Alvin Coox

History of World War

01963*6

The editorial team producing

Bailantine's Illustrated History of World War II

The author of japan:

Alvin D. Coox

Alvin D Coox, Professor of History at SanDiego State College, possesses the A.B. from

New York University and the A.M. and Ph.D.

from Harvard. He has held Rockefeller

Foundation grants in Japan, and lectured at

the Universities of California and Maryland.

He. has written extensively on his speciality,

modern Japanese history.

\ Editor-in-chief:

Barrie Pitt

Barrie Pitt, author of 'Zeebrugge', 'St. George's

Day 1 91 8', '1 91 8 - The Last Act', 'The Edge

of Battle' and 'Revenge at Sea'. Contributor to

The Encyclopaedia Britannica on naval war-

fare; historical consultant to The SundayTimes Colour Magazine; Editor of Purnell's

History of the Second World War; consultant

to the producer of the B.B.C. film series

The Great War.

Art director:

Peter Dunbar

Peter Dunbar has been Art Director of the

prestigious London weekly The Economist for

eight years. Responsible for new styles in

format and typography which have revolu-

tionised London publications during recent

years. Art Director of Purnell's History of the

Second World War, one of the outstanding

editorial and commercial successes in British

post-war publishing.

Military Consultant:

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart

Between the two World Wars Captain Sir

Basil Liddell Hart radically influenced military

development as a leading advocate of air-

power, armoured forces, and amphibious

strategy. Many of the foremost commanders of

World War II were his 'disciples', including

General Guderian, the creator of the Germanpanzerforces. Sir Basil Liddell Hart has written

more than thirty books.

he final agon

Editor-in-Chief: Barrie Pitt

Art Director : Peter Dunbar

Military Consultant : Sir Basil Liddell HartPicture Editor : Bobby Hunt

Executive Editor : David MasonDesigner : Sarah KinghamSpecial Drawings : John BatchelorCartographer : Richard Natkiel

Cover : Denis Piper

Photographs for this book were especially selected from the following archives : from left to right page 2-3 Paul Popper Ltd

;

9-14 Keystone ; 15-16 Imperial War Museum ; 17 US Marine Corps : 18 Keystone ; 19-21 US Marine Corps

;

23-25 Keystone ; 28-29 Paul Popper ; 30-31 Keystone ; 31-37 US Air Force ; 37 Paul Popper ; 39 IWM ; 40-43 US Air Force

;

50-54 Keystone ; 58-59 IWM ; 60-61 US Coast Guard ; 62-63 Keystone ; 66 US Marine Corps ; 66-67 IWM ; 68-71 US Marine Corps

;

72 Paul Popper ; 74-79 IWM ; 80-83 Keystone ; 84 US Air Force ; 88 US Marine Corps ; 92 IWM ; 94IWM ; 96 AP

;

98-103IWM ; 106 Keystone ; 110-111IWM ; 113 IWM ;116-117 US Army ; 118-119 Keystone ; 120-121 US Army

;

124-125 IWM ; 126-127 US Army ; 128IWM ; 131 US Air Force ; 132-133 Keystone ; 134-135 US Army ; 136 Keystone

;

136-137 US Air Force ; 137 Keystone ; 138-139IWM ; 141 US Navy ; 142 Paul Popper/US Army ; 143 Keystone ; 144 US Navy

;

145-151 Keystone; 153 US Army; 155 US Navy

Copyright © 1970 by Alvin Coox

First printing: September 1970Printed in United States of America

Ballantine Books Inc.

101 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10003

An lnte\t Publisher

CONTENTS

8 The year of doom opens; Tojo's appreciation

22 Cauldron of death

50 Realities on the home front

60 When the enemy lands

86 Bamboo spear phsychology

100 How to be defeated 'gracefully' ?

114 Japan in the death throes

130 Finally

140 Aftermath

156 Dramatis Personae

160 Bibliography

Sowing the windIntroduction by Borrie Pitt

In the pages which follow, the readerwill find a fascinating account of thefinal year of Japan's conflict with theWestern Powers. I think perhaps it

might be as well to outline verybriefly the events which led up to thedisasters which then engulfed theisland race.

In December 1941 Japan went to waragainst America - and, inevitably,

Great Britain and the Commonwealth- basically for oil. During the previousfour years she had fought a long andsemi-successful war against Chinasupplied in essential metals and fuels

primarily by America and the Nether-lands, and now those supplies had beenabruptly cut off. Japan was thus facedeither with abandonment of herhard-won gains of four years' fighting,

together with a loss of prestige andface which no Eastern nation couldafford, or with the tasks essential to

the attainment of other sources of

supply.

The second alternative was the oneshe chose, attaining the sources of oil

and the equally essential clear

passageway for the oil back to thehomeland in an astonishing explosionof military energy which menaced theborders of India, completely containedthe Dutch Eastern Empire and brushed

the north coast of Australia, besidecontrolling half of the Pacific Ocean.Domination over this vast area wasalmost all achieved within six monthsof the attack on Pearl Harbor, but atthe end of this period Japan wasextending her military strength to its

utmost limit; she resembled a manlying on a floor, holding the four doorsof a room shut, one with each foot,

one with each hand, hoping that thepressures on the doors would never beenough to force any of them open.

This was, obviously, a weak posture- though it did not appear so to thehard-pressed Allies, who during 1942

were experiencing Fortune's ebb andwho, by the middle of that year,

appeared to be in desperate straits.

However, this period was in fact, thehinge of fate, and in June 1942 the

Battle of Midway was fought - thoughonly a few people (including, sur-

prisingly, the Japanese EmperorHirohito) realized its immense signif-

icance. For many months to come it

appeared to the watching world thatJapan dominated the Pacific and, in-

deed, the vast area known to Europe-ans as the Far East, but in fact, theweakness of her posture made hertotally dependent for continued exist-

ence on the victories of her German

ally, and once the destruction of theThird Reich became inevitable,

Japan's days of power were numbered.As it happened, geography deter-

mined that the early efforts of theAmericans and Australians to repel

the Japanese danger could wreaklittle apparent harm on the newEastern Empire. The great navalcampaigns mounted by the Americanswere at first attacking Japan in the

most unimportant areas; she couldafford to lose a myriad of SouthPacific islands, so long as the areas

in the west - Java, Sumatra, Borneoand the seaways north of the Philip-

pines, and the essential shield of

islands to the south of the homeland -

remained under her control.

But inexorably, Allied attacks crept

nearer and nearer to the vital areas.

To use Dr Coox's words, 'By the sum-mer of 1944 Japan's "absolute zone of

national defense" in the central

Pacific was pierced fatally whenSaipan, Guam and Tinian fell to

American invasion forces, and "Hellwas upon us when we lost Saipan," thechief of the Japanese Naval GeneralStaff admitted. By the end of October1944, American divisions had landed atLeyte, by December they had reachedMindoro, and the following monththey invaded Luzon itself.

One quickly exhausts superlativeswhen describing the bravery andstubborn determination of Japanesetroops, for they fought with fanaticismin every field and on every occasion.As Field-Marshal Slim has said, thestrength of the Japanese army lay inthe spirit of the individual soldier:'He fought and marched till he died . .

.

it was this combination of obedienceand ferocity that made the Japanesearmy, whatever its condition, soformidable . .

.' To the Japanesesoldier or sailor, surrender was un-thinkable, death 'as light as a feather'.

What social system producedfighters of this calibre? A system, alas,

as authoritarian as any in history,under the control of a military fasc-

ism. At the lofty apex of the societal

pyramid was the monarch who, in hiscapacity as emperor-patriarch-priest,symbolized the spiritual and temporalprescriptions of the Constitutionpromulgated under Meiji in the 19thCentury; he was sacred and inviolableand, as head of the Empire, combinedin himself the rights of sovereignty.In actual fact, Emperor Hirohito was ahumane, intelligent and hard-workingindividual - but he was a prisoner ofthe system over v/hich he nominallypresided.

The government was of theEuropean cabinet-responsibility type,under a premier minister, but in factthe army and navy exerted decisiveinfluence through their power towithhold or to bestow cabinet serviceministers drawn from the activegeneral or flag lists, and also throughtheir separate, direct access to thethrone. Wartime conditions had re-

duced the two chamber parliament tothe status of a rubber stamp, and theso-called demands of national securitymeant, in effect, that what power theypossessed in theory became sub-servient to the pressures of themilitary and industrial complex.To keep them - and indeed the entire

Japanese race - under strict controlwere the formations of the dreadedSpecial Higher Police - the awfulembodiment of Orwell's ThoughtPolice. These mercilessly hunted downsuspected defeatists and subversivesand, aided by complete control of all

information media, successfullydeluded the public with stories ofnever-ending strings of victories attrifling cost. Disciplined, uncomplain-ing, indefatigable and tough, theJapanese produced some of the mostskilful and fanatical fighters in theSecond World War. The Japanesecivilian of all ages was expected tomatch the example of sacrifice of theImperial Armed Forces, and hisgovernment never ceased remindinghim of his duty of blind obedience.This was the race whose leaders

had sown the wind. Now they were toreap the whirlwind.

The year of

doom opens;

Tojo's appreciation

'The worst condition in which abelligerent can be placed,' wroteClausewitz, 'is that of being com-pletely disarmed. If, therefore, theenemy is to be reduced to submission... he must either be positively dis-

armed or placed in such a position thathe is threatened with it'. We nowknow that, as early as the spring of

1943, the Emperor himself sensed thatJapan was indeed confronted by whatClausewitz called 'the worst condi-tion'. Although few others knew aboutor comprehended it at the time, themonarch realized that the battle of

Midway, lost without publicity in

June 1942, had already doomed Japan.'The future of this war is not bright',

the Emperor told the Lord Keeper of

the Privy Seal. 'The vast battle zonewill be breached in many places,

without air supremacy'. In April 1944,

the royal prince Mikasa suggestedthat the military consider declaringKyoto and Nara open cities. At thesame time General Ushiroku, seniordeputy chief of Army General Staff

(AGS), admitted to insiders that theempire's crisis could be expected in

June and July of 1944, a view sharedby Prince Kaya.

8

These anxieties proved well-founded.

By the summer of 1944, Japan's'absolute zone of national defense' in

the central Pacific was pierced fatally

when Saipan, Guam and Tinian fell to

American invasion forces. 'Hell wasupon us when we lost Saipan,' thechief of the Japanese naval generalstaff (NGS) later admitted. Uponhearing of the defeat in the Marianas,the head of the army's vital militaryaffairs bureau, Lieutenant-GeneralMuto, told his aide, 'Japan is defeated'.

One Japanese colonel noted in his

secret diary that Saipan marked theturning point, both for Japan and for

the Greater East Asia War as a whole.A distinctly troubled Emperor con-

vened his senior military and navaladvisers in late June. Fiery PremierTojo - he who had led the countryinto war in 1941, but by now may havebeen marked for assassination withinthe army - resigned reluctantly in

July 1944, admitting that 'the presentcabinet was not able to achieve its

objective.' On 24th September, USSuperfortresses began to bombJapan's main islands from bases in

Emperor Hirohito

I litW

Prince Mikasa

General Tojo

10

the Marianas ; the new prime minister,Koiso, warned that the people woulddo well to consider the possibility ofenemy landings on home soil. WhenJapanese Imperial General Head-quarters (IGHQ) gave up on Leyte, inDecember 1944, even Japanese sourcesadmit that the overall outcome of thePacific war had been decided and thatthere was no further hope of frustrat-

ing the Allies. Iwo Jima was invadedon 19th February 1945. To the GreaterTokyo area from Iwo was only about700 miles; 'if the island falls,' warnedthe deputy chief of the AGS, 'Tokyowill become a battleground in amonth.' On 7th April, Superfortressesbegan raids on Japan from the con-quered island. The seizure of Okinawa,begun on 1st April, brought the Allies

325 miles from Japanese cities. 'Theknowledge that the homeland was left

wide open to air-attack,' remarkedShigemitsu, foreign minister underKoiso, 'came as a thunderbolt to thewhole nation'.

Nevertheless, it could only bethrough the translation of militaryand economic pressures into political

events that the Allies could achievetheir war objectives of bringing aboutthe unconditional surrender of Japan.And the Japanese army considereditself undefeated. In the spring of 1945,

at a PoW camp for Allied captivesnear Mukden, Japanese officers told

the prisoners that if they observed all

rules for the next ten or twenty years,

their relatives might be permitted to

come from home to visit them. OnTaiwan, long-imprisoned General Jon-athan Wainwright was assured by acocky Japanese colonel: 'You have nochance of beating Japan ... it tooktwenty thousand American troops to

defeat two thousand Japanese soldiers

on Attu island . . . there are a hundredmillion people in the Japanese empire.It will take ten times one hundredmillion to defeat Japan. To move sucha force against Japan, even if you hadthat many warriors, would be im-possible. It will therefore become amatter of generations'.

Such convictions were nurtured notonly for the benefit of prisoners.

Colonel Kazuyoshi Obata, EighteenthArmy staff officer, later told Americaninterrogators : 'I thought that the warwould continue three or four years[beyond 1945] because, although the

Japanese national power was far belowstandard, it was considered that if the

scene of war should shift near Japan,and the ratio of power was 1 : 100

[against Japan] this would be in-

sufficient to carry out a successful

operation against the homeland. In

New Guinea the ratio was about1 : 250 but, although the war wasgoing badly for the Japanese [there],

it was thought that the battle for thehomeland would be difficult, would re-

quire years and, with the help of

Manchuria, would be fought to adraw.'

The Japanese public had been told

much the same thing. Propagandistsclaimed that the supernatural abili-

ties of Japanese troops were knownto have caused untold numbers of

cases of mental derangement andsuicide among American soldiers,

who suffered from morbid fear andnervous breakdown. Psychologicaltests of Allied prisoners, it wasclaimed, had demonstrated that 'the

Yankees are cry-babies'. Even the

Throne was given a heavy dose of

bombast when ex-Premier Tojo wasreceived in private audience for overan hour on 26th February 1945. Al-

though 130 B-29s had raided thecapital in a snowstorm only the daybefore, Tojo exuded confidence. Al-

though Manila had been abandoned,Japanese forces in the Philippines

had concentrated in the mountainsand would fight a delaying campaignof considerable dimensions. TheAmericans were employing twelvedivisions in the Philippines; only tenmore US divisions were available in

the Pacific theater in reserve. TheAmericans had 'recklessly' landed onIwo Jima but, whereas US forces hadbeen able to stage carrier attacksagainst Saipan for a week in 1944, the

Americans now could only soften upIwo on the first day or two; theylacked strength to do more. Tojosuggested that, if enemy task forces

were to attack in the offshore reachesof the homeland, they could probablymaintain the tempo for no more than aday and a half. Hundreds of enemyplanes had raided Japan on the 25th,

but how many more days could this

type of offensive be sustained? As amatter of fact, the enemy had not evenreappeared on the 26th. [Sic: As of

11am, merely]. This was because theAmericans lacked the power, andbecause their objectives were funda-mentally political. Japanese war pre-

parations could be described as 'half

successful'; while one should not beoptimistic, there was no cause to bepessimistic.

At the Teheran conference in 1943,

continued Tojo, the enemy had decidedupon offensives in the Pacific and onthe Asian continent, as well as uponthe bringing-in of the Soviets if pos-

sible. Fortunately, however, the Japa-nese had been able to stifle Allied

intentions on the continent, as dem-onstrated by the diminution in enemybombing operations from Chinesebases. As for the Russians, it had beenfeared they might intervene in 1942,

but this danger had never come to

pass, and the Allies had still notprevailed on the Soviets to come into

the Pacific war. Thus, Tojo argued,Japan had thwarted two of the threeAllied objectives described earlier.

With respect to the third problem -

the situation in the Pacific - Tojocalled it serious but, when viewedfrom Japan's overall standpoint, afifty-fifty success. Anglo-Americanhopes of knocking out Germany bythe end of 1944 had been utterly upset,

as had Japan's own fears of such aneventuality. By fighting on, theGermans were draining off immenseAmerican and British strength. Hencethe Western Allies were unable to

shift forces to the Pacific theater. As amatter of fact, there was evidence of

contradictions in US-British opera-

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tions and political strategy.

Tojo professed to derive comfortfrom comparisons of production data.

American iron and steel output wasunder 80,000,000 tons for the year,

while coal production had droppedbelow 600,000,000 tons. Aircraft man-facture had been targeted at 120,000

in 1942 but only 100,000 had actuallybeen turned out. The figure mighteven drop to 74,000 or 75,000 in 1945.

The Americans' mobilization capa-bility had reached their limits. Froma total population of 120,000,000,

11,700,000 had been drafted into thearmed services, and 60,000,000 into thelabor force. But the US white popula-tion numbered only 80,000,000, and this

was about the same as Japan's ownpopulation. One could concludethat although Japanese productionstrength had diminished, America'swas dropping too. Admittedly, theenemy could not be matched battle-

ship for battleship or carrier for

carrier, but he could be matched

cheaply by explosives, and by planesor speedboats employing suicide-

attack tactics. The closer the enemygot to the homeland, the longer his

supply lines would become, and theshorter the defenders' own.His appreciation might sound ex-

cessively favorable, said Tojo, but it

was important to note that theenemy had his problems too, whileJapan possessed reserves of opera-tional strength against the threat of

the next two months, a particularperiod of danger. Tojo was clearly

disturbed by evidence of unwarranteddefeatism. The unfavorable war situ-

ation and intensified bombings, coup-led with subversive enemy propa-ganda, had caused uneasiness among

Below: Emperor Hirohito and EmpressNagako greet the crowds at their

Tokyo palace. Right: One of the war'smost celebrated pictures; United States

Marines raise the Stars and Stripes

on Iwo Jima

. !*%'•»Ui*'

Above: Amtracs move towards the IwoJima beaches. Right. Marines of the 4th

Division disembark

the populace. Nevertheless, until now,the Allies' operations in the Pacific

were directed against the outer de-

fense zone and the territories onlyrecently attached to Japan, such as

the Mandates or occupied districts.

The invasion of Iwo Jima representedthe first time the Allies had set foot

on true Imperial soil but, even here,

their bragadoccio was evident: al-

though they had talked, at the outset,

about defeating Japan in four weeks,they had only come as far as Iwo Jimafour years later. The enemy air offen-

sive was not overwhelming to date.

According to press information, 4,000

planes were in action against Ger-many but, so far, only about 100

B-29s could strike Japan, once in five

to seven days, at ranges of over 2,000

kilometers. Teaming of enemybombers and fighters, based upontask forces, had begun recently but

would not last long. From the stand-point of modern war, then, Allied air

raids against Japan were just begin-ning. If the nation allowed itself to

become discouraged by such relatively

minor matters, it would be impossibleto be influential in the case of majormatters such as effectuation of theGreater East Asia War. The public hadrevealed anxieties about present living

conditions and the like, but anacquaintance of Tojo's, who had veryrecently returned from Europe, said

the current situation of Japan was notbad when compared with that of

Germany or Finland. In Japan, for

example, it was possible to obtainvegetables in winter, but that had notbeen possible in Finland for several

years. The level of Japanese food

rations did not seem too low, either.

Complaints, argued Tojo, derived

from unrealistic comparisons withprewar food levels. He had neverheard of an Imperial subject dyingfrom hunger.Tojo concluded on a positive note.

16

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Even if the USSR denounced theexisting neutrality pact in April (due,

in any case, to run till 1946), therewas no need to be pessimistic, Japan'scause was righteous, and there mustbe faith in the indestructability of theEmpire. Peace in the Pacific could beattained if a close eye were kept onthe European situation. Should Japanever falter, she would be ignored after-

ward, and all would be lost.

The Emperor, who seemed to havebeen frowning with dissatisfaction

during portions of the report, askedTojo whether he thought the SovietUnion would attack Japan. Tojoreplied that his most recent informa-tion was inconclusive. A source whohad returned from Finland a monthearlier heard at first-hand from aretired Soviet army major that theRussian people were not hostile to theJapanese, and that the Soviets werecommitted fully against Germany.Only if the latter collapsed would theUSSR possess sufficient reserves tofight Japan but, as long as Germany

resisted, the Russians could not re-

lease forces to the Siberian frontfrom the European theater. Neverthe-less, even if Germany were defeated,

the USSR would have to retain greatstrength in the west, because ofserious difficulties with the USA andBritain. As a matter of fact, Russiawas exhausted by now and would find

it difficult to. fight another war unlessrecouped. The retired Soviet majoradmitted openly that both the USSRand Japan would be glad to end theSecond World War. But, said Tojo,another Japanese traveler who hadreturned home via Soviet Siberia onlytwo weeks earlier, was of the opinionthat the USSR was quite prepared totransfer vast strength from Europe if

a golden opportunity presented itself

to strike down Japan. Although Tojofound it difficult to choose betweenhis sources' evaluations, he felt that,even now, Soviet Far Eastern strengthand Kwantung Army strength in Man-churia were in balance. Dependingupon the course of German resistance,

17

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Marines advance under fire

the Russians could enter the Pacific

war by sending reinforcements to

Siberia, but Tojo called the prospectsfor Soviet intervention 'a toss-up'.

An official present at this Imperialaudience admired Tojo's candor butwas disturbed by his dogmatism - his

obvious dislike of the measures takenby the cabinet which succeeded him,his condemnation of the so-called de-

- tff ^

cline in fighting spirit, his equation of

peace with defeatism, his rosy appre-ciation of Japanese prospects in thewar. It was the feeling of the official

that aggressive Tojo had probablyfailed to discern the agony of theEmperor's outlook. But, for our pur-

poses, it is important to observe thatTojo, whether his facts were right or

wrong, was accurately mirroring thethoughts of the fire-eating Japanesemilitary.

19

jW*iiilj|)4i

Marine rocket-firing trucks in action

onlwoJima

m

Cauldron of death

Events already belied Tojo's bravado.Fifty-five bombers from China con-

ducted the initial B-29 raid againstYawata on 15th June 1944. The first

B-29s from Saipan appeared high overTokyo in November for daytime re-

connaissance. On the 24th, in broaddaylight, eighty bombers struck the

Nakajima engine plant at Musashinofrom high altitude and then attackedother parts of the tinderbox capital

and harbor. According to municipalrecords, 550 persons were killed or

wounded, and 1,325 were renderedhomeless. Kase claims that 'such wasthe shock of this experience . . . thegovernment ceased to function duringthe raid'. But it was only a beginning.

By December, enemy aircraft wereattacking in formations of more than250, though sometimes they strucksingly or in pairs, taking the defendersby complete surprise. During fifteen

high-altitude raids on the capital in

December, it was noteworthy that theduration of the strikes was extendedto an hour or two. 800 houses were

22

razed, 734 casualties inflicted, 3,200

persons rendered homeless. The newyear was ushered in by raiders whichdropped 700 incendiaries shortly after

midnight on 1st January. 'Toward thedirection of Ueno,' an official recordedin his diary, 'the sky was ablaze withfire. Poor helpless people renderedhomeless on New Year's day!' Addedthis astute observer: 1945 'is the yearof decision. This year will see the endof war both in Europe and Asia. Sadthough it is, we must face realities

squarely. We have lost the war'.

Although casualties were decep-

tively light at first, the scope of the air

attacks increased; blind bombingbegan to supplant the raids against

purely major military targets. Duringthe first two months of the B-29

attacks, twenty-three of Tokyo'stwenty-five wards were bombed in-

discriminately. Fifteen hundred civi-

lians became casualties in January,another 6,400 were left homeless, 1,300

houses were razed. The authorities

noted that many residents were

being wounded by fragments of anti-

aircraft shells, and houses were beingdestroyed by crashing defense planes.

Matters grew worse from February.Navy Grumman fighters and armyP-51s joined the B-29 offensive, and theduration of raids now exceeded twohours. Burned-out areas increasedmassively, as did human losses. Forthe whole month of February, over2,000 citizens were killed or injured,

82,000 lost their homes, 13,000 houseswere burned down. A carrier assaulton 16th February, conducted byswarms of fighters estimated to num-ber 1,400 in total, was particularlyimpressive and disheartening. 'Noth-ing was done to interfere with the hugetask forces operating at the gates of

the Imperial capital,' complained anAGS officer. 'There is nothing worseto depress the fighting spirit of thepeople'. Known to but few at the timewas the fact that, in the biggest single

bomber raid to date, on snowy 25thFebruary, spill-over from the 6,000

projectiles dropped by 130 B-29s on the

Emperor Hirohito inspects bomb damagein Tokyo after the first B-29 raid

Kanda area ignited a number of build-

ings in the grounds of the Imperialpalace; e.g., the apartments of thecourt ladies, the cabinet library, aguard barracks, warehouses. One Im-perial official saw, hanging on a tall,

snow-covered tree , an incendiarybombsparkling with fire 'like a gruesomeChristmas tree'. In the city itself,

10,000 buildings were destroyed on the25th, over 35,000 people were homeless.For the whole month, over 2,000 citi-

zens were killed or injured, 82,000 lost

their homes, 13,000 structures wereburned down.

It was clear that the Americanswere in control of the skies over

Tokyo. The Japanese now noted that

enemy planes were able to change tac-

tics and to come in at low altitude

at night, without formation, to con-

duct incendiary carpet-bombing in

waves. The fire raid of 10th March(Japanese 'Army Day') on Tokyo,

23

launched by 150 B-29s striking low andseparately in a gale after midnight anddropping 190,000 incendiary bombs,burned out forty per cent of thecapital in two-and-a-half hours. Thecity 'caught fire like a forest of pinetrees'. An eyewitness reported that'the fire clouds kept creeping higher,and the tower of the Diet buildingstood out black against the red sky.The city was as bright as at sunrise;clouds of smoke, soot, and sparksdriven by the storm, flew over it. Thatnight we thought the whole of Tokyohad been reduced to ashes'. Metropoli-tan police records indicate that89,000 civilians were killed and an-other 41,000 injured. Over 276,000

houses were destroyed, over sixteensquare miles were gutted, and at least

1,150,000 persons were left homeless.Twenty-five days were required to

clear the ruins of the dead. Bloatedand charred corpses surfaced on theSumida river for months. Caidin calls

it 'the single most devastating fire

the human race has ever known'.IGHQ admitted publicly that a fire

at the bureau of Imperial mews wasput out by 8 am on the 10th, but thetruth was that the flames had actuallyapproached the air raid shelter hous-

Above Left: Admiral Suzuki. Above:General Mori. Right: General Tanaka

ing the Emperor and Empress. Thisstructure, euphemistically called thelibrary 'Obunko', had been completedby the end of 1942. After the majorraid on Tokyo from Saipan on 24thNovember 1944, the sovereign hadmoved into Obunko in mid-December.In the 10th March raid, bombs directlyhit the Imperial mews building and atea house in the garden of Obunko.Even more dangerously, firebrands

from burning central Tokyo flashed

into the main palace area, ignitedgrass and hedges, and, fanned bydemonic winds, spread to the dense,man-high shrubbery which camou-flaged Obunko itself. Dozens of sol-

diers, guards, workers and firemenbeat out the flames, which had beenlapping at the verandah of Obunko,with buckets of water and with tree

branches. Amid the confusion andnoise, the Imperial couple sat quietlyon the second floor below Obunko. TheEmperor was awaiting reports on theJapanese military occupation of

French Indo-China, on the inferno in

central Tokyo, and on the imminentbirth (in another air-raid shelter in

24

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Bomb damage in Asaksa, Tokyo'stheaterland

town) of his first grandchild. Acridsmoke could be smelled in the Im-perial shelter, though there wereexhausts.

When the long night was over, theEmperor took his retainers by sur-prise: he wanted personally to in-spect burned-out Tokyo, whose plightgrieved him deeply. Officials who madepreliminary inspections of the cityreturned horrified. They were especi-ally stricken by the sight of in-numerable 'rice-plant mounds' which,on closer examination, proved to bestacks (two to three meters high) ofmelted bodies of humans who hadtried to flee from the fires but had beenroasted alive by the furnace-likegales. The retainers were also worriedabout the possiblity that an Im-perial party, if announced beforehand

28

and if escorted heavily as usual,would attract the attention of enemyaircraft. After much hesitation, itwas decided that the monarch shouldmake his inspection unannounced,with a small motorcade and fewguards, but with air cover. Normaltraffic and pedestrian movementwould be entirely free. Sunday 18thMarch was chosen, partly because itwas hoped the enemy air forces wouldtake the day off. (Actually, 1,400Allied planes hammered Japan thisday, but the raids were conductedagainst air bases throughout Kyushu.)Moving at thirty-six kilometers per

hour, the Imperial motorcade left thepalace at 9 am on the 18th. The Em-peror quietly studied the grim scenesof desolation. Most of his subjectswere taken by surprise, to see theirmonarch in his car flying the red andgold chrysanthemum pennon. Manybowed hastily after the procession had

passed. When the bows were in time,

an aide would call them to the Em-peror's attention, and the sovereign

would salute graciously each time. Anumber of survivors, poking in the

ruins, looked on, dazed and uncompre-hending, as the cars went by. At the

remains of a torii gate, the Emperordismounted and was given briefings byofficers. Where bustling factories,

houses, and shops had stood, there

were now gutted buildings, contorted

trees, tangled frames of trucks andbicycles, scorched girders, rubble. Oneold lady caught the Emperor's atten-

tion: oblivious to everything she waswashing clothing in the water pouring

from a broken main. The monarchnext viewed the scene from a bridge,

and then went to a police station

where he was told about the situation

in that ward: 12,884 of 12,934 houseshad been destroyed; 10,500 people hadbeen killed or injured. In the car on the

way back to the palace, the Emperorsaid sadly to a chamberlain that at

the time of the great Kanto earth-

quake of 1923, he had inspected the

entire city on horseback. Everythinghad been burned down; nothing wasleft. But perhaps because there were

no tall buildings then, the Emperorhad not derived such feelings of agony.

This time, a far more merciless im-

pression was conveyed. Wreckage of

concrete remained now; it pained the

monarch's heart even more. 'It is

truly tragic . . . Tokyo has finally

become scorched earth, has it not?'

At 11.00am the motorcade returned

from its somber and highly unusualinspection. The Emperor had truly

risked his life, for at 1.42pm an enemyplane raided Asakusa, not far fromwhere the party had driven; seven

civilians were killed or wounded.The fact of the Imperial inspection

of 18th March 1945 possesses special

significance. Japanese officers werewell acquainted with the saying that

even victorious commanders should

not go to the battlefield. Many drewthe conclusion from their humaneEmperor's inspection, that a rapid

ending of the war could be expected.

The main fear was that 'ending of the

war' could be equated with 'defeat'.

The obliteration of the city ofTokyowas completed by saturation raids in

April and May. In the early hours of

14th April, 160 B-29s dropped 754 tons

of incendiaries, left 641,000 civilians

homeless and 11.4 square miles burnedout. The sacred Meiji shrine wasrazed, and 36 instances of damagewere caused by flames invading the

Imperial compounds, although the

main palace was still intact. SomeJapanese writers professed to see in

the inferno of 14th April, 'revenge' for

the death of President Roosevelt twodays earlier. 'Paper bombs', leaflets

dropped by enemy planes, warned that

the Japanese militarists, from magni-ficent air-raid shelters, had brought

the people to the verge of doom:'. . . You have no way of escaping the

bombs. You have no place to hide.

29

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Continued resistance means only ahorrible death. Demand an end tosuch hopeless resistance. It is the only-

way to save your homeland'. Japanesemilitary police were on the alert to

try to prevent the populace fromreading the leaflets.

