Jan Opsomer - Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter

Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter(De mal subs 30-7)1

JAN OPSOMER

ABSTRACT

In De malorum subsistentia chs 30-7 Proclus criticizes the view that evil is tobe identi ed with matter His main target is PlotinusOtilde account in Enn I8 [51]Proclus denies that matter is the cause of evil in the soul and that it is evil ora principle of evil According to Proclus matter is good because it is producedby the One PlotinusOtilde doctrine of matter-evil is the result of a different concep-tion of emanation according to which matter does not revert to its principleProclus claims that to posit a principle of evil either amounts to a coarse dual-ism or makes the Good ultimately responsible for evil Plotinus does not seemto be able to escape the latter consequence if he is to remain committed to theNeoplatonic conception of causation Plotinus equated matter with privation andsaid it is a kind of non-being that is the contrary of substance thus violating fun-damental Aristotelian tenets Proclus reinstates Aristotelian orthodoxy as doesSimplicius in his Commentary on the Categories It is possible that Iamblichuswas the source of both Proclus and Simplicius and that he was the originator ofthe parhypostasis theory and the inventor of the anti-Plotinian arguments

When Proclus in De malorum subsistentia2 criticizes PlotinusOtilde views onmatter-evil he is speci cally referring to Ennead I8 [51] known underthe Porphyrian title On what are and whence come evils It is a text that

copy Koninklijke Brill NV Leiden 2001 Phronesis XLVI2

1 My warmest thanks go to Christopher Preston for help with the English I amindebted to those who heard versions of this paper given in London Leeds andLeuven and especially to K Algra D Runia J Mansfeld D OOtildeMeara C Rowe R Sharples A Sheppard R Sorabji C Steel H Tarant and G Van Riel I acknowl-edge the support of the following institutions The Fund for Scienti c Research-Flanders (Belgium) The Institute of Philosophy of the KU Leuven the Institute ofClassical Studies London KingOtildes College London The University of South Carolina

2 For De malorum subsistentia (hence DMS) I have used the edition by H BoeseProcli Diadochi Tria Opuscula (De providentia libertate malo) Latine Guilelmo deMoerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collectaed H Boese (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie 1) Berolini 1960Line numbers are to BoeseOtildes Latin text even when I refer to the corresponding wordsfrom the Greek parallel texts Translations are mine and C SteelOtildes Our translation ofthe entire text is forthcoming in R SorabjiOtildes Ancient Commentators series The pre-sent paper will show among other things why it is a good idea to include DMS in aseries of commentaries on Aristotle

PROCLUS VS PLOTINUS ON MATTER (DE MAL SUBS 30-7) 155

Proclus knew well3 as he was the author of a commentary of the Enneadsnow lost in which he must have paid special attention to the problem of evil4

It is commonly understood that when Proclus in the De malorum sub-sistentia criticizes the view that matter is the principle of evil he isaddressing the view of Plotinus Yet Proclus nowhere in the entire trea-tise on evil explicitly mentions his predecessor Indeed he refers to noneof his predecessors by name (except Plato and the interlocutors of the dia-logues) However there can be no doubt that Plotinus is ProclusOtilde maintarget This is demonstrated by the numerous passages in which Proclusparaphrases and sometimes quotes almost literally from Ennead I85 It iscon rmed by the parallel text in Simplicius where Plotinus is explicitlymentioned in a strikingly similar context (cf sect XIV) When we lookat the text more closely it becomes clear that throughout ProclusOtilde entiresection on matter (and privation) PlotinusOtilde presence is constantly felt inthe background This does not mean that when Proclus polemicizes against

3 JM Rist (OcircBasilOtildes OgraveNeoplatonismOacute Its Background and NatureOtilde Basil ofCaesarea Christian Humanist Ascetic A Sixteen-Hundredth Anniversary Symposiumedited by Paul J Fedwick Toronto 1981 137-220 and esp 137-79) has cast doubton the assumption that PorphyryOtildes edition of the Enneads (presumably 301 AD)became widely available soon after its publication He links PlotinusOtilde comparativelyslight in uence ndash in the East as well as the West ndash during the fourth century to hissurmise that PorphyryOtildes edition was hardly known or available from about 324 untilthe last quarter of the century Probably only a few copies of a very small number ofworks circulated However by the time of Proclus Athens was equipped with goodphilosophical libraries cf HD Saffrey and LG Westerink Proclus Th ologie pla-tonicienne Livre I (CUF) Paris 1968 xlviii Proclus wrote a commentary on theEnneads which proves that he had a Porphyrian edition at his disposal See the fol-lowing note

4 This can be inferred from a scholion to in Remp 13723 (237110-18 Kroll) thescholiast who is obviously well-informed is referring to other texts where Proclus dis-cusses evil DMS (tograve mcentn currenn tOgrave perUuml tdegw tCcediln kakCcediln ecircpostlsaquosevw monobUcircblAuml) a com-mentary on the speech of Diotima a commentary on Theaetetus 176A and a com-mentary on the third () Ennead OcircWhence come evilsOtilde (kaUuml currenn toYacutew eTHORNw tmacrn trUcircthncurrennnelsaquoda pntildeyen tŒ kaklsaquo) P Henry (ƒtudes plotiniennes I Les ƒtats du texte de PlotinParis-Bruges 1961 [= 1938] 8 n) suggests reading prAringthn for trUcircthn R Beutler (seebelow) considers this emendation unnecessary pointing out that the reference couldbe to Enn III2-3 [47-8] PerUuml pronoUcircaw ProclusOtilde comments on the Enneads (not nec-essarily a full-blown commentary on all of them) are further mentioned in a few otherplaces See R Beutler OcircProklos 4 NeuplatonikerOtilde RE 45 Hb (XXIII-1) 1957 1984-52 LG Westerink OcircExzerpte aus ProklosOtilde Enneaden-Kommentar bei PsellosOtildeByzantinische Zeitschrift 52 1959 1-10

