampson Low ,Marston & Company , London , 1965 ) , pp . 105- 6 .

32Streetly ,World Electronic Warfare Aircraft , p . 95 .

33 ‘ ASDF Plane to Gather Data on Soviets : Sources ' , Japan Times , 26

April 1985 , p . 3 .

34“Japanese Continue to Upgrade Airborne EW Capability ' , Journal of

Electronic Defense , Vol . 14 , No . 12 , December 1991 , p . 19 ; and MarkLambert ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1994 - 95 (Jane ' s

Information Group , Coulsdon ,Surrey , 1994 ) , p .237 .

35 The International Institute for

Strategic Studies ( IISS ) , The MilitaryBalance , 1996 - 97 (Oxford University Press , Oxford , October 1996 ) ,

p . 186 ; and The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS ) , TheMilitary Balance , 1998 - 99 (Oxford University Press , Oxford , October1998 ) , p .185 .


Publishing Company , London , 1987 ) , pp .418 - 19 ; and Mark Lambert

( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1994 - 95 ( Jane ' s Information Group ,

Coulsdon , Surrey , 1994 ) , p .548 .

37 Jackson ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All the World ' s Aircraft , 1998 - 99 , pp .282 - 3 .

38 ibid . , p .282 .


39 Rear Admiral Makoto Yamazaki , “Rear Admiral on Future MSDFTechnology ',Gekkan Jadi,November 1996 , pp 7- 17, in FBIS -JST-97 -001 ,FBIS Translated Text, 1November 1996 .

40 Jackson (ed .), Jane's All the World 's Aircraft , 1997 -98, pp.708 - 9.41 “Japan Air Self -Defense Force Completes Key E -2C Milestone',Aerotech News and Review : Journal of Aerospace and Defense IndustryNews, 12 October 1999 , at <http ://www .aerotechnews .com /starc/1999/101299 /Japan _ E2C .html> (November 2000 ).

42 Defense of Japan (JDA), Defense of Japan 1984 (The Japan Times,Tokyo , 1984 ), p.99 .

43 Tokyo Shimbun , 17 August 1999 , in Daily Summary of Japanese Press ,American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office of TranslationServices , 18 August 1999. See also John Barron , MiG Pilot : The FinalEscape of Lieutenant Belenko (Reader ' s Digest Press, New York , 1980 ).44 Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Defense of Japan 1993 (Japan DefenseAgency , Tokyo , 1993 ), pp.110 -13; and Tokyo Shimbun , 17 August 1999 ,in Daily Summary of Japanese Press , American Embassy , Tokyo , PoliticalSection ,Office of Translation Services , 18 August 1999 .

45 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ), Defense of Japan 1986 (The JapanTimes , Tokyo , 1986 ), p . 14

8 ; and 'Japan Weighs E - 3 Additional E -2Csfor AEW Mission ' , Aviation Week & Space Technology , 11 May 1987 ,

p . 59 .46 'Documents Reveal SDF ' s Intelligence Collection Activities ' , Tokyo

Shimbun , 13 August 1998 , p . 1 , in FBIS -EAS - 98 - 30 , FBIS TranslatedText ,Daily Report , 28 October 1998 .

47 BillGunston , An Illustrated Guide to Spy Planes and Electronic Warfare

Aircraft (Arco Publishing ,New York , 1983 ) , pp. 122 - 3 .

48 Jackson ( ed . ) , Jane ' s All theWorld ' s Aircraft , 1997 - 98 , pp .708 - 9 .

49 Kenneth Koehler , 'The Grumman E - 2C Hawkeye Airborne Warning

and Control System ' in Desmond Ball ( ed . ) , Air Power : GlobalDevelopments and Australian Perspectives (Pergamon -Brassey ' s DefencePublishers , Sydney , 1988 ) , p .385 .


50 U .S. Department of Defense Memorandum for

Correspondents ,

No .079 - M , 19 May 1997 at

< http : / /www .defenselink .mil : 80 /news /

May1997 /m051997 _m079 - 97 .html > (November 2000 .

51General Isao Ishizuka , cited in Paul Beaver , ‘Japan ' s Balancing Act ,

Jane ' s Defence Weekly , 24 April 1993 , pp . 24 - 5 .

52 ‘ U . S . Trains With Japan in Exercise Cope North Guam ' 99 ' ,PACAF

News , 21 June 1999 , at < http : / /www2 .hickam . af .mil /news /newsarchive /

1999 /99108 . htm> (November 2000 ) .

53 Yomiuri Shimbun , 3 November 1998 , p . 3 , in Daily Summary of Japanese

Press , American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office of

Translation Services , 9November 1998 .