By May, forces numbering 400

American planes went after majortarget complexes. A number of Japan-ese expected a great saturation raid

against Tokyo on Navy Day, 27thMay, a precedent set by the hugeattack on Army Day in March. TheB-29s came early. About 250 bombersthundered over the defenseless capital

near 1.30am on 24th/25th May andloosed 119,000 bombs (3,646 tons) in twohours. Six incendiaries razed a two-story arbor near the Imperial Obunkoshelter, and other damage was doneto the compound, but the palace still

stood. After noon, thirty fighters

attacked the capital again for a half-

hour. When night came on the 25th,

the Imperial chamberlains hoped theweary sovereign could retire early

Above: Refugees begin the exodusafter Tokyo's first raid. Right: Theremnants of shattered city services

but, around 10.00pm, over 200 B-29sreturned to complete the destructionof Tokyo. On a fine night with a strongsoutherly wind and a humidity of

fifty per cent, the bombers raineddown 149,000 bombs (3,252 tons) on thesurviving center of Tokyo. They hit

the Yasukuni shrine to the war dead,the central markets, Tokyo station,

the old American embassy, theforeign minister's official residence,

the Imperial Hotel designed by FrankLloyd Wright, which had survivedthe 1923 earthquake, the war ministry,the navy ministry, the army generalstaff headquarters, the war minister'sofficial residence, the transportationministry, the Kabuki theater, theministry of Greater East Asia, KeioUniversity, the Yomiuri Press, etc.

Errant incendiary bombs directly

struck Hanzo gate, west of the palace,

and destroyed the entranceway and the

30

two guard boxes. Nearby, other incen-diaries hit the structure housingJapan's holy of holies, the mytho-logical Three Sacred Treasures, whichhad only been moved to strong under-ground vaults the preceding Novem-ber. Pump trucks poured water ontothe structure for two hours; whenwater ran out, firefighters scaled theroof, pulled off incendiaries and threwthem to the ground, where the bombswere stamped out. The treasure build-

ing was saved.

The wind fanned Tokyo's fires, thefires fanned the wind, and thermalcyclones hurled blazing ashes, bullets

of fire, in jets across the broad Im-perial moats. Fireballs caught onancient pines and palms, and on theeaves and gutters of the main palace.

Firefighters finally beat out theflames. At 1.00am on the 26th, theall-clear sounded, and the Imperialcouple came up to ground level fromthe basement shelter in Obunko. Fiveminutes later, flames exploded from

the lattice work above the ceiling- of

the main palace. Witnesses likened

the fiery blast to that of a flame-

thrower. Frenzied efforts were madeto play hoses on the fire, but the angle

was poor and the water pressure wasfeeble. Flames spread like lightning

through the glass-paned, wooden hall-

ways.General Mori (Imperial Guard Divi-

sion commander) and General Tanaka(Eastern Army District commander)raced over to direct the efforts to savethe Imperial palace and environs.

But the cypress wood burned fiercely,

and the molten copper roof slates

gave off a strange and poisonous greenflame. A change in wind drove thefires from the front palace to the rearpalace, where Their Majesties used to

reside before moving to Obunko. It

was imperative to destroy three hall-

ways linking the palaces, in order to

create firebreaks, but even the Im-perial Guards commander could notundertake such a thing at the sacredpalace on his own authority. Whenpermission was obtained from theImperial ADC, army engineers set

demolition charges, but these failed to

do the job. Thereupon the soldiers

attacked the pillars and beams withmallets and crowbars. Meanwhile,orders had been issued for the troopsto save all possible items from therear palace. Working with a frenzy,

the men hauled out twenty truckloadsof straw mats, gilt doors, books,paintings, clothing, furniture, thecrown prince's toys. To save the goods,water hoses were concentrated on theshell of the palace, until it collapsedgently, as in a scene from a slow-motion movie. In four hours, by5.00am on the 26th, 18,239 squaremeters of 20,856 in the palace com-pound had been razed. Only a recep-tion chamber survived from twenty-seven buildings in front and rear.

There had been something like areligious faith, held even among

American air attack with parachutebombs on a Japanese motor convoy

those at the top of the government,that the Imperial palace was immunefrom the foe ; few had believed that its

survival until 25th May was attribut-

able to sheer luck. The actuality wasan immense shock, 'like the fall of acastle in days of old'. At the height of

the fires, Premier Suzuki (who hadbarely escaped incineration with his

family when his own official residencewas burned down this day) went to theroof of his shelter and worshippedthe blazing palace from afar, while,

gasping from smoke, he wiped awaytears of sorrow. Thirty-four bodieswere found, mainly in the inner gar-

dens of the front palace, where a dozensoldiers were cremated alive in thesupposed safety of an air-raid shelter.

The Emperor was saddened by newsof the loss of the palace and of thedestruction of residence after resi-

dence belonging to all of the royalprinces. According to Kase, however,the monarch stated that he felt

better since the palace bombing as hecould now share the people's hard-ships . A sleepless Emperor thankedhis retainers and officers for their

strenuous efforts and sacrifices. Onthe morning of the 27th, he and theEmpress started to tour the burned-out palace compound, but an air-raid

alert sounded and they could notleave Obunko again till afternoon.Guided by Imperial retainers, theythreaded their way through charredtimber, slates, and rocks, toward thesite of their old palace. At one point asenior aide apologized for the tragedy,

but the Emperor replied that it wasunavoidable in wartime, and in turnexpressed his own sorrow for theregrettable loss of so many lives. Anaide never forgot the sight of theEmpress, clad in wartime trousers,

poking among the slates and debris

with a stick ; she gave him a little clayfigurine, which she had found, as amemento when the inspection wasover. Meanwhile, the Emperor waswondering about the fate of a favorite

bronze statue of Frederick the Greatwhich used to stand in the garden of

33

}M®m his study. Later the bronze was foundbroken in two.

General Tanaka sought to resign by-

way of apology, but the war minister

declined to accept the action. TheImperial Household air defense chief

did resign, as did the distinguished

minister of the household and his

deputy. General Umezu, chief of the

AGS, stated he would take responsi-

bility for the disaster, but the warminister, General Anami, insisted that

he was ultimately responsible for

defense of the capital, and he could not

be dissuaded by either the primeminister or the Lord Keeper of the

Privy Seal. Anami's resignation wouldhave brought down the cabinet at this

critical juncture; therefore the Em-peror interceded to reassure the warminister.

The latest raids on Tokyo at the endof May had razed another twenty-twosquare miles, burned out 90,000 houses,

and caused 'the most violent fires ever

experienced in Japan'. 'As I ran to-

ward the distant Tama river,' recalls

a survivor of the hell of 25th May,'I kept my eyes on the sky. It was like

a fireworks display as the incen-

diaries exploded. Blazing petroleumjelly, firebrands and sparks flew every-

where. People were aflame, rolling andwrithing in agony, screaming pite-

ously for help, but beyond all mortalassistance ... I still remember abamboo grove on fire, the bambooknuckles exploding with frightening

shots ... I saw roofs flying in air anda huge flaming telephone pole being

spun by a tornado ... It was the

longest night of my life'. The capital

was no longer worth another B-29

assault in 1945.

During the first five months of the

year, all of Japan was struck by 16,958

enemy planes, according to AGSestimates. Casualties had mounted to

214,261. American records indicate

that 153,887 tons of bombs (including

98,466 incendiary) were dropped on the

Bomb attack on the Kawasaka aircraft

Jpp factory north of Tokyo. January 1 945

35

whole of Japan by US Army planes in

1945. A contemporary home ministryreport evaluated the behavior of the

populace in the May catastrophe : 'The

consequences of the air raid [of 10th

March] had caused the people to

evacuate from the area, and in certain

sections they had neglected to keepthe water tanks filled, lacked the

preparation for air defense, and also

from the beginning the people devotedthemselves to carrying out their

household goods and lacked a fighting

spirit toward the incendiary bombing... so that they were not able to defend

themselves against the aerial attack.'

After the May raids, the minister of

home affairs admitted that civilian

defense measures in Tokyo and else-

where were considered to be futile.

The police section chief at air defense

headquarters said that the public

began to realize that equipment andgeneral preparations against raids

were useless. Enlightened citizens

often gave up attempting to cope withthe situation. After a few heavy raids,

the ignorant also lost hope. During the

later attacks there was a general

exodus from afflicted areas.

Community interest varied withrespect to the protection of public

buildings. The overall tendency wasto look after one's own property andnot to worry excessively about one's

neighbor. Local neighborhood groupsmay have been willing to help eachother and the schools but they werereluctant to leave their own sections

to fight fires in public buildings andhotels or even temples and shrines.

In the case of the larger office buildings

and hotels, antagonism supplantedindifference. To this societal pheno-menon, one might add the problemsof harbor fire fighting. Until the endof 1944 the great port of Yokohamapossessed only one antiquated andpuny fireboat; the authorities had to

depend upon auxiliary boats owned byprivate companies in the dock area.

But when the fire raids occurred, the

private firms refused to respondbecause they were preoccupied with

Extensive bomb damage to strategic

targets. Above, the oil refinery at Otake.

Right: the waterfront at Osaka

protecting their own properties. Since

this condition typified the entire

harbor-defense system, it became the

practice to drag burning ships to anunused portion of the harbor, so that

their eventual sinking would not blockwater traffic. Ashore, fire-fighters

abandoned blazing buildings, to pro-

tect those surrounding, althoughsomewhat more effort was made whena flaming ship was tied to a pier.

Air-raid shelters were without ex-

ception inadequate, due in part to the

shortage of building materials, especi-

36

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ally of reinforcing steel and cement.

Large exterior facilities were built of

wood and earth, and lacked lighting,

sanitary facilities, and seating. In

many cases, the structures were so

weak that they constituted suffo-

cating death traps for those whosought refuge in them. None of these

public shelters was gas or fire proof.

The home ministry forbade use of the

Tokyo subway stations as shelters

because water seepage and the sandysoil prevented construction to a

depth sufficient to afford ample pro-

tection against high-explosive bombs.The value of tunnel-type public shel-

ters was often offset by the distances

which the populace had to traverse to

reach them. In all, less than two per

cent of the population had access to

shelters which might shield themagainst bombs weighing up to 500 lbs.

It has been estimated that the

average tonnage of incendiaries drop-

ped during the saturation raids amoun-ted to 225 tons per square mile, or

700 pounds per acre. In the three urbancomplexes which constituted the key-

stones of Japan's war economy, the

following percentages were burnedout in the air raids : Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki, fifty-six per cent; Nagoya,fifty-two per cent; Osaka-Kobe, fifty-

seven per cent. Sixty-five of the

leading cities were devastated, Kyotobeing the only major center spared.

The medium-sized cities were obliged

to yield their fire-fighting and air-

defense equipment to the largest

cities, and were thus themselves help-

less against incendiary attacks. TheJapanese navy is known to havestripped the larger cities of new hose

;

hundreds of remaining sections had as

many as 300 patches each. Probably

the hose in service would have burst at

high pressures, but working pressures

seldom exceeded 80 lbs per square

inch, and generally ranged betweenzero and 60 lbs.

By June 1945, the fire-bomb offensive

against the largest urban complexeshad been extended to small andmedium-sized cities which contained

important basic materials and sub-

contracting installations. Bombersrazed seventy-two per cent of the areaand displaced eighty per cent of thepopulation of Hamamatsu, a majorproducer of airplane propellers and avital railhead on the main network of

Honshu island. About sixty-two per

cent destruction was visited uponOkayama city, an important source of

explosives, metals, and plastics. In

view of the extensive decentralization

of Japanese industry, the gross dam-age percentages reflect a fairly accu-rate index of the total physical

damage to industrial floorage.

Variations in the planned conductof the populace were many. In Kobecity, for example, workers droppedtheir tools as soon as an air raid alert

sounded, so that they would haveenough time to flee to the hillsides

immediately behind the metropolisbefore the bombers could arrive.

Consequently, the mere sounding of

the alert signal in the Kobe regioncaused an immediate drop in indus-

trial production. According to infor-

mation reaching the war ministryaround May 1945, the attendance rate

at munitions factories, throughoutthe country, promptly after a raid

dwindled to between twenty andthirty per cent. The average rate of

absenteeism at factories in deva-

stated areas approximated forty per

cent. In unraided zones, the absenteerate averaged fifteen per cent, buteven in unbombed Kyoto lost man-hours totaled forty per cent by July1945.

Labor conscription measures fur-

ther increased the absenteeism, as

growing numbers of students, women,Koreans and Chinese, prisoners of

war, and penitentiary inmates hadto be placed in the labor force. By 1945,

according to munitions ministry an-

nals, 3,363,000 women belonged to the

labor pool. This meant that aboutthirty-six per cent of the entire workforce consisted of women, of whomapproximately sixty per cent wereengaged in agriculture. Of the female

38

age group fifteen to forty-five nation-

wide, 21.4 per cent had been mobilizedfor labor. Two million students werelaboring by mid-year, including farmand forestry work. Another 323,000

Koreans and 34,000 Chinese had beenbrought into Japan as war workers.An indirect side-effect of the raids

was the dispersal of the labor force

because of housing problems, therebyaffecting both control and efficiency.

Professor Shioda, an economist at

Tokyo Municipal University, tells ussomething of the Japanese worker'soutlook: 'The "Association for Ser-

vice to the State Through Industry"would allot an added pittance of sake,

rice, or wheat to "labor heroes" whofulfilled their norms. Other than that,

there were only spiritual lectures, of

no help to an empty stomach. Ex-hausted workers, whose lives werebeing ravaged by the national per-

sonal service draft law and by thewage control ordinance, and whosehealth was being undermined by longhours of labor and by insufficient

nutrition, could not enhance their

The remains of a factory in Tokyo

.--*•k

killed, 313,041 injured, 8,045,094 home-less, 2,333,388 buildings destroyed,

110,928 partially destroyed. The num-ber of houses razed represented at

least thirty per cent of the national

total. It should also be noted that

the Japanese themselves demolished615,000 buildings as firebreaks, 214,000

of which were located in Tokyo. In all,

about 13,000,000 people were driven

from their homes by the destruction

of dwelling units; a substantial num-ber, in addition, were rendered home-less by the bombing of factory dor-

mitories.

Major evacuation of Japanese civi-

lians from urban areas began in 1944.

Between January and September of

that year, 1,000,000 people were movedout of Tokyo. The capital's populationfell from 5,000,000 in January 1945 to

2,453,000 in June. About fifty-five percent of the Nagoya area inhabitantswere evacuated; sixty per cent of

the Osaka-Kobe complex. Probably8,295,000 persons in all categories wereevacuated throughout Japan. Disper-

sal of the urban school population,begun slowly in mid-1944, was intensi-

fied after the raids of March 1945. ByApril, over eighty-seven per cent of

urban school children had been movedto places away from target areas.

Naturally, there was little time for

recording of impressions by the dis-

traught survivors of air raids, but thefamous wartime correspondence of

the young student Ichiro Hatanoremains. In late June 1945, at Suwa,he wrote; 'These air-raid warningsevery night are very tiring. The planesdon't always come, but I am abso-lutely fed up with the continualbuzzing on the wireless. As it is quiteimpossible to write in the eveningthese days, I have not opened this

book for a long time'. What com-pelled Hatano to write this time washis astonishment at his father's

detached attitude during the mostrecent night-time alert: 'So youthink, Ichiro,' said the father, 'that

it's better to get as much sleep as onecan - four or five hours - before dying?

I don't agree. We don't know when weshall be killed, and for that reason I

should like to read all I can, at least,

while I am alive. Look, I have herethree books I want to read before I die.

Do you really think I have time to let

myself go to sleep?' Upon saying this,

the old man 'gently drew his handover the book and began readingagain'. All survivors comment uponthe gnawing, neurotic pressures, rang-

ing from irritability to exhaustion to

lassitude, induced by incessant air

raid alerts and alarms since 1944.

The saturation attacks of the spring

of 1945 caused such an exodus that the

authorities allowed only children, thenon-essential, the sick and the agedto leave evacuation zones. This policy

had been made necessary becausepersonnel essential to air defense andproduction had been getting out underthe guise of air-raid sufferers or official

evacuees, and because people in smalltowns had caught the evacuationscare from the cities and were fleeing

to supposed safety. The governmentwas obliged to emphasize that keypersonnel, including officials, medicalstaff, munitions workers, and trans-

portation employees, must remain at

their posts with 'renewed indigna-

tion'. The totalitarian-type ImperialRule Assistance Association (IRAA)put up scolding posters which said,

'Do not mistake evacuation for flight'.

Nevertheless, the populace which hadexperienced or heard of the ghastlyfire raids streamed interminably into

the countryside with their carts andtrailers, drawn by old folk or bywomen. Not only were furniture andbedding loaded aboard, but one oftensaw even floor matting (tatarni). Afterthe incendiary raid on Tokyo in late

February 1945, survivors could beobserved dragging wagons throughthe rutted snow, their faces andhands caked with ash and soot andblood, their feet encased in thin socksinstead of shoes or clogs. As theEmperor himself had said in March'Tokyo has finally become scorchedearth'.

41

B-29s shower incendiary bombs downon Kobe

Mitsubishi J8M1 Shusui (Swinging Sword) rocket-driven interceptor based

broadly on the design of the Messersch mitt Me163B Komet for Imperial Japanese

Navy. Proposed variant for Army was designated Ki-200. Sole flight of J8M1 on

July 7, 1945 terminated in crash and destruction of aircraft. Power Plant : Yokosuka

Toko Ro.2 bi-fuel liquid rocket of 3,31 lb thrust. Armament : Two wing-mounted30-mm Type 5 cannon with 60 rounds per gun. Estimatedmaximum speed: 497 mphat 39,370 ft. Estimated climb : 2 min 10 sec to 1 9,685 ft, 3 min 30 sec to 32,81 ft.

Ceiling : 39,370 ft. Powered endurance ; 5 min 30 sec. Weight empty : 3,1 86 lb.

Weight loaded : 8,598 lb. Span : 31 f1 2 i n . Length : 1 9 ft 2£ in.

Nakajima Ki-201 Karyu (Fire Dragon) twin-jet attack fighter for Army based ondesign of Messerschmitt Me 262 but somewhat larger. The prototype was scheduled

to fly in December 1945 but no production order had been placed. Power Plant : TwoNe-230 turbojets each of 1 ,950 lb thrust or two Ne-1 30 turbojets each of 2,000 lb

thrust. Armament ;Two 20-mm and two 30-mm cannon. Estimatedmaximumspeed: 530 mph at 32,800 ft. Estimated climb : 1 3 min 1 5 sec to 32,800 ft. Span : 44 ft

1 1 1 in. Length : 37 ft 8| in

Kyushu J7W1 Shinden (Magnificent Lightning) interceptor fighter of canardconfiguration for Imperila Navy and only piston-engined aircraft of this unorthodoxarrangement ever to be ordered into production. First prototype made initial flight

on August 3, 1 945, and only two additional flights made. Output of 1 50 per monthanticipated for mid-1946 but no production examples completed. Power Plant : OneMitsubishi MK9D (Ha-43) 18-cylinder radial with supercharger rated at 2,130 hp.

Armament : Four 30-mm Type 5 cannon with 60 rounds per gun. Estimatedmaximumspeed: 466 mph at 28,540 ft. Estimated climb : 1 min 40 sec to 26,250 ft. Ceiling :

39,000 ft. Range: 528 miles. Weight empty: 7,639 lb. Weight loaded : 10.$12 lb.

Span : 36 ft. 5i in. Length : 30 ft. 4i in.

45

North American P-51 C Mustang interceptor, long-range escort fighter and fighter-

bomber was the initial Merlin-engined version of the Mustang built at Dallas, Texas,

the identical model built simultaneously at Inglewood, California, being the P-51 B.

Total of 1 ,988 P-51 Bs built at Inglewood and 1 ,750 P-51 Cs at Dallas before bothplants switched to manufacture of the P-51 D. These models of the Mustangappeared in the Pacific Theatre during the first half of 1 944. Following applies to

P-51 C-1 . Power Plant: One Packard V-1 650-3 Merlin of 1 ,620 hp. Armament : Four0.5-in Browning MG 53-2 guns with 350 (inboard pair) and 280 (outboard pair)

rounds per gun. Maximum speed: 440 mph at 30,000 ft. Climb : 3.6 min to 1 0,000 ft,

7 min to 20,000 ft. Ceiling : 42,000 ft. Range : 550 miles normal, 2,200 miles max.Weight empty : 6,840 lb. Weight loaded : 9,200 lb normal, 1 1 ,200 lb maximum.Span : 37 ft 0£ in. Length : 32 ft 3 in

46

Grumman F6F-3 Hellcat shipboard interceptor and fighter-bomber joined combatin the Pacific mid-1 943 and soon became mainstay of the US Navy's carrier-based

fighter force, being joined during final phases of war by the improved F6F-5 model.Total of 4,423 F6F-3 Hellcats was built before production switched to the F6F-5 in

April 1 944, and the two models of this Grumman fighter were credited with thedestruction of 5,1 56 enemy aircraft. Power Plant : One Pratt & Whitney R-2800-1

1 8-cylinder radial of 2,000 hp. Armament : Six 0.5-in machine guns with 400 roundsper gun. Maximum speed: 376 mph at 1 7,300 ft. Climb : 3,500 ft/min initial. Ceiling :

38,400 ft. Range : 1 ,090 miles normal, 1 ,590 miles maximum. Weight empty: 9,042 lb.

Weight loaded : 1 1 ,381 lb normal. Span : 42 ft 1 in. Length : 33 ft 7 in

Boeing B-29A Superfortress strategic

heavy bomber of the USAAF played a

vital role in the Pacific War, joining

combat in June 1 944, making its first

long-distance strike against Japan onthe 1 5th of that month, and continuing

the bomber offensive until the end of

WW II. V-J day resulted in cancellation

of orders for 5,092 B-29s, and the last

of the 3,974 built was not delivered until

June 10, 1946. Power Plant : Four WrightR -3350-23 twin-row radials of 2,200 hp

each. Armament : 1 6,000 lb of bombsand 10-120. 5-in machine guns for

defence. Maximum speed: 365 mph at

25,000 ft. Cruising speed: 220 mph.Ceiling : 31 ,850 ft. Range : 5,830 miles.

Weight empty : 69,61 lb. Weight

loaded: 1 05,000 lb. Span : 1 41 ft 2| in.

£enflrf/i:99ft0in.

47

Kawanishi Baika (Plum Blossom) was a projected piloted suicide aircraft which,inspired by the manned version of Germany's V-1 , was still on the drawing boardswhen the Pacific War ended. The Baika was to have been fitted with a 550-lb warheadand the pilot was intended to jettison his undercarriage after taking-off on his one-

way mission. Power Plant : One Maru Ka-10 pulse jet of 795 lb thrust. Estimatedmaximum speed: 460 mph. Weight loaded : 3,1 50 lb. Span : 21 ft 7 in.

Length :22 ft 11 in

Nakajima Ki-1 1 5 Tsurugi (Sabre) was specifically designed for the suicide mission

and was the essence of simplicity. It could be powered by a variety of surplus

engines, and a recessed crutch under the fuselage centre section could

accommodate a single bomb of up to 1 ,764 lb. The Tsurugi was designed and the

first prototype built within two months, and 1 04 production examples had beenrolled out by the time flight trials were completed in June 1 945, although none wasused operationally. Power Plant : One Nakajima Ha-3514-cylinder radial of 1,1 30 hp.

Maximum speed : 340 mph at 9,1 85 ft. Range : 745 miles. Weight empty : 3,61 6 lb.

Weight loaded : 5,688 lb. normal, 6,349 lb. maximum. Span : 28 ft 2\ in. Length

:

28 ft 0i in

48

Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka (Cherry Blossom) suicide aircraft was conceived for coastal

defence and as an anti-invasion measure. The Model 1 1 (illustrated) was intended to

carry a 2,646-lb warhead, and the first powered flight was made in November 1944,

the first operational use of the weapon being made on March 21 , 1 945, the Ohka's

first victims being the battleship West Virginia and three transport vessels whichsuffered heavy damage 1 1 days later. A total of 755 Ohka Model 11s was built, but

only a small proportion of these saw action. Power Plant: Three Type 4 Mk1 Model20 solid -propellant rockets with total thrust of 1 ,765 lb. Maximum speed

:

402 mphat 1 1 ,500 ft. Range : 23 miles. Weight empty : 970 lb. Weightloaded : 4,720 lb. Span :

1 6 ft 9 in. Length ; 22 ft 6| in

One of many last-ditch weapons developed by Japan in her last effort to stave off

defeat was the Shinyo suicide boat. They were armed with a large charge of H E or

two depth charges in the bows, the idea being that the pilot would set a collision

course with a worthwhile Allied target, arm the explosive and then hold on till hecollided with the ship. It was hoped that these craft would cause enough damage to

sink a medium sized vessel. By the end of the war about 6000 Shinyo boats had beenbuilt for use at Okinawa and in Japan, but so far as is known, no Allied vessel

suffered major damage as a result of one of these craft. They weighed between 1 \

and 2 tons, measured 1 6^ to 1 8 feet in length and were capable of between 25 and 30knots on the power of one or two automobile engines. Each craft was equipped withtwo 5-inch rockets at the stern. The rockets were meant to explode and send out a

shower of incendiary bullets to put off the aim of gunners on exposed mounts for

gunsof 40mm calibre or smaller

49

Realities en

the home front

! i

jHk^v

If V

Food shortages appeared early. Somefifty per cent of the population wereordinarily involved in feeding thenation, but twenty per cent of the rice

had to be imported. When the warbegan, Japan's total food supplyallowed an average calorie intakeonly 6.4 per cent above minimum sub-sistence , despite intensive agricultural

practice and high yields per acre. Asearly as 1942, the authorities hadbeen obliged to begin substitutingwheat and barley for a portion of therice ration, in view of declines in

supply. Later, sweet potatoes andwhite potatoes had had to be added.The calorific value of the ration con-tinued to diminish, as did the total

per capita intake of food. As a result

of the declining stocks of basic foods,

the daily ration in 1945 fell below1,500 calories. Although not a starv-tion diet, this level amounted to aboutsixty-five per cent of the minimumJapanese standard for the mainten-ance of health and of work efficiency.

In one famous case, a whole family inHayama was said to be subsisting onthe official food ration, but a nutri-tional expert, who was touched bythe report and went to investigate,found that each member was suffering

from acute night blindness. Agricul-tural Minister Shimada had said, inAugust 1944, that Japan would have todecide whether to pursue a policy ofliving 'thick and short' or 'thin andlong'. Clearly, the second course wasbeing chosen.Hunger and disease stalked the

Japanese populace by 1945; food mono-polized their thoughts. A schoolchildevacuee remembers standing in thewarm sun under temple eaves and in-

haling tooth powder in order to with-stand hunger pangs. Others recall

eating uncooked, purloined sweetpotatoes. When rice was occasionallyissued, it proved to be charred. Withbowls in hand, teachers would go fromhouse to house in farm hamlets, beg-ging for salt and bean curd for thechildren. The latter resorted to dig-

ging up lily roots, eating mulberries,catching and broiling snakes, devour-ing wild grass and crabs found instreams. Many of the evacuees sufferedfrom chronic diarrhoea, lice, or scabies.City residents flocked to the farm-

lands by the tens of thousands, topurchase potatoes, vegetables, andfruit directly from farmers at exor-bitant black market prices, often en-tailing the barter of scarce civilian

goods and personal possessions orclothing. As many as 900,000 personsare judged to have made such foraysfrom Tokyo on a single Sunday.Although transportation of foodstuffs

by individuals aboard passenger trains

Philippine women plant rice watchedby Japanese guard

51

contravened the ordinances, no effort

at enforcement was being made by-

August 1945. 'The experience ofpatron-

izing black markets,' ex-Premier

Shigeru Yoshida has written, 'and of

riding in congested trains to the

countryside to barter . . . for sweetpotatoes or cabbages will remain vivid

in the memories of urban dwellers wholived through those grim years'.

According to Bank ofJapan estimates,

black market prices exceeded the offi-

cial price controls by the following

percentages in July 1945: rice - 7,000

per cent; soy beans - 3,000; sweetpotatoes - 2,250; beer - 1,667; sugar -

24,000; dried bonito - 3,560. Corres-

ponding percentages for consumergoods included cotton cloth - 4,000 per

cent; silk cloth - 1,000; leather shoes -

4,400; soap - 20,000; matches - 20,000;

socks - 7,500 ; charcoal - 4,000 ; firewood- 2,000 ; iron kettles - 3,000 ; saucepans -

4,000; bicycles - 2,600. These data canbe corroborated from survivors' re-

collections and from notes made at

the time. For example, one authorwrote in his diary entry for 13th July1944, that one cup of cooking oil cost

him twenty-three sen, at the official

price. The black market rate at the

same time was seven yen. At the

permanent rate of one hundred sen

to the yen, this means that the blackmarket price for this particular com-modity was over thirty times the

official price. On average, black mar-ket prices of most consumer goodswere 4,200 per cent higher than the

official prices. Those people hardest

hit were bombed-out urban residents,

who had to turn to the black marketto replace the bare essentials.

Since the armed forces were requir-

ing rice in increasing quantities,

civilian consumers were averagingforty per cent less rice than at the

beginning of the war. In the spring of

1945, an important Diet member told

Prince Higashikuni that rice supplies

for May could only be made available

to the public by drawing upon stocksreserved for July. By August, rice

could be expected to be in critically

short supply. To complicate thematter of the deteriorating food

situation, there had also been apoor wheat and barley harvest, attri-

butable to violent floods and stormsas well as to shortages of fertilizer

and of labor. In a secret Diet inter-

pellation on 10th June 1945, ViceMinister of War Shibayama admittedthat it would be impossible to protract

the war past spring 1946, in view of the

worsening food crisis. As a matter of

fact, the 1946 rice year, as from 1st

November 1945, began with a carry-

over of only enough rice for four days'

consumption: 133,000 tons, against apeak figure of 1,178,000 tons in 1941.

The 1945 rice harvest was so disastrous

(the smallest since 1909) that further

reductions would undoubtedly havebeen required soon, particularly be-

cause no additional rice could bebrought from Taiwan after April 1945.

It is said that an odious flour wasmilled from bleached acorns. Ricewas adulterated by the admixture of

unidentifiable ingredients, sometimesseaweed, sometimes less desirable

elements.Insufficient amounts of fruits, vege-

tables, fish and soybean products wereavailable through rationing. Becauseof manpower and fertilizer shortages,

for example, vegetable production wasdown eighty-one per cent. Supplies of

seasoning were fifty per cent of the

1941 level. Feed entered the blackmarket as foodstuffs. Without im-ported forage, meat production wasdown seventy per cent from the quan-tity at the outset of the war.

Figures concerning the availability

of sugar provide another useful index

as to Japan's declining food situation

after 1944. Whereas prewar sugar

consumption averaged thirty lbs per

capita, by 1945 the level amounted to

three lbs. At the end of 1945, the

Japanese government possessed only

4,583 tons of sugar throughout the

country, as against a peak inventory

of 167,000 tons in 1942. From what little

sugar was extant, almost all found its

way into the black market; no official

52

ration was available in 1945.

Salt is perhaps an even more critical

indicator; apart from being- judgedindispensable in the diet, salt was vital

for the chemical industry, oil refining,

and explosives manufacture. In 1945

salt production averaged one-third of

the minimum national requirement of

600,000 tons. At a conference on war-making capabilities, conducted in late

May 1945, a representative from the

finance ministry reported that, un-

less the situation improved, salt to

feed domestic animals would have to

be cut off by autumn, when salt pro-

duction in Japan proper would becomealmost impossible. After that date, the

official confessed to doubts whetherthere would be sufficient salt for

human consumption by 1946, in whichcase there was 'no guarantee that the

fate befalling the domestic animalswould not afflict the people at large'.