5 The opening phrase and rst chapter of DMS unmistakably echo the Porphyriantitle and the rst chapter of PlotinusOtilde text Other parallels are pointed out below

156 JAN OPSOMER

the identi cation of matter and evil he has only Plotinus in mind to theexclusion of others Chapters 30 to 39 indeed amount to a refutation ofthe general view that matter is evil6 For instance the dilemma formulatedin chapter 31 (cf sect VIII) is clearly intended as a refutation of everypossible doctrine that makes matter the principle of evil one horn of thedilemma addresses more primitive views which are quickly dismissed the other horn is directed at a Plotinian-type doctrine and its discussioncontains again some obvious allusions to Plotinus So although Proclusintends his arguments to be valid against anyone who attributes evil to matter or even makes matter the source of all evil the details of hisarguments are often too speci c to be related to anyone other thanPlotinus This is most noticeably the case in ProclusOtilde discussion of priva-tion and contrariety

Before we take a closer look at ProclusOtilde criticism of Plotinus I brie ysummarize the latterOtildes views on matter and evil as they can be derivedfrom Enn I8 [51] and II4 [12] On matter I follow the interpretation ofD OOtildeBrien 7 with whom I would hesitate to disagree but who in any caseseems to me to have got things right His interpretation is for the mostpart also that of D OOtildeMeara8

6 S Menn (Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 141998 [1999] 104) is of course right when he points out that Proclus starts from strongassumptions ie from a speci cally Neoplatonic frame-work (OgraveThus the argumentsthat evil does not exist proceed on the assumption that all causality proceeds top-downwith each thing being produced by a higher principle and striving to OcircreturnOtilde to thathigher principle and that all beings proceed ultimately from a single rst principle agood beyond beingOacute) DMS is indeed not written for people who do not accept thefundamental tenets of the school Herein lie the limitations but also the value of thistext it addresses an audience sharing a philosophical language and a common back-ground thus considerably reducing the chance of talking at cross-purposes And atleast Plotinians could be expected to share ProclusOtilde basic premisses However as Iwill show the divergences of views on evil may be reduced to or rather may beexplainable by different conceptions of the process of emanation (I refrain from mak-ing any assertions about what came rst in the development of PlotinusOtilde views hisgeneral metaphysics including the details concerning the nal stages of the processionor his theory of evil for which some invoke existential explanations ndash I even doubtwhether that would be a useful question at all)

7 Esp OcircPlotinus on Evil A study of matter and the soul in PlotinusOtilde conception ofhuman evilOtilde Le N oplatonisme Royaumont 9-13 juin 1969 (Colloques Internationauxdu Centre National de la Recherche Scienti que Sciences humaines) Paris 1971 113-46 Plotinus on the Origin of Matter An Exercise in the Interpretation of the EnneadsNapoli 1991 Th odic e plotinienne th odice gnostique (Philosophia antiqua 57)Leiden ndash New York ndash Kšln 1993 OcircLa mati re chez Plotin son origine sa natureOtildePhronesis 44 1999 45-71

8 D OOtildeMeara OcircDas Bšse bei Plotin (Enn I8)Otilde Platon in der abendlŠndischen


I

1 According to Plotinus matter is produced by a soul more speci callyby a partial soul which is itself an image of the higher soul and is saidto be OgravesensationOacute and Ogravethe nature which is found in plantsOacute9 By generat-ing an image of itself this lower manifestation of soul produces the non-being which is matter10 Yet the generation of matter in no way impliesany evil on the part of soul When the soul produces matter-evil it doesso in all innocence The production of matter is merely due to an imper-fection proper to the nature of the soul and an imperfection in itself doesnot yet amount to being positively evil This constitutes a crucial differ-ence from Gnostic doctrine on the origin of matter11

2 The product matter is evil as such the principle of evil For matter isOgraveunmeasuredness in comparison with measure unlimited in comparisonwith limit formless in comparison with formative principle in perpetualneed in comparison with the self-suf cient always unde ned nowhere sta-ble subject to every kind of in uence insatiate complete povertyOacute (I8[51] 313-16) These characteristics are not incidental but in a sense makeup the nature of evil insofar as each part of evil will have all of the char-acteristics of evil and other things will have any of these characteristicsthrough participation For these reasons it may be considered a nature ofits own and the properties which Plotinus has summed up truly are itscharacteristics (330-32) In this way Plotinus says reason will have reachedthe substance of evil if indeed there can be such a thing as a substanceof evil (eagrave tiw kaUuml daelignatai kakoegrave oeacutesUcirca eaumlnai) the rst evil the per se evil(kakograven prCcedilton kaUuml kayƒ aecirctograve kakntilden 338-40)

3 Once matter is there it can cause evil in the soul when the latter comesdown a second time in its endeavour to invest matter with form andbecomes fascinated by what it has generated12 In order for the soul tobecome evil two conditions need to be ful lled a certain weakness mustbe present in the soul and the soul needs to be in contact with matter and

Geistesgeschichte ed by Th Kobusch and B Mojsisch Darmstadt 1997 33-47Plotin Trait 51 I 8 (Les ƒcrits de Plotin) Paris 1999