54 'Exercise Cope North Guam ' 00 Begins May 30 ' , PACAF News , 23

May 2000 , at <http : / /www2 .hickam . af .mil /news /2000 /2000079 . htm >

(November 2000 ) .

55 ' US Lagging on Defense Deliveries : Audit Board ' , Japan Times , 11

December 1998

56 Tokyo Shimbun , 17 August 1999 , in Daily Summary of Japanese Press ,

American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office of

Translation

Services , 18 August 1999 .

57 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) , Defense of Japan 1993 , pp . 110- 13 ; and

Tokyo Shimbun , 26 March 1998 , pp . 6 - 7 , in Daily Summary of JapanesePress , American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office o

fTranslation Services , 30March 1998 .

58 Norman D . Levin ,Mark Lorell and Arthur Alexander , The Wary

Warriors : Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies (RAND , SantaMonica CA , 1993 ) , p

p. 62 - 3 .

59 ibid . ; and Naoaki Usui , 'AWACS May Get New Plane : Boeing

Considers Retrofitting 767 Airframe For Japan Buy ' , Defense News , 21

December 1991 , p . 4 .

60David E .Sanger , “Japan May Delay Buying US Military Planes ' ,New

York Times , 5 August 1991 , p . D8 .

61 Naoaki Usui , 'AWACS May get

New Plane : Boeing ConsidersRetrofitting 767 Airframe For Japan Buy ' , Defense News , 21 December1991 , p . 4 .


62 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ), Defense of Japan 1993,pp.110 -13 .63 'In Brief: AWACS Enter JASDF Service', Jane's Defence Weekly , 24May 2000 , p. 14; and Japan :AWACS Enter Service ', Asian DefenceJournal , June 2000, p.54 .

64 Asahi Shimbun , 2 December 1995 ; and Lam Peng Er, 'Japan and theSpratlys Dispute : Aspirations and Limitations ', Asian Survey , Vol.36 ,No. 10, October 1996 , p.1009.65 Jackson (ed .), Jane's All th

e

World ' s Aircraft , 1997 - 98 , pp .582 - 3 ; andTetsushi Kajimoto , ‘ASDF Takes Delivery of AWACS Planes ' , JapanTimes , 26 March 1998 , p . 3 .

66

D . Clifford Bell , 'The Boeing E - 3 Airborne Warning and ControlSystem ' in Ball ( ed . ) , Airpower : Global Developments and AustralianPerspectives , p .327 ; Lambert ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Al

l

the

World ' s Aircraft , 1991 - 92 ,

p .365 ; and Blake ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems , 1995

96 , p .292 .

67 Blake ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems , 1995 - 96 ,

pp. 588- 9 .

68 Japan Defense Agency (JDA ) ,Defense ofJapan 1993 , pp . 110- 12 .

69 Tokyo Shimbun , 26 March 1998 , pp. 6 - 7 , in Daily Summary of Japanese


Translation Services , 30 March 1998 .

70 ‘Electronic Systems Center ' , at < http : / /www .afmc .wpafb . af .mil /HQ

AFMC / PA /leading _ edge /may98 /esc . htm> (November 2000 ) .

71 Japan Adopts Thomson -CSF ' s ASTAC EW Pod ' , Defense and

Armament International , February 1990 , p . 12 .


Agency , Tokyo , 1976 ) , Appendix 6 , p . 147 .


Agency , Tokyo , 1989 ) , p .114 .

74

F . P . Dube ( ed . ) , International Electronic Countermeasures Handbook

(Horizon House ,Norwood MA , 1999 ) , p . 14 .


75 Pierre Alain Antoine , “Tactical ESM and ELINT', paper prepared for

a conference on Electronic Warfare Asia ' 97 , Kuala Lumpur , 5 - 6

November 1997 .

76 Martin Streetly ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems ,

1998 - 99 (Jane ' s Information Group , Coulsdon , Surrey , 10th edition ,

1998 ) , p .436 .

77 ibid .

78 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS ) , The Military

Balance , 1999 -2000 , p .192 .

79 Taylor ( ed . ) , Jane ' s Allthe

World ' s Aircraft , 1978 - 79 , pp .123 - 5 .

80 J . A . Boyd , D . B . Harris , D . D . King and H . W . Welch (eds ) , Electronic

Countermeasures (Peninsula Publishing , Los Altos CA , 1978 ) , chapter

11 ; and Lt . Col . Richard E . Fitts ( ed . ) , The Strategy of Electromagnetic

Conflict (Peninsula Publishing , Los Altos CA , 1980 ) , chapter 4 .