Although the national slogan re-

mained, 'We want not a thing until

victory,' Japanese planners weresecretly alarmed at the prospect of

famine, especially in densely popu-lated areas, in the event the Allied

blockade were tightened, the landtransportation system disrupted, andthe unharvested fields attacked fromthe air. Consequently, although therewas a desperate need for industrial

raw materials, the foreign ministrysucceeded in pushing through a re-

commendation that the last shippingspace should be set aside to the great-

est extent possible for the importationof salt, cereals and soy beans. Thismeant an abandonment of the formerimport priorities accorded iron ore,

coal, pig iron, and other non-ferrousmetals. Steamships were even al-

lowed access to the precious, dwind-ling fuel stocks hoarded by the armedforces, so that every last bushel ofrice might be hauled into Honshu.Even so, rice imports in 1945 decreasedto eleven per cent of normal, andwould soon have been severed entirely.

Soy bean imports had by now droppedby thirty-one per cent of the 1941 level.

Malnutrition, fatigue, and loss of

weight were accompanied by an in-

crease in the incidence of tuberculosis,

especially among factory workers,deriving in large measure from accu-

mulated exhaustion and from food

shortages. One factory in Tsurumireported that a health examinationin August 1944 revealed that thirty

per cent of the workers were suffering

from beriberi. Medical personnel,

however, became less available after

the incendiary bombing raids beganin earnest. In Tokyo the number of

doctors decreased from 8,900 to 2,200

by August 1945; nurses, from 26,200

to 3,600. Hospital sanitation andequipment declined to deplorable

levels, and medical and nursing tech-

niques became primitive. Serums,drugs, and blood plasma were in

shortest supply. Surgical dressings

had to be used over and over, often

without proper cleaning or steriliza-

tion.

Troubles come not singly. On 7th

December 1944 a very severe earth-

quake struck the Tokai area, the

southern coast of central Japan,wrecking the long railway bridge onthe main Tokaido line across the

Tenryu river, and shattering impor-tant Nagoya city and its southeasternsuburbs. The giant Mitsubishi andAichi airframe production works,built on reclaimed land, were knockedout for at least a month, and neverfully overcame the effects of the

shattering ground tremors. The des-

truction of the Tenryu bridge blockedtrunk line movement for weeks.Additionally, the winter of 1944-

1945, by all accounts, was particularly

severe in all parts of Japan. Waterpipes- in the cities froze by day as well

as by night ; one survivor noted in his

diary that, during thirty years in

Tokyo, he had never before experi-

enced the freezing of water inside the

house. Frozen water pipes were use-

less, of course, in combating the fires

set by incendiary bombs. At Osaka, ahigh-explosive bombing raid in June1945 crippled the power supply leading

to the water department pumping

53

plant and damaged many water mains.For over a month afterward, there wasno water in any of the mains. Thedamage to nineteen principal mainshad not been entirely repaired four

months later. In Tokyo and other

major cities, electric train service

was repeatedly cut off by heavy snowsand icing. Despite the unaccustomedtribulations of winter, the populace

generally lacked firewood and fuel.

Families were fortunate to obtain onesack of charcoal, at the official rate,

all winter. In the bone-chilling cold,

heavy clothing was also in very short

supply. Cotton or wool cloth available

to civilians diminished by ninety-two

per cent between 1937 and 1945. Theratio of actual wartime production

to estimated minimum civil require-

ments fell to twenty-four per cent for

cotton cloth, nineteen per cent for

wool cloth, and thirty per cent for silk

cloth. At the same time, soap supplies

Japanese bombers are built in

preparation for war

were down ninety-six per cent fromthe prewar figure ;

paper, down ninety-

two per cent.

Substitute production often fared

very badly. Crude oil was in particu-

larly short supply. From a high point

of 12,346,000 barrels in stock duringthe first quarter of 1942, reserves hadfallen to 490,000 barrels by the end of

1944, and below 200,000 barrels byApril 1945. Wood turpentine, fish oil,

vegetable oil, and charcoal were usedas fuel; alcohol for aviation gasoline.

Imaginative government chemistsworked on many a fruitless project

designed to create ersatz petrol. Vil-

lagers - the aged, the children, the

women - took up picks and shovels to

dig out the deep roots of giant old pine

trees, from which crude oil was to be

extracted. One year of such labor

produced ten tons of pine tree oil. In

another late start, the attempt to

produce alcohol from potatoes com-menced at the beginning of 1945. In

June of that year, the 'War PowerCouncil' explored possibilities of em-

ploying tar as fuel. The chemicalfertilizer industry simultaneously de-

vised a product derived from a primi-

tive process of wood-ash leaching' as a

substitute for potash. Bamboo re-

placed metals in containers. Alunite

was tried as a substitute for bauxite,

with limited success. Plastics had to

be replaced by wood or glass. It is

significant that plain glass, much of

it not even shatter-proof, was em-ployed extensively in combat airplane

cockpit canopies, windows, and gunturrets, at a time when transparent

plastics were common in the air

forces of the United States and GreatBritain. Wood was substituted, quite

late, for aluminium wing tips, tail

surfaces and assemblies, and fuselages

as far forward as the cockpit. A cer-

tain amount of almost one hundred*per cent wood-for-metal replacementwas attempted in aircraft manufac-ture. Thus wood was used inside

cockpits for knobs, handles, and smallcontrol wheels where molded plastics

would normally be found. But even the

supply of wood fell short ; there was acase, in late January 1945, when acoffin could only be obtained by acivilian on condition that it be re-

turned after use.

Economists are of the opinion thatthe Japanese consumer was hit harderby the war than were civilians in anyother major belligerent country for

which data are available. More thanfive million people had been engagedin business before the war; by thespring of 1945 the number had de-

clined to less than two million. Aftermid-1944, the peak in the Japanesewar economy was past ; a further rise

in total output had become impossible.

Probably the level of gross product in

the first half of the fiscal year 1945 wastwenty-six per cent below that of thepreceding year. By July 1945, civilian

production, which had been allowed to

deteriorate throughout the war, wasbelow the level of subsistence. Durablegoods almost disappeared from themarket by 1945. It has been estimatedthat the destruction wrought upon the

Japanese civilian economy in six-and-

a-half months of 1945 was as great as

that inflicted upon Germany in three

years.

Even in prewar days, Japan's rail-

way mileage had been modest and the

system of relatively limited capacity.

Only two main lines traversed the

length of the main island of Honshu,generally close to the twisting sea-

coast. Lateral lines were few and of

minor importance. On Kyushu andHokkaido islands, the system con-

sisted of gathering lines which fed

the ports and the ferry or tunnel

bottlenecks. Tunnels totaled 2,285;

ferries, 48; bridges, 42,882. Throughoutthe system, freight traffic was mainlyof the short-haul variety, secondaryto coastal and ocean transportation.

Consequently the railroads had to

bear an unaccustomed burden of

longer-haul freight tonnage movedduring the Second World War. Whilethe capacity of passenger traffic is

said not to have declined absolutely,

there were visible inefficiencies in

loads. Although long-distance train

tickets were often extremely difficult

to obtain by individuals (who often

had to pay outrageous premiums,handled openly by the spring of 1945),

travelers reported empty passenger

trains as early as spring and summer1944, on the Utsunomiya, Karuizawaand, more importantly, Tokaido runs.

It should be added that no importantimproved inter-city highways werein existence by 1945, while the roadwaysystem was primitive and almost en-

tirely unsurfaced. And, by the end of

1944, only forty per cent of Japanese

lorries were operational, many of

these being charcoal burners. TheJapanese had already had to resort

to ox and horse-drawn carts andsleds on an extensive scale. But horses

were in critically short supply even

in the army. Thus the huge Twelfth

Area Army in the homeland projected

a need for 120,000 horses; it could

amass only 2,700.

The vulnerable railway net, mostlysingle-tracked, was over-burdened,

55

defenseless, and deteriorating. OnKyushu, only a fraction of the normaltrain schedules were being kept in

daytime. By February 1945, AGSplanners admitted privately that the

railroads could not be counted on for

troop concentration, and that all

major movements must be made bynight. Cabinet Secretary Sakomizutold Premier Suzuki that, by mid-

1945, railway activity would be con-

fined to local districts. Transporta-

tion, he stressed, was faced withinsurmountable difficulties because

of lack of fuel, insufficient cargo-

handling manpower, and shortage of

local movement capabilities. Railwaystock was being utilized long after it

became so dangerous that train speeds

had to be reduced. Electric power,

transmission once disrupted, re-

mained dead for weeks and sometimesmonths. We know that by June 1945,

government railways data revealed

daily carloading at an average so lowthat a comparable figure cannot be

found throughout the entire period of

the Second World War. Freight ton-

nage was down by more than forty per

cent from the wartime peak. Alogistics expert remembers seeing

desperately needed soybean stocks

piled high, uncovered, at Niigata pier,

from which transportation was not

forthcoming. In early July 1945 the

Americans began tactical air attacks

against rail installations and bridges

in southern Kyushu, designed to

prevent troop transfers. The samemonth, a single US carrier-based air

strike destroyed ten of twelve rail

ferries and damaged the other two,

on the vital Honshu-Hokkaido line,

over which thirty to forty per cent of

Hokkaido's coal was customarilytransported. This capability was re-

duced by eighty-two per cent at once,

with no prospect of recovery for nine

months. Small-scale Allied strategic

air operations against the railroads

was begun at war's end on 15th August.With respect to maritime shipping,

the Japanese planning board hadestimated in 1941 that, if the war lasted

three years, the country would possess

a net shipping tonnage of 5,250,000. Infact, Japan had 2,366,000 gross tonsafloat by March 1945, of which only1,560,000 tons were operable. In mid-August the figure for serviceable

merchant shipping had diminished to

557,000 gross tons, by which time the

built-to-sunk ratio amounted to amere seventeen per cent. Japan nowhad only twelve per cent of the mer-chant fleet with which she had openedthe war. The remnants were mainlyslow, comparatively small, and in-

efficient. One of the major effects of

the shipping shortage was that pig

iron and coking coal, the raw mate-rials needed for steel production, werecut by two-thirds by mid-1944. Whilesteel capacity increased, output fell.

Major port activity almost disap-

peared by the summer of 1945. Againsta rated index of one hundred per cent

for the monthly average of cargo

tonnage handled by merchant ships

in 1942, the 1945 average percentageswere as follows: Tokyo, 1.2 per cent

(nothing since 27th May) ; Yokohama,4.3 (nothing since 23rd May) ; Nagoya,0.9 (nothing since 27th April) ; Osaka,

9.5; Kobe, 11.2. Ports fronting on the

East China Sea and the Pacific weretotally idle. In July 1945, ships weresunk in increasing and significant

numbers off the coast of the homelanditself: six northeast of Honshu; fifteen

off the Japan Sea coast of Honshu;eleven around Kyushu; twelve in the

Shimonoseki strait; twenty in the

Inland Sea; twenty off Korea; six off

Hokkaido. Perhaps the best barometerof the shipping situation was the

strait of Shimonoseki, where only

thirty ships (totaling 29,954 tons) wereable to pass during the first two weeksof August 1945. One effect of the

shipping losses was that deep-sea

fishing, a key element in Japan's

overall food structure, had had to be

largely abandoned. The total fish

catch decreased by fifty per cent in

1945, against the prewar figure; fish

products amounted to only twenty-two per cent of the 1941 level.

56

After the fall of Okinawa in 1945,

munitions output fell to less than half

the wartime peak, a level that couldnot be expected to support sustaineddefensive operations against a majorinvasion of the homeland. In a countrywhere hydro-electric power was muchin use, it was noteworthy that in 1945

there was a surplus of electricity

available in January, normally thedriest time of year - a reflection of the

unavailability of raw materials re-

quired for manufacture. The decline

in production had resulted in growingamounts of unused plant capacity,

while the lack of coal indicated that aconsiderable portion of the industrial

areas would have to suspend opera-tions entirely. One factory workerrecalls having only three days' workin a month-long period, from mid-January to mid-February 1945; thecoal shortage was given as the reason.At its peak, Japanese munitionsoutput had never reached a point morethan ten per cent that of the UnitedStates, but now the isolation of thecountry by 1945 constituted, in thewords of a Tokyo University professor,

'indeed a death blow to the wareconomy of Japan, which had beenimporting almost every item of mat-erial from abroad for the use of its

home munitions industry'. As early asOctober 1944, a Japanese economicexpert admitted confidentially to

Prince Konoye's personal secretarythat the country's overall industrymight well break down by 1945 fromlack of resources.

With only one-third of estimatedaircraft production being turned out,

in fact, by early 1945, the Japaneseauthorities' attention was focused onaluminum shortages. The decrease in

shipping tonnage drastically affectedbauxite supply; seventy per cent ofshipments were lost at sea in 1944.

Additionally, it had been found thatonly fifty-five per cent of availablealuminum was actually going intoplane production. A campaign wastherefore initiated, to collect all

possible aluminum from domestic

nonmilitary sources. It is said thatthe Emperor became perturbed by thescale of this campaign and advisedthat household utensils not be confis-

cated. Meanwhile, in a most unusualshift of assignment, Japanese militarypolice units became involved in thealuminum scrap collecting drive, andsome were obliged to deal with blackmarket brokers. One MP officer re-

marked, 'We were like sophisticatedragpickers'. The need was demon-strable. By 1945, primary aluminumproduction was only nine per cent of

the paltry peak of 1944. Scrap alu-

minum was accounting for eighty percent of the supply available to theaircraft industry, thereby causing agrave deterioration in quality. Im-ports of bauxite had ceased sinceJanuary 1945.

The military police's relative suc-

cess in three weeks of aluminumscrap collection led to their mobiliza-tion to collect scrap iron. At best,

Japanese steel production had reachedonly one-third that of the UnitedStates, but the output in 1945 hadfallen by fifty per cent from 1944.

Bayonets were already in short sup-ply, and the latest old conscripts didnot even have swords. Learning fromthe aluminum drive, the militarypolice now used black marketeers as'consultants', under a rather moreformalized setup designed only toidentify sources for purchase by thesupply agencies. In about a month ofsuch activity, the military policeestimated that they squeezed enoughscrap iron from the economy to under-pin ten wartime divisions. But thebasic estimate made by the GreaterEast Asia Ministry in 1943 had by nowcome to pass: '.

. . should there evercome a time when supplies of rawmaterials from overseas are cut off,

we cannot but predict that the con-tinuation of this modern war will

become almost impossible'.

Those Japanese in a position toknow the country's material weak-nesses grew increasingly pessimisticabout the country's war prospects.

57

The thinking of staff officers in themunitions ministry developed beyondconsiderations of not winning, andentered the realm of speculation con-cerning capitulation. Raw materialstores were drying up as the homelandbecame isolated from external sourcesof supply. Enemy resources appearedto be vast and limitless. Given this

outlook, the military police com-menced a vain surveillance of thedefeatist munitions ministry. Onthe positive side, efforts were made to

hearten the ministry and to introducegreater self-discipline and determina-tion. The thought police soon foundthat the munitions staff was infected

by indolence and low morale. 'In sucha time of national crisis,' noted onecounterintelligence officer, 'the maintemple of wartime production (the

munitions ministry) mainly lackedthe will to win, or else they may al-

ready have given up on the war'. It

was known that a section chief, anavy captain, had greeted the newyear 1945 by advising his subordinatesthat the year marked Japan's defeat,

and by counseling them to be readyto flee at any time. No case could bemade against this officer by the army,and he was turned over to the navyministry for administrative punish-ment. In February 1945, retired

General Tojo admitted privately: 'It

is really serious that the fighting

spirit of the people has deterioratedsince the food situation became so

tight, and that the intelligentsia

harbor feelings of certain defeat'.

Later, in June, Tojo was sufficiently

agitated to go to see War MinisterAnami and encourage the army to

remain stouthearted, because NavyMinister Yonai and Foreign MinisterTogo had given Tojo the impressionof being agreeable to a surrender atany moment.Domei News Agency correspondent

Masuo Kato became convinced that

Steel rolling mill in action as

heavy industry is geared up for

arms production

58

no successful Japanese resistance wasany longer possible, and that perhapsthe country was continuing to fight

only from habit and because it did notknow how to stop. Kato judged thatby the summer of 1945 Japan's war hadbeen lost irrevocably, and that theleaders- 'floundering in dissension andindecision - knew this well, althoughthe general public could not. Terror-ized and ignorant, the people might'feel in their skin' that all was notwell, but they were obliged to cling

desperately to a world of myths, till

the end. Nevertheless, Japanese civi-

lians' discontent with the militarybecame especially intense after enemyplanes came freely to dominate theskies over the homeland. In one case

in Tokyo in March 1945, following

the great fire raid, exhausted anddepressed refugees railed bitterly

against and drove away several armystaff officers who had roared up in twosedans, had splashed mud on the

homeless group, yet had the effron-

tery to try to conduct an 'inspection'.

Subjective conjectures concerningthe state of civilian morale are sup-

ported by classified surveys conductedby the supreme war direction council

since the spring of 1945, when the

Allied air offensive was reaching a

crescendo. The Japanese military andcivilian analysts, in a remarkablyforthright wartime document, repor-

ted evidence of declining civil morale,black-marketing, and corruption,

growing distrust in the leadership,

and criticism of the military and

government. Although inherentlypatriotic, the public was revealingegotism, lack of spirit, despair andresignation, restlessness, peace-mongering, and even revolutionarytendencies. The president of theprivy council admitted at an Imperialconference that public morale hadobviously been lowered, that publicwillingness to glorify the best tradi-

tions of the ancestors might suffer

'under certain circumstances'. Ofequal significance, at a meeting of all

deputy chiefs of staff of the armies inthe homeland on 25th July, an AGSplanner stated frankly that the intel-

ligentsia were 'anti-war, anti-military, and anti-government'. Theirattitude, the colonel said, reflectedthe very last stage of a war.

When the

enemy lands

The Japanese began the Pacific warby seeking to neutralize or seize everyhostile air base which was withinbombing" range of the homeland andwhich an enemy might have used for

staging raids. It was also hoped to

knock out hostile aircraft-carrier

capabilities of dispatching fighter-

bombers against the home islands.

The defeat in the Marianas islands in

mid-1944, however, meant that theAllies had penetrated the centraldefense perimeter connecting theBonins, the Marianas, and the BandaSea, thereby upsetting Japan's strate-

gic position. Direct landings againstthe homeland could no longer beruled out. Consequently, from July1944, emphasis was placed on thedefense of the core zone between

southern Kyushu, the Nansei islands,

Taiwan, and the Philippines. Theworst was expected after the middleof 1945; as early as August 1944, thehigh command conceived the idea of

decisive battle in the homeland.IGHQ anticipated that the Allies

would intensify their aerial and navaloperations throughout the Pacific

and would seek to neutralize thehome isles. Japan proper was alreadyin process of being isolated from theAsian continent and from the regionof the southwest Pacific. Attrition of

Japanese production resources hadbegun, as had demoralization of thecivil populace. The main Japanesenaval, air, and field forces were beingengaged and destroyed, as at Leyte.Next the homeland would be broughtwithin range of land-based fighter

aircraft. From spring 1945, IGHQ also

expected to encounter enemy opera-tions designed to advance the strike

bases around Iwo Jima, Okinawa,Taiwan, central China, and perhapssouth China, Hainan, and the Kuriles.

If Japanese strength were erodedsufficiently after Iwo fell, the enemymight invade Japan directly by sum-mer 1945. Ordinarily, however, the foe

was expected to consolidate positions

in the Philippines and Marianas andto accelerate a build-up for the in-

vasion of the homeland, a processwhich ought to be completed by Augustor September 1945. From the Japaneseexpeditionary forces in China camethe recommendation to Tokyo, inearly January 1945, that a final

ground campaign be mounted to

knock out Chungking before theAmericans landed on the southeastChina coast in mid-year.With the intensification of Allied

pressure from all sides, especially

since the fall of Saipan, strengtheningof homeland defenses commandedJapanese attention. Yet, accordingto a secret Japanese evaluation madeat the time, the situation was de-

plorable. Greater progress was, in

Okinawa beachhead

61

War Minister Hata

fact, being* achieved outside the

country, in the Bonins, Ryukyus, andTaiwan. Considerable strength hadalso had to be diverted to defend the

Philippines. In Japan itself matterswere not proceeding smoothly. Laborwas lacking, and there were diffi-

culties with mobilization and bil-

leting, food and weapons, jurisdic-

tions and duties. Countrywide warweariness was deepening.Defending the home islands were

four ground armies numbering onlyeight line divisions (one in Kyushuand five in the Kanto area), plus three

brigades, four anti-aircraft artillery

(AAA) divisions disposing of 1,200

guns, and fourteen depot divisions.

Normally there were two air armies,

but the one based on the Kantodistrict possessed an operational

strength of merely fifty planes, andthe other (on Honshu) was only atraining force. The three air defense

divisions comprised less than 800

army and navy fighters. Coastaldefenses were behind schedule andsecondary sectors were still in the

planning stage. The construction of

semi-permanent artillery sites wasproceeding satisfactorily but infantryposition work was lagging badly.

Only around Ariake bay in southKyushu were the positions more thanforty per cent completed; in theToyohashi and Hachinohe sectors the

progress amounted to only ten percent of the goals. In the Kanto region,

where construction had just begun,most of the fortification details wereleft to the judgement of the local

commanders, since the high commandhad drafted no definitive guidelines.

Inspectors later found most of these

works to be inadequate or even worth-less. Weapons were poor, manpowerquality was deteriorating, ammuni-tion was short, and training levels

were primitive. Prince Higashikuniheard, late in 1944, that AAA unit

commanders were not able to fire live

ammunition during training exercises

in the homeland, because of the short-

age of steel and, hence, of shells. Liverounds were rationed strictly amongthe batteries. The best air defense

units had actually been shipped out of

Japan, to the southern islands. 'Wehave toothless gaps here and there,

causing the defense system to col-

lapse,' complained Higashikuni. 'I feel

insecure'. One Japanese economistestimated that in combat the Ameri-cans fired ten rounds for every one fired

by the Japanese - a reflection, in part,

of the adverse 1:16 ratio in iron andsteel production with which Japanentered the war.From the outset of 1945, the Japan-

ese High Command struggled to im-prove the defensive posture in the

homeland. It was hoped to transfer

many troops and munitions homefrom the Asian mainland by autumn1945, but this task grew more difficult

in the face of accelerating Allied

surface, air, and submarine assaults.

Inter-service controversies compli-cated the situation, particularly so

far as homeland air defense operations

were involved. The army, for example,insisted upon maximum air effort in

the East China Sea region, whereasthe shattered navy air arm con-

sidered this concept to be piecemealand premature.

62

In January 1945, the first joint

army-navy operational plan was fin-

ally devised, stressing- decisive com-bat in the homeland but the gaining"

of time through delaying actions onthe periphery, especially at Okinawa(and in the Philippines as long as

possible). Surprise and 'special-

attacks' (Tokko: a euphemism for

suicidal sea and air assaults) were to

be the main features of Japanesestrategy. Navy flyers were expectedto hit aircraft-carriers and warships;army flyers, the relatively easier

targets of troopships. Later, in May1945, it was agreed that all air forces

should converge against transports

in convoy. The front line of the newheartland perimeter would extendfrom the southern Kuriles to theBonins, Ryukyus, Taiwan, east China,and South Korea. Operational pre-

parations against enemy landingswould be accomplished in early 1945

at Iwo Jima, Taiwan, Okinawa, Shang-hai, and South Korea; and, in thehomeland, the Kanto, Kyushu, andTokai (Eastern Sea) regions. Specialemphasis would be given to air de-

fense of these districts, lines of com-munication, and the metropolitan andindustrial complexes of Tokyo, Osaka-Kobe (Hanshin), Nagoya, and Moji-Kokura-Yawata. In the main battle

theater of the Pacific and the EastChina Sea, every effort would be madeto destroy the attackers while theywere still on the water. Enemy forces

which got ashore within the homelanddefensive perimeter were to be en-gaged by local ground forces, withoutimmediate reinforcement from othertheaters.

Operations Bureau Chief Miyazakiclarified AGS thinking for the first

time at a secret conference on 6thFebruary 1945. The High Commandexpected a turn in the combat situa-

tion as a result of the impendingdecisive battle for the homeland.IGHQ planned to complete militarypreparations, on the part of sixteendivisions for the time being, by mid-year. General Miyazaki also told the

Field-Marshal Sugiyama

local army commanders that the HighCommand was working with thefollowing estimates of the situation:

the enemy might first land on theChina coast and then invade Japan;or else seize the south-west Pacific

islands and strike at the homeland.Great danger was to be expected after

August or September 1945. Thereforepreparations should be completed bythe middle of the year. For the groundstruggle, all depended on massingtwenty divisions within two weeks of

the hostile landings; the defendersmust concentrate firepower whichexceeded that of the foe by threetimes locally. Since railway move-ment could no longer be depended onby day, troops should be shifted bynight. The deployments should em-brace five divisions for northernHonshu; ten for the Kanto; five for

Tokai (Eastern Sea); four for Chubu(central Honshu); four for Kyushu;five for reserves of Tokai, Kanto, andnorthern Honshu; three for mid-western Honshu; and three for SouthKorea.AGS and war ministry staff officers

indulged in very heated arguments in

February 1945 concerning how andwhere to find the manpower necessary

63

HONSHU

X MINUS 7 DAYS

6 US DIVISIONS

YakoshimaBASES TO BESECURED BEFOREXDAY

-j- Japanese air bases

& airfields U"S.Kyushu

J, Japanese naval bases

Miles 100I i

'

i i ' i 'i i

Kilometres 160

Japanese anticipation of United States invasion plans

HONSHU

Shizuoko

Kashima-

POSSIBLELANDINGS

PRE- INVASIONLANDINGS

15DIVS.

Islands

PACIFIC OCEAN

"1" Japanese airfields

Miles 60

160Kilometres

I

to raise the number of divisions de-

ployed in Japan, Hokkaido, and Koreato thirty-one by March, to forty-one

by July, and to fifty-nine by August.One colonel fumed: 'It is as unrealistic

as asking a twelve or thirteen-year-old

girl to give birth'. Eventually it wasdecided that immense manpowerlevies were to be raised within a fewmonths, in three stages, on the basis

of the new operational plans anddrawing upon the Kwantung Army in

Manchuria: fifty-six divisions, thirty-

eight brigades, logistical and admini-strative support units, etc., involving

between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 newmen. Between 2nd January and 19th

June 1945, the Emperor, in full-dress

army uniform with sword and medals,presided at eight palace ceremonieswhere 103 regimental colors werebestowed - for 103 new regiments.Army headquarters were abolishedand replaced by operational areaarmy headquarters and army district

Marines in Saipan

headquarters, mainly in charge of

military administration at Sendai,Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Fukuoka.A mobile reserve, Thirty-sixth Army,was set up on the Kanto plain. Mili-

tary police in the homeland weremore than doubled in manpower,from 9,000 officers and men to 20,000.

But munitions soon proved to be aserious bottleneck. Stocks of light

machine guns to outfit the new units,

for example, amounted to onlytwenty-three per cent ; of small arms,fifty per cent; of infantry cannon,twenty-eight per cent. Materiel wouldhave to be brought in from the Kwan-tung Army or from the navy, or else

produced in 1945; but priority had to

be accorded the production of 9,000

special-attack boats and 16,000 planes.

In February-March 1945, the Ameri-can conquest of the 'unsinkableaircraft-carrier' Iwo Jima threw a chill

into IGHQ. Enemy penetration of theEast China Sea area could not be far

off. By March, American carrier air-

craft were neutralizing bases in

central and southern Kyushu and in

Shikoku; the German armies werebeing beaten in the west; and theUSSR had begun to deploy troopsfrom Europe to Siberia. IGHQ there-

fore hurriedly completed a volu-minous plan for homeland defenseoperations against the initial direct

invasion (coded KETSU-GO anddisseminated formally in earlyApril) : KETSU-1 : Hokkaido-Karafuto-Kuriles; KETSU-2: northern Honshu;KETSU-3: Kanto; KETSU-4: Nagoya-Shizuoka; KETSU-5 western Honshu-Skikoku; KETSU-6: Kyushu; KETSU-7: Korea. The Ryukyus were desig-

nated the focal point on the perimeter,Kanto and Kyushu, in the homeislands.

Hit-and-run raids were to be con-

ducted against forward enemy attackbases, to thwart the launching of aninvasion into the zone of the EastChina Sea. In Japan, exploiting theunique terrain and exhorting thefighting spirit and fanatical patriot-

ism of the hundred million Imperial

67

n*

m^* **

subjects, all navy and air force rem-nants were to undertake the death-defying special-attack mission of

annihilating hostile forces while still

at sea, even at the temporary expenseof the air-defense and tactical-support

capability. Since Japanese navalpower was almost destroyed and the

air units were so feeble, homelandground formations (deployed in depthand massed speedily in decisive battle

sectors) would take the offensive

against enemy troops who managedto get ashore, would overwhelm andeliminate the hostile landing force

in the coastal area before the beach-head was secure, and would 'recoup in

one stroke the declining fate of the

empire'. Defenses must be strength-

ened at important straits (Bungo,Kii, Shimonoseki) and bay entrances,

and sea routes to the continent pro-

tected. Enemy airborne penetrationsmust be forestalled.

Emergency defense preparations

would have to be accomplished be-

tween April and July 1945; by early

June in the case of Kyushu and Shi-

koku. Reinforcement would be effec-

ted during the second stage, August-September; and the entire programwould be completed thereafter. Pro-

vision must be made to rush reserves

to the main landing theaters, whetherKyushu or Kanto. In anticipation of

enemy disruption of sea and rail trans-

portation lines, the troops were to

move on foot essentially; maximumuse was to be made of secondaryroutes. This meant that defensive

planning time factors had to be pro-

tracted, although the enemy's ownlanding operations were expected to

be executed swiftly. For example, it

might take sixty-five days to moveJapanese divisions from Kyushu to

the Matsumoto-Nagano sector of Hon-shu, and another ten days to deploy

them into the line. To move mecha-nized divisions as soon as enemyintentions were 'sensed', it was deci-

ded to operate only by night and to

The battle for Okinawa, May 1 945

69

seek cover in prepared tank ditches

by day, echelon by echelon.

Operational success would be soughtthrough exploitation of the tradi-

tional spirit, 'Every citizen a soldier'.

Guerrilla resistance was envisaged as

part of the overall operation to sup-

port line units, to cope with airborneraiders and small secondary amphi-bious landings, and to cut off and har-

ass units which penetrated into

the interior. Guerrillas were to ob-

struct and cause attrition to enemyactivities, by means of combat,espionage, deception, raids on rear

areas, and demolitions. Guard units

and civilian defense organizationswould provide the manpower, built

around cadre elements of the field

forces and responsible to the district

army commanders. The plans also

contemplated a possible need to quell

public disorder resulting from air

Left: Blood plasma for a woundedmarina Below: the advance on Guam

raids, bombardment, invasion, propa-ganda, or natural disaster. Area self-

sufficiency must be stressed, especi-

ally with respect to food, materielrepair, and procurement of designatedtypes of arms and equipment. Thehomeland logistical core would con-sist of 2,903,000 men, 292,000 horses, and27,500 motor vehicles. Only in Kyushuand the Kanto would full ammunitionallocations be available in operationalstockpiles. Special-attack units wouldhave first call in all supply matters.Tactical concepts for defense of the

homeland were divided into fourphases

:

1. Submarines would disrupt enemycommunications prior to sortie of theconvoys ; submarine-based planes andlong-range bombers would attackhostile forward bases by surprise.