9 V2 [11] 118-2110 Cf III9 [13] 3 III4 [15] 1 OOtildeBrien Plotinus on the Origin of Matter 16-18

Th odic e plotinienne 19-2711 Cf OOtildeBrien OcircPlotinus on EvilOtilde 128 Th odice plotinienne 31 3512 See also V1 [10] 117-19 when matter becomes the object of fascination the

soul by pursuing it in a sense confesses its inferiority to the thing pursued

158 JAN OPSOMER

undergo the latterOtildes negative in uence Matter and weakness are thus partcauses of evil in the soul The presence of matter is not enough to pro-duce evil in the soul nor is the soulOtildes weakness for to be weak is not yetto be evil it is just a necessary condition for the soul to be affected byevil Only jointly do matter and weakness constitute a suf cient cause forvice Yet they are not part causes in the same sense as matter is evilitself whether or not the soul is weak so as to be affected by it Howeveran extra observation needs to be made without matter the soul would notbe weak So rst matter causes weakness though not necessarily so andthen matter and weakness together produce evil in the soul In otherwords matter is Ograveboth the cause of weakness in the soul and the cause ofviceOacute (igravelh toUcircnun kaUuml syeneUcircaw cuxraquo aTHORNtUcirca kaUuml kakUcircaw aTHORNtUcirca I8 [51]1449-50)13 Even the fact that the soul itself produced matter and sub-sequently descends to it does not mean that matter is not the cause ofevil Despite the soulOtildes descent and despite the fact that the soul actuallyproduced matter so that it is indirectly the cause for its own downfall14

we must still maintain that matter remains the cause of evil matter is evil rst and the rst evil (prntildeteron ra kakmacr aeacutetmacr kaUuml prCcedilton kakntilden I8 [51]1450-1)15

13 Not every contact with matter makes the soul do bad things only too intimate arelation has this result that is when the soul is dragged by its own enthusiasm andovereagerness Cf IV8 [6] 79-10 OOtildeBrien OcircPlotinus on EvilOtilde 131 Th odice plo-tinienne 48

14 Cf OOtildeBrien OcircPlotinus on the Origin of MatterOtilde 22 n 2715 I fail to see how C SchŠfer (OcircDas Dilemma der neuplatonischen Theodizee

Versuch einer LšsungOtilde Archiv fŸr Geschichte der Philosophie 82 2000 20-3 31-2)could reconcile these texts with his claim that for Plotinus matter is not evil in actuAccording to SchŠfer evils come about only when matter and soul meet The textquoted by SchŠfer (p 21) to prove that it is not matterOtildes nature but its effects on thesoul which make it the opposite of the Good seems to me to show the opposite currenjntiyiexcltvn suniexclsthke kaUuml tŒ currennantUcirca poieYacute (I8 [51] 658-9) suggests that its Beschaffenheitis logically prior to its activity (kaUuml tŒ currennantUcirca poieYacute seems to follow from the thingOtildesconstitution) oeacutex Atilde pointilden ti does not imply that matter is not evil in what-it-is-to-be-matter Plotinus wants to make clear that matter is evil because it has no positivedeterminations it is not something quali ed (cf 1012-16) Yet it has pseudo-charac-teristics (lack of determination lack of measure lack of form) that constitute itsessence Ograveas it wereOacute (34-5 12-22 30-2) A more careful approach can be seen in J-M Narbonne La m taphysique de Plotin (Bibliothque de lOtildehistoire de la philosophie)Paris 1994 130 and esp J-F Balaud OcircLe traitement plotinien de la question dumal thique ou ontologiqueOtilde Les Cahiers Philosophiques de Strasbourg 8 1999 68Ogravela mati re est au point de vue ontologique le principe du mal mais le champ devalidit de ce principe est thiqueOacute


II

PlotinusOtilde solution of the problem of evil certainly has merits from a Neo-platonic perspective Above all he wanted to avoid making the primaryhypostases responsible for evil without allowing any kind of dualism toenter his philosophy These two concerns indeed characterize his solution

1 By carefully distinguishing weakness of the soul and evil Plotinus doesnot make the soul alone responsible for its vice Only the combination of weakness in the soul and the alluring presence of matter constitute asuf cient cause for evil What is more the soulOtildes weakness is in its turncaused by matter

2 Plotinus argues for the subtle position that matter is evil itself and theonly source of evil yet is not an independent principle on equal footingwith the One matter is generated by something else If indeed evil isentirely due to one source matter and the good cannot be held responsi-ble for its existence Plotinus seems to get away with a paradoxical com-bination of dualistic and monistic ideas16 Or does he Plotinus desper-ately wants to be a monist yet by making all evils dependent on oneprinciple whose nature and effects are the complete opposite of those ofthe supreme principle he cannot escape sounding like a dualist Howeverif a soul produces the principle of evil evil will never constitute a threatto the supremacy of the good as it will never be a true principle nor evenraise itself to the level of soul let alone to the higher levels17 The hier-archy thus remains intact

The reason why matter is evil is that it is the last degree in the onto-logical hierarchy lower than which it is not possible to descend It is thedegree of least possible perfection in other words of greatest possibleimperfection With matter the process has reached a stage where some-thing is produced that is of itself incapable of returning to its principle Itcannot even truly receive the forms that soul tries to impose on it It isimportant to remark that the gradual loss of perfection that characterizes

16 Compare Narbonne La m taphysique de Plotin 14717 OOtildeBrien OcircPlotinus on EvilOtilde 144 Th odic e plotinienne 48-9 OgraveLa mati re est

pour Plotin le Ocircnon- treOtilde et le Ocircmal en soiOtilde mais du fait m me que cOtildeest lOtildepermilme quilOtildea engendre la mati re le Ocircmal en soiOtilde ne sOtilde levera jamais au-dessus de lOtildepermilme pourse situer aupr s des tres premiers et elle ne sera jamais d laiss e par lOtildepermilme ni con-damn e ˆ se voir prive de forme (OcircseuleOtilde Ocircˆ lOtilde cartOtilde)Oacute See also Chr Horn PlotinŸber Sein Zahl und Einheit (BeitrŠge zur Altertumskunde 62) Stuttgart-Leipzig 1995 172-3 and K Corrigan PlotinusOtilde Theory of Matter-Evil and the question of sub-stance Leuven 1996 198 (pointing out that when Plotinus says that matter is kayƒaecirctograve kakntilden at I8 [51] 339-40 kayƒ aecirctntilde does not mean Ograveabsolute self-dependenceOacutebut simply Ogravein itselfOacute)