Agency , Tokyo , 1998 ) , p .115 .


Agency , Tokyo , 1977 ) , p . 66 .

83 Rear Admiral Yasuo Ito , ‘Surveillance Tasks ' , Journal of the Australian

Naval Institute ,November 1989 , p 37 .


Agency , Tokyo , 1998 ) , p . 115.

85 Eric Johnston , 'Maizuru in Pyongyang ' s Sights ? ' , Japan Times , 2

September 1999 , p . 3 .


Agency , Tokyo , 1999 ) , p . 34 .

87 The International Institute for

Strategic Studies (IISS ) , StrategicSurvey 1995 -1996 (Oxford University Press , Oxford , April 1996 ) , p .253 ;

and Michael J . Green and Benjamin L . Self , 'Japan ' s Changing ChinaPolicy : From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism ' , Survival ,

Vol . 38 ,No . 2 , Summer 1996 , p . 37 .


88 Asahi Shimbun , 7 April 1999 , pp.2-3, in Daily Summary of JapanesePress , American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office ofTranslation Services , 12 April 1999 .89 See Desmond Ball, Pine Gap : Australia and th

e

US Geostationary SignalIntelligence Satellite Program (Allen & Unwin , Sydney , 1988 ) , especially

pp. 34 - 41 .

90William E .Burrows ,Deep Black : Space Espionage and National Security

(Random House , New York , 1986 ) , pp.171 - 3 ; Tom Bernard and T .

Edward Eskelson , ' U . S . Spy Plane Capable of Interceding in Attack on

Korean Jet ' , Denver Post , 13 September 1983 , p . 38 ; and 'Recon WingFamed for Skill , Endurance ' , Aviation Week & Space Technology , 4

August 1997 , p . 53 .

91 Jeffrey T . Richelson , The

U . S . Intelligence Community (Westview

Press , Boulder CO , 4th edition , 1999 ) , p . 193 ; and 'Recon Wing Famed

for Skill , Endurance ' , Aviation Week & Space Technology , 4 August 1997 ,

p . 53 .

92 Richelson , The U . S . Intelligence Community , p .193 ; and Bill Gertz , ' N .

Korea Fires New Cruise Missile ' , Washington Times , 30 June 1997 ,

pp.A1 , A8 .

93“ ' Informed Sources ” Tell TASS US Alerted to Imminent Chinese

ICBM Tesť , ITAR - TASS 1151 GMT 6 June 2000 , in FBIS TranscribedText ,Daily Report , FBIS -SOV -2000 -0606 , 6 June 2000 .

94 Bungei Shunju ,November 1998 , pp.150 - 7 , in FBIS -EAS - 98 -299 , FBIS

Translated Text ,Daily Report , 26 October 1998 .

95 ibid .

96 ibid .

97 Rear Admiral Makoto Yamazaki , “Rear Admiral on Future MSDF

Technology ' ,Gekkan Jadi ,November 1996 , pp . 7 - 17 , in FBIS - JST - 97 -001 ,

FBIS Translated Text , 1November 1996 .

98 ‘ Tokyo Leaders Fear SmallMistake Could Turn Confrontation into a

Military Conflict , South ChinaMorning Post , 7 October 1996 .

99 'Documents Reveal SDF ' s Intelligence Collection Activities ' , Tokyo

Shimbun , 13 August 1998 , p . 1 , in FBIS -EAS - 98 - 30 , FBIS TranslatedText , Daily Report , 28 October 1998 .


100'Rabbits ' Ears and Doves ' Dreams : Information on North Korea ' s

Missile Test -Firing Kept Secret ' , Mainichi Shimbun , 14 August 1994 ,

Morning Edition , p . 1 , FBIS Translated Text , at < http : / /www .fas .org /

news / japan /eas9x192 . htm > (November 2000 ) .

101

Bungei Shunju , November 1998 , pp. 150 - 7 , in FBIS -EAS - 98 -299 , FBIS

Translated Text , Daily Report , 26 October 1998 .

102

Mainichi Shimbun , 7 September 1998 , p . 3 , in Daily Summary of

Japanese Press , American Embassy , Tokyo , Political Section , Office of

Translation Services , 10 September 1998 .

103'Agency Alarmed by

Sinking of

Sub ' , Daily Yomiuri , 19 December1998 , p . 2 .

104

Asahi Shimbun , pp. 2 - 3 , 7 April 1999 , in Daily Summary of Japanese


Translation Services , 12 April 1999 .