2. Long-range navy bombers andshort-range submarines would attackelements of the enemy invasion forcewhen it entered the outer aerial peri-

meter. After the main invasion convoycame within 200 miles of Japan, all

army and navy special-attack air

forces and midget submarines wouldstrike en masse. Airborne raiderswould hit forward enemy air basessupporting the invasion.

3. When the hostile invasion convoyhad arrived, midget-submarines, hu-man torpedoes, and crash-boats shouldconstantly attack the gunfire-supportships and the transports, particularlyat night. Long-range artillery andspecial-attack units would interdict

the anchorage. All available firepowerwas to rake the transports andlanding craft engaged in ship-to-shore

shuttling.

4. After the hostile forces hadlanded, defending artillery shouldshift its fire from waterborne tolanding-beach targets. Air and seaspecial-attack forces would continueto strike. Infantry units of the coastalcombat divisions were to counter-attack persistently and continuously,from positions close to the beach, inorder to disrupt consolidation of thebeachhead and merging of lines.

71

h

Enemy air, artillery, and naval gun-fire would be seriously hampered in

identifying targets amid the confusedmelee ashore. As soon as hostile ob-

jectives had been ascertained, line

combat divisions from reserve wouldmove into the main attack area, whiledefending tanks, heavy artillery, andother elements were committed uponarrival forward without awaitingassembly of the entire counterassaultforce. Units were to be constantlyflung into battle as they came up;

they would be committed on a narrowfront and in great depth against ashallow enemy beachhead alreadyweakened by the coastal-combat de-

fenders. If properly executed, thecounterattacks must result in utter

collapse of the beachhead before thefoe had had a chance to land his heavystriking elements. Any enemy pene-trations into the hinterland wouldbe countered by fierce and determinedguerilla resistance.

Formation of sixteen new coastal-

combat and two line divisions plusthree independent mixed brigadesproceeded apace, under the stimulusof imminent invasion, while four elite

divisions and the last armor in theKwantung Army, recalled from Man-churia, traversed the Korea Strait bynight. In April, IGHQ directed changesin the homeland command system,although the army was never able to

achieve unified command of all groundoperations, even during operationalpreparations, reportedly because of

the navy's opposition or apathy. TheGeneral Defense Command was de-activated, and a First General Armyformed at Tokyo, under Field-MarshalSugiyama, encompassing easternJapan and including three areaarmies, exclusive of Hokkaido underdirect IGHQ control. A Second GeneralArmy was established at Hiroshimaunder another field-marshal, Hata, to

The three wise monkeys, Japaneseversion. Do not look at military

installations; do not listen to rumors;do not tell secrets

defend western Japan and Shikoku,utilizing two area armies. Lastly, AirGeneral Army was set up at Tokyo,under General Kawabe, to commandthree air armies in the home islands.

The US forces, designated the mainenemy, were to be defeated in decisive

battles in strategic zones of the home-land, especially in Kyushu and theKanto. Hundreds of air squadrons,mainly fighters, were in process of

being fitted out. In addition, thesuicide air units were being rushedinto readiness. By the end of June1945, some 2,000 suicide aircraft hadbeen produced.The Japanese army seems to have

viewed the Okinawa campaign in thespring of 1945 as a battle of attritionwhich must earn time for the home-land defensive build-up. One infantrydivision, the 84th, for example, wasnever released from Himeji in Japanto reinforce the Okinawa garrison,

which had already been required to

transfer one of its own best divisions

to the defense of Taiwan. In otherwords, whereas the navy was inter-

ested in staking all at Okinawa, thearmy viewed the Japanese mainlandas the proper scene for decisivestruggle. But if the Ryukyus werelost, enemy land-based fighters couldoperate within easy range of all Japansouth of Tokyo, in addition to Koreaand the lower Yangtze valley. GeneralMiyazaki admitted to Premier Koisoat an IGHQ conference on 2ncl April1945 that the enemy was expected to

plunge against the homeland afterOkinawa fell. American forces wouldundoubtedly attempt landings at keysites along the China coast, in theKorea Strait, and on islands near theJapanese homeland. These spring-board operations might occur some-time in the summer. Subsequentlandings in the Kanto area (or, alter-

natively, first in Kyushu and then inthe Kanto) would most probably takeplace after autumn 1945.

With the collapse of the defenses onOkinawa in June 1945, the Japanesebegan to fear that the 'jubilant'

73

The military (above) and civilian population of Japan undergo pre-war training

Americans might next assault Kyushudirectly, before the lagging defensive

preparations had made much progress.

Mobilization and redeployment mea-sures were on schedule, but there wasordinarily a time lag of six to eight

weeks between the activation of units

and the completion of the assemblyof cadre and filler troops. Units of the

second mobilization scheduled for

Kyushu had not even begun to train in

early May. Even at vital Ariake bay,

only fifty per cent of the projected

construction was ready, and the per-

centage was far lower at Miyazaki,Satsuma, and Fukuoka. Along the

coasts of Kyushu, a mere four-and-a

half ground divisions were in place bynow, poorly trained and ill equipped.

Troops were still in transit, head-quarters were not operational, ammu-nition was being collected. The situ-

ation was much the same on Shikokuisland, and not better on the Kantofront, where seven-and-a-half divi-

sions were strung along the coast,

working on defenses.

After concluding that there was nowlittle likelihood of an immediate in-

vasion from the Aleutians areaagainst northeastern Japan, IGHQdecided to withdraw strength from theHokkaido region and to shift it to

Honshu and Kyushu, leaving onlygarrisons to defend the more im-portant islands in the Kurile chain.

In late May, operational preparationsin the Kanto sector were momen-tarily suspended, and all available

railway transportation was divertedto the emergency build-up of southernKyushu. Units made up of untrained,physically inferior, or old reservists

were fielded without full equipment.Even bayonets were in short supply,

and mortars had to be substituted for

artillery. The rationale was thatharmony among the soldiery trans-

cended weapons. But a hard-headedJapanese military observer com-mented that if the enemy had invadedsouthern Kyushu in June or July 1945,

the country would have faced disaster.

Japanese intelligence, however, was

reporting no evidence of an early

invasion of the homeland, and the

army began to expect no landingefforts against the main isles before

October 1945, an estimate which pro-

vided vast reassurance. The doggedJapanese resistance at Okinawa wasjudged to have bought time for the

homeland defensive build-up, and the

outlook in Kyushu therefore bright-

ened noticeably.

Meanwhile the supreme war guid-

ance council and the governmentdecided that Tokyo must be defended

to the last. In June 1945, IGHQ estab-

lished Tokyo Defense Army. PremierSuzuki told the new commander,General Iimura, that he hoped Tokyocould be defended six months in

emergency. Iimura entertained pri-

vate doubts. The AGS provided no

answers to the general's questionsabout food supplies and guerrilla

plans in case the capital were isolated.

But an immense position construc-tion program was studied (largely

around the Imperial palace and westof the city), essentially as a psycho-logical and political gesture. Under-ground fortifications were to be built,

capable of withstanding assaults for ayear; but by the end of July 1945,

sites were still being reconnoitered,and geological problems were provingvery difficult. Construction wouldprobably have been started about20th August. Ground units to rein-

force the capital's defenses had still

not been designated as of mid-August.IGHQ was convinced that the enemycould not invade Tokyo directly, butin case of emergency an additional

four divisions were promised, to re-

inforce Iimura' s mere 20,000 men. Thedefense chief of staff, troubled by the'six-month' assignment, thought of

such desperate expedients as breakinga dam and flooding downtown Tokyo,or conducting street fighting in thered-brick buildings of the Marunouchibusiness district. The point was, to

inscribe in history the fact that theImperial army, at the time of its

death, defended the capital to the

75

M w

K <&>£,::'-

J"*-^i

very last. But, privately, the chief of

staff had already selected a site for his

own harakiri.

Against the most dire eventuality,

the army had tentatively decided

upon a site for a provisional Imperial

palace to be located in the suburbs of

Nagano city, in the direction of the

Sea of Japan. A large-scale Imperial

General Headquarters was well in

process of secret construction in

caves at Matsushiro, in Nagano pre-

fecture, since 1944. Working twenty-four hours a day, laborers scooped ten

kilometers of tunnel out of three

mountains, at an expense estimatedat sixty million yen and 750,000

man-hours.In view of the capitulation of Ger-

many in May 1945 and the deteriora-

tion of Japan's overall stance, ac-

quisition of intelligence concerningAllied intentions grew difficult for

the Japanese. Yet by July it hadbecome imperative to draft a newestimate of the situation in order to

try to outguess the foe and to massoverwhelming strength against him.Using whatever information was avail-

able to them, the Japanese revised

their earlier judgements. Signal in-

telligence and operational observa-

tions were helpful. For example,enemy attack and reconnaissanceplanes were most active over Kyushu,while the Bonins air and sea basesappeared quiet. Tactical air assaultshad not begun. The Okinawa operationhad delayed the enemy. It was there-

fore believed that the Americanswould not invade Kyushu and Shikokuuntil after late September 1945, whenthe typhoon season was over. Enemybases of operation would meanwhilehave been set up or expanded in theRyukyus, Amami Oshima, and otherislands near the homeland. Oncemajor advanced air and naval instal-

lations had been established in Kyu-shu and Shikoku, etc., the foe could beexpected to land in the Kanto district

and seek a showdown in the spring of

Homageto the Emperor

1946, after redeploying the necessaryforces from the now-quiet Europeantheater. Diversions or feints could beanticipated in the regions ofHokkaidoand the Tohoku. If the enemy com-mitted forces to the China mainland,an invasion of Kyushu could not bemounted until after late autumn.Meanwhile, if the present rate of

Russian military build-up continuedin the Far East, the USSR couldcommence action against Japan in

August or September 1945.

The preceding judgement represen-

ted a significant modification of theApril estimate, for it was now theview that the Kyushu invasion wouldprecede the Kanto landings, and thatthe latter would not materialize until

1946. Nevertheless, there was by nomeans unanimity concerning details

and alternatives. Some officers felt

that Japan's disintegrating posturemight encourage the enemy to seeka quick decision, to press straight to

the Izu islands, and to land in theKanto area by the late autumn of 1945.

Or, if the foe judged that the coastal

defenses were too far advanced in theKyushu and Kanto regions, he mighteven try to split the weakly-defendednarrow waist of Honshu by pushingfrom Ise bay against the Nagoya andKyoto-Osaka-Kobe sectors. Enemyelements might possibly dare to

penetrate the Korea Strait and landon the still extremely-vulnerableJapan Sea coast of Honshu.A number of Japanese planners were

of the opinion that the enemy mig'ht

first try to isolate the home islands

from the continent by setting upspringboards in central and northChina (Ningpo-Shanghai and southShantung), as well as South Korea or

Quelpart island, before invading theJapanese homeland. Alternatively andnot unreasonably, it was believed theenemy might concentrate on intensi-

fying and protracting the surface andunderwater blockade and incendiarybombing campaign. At a chosen point,

the reeling Japanese governmentmight be given an ultimatum to

77

surrender which, if rejected, wouldbe followed by simultaneous landing

operations at various key locations.

Navy Minister Yonai and others con-

fided to colleagues, as early as

September 1944, that IGHQ would be

faced with the most dangerous alter-

native if the foe chose not to invade

but instead tightened the strangling

noose of aerial and naval pressure.

Generals Kawabe and Arisue have said

that a majority of IGHQ staff officers

actually wanted the enemy to attemptto invade the home islands before the

end of 1945. Not only would this give

Japan a chance to strike a heavy blow,

but it would also mitigate the overall

logistics crisis, which was deteriora-

ting so swiftly that the longer the

invasion was put off, the weaker andhungrier Japan would become.From an estimated total of ninety

American divisions (includingMarines) deployed in the Far East,

about sixty - endowed richly in

artillery and tanks - were expected to

be committed to landing operations

against Japan. Using 8,600 warplanes,

the US navy and air force wouldprovide all-out strategic and tactical

air support. British and Common-wealth divisions in the Orient wereexpected to increase from sixty-seven

to eighty-two by the end of 1945, but it

was thought that none would be usedin the invasion of Japan. The 3,400

British land-based planes available

by year's end were expected to be

employed only in support of peripheral

operations in Asia; but 700 British

carrier-based planes would un-

doubtedly go into action against the

homeland area. US airborne units

would probably see service, especially

against Kyushu from bases in

Okinawa. On one point, most Japanesestrategists could agree: an invasion

of Kyushu was most likely, althoughenemy objectives would likely be

limited rather than exterminatory.

The final battle, however, must takeplace on the Kanto plain, the political

and strategic center of the country,

where the terrain was most suitable

for the foe to unleash his armor andmechanized forces. In Tokyo head-quarters there was always latent

dread of a direct invasion of the Kanto,a fact which prompted IGHQ to holdback strategic reserves (especially of

armor) from Kyushu. It was also

feared that emphasis upon the build-up

of Kyushu would cripple the defense of

Kanto if the latter should be attackedby the end of 1945. There could be nodoubt that the Allies would want to

establish major air and naval bases in

southern Kyushu, especially in view of

any subsequent operation against

Kanto. Particularly vulnerable to anattack from Okinawa, south Kyushupossessed excellent facilities: air

bases at Chiran, Kanoya, Miyakonojo,Nyutabaru; airfields at Kokubu,Kagoshima, Miyazaki, Izumi; navalbases in the bays of Ariake andKagoshima. Initially, there was somethought that northern Kyushu mightbe attacked after Cheju-do and the

Goto islands had been seized by the

foe: but later it was judged thatsouthern Kyushu would probablyreceive main attention. If the enemydid assault northern Kyushu, he couldbe expected to commit even greater

strength than was hurled againstsouth Kyushu. The main body wouldland on the Fukuma coast east of

Hakata, elements in Hakata bay andin the Shimonoseki-Moji sector.

Beforehand, Cheju-do and the Gotoarchipelago might be taken, andTsushima and Iki neutralized.

As for debarkation points in southKyushu, there were three likely

coastal sites: Miyazaki prefecture

(Sumiyoshi beach), Ariake bay (right

bank of the mouth of the Hishidariver), and Satsuma peninsula

(Fukiage beach). Until May 1945 the

major enemy effort was expected in

the region of the Miyazaki plain, butlater priority was accorded Ariakebay. Airborne raiders could be antici-

pated at the airbases of Kanoya and

Japanese boy gets the feel for flying

on an elementary flight simulator

78

I

•;

The Japanese Kwantung Army invade China

"«,.:

¥^^m&^ - ' *0

Miyakonojo. Enemy fighter and navalstrike points might be set up at

Tanegashima beforehand ; Koshikiwas less likely. In conjunction withan invasion of south Kyushu, somediversionary units, perhaps two divi-

sions strong, would probably belanded on Shikoku island. They wouldinvade the Tosa plain in particular,

and Sakumo bay in the southwest,in order to extend enemy air coverageover all of the Inland Sea and to

neutralize suicide-attack bases onShikoku itself.

The highest military circles werenot agreed as to the focus of thelandings envisaged in the Kantodistrict. Kujukurihama (Togane-Yokaichiba sector) and Sagami bay(left bank of the Sagami river) wouldundoubtedly be assailed simul-taneously, with the main enemyeffort (perhaps fifteen divisions)

directed against the former objective,

farther from Tokyo but easier to getashore. Landings were also possible

at Kashimanada (Hokota sector),

and airborne raiders could be expectedto be dropped at the airfields nearYachimata and Atsugi. Some hostile

forces might come ashore on thepeninsula fronting on Tokyo bay(Miura and Boso). Hostile fighter

bases would probably first have beenmoved up to Oshima, Tateyama, andOmae zaki.

Throughout, the Japanese plannersclung to the expectation that tokkoplanes and ships would cripple anyinvasion force. Suicide operations, in

fact, were deemed the key to successin the defense of the homeland, as theAGS deputy chief told an Imperialconference in June 1945. The homelandwas not far-off Guadalcanal or NewGuinea. Even on Okinawa, hemmedin by enemy naval fire, two-and-a-halfJapanese divisions had held off anAmerican army five or six times aslarge, for one hundred days. The oddsagainst the homeland defenders werefar from impossible. This time, for

instance, shipping across immensedistances would become the problem

of the Americans, not the Japanese.Defending warplanes could operatefrom improvised airstrips and under-ground installations. Serious (but

ineffective) thought was given to thedispatch of airborne raiding teamsagainst B-29 bases in the Marianas,or surprise attacks by submarine-launched aircraft. Planes wereactually readied at Misawa airbase to

fly teams out, but the concentrationwas destroyed by US carrier planeson 14th July 1945. The main strengthof the Japanese ground forces

remained intact. Enemy successes in

the Pacific to date had been basedlargely upon immense numericalsuperiority concentrated against con-stricted and isolated island beach-heads. The Japanese army had notyet been able to show the Americanshow well it could fight on an orthodoxcontinental or strategic scale. In thehomeland, whatever the limitations,

there was depth, breadth, saturationdensity, reserves, and preparation.

All material and spiritual resourcescould be amalgamated to defendhearth and home, to annihilate theforeign invaders on soil that wasknown and adored. Since there was noescape route, the defense motto wouldtruly be, 'Victory or death!' - and thespirit would be that of the DivineWind.Referring to the desired counter-

measures, the NGS estimate of June1945 asserted that although utmostefforts must be made to destroy enemyinvasion forces at sea, in case landingsdid take place in the homeland earlier

than expected (i.e., in summer) onlyfifty per cent of the troops would beable to get ashore, after the suicide

assaults waged by the combinedservices. In event of a delay in theinvasion, the possibility of anni-

hilating forces on the high seas wouldbe enhanced. The chief of NGS presen-

ted the same appreciation to theImperial conference in June - asignificant increase from the admiral'srecent view that sixty to seventy percent of the invaders would probably

81

reach the beaches. To evaluate these

high-level assurances, the GeneralAir Army and the Combined Fleet

conductedmap maneuvers at Fukuokain early July 1945. It was assumed that

sixteen US divisions would invade

south Kyushu in October 1945: six

divisions on the Satsuma peninsulaat X minus seven ; ten divisions on the

coast of Miyazaki at X-Day. The staff

officers concluded that suicide aerial

attackers would be able to sink

some 500 transports and that surface

attackers would wipe out another 125.

Consequently, one-third of enemytroop strength (the equivalent of

more than five divisions) would be

smashed at sea. If the special-attack

strength were increased, or if agreater number of large enemy trans-

ports were encountered, many of the

Japanese officers thought it not at all

unreasonable to expect to be able to

destroy thirty to fifty per cent of

the invasion forces; in fact, these

calculations were judged to be

conservative.Certain ground commanders, how-

ever, considered that a maximumfifteen to twenty per cent destruction

factor (the equivalent of knocking outthree divisions) might be closer to

reality. The premise of 'one suicide

plane (or boat), one enemy transport'

struck some as unsound. Air Staff

Officer Inoguchi believed that in the

Philippines only one of every six

kamikaze planes hit the target; at

Okinawa, approximately one in nine.

Given the inexperience of the home-land suicide pilots and the lack of

defense against swarms of enemyfighters, the special-attack planescommitted to defend Japan might hit

only one-ninth or one-tenth of their

prey, even though they struck in

bright moonlight or at dusk against

massed targets.

The last Japanese peripheral

counterattack operations havingfailed, the army and the navy agreedin July 1945 upon the decisive KETSU-GO air operations in defense of the

homeland. This time it was intended

to smash the enemy transports andtroops just before they began thelandings. Convoys were to be shat-

tered by tokko planes, day and night,

at about the time the ships wereanchoring at beachheads. The old

navy preference for singling outenemy aircraft-carriers and taskforces was converted to the army'schoice: both services would combineall air strength mainly against theconvoys. Ground-support missionswould become secondary; emphasiswas upon hit-and-run tactics. Highest

defensive priority was to be assigned

Kyushu, Shikoku, and South Korea.

Cooperating with these final counter-

attack operations in defense of Japanwould be approximately 700 army and5,200 navy special-attack boats (somebearing one-ton bombs), in addition

to the thirty-eight surviving sub-

marines and nineteen destroyers,

although the latter lacked fuel to

operate beyond Kyushu waters. All

key harbor and bay entrances weremined, and demolitions frogmen wereto go into action against landingcraft.

In mid-July, the army worked outair defense plans in conjunction withthe navy. 1,000 regular planes, and1,600 suicide planes would be hurledinto defense of Kyushu, Shikoku, andthe Kanto area. From Korea, Man-churia, and even North China, 200

regular and 500 suicide planes wouldbe rushed in emergency. Another 500

to 1,000 tokko craft were expected to

be fitted out in the homeland byAugust 1945. Cooperating with AirGeneral Army were to be 5,225 navyplanes: over 1,000 fighters, 4,000 anti-

convoy and anti-task force bombers,the rest reconnaissance aircraft. Afurther 600 planes from Taiwan werealso programmed to strike at enemybases in the Ryukyus when the battle

for Kyushu got underway. Air GeneralArmy would direct operations affec-

ting Kyushu, from headquarters nearOsaka ; the navy, from the Nara area.

In all, then, against the expected

invaders, the Japanese could commit

82

over 10,000 last-stand planes, seventy-five per cent of which were tokko air-

craft hastily converted from trainers.

Two-thirds of the force would bedeployed to defend Kyushu at the out-set, one-third to cover the Kantodistrict. A total of 325 airstrips,

including- simple one-way strips, werebeing1 constructed throughout Japan,ninety-five of them at secret sites far

inland. The planners were emphasizingdispersion to many small strips, aswell as use of caves as hangars.Particularly discouraging to IGHQ,

however, was the local commanders'misunderstanding of the KETSU-GOconcept of aggressive beach defense.

Generals Kawabe and Miyazaki wereinsistent there was no assurance that

The rising sun in China

Japanese firepower and tokko weaponscould successfully penetrate an enemybeachhead once it had been enlargedto the rim of the coastal plain. Addi-tionally, the littoral zones containedall of the large and important air-

bases, the main trunk communi-cations, and much of the arable landunder cultivation.

Many coastal combat units seemedto have learned fallacious lessons fromthe experience of garrisons defendingSouth Pacific islands and atolls, andtended to construct rallying works toofar inland from the beaches. Certainlythis represented an understandabledesire to evade the devastating effects

83

of enemy naval bombardment, but theconsequences ran counter to basicKETSU-GO theory, which sought toallow the foe no time to seize, con-solidate, and expand a beachhead. Theexperience of Iwo Jima should be themodel, not that of Guadalcanal,Bougainville, the Marianas, andLeyte.IGHQ staff officers detected thesediscrepancies during field inspectionsin May 1945, with the result that a newand unequivocal manual of battle

tactics had to be issued in June.Coastal combat units, entrenched in

deep cave and tunnel positions andsupported by fortress and siege artil-

lery, were instructed immediatelyto engage hostile landing forces close

to the beach. All available reservesmust be deployed with speed andflexibility. Ground operations wereexpected to complete the destructionbegun by the special-attack units.

The Japanese estimated that their

artillery and automatic weapons fire,

The end of a bombed Japanese destroyer

directed against landing-craft andconcerted with fierce counterattacksby the coastal combat units, wouldreduce the remaining enemy forcesby thirty to fifty per cent. The terrainof the Kyushu coast was particularlywell adapted to employment ofenfilade

fire by heavy artillery dominating theapproaches to the principal beaches.The spirit of decisive combat wasepitomized in the outline issued bythe First General Army in mid-July1945: 'The homeland operation mustbe a decisive one in which the invasionforces will be quickly sought out andannihilated. The key to ultimatevictory rests in wiping out the enemyat the water's edge in the period whenhis landings are still in progress. Thedecisive battle area must be deter-

mined irrespective of the foe's plans;

he must be made to fight at that point.

The assault must be undertaken withthe resolve that each man will take anenemy to death with him at thewater's edge.' It was thought therewould be about a week before the

** *&fftpf.

Americans could carve out a foothold.

Experience in the Pacific island

battles indicated that the enemyneeded this time to establish a port or

pier for landing materiel, and to

construct an airfield for direct cover.

During this critical period, theAmerican beachhead would betenuous; now would be the time for

the defenders to concentrate and to

strike with all possible speed andstrength. The Second General Army,for example, had hopes of counter-attacking and repulsing an invadingarmy by employing beachline defenseforces outnumbering the enemy whoactually got ashore, by a ratio of 3:1

amassed within one week.To ensure that beachline combat

was enforced strictly, all 'unneeded'AGS staff officers, of all ranks, wereassigned to frontline corps, generallytheir home districts. These officers

themselves were extremely anxious toparticipate at first-hand in thedecisive fighting. Due to the suddenproliferation of headquarters, everycorps suffered from a shortage of staff.

The usual division chiefs of staff andbureau chiefs were to be replaced bythe division commanders assisted bysmall staffs enabling expeditiousdecision-making. Another considera-tion was the possibility that com-munications might be severed duringthe decisive campaign, and the defensecorps might have to operate on their

own. IGHQ could hardly controlnational resistance under such cir-

cumstances but AGS staff officers,

who knew the basic policies well,

could direct unified fighting.

During the summer of 1945, workwas rushed on the still unsatisfactorycoastal defenses, hampered by thecostly misunderstandings with regardto KETSU-GO tactical doctrine.

Operational preparations in Kyushuand Shikoku were far more advancedthan in the relatively unhurriedKanto district. Units at the formerlocations were expected to be outfittedfully by about October 1945; those inthe Kanto by next spring. Units in

Kyushu were in satisfactory conditionwith respect to stockpiling of expen-dables by summer 1945: ammunition,one hundred per cent of KETSU-GOrequirements; fuel, ninety-four percent; rations, 164 per cent. But evenin Kyushu, stocks of equipmentamounted to merely fifty per cent ofthe third mobilization requirementstentatively targeted for completionby 31st August. In Kanto, no munitionsand ordnance stockpiles had beenestablished, and ration stocking wasonly fifty per cent complete.Beach defenses at main coastal

sectors in Kyushu, Shikoku, andKanto reached sixty to eighty percent of goals by August. The impera-tiveness of construction overrodeconsiderations of troop training. Steeland concrete were in particularlyshort supply. Army inspectors des-cribed many of the fortifications asprimitive and toylike, hand-made andcrude. Commanders complained thatthe preponderantly middle-aged con-scripts lacked stamina for the ex-hausting and unexciting work ofdigging entrenchments in the heat.

Efforts were made to impress uponthe men that their labors were vital

operationally. But there was also avery serious lack of geological know-ledge. In the Kanto district, college

professors had to be engaged asconsultants. Problems with subter-ranean water tables and springs wereencountered in such places as the Izuand Boso peninsulas, and in Ibaragi.

Lacking electric drills and compres-sors to dig through rock, the mendid almost everything by hand. Thosewith smithy experience were called

upon to fashion chisels. In beachareas, there were difficulties withproviding supports to shore up sanddiggings. Nevertheless, a staff officer

back from 'impregnable' Rabaul called

the defenses at Kamakura, Eno shima,and Oiso 'fabulous' , and Kyushu evenstronger. In general, this expertdeemed the homeland defenses good,but his appears to be the opinion of adistinct minority.

85

Bamboo spear

psychology

In early June 1945, at a cabinet

advisers' briefing at the premier's

residence, one elder put the Japanesearmy on the spot by asking: 'What if

the enemy does not invade this year or

next but instead pursues a policy of

wiping out Japan by bombardmentalone?' The army briefing officer wasobliged to admit, with painful candor,

that 'that would pose the mosttroublesome possible course whichcould be adopted against us'. Latenext month, the same colonel wasinfuriated to detect that the AGSoperations staff in Tokyo seemed to

be relying on the prospects of dip-

lomatic mediation through the goodoffices of the USSR and to be lackingin confidence of certain victory. 'Yourduty,' he bellowed, 'is only the for-

mulation of optimum operations plansdesigned to achieve success. Don'tgive us evasive answers!' With this,

he stalked from the conference.

Privately, the officer mused: 'Since

the core of IGHQ is already thinkingin this fashion, how can we speak to

86

the public about certain victory in adecisive battle for the homeland?'Next day, the colonel was posted to

Korea Army headquarters in Seoul.

At this point, one must ask whatthe Japanese army leaders foresaw as

the result of a fierce campaign to

defend Kyushu. A number of sources

shed light on Japanese military

thinking in 1945.

Colonel Takushiro Hattori asserted

that IGHQ deemed it imperative to

inflict a staggering blow against at

least the first wave of elite enemyinvaders, thus compelling the Allies

to comprehend the indomitablefighting spirit of the Japanese armedforces and civilian population, as well

as the difficulty if not impossibility

of subduing the home islands. IGHQ,according to Hattori, was of the

opinion that Japanese success in the

Kyushu fighting could delay andperhaps prevent an invasion of theKanto district, or allow Japan to

negotiate on relatively advantageousterms. Hence victory in Kyushu must

be sought at any cost, for this rep-

resented the last chance of obtaining

an honorable peace with conditions.

The Kyushu campaign would prove

decisive in far more than the military

sense. There was even growing senti-

ment that the country's fate must be

decided on Kyushu, and Kyushu alone,

where ten million fanatical subjects

reinforced the fighting troops. Fuel

and food shortages were worsening to

the extent that the nation might not

be able to wage crucial struggle past

the spring of 1946; that is, Japanmight not be able to fight twoclimactic battles.

When told in late 1944 that the armywas determined to go down fighting

to the last, Prince Higashikuni is

known to have commented: 'If Japan'sdetermination to be annihilated is

comprehended abroad, then Britain,

America, and Russia might hesitate

to wage a battle to the finish with us,

and might reconsider matters . . .

Whether Britain and the USA seek adecisive battle will depend entirely onout internal situation. If our internal

unity is strong and our martial

spirit high, some opposition mayspring up within America about con-

ducting another decisive campaignregardless of immense losses.'

Still, one wonders, did not even the

most vocal AGS bitter-enders harborgnawing internal doubts about Japan'sprospects? Prince Kaya intimated to

Prince Konoye that the army'sespousal of a battle of annihilation

was entirely a matter of surface dis-

play. A certain staff officer stationed

in Chiba prefecture and known for his

bravery had admitted that the warwas hopeless and that creation of aredoubt in the mountains of Naganowas futile. Even the chief of AGSoperations had admitted that, in the

material or objective sense (men,equipment, rations), the decisive

mainland battle or, strictly speaking,continuation of the war, was 'ex-

tremely dubious'. 'Although one cannever predict the result till oneactually fights, I never thought we

could win. But as operations bureauchief, I could not simply give up. I

had to go on. In my diary, I wrote:

•'Japan, whither art thou heading?Back to the situation immediatelyafter the war of 1904-1905 ... the warof 1894-1895 ... the Meiji Restorationof 1868?" I was thinking that Japanmight be set back to that extent.' AJapanese general has admitted that

there was some unenthusiasticthought of merely allowing thepopulace in invaded areas to surren-

der to the enemy, and of then infil-

trating military guerrillas amongthem. But IGHQ planners termed'absurd' a Sixteenth Area Army idea

to fall back to Mount Aso if the forces

in Kyushu were beaten near thecoast.