160 JAN OPSOMER

emanation is itself not caused by any other principle Matter is just theend of the process18 Yet as D OOtildeMeara has rightly pointed out it is alsoits result And this brings us back at the paradox that at least indirectlythe good seems to be causally responsible for evil19 Apparently Plotinuswants to reconcile the irreconcilable the cause of evil is the result of acausal chain yet the cause(s) of the cause of evil should not be called thecause(s) of evil

III

Proclus is fundamentally opposed to PlotinusOtilde solution of the problem of evil

1 On exegetical grounds Proclus rejects the claim that matter is the causeof badness in the soul completely disregarding the sophisticated Plotiniandistinctions between the weakness of the soul and its badness InsteadProclus claims that the soulOtildes fascination for what is inferior is in itselfalready evil The fairly complex causal analysis of the origin of evil inthe soul then becomes pointless and it is unlikely that Proclus paid muchattention to it or even noticed the complexity of PlotinusOtilde argument

2 Proclus goes to great lengths to refute the view that matter could bethe source of all evils His arguments are both exegetical and systemicAbove all he objects to the idea that matter could be a principle of evilfor to believe that there is a principle of any sort for evils inevitablyamounts to a dualism of principles As long as one keeps looking for onesingle cause of evils one will always end up with some form of dualismInstead one should assume so he argues that there are many accidentaland inderminate causes for evil or rather for evils as evils themselvestoo constitute an indeterminable multitude They cannot be related to one

18 Sharples OcircPlato Plotinus and EvilOtilde BICS 1994 181 OgraveThe idea of a progres-sively diminishing in uence of good not caused by anything separate opposing itenables him to combine monism with an explanation for imperfectionOacute

19 Cf OOtildeMeara Trait 51 109 OgraveComment le bien absolu peut-il produire le malabsolu Une r ponse possible (cf III 2 [47] 527-32) consisterait ˆ faire observer quela th orie de la d rivation suppose que chaque tape successive de ce processus repr senteun degr moindre de perfection ou (pour exprimer cela n gativement) un plus granddegr dOtildeimperfectionOacute Also p 11 OgraveIl reste vrai cependant que la mati re en tantque mal absolu nOtildeest pas seulement le terme de la d rivation Elle est aussi le r sul-tat de la d rivation la mati re est produite par lOtildepermilme Nous demeurons avec le para-doxe irr solu que le bien qui pour Plotin doit donner de lui-mme de sa bont enfait engendre le malOacute


principle20 they cannot be explained by one cause Evils are never causedper se for their own sake (cf sect XIII)

Now if matter were the source of all evil it would have to be eitheran independent principle or a being in its turn produced by another prin-ciple superior to it Both are unacceptable

the rst option would amount to a strong dualism ndash which is exactlywhat Plotinus wanted to avoid at all cost yet he at least gives theimpression of having been tempted by the advantages it offered for thepurpose of theodicy as is suggested by his insistence on the fact thatmatter is the absolute evil the ultimate evil the principle of evil21

aeacutetokakntilden (I8 [51] 842) the second option makes the good ultimately responsible for evil

Plotinus did claim that matter is generated yet tried to escape fromthe consequence that the superior principles on this account cause evilthe production of matter is in itself innocent and matter is evil onlybecause it is the last stage of the decline a complete privation of thegood This position is untenable so Proclus claims

Proclus himself will argue that matter is in fact produced by the goodand is not evil let alone a or the principle of evil Indeed it is even good

IV

Proclus deals with the view that matter is evil in the large section of Demalorum subsistentia (chs 11-38) where he examines the level(s) at whichevils may occur Starting with the gods and the intelligible reality hedescends to the superior kinds ndash angels demons heroes ndash then to thesouls which he subdivides into divine souls and ordinary souls before

20 In other words Proclus rejects the reduction of plurality to unity in the case ofevil (see eg I8 [51] 321-4) In this aspect evils cannot resemble the good Cf DMS473-6 OgraveFor if there is one cause of good things there are many causes of evils andnot one single cause If all good things are commensurate with similar to and friendlywith one another with evils it is the complete opposite neither among themselves norin relation to good beings do they have a common measureOacute See already Orig Cels464 (SVF II 1174) Cf OOtildeMeara Trait 51 31 Narbonne La m taphysique de Plotin118 OgravePlotin serait-on tent de dire fait du platonisme ˆ lOtildeenversOacute

21 Cf I8 [51] 633-4 rxaUuml gŒr mfv sup2 mcentn kakCcediln sup2 dcent gayCcediln As long as onetakes rxreg in the sense of OgravebeginningOacute there is nothing objectionable in the assertionthat matter is the rxreg of evil This meaning is compatible with eg Arist Metaph51 1013a7-10 It is only when rxreg is taken to refer to an ultimate principle of real-ity that the assertion becomes problematic

162 JAN OPSOMER

moving on to images of souls or irrational souls The next level he dealswith is that of nature the governing principle of body that is The dis-cussion of body leads him to that of matter to which chapters 30 to 37are devoted These are the chapters that interest us most for our presentpurpose They are followed by a chapter on privation The conclusion ofthe entire section (chs 11-38) is that evil occurs only in particular soulsand particular bodies which are beings capable of change with respect totheir rank by letting themselves be guided or ruled by what is either supe-rior or inferior22 Divine souls are merely hindered in their activities Thereforethey are only affected by a minor or even a merely apparent evil Thehigher levels are completely free from evil But also the levels below thatof body ndash matter and privation ndash are not evil