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Captain Russ Swinnerton RAN andDesmond Ball

WP279 ThePoliticalRole of the Singapore Armed Forces 'Officer Corps : Towards a

Military - Administrative State ? by

Tim Huxley

WP280 The East Coast Armaments Complex (ECAC ) Location Project : Strategic andDefence Aspects b

y

Desmond BallWP281 Rules of Engagement in Maritime Operations by

Captain Russ Swinnerton RAN

1993

1994

1995

1996

WP282 The Political and Strategic Outlook, 1994-2003: Global,Regional and AustralianPerspectives by Paul Dibb

WP283 Index to Parliamentary Questions on Defence, 1993by Gary BrownWP284 New Dimensions to the Japan -Australia Relationship : From Economic Preference to

Political Cooperation by Nobuyuki TakakiWP285 Winners and Losers: South Asia After th

e

Cold War by

Sandy GordonWP286 Australia and New Zealand : Towards a More Effective Defence Relationship b

y

Jim

RolfeWP287 China ' s Policy Towards the Spratly Islands in the 1990s b

y

Sheng Lijun

WP288 How to Begin Implementing Specific Trust - Building Measures in the Asia -PacificRegion b

y

Paul Dibb

WP289 Burma ' s Arms Procurement Programme by

Andrew SelthWP290 Developments in Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare in Southeast Asia b

y

Desmond BallWP291 India ' s Naval Strategyand th

e

Role ofthe

Andaman and Nicobar Islands byD . N .

Christie

WP292 Japan and Australia : A New Security Partnership ? by

Naoko Sajima

WP293 Chinese Strategy and the

Spratly Islands Dispute by

Brigadier Chris RobertsWP294 Transnational Crime : TheNew Security Paradigm b

y

John McFarlane and Karen

McLennanWP295 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT ) in North Korea b

y

Desmond BallWP296 The Emerging Geopolitics o

f

the Asia -Pacific Region by

Paul DibbWP297 Maritime Strategy into the Twenty -First Century : Issues fo

r

Regional Navies by

JackMcCaffrie

WP298 The Cold War in Retrospect : Diplomacy , Strategy and Regional Impact by

Coral BellWP299 Australia -Indonesia Security Cooperation : For Better o

r

Worse ? by

Bob Lowry

WP300 Reflections on

American Foreign Policy Strategy by

John Chipman

WP301 New Requirements for Multilateral Conflict Management by

UN and Other Forces :

Nordic Responses by

Jaana Karhilo

WP302 Developing Army Doctrine in the Post -Cold War Era by

Bill HoustonWP303 The Joint Patrol Vessel ( JPV ) : A Regional Concept for Regional Cooperation b

y

Desmond Ball

WP304 Australian - American Relations after the

Collapse of

Communism by

Harry G . GelberWP305 Policy Coordination for Asia - Pacific Security and Stability by Yukio SatohWP306 Force Modernisation in Asia : Towards 2000 and Beyond b

y

Paul DibbWP307 PMC , ARF and CSCAP : Foundations for a Security Architecture in the Asia -Pacific ?

by

Jörn Dosch

WP308 Burma ' s Intelligence Apparatus by

Andrew SelthWP309 Burma ' s Defence Expenditure and Arms Industries by Andrew SelthWP310 Australia ' s Vulnerability to Information Attack : Towards a National Information

Policy by

Adam Cobb

WP311 Australia , the US Alliance and Multilateralism in Southeast Asia by

Desmond BallWP312 From Distant Countries to Partners : the Japan -Australia Relationship b

y

YukioSatoh

WP313 The Burma Navy by

Andrew SelthWP314 Problems and Issues in Malaysia - Singapore Relations b

y

Andrew Tan

WP315 The Burma Air Force by

Andrew SelthWP316 Australia ' s National Security into the Twenty -First Century b

y

Brigadier Mike SmithWP317 Alliances , Alignments and theGlobal Order : The Outlook for the Asia -Pacific

Region in theNext Quarter -Century by Paul DibbWP318 The South African National DefenceForce : Between Downsizing and New

Capabilities ? by

Greg MillsWP319 The Evolution o

f

China ' s Perception of Taiwan by

Sheng Lijun

WP320 UN Peacekeeping , UNIFIL and the Fijian Experience by

Jim Sanday

WP321 The Future of

the ASEAN Regional Forum : An

Australian View by

Alan Dupont

WP322 Singapore ' s Defence Policy in theNew Millennium by

Andrew TanWP323 Responses to NATO ' s Eastward Expansion by the

Russian Federation by

AlexeiMouraviev

1997

1998

1999

WP324 TheRemaking of Asia 'sGeoppolitics by Paul DibbWP325 The Nuclear Crisis in Asia : The Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programmes by