AGS Colonel Saburo Hayashi adds amost intimate glimpse of the armyleaders' true thinking: 'As the warsituation grew worse, confidence in

sure victory was increasingly stressed

within the army. From the first, thephrase "to be defeated" was inter-

preted as "to feel defeated". Stemmingfrom this point of view, adherence to aconfident belief in certain victory wasemphasized at every opportunity, butthe import was not always clear. Forexample, it was not evident whetherconfidence in certain victory meant"sure to win and able to win" or

"must win by all means"; or whetherit involved both of these types of

confidences. Most officers and men hadan easy-going confidence of winning("certain to win," and "able to winfor sure"), without any sense of effort'.

Continued Hayashi: 'Although it wasdeclared that there were prospects of

success in the decisive battle for the

homeland, this did not imply con-

fidence of defeating the Americanforces' second and third landings whenmade continuously. All of the armyhigh command felt secretly (when theyconsidered the course of the decisive

battle in the homeland coolly andconcretely) that it was impossible to

defeat the US troop landings, becauseof lack of weapons, ammunition, and

87

*~300

Japanese suicide boats found byAmerican troops on Motobu peninsular

food, in case second and third landingswere made one after another. Thisheld true even if the initial Americanlanding could be frustrated'.

IGHQ strategists assessed thechances as follows in mid-1945: 'Theenemy is mustering enormous andoverwhelming military power for useagainst us; the issue will be joined

between now and next spring.

Although Japan is faced with anexceedingly precarious overall

situation, certain circumstances are

working to her advantage. While theend of the war in Europe has given theUSA a comfortable reserve of nationalwar potential, industrial mobilizationand reconversion have already begun,due to the desire to grab postwaiprofits. The fighting morale of theUnited States is being weakened byfear of large casualty tolls. There hasbeen an increase in labor strife,

criticism of the military, and agi-

tation from the ranks to engage in aprecipitous demobilization. Shouldthe USA be defeated in the battle for

Japan itself, public confidence in thePresident and military leaders will

decline abruptly, fighting spirit will

deteriorate in the flurry of recrimi-

nations, and Japan will find herself in

a much more favorable strategic

position'.

But even the highest-rankinggovernment officials were horrified bythe army's primitive notions for

militia defense. In July 1945, PremierSuzuki and his associates were invited

to visit a display of weapons to beissued to the citizenry: single-shot,

muzzle-loading muskets; longbowsand arrows (effective range thirty to

forty meters, hit probability fifty percent, according/ to the placards);

bamboo spears, pitchforks. Theordinarily phlegmatic old PrimeMinister whispered to his secretary,

'This is terrible!' The secretary couldonly agree, in despair and fury, thatthere were limits to deception of the

88

populace. Privately, the aide felt thatthis was hardly a sane way of fighting

in the 20th Century.The Emperor also grew troubled by

the visible credibility gap between the

military's intentions and capabilities.

The AGS chief had recently described

defense plans for Kujukurihamabeach, yet these appeared to be at

considerable variance with a reportsubmitted by the Imperial ADC after

an on-the-spot inspection. Despite thearmy's promises, construction of

defensive sites at Kujukurihama wasdefinitely very far behind schedule,

and could not be finished before the

end of August. The army had also

asserted that outfitting of a certain

new infantry division was complete,but the monarch had learned that evensmall arms had not been issued. Hewas profoundly disturbed, said theEmperor. What would happen if Japanplunged into decisive battle undersuch circumstances? The best answer,honest but ominous, was articulated

by the AGS planner at the armydeputies' secret conference on 25thJuly: national strength and combatstrength had been dwindling day byday; the future of the country's battle

situation was black. The conduct of

the war had become hopeless.

There was good reason for nervous-ness on the General Staff. The armywas known to be suffering fromqualitative weaknesses, and civil-

military relations were worsening. By1945 the authorities were obliged toscrape the bottom of the manpowerbarrel, inevitably sacrificing qualityfor quantity. Men who mightordinarily be deemed physicallyhandicapped were now being calledup. A physician who was assigned toexamine inductees in the spring of

1944 told a confidant that his orderswere to pass ninety-eight per cent of

the men. Of some possible use on thehome front, such physical dregs wouldbe useless in the armed forces, wherethey could be expected to fall ill - acostly luxury for the government.The physician saw no sense to his

orders. Still, the percentages of

physically fit active-duty soldiers

actually called for military service

(i.e., personnel mobilized in terms of

fit men of conscription age) approxi-mated fifty-one per cent in 1941, sixty

per cent in 1943, and ninety per centin 1945. By 1944 and 1945, all men in

category 3B, the lowest physicalcategory of non-exempt males, werebeing drafted for active duty.The effects were visible. During an

inspection ofAAA units in the autumnof 1944, Prince Higashikuni was sur-

prised and distressed to see thecrippled and the one-eyed in uniform.'IGHQ certainly has adopted a front-

areas-first policy,' grumbled theprince, 'and is not thinking aboutdefense of the homeland'. Men of themaximum draft age of forty-five foundthemselves serving with youngsters,after the minimum age was dropped ayear in December 1944. The field

realities were not unknown to AGSplanners, who comprehended, byFebruary 1945, that 'troop quality is

sinking'. Staff experts were parti-

cularly disturbed by the dwindlingpercentage of officers who weregraduates of the Imperial MilitaryAcademy in terms of all officers, fromthirty-six per cent before the war, to

twenty-five per cent at the end of

1944, to twelve per cent and below bymid-1945. It was also noteworthy thatthere were serious diminutions in thepercentage of active-duty soldiers to

all enlisted men, from sixty per centbefore the war, to forty per cent by theend of 1944, to fifteen per cent andbelow by the middle of 1945.

The results of troop dilution and of

general deterioration were being felt

throughout the country at large.

Although the military ordinarily atebetter than the populace, soldiers

from a unit stationed at Shimoshizuin Chiba prefecture were known to

have slipped from the barracks andentered farmers' cottages during air

raids or after an evacuation, and tohave stolen food, unknown to theplatoon leaders and company com-

89

MANCHURIAKWANTUNG ARMY

KETSU 1

AREA ARMY

(5 infantry divisions

JAP. ELEVENTHAREA ARMY(6 infantry divisions)

PA C I F I C

OCEAN

\ ftftftm KANTOPLAIN

rsm >

JCamakura, KujikurihamarH|BA Aeac/i

JAP. TWELTHAREA ARMY(18 infantry divisions,

2 armoured divisions)

JAP. THIRTY SIXTHARMY (in reserve)

AIR GENERAL ARMY

*Boso Pen.

VIzu

islands [5

©

"KETSU-GO" operational boundaries

Japanese 1st General Army HQ (Sugiyama)

Japanese 2nd General Army HQ (Hata)

Area army headquarters

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION

Armoured division

Miles

¥ Infantry division

200

Kilometres 200 300

manders. Soldiers went food-hunting

during unsupervised daytime duties,

and universally at night. Althoughthe number of sentries was increased,

these very men would often leave

their posts to go out on food forays.

Even division commanders wereknown to schedule 'inspections' in the

countryside in order to load up withvegetables and poultry. 'Inspections?'

snorted local observers. 'These are

nothing but market trips for the

generals' wives.'

In other instances, in the Sakuraarea, unit staff personnel ignored the

fact that soldiers stole seed potatoesfor food, although the farmers des-

perately needed these for the nextplanting. A unit commander in Ibaragi

seized farmlands and turned them overto his amateur soldiers for truckfarming. Certain units would not or

could not wait for the regular rice

harvest season, and sent out eagersoldiers to cut young green rice in thepaddies. At Matsumoto, in Naganoprefecture, the citizenry were dunnedfor contributions to enable a troopunit to purchase implements for

farming use. Near Fujisawa, an over-

zealous platoon leader had a dozengiant pines felled for position con-

struction, without the individual

owner's permission. When the ownerprotested, he was berated for daring to

interfere with military security.

Regardless of the merits of the caseand the urgency of the situation, there

were many who grumbled that thearmy seemed to be perpetratingatrocities in the 'occupation zone' of

the homeland itself. Others remarkedthat the military had degeneratedinto riffraff wearing the respectedImperial uniform. The constantlyexhorted national unity betweencivilian and soldier was proving to bea divisiveness in practice, on the eveof decisive battle. Colonel Hayashidescribes the crisis in these words:'The worsened military circum-

Fitness training for the workers in a

Japanese electrical machinery works

stances, coupled with intensified air

raids, lack of food, etc., increased thenation's distrust of the armed forces

and gradually gave rise to country-wide war weariness . . . there wasdisorderliness on the part of officers

and men swarming in towns andvillages; the troops were especially

selfish in behavior where food wasconcerned. These actions, whichincurred severe antipathy throughoutthe nation, were ascribable to thedecline in the quality of personnel as

a result of the great increase in forces

mobilized. It was, nevertheless, felt

that the primary cause was hungerdue to decreased food rations. Thearmy chieftains were sorely distressed

in coping with such an atmosphere.'For the fateful struggle, by August

1945 the Japanese armed forces pos-

sessed approximately 2,350,000 officers

and men under arms in the homeland,organized into fifty-three infantrydivisions (apart from five divisions

in Hokkaido and the northeast islands)

and twenty-five brigades. In addition,

there were two tank divisions andseven brigades, plus four AAAdivisions. The fifty-five ground divi-

sions were deployed as follows : Honshu- thirty-five infantry, two tank;Shikoku - four infantry; Kyushu -

fourteen infantry. Behind the combattroops were 2,250,000 army workers,1,300,000 navy workers, 250,000 special

garrison force personnel, and anational volunteer force of militia

officially put at 28,000,000.

The statistics, of course, do notconvey an accurate picture of Japan'sfundamental posture in mid-1945.

Men inducted into the army in thethird draft, in May, at first wereobliged to continue wearing their

civilian clothing and shoes. Somewere issued bamboo bayonets. Rifles

could be allotted only to experiencedtroops ; the latter received them fromtraining schools but, even so, therewas only one for ten soldiers. Whennew rifles and machine guns werereceived, they went on a priority

basis to the forces on Kyushu and

93

B-29, instrument of devastation

throughout Japan

Shikoku. The First General Armyon Honshu received equipment last.

Meanwhile, the third-phase soldiers

spent their time digging- - unarmed.The planners hoped to be able to

supply enough swords, battalion andregimental guns by September 1945;

enough trench mortars by October;enough bayonets, rifles, grenadethrowers and heavy machine guns byOctober or November; enough light

machine guns by February 1946.

Aside from problems of concentra-tion and tokko effectiveness, Japaneseplanners considered that time wasworking against them, especially in

the Kanto region. Of course, training

and construction measures could pro-

gress if the enemy delayed his invasionattempt until the spring of 1946,

but meanwhile the air raids wouldintensify the devastation and theshortages of food and fuel. Publicmorale would be depressed and combat

operations affected indirectly.Evacuation of the populace fromcoastal battle zones posed anothervexing problem, for many of the

evacuees would be workers, whosepull-out from industry ought to bedeferred as long as possible. Trans-portation, housing, protection, sani-

tation, and food problems were almostinsuperable, in terms of the masses of

non-combatants who would have to

be moved. In the Twelfth Area Armyzone alone, the population numberedalmost 20,000,000. There was also

fear that the Americans mightattempt to deepen Japan's food crisis

by razing rice fields with incendiaries

on a massive scale just before harvesttime.

If any one weakness underminedJapan's defensive stance by 1945, it

was the problem of fuel. By late June,when the B-29 raiders had singled outrefineries for destruction, stocks of

crude oil were virtually exhausted,

and the refineries were almost entirely

shut down. The military resorted,

94

without notable success, to alcohol,

low-grade gasoline with methanol,and water-injection systems. Evenmilitary lorries were converted to theuse of charcoal gas. But synthetic oil

output was negligible, and oil tanksthroughout industrial complexes wererunning dry. Storage tanks, in fact,

were torn down for scrap. AfterFebruary 1945, imports of oil ceasedbecause of Allied interdiction of

shipping routes from Palembang andthe south. Navy units lacked fuel to

support more than two sorties by thefew remaining destroyers, even in

homeland waters. The last two Japa-nese battleships had to be moored in

Kure with skeleton crews. It wasdecided that, because of the critical

fuel shortage, warships and smallcraft could be used only as floating

AAA or coast defense batteries at

Kure and Yokosuka. Faced by adesperate need for shipping, theJapanese proceeded to lay up over100,000 tons of oil-burning vessels in

the home coastal trade early in 1945.

When Prince Konoye was told

privately by an army colonel in late

June that the navy was mainly aground force by now, the retired

premier was shocked.In the Japanese army and navy

air corps of 1941, the average combatflyer had 500 to 600 hours of cockpittime, whereas USAAF pilots enteringbattle had less than half of theJapanese flying experience. As theyears went by, the Japanese programof military pilot training time hadhad to be reduced progressively, until

by the summer of 1945 Japanesepilots sometimes had less than one-hundred hours of flying experience,against a US navy and AAF averagenow approaching 1,000 hours. Whenthe AGS operations bureau chief,

on an inspection trip from Tokyo,observed new Japanese fighter planesen route to the Luzon battlefront,

he was shocked to see that the pilots

lacked the skill even to fly information. Fuel shortages as well ascrew replacement problems caused the

Japanese to abandon routine flight

training; emphasis was assigned toprimary training in the piloting

(essentially take-off and steering) ofsuicide-attack planes. Many suchpilots were given only twenty to

thirty hours of training.

The critical fuel shortage also

affected Japanese army and navyflight test requirements of aircraft.

In the first years of the war, planeswere subjected to two or three hours of

test flying, including five landings. By1943, test flights were becoming shortand meaningless; if a plane seemedsatisfactory after thirty minutes of

testing, it would be landed and accep-ted. In 1945, aircraft types which hadbeen in production for some time weremerely flown once or twice around theairfield; if found to be satisfactory,

they were immediately accepted. Newplanes often received their trials

while en route to the delivery depot;training aircraft underwent no trials

at all. It has been generally estimatedthat seventy per cent of the output of

new planes broke down before enteringcombat.In the representative technical

sphere of aviation, lack of equipmentand introduction of substitutematerials for vital engine parts slowedproduction and led to increasedfailures of such items as gears andcrankshafts. Quality control suffered

inevitably. Engineers were obliged to

reduce bench-test time for newengines, which often went into pro-

duction despite operating deficiencies.

At the outset of the war, all aircraft

engines were broken down for friction

inspection and given a test run. Bythe summer of 1945, only one engineout of ten was withheld for suchinspection. The Japanese army, whichhad required about seven-and-a-halfhours' running-in time on engines in

1941, reduced the level to less thanthree hours by June 1945, while navyrequirements were dropped from nineto two hours. A staff officer of the 13thAir Fleet has revealed that shortageof fuel prevented planes from

95

The Allies conquer in Europe

:

Japan stands alone

averaging more than two hours'flying time a month; this meant thata plane was only used on an averageof once every three weeks. No attemptwas made to keep the engines in

condition by running themperiodically.

Aviation fuel reserves dwindled to

a point where a final sortie by all

available planes could not even havebeen mounted. Army pilots say thatoil had become more precious thanblood. To conserve air strength in

1945, the High Command issuedinstructions that direct combat withenemy task force sweeps and bom-bardments must be avoided. Recon-naissance and anti-submarine flights

were curtailed. Consequently, little

resistance, in general, was being putup against Allied carrier planes,

bombers, and warships that werehammering the homeland. Forexample, in February 1945 an esti-

96

mated 1,400 US carrier planes struckat the Kanto-Tokai districts duringone sweep. A Japanese staff officer

despaired at the lack of interference

on the part of the defenses. Yet nextmonth the 5th Air Fleet commanderin Kyushu, Vice-Admiral Ugaki, wasinstructed to attack a huge ap-proaching task force only if it con-tained invasion transports; if theforce was made up only of warships,he was to refrain from striking.

After pleading with the High Com-mand for special permission to attack,regardless of the composition of thehostile task force, Ugaki was allowedto use his own judgement.By July 1945, Allied warships dared

to penetrate Hokkaido waters andconduct surface bombardment of tar-

gets at Muroran bay, Kamaishi, andHakodate. War Minister Anami apolo-

gized formally to local militarycommanders who met in Tokyo on16th July 1945, for 'allowing enemytask forces to dominate the areaaround the homeland'. IGHQ was

obliged to relax its hitherto strict

policy of conserving aircraft and to

release eleven fighter regiments to theair defense army; but since the unitswere deployed thinly, quick concen-tration was difficult, and bases wereinterdicted by the enemy, theJapanese defenses remained relatively

ineffective. There was also a chronicshortage of AA guns and ammunitionbecause of the decline in munitionsproduction. Available AA guns provedineffective against night attacks byplanes striking at high altitude. Thegrowing ineffectiveness of the air-

defense system caused very real fear,

on the part of the government, thatportions of the homeland mightsoon be isolated from the remainder,as the result of intensive enemy raids

against the transportation network.For a have-not country such as

Japan, government economic expertsjudged that the raw-material - andhence production - situation wouldbecome unacceptable after 1944. Muni-tions output was less than half thewartime peak, a level that could notbe expected to support sustaineddefensive operations against a sea-

borne invasion. In February 1945, anAGS officer wrote privately that,

judging from the trifling amounts of

steel upon which the army could rely,

'one can now see clearly that we can-not expect much in the way of

materiel, although the decisive battlefor the homeland is being demandedof us'. Added the colonel: 'Militarypreparations in the home islands areto expand on a record-breaking scale.

The quality of the soldiery mustdecline; what about the equipmentthey require?' Shortages were felt

in all sectors of the economy, not onlyoil but also transport, aircraft, coal,

steel, nonferrous metals, etc. Themanufacturers reported they couldprovide only fifteen to forty per centof the total suicide boat force pro-jected for the end of September 1945.

Airplane engine manufacturers couldnever equal the output of airframes,which themselves were afflicted by

poor construction and unacceptablelevels of interchangeability. Ordnanceoutput by the end of July 1945 wasbehind schedule in every importantcategory. The percentage of actualproduction norms achieved amountedto the following: rifles sixty-eightper cent; light machine guns sixty-

three; machine guns, ninety; infantrycannon fourteen ; AA guns fifty-three

;

mortars nine; self-propelled gunstwenty-one; light artillery thirty-

seven ; heavy artillery fifty-four. Theselow levels of weapons productioninevitably frustrated the capabilityto equip new units or to build thenecessary levels in supply dumps.Increasingly, it came to be felt thatonly one battle, the battle for Kyushu,could ever be waged against theanticipated invaders.

Publicly, however, the Japanesepopulace was given no respite fromfire-eating prescriptions. In January1945, the military authorities soughtto inflame the people by getting thedomestic press to report that the'monstrous' enemy had bombed theholy shrines of Ise. Three monthslater, Kantaro Suzuki entered uponhis term as premier by 'patriotically

promising that he would give his all

to the state and would himself take upa stand in the foremost line of herdefenders'. General Umezu, the chief

of AGS, prepared an article for armyofficers, in mid-1945, on the subjectof the general decisive battle. The wayto certain victory, stressed Umezu,lay in 'making everything on Imperialsoil contribute to the war effort, andin combining the total fighting

strength of the nation, both materialand spiritual, to annihilate the in-

vading American forces. In particular,

the establishment of a metaphysicalspirit for waging the decisive battle

is the first rule. What should beremembered above all in carrying outthe general decisive battle is ad-

herence to a vigorous spirit of attack'.

In this vein, a last-minute warministry statement called upon theJapanese army to fight through the

97

'holy war' to defend the national

polity, even though there mightbe nothing to eat except grass anddirt, and no place to sleep but the

open fields. Eternal life was to be

sought in death; 'a resolute fight will

surely reveal a way out of a desperate

situation.'

Defense plans continued to becharacterized by the idea of mass use

of special-attack tactics on the part of

regulars and guerrillas; by anemphasis upon aggressive beachline

defense ; and by the engagement of all

able-bodied men and women in anational resistance program. A formermilitary attache who once served in

the United States exhorted armypersonnel to risk their lives and 'slay

several enemy soldiers with one,'

thus breaking the foe's will to fight.

'American troops,' this officer claimed,

'tend to launch bold and reckless

headlong rushes when the military

situation develops somewhat badlyfor them. That is the very best time to

deal them a violent blow, by means of

surprise attack.' Defense action

against tanks, and especially flame-

throwing tanks, stressed close combat- 'one soldier, one tank'. Materiel wasprimitive : hand-thrown explosives,

handle charges, Molotov cocktails,

and fuzed depth charges in sacks to

be hooked onto armored vehicles. Atworst, a soldier should strap charges

to his back and explode himself bydashing between the treads.

All the while, the leaders werepublicly calling upon the general

public for a struggle of flesh against

iron, of spirit against materiel, in the

Japanese traditionwhich, historically,

despised surrender. The Diet passed a

'volunteer military service' law affec-

ting boys of fifteen and men of sixty,

girls of seventeen and women of

forty. But, regarding the much-publicized issue of the bamboo spears,

a staff planner reminds us that it wasfundamentally a psychological con-

Civilians queue for their weekly fooddistribution in Tokyo

98

ditioning device to inculcate nationalwillingness to fight and to die. Thisofficer, interestingly, cites Churchill's

beachhead exhortations of 1940 as

an example of 'bamboo spear psy-

chology'. In April 1945, the armyissued a graphically illustrated

'People's Handbook of Combat Resis-

tance,' whose cover showed a Japaneseabout to knife the throat ofa prostrateenemy soldier. A wealth of simpletips were provided: 'The safety pinmust be removed from Molotov cock-tails, which should be hurled so that

the side of the bottle impacted against

vehicles. In aiming against descendingenemy parachutists allow two-and-a-

half lengths. When engaging tall

Yankees, do not swing swords or

spears sideways or straight down;thrust straight into their guts. Attackfrom behind employing hatchets,

sickles, hooks, or cleavers. In karate

or judo assaults, smash the Yankee in

the pit of his stomach or kick him in

the testicles.'

Summing up the Japanese militaryoutlook in the summer of 1945,

Lieutenant-Colonel Iwaichi Fujiwara,an intelligence and operationsspecialist, remarked that, 'Relying for

the most part on the suicidal bravery,ardent patriotism and fierce loyaltyof the people, Japan prepared to wage

the final decisive battle against anenemy far superior in both technicalresources and manpower ... In spite

of the odds building up against them,the Japanese people well knew thatif their leaders were determined to

carry out the decisive battle on thesacred soil of the homeland, there wasno alternative but to fight to the bitter

end'. Admits a staff officer who servedat IGHQ between May and August1945 : 'We merely prepared for the final

operations with the philosophy thatwe must fight in order to glorify ournational and military traditions, thatit was an engagement which trans-

cended victory or defeat.'

How to be

defeated

'gracefully'?

At a Navy General Staff conferenceheld in late June 1944, an Imperialprince reportedly remarked that,

since the New Guinea-Ogasawaradefense line had been broken by theenemy, perhaps the war objectives

now ought to be : 'How to be defeatedgracefully?' Soon afterward, ColonelMatsutani, Chief of the War Directionsub-section of the AGS, and two of

his subordinates drafted a study whichconcluded, among other matters, thatJapan retained no further hope of

restoring her declining fortunesoperationally. It would thereforeappear wisest to plan to end the warquickly. On 2nd July, Matsutanifrankly told General Tojo that thecountry must seek to get out of thewar as soon as Germany fell. The onlycourses of negotiation were a com-promise peace - or capitulation. Atworst, the minimum terms must bepreservation of the national polity.

Matsutani also briefed the NGS, andderived the impression that high navalcircles as well as the senior statesmen

100

were pessimistic about the war'soutcome and desirous of a compromisesettlement.The day after Matsutani briefed

Tojo, he was ordered to be transferred

to the China front, at Tojo's direct

instruction. Nevertheless, at this verytime in mid-1944 Konoye and the LordKeeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, werealready discussing the possibility of

peace overtures to Great Britain, theabdication of the Emperor and a re-

gency by Prince Takamatsu in CrownPrince Akihito's minority. There is

also evidence that, in early 1945,

sources close to the throne werethinking that the sovereign ought to

contemplate retirement to a temple to

pray for the repose of the war dead.

Just before Tojo's fall on 18th July1944, senior statesmen, centering onKonoye, secretly considered endingthe war by ascribing all the blame for

defeat upon Tojo himself. MarshalTerauchi was to be brought back fromthe south to control the military, andPrince Higashikuni or Prince Taka-

matsu would assume the premiership.

An Imperial edict would terminate the

war; the immediate ceasefire wasdesigned solely to protect the national

polity (sometimes termed the national

identity), whose interests transcended

the problem of unconditional sur-

render, Konoye felt. It is significant

that such thinking existed at very

high levels, thirteen months before

the actual capitulation.

The Japanese military, of course,

was fiercely anxious to thwart public

or private advocacy of peace views,

and even prevented elders' consulta-

tion with the monarch. It was said

that Tojo was urging constantly that

even Konoye, his predecessor as primeminister, be kept under close surveill-

ance. 'I hope there are no military

police about,' was the first thing

Konoye said to Shigeru Yoshida whenhe visited the latter's house in the

spring of 1945. Many of Konoye's mostimportant private conferences wereconducted at roundabout rendezvous,

and the prince is known to have en-

trusted important personal papers for

safeguarding by secretaries. It wouldbe misleading to think that only the

high-born and the 'peace-mongers'

suffered from the attentions of the

military police or the thought-controlagents. To cite but one of innumera-ble instances: at the end of December1944, on a passenger train, a merehousewife told another, 'The Ameri-can guests (the B-29 s) may cometonight'. She was knocked senseless

by a gendarme who had overheard her.

The first substantial evidence thatthe highest army leaders were at last

willing to consider a negotiated peaceis to be found in Marshal Sugiyama'sremarks - optimistic at best, foolish atworst - during a policy conference on5th September 1944. He thought thatGermany and Russia, both exhausted,might be induced to make peace,

especially if Japan threatened to

attack the USSR from the rear. TheChungking regime was in difficulty,

and Japan might arrange peace withChina if Chiang Kai-shek were allowed

to combine with the Nanking (col-

laborationist) government. It wasalso possible, argued Sugiyama, to

talk peace with Britain, which pos-

sessed huge interests in the Far Eastand many friends in Japan.By January 1945, after the unex-

pected defeat at Leyte, the Emperorcould no longer bear the wall of

obfuscation and secrecy that sur-

rounded him. To the Lord Keeper, His

Majesty intimated that he would like

to hear from the elder statesmen, the

ex-premiers, for the first time during

the war. Kido feared that the covert

peace movement would be wrecked bythe army if he (and consequently the

monarch) were linked openly with the

'doves'. Eventually, it was arrangedfor the elders to visit the palace

separately in February, on the pre-

text of inquiring after the Imperial

health. Baron Hiranuma, on the 7th,

spoke in abstractions about the needfor concentrated war measures andfor government officials' benevolence.

The senior diplomat Hirota saw signs

of American resolve to end the war in

Europe and in Asia vigorously andsoon, in the fact that Roosevelt hadselected Stettinius and Grew for keypositions. The core of Hirota's re-

marks centered on the matter of the

USSR, as potential mediator or dread-

ed foe.

On 14th February, Konoye visited

the Emperor and pressed openly for

peace. 'I believe,' began the prince in

an eight-page report, 'that our defeat

in war is imminent and inevitable,

regrettable though it is'. From the

standpoint of preserving the national

structure, Konoye argued for the

conclusion of hostilities at the earli-

est possible moment. The prince madethe apt comment that the militarists

had 'in their hearts lost self-confidence

to continue the war, but they will

probably resist to the death in order

to save face'. Konoye respectfully

appealed to the Emperor for 'extra-

ordinarily bold decision'. Otherwise,

if the war continued, a communistrevolution would surely erupt within

101

Japan, instigated by young armyofficers who foolishly believed that

communism and the national polity

could coexist. A number of bureau-crats and civilians were closely associ-

ated with the reformist officers, someof whom dared to advocate direct

cooperation with the USSR and eventhe Chinese communists. The con-

spiracy would only be facilitated bythe confusion of the fatal 'decisive

battle' ; an early purge was therefore

imperative.During the question period, the

Emperor asked about the apparentcontradiction between the Army Chiefof Staff's view, that the Americanswere thinking of effecting majorchange in the national polity, andKonoye's opposite statement. Theprince replied that the military wasresorting to belligerent phraseologyin order to stimulate national fighting

spirit. He believed that Under Sec-

retary of State Grew was too respect-

ful and understanding to harborintentions which were hostile to the

Imperial institution. Predictions weredifficult, however, especially in war-time, as America was a countryguided by public opinion. In fact, this

was another reason to end the war now.The Emperor then pressed Konoye

about the matter of a purge and of

purgees, but the prince evaded a direct

reply. Eventually pinned down,Konoye mentioned possibilities of

suitable 'anti-main-stream' generals

such as Ugaki, Kozuki, Mazaki, Bin-

shiro, Obata, and Ishiwara. Given the

wartime circumstances, Anami or

Yamashita might be even better for

rebuilding the military. To this, the

Emperor commented that it would all

be rather difficult unless some victory

intervened. Konoye replied that it

would indeed be gratifying if suchcombat results could be accomplished,but that time was of the essence.

Peace in a half year or a year would be

too late.

Ancient Baron Wakatsuki was later

received in audience on the 19th,

Count Makino the same day, Admiral

Okada on the 23rd, and Tojo on the26th. Okada's presentation was parti-

cularly interesting, for it stressed

Japan's scientific and technologicallag. But none of the elders, andcertainly not fire-eating Tojo, was as

emphatic or direct regarding peace as

Konoye. In fact, soon afterward,

Yoshida (a former ambassador to

Great Britain) was arrested by themilitary police for his known role in

assisting Konoye with the memorialto the Throne. Additionally, Yoshidawas charged with having written to

another distinguished personage that'the army has lost confidence in carry-

ing out the war, and there is no dis-

guising the fact that morale is low. I

think that defeat is unavoidable.'

By 16th March 1945, Iwo Jima, the

'main entrance to the homeland,' wasentirely in American hands. Twoweeks later, Okinawa was invaded.

Ineffective General Koiso, after stum-bling along since he and Yonai hadreplaced Tojo in July 1944, decided to

resign as prime minister. Koiso, aretired officer, had been denied access

to operational and intelligence databy the military, and had had no suc-

cess in seeking to combine the post of

war minister with that of premier,

because of the army's opposition. Hehad also botched clandestine peacenegotiations with free-lance MiaoPing, a supposed emissary of the

Chinese Nationalists. On 5th April,

Koiso stepped down, without notice,

but with the recommendation to the

throne that the succeeding govern-ment be a powerful 'IGHQ cabinet'.

The day after Koiso resigned, the

Soviet government gave one year's

notice of its intention to denounce the

five-year Russo-Japanese neutrality

pact signed in April 1941. The reasongiven was that Japan was assisting

Russia's enemy, Germany, and fight-

ing Russia's allies, America andBritain, a situation quite different

from that of four years before. Despite

the allegation in most publications

that Ambassador Naotake Sato wascalled in by Vyacheslav Molotov to be

102

given the news orally, Sato denies it.

He says he was bypassed insultingly:

a note was merely sent over to theJapanese embassy. Molotov continuedto avoid seeing Sato; when he finally

did, on the 27th, Molotov tried to

evade any commitment about theremaining year of legal validity

attached to the neutrality treaty. Themost that the ambassador could ex-

tract was a very, very reluctant 'Yes'.

Meanwhile, since early 1945, theKwantung Army was reporting sig-

nificant Soviet troop movements east-

ward to Siberia.

Despite these hammerblows in

succession, and the fact that NaziGermany was on its last legs, theJapanese military still spoke of

fighting on. 'The prospects cannot becalled good,' General Umezu admittedto Kido, 'but we must go on, preparedto fight to the last. If morale is highand we concentrate all of our strength,matters are not impossible, althoughcertainly not easy'. None of the

Funeral rites for a dead soldier

service chiefs favored Koiso's idea of

an IGHQ cabinet, primarily becausethe concept ran counter to the consti-

tutional set-up, they said.