I will come back to matter below but rst a few words need to be saidabout privation Unlike the previous OgravelevelsOacute privation cannot be consid-ered as a hypostasis Already from the very fact that Proclus offers a sep-arate treatment of privation after the section on matter23 it is obvious thathe rejects the Plotinian equation of matter with complete privation24 Thebeginning of chapter 38 is reminiscent25 of Aristotle Phys 19 192a13-25 who criticises Ogravecertain thinkersOacute (unfortunately Platonists) for not dis-tinguishing matter and privation Privation which is the contrary of theform and in its own nature is not is different from the substrate whichdesires form and only accidentally is not Aristotle says that if one con-siders privation (Ogravethe other part of the contrarietyOacute ie Ogravethat which is con-traryOacute and hence is the destruction of the form) as an evil agent26 it mayalmost seem not to exist at all (192a14-16) He explains that privation iscontrary to what is divine good and desirable which is precisely whatmatter desires and yearns for Now if one con ates matter and privationthe contrary will desire its own extinction Ograveas contraries are mutuallydestructiveOacute27 Next Aristotle compares matterOtildes desire of form to thefemale desiring the male an example that does not t his account (the

22 See also Theol Plat 39415-21 in Tim 138024-381623 The transition is clearly marked (381-2) OgraveSed materiam quidem hic relinquen-

dum Ad privationem autem rursum transeundumOacute24 Cf I8 [51] 11-12 partial privation is not good ndash or rather bad ndash enough for

Plotinus because he wants to arrive at pure unmixed evil the rst evil See also 423OOtildeBrien OcircLa mati re chez PlotinOtilde 55 64-6

25 As observed already by M Erler Proklos Diadochos daggerber die Existenz des Bšsen(BeitrŠge zur klassischen Philologie 102) Meisenheim am Glan 1978 114 n 2

26 kakopointildew the same word is used by Proclus ndash mali cam in MoerbekeOtildes trans-lation 384 also 3829

27 Compare DMS 3717


female does not disappear as a result of the ful lment of its desire) butwhich Plotinus uses for his own theory of matter (II4 [12] 1614-17) inorder to show that change does not necessarily entail the disappearanceof privation28

Taking AristotleOtildes rather unfortunate remark as a cue Plotinus argues ndashagainst Aristotle ndash that in the case of both change and desire the priva-tion ie non-being does not disappear but persists Hence the substrate ndashmatter ndash can be identi ed with privation complete absence of form andlight that is and therefore with evil This is also why he claims that mat-ter can never truly receive form the privation remains Proclus on thecontrary upholds the distinction between privation and matter29 and in sodoing sides with Aristotle against Plotinus However Proclus does notconcede to Aristotle that privation is evil If the primal good were iden-tical with being then indeed privation would have been the primary evilBut the good transcends being Privation of a form could never be the pri-mary evil as it merely is privation of being not of the good Privation ofa form is mere absence and complete privation leads any being to non-existence thus entailing the end of its suffering Proclus distinguishes betweenprivation of form (ie OgraveAristotelianOacute30 privation) which is a mere absence

28 Cf OOtildeBrien OcircLa mati re chez PlotinOtilde 63-629 See also DMS 3214-16 OgraveNor is it a removal of measure and limit for it is not

identical with privation because privation does not exist when measure and limit arepresent whereas matter keeps existing and bearing their impressionOacute

30 Cf Simpl in Cat 41729-4181 See however also S MennOtildes valuable remarks(Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 14 1998 [1999]106) in his reply to C Steel Menn explains that in several texts OgraveAristotle thinks ofthe evil which is contrary to a speci c good as its privationOacute Hence it is notunquali edly true that Aristotle considers possession-and-privation as one kind ofopposites and contraries (eg good and evil) as another One could also refer toDexippus in Cat 5218-26 In the same reply to Steel Menn points out that the Stoicsdid not deny the existence of evil and that indeed they thought that evil (vice) hasexactly the same ontological status than good does Therefore when Proclus attacksthe view that evil does not exist at all he cannot be referring to the Stoics but is justputting up a strawman Menn overlooks the fact however that Proclus is simply heirto an old Platonic tradition that dialectically construes this position as the Stoic viewAnd it remains open to debate whether by practically denying evil on a cosmic scalethe Stoics can still claim a place for evil at the level of human action Is not Plutarch(eg De Stoic rep 1048D 1049D and esp 1050A-D) right to point out that thisamounts to an inconsistency See J Opsomer ndash C Steel OcircEvil without a cause ProclusOtildeDoctrine on the Origin of Evil and its Antecedents in Hellenistic PhilosophyOtilde ZurRezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie in der SpŠtantike Akten der 1 Tagung derKarl-und-Gertrud-Abel-Stiftung vom 22-25 September 1997 in Trier herausgegebenvon Therese Fuhrer und Michael Erler in Zusammenarbeit mit Karin Schlapbach(Philosophie der Antike Bd 9) Stuttgart 1999 229-243

164 JAN OPSOMER

and in no way evil from the so-called privation of the good ie thatwhich actively opposes the good and is therefore evil31 The latter kind ofOgraveprivationOacute derives its power from the good and should therefore be callednot a contrary but a subcontrary of the good as he will argue later (chs52-3) In ch 38 he just claims that opposition to the good should not becalled privation