Desmond Ball and Mohan Malik

WP326 Researching Security in East Asia : From "Strategic Culture ' to 'Security Culture 'byPauline Kerr

WP327 Building the Tatmadaw : TheOrganisational Development of the Armed Forces inMyanmar , 1948-98by Maung Aung Myoe

WP238 Drugs , Transnational Crime and Security in East Asia by Alan DupontWP329 The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge by Paul DibbWP330 TheUS -Australian Alliance : History and Prospects by Desmond BallWP331 Implications of the East Asian Economic Recession fo

r

Regional SecurityCooperation b

y

Desmond BallWP332 Strategic Information Warfare : A Concept b

y

Daniel T . KuehlWP333 Security Developments and Prospects for Cooperation in the Asia -Pacific Region ,

with Particular Reference to the Mekong River Basin by

Desmond BallWP334 Burma and Weapons o

f

Mass Destruction by

Andrew SelthWP335 Transnational Crime and Illegal Immigration in the Asia -Pacific Region :

Background , Prospects and Countermeasures by

JohnMcFarlaneWP336 Burma and Drugs : TheRegime ' s Complicity in theGlobal Drug Trade b

y

DesmondBall

WP337 Defence Strategy in the Contemporary Era by

Paul DibbWP338 TheBurmese Armed Forces Next Century : Continuity o

rChange ? by

Andrew SelthWP339 Military Doctrine and Strategy in Myanmar : A Historical Perspective b

yMaungAung Myoe

WP340 TheEvolving Security Architecture in the Asia -Pacific Region by

Desmond BallWP341 The Asian Financial Crisis : Corruption , Cronyism and Organised Crime b

y

JohnMcFarlane

WP342 The Tatmadaw in Myanmar since 1988 : An

Interim Assessment by

Maung Aung

MyoeWP343 Cambodia and Southeast Asia by Tony KevinWP344 ThePrinciple o

f

Non -Intervention and ASEAN : Evolution and Emerging Challenges

by

Herman KraftWP345 Will America ' s Alliances in the Asia -Pacific Region Endure ? b

yPaul Dibb

WP346 Officer Education and Leadership Training in the Tatmadaw : A Survey by

Maung

Aung Myoe

WP347 The Prospects for

Southeast Asia ' s Security by PaulDibbWP348 The Army ' s Capacity to Defend Australia Offshore : TheNeed for a Joint Approach

by

John Caligari

WP349 Interpreting China -Indonesia Relations : 'Good -Neighbourliness ' , 'Mutual Trust '

and 'All - round Cooperation ' by

He KaiWP350 Strategic Trends in the Asia -Pacific Region b

y

Paul Dibb

WP351 Burma ' s Order of Battle : An Interim Assessment by

Andrew SelthWP352 Landmines in Burma : TheMilitary Dimension b

y

Andrew Selth

WP353 Japanese Airborne SIGINT Capabilities by


2000

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS SA

(including cost of packaging & postage )

Australian Paper on

Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Regionby Gareth Evans and Paul Dibb ( 24 + iv p

p) 1994 11 . 50

Armies and Nation -Building : Past Experience - Future Prospects by

David Horner ( ed . )

(240 + xvi pp) 1995 28. 00

Planning a Defence Force Without a Threat : A Model for Middle Powers by

Paul Dibb

( 27+ iv pp) 1996 12. 50

Restructuring the Papua New Guinea Defence Force : Strategic Analysis and Force StructurePrinciples for a Small State by

Paul Dibb and Rhondda Nicholas (162 + xii pp ) 1996 34 . 50

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Strategic and Defence Studies CentreAustralian National University

MISSION STATEMENT

Strategic studies is the primary analytical discipline

for examining the defence policies of, and securityrelationships between , states. It embraces not onlythe control and application ofmilitary force , but thefull range of factors determining the security ofstates. Strategic studies is interdisciplinary , and

includes military , political , economic , environmental, scientific and technological aspects .

The mission of the Strategic and Defence Studies

Centre (SDSC ) is:• to be the leading Australian research centre on

strategic and defence studies ;

to develop postgraduate research and teaching

on Asia -Pacific strategic affairs , which willsupport the priorities of the Research School ofPacific and Asian studies ;

to achieve quality in its scholarly publication

programme , which will enhance the Centre ' s

international reputation ;

to provide advice to Government , the

Parliamentand th

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private sector that will contribute to the

University ' s national function ;

to promote awareness of , and informed public

debate on , strategic and defence issues .

JUICS ,