For Koiso's successor at this critical

juncture, the elder statesmen agreedupon a number of prerequisites. Thenew premier must be oriented towardan early peace but he must not possess

political strings from the past. Heshould be a general or admiral, active

or retired, who outwardly was resolved

to go on with the war. The Emperorand the public must have full faith in

him. OutgoingWar Minister Sugiyamarecommended the chief of AGS.Umezu, but Kido's choice was retired

old Admiral Kantaro Suzuki, presi-

dent of the privy council. One sourceof relief to Kido was the fact the armywould provide an intelligent andpopular war minister in GeneralAnami, who had once served as Im-perial aide de camp for four years.

103

Unknown to elders Hirota, Tojo, andSuzuki himself, the five other senior

statesmen (Kido, Konoye, Okada,Hiranuma, and Wakatsuki) hadreached agreement on Suzuki several

weeks earlier. Now, at the decisive

meeting on 5th April, Hiranumarecommended Wakatsuki, Suzuki rec-

ommended Konoye, Hiranuma thenrecommended Suzuki, but Tojo rec-

ommended Marshal Hata. Kido there-

upon gracefully endorsed the sug-

gestion that Suzuki became premier,

although Tojo angrily warned that the

army might not agree - a statementwhich infuriated some of his col-

leagues and led to hot exhanges. Kidodeftly intimated that it was the

people who might not cooperate withthe army. In any case, a sincerely

reluctant Suzuki became the elders'

choice. His was intended to be the last

wartime cabinet, although the 'doves'

dared not mention the word 'peace,'

because Tojo was present and Konoyewas notoriously loose-lipped.

Suzuki remained respectfully re-

luctant even when he appeared before

the Emperor. He was seventy-nine

years old, hard of hearing, and a sim-

ple, non-political sailor. The monarchsmiled and asked Suzuki to consent;

at such a critical juncture, he was the

only man for the premiership. LoyalSuzuki accepted with trepidation. Hewould do his best to carry out the

Imperial wishes. But, one wondered,did this encompass suit for peace?The Emperor, who had known Suzukisince his days as grand chamberlain,had said nothing specific about the

basic policy to be pursued by the newcabinet. In persuading Suzuki to

accept, Kido had hinted at ending the

war, by phraseology that 'a veryimportant matter must be conducted'.

The admiral said he understoodclearly. But was he thinking of mak-ing peace or waging a decisive strug-

gle to the death as the 'very importantmatter'? Even Kido is not entirely

sure, but his original impression wasthat Suzuki understood the Emperor'sintention to mean peace ; Kido retains

that conviction, given the ultimateoutcome of 1945. Suzuki later asserted

vaguely that he had been 'given to

understand' that the Emperor wantedhim to strive to bring the war to a

conclusion (that is, to make peace) as

speedily as possible. Intimates suggestthe probability that even Suzuki did

not fully comprehend the deteriora-

tion in Japan's military posture or

the extent of the attrition in warpotential at the time he took office.

The chiefcabinet secretary, Sakomizu,remains irked at the British journa-

list who claims that 'to those elementsaround the Emperor who saw hope for

Japan's survival only in a swift end to

hostilities, it became hourly moreevident that in choosing Suzuki to

stamp out the fire they had picked aman who just liked spreading sparks'.

Not so, insists Sakomizu; it was just

that Suzuki was a 'true Oriental' in

his modes of thinking. For example,around June, the premier inked for

Sakomizu a Chinese saying whose gist

was that, in cooking a small fish,

excessive stirring or haste woulddestroy the shape ; it was the same in

ruling a country. Kase calls Suzuki's

character 'unique'.

Part of the confusion in understand-ing the old admiral stemmed fromgeneral semantic obfuscation. Duringthe last climacteric of the war, at a

conference on 13th June, Kido told

Suzuki that Navy Minister Yonai hadcommented: 'The premier still ap-

pears to be very positive (about

continuing the war)'. Suzuki laughedand remarked, 'I thought that Yonaiwas still very positive. Can I be mis-

taken about this?' Observed Kido, 'So

by chance I learned that these twomen were thinking along the samelines'.

Another source of confusion wasprovided by deliberately manipulated'stage acting' (haragei) designed to

exert certain desired psychological

effects. So deft were the performanceson occasion, and so subtle the mani-festations, that even Japanese associ-

ates were taken in by the principals.

104

Haragei has been called 'the art of the

hidden and invisible technique - the

wary and prudent approach'. BothPremier Suzuki and War Minister

Anami were consummate actors, in

public and toward each other. Suzukihimself often resorted to ambiguoushistorical or literary allegories, withmuch reliance on extrasensorythought-transference. He later wrotethat he sensed the Emperor's inner-

most feelings but had to conceal

matters deep within himself, withoutthe relief of sharing them. Suzuki wastoo ruggedly honest to have been ahypocrite in the Western meaning of

the word.Suzuki's first problem as premier

was to win the cooperation of the

army. On the night of 6th April, the

gendarmerie commander had warnedMarshal Sugiyama that the Suzukicabinet might be another Badogliogovernment and therefore ought to be

blocked (i.e., by the withholding of a

war minister). Although Sugiyamaand his associates may have dismissed

this appreciation as one based uponrumor, they were worried. Suzukimade a good impression by taking the

initiative and coming personally to

the war ministry, but he was presentedwith three written conditions pre-

pared by the war minister, the chief of

staff, and the inspector-general

:

1. The war must be carried on to the

last.

2. The army and the navy must beunified.

3. All measures planned by the army,in order to achieve certain victory in

the decisive battle for the homeland,must be conducted concretely andwithout hesitation.

Suzuki glanced at the three con-

ditions and accepted them withoutfuss. 'I shall try to satisfy yourwishes,' he promised. ThereuponSugiyama formally recommendedAnami as war minister, a choice

welcomed by the premier.For navy minister, Suzuki prevailed

upon Yonai to remain, although there

was some mild army opposition, and

Yonai himself had preferred to resignbecause he had been deputy premier in

the unsuccessful Koiso cabinet.

The new premier's other very im-portant problem was to appoint askilful foreign minister who would beattuned to his policies, whatever theywere. Koiso did not endorse Kido's

suggestion that Shigemitsu stay on.

Hirota, in turn, declined to serve, andrecommended Shigenori Togo. Suzukithen asked the latter to resume the

post he had resigned in 1942. But whenTogo asked for a straightforwardopinion on the taboo subject of the

prospects of hostilities, Suzuki ans-

wered, 'I think we can carry on thewar for another two or three years'.

Togo thereupon declined to serve

unless the premier reconsidered his

views. Pressure was put upon Togo, bya number of officials, to 'save' Japan byaccepting. Sakomizu, for one, insisted

unconvincingly that Suzuki simplycould not speak openly for peace, for

fear of undesirable repercussions. 'I

should, he thought, read the premier's

real intention'. Kido's chief secretary

added that Suzuki's views were pro-

bably not unalterable; Togo couldcorrect them by entering into thecabinet. 'Anyway,' said the secretary,

'I believe that you needn't worry toomuch, because it seems the Emperoris considering the ending of the war'.

Togo eventually saw Suzuki again andwas now told, 'So far as the prospect of

the war is concerned, your opinion is

quite satisfactory to me. As for diplo-

macy, you shall have a free hand'.

Togo then accepted the post of foreignminister. Suzuki had been acting in

the post, concurrently, when thecabinet was installed on 7th April.

Now, with Togo's entry as foreignminister, the lineup was complete, asof the 9th.

Suzuki began his premiership witha bang. In a radio address on theevening of 8th April, he told thenation: 'I, who am eighty years old,

have tried all my life to serve the causeof the country. Having, however, so

far taken no active part in politics, I

105

Prince Konoye

consider myself utterly unfit for the

office of prime minister. It is onlybecause of the grave situation that I

have accepted the Imperial command.Now I stand at the head of the gallant

nation, confident that though I fall

at this my last post of service, all youpeople, a hundred million strong, will

march forward over my lifeless bodyto overcome the unprecedented crisis

that confronts our fatherland'. 'Bom-bastic ignorance!' sputters a foreign

critic. But Suzuki himself insisted

later that he really meant he wasdetermined to end the war at the first

opportunity and even at the risk of

assassination. 'I had always beenthinking that the fall of Japan wasevident if the war was conducted the

way it was . . . Would it be possible

for the everlasting soul of the countryto live eternally even after the state

died...?' Despite these covert

thoughts, Kase admits that Suzuki's

speech was 'rather unfortunate,' in

that it disappointed the enemy powerswho thought they discerned, in the

advent of the new premier, someevidence of the painful emergence of

peace elements. Suzuki's broadcastexhorted the people to fight to the

last ; it did not even hint at any desire

to seek peace. In this respect, Suzukiwas either playing it safe because of

the presence of the dominant warfaction ; or, quite possibly, he still did

not comprehend the urgency of thesituation or the concrete nature of his

commission. Sakomizu had had somedoubts about the speech before it wasread but, when Suzuki perused thefinal draft prepared for him, he said,

'It sounds fine to me'.

Following the Soviet denunciationof the neutrality pact, it became all

the more important to deal the Allies

a major blow at Okinawa, in order to

improve Japan's deteriorating posi-

tion. But the last Japanese counter-offensive failed in early May, and thekey island was doomed. Of ultimatelygreater importance for Japan was thedeath of Hitler and the capitulation of

Germany on 8th May. Now Japanalone would have to withstand the full

fury of the Western Allies. But wouldthis not have been the best time for

Japan to extricate herself from hertragic destiny, by disclaiming the

useless ties to the Third Reich? Theagriculture minister, who knewJapan's hopeless food situation better

than most, said as much to several

colleagues. They replied that peacewas still out of the question, or at

least it was not the time to speak of it.

Still, Togo (whose hair grew grayer at

this time) tried his best. Believing

that air power had doomed Germanyas it was now dooming Japan, headvised the Emperor on 21st April

that now was the time seriously to

explore an ending of the war. Themonarch said he wanted the war to

end soon - words which heartenedTogo immeasurably.For Japan, at this stage, 'uncondi-

tional surrender' was the stumblingblock posed by the governments of the

United States, Great Britain, andChina. Direct negotiation for peacewith terms seemed hopeless. Dealingthrough Sweden, Switzerland, China,

or the Vatican appeared unpromising.Togo did not even know till two days

106

after he took office that Bagge, theSwedish ambassador in Tokyo, hadtalked with Shigemitsu, his pre-

decessor, about the feasibility of

sounding out the United States re-

garding peace terms. Although Togowas sympathetic, he boggled overJapanese rather than Swedish initia-

tive. The truth was that Togo (andKido) held out hopes of intermedia-tion by the USSR, partly because hehimself had dealt effectively with theRussians when he was ambassador in

Moscow in 1939 at the time of the veryserious Russo-Japanese border war-fare at Nomonhan, partly because theJapanese army seemed to be willing to

consider a negotiated peace arrangedthrough Soviet good offices.

General Anami suggested in mid-May that Soviet and American poli-

cies were bound to conflict after thewar, and therefore Moscow would notwant to see Japan destroyed. TheUSSR, in fact, ought to be thankfulfor Japan's restraint against Siberiathroughout the Second World War - arestraint which helped the SovietUnion to defeat the Germans. Japan-ese abrogation of formal ties with theNazis might be expected to help nowtoo. Still, there could be few illusions

about Russian benevolence toward ananchor country of the old anti-Comin-tern pact. Japan must operate fromsome position of strength, howeverslight, and must be ready to offer veryhandsome compensation. While theJapanese army would have settled for

Russian quiescence in the Far East,the desperate navy went so far as tohope to be able to barter cruisers for

oil and aircraft from a friendly USSR.Premier Suzuki thought he detectedelements of fairness in Stalin's make-up and suggested that Soviet 'broker-age' be sought. Even Togo had toagree that the only hope of securingterms from the Allies would have to bevia the still-neutral great powerRussia; his own thinking was gearedto peace, not to tactical advantageswanted by the armed forces.

There were some tentative, painful

discussions by the supreme council,

during meetings between llth-14th

May, about plums to be dangled before

the USSR: abrogation of the Ports-

mouth Treaty provisions of 1905,

general restoration of the situation

before the Russo-Japanese war,neutralization of South Manchuria.Even the northern Kuriles might haveto be relinquished for the benefit of ageneral settlement. But terms withthe United States and Britain couldnot be resolved. Anami argued that

the basis should be Japan's currently'favorable' stance: still undefeated,the country possessed far more terri-

tory of the foe than vice versa. Togodisagreed: one dared not ignore theprospects of the war. Interestingly,

Suzuki told neither the cabinet northe Throne about the delicate deci-

sions reached by the council, either

because the premier thought the tim-

ing was premature or the wholematter would come to naught. Somesuggest, unconvincingly, that he sim-ply forgot.

Meanwhile, the Suzuki governmentopenly breathed fire, though Hitler's

Germany was no more. The supremewar council, on 30th April, agreedformally to continue hostilities. On3rd May, Suzuki told the country thatevents in Europe were not unexpectedand that 'we Japanese must renew ourdetermination'. Japan's self-existence

was at stake. Three days later, Togoasserted publicly that 'whatever theattitude of Germany, it will have noeffect on Japan's resolve to prosecutethe war successfully against the USAand Great Britain'.

Behind the scenes, in early June,Hirota - a former premier, foreign

minister, and ambassador to the USSR- informally sounded out Soviet Am-bassador Malik in secret at Hakonespa about improving the two count-ries' relations. The mood was cordial,

and Malik merely asked for time to

study the proposal. Largely because of

the relatively high hopes pinned onthe Soviet channel, the Japanesearmy, navy, and foreign office stopped

107

or failed to encourage promising-

contacts with the Allies via Stock-holm and Berne. In Tokyo, at the endof May, State Minister Shimomurawarned the premier and IGHQ that

Japan ought not to put all of her eggs

in one basket; direct negotiations

with America and Britain should be

attempted. Nobody objected but noth-

ing was done. Anami and Yonai got

into a protracted argument about the

prospects of the war, the formerexuding optimism, the latter pessim-

ism. The tough army line was re-

affirmed by the supreme council on6th June and by the rubber-stampImperial conference of the 8th. Togo'sobjections were shunted aside; helater chided Admiral Yonai for his

inaction. Privy Council PresidentHiranuma went so far as to suggestthat any mention of peace be strictly

prohibited. Suzuki seemed unexcited;perhaps he viewed the policy state-

ments as merely academic, under the

circumstances, or else he put national

unity above all else, for he had daredto admit that the hope of success was'desperately slim'. It is also illuminat-

ing that the premier included the fol-

lowing remarks in the speech he madeto the special session of the Diet on9th June

:

'Once in 1918 I navigated to the

western coast of the United States as

commander of the training squadron.

When I was invited to a welcomereception at San Francisco I delivered

an address concerning a war betweenJapan and the United States ... I

stated that the Japanese are nolovers of war but a people that love

peace . . . Then I said that there wasno cause for a war between the twocountries, and that if there ever werea war, it would be much prolonged andwould invite a very foolish result. I

said that the Pacific Ocean is a blessing

given by Heaven for the intercourse of

Japan and the United States, and if

the ocean were ever used for trans-

porting troops both countries wouldreceive punishment from heaven. Buttwenty years later unfortunately the

two countries came to war. It is mostregrettable.'

For a while there was no particu-

larly adverse reaction in the Diet,

which was attracted by Suzuki'sotherwise very bellicose address. Buta perceptive interpolator soon de-

tected the italicized passage andlaunched a violent attack upon thepremier, almost causing the collapse

of the cabinet. It is worth remember-ing, however, that the old admiral hadpersonally re-inserted the trouble-

some phraseology after his aides hadinked it out in the draft, and thatAnami did not support the oust-Suzukiclamor.Another internal crisis occurred in

June, when Navy Minister Yonaiindicated that he wished to resign.

Ostensibly, he was displeased with the

uselessness of the special Diet session;

but, at heart, he was bitterly dis-

appointed with Suzuki's apparent lackof seriousness about ending the war or

his ability to do so. Togo heartenedYonai by promising to expedite peaceprobes via the USSR. Kido also

showed the navy minister a draft of

his own plan to save the situation,

whereupon Yonai agreed to stay on,

thereby saving the cabinet fromfurther difficulty.

Kido had concluded that Okinawawas doomed and that Japan's capa-

bility to fight on would be almostexhausted by year's end. The enemy'sfierce aerial offensive would reach all-

out proportions, causing dangerous if

not uncontrollable unrest among the

populace. Resolute action was neededto end the war now; if Japan waited

too long, she would meet the same fate

as Germany and would fail to accom-plish the supreme objectives of pro-

tecting the Imperial institution andthe national polity. Kido then madethe revolutionary suggestion that the

Emperor issue a personal letter, borne

by an Imperial envoy, to a mediating

power. The terms of peace might,

inevitably, be harsh, but they must be

honorable.After preliminary coordination with

108

secret 'doves' close to Togo andSuzuki, Kido saw the Emperor on 9th

June. Unhappy with the war direction

authorities' tough stance, which wascontradicted by confidential reports

from the army (about the forces in

Manchuria) and from the navy (aboutthe capability with regard to special-

attack motorboats),. the Emperorexpressed profound satisfaction withKido's draft, and urged the LordKeeper to proceed promptly. Kidoaccordingly conferred individually

with Suzuki, Yonai, Togo, and Anami.The last-named was still talking aboutthe decisive battle for the homelandbut agreed with Kido's basic intention.

Anami, for all of his public belliger-

ence, was both patriot and realist. Themilitary secretary to Suzuki, ColonelMatsutani - a 'dove', heard Anami saythat the Japanese might be able to

smash one-third of the enemy's first-

wave landing force but could notannihilate the foe.

That the Emperor was known to

have looked favorably upon the Kidoplan helped to move it through thecoordinating levels. At a meeting of

the supreme war direction council on18th June, all agreed that Japan mustfight on, since the United States andEngland demanded unconditional sur-

render, but that peace negotiationsthrough a third power were desirable,

on the basis of maintenance of thenational identity. It was hoped thathostilities could be ended by Septem-ber. On 22nd June, at Kido's sugges-tion, the Big Six (premier, foreignminister, war and navy ministers,

chiefs of AGS and NGS) met in thepresence of the Monarch, who said hewanted efforts made to bring aboutpeace promptly. He took his auditorsby surprise when he then asked for

opinions. Suzuki, significantly, askedYonai, of the silent group, to reply.

Umezu stressed the need for circum-spection, whereupon the Emperorstressed the need for speed too. Anamiheld his peace, as did the NGS chief,

Toyoda. One Japanese historian as-

serts that the Emperor's 'definite

expression of his desires at the meet-ing . . . was Japan's first step towardpeace. The government's attitude

toward the termination of the war,obscure till now, was set'. Suzukireportedly told Sakomizu that he wasdeeply grateful because the sovereign'had said today what (the premier) andothers dared not say, although theyhad wanted badly to voice the samethoughts'. In other words, Suzuki hadat last gained confidence to try to endthe war in earnest.

When Hirota promptly saw Malik on24th June, however, the Soviet am-bassador now stated that the previousJapanese proposal was too abstract;

more specific details were required.

On the 29th, Hirota brought a draft

proposal originating with Togo, to the

effect that both countries shouldsupport peace in Asia and arrange arelationship of non-aggression. Moreconcretely, Manchukuo should beneutralized, and Japanese fishing

rights traded for Soviet oil. 'Other

possible requirements might be madeby the USSR.' Hirota asked for anearly response. Afterward, Malik re-

fused to meet with Hirota (or withTogo) and feigned illness. Togo judgedthat local parleys- were doomed whenhe learned the Soviet embassy hadtransmitted the Japanese proposal bycourier, not by telegraph.

At the governmental level, on 28th

June, Togo directed Ambassador Satoto obtain a swift reply from theRussian authorities regarding theproposals transmitted through Malik,although peace mediation was notmentioned. As the days passed with-out obvious activity, the Emperorcalled in Suzuki on 7th July andsuggested that it might be wisest to

speak frankly to the Russians aboutmediation. What about the idea of theImperial envoy bearing a letter fromthe Throne? Suzuki, regretful, replied

that Togo was now conferring withKonoye.Kido had always had the idea of

dispatching Konoye to Moscow. Infact, the Lord Keeper had seriously

109

School physical training led by a sumo wrestler

;pWW**if W^j^

P^ ^

hoped to send the prince to confer

directly with President FranklinRoosevelt in 1941, in a desperate effort

to prevent war, by going over the headof the Japanese military and the

cabinet. Kido hoped to try the samething in 1945: Konoye would visit

Russia and would send Kido a tele-

gram when agreement was reached.

Then the Lord Keeper would report to

the Throne, obtain Imperial sanction,

and present the accomplished fact to

the cabinet, which would be in noposition to deliberate even if desired.

Konoye was the ideal emissary to worksmoothly with the Emperor and withKido. Suzuki consented, of course.

Konoye told Togo he agreed to go to

Moscow on this climactic trip, if

directed, but he expected to be allowedflexibility of action. On 10th July, thesupreme council formally approvedthe idea and looked ahead to workingout details. Togo was anxious to

expedite the diplomacy before theleaders of the United States, Britain,

and the USSR met at Potsdam later in

July.

In Moscow, Ambassador Sato hadnot been optimistic about the pros-

pects for a new non-aggression pact;

he felt that Japan should end the warwithout conditions, or rather withonly the condition that the nationalpolity be preserved. At Togo's urging,

however, he pressed to see Molotov.The latter had been conferring in

Moscow with the Chinese Nationalist

foreign minister, TV Soong, and did

not agree to meet with Sato until 11th

July. The foreign minister providedthe ambassador no satisfaction : 'moreexhaustive study' was needed. Togonow urgently directed Sato to deter-

mine from Molotov the extent of

Russian availability to assist in nego-tiations envisaging an end to thePacific war. This was not the samething as formally asking the USSR to

mediate, but it was hoped that theRussians would now understand, dir-

ectly and for the first time, that Japanwas truly desirous of terminating thewar. Molotov was to be assured that

Japan had no intention of annexing orholding areas under occupation; per-

manent peace was the objective.

Preparations therefore proceeded in

earnest at Tokyo to send Konoye to

Moscow. The prince received his

commission from the Emperor per-

sonally on 12th July, whereupon Togorushed another telegram to Sato.

The ambassador was to secure Rus-sian approval for Konoye' s party to

enter the USSR and, in fact, was to

arrange for a Soviet plane to fly thegroup to Moscow. Before the Russiansbecame involved in the Potsdamconference, Sato was to acquaint theKremlin leaders with the Emperor'spersonal wish to terminate the warpromptly 'for the sake of the happin-ess of mankind'. A fight to the death,

dictated by the Anglo-American in-

sistenceuponunconditional surrender,would only lead to enormous further

bloodshed. The Emperor consequentlywished to send Prince Konoye as aspecial emissary bearing a personalmessage to the USSR.By 14th July, the Japanese Big Six

were discussing the composition of

Konoye's party and the terms to besought in Moscow. Representation bymembers of the foreign ministry, thearmy, and the navy was easily agreedupon, but not the conditions. Anamistill argued that Japan should speakfrom strength, but Togo and Yonaireplied that there might be a worsefate than acceptance of harsh terms of

peace. The conferees evaded the issue,

at this late stage, by agreeing to defer

a decision until Konoye had actually

reached Moscow and had begun nego-tiations with the Russians. Whenadvised ofthese developments, Konoyereiterated his insistence that there beno bindinginstructions ; unconditionalsurrender was by now the only coursefor Japan. Togo seems to have beenunenthusiastic about 'troublesome'Konoye, although the foreign ministerdid agree that something very near to

unconditional surrender had becomeinevitable

In Moscow, Ambassador Sato asked

112

to see Molotov on the 13th. The foreign

minister sent word that he was too

busy because he was about to leave for

the Potsdam conference. The vice

minister, Lozovsky, instead saw Sato.

When the latter delivered the informa-tion concerning the Emperor's desire

to end the Pacific war and the request

for authorization to dispatch Konoye'sspecial mission, Lozovsky indicated

that he would promptly pass the

word to Molotov but doubted whetherthe foreign minister could reply

before he left Moscow. Next night,

Molotov departed with Stalin, abouttwenty-four hours after Sato hadseen Lozovsky. There was no doubt in

Japanese minds that the Russianleaders were fully cognizant ofTokyo'sintentions when they left for Potsdam.On 18th July, Sato received Lozov-

sky's rejection of the Japanese pro-

posals. The Emperor's message struckthe Russians as too general, lackingconcrete propositions; the exact mis-sion of Konoye was not clear. Sato's

telegram reached Tokyo on the 20th.

The ambassador berated the foreign

ministrv for an abstract approachwhich was ill-suited for dealing withthe Soviets. It was quite probable thatthe Russian answer was made after

consultation with the Americans andBritish at Potsdam. In any case, theJapanese feeler would by now beknown to all the Allied leaders. And,at about this time, the women andchildren at the Soviet embassy in

Tokyo sailed happily for home. Werethey merely seeking refuge from theAlliedbombings, anAGS officer mused,or did they know that Russia's entryinto the Pacific war was at hand?

Still, Tokyo clutched at straws. If

Moscow needed clarifications of theImperial proposals, Togo was preparedto frame them. On the 21st, the foreignminister sent new directives to Sato,but it was still the Japanese positionthat a negotiated peace, not un-conditional surrender, must be sought.There were international as well asdomestic reasons for not revealingconcrete conditions yet. Stress should

Inside a B-29 : the bomber crews hadcause for satisfaction

be laid upon the fact that PrinceKonoye was close to the throne andwas a very important personage in his

own right in Japan. Konoye would beconveying the peace plan in detail,

based upon the Imperial wishes.

Soviet demands in Asia would be met,so far as possible, in return for thehoped-for Russian good offices.

Sato saw Lozovsky again on 25th

July. The Russian's mood was earnestand courteous. Sato was convincedthat he had made a considerable im-pression, as he repeatedly explainedthe envisaged role of Konoye. But animmense shock was in store for thewell-intentioned fumblers in Tokyo.On the morning of 27th July, Japaneseradio monitors picked up the text of atripartite Anglo - American - Chinesedeclaration issued at Potsdam the daybefore. Japan was being given 'an

opportunity to end this war' but, if

she did not accept unconditionalsurrender of the armed forces, theonly alternative was 'prompt andutter destruction'. Clausewitz's 'worstcondition' was at last becoming a

reality for Japan.

113

Japan in the

death throes

The Potsdam Declaration July 26th

1945

Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender

1. WE - the President of the UnitedStates, the President of the National

Government of the Republic of China,

and the Prime Minister of GreatBritain, representing the hundreds of

millions of our countrymen, haveconferred and agree that Japan shall

be given an opportunity to end this

war.2. The prodigious land, sea and air

forces of the United States, theBritish Empire and of China, manytimes reinforced by their armies andair fleets from the west, are poised to

strike the final blows upon Japan.

This military power is sustained andinspired by the determination of all

the Allied Nations to prosecute the

war against Japan until she ceases to

resist.

3. The result of the futile and sense-

less German resistance to the might of

aroused free peoples of the worldstands forth in awful clarity as an

114

example to the people of Japan. Themight that now converges on Japan is

immeasurably greater than that

which, when applied to the resisting

Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the

lands, the industry and the method of

life of the whole German people. Thefull application of our military power,

backed by our resolve, will mean the

inevitable and complete destruction

of the Japanese armed forces and just

as inevitably the utter devastation of

the Japanese homeland.4. The time has come for Japan to

decide whether she will continue to be

controlled by those self-willed mili-

taristic advisers whose unintelligent

calculations have brought the Empireof Japan to the threshold of annihila-

tion, or whether she will follow the

path of reason.

5. Following are our terms. We will not

deviate from them. There are noalternatives. We shall brook no delay.

6. There must be eliminated for all

time the authority and influence of

those who have deceived and misled

the people of Japan into embarking onworld conquest, for we insist that a

new order of peace, security and jus-

tice will be impossible until irre-

sponsible militarism is driven fromthe world.

7. Until such a new order is established

and until there is convincing proof

that Japan's war-making power is

destroyed, points in Japanese terri-

tory to be designated by the Allies

shall be occupied to secure the

achievement of the basic objectives weare here setting forth.

8. The terms of the Cairo Declarationshall be carried out and Japanesesovereignty shall be limited to the

islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu,Shikoku and such minor islands as wedetermine.9. The Japanese military forces, after

being completely disarmed, shall bepermitted to return to their homeswith the opportunity to lead peaceful

and productive lives.

10. We do not intend that the Japaneseshall be enslaved as a race or destroyedas a nation, but stern justice shall be

meted out to all war criminals, in-

cluding those who have visited cruel-

ties upon our prisoners. The JapaneseGovernment shall remove all obsta-cles to the revival and strengtheningof democratic tendencies among theJapanese people. Freedom of speech,of religion, and of thought, as well asrespect for the fundamental humanrights shall be established.

11. Japan shall be permitted to main-tain such industries as will sustain hereconomy and permit the exaction ofjust reparations in kind, but not thosewhich would enable her to re-arm forwar. To this end, access to, as dis-

tinguished from control of, raw mate-rials shall be permitted. EventualJapanese participation in world traderelations shall be permitted.12. The occupying forces of the Alliesshall be withdrawn from Japan assoon as these objectives have beenaccomplished and there has beenestablished in accordance with thefreely expressed will of the Japanese

people a peacefully inclined andresponsible government.13. We call upon the government ofJapan to proclaim now the uncondi-tional surrender of all Japanesearmed forces, and to provide properand adequate assurances of their goodfaith in such action. The alternativefor Japan is prompt and utter de-struction.

Upon receiving the broadcast of theAllied proclamation from Potsdam,the Japanese foreign ministry wentover the translation with a fine-tooth

comb. Togo's first reaction was that,

in view of the language, 'Followingare our terms,' it was evidently not adictate of unconditional surrender for

the country as a whole, and the phraseof unconditional surrender, used onlyonce, was applied specifically to thecase of the armed forces. It nowseemed that the Emperor's wishes hadgot through to the United States andEngland, with a resultant moderationin attitude. Perhaps more import-antly, the USSR had not signed the

tripartite declaration and was there-

fore maintaining a policy of legal

neutrality toward Japan, althoughthe motives were not clear yet. Togo'spolitical adviser suggested that it

would not be a source of dread if, as

the Allies demanded, 'a peacefully

inclined and responsible government'were left to 'the freely expressed will

of the Japanese people'. Certainly the

majority of the nation was not think-

ing of abrogating the Imperial system.

'Let us have faith in the nation,' Togowas advised. Another relatively mildportion of the Allied declaration wasthe phrase 'to end this war,' instead of

'to surrender'. Such language mightmake it more palatable to the militaryleadership.Nevertheless, Togo detected a num-

ber of uncertainties and ambiguities

;

e.g., the eventual form of the Jap-

anese government, the questions of

disposition of war criminals anddisarmament, the matter of cities or

points to be occupied 'in guarantee'.

In any case, Togo directed Vice

115

Minister Matsumoto to investigatethe legal aspects of the Potsdamdeclaration, while the foreign mini-stry sought to initiate negotiationswith the Allies in order to obtainclarification and revision, howeverslight, of disadvantageous features.

In reporting to the Throne on 27thJuly, Togo stressed the need for

Japan not to manifest any intentionto reject the declaration. Efforts

should still be made to secure Sovietmediation - softening of the terms -

which must determine Japan's policy.