V

Proclus introduces the section on matter by saying that the previous dis-cussion has already led him to mention matter occasionally (301-2) Sohe has said that eternal and universal natures are never evil because theycompletely dominate the underlying matter which by way of an obviousallusion to Plotinus he calls something ugly investing itself with a for-eign ornament32 Particular bodies on the contrary can get pervertedwhen they let themselves be dominated by what is inferior33 Moreoveronly material bodies can become evil34 contrary to immaterial bodies suchas light Even semi-material bodies such as pneumatic vehicles can bemoderately affected by evil when they Ograveintroduce into themselves thebaseness of matterOacute35 In his concluding remarks on bodies and natureProclus even explicitly says that Ogravedown here disorder is due to matter andto the mixture of form with the formlessOacute while Ograveup thereOacute disorder isdue to the deprivation of life36 Like the sensible bodies which have ahylemorphic structure whereby the form of the body ultimately inheres inprime matter immaterial bodies too consist of a substrate and a forma-tive principle Yet there both the substrate and the form are immaterialIt should be remarked that Proclus objects to Plotinus calling the intelli-gible substrate matter Instead he prefers the term OgravepowerOacute (daelignamiw) ashe wants to reserve OgravematterOacute only for the lowest reality37 This lower mat-ter seems to be the main cause of disturbance for sensible things

In the realm of generation however disorder is situated in matter because ofthe irrational obscure and indeterminate character of its nature For the disor-derly character is not accidental to matter nor is matter said to be disorderly with

31 Cf Steel OcircProclus on the Existence of EvilOtilde Proceedings of the Boston AreaColloquium in Ancient Philosophy 14 1998 [1999] 83-102 109

32 DMS 2719-22 cf Plot I8 [51] 335-633 DMS 289-1034 DMS 2814-9 Plot I8 [51] 3 I8 [51] 827-8 et passim35 DMS 2826-3836 DMS 2912-1437 Cf Theol Plat 33924-309


respect to something else for what is disorderly with respect to something elseis not yet the last No absolute unmeasuredness absolute indeterminatenessabsolute darkness that is the disorder of matter (2916-21)

This summary of the characteristics of matter is strongly reminiscent ofPlotinusOtilde account38 and this may be no coincidence Indeed in the chap-ters that follow Proclus will implicitly but unmistakably discuss and rejectPlotinusOtilde account of matter as we nd it in Ennead I8 [51] Proclus willcategorically refuse to regard matter as evil However in the chapters onthe evils of souls and bodies he occasionally seems to attribute the originof evil to the in uence of matter Indeed in his account of the evils ofthe soul too he alludes to the presence of matter

What then is the origin of evil for us It is the continuous communion and cohab-itation with what is inferior to us It is also oblivion and ignorance which comeabout by looking at that which is unintellectual and dark39 (2432-35)

However in the chapters where Proclus explicitly deals with matter heemphatically rejects the view that makes matter evil or even the principleof evil The fact that he sporadically does give the impression of closelylinking matter and evil ndash though he nowhere calls it evil or a cause ofevil ndash may be blamed on the Platonic tradition which had always beensubject to the tendency to associate the two things

Indeed in antiquity as in more recent times a number of commenta-tors took the view that for Plato matter is the source of all evils40 Amongthe Middle Platonists Numenius41 made matter a positively evil forceidentifying it with the Inde nite Dyad Also Cronius as well as Celsus42

and perhaps Moderatus43 considered matter the source of evil whereasHarpocration44 is said to derive it rather Ogravefrom the bodiesOacute

38 See however PlotinusOtilde description of matter at III4 [15] 111-12 III9 [13] 312-13 I8 [51] 327 641-4

39 Cf Enn I8 [51] 417-3240 Some illustrious examples are summed up by H Cherniss OcircThe Sources of Evil

According to PlatoOtilde Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 98 1954 25n 21

41 Ap Calcidius c 29442 Cf Orig Cels 465 85543 Cf Simpl in Phys 23121 HD Saffrey and LG Westerink Proclus Th ologie

platonicienne Livre II (CUF) Paris 1974 XXXI G Bechtle OcircDas Bšse im Platonismusdaggerberlegungen zur Position JamblichsOtilde Bochumer Philosophisches JahrbŸch fŸr Antikeund Mittelalter 4 1999 72-3

44 For Numenius Cronius and Harpocration see Iamblichus De anima ap Stob13712-16

166 JAN OPSOMER

VI

For the readerOtildes convenience I lay out the structure of the section on mat-ter in the DMS (in a more rigorous way probably than Proclus who is notused to always clearly separating one counter-argument from another)

1 The view of the opponents matter is evil [30-315]

2 Counter-arguments [315-35]

21 If matter is the principle of evilndash either there are two ultimate principles which is unacceptable as there can-

not be two rstsndash or matter stems from the good (the view of Plotinus)

but then the good will be the cause of evil and hence the good will be evil(as its cause it is to a higher degree what the product is) and evil will begood (as products always assimilate themselves to their cause) [315-21]

22 Matter is necessary for the universe [321-8]23 Matter is called unmeasured not as being the mere absence of measure (since

matter is not identical with privation) nor as something that actively opposesmeasure (since matter [according to Plotinus45] is inert) but as the need formeasure46 ndash matter desires measure and therefore cannot be bad [329-23]

24 Evil existed in the souls prior to their descent to matter cf Phaedr 248A1-B1 Resp 621A6-7 [33]

25 Matter is the mother and wet-nurse of generation it contributes to the fabri-cation of the world and is therefore good cf Tim 49A6 50D3 51A4 52D4-5 34B8-9 [341-5]

26 The disorderly Ograveprevious condition of the worldOacute of Polit 273B4-C3 shouldnot be equated with precosmic matter as such47 it refers to (precosmic) mat-ter in which partial ndash and hence con icting ndash forms48 are present [345-9]