Togo said much the same thing whenhe addressed the supreme councillater on the 27th. Admiral Toyodaargued that the public was bound to

get wind of the declaration, and thatmorale would suffer unless the ulti-

matum were branded 'outrageous'publicly. Suzuki and Togo objectedvigorously. It was agreed that nothingofficial should be said until Russia'sresponse had been determined. Whenthe cabinet met, it decided, undermilitary pressure, that a censoredversion of the Potsdam declarationmight be released to the press, but noofficial views were to be published,and editors should arrange minimumpublicity. The most that newspapersmight do, would be to add a commentthat the government 'seemed to beignoring the tripartite declaration'.

It is noteworthy that not until this

meeting on 27th July did Togo reveal

to the entire cabinet that negotia-tions had been initiated with theSoviet Union.

Still later on the 27th there was agovernment-high command coordinat-ing conference, ordinarily a strictly

routine affair. Togo, tragically, hadnot thought it important enough toattend. But, at the conference, onemilitary member proposed that thePotsdam declaration be rejected out-right; whereupon a private meetingwas hastily held between the premierand the four top military and navalchiefs. Reportedly, the more militant

The Americans invade Luzon Island

116

officers prevailed upon Suzuki tospeak out in the general vein of ignor-ing the declaration. At a subsequentpress conference, the aged premier,inexpert with journalists and hard of

hearing, used an archaic word(mokusatsu) to explain the Japanesegovernment's position of equivoca-tion. Dictionaries provide variantinterpretations of mokusatsu : 'to takeno notice of,' 'to treat with silent

contempt,' 'to ignore by keepingsilence,' 'to remain in a wise andmasterly inactivity'. UndoubtedlySuzuki, caught between dangerouscurrents, had the fourth meaning in

mind. He certainly could not havemeant 'to reject' baldly. But Japanesenews agencies and broadcasters did

translate mokusatsu as 'reject'. The

consequences were calamitous.Whether from sincere misunderstand-ing- or from search for a pretext, bothWashington and Moscow would sooninvoke the word 'rejection' to justify

unlimited violence unleashed againstJapan. Togo, horrified at Suzuki'sapparent reversal of the cabinet's

decision, could do nothing to reverse

the effect left by the prime minister.

'Had Suzuki been more steadfast,'

laments Kase, 'or his advisers less

stupid, we might have been spared theatomic attack'. It is ironic that, uponreceiving the text of the Potsdamdeclaration and Togo's detailed ex-

planation, the Emperor had 'said

without hesitation that he deemed it

acceptable in principle'. And, on 3rd

August, a group of cabinet advisers

notified a state minister of their

unanimous recommendation thatJapan had no recourse but to acceptthe Potsdam declaration.

When Molotov, back from Potsdam,finally agreed to see Sato on 8thAugust, it was not to discuss media-tion but to declare war against Japan.Events had cruelly overtaken theefforts of the Japanese 'doves' to savetheir country from destruction. Al-

though the Potsdam declaration hadwarned that the Allies would brookno delay, the Japanese governmentwas still trying to conduct routinediplomacy; death was near. At 8.15

am on 6th August, after the all-clear

had been sounded from an earlier

reconnaissance alert, a single B-29bomber dropped the world's first

Admiral Yonai

atomic weapon from high altitudeupon the city of Hiroshima. A para-chute was seen falling, followed by aflash of blindingly intense light and ahorrendous blast in the sky over thecity's heart. '.

. . a great, an enormouscolumn of cloud,' writes Ibuse, '.

. .

trailed a single, thick leg beneath it,

and reached up high into the heavens.Flattening out at its peak, it swelledout fatter and fatter like an openingmushroom. . . . Although the cloudseemed at first glance to be motion-less, it was by no means so. The headof the mushroom would billow outfirst to the east, then to the west,then out to the east again; each time,some part or other of its body wouldemit a fierce light, in ever-changingshades of red, purple, lapis lazuli, orgreen. And all the time it went onboiling out unceasingly from within.Its stalk, like a twisted veil of fine

cloth, went on swelling busily . . .

The mushroom cloud was really shap-ed more like a jellyfish than a mush-room. Yet it seemed to have moreanimal vitality than any jellyfish,

with its leg that quivered and its headthat changed colour as it sprawledout slowly . . . writhing and raging . . .

It was an envoy of the devil himself . .

.

who else in the whole wide universewould have presumed to summonforth such a monstrosity?' Between130,000 and 200,000 people died in agony,were injured horribly, or disappeared.Hiroshima was no more.With all communications severed,

the military in the Hiroshima areacould not notify Tokyo till afternoonon the 6th that a bomb of unprece-dented destructive power had beenemployed by the enemy. Although,next day, President Truman confirmedpublicly that the weapon was atomicin nature and warned that more wasin store unless the war was ended, theJapanese authorities were torn be-

tween skepticism and belief. Even if

the American statement were true,

could the Japanese populace at large

be told? The newspapers on 8thAugust carried only a simple IGHQcommunique to the effect that 'Hiro-

shima has suffered considerably froma new-type bomb'. Meanwhile, in-

vestigations proceeded, on the part of

intelligence, ordnance, medical, andscientific experts. IGHQ received areport on 9th August that a special

kind of bomb had indeed been utilized,

but that burns could be prevented if

one's body were covered. The local

army headquarters then reported thatpeople in white clothing were burnedonly slightly, that those in air-raid

shelters were also burned onlyslightly, and that the huge fires wereattributable to the fact the bomb wasdropped while the inhabitants werepreparing breakfast. The army wasnot only trying to prevent panic butwas hoping to play down the effects of

atomic weapons upon existing plansfor the decisive battle for the home-land.

Prior to receipt of the field team'sreport from Hiroshima, Togo decidedto recommend to the Throne that thePotsdam declaration be accepted with-out further ado. When the Emperor

Marquis Koichi Kido, the Emperor's

closest adviser, in traditional garb

118

si

Kwantung Army that weak? Then the

jig is up'. Adds Colonel Hattori:

'All our diplomatic efforts of the past

two months not only came to naught,but they were answered with a shat-

tering blow'. The Russians strucknot only at Manchuria but also at

southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles, andNorth Korea.Under ordinary circumstances, a

premier of Japan might have resignedat this point. But times were hardlyordinary, and loyal Suzuki still mustcarry out his responsibility to theEmperor to end the war. He said as

much to Togo and Sakomizu on the9th. The sovereign meanwhile pressedKido to get the government movingrapidly toward termination of

hostilities. Suzuki promptly convenedthe supreme council at the palace,

where he shook the military andnaval conferees in particular byannouncing that Japan would have toaccept the Potsdam declaration. Hotdiscussion ensued as to the 'strings'

that should be attached to acceptance.Togo argued that only safeguardingof the national polity should be in-

sisted upon, but the generals andadmirals spoke of three other condi-tions respecting war criminals, dis-

armament, and enemy occupation.The foreign minister warned thatnegotiations with the Allies would bejeopardized by hopeless attempts atbargaining, and that forced invasionwould ensue. Eventually the confereesagreed in principle to accept the

tripartite declaration but reached noconclusion regarding conditions to

be attached.

While the supreme council wasconsuming time in argument, a B-29

dropped the second atomic bomb, this

time on Nagasaki at 11.30am on 9thAugust. Approximately 80,000 personswere killed, injured, or left missing in

the cathedral city on Kyushu. Truly,the Allies seemed bent on obliterating

every metropolis in Japan. TheAmericans reportedly had a hundred

of the fantastic new bombs, prisonershad revealed, and Tokyo was markedfor final erasure. But, even now, thearmy high command notified all

forces that the type of bomb droppedat Nagasaki was 'not formidable, andwe have countermeasures'. To cite

another example of the Japanesearmy's studied contempt for or ignor-ance of the fearsome effects of thenuclear bombs, it is said that on themorning of 14th August, Anami dinedwith Marshal Hata, who had come upto Tokyo from his headquarters atHiroshima. 'The marshal told theminister . . . that the atomic bombhad hardly any effect on the groundone foot below the surface. Immedi-ately, the minister told the marshal:"Please explain about this to theEmperor without fail when you reportto him, and make him understandthat the atomic bomb is not such adreadful weapon".' Apparently Hatadid not get the chance to tell this tothe Emperor.At 2pm on 9th August, the cabinet,

in full session, finally discussed thematter of seeking jpeace immediatelyor of fighting on. Anami spoke of thehonor of the race and of the need totake desperate chances to improve thecritical situation. But Navy MinisterYonai urged the cabinet to abandonfalse pride and wishful thinking, andto save the country from total de-

struction by entering into prompt andrealistic negotiations to end the warwithout further dangerous gambles.At Yonai's request, the various mini-sters presented reports on the recentdomestic situation - munitions, food,

transportation. All of the presenta-tions were extremely gloomy. Sincethe conference still would not or couldnot agree to acceptance of the Pots-dam declaration, a short recess wastaken.

When the conference was resumed,Suzuki stated that the tripartite

declaration must either be accepted orrejected; the supreme council hadalready decided in favor of acceptance.After a forceful presentation by Togo,

Anami declaimed passionately infavor of conditions, lest Japan meetItaly's sad fate. The army high com-mand, he warned, was even morepositive in this regard than he ; it didnot believe the war was lost. Afterfurther exchanges, Suzuki called oneach participant for his view. Anamiwas joined by the justice minister anda state minister in opposing Togo'sproposal. The state minister asked apainful question: 'What if the nationalpolity could be retained but the Allies

decided to charge the Emperor as awar criminal?' Yonai supported Togo,as did the ministers of agriculture andforestry, munitions, transportation,and education, plus another state

minister. The remaining five ministersexpressed no opinion. To a questionwhether the cabinet ought to resignbecause of the failure to obtain Sovietmediation, Suzuki reacted hotly andnegatively. Peace was the first andforemost consideration. It was six

hours since deliberations had begun;the premier announced adjournmentat 8.30pm. He would now visit theEmperor to ascertain the monarch'swishes.

Suzuki and Togo were received bythe Emperor at about 11pm on the 9th.

After the foreign minister briefed thesovereign on the discussions that day,

Suzuki asked for a special Imperialconference at once. The Emperorconsented readily. It was to be a mostunusual conference - the first of its

kind to consider the question of thePotsdam declaration; the first to meetin the Imperial presence without prior

agreement regarding the agenda.When the session opened at 11.50pm,

Sakomizu read the entire Potsdamdocument, as the Emperor wished.Then Suzuki personally read a pro-

posed statement that the Japanesegovernment accepted the declaration,

with the understanding that the termsdid not constitute any demand to alter

the status of the Emperor undernational law. The premier explainedthe division of opinion in the cabinetregarding the dispute as to whether

122

there should be one or four conditions.

The majority having shared Togo's

view, the foreign minister's position

was presented as the basis of the

proposed reply by the Japanese gov-

ernment. Suzuki wanted His Majestyto hear the various positions. Togodefended his stance ; Yonai concurred

fully. Anami and the AGS chief,

Umezu, were inwardly furious with

Suzuki s 'high-handed and arbitrary

handling of the conference ; they hadnot even been consulted about the

proposed policy statement. Maskingtheir displeasure, they spoke vigor-

ously in favor of fighting on, or at

least of incorporating the four condi-

tions as the army's maximum compro-mise. Hiranuma, privy council presi-

dent, next made a cautious presenta-tion supporting Togo's view, but withmany 'if's' and 'but's' and improve-ments in wording. The NGS chief,

Toyoda, vigorously supported Anamiand Umezu. Victory was by no meanscertain, total defeat by no meansinevitable.

Two hours had been expended but nodecision was forthcoming. At 2am onthe 10th, Suzuki stated that he musthumbly submit the question for theEmperor's decision; the conferencewould abide by the Imperial desire.

Actually, there had already been greatpressure by senior statesmen and highofficials to prevent the attachment of

the four conditions to acceptance of

the Allied declaration. Among thosewho urged Kido, directly or indirectly,

to take countermeasures were PrinceKonoye, Prince Takamatsu, Shige-mitsu, Matsudaira, Takagi, and Kase.Kido was reluctant to trouble theEmperor again, but he did confer withthe monarch at least four times onthe 9th. Meanwhile Yonai, Sakomizu,and other cabinet members had beenurging Suzuki to guide the conferencein the direction of an Imperial deci-

sion as a last resort, rather than leavethe matter to majority vote.

After Suzuki had made his dramaticplea to the Emperor, the latter askedthe premier to be seated and then, in

quiet tones, stated that he approved

the opinion of the foreign minister.

The planning of the army and the navyhad been 'erroneous and untimely'.

Despite the intention to wage a

decisive campaign on homeland soil,

defensive beach works at Kujukuri-

hama, only seventy miles from Tokyo,were far behind schedule. New divi-

sions lacked equipment. How could aninvasion ever be repulsed? Air raids

were increasing in severity. 'To sub-

ject the people to further suffering, to

witness the destruction of civiliza-

tion, and to invite the misfortune of

mankind, are entirely contrary to mywishes.' Disarmament of the loyal

armed forces and indictment of citi-

zens as war criminals were indeed

painful to contemplate, but it wasinevitable for the salvation of the

country. Japan must bear the un-

bearable. On this climactic note, the

Imperial conference ended at 2.30am

on the 10th. The cabinet then resumedits session and, without objection, by4am endorsed a decision based uponthe Emperor's expressed wishes.

Togo immediately oversaw the

drafting of telegrams of notification

to the Allies. The messages to the

United States and China were trans-

mitted on the 10th through the Jap-

anese embassy in Switzerland; those

to Britain and Russia, throughSweden. Ambassador Malik, when he

saw Togo in Tokyo on the 10th to

serve the Russian declaration of war,

was told to notify his governmentthat Japan had accepted the Potsdamdeclaration. As an additional meansof reaching the Allied leadership, the

Domei news service and NHK (JapanBroadcasting Corporation) sent out

the news on the night of the 10th, at

the request of the vice minister of

foreign affairs.

The cabinet met on the afternoon of

the 10th to discuss procedures for

revealing to the Japanese populace

that the tripartite declaration wasbeing accepted. It was decided that noofficial statement should be madebefore an Imperial rescript was issued.

123

Meanwhile, steps should be takeninformally to prepare the people for

the end of the war; for example, the

chief of the information bureau,

Shimomura, made a vague 'back-

ground' broadcast on the night of the

10th, published by the morning news-papers on the 11th. Concerned by the

need to maintain military morale anddiscipline - whether the war was to

end or to be continued, Anami allowed

the drafting and publication of abelligerent public message over his

signature. Shimomura's and Anami'smessages seemed to suggest to astute

readers that the views of the govern-ment and of the military must be in

sharp disarray.

Shortly after midnight on 11th

August, Japanese foreign ministry,

news, and military monitors pickedup the broadcast of the American-coordinated reply by Secretary Byrnesto the question whether the Potsdamdeclaration prejudiced the preroga-

tives of the Emperor as a sovereign

ruler. Although the official text did

not reach Tokyo via Berne until early

on the 13th, enough was known by the

12th to warrant analysis. Remainingambiguities and harshnesses werebound to upset most of the Japaneseleadership, and Togo wonderedwhether demands for further clarifi-

cation would not wreck the negotia-

tions. Trusted associates convincedTogo that this was the best that could

be expected. Word also came that

Suzuki intended to accept the Allied

answer. When Togo visited the Em-peror on the 12th, he was prepared to

recommend acceptance. Togo's mem-oirs record that the monarch 'con-

sidered that, the reply being satis-

factory, we should accept it as it

stood'. This is all the more courageouswhen one notes that, earlier on the

12th, AGS chief Umezu and NGSchief Toyoda (without consultingYonai) had recommended to the

Emperor that the Allied note be

Supplies are landed at Tacloban,

Leyte, for the invading Americans

124

*

b4#

rejected resolutely. The high com-mand, they stressed, judged that the

enemy intended to render Japan a

tributary state and to debase the

dignity of the monarch, who was the

apex of the national polity. The army,in fact, radioed all commands on the

12th, in the name of the war minister

and the AGS chief, reassurance that

the war must continue, since the

national polity was in danger.

Thus, when the cabinet reconvenedat 3pm on the 12th, the old cleavage

between 'hawks' and 'doves' had only

been exacerbated, although the Im-perial wish had already been uttered.

Despite Togo's explanations and ex-

hortation of alacrity, plus Yonai's

support, Anami and several ministers

insisted that the Allies must be con-

tacted for clarification of dangerouspoints, particularly with regard to

the statement that the ultimate formof Japanese government must 'be

established by the freely expressed

will of the Japanese people'. Suzukihimself, confessing to misgivings

about disarmament and the future of

the Imperial system under enemyoccupation, unexpectedlycame aroundto Anami's view and said that the warwould have to go on unless Japanesedemands were accepted. Togo, dis-

comfited enormously, managed to

secure an adjournment until the

formal text of the Allied reply arrived

next day. He then expressed his bitter

personal disappointment to Suzuki,

and reminded him of the Emperor'sown desire. For a while, the foreign

minister even thought of resigning.

Kido intervened to smooth over these

startling last-minute complications,

and persuaded Suzuki to comprehendwhat was in the Emperor's mind andto accept the Allied note withoutadditional bandying of words.

While the cabinet had been in

session on the 12th, the Imperial

princes met with the Emperor at the

palace. The monarch personally ex-

plained the latest developments andasked for cooperation in this supremecrisis. On behalf of all members of the

Imperial family, Prince Nashimotogave assurances to the Emperor. Soonafter the conference adjourned, Anamivisited Prince Mikasa and asked himto persuade the sovereign to recon-

sider his decision. Not only did Mikasarefuse, but he apparently reprimandedthe military for their behavior eversince the Manchurian Incident of 1931.

This censure by a brother of theEmperor may well have affected

Anami's eventual decision to commitsuicide in atonement.To gain time, officials in the foreign

ministry delayed dissemination of thedefinitive Allied reply, actually re-

ceived from Berne and Stockholm onthe evening of the 12th, until nextmorning. There was really nothingnew in these telegrams, of course. At9am on the 13th, the Big Six met to

discuss policy toward the Allied reply.

Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda still

spoke of a need to amend certainparagraphs, and even to submit theconditions regarding disarmament

126

and occupation. The officers clearly-

dreaded Allied suppression and coer-

cion under occupation, despite

vaguely beneficent phraseology in thedeclaration. Togo warned again that

such maneuvering was out of thequestion by now, but no conclusionhad been reached by 3pm, whenSuzuki recessed the meeting. In themeantime, at 2pm, Togo had left to

report in detail to the Emperor, whoasserted that the foreign minister's

position was entirely appropriate andasked him to tell the premier so.

The cabinet met again at 4pm onthe 13th. Suzuki requested eachminister to speak up definitively.

Despite much dissatisfaction with theAllied reply, most of the officials

agreed with Togo's stand. Anamicontinued his opposition, ostensibly

to be of assistance to his monarch; heargued that it was craven to 'knuckleunder' to the Allies in every way,without even seeking to dispel themisgivings entertained by all. Finally

United States Navy task force

assembled in Lingayen Gulf, Luzon

Suzuki asserted that he had nowchanged his mind about the need to

continue the war, because there hadbeen major developments recently,

e.g., the use of the atomic bombs, theattack by the USSR. After readingand rereading the Allied reply, he hadreached the opinion that the phrase-ology was not malicious. Fighting onmight be personally satisfying, but it

would endanger the future of Japan,and it contravened the Imperial wish.

Since no general agreement had beenreached, however, Suzuki would re-

port candidly to the Throne andagain beg the Emperor to hand down adecision. Anami continued to insist

upon the need for conditions, despite

Yonai's and Suzuki's opposition, andhe won considerable support for his

position.

The trend on high was causing pro-

found anxiety and hostility among the

127

army ana navy staffs. A number of

section chiefs, meeting on the after-

noon of the 13th, agreed to prevent the

convening of another Imperial con-

ference until the 'doves' could be

prevailed upon to recant. Many visits

were made to Imperial princes andsenior generals and admirals, in aneffort to win their support. Theresults were not encouraging. Umezuand Toyoda also sought to convince

Togo to agree to the conditions, but

the foreign minister would not yield.

Already, on 12th August, war minis-

try officers had asked Anami to 'take

emergency measures when necessary'.

If Anami could not prevent national

Harry S Truman, new to the Presidency,

took the decision to drop the bomb

disgrace, he should kill himself. Sinceevents were moving rapidly in thedirection of unconditional surrender,

AGS and war ministry staff officers

devised plans on the 13th to use force

to quash the 'doves'. Troops were to bedrawn from the Eastern District Armyand the Imperial Guards Division.

Kido, Suzuki, Togo, Yonai, and othermajor personages were to be isolated

by force, while senior statesmen favor-

ing peace would be kept away fromthe palace. Until definitive assurancehad been obtained regarding condi-

tions for upholding the nationalpolity, Japan would not surrender butwould carry on the negotiations.

However, the assent of the war mini-ster, the AGS chief, and the local

district army and division command-

****MJi["

^HHK

ing generals must first be obtained.

At 9pm on the 13th, Anami wasvisited at his official residence by adelegation of staff officers whom heespecially trusted and who trustedhim: Colonel Arao (military affairs

section chief in the war minis-try), Lieutenant-Colonels Takeshita(Anami's devoted brother-in-law),

Inaba, Ida, and Shiizaki, and MajorHatanaka were there, among others.

For an hour and a half, these officers

conferred passionately with Anami;they wanted their plan to go into effect

on the morning of the 14th. The generalgave no sign of consenting, or of dis-

approving for that matter. When theofficers pressed him, he told Arao to

see him again at midnight at the warministry. At the time the two con-ferred, later, Anami merely spoke in

roundabout fashion about the diffi-

culty of waging a decisive homelandbattle and about the poor prospects of

a coup, but he still did not say Yes orNo. He would see Umezu about theplan in the morning. Regardless of his

words, Anami's attitude seems to

have conveyed the impression to

certain staff officers that he wasinwardly in agreement with a coup.Actually Anami, worried about anemergency, summoned MilitaryPolice Commander Okido and warnedhim that important orders must be dir-

ectly issued only by the war ministeror the vice minister. This meant thatOkido should beware of false instruc-tions. Anami also cautioned ImperialGuards Division Commander Mori toleave nothing undone in defending theImperial palace. On the 14th, at 7am,after seeing Marshal Hata and talkingabout Hiroshima, and after beingpressed again by the eager rebels,

Anami went with Arao to sound outUmezu. The AGS chief would notendorse the plan, which thereby lost

all prospect of official, high-levelmilitary backing, for Anami still

refused to be explicit.

On the afternoon of 13th August,Japanese radio monitors picked up anAmerican broadcast blaming the Jap-

anese government for stalling. Thesame day, Allied carrier-planes struckwith particular fury. From thatafternoon till morning on the 14th,

enemy planes dropped leaflets onTokyo and other cities, with details ofthe till-then secret negotiations in

progress concerning peace on thebasis of acceptance of the Potsdamdeclaration. Kido showed the Emperora leaflet on the 14th and obtainedpermission to begin arrangements toterminate the war, since the Alliedpropaganda was bound to inflame the'hawks' and cause confusion in theland, while the Soviet armies wereknifing through the 'paper tiger' whichwas the Kwantung Army in Man-churia. Suzuki and Kido found them-selves in full agreement that anemergency Imperial conference wasimperative, although the service mini-sters angrily opposed irregularmethods of convening it. On themorning of the 14th, the premier andthe Lord Keeper requested the Em-peror personally to call a joint sessionof the supreme council and all cabinetmembers to meet in his presence.Such an Imperial conference had notmet since just before the attack onPearl Harbor in 1941. The sovereignconsented immediately. As a conse-quence, around 10am, all of the pro-posed participants were summoned toappear at the air-raid shelter in thepalace, on thirty minutes' notice. 'Wewere notified that, it being a suddencall to audience,' writes Togo, 'the

wearing of formal attire would bedispensed with, and the ministers whoin midsummer were without evenneckties borrowed them from thesecretaries and managed to preserve adecency barely adequate to the occa-sion'. Meanwhile, at 10am, the Em-peror called in the highest officers onactive duty and available - MarshalsSugiyama and Hata (just in fromHiroshima) and Fleet Admiral Nagano.After advising them of his decision to

finish the war, the monarch demandedand received military and navalcompliance. The finale was near.

129

Finale

The last Imperial conference of thewar met at 10.50am on 14th August.Suzuki, surprisingly sharp, reportedto the Emperor on the recent con-ferences and the failure to achieve aconsensus regarding Togo's and his

own proposals. Although it was anawesome matter for him, he mustagain trouble His Majesty for a deci-

sion, after all opinions opposingacceptance of the Allied note had beenheard. Umezu, Toyoda, and Anamithen pleaded emotionally for sanctionof their request that further explana-tions be obtained from the Allies,

until which time the nation shouldfight on, desperately.

The Emperor broke the ensuingsilence to pronounce his fateful de-

cision. He was fully acquainted withthe recent controversy about accept-ance of the Allied reply, but he hadhad no reason to modify his original,

carefully thought-out determinationto accept the Potsdam declaration.

The latest explications generally con-firmed the first impressions. He agreedwith the foreign minister that, fromthe tone of the Allied answer, thereseemed to be no intention to subvert

130

the national polity. As a matter of

fact, the country's structure might besmashed and the population annihi-

lated unless hostilities were endedimmediately. 'It is therefore my wishthat we bear the unbearable, suffer

the insufferable, and accept the Allied

reply, thus to preserve the state as a

state and to spare my subjects further

suffering. I wish you all to act in that

intention.' The service ministers hadreported opposition within the armedforces ; che monarch wanted the armyand navy to be made to comprehendhis wishes, although he fully under-

stood the unendurable feelings of

agony.In this tense and noiseless basement,

thirty meters underground, the atmos-phere was electric. Sakomizu heardhis tears fall on the papers before him.The Emperor was leaning forward alittle as he spoke, quickly wipingaway his own tears, first with onehand, then with both. Among his

distinguished auditors, it is said that

muffled sobbing broke out when His

Majesty, overcome with emotion and

Nagasaki

General Umezu General Anami

speaking haltingly, said that, 'regard-

less of what may happen to me, I wantto save the people's lives ... I cannotbear to see the people suffering further

. . . my heart is filled with grief andsorrow . . .' The groans and tears

"became uncontrollable as the sover-

eign proceeded to say, 'If there is

anything that I ought to do, I shall notspare myself. If it is desirable for meto appeal to the nation, I shall speakover the radio at any time'. If neces-sary, he would personally appeal to

the armed forces to maintain order.

The main thing now was to strive to

re-build the country, as long as theroots remained. An Imperial rescript

should be drafted immediately.The premier replied that the

Imperial wish would be implementedpromptly, and he apologized humblyfor having brought pain to the Em-peror on more than one occasion.

After the monarch departed, some of

the ministers dropped to the floor,

where they knelt in awe and grief. 'It

was an inexpressibly solemn andmoving scene,' recalled Togo; 'as weretired down the long corridor, whilereturning in our cars, and at the re-

sumed cabinet meeting, each of us in

his thoughts wept again'. The cabinetworked all afternoon and evening onthe draft of the Imperial rescript

ending the war. Anami pressed for arephrasing of 'offensive' wording.Finally, Suzuki brought a rathermessy document to the Emperor after

10pm on the 14th. The Emperor signed

and affixed his seal. Thereupon thecabinet countersigned the rescript,

which was promulgated at 11pm.At the same time, the foreign

ministry sent urgent telegrams, via

Berne and Stockholm, notifying the

four Allied powers that Japan wasaccepting the Potsdam declaration

and was prepared to implement the

Imperial rescript. Other telegramswere transmitted with the Japanesegovernment's plea that consideration

be accorded a number of concessionsdesigned to insure smooth fulfilment

of the country's obligations, e.g.,

regarding honorable disarmament,token occupation, early repatriation

from abroad, allowance for communi-cations delays, attention to the sick,

wounded, and starving on isolated

islands in the Pacific. Anami now cameover to Togo and stated very formally,

*I have seen the foreign ministry's

draft of the communication to the

Allied powers regarding the occupa-tion and disarmament, and I am grate-

ful beyond expression. Had I knownthat the matter would be dealt with in

that way, I should not have felt it

132

f^tn

Lieutenant-Colonel Takeshita Jacob Malik

necessary to speak so zealously at the

Imperial conference'. Togo replied

that he had only resisted proposing

conditions, but had never opposedexpressing Japan's desires to the

Allies. Anami again thanked Togoformally. Although the war minister

seemed overly polite (he was, in fact,

preparing to commit suicide), 'we all

parted with smiles, saying to eachother that it was good that it wasover'. In full attire, Anami thenvisited Suzuki to apologize for all of

the recent troubles and to assure the

old premier that his principal objec-

tive had always been only the preser-

vation of the national polity and the

safety of the Emperor. Cordial wordswere exchanged, Anami presentedSuzuki with a package of rare cigars,

saluted stiffly, and left in silence. 'I

think that the war minister came to

say goodbye,' Suzuki told an aide.

Anami went back to the warministry and conveyed the gist of

the Imperial decision. There was con-

cern among the cabinet ministers thatAnami might resign at this point,

thereby bringing down the cabinet

and wrecking measures to implementthe negotiations. Indeed, some armyofficers did recommend precisely sucha course to the war minister on the13th. But to Anami, once the Emperor

had spoken, there could be no choice

except absolute personal obedience

On the evening of the 14th, Anami andUmezu signed a painful messageradioed to all IGHQ commands, de-

signed to acquaint the army with the

background of the Imperial decision

and to exhort the forces not to take

any rash actions, which would bring

dishonor. On the 14th and 15th,

Anami, Umezu, and Yonai also in-

structed their subordinates in the

same vein, with particular stress uponthe meaning of the Imperial will. Tothe frustrated officers at headquarters,

who had promised to follow him, nomatter his course, Anami thundered,

'Anyone who disagrees now will haveto do so over my dead body !'

Meanwhile, NHK was given the

bombshell news that the Emperorhimself would address the nation onthe 15th, and would read the rescript

of capitulation over the radio. Thecabinet decided that it would be best

for the monarch to make a recording

at the Imperial household ministry.

Recording equipment was secretly

brought to the palace grounds. Thedeliberations of the cabinet, the

dragged-out countersigning of the

rescript, and an air-raid alert seriously

delayed the actual recording. Whenthe Emperor finally recited his speech,

133

the pitch was poor and a few wordswere inaudible. Tense, high-pitched,

and visibly torn by emotion, he madea second recording, and was evenready to make a third. The Imperialretainers agreed that the ordeal wastoo much to ask. The completed disks

were then hidden by a chamberlain in

an obscure safe in the Imperial house-hold ministry. The entire nation wasto listen to the broadcast at noon on15th August, without prior publicity

in the press.

The supreme test of Anami's integ-

rity was yet to come. Instead of

sanctioning the plot for a coup d'etat,

he had, after seeing Umezu on themorning of the 14th, ordered theEastern Army District commander to

reinforce security and to insure public

order. Hatanaka and Shiizaki, how-ever, would not abandon their con-

spiracy. As Takeshita later explained,

'The news of the Imperial decision

pained us severely. Although preser-

vation of the national polity had beenmade the sole condition for surrender,

disbandment of the Japanese armedforces and occupation of our home-land by foreign troops would meanthat we would be compelled to changethe national polity in whatever waythe occupation forces desired. Sincesuch a unique national polity as weenjoyed was beyond the understandingof foreign nations, there was little

doubt that the occupation forces

would eventually compel us to trans-

form it as they wished ... It wouldbe useless for the people to survivethe war if the structure of the state

itself were to be destroyed . . . Al-

though a coup would mean temporarydisobedience to the present Emperor -

a situation certainly to be avoided - to

act in compliance with the wishes of

his Imperial ancestors would consti-

tute a wider and truer loyalty to theThrone, in the final analysis . . . Trueloyalty must accompany remon-strance and exploitation . . .We decidedthat the peace faction should be over-ruled and a coup d'etat staged in orderto prevail upon the Emperor to revoke

his decision. The purpose of the pro-

jected coup d'etat was to separate theEmperor from his peace-seeking ad-

visers and persuade him to change his

mind and continue the war. It was notconsidered essential to kill the mem-bers of the peace faction. All wewanted was a military governmentwith all political power concentratedin the hands of the war minister'.