45 See Enn I8 [51] 10 III6 [26] 1129-36 43-546 Plotinus included measurelessness and need (tograve currenndeiexclw) among the characteristics

of evil I8 [51] 312-15 He even gives a vivid description of matter begging the soulmaking a nuisance of itself and trying to worm its way inside (1435-36) Cf III6[26] 145-15 where the metaphor of begging clearly refers to Plato Symp 203B4 Seealso III6 [26] 19

47 Plotinus glosses Ogravethe worldOtildes ancient natureOacute from the Politicus as Ogravethe underly-ing matter not yet set in order by some godOacute (I8 [51] 76-7)

48 These are the so-called OgravetracesOacute of the forms Cf Tim 53B2 See also FAJ DeHaas John PhiloponusOtilde New De nition of Prime Matter Aspects of its Background inNeoplatonism and the Ancient Commentary Tradition (Philosophia antiqua 69) Leiden ndashNew York ndash Kšln 1997 15-16 96-8 (chaos is above the level of prime matter whichis incorporeal and formless but also above that of unquali ed body ndash the substratumof the universe and the second lowest level ndash which is already characterized by three-dimensionality and determinate size three-dimensionality (extension) according toProclus is not what de nes but rather what rst characterizes prime matter)


27 In the Philebus it is said that matter is produced by the One and according toResp 379C6-7 god does not cause evil things [349-14]

28 The Ograveirregular motionOacute of Tim 30A4-5 is not matter nor due to matter cf 26[3414-28]

29 Matter is generated by god cf Phil 23C9-10 26C4-27C1 [35]

3 The view of Proclus matter is necessary [36-37]

31 Matter is neither good nor evil but necessary [36-376]32 Evil does not exist in itself but only in other things for it is the contrary of

the good in other things not of the rst good Indeed nothing can be contraryto the rst good as (1) contraries are mutually destructive and (2) contrariesmust belong to the same genus [376-25]

VII

When Proclus in the rst chapter of this section (ch 30) presents the viewthat matter is evil he is almost quoting from Ennead I8 [51] 3 Plotinusthere argues that evil is all kinds of privations of the good (12-16) thesedo not belong to evil as accidents they constitute evil itself (16-22) Nexthe explains the difference between evils that participate and the absoluteevil in which they participate (21-4) this is followed (35-40) by thedescription of this rst evil as that which underlies all forms and meas-ures but is incapable of receiving them The view of Plotinus is clearlywhat Proclus here reports

[I]t is by no means possible that evil belongs to matter as an accident becauseby itself matter is without quality and formless matter is a substrate49 and notin a substrate it is simple and not some thing in another If matter is entirelyevil ndash and some say it is ndash it must be evil in essence as they also say makingmatter the primary evil and Ogravethat which the gods abhorOacute50 For what is evil otherthan unmeasuredness and indeterminateness and all kinds of privations of thegood Indeed good is the measure of all things their boundary limit and per-fection That is why evil is unmeasuredness absolute unlimitedness imperfectionand indeterminateness Now all these things lt they saygt are primarily in mat-ter they are not other things besides matter but matter itself and what it is tobe matter Hence matter is the primary evil the nature of evil and the last of allthings If good is twofold ndash one being the absolute good and nothing other thangood the other being the good in something else a partial good that is and notthe primary good ndash then evil as well will be twofold the one being as it wereabsolute evil and the primary evil and nothing else but evil the other being evilin something else and some evil ie that which is evil because of that lt rstgt

49 Accidents are predicated not of substrates but of individuals and of species CfPorph Isag 1310-21

50 Hom Iliad 2065 See also Plotinus V1 [10] 227

168 JAN OPSOMER

evil by participation in or assimilation with it And just as the good is the rstthe absolute evil will be the last of beings For it is not possible for anything tobe better than good nor worse than evil since we say that all other things arebetter or worse by virtue of these But matter is the last of things for all otherthings are disposed to act or to undergo whereas matter does neither as it isdeprived of both these potencies Hence the absolute and primary evil is matter(DMS 30)

The attentive reader of the treatise will immediately realise that Proclusis not here presenting his own view For in the rst chapters he hademphatically rejected the existence of absolute evil Of course this doesnot lead immediately to Plotinus The latter was not the only philosopherto have held the view that matter is evil and Proclus does want to chal-lenge the equation matter-evil in general Nevertheless the similaritieswith Plotinus are striking Many details point to Plotinus such as theassertion that matter is deprived of the potency to be affected For anyonewho is familiar with the thought of Proclus but misses the Plotinian back-ground this is a very surprising statement indeed as the concept of mat-ter here expressed is foreign to Proclus But of course through Proclus weare reading Plotinus who indeed holds that matter is incapable of receiv-ing the form it lacks and remains completely unaffected51 Proclus againrefers to the same idea in 3212-16 where he is arguing against the viewhe here presents and dialectically uses PlotinusOtilde own view against him

Now matter is not disposed to oppose nor in general to effect anything since itis also incapable by nature of undergoing an effect because of its lack of potencyto undergo anything

Proclus concludes his account of the doctrine of evil matter by remindinghis reader once more of the role that matter apparently played in the per-verting of particular bodies and souls (ie the realities that were studiedin the chapters preceding the section on matter)

If as we have said in bodies the unnatural arises when matter prevails and insouls evil and weakness come about when they fall into matter get drunk withthe indeterminateness surrounding it and assimilate themselves to it why shouldwe dismiss this ltexplanationgt and seek for another cause of evils as a principleof and source for their existence (311-5)

Temptingly easy and self-evident as this reasoning may seem to beProclus will not go for this solution He will argue instead that one should