Disgusted with the speed of the'doves', around midnight on the 14th

the plotters went to Imperial GuardsDivision headquarters to try to induceDivision Commander Mori to cooper-ate. Entrusted with defense of theImperial palace and under direct

command of the Emperor, in theory,

Mori said he could never betray thesovereign's decision, whatever his

134

•

'^

Jtr^ritfr*

'Hiiiinr ^('lirilliiiiaiifjifli, ; HP

own previous views. A white-faced

Hatanaka emerged from the general's

office, pistol in hand, at about 2 am onthe 15th. 'Pardon me,' he said, 'I havedisposed of him for fear that we may-

only waste more time this way'. Morihad been talking about going to

worship at the Meiji shrine 'to help

him make up his mind'. On the floor

lay Mori and Staff Officer Shiraishi,

hacked and shot to death.

A bogus division order was thenissued over the name of Mori. Colonel

Haga, one of the guards regimentcommanders, was directed to rein-

force the defenses of the palace and to

isolate it. Haga did as ordered. Mean-while, Hatanaka and his fiery associ-

ates began a desperate search of the

Imperial household ministry for the

The Big Three : Churchill, Truman, Stalin

Emperor's fateful recording. The air-

raid alert kept the palace groundsblacked out; none of the retainers,

although some were roughed up, knewanything or would say anything. Thefrenzied search failed, and nothing

came of an isolated wild effort to air

the rebels' pleas over national radio.

When Colonel Haga learned of the

murder of Mori, he realized that the

orders had been false and he accepted

no more. Advised of these shockingdevelopments, the Eastern District

Army commander, General Tanaka,placed all of the Imperial guards

forces under his personal control andraced, alone, to the Imperial palace.

Defying any smouldering remains of

135

The first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima,6th August 1 945.

Above : Survivors flee the city. Above right : The observatory, one of the fewbuildings that withstood the blast, now a memorial. Below: The damage

*&&*»»*>

Ifilm i

•* v<

i

The Big Three in conference at Potsdam,July 1945. Clement Attlee has replaced

Winston Churchill

rebellion, he harangued the plotters

and broke up the insurrection. Byabout 8am, having restored the situa-

tion, he reported to the Throne thatthere was no need for further concernabout the incident.

Anami had already committedsuicide, in most painful fashion, dur-ing the early hours of the 15th, after

having countersigned the Imperialrescript without an overt murmur. Hefell toward the palace, which herevered. Nearby, spattered with his

blood, he left two wills. One, drawn upin his capacity as war minister, statedthat, 'With my death, I apologizehumbly to the Emperor for graveoffenses'. Shortly before he disem-boweled himself, he was told of themutiny at the palace. He said that theincident would not expand, but that hewould make apology for this disgracetoo. Anami left another farewell poemin which he said he left the worldwithout regrets, because he hadbasked in the Imperial favor. Even his

old adversary in polemics, Togo, wasdeeply moved when he heard the news.'He did commit harakiri, did he? Therewas a splendid chap'. Added Tonai,whom Anami supposedly detested,

'We've lost a very valuable man'. 'It

was as if his afflictions had conqueredhim,' Kase remarks. 'He was obviouslyin a dilemma from which it washumanly impossible to extricate him-self.'

An insurgent Imperial guards staff

officer, Major Koga, killed himself atdivision headquarters after the wakefor General Mori. On the palace plaza,

plotters Shiizaki and Hatanaka com-mitted suicide at 11.20am on the 15th.

'Beneath the molten orange middaysun,' writes a Japanese historian, 'the

grass in front of the Imperial palacewas stained with human blood andbrain; the men who resisted peacewith all their strength had foundpeace at last.'

139

Aftermath

At noon on 15th August 1945, after

being alerted since early morning, theJapanese people tuned in to a mostremarkable radio broadcast. For thefirst time in Japanese history, theEmperor's high, thin voice was heardby the multitudes. The unaccustomedlanguage was stilted and formal, andthe word 'capitulation' was nowherementioned, but it was apparent thenation was being called upon to acceptdefeat graciously and conscientiously.

Stressing the need for unity andcontinuity, the monarch was enjoin-

ing the populace to beware of out-

bursts of national emotion or 'frater-

nal contention and strife which maycreate confusion, lead ye astray andcause ye to lose the confidence of theworld'.

As Kawai says, the horrors of thefinal phase of the war had reducedmany Japanese to 'an inner state

bordering on panic'. One of Umezaki'scharacters had already become'acutely conscious of something un-seen tightening its neck around meand hemming me in'. Yet the people at

large were psychologically unpreparedfor the shattering denouement. It was

140

widely expected that the Emperorwould exhort and encourage thecountry to fight to the death with himagainst invaders from all directions.

The mass propaganda media had beenpouring forth the army's warnings of

barbarous foes bent upon rapine andpillage. A hundred million loyal andfanatical subjects would rise in supportof an 'unbroken' army and a land thathad never been conquered in war.

Proud and intensely patriotic, manyJapanese - soldiers as well as civilians- now wept unabashedly as theylistened to the Imperial rescript andrealized the hopeless truth. 'I was so

agitated that I felt unsteady on myfeet,' recalls one survivor. '.

. . scald-

ing tears suddenly streamed from myeyes ... in an endless flow. The land-

scape, through my tears, becamedistorted and disjointed. I clenched myteeth . . . fighting back the chokingsensation which rose in my thought.My mind was a confused jumble . . .

and nothing was clear any more. I did

not even know whether I was sad'.

A Japanese prisoner-of-war reacts to

the news of his country's surrender

%

•-•

***"**

Above: Foreign Minister Shigemitsu signs the surrender document. Below.

Japanese delegation discusses preliminaries at Atsugi airfield

f^WF

40

Above : Prince Konoye, one of many suicides. Be/ow:To\o's attempt to kill himselfwith a bullet in the chest failed

*'

<v

Left: 'Tokyo Rose', the American born

Japanese broadcaster, Iva Toguri, is

interviewed. Above. A soldier returns

to the makeshift home built by his

bombed-out family

Remarks another Japanese, a devoutBuddhist : 'It was neither all grief norall rejoicing, but a feeling as if gaspingfor air'. The sensitive novelist Oe,

then a ten-year-old villager, tells how'the adults sat around their radios andcried. The children gathered outside

in the dusty road and whispered their

bewilderment. We were most confusedand disappointed by the fact that theEmperor had spoken in a human voice,

no different from any adult's. None of

us understood what he was saying, butwe all had heard his voice. One of myfriends could even imitate it cleverly.

Laughing, we surrounded him - atwelve-year-old in grimy shorts whospoke with the Emperor's voice. Aminute later we felt afraid. We lookedat one another; no one spoke. How

could we believe that an augustpresence of such awful power hadbecome an ordinary human being on adesignated summer day?'

Any doubts that assailed the Jap-

anese people were dissolved when the

text of the rescript was printed in the

afternoon papers of 15th August. In

the evening, Premier Suzuki broad-

cast an appeal for solidarity behindthe Throne during this grave national

crisis, 'to restore the empire to its

proper place in the world as quickly as

possible'. The first public reactions

were shock and pain, bewildermentand disbelief. Many blamed them-selves for failing monarch andcountry. From evening on the 15th, in

Tokyo, crowds of somber subjects

trooped to the pebble-filled Imperial

plaza to bow toward the palace in

deepest reverence and atonement.Amidst sobs, some sang Kimigayo, the

national anthem. Thousands of others

flocked to the sacrosanct Meiji shrine

and to Yasukuni, the shrine for the

145

war dead, to pray and to apologize in

agonies of silence.

Some few, especially among ex-

tremists and the more junior army andnavy officers, reacted fiercely against

the national leaders whom theycondemned for bringing the land to

catastrophe. In the early hours of the

15th, gangs of soldiers and civilians

attacked and burned the residences of

high officials such as Suzuki, Hiran-

uma, and Kido. Near the heart of

Tokyo, a band of extremists seized

Atago hill, until compelled to yield onthe 22nd. All killed themselves withhand grenades. On 17th August, anarmed group of recalcitrant signal

troops from Mito came to the capital

and encamped at the Ueno art

museum. Loyal units broke up the

small scale insurgency ; whereupon the

young officers committed suicide, andthe men went back on the 20th. In

neighboring Saitama prefecture, mili-

tary prep school cadets seized trans-

mitter stations for most of a day and

interfered with broadcasts by RadioTokyo. The commandant of the schoolinduced these young diehards to give

up. Other disturbances were reportedfrom Matsue, where on 24th Augustsome forty armed civilians (led byyoungsters of twenty or less, andincluding ten women) attacked theprefectural government building andtried to storm the radio station, postoffice, power station, and newspaperoffices. Local police managed to sup-

press the dissidents. The populace did

not support these isolated and dis-

connected incidents.

More importantly, however, there

were reports of potential danger fromunits in Kyushu (where masses of

ground and air defenders were waitingto meet an invasion) and from the

Atsugi air base near Tokyo (whereAllied occupation forces were expectedby 26th August). Although all aerial

operations were to have been sus-

pended as from the 14th, Vice-AdmiralUgaki, the 5th Air Fleet commander,

>*

5e/ow7eff: Symbol of surrender: thousands of Japanese swords are cut in half and

melted down. Above: Invader becomes tourist. Below: Life in a bombed city

• Sj*&

defied the surrender rescript and led

an unauthorized suicide sortie byeleven planes against enemy shippingin the Okinawa region. No aircraft

returned. At Oita airdrome, Ugaki'ssuccessor promptly separated units

from weapons. Hotheaded naval air

force elements at Atsugi took off anddropped inflammatory leaflets de-

manding continuation of hostilities.

The surrender proclamation, theyclaimed, was not the true will of theEmperor but the work of traitors.

Eighty-three officers and noncomsrefused to obey further orders ; there-

upon the authorities ordered the fuel

tanks drained and the propellers

removed. But despite personal appeals

by a royal prince and other senior

officers, the rebels managed to com-mandeer twenty-three planes and fly

to Saitama prefecture, where they

Left : Banknotes are counted during post-

war inflation. Below : Fraternization,

which often led to marriage

9* 1111

hoped to incite army air units to

support them. Not until 25th August,at the 'eleventh hour,' did all of thediehards surrender.While a relatively few Japanese thus

broke under the strain and soughtrecourse in violence, others foundrelease, expiation, or 'safety' in sui-

cide. Shortly after General Anamicommitted ceremonial suicide earlyon the 15th, the vice-chief of NGS andorganizer of the first kamikaze special-

attack units, Admiral Onishi, killed

himself. Suicides by other high-rank-ing military and civil officials con-tinued from August into the autumnand winter : the Eastern District Armycommander, General Tanaka, on 24thAugust; Marshal and Mrs Sugiyama,on 12th September; General Honjo, on20th November; Prince Konoye, on16th December. Tojo bungled a suicide

attempt when American militarypolice came to arrest him on 11th

September. According to one Japaneseestimate, more than a thousand

i

A»0|

.; te.. r

*****"

%JMajor Koga Major Hatanaka

Shigenori Togo Baron Hiranuma

Hiroshi Shimomura Admiral Toyoda

Chamberlain Irie Hisatsune Sakomizu

officers and men had committed sui-

cide by the end of summer ; there wereseveral instances of mass suicide bymembers of patriotic and nationalistic

societies. According to the records of

national police headquarters, 27,048

men and women were reported to havekilled themselves in 1945 and 1946, of

whom 5,102 gave 'disillusionment withlife' as their reason.The overwhelming majority of the

weary and bewildered Japanese people,

however, greeted the news of war'send with dull apathy and shockeddisillusionment, accepting the inevit-

able with a confused resignationbordering on spiritual paralysis. Atthe individual level, air-raid survivorsreacted with private relief that thebombings had ended, that the blackoutwas over, that uninterrupted nights of

sleep would now be possible. Thenovelist Kawabata calls it a period'when time itself had died, had beenlost; when people were caught in theturmoil of seeing their national andindividual past, present and future

confused and disorganized. For manyit was like being engulfed by a frenzied

whirlpool'. The forlorn scenery ap-

palled the senses: the sour scorchedsmell of ruins, the oppressive stillness,

the petrified landscape of doom, thegarish rust that daubed tangledscraps of metal left from a city mademostly of wood. Describing the un-recognizable and misshapen face of

once-beautiful Tokyo, a Japanesewriter noted that 'the limitless acres

of ruin seemed to spread everywhere,like a desert, in a drab and monoto-nous panorama of hopelessness'. Katoobserves that, 'instead of the industri-

ous activity usually to be seen in thestreets of Tokyo . . . there were every-where idle groups of people, huddlingtogether in the ruins of a once greatcity, watching the sky and the passers-

by, waiting for what might happennext . . . Tears were soon over. Therewere only vacant, dull stares for manydays'.

In this atmosphere of apathy andgloom, Prince Higashikuni replaced

Suzuki as premier on 17th August.Beset by numerous and highly critical

problems, the new government pos-

sessed only the advantages ofJapaneseresiliency and loyalty to the Emperor.The latter reassured the populacethat, 'having been able to safeguardand maintain the structure of theImperial state, We are always with ye,

Our good and loyal subjects, relying

upon your sincerity and integrity'.

IGHQ promptly advised all senior field

commanders that, in accordance withthe Imperial will, it was imperativethat all forces 'act in such a way that

no dishonor shall be brought to their

glorious traditions and splendid re-

cord of meritorious services, and thatfuture generations of our race shall be

deeply impressed'.

Effective measures taken by the

Japanese High Command thwartedany hopes by cliques of conspirators

that unified military rejection of thecapitulation was still possible. Therewould occur isolated and potentially

serious instances of army and navydefiance of the central authorities'

will, but the command was able to

maintain discipline by drawing uponthe traditional sense of fealty to the

Throne. Thus the ugliest eventualities

were avoided, despite popular nervous-ness and military displeasure. Widelyheard was the rallying cry, 'Reverent

obedience to the rescript'. In the home-land, the government formed a central

liaison office to handle prospective

relations with the Allied forces of

occupation. Reception committeeswere established at the points whereoccupation elements were expected to

land. The advance party of Americanslanded by air at Atsugi on the morningof 28th August. General DouglasMacArthur flew in on the 30th. At 9amon 2nd September, the definitive

instrument of surrender was signed

without difficulty aboard USS Missouri

anchored in Tokyo bay. As one hist-

orically sensitive Japanese observer

Correspondents inspect a haul of

diamonds found by the occupying forces

152

wrote, 'The fleet eerily resembledPerry's "black ships" which openedJapan almost a century ago'.

Clausewitz's 'worst condition' wasnow real for defeated Nippon.By the summer of 1945, Japan

presented an ambivalent and frac-

tionalized picture. On the surface, thearmy chiefs and certain civilian lead-

ers still spoke of death-defying holywar by a resolute 100,000,000 subjects

wielding staves and bamboo spears.

Thought police hounded and terror-

ized individuals suspected ofharboringpeace-mongering views. Still, as theEmperor had already sensed - andintimated- Japanese intentions did

not all accord with Japanese capa-bilities by now. 'Last battle' meantjust that. Since the Japanese armyknew fundamentally that the overall

fortunes of the war could not bereversed, their concept contained themeaning of a glorious last farewell. Asthe chief of staff of the Twelfth AreaArmy admitted later, the decisive

homeland battle might well haveproved to be nothing more than 'sandcastles' symbolized by the crumblingdefenses at Kujukurihama beach.Nevertheless, the specter of 'dis-

graceful' unconditional surrender andof the feared impairment of thenational polity led to protraction ofthe war into the essentially unneces-sary disasters of August 1945. Theattitude toward safeguarding of thecountry's identity is described byKido: 'I knew very well that, at thatstage, it was impossible to guaranteethe security of the Imperial family andthe protection of the national struc-ture, even by seeking to negotiatepeace terms. But, although Japancould survive even on republicanprinciples, continuity and traditionwere vital. We must avoid generatingturmoil at war's end; for this reason,the Imperial institution had to bemaintained. This point had to beemphasized even after surrender . . .

Still, I must confess that I was terribly

anxious about how the Allied powerswould view the need for upholding thenational polity. Would our chances befifty-fifty? . . . The army and the navyseemed to be resisting, out of ob-stinacy . .

.'

The conclusion is inescapable thatthe will to resist on the part of theJapanese political leaders collapsedwell before the will of the people as a

whole, but that the chiefs were un-willing or unable to move too far

ahead of public opinion. His Maj-esty was not unaware of the problemsof the 'doves' versus the 'hawks'.

Much later, he told a senior chamber-lain that, if the subject of peace hadbeen mentioned publicly in the midstof the hostilities, the country wouldhave been torn by civil war, withconsequences much more disastrousthan those of the mutiny of 1936. Thechamberlain says that, at the time, hepersonally believed that anyone whoeven mentioned the word 'peace,'

would have been killed immediatelyby the military, no matter who hewas, statesman or soldier. Hence theEmperor's wish to stop the war hadto be nurtured covertly, and his innerdistress was profound. Only Kido hassaid that the sovereign discussed thesubject of peace, in so many words,with him privately; but even theLord Keeper, it will be recalled, wasnot known publicly as a 'dove'.

We do know that a surprisingnumber of important Japanese leaders

and officers were well acquaintedwith the realities of a catastrophicsituation, but dared not voice their

true sentiments openly. Some officials

were of the opinion that 'to say whatwe thought would have been to cut off

our noses to spite our faces'. Othersfelt that 'our mouths could not speakwhat our "stomachs" felt; had we laid

bare our hearts and revealed our firmbeliefs, we would never have beenable to achieve our goal of peace'. Yetinwardly, as Kawai has put it, 'al-

though traditional controls largelystifled overt expressions of defeatism,the horrors of the last few months of

the war had reduced many of theJapanese to an inner state borderingon panic . . . They were disillusioned,

demoralized, and paralyzed'. Japan'sde facto defeat was manifested by thehundreds of thousands of homelessand hungry urban survivors, squattingin shanties put together from therubble of air raids, or sleeping in trainstations or under trestles. The coun-

Allied prisoners of war, looking

remarkably well-fed, celebrate their

liberation

try's pygmy economy was prostrateand the prospects bleak, while thenoose of the air and sea blockade greweven tighter, and full-scale invasionwas expected momentarily.What part did the nuclear weapons

play in Japan's decision to end thewar? A lieutenant-colonel in the warministry says that 'the members of

the Imperial family appeared to havebeen shaken extremely by the atomicbomb. We presumed these facts greatlyinfluenced the minds of the advocatesof peace'. The very well placed director

of the AGS intelligence bureau,General Arisue, judges that 'the final

victory would have been in the handsof the American army even withoutthe atomic bomb. However, if the fear

of atomic warfare had not existed andif Japan had had a strong will to fight

until the end, I believe the Americaninvasion of Japan proper could havebeen repulsed once. If a fatal blowcould have been inflicted upon theAmerican army in this one invasionand thereby have caused a breakdownin the war spirit of the Americanpeople, the Japanese could have metthe end of the war with a reasonableadvantage. However, this problem is

considered without the existence of

the atomic bomb'.It required a heterogeneous and

complicated constellation of nativetalents - from Suzuki to Togo to Yonaiand, of course, Anami - to combinesomehow to save Japan from the com-plete catastrophe promised her byGeneral Curtis Le May: 'We had twoor three weeks of work left on thecities, a bit more to do on precision

targets, and were just getting started

on transportation. Another six

months and Japan would have beenbeaten back into the dark ages . .

.'

Even the Japanese have called thetermination of the war a kind of

euthanasia, a merciful end to the

visible pain and the secret fears.

154

Dramatis Personae

The term Imperial Prince refers to the younger brothers of the Emperor;the term Royal Prince is used for Princes of the Blood. After the warthe Royal Princes all became commoners, leaving only the close ImperialFamily, including the Imperial Princes, with rank.AKIHITO, CROWN PRINCE: First son of Emperor; born December 1933.

ANAMI, GENERAL KORECHIKA: Born 1887; War Minister, 7th April-

15th August 1945.

ARAO, COLONEL OKIKATSU: Chief Military Affairs Section, War Ministry.ARISUE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SEIZO: Director, Intelligence Bureau,AGS, August 1942- ; Lieutenant General from March 1945.

BAGGE, WIDAR: Swedish Minister to Japan, March 1937-.

FUJIWARA, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL IWAICHI: Served in Malaya andBurma operations; final post Senior Staff Officer, Fifty-Seventh Army,West Japan.GREW, JOSEPH C: American Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942;

then Under Secretary of State and/or Acting Secretary of State to 1945.

HATA, FIELD-MARSHAL SHUNROKU: Commander in Chief, SecondGeneral Army, Hiroshima from 1945.

HATANAKA, MAJOR KENJI: Military Affairs Section, Ministry of War.HATTORI, COLONEL TAKUSHIRO: Chief, Operations Section, AGS, October1

1943; Commander 65th Infantry Regiment, China, from February 1945.

HAYASHI, COLONEL SABURO: Military Secretary to Minister of WarAnami, April 1945-.

HIGASHIKUNI, PRINCE: General; born 1887; Commander in Chief, GeneralDefence Command, December 1941; Councillor of State, April 1945;

Prime Minister, August 1945.

HIRANUMA, BARON KI'ICHIRO: President, Privy Council, 1936-1939 and5th April-14th December 1945.

HIROHITO, EMPEROR; born 1901; son of Emperor Taisho; married 1924

Princess Nagako Kuni; Regent 1921-1926; succeeded 1926.

HIROTA, KOKI : Senior Statesman ; Foreign Minister, 1933-1936,

1937-1938; Prime Minister 1936-1937.

HONJO, GENERAL SHIGERU: Commanding General, Kwantung Army,August 1931-August 1932; Chief Imperial Aide de Camp, April 1933-April 1936.

IBUSE, MASUJI: Novelist; born 1898.

IDA, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MASATAKA: Military Affairs Section,

Ministry of War.IIMURA, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JO: Commander, Tokyo Defence Army,June 1945, and Commander, Tokyo Divisional District, July 1945.

156

IKEDA, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SUMIHISA: Director, Combined PlanningBoard, July 1945.

INABA, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MASAO: Military Affairs Section, Ministry

of War.INOGUCHI, CAPTAIN (UN) RIKIHEI: Air Staff Officer, Naval General Staff.

ISHIWARA, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL KANJI: Commander, 16th Division,

September 1939-March 1941 ; retired thereafter.

KASE, TOSHIKAZU: Foreign Ministry diplomat; section chief, Bureau of

American Affairs; Secretary to Togo and to Shigemitsu during their Foreign

Ministerships ;postwar Ambassador to United Nations.

KATO, MASUO: Domei News Agency correspondent.

KAWABE, GENERAL MASAKAZU: Commissioned 1907; full General, March1945; Commander Air General Army, April 1945.

KAWABE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL TORASHIRO: Commissioned 1912;

Deputy Chief of Army General Staff, April 1945-.

KAWAI, KAZUO: prewar UCLA professor; Editor, Nippon Times, 1941-1949.

KAYA, PRINCE: born 1900; older brother of Princes Higashikuni andAsaka; Lieutenant-General 1943.

KIDO, MARQUIS KOICHI: born 1889; Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal,

June 1940-.

KOISO, GENERAL KUNIAKI: born 1880; commissioned 1901; General 1937;

Prime Minister, with Yonai, July 1944-April 1945.

KONOYE, PRINCE FUMIMARO: born 1891; Prime Minister, June 1937-

January 1939, July 1940-July 1941, July-October 1941.

KOZUKI, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL KIYOSHI: Commander First Army,North China, August 1937-July 1938.

LOZOVSKY, SOLOMON : Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs under Molotov.

MAKINO, COUNT NOBUAKI: born 1861; Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal,

1925-1935.

MALIK, YAKOV G: Soviet Ambassador to Japan, 1942-1945;

postwar delegate to United Nations Security Council and Ambassador to

Great Britain.

MATSUDAIRA, MARQUIS YASUMASA: Chief Secretary to Lord Keeper of

the Privy Seal Kido.

MATSUMOTO, SHUN'ICHI: born 1897; Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,

May 1945-.

MATSUTANI, COLONEL MAKOTO: Chief, War Direction Section, AGS,October 1943-July 1944; ADC to War Ministers Sugiyama and Anami;First Private Secretary to Prime Minister Suzuki, April 1945-.

157

Dramatis Personae

MAZAKI, GENERAL JINSABURO: born 1876; General, 1933; Inspector-General, January 1934-July 1935; retired March 1936.

MIKASA, PRINCE Lieutenant-Colonel: born 1915, fourth son of

Emperor Taisho.MIYAZAKI, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SHU'ICHI: Director, OperationsBureau, AGS, December 1944-.

MOLOTOV, VYACHESLAV: Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

MORI, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL TAKESHI: Commander, 1st ImperialGuards Division. April 1945-.

MUTO, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL AKIRA: Chief, Military Affairs Bureau,War Ministry, September 1939-April 1942; Chief of Staff to Yamashita,Fourteenth Area Army, Philippines, October 1944.

NAGANO, FLEET ADMIRAL OSAMI: Chief of Naval General Staff, April1941-February 1944.

NASHIMOTO, PRINCE: born 1874; Field-Marshal, 1932; Chief Priest of GrandShrines of Ise, 1937-.

OBATA, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BINSHIRO: Director, OperationsBureau, AGS, 1932; Deputy Commandant, Army War College, 1935-1936;

retired 1936.

OBATA, COLONEL KAZUYOSHI: Supply Staff Officer, Eighteenth ArmyNovember 1942-April 1944.

OKADA, ADMIRAL KEISUKE: Prime Minister, July 1934-March 1936.

OKIDO, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SANJI: Commander, Military PoliceForces, October 1944-.

SAKOMIZU, HISATSUNE: Chief Cabinet Secretary to Suzuki, April 1945-.

SATO, NAOTAKE: Ambassador to USSR, February 1942-.

SHIBAYAMA, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL KANESHIRO: Vice Minister of WarAugust 1944-July 1945; concurrently Chief, Logistics GHQ, May-July 1945;

sole Chief of latter from July 1945.

SHIGEMITSU, MAMORU: Foreign Minister, April 1943-July 1944 (Tojo),

July 1944-April 1945 (Koiso), August-October 1945 (Higashikuni).SHIIZAKI, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JIRO: Military Affairs Section,War Ministry.SHIMORUA, HIROSHI: State Minister under Suzuki, April 1945-.

SHIODA, SHOBEI: Professor of Economics, Tokyo Municipal University.SOONG, TV: Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister.SUGIYAMA, FIELD-MARSHAL GENERAL: War Minister, July 1944-April1945, under Koiso ; Commander, First General Army, April 1945-.

158

SUZUKI, ADMIRAL KANTARO: born 1867; Admiral 1923; Senior ImperialAide de Camp, January 1929-March 1936; President, Privy Council, 10thAugust 1944-5th April 1945; Prime Minister, April-August 1945; died 1948.

TAKAGI, REAR ADMIRAL SOKICHI: Chief, Naval Training Bureau,March-September 1944.

TAKAMATSU, PRINCE: born 1905, third son of Emperor Taisho; Captain(UN) 1942.

TAKESHITA, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MASAHIKO: Military Affairs

Section, War Ministry.

TANAKA, GENERAL SHIZU'ICHI: Commander, Eastern Army District,

March 1945-.

TERAUCHI, FIELD-MARSHAL HISA'ICHI: Commander-in-Chief,Southern Army, November 1941-.

TOGO, SHIGENORI: Foreign Minister, October 1941-September 1942 (Tojo);

April-August 1945 (Suzuki).

TOJO, GENERAL HIDEKI: born 1884; Prime Minister (and War Minister,

etc.), October 1941-July 1944.

TOYODA, ADMIRAL SOEMU: Chief of Naval General Staff, May 1945-.

UGAKI, VICE-ADMIRAL MATOME: Commander, 5th Air Fleet,

February 1945-.

UMEZAKI, HARUO: Novelist; born 1915, died 1965; author of

SAKURAJIMA.UMEZU, GENERAL YOSHIJIRO: Chief of Army General Staff, July 1944-.

USHIROKU, GENERAL JUN: Senior Deputy Chief of Army General Staff,

February-July 1944; Commander, Third Area Army, Kwantung Army,August 1944-.

WAINWRIGHT, GENERAL JONATHAN: successor to General MacArthur in

the Philippines, surrendered 1942.

WAKATSUKI, BARON REIJIRO: Prime Minister, January 1926-April 1927,

April-December 1931.

YAMASHITA, GENERAL TOMOYUKI (HOBUN): Commander, FourteenthArea Army, Philippines, September 1944-.

YONAI, ADMIRAL MITSUMASA: Co-Premier with Koiso, and NavyMinister, July 1944-April 1945; Navy Minister again under Higashikuni,August-October 1945.

YOSHIDA, SHIGERU: Ambassador to Great Britain, April 1936-March 1939;

Foreign Minister, September-December 1945; Prime Minister, May 1946-

December 1954.

159

Bibliography

Midway: the battle that doomed Japan; the Japanese Navy's story M Fuchida andM Okumiya (Hutchinson, London. US Naval Institute, Annapolis)Mother and Son; a Japanese correspondence I Hatano (Chatto and Windus,London. Houghton and Mifflin, Boston)Kogun : the Japanese army in the Pacific War S Hayashi and A D Coox (USMarine Corps Association, Quantico, Virginia)

Black RainM Ibuse (Kodansha International, Tokyo and Palo Alto,

California)

The Divine Wind R Inoguchi, T Nakajima and R Pineau (US Naval Institute,

Annapolis)The End of the Imperial Japanese NavyM Ito and R Pineau (Norton, New York)Journey to the Missouri T Kase (Yale University, New Haven)Eclipse of the Rising Sun T Kase (J Cape, London)The Lost War: a Japanese reporter's inside story M Kato (Knopf, New York)Japan's American InterludeK Kawai (University of Chicago, London and Chicago)Zero! M Okumiya, J Hirokoshi andM Caidin (Dutton, New York)The Zero FighterM Okumiya, J Hirokoshi andM Caidin (Cassell, London)Japan's Longest Day Pacific War Research Society (Souvenir Press, London.Kodansha International, Tokyo and Palo Alto, California)

The Shadow ofSunrise edited by S Saeki (Kodansha International, Tokyoand Palo Alto. Ward Lock Educational, London)Japan and her Destiny: my struggle for peaceM Shigemitsu (Hutchinson, LondonDutton, New York)The Cause ofJapan S Togo (Simon and Schuster, New York)Japan's Decision to Surrender R J C Butow (Oxford University Press, London.Stanford University Press, California)

Hirohito, Emperor ofJapan L Mosley (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London.Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey)

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Ravaged by firebombs and torn by her efforts

to provide the manpower, munitions and food

to mount a sufficient force to repulse the

American invasion, war-weary japan was

determined still to fight - with bamboo spears

in the hands of old men if necessary - but

finally her leaders knew the truth: japan had

to capitulate or be annihilated.

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History of World Wor