51 Cf Plot I8 [51] 335-40 III6 [26] 1129-36 43-5 See also Porph Sent 21 (p 128-9)


indeed look for other causes of evil Plotinus on the contrary had takenthe OgraveeasyOacute path in I8 [51]1417-24 he argued that the fact that weaknessonly occurs in souls that are near52 matter is an indication that matter is the cause of this weakness He also claimed that matter is a principleand that souls become evil by assimilating themselves to it53

From the text cited above it is already clear that Proclus does not caremuch about PlotinusOtilde subtle distinctions between the soulOtildes weaknessesand its vices54 This impression is con rmed if one looks at the fourth ofhis counter-arguments in which he treats weaknesses and de cienciesstraightaway as evil

If then the souls suffer weakness and fall this is not because of matter sincethese ltde cienciesgt existed already before the bodies and matter and somehowa cause of evil existed in the souls themselves prior to lttheir descent intogt mat-ter (331-3)

Proclus rejects the Plotinian account of the evil in the soul For thePhaedrus teaches us that weakness was there prior to the descent of thesoul So matter cannot have been the cause either of weakness or of evilBefore the soulOtildes encounter with matter there must already have beensome cause of evil (331-15) Proclus wants to save the moral responsi-bility of the souls OgraveWhere would be their self-motion and ability tochooseOacute (3323) if we attribute the cause of their descent to the activity

52 Proclus later neatly refutes this argument If it were really the case that nearnessto matter causes evil what is nearer to matter should be more evil than that which isless near But as a matter of fact there are good reasons to believe that the evils ofsouls are OgravegreaterOacute than those of bodies (3944-50)

53 Cf I8 [51] 839 43 In sect8 Plotinus discards some other possible candidates forthe title Ograveprinciple of evilsOacute Neither form nor body can aspire to be Ogravethe primal evilOacute(prAringtvw kakntilden [837-38 see also 1118]) Ogravethe evil itselfOacute (aeacutetokakntilden [842 see also139]) Ogravethat in which all other evils participate or to which they assimilate them-selvesOacute One may safely infer e contrario that these terms ndash which Proclus considershighly objectionable ndash do apply to matter

54 Cf Plot I8 [51] 1449-51 However in chapter 24 Proclus says that weaknessis not evil if it is not excessive (2418 et nondum horum dirum si non multo cfPlot I8 [51] 512-14) It can safely be assumed that Proclus had Plotinus in mind(but possibly also others) when he made the claim that the souls were evil before theywere affected by matter He must at the very least have been aware of the fact thatfor Plotinus matter was somehow the cause of vice (the view is clearly evidenced inEnn I8) although he may have overlooked the details of PlotinusOtilde view Or possiblyhe chose to ignore them as his exegetical arguments are valid against any Platonistwho holds that matter directly or indirectly causes vice and are held to be suf cientto refute Plotinus on this point

170 JAN OPSOMER

of matter The souls make their own choices55 and when they have cho-sen badly they deserve their punishment (21-22) The particular soulshave the possibility to choose a different kind of life and as a consequencemay admit evil These souls are susceptible to evil but not on account oftheir contact with the body or with matter No their own weakness makesthem descend to the body and the material world And it is wrong claimsProclus to explain the soulOtildes weakness through the contact with matteras Plotinus does The soul itself is responsible for descending and ascend-ing and makes its own choices

VIII

In chapter 31 Proclus presents the advocates of the thesis that matter isthe ultimate cause of all evil with a dilemma56 either matter is an ulti-mate principle itself not generated by any other principle or it derives itsexistence from another principle The rst horn of the dilemma amountsto a coarse Numenian-styled dualism that was certainly not shared byPlotinus57 Proclus dismisses this thesis in a few lines there cannot be twoindependent rst principles that eternally oppose one another if there weretwo Ograve rstsOacute another higher principle would be needed to give existenceand oneness to both of them Elsewhere (367-12) he adds the objectionthat the good would be faced with a perpetual struggle and could not enjoythe tranquillity proper to the gods Proclus is clearly not exclusively inter-ested in the refutation of Plotinus but also in that of more crude formsof dualism

The second horn of the dilemma corresponds to the Plotinian positionwhat if matter being the source of all evils is itself generated Then saysProclus the good will inevitably be the cause of evils But then it willitself be evil as the cause is what its product is in a greater degree Alsoanother absurdity follows since Neoplatonic causation is not a one-wayprocess but reversion is an essential aspect of it the evils produced bymatter will be good for they will assimilate themselves to their ultimatecause A double conclusion follows Ogravethe good as the cause of evil wouldbe evil and evil as being produced from the good would be goodOacute(3120-1)

55 Cf DMS 207-8 2432-40 in Tim 331318-2156 Cf OOtildeMeara OcircDas Bšse bei Plotin (Enn I8)Otilde57 In his treatise on matter Plotinus himself rejects this coarse dualism Cf II4 [12]

29-10


Plotinus had wanted to hold simultaneously that matter is intrinsicallyevil and the principle of evil on the one hand and that it is the result ofthe emanation on the other By claiming that an inferior soul producesmatter innocently he tried to escape the consequence that the superiorprinciples and ultimately the One are responsible for evil Thus he in-tended to do justice to the Platonic axiom according to which the good isthe cause of everything (is Ograveresponsible forOacute everything) yet is responsiblefor good things only not for bad things58

Proclus objects that this goes against the Platonist metaphysical princi-ple that the cause is like the effect in an eminent way That which pro-duces evil must therefore be even more evil than the effect Fritz-PeterHager clearly a Plotinian believer comments that Proclus scholastic-mindedas he was could not understand PlotinusOtilde sublime insight Plotinus wasmore or less alone in having realised the fact that we cannot apply therules of causation to the relation between the superessential principle andthe negation of being

Hier sieht man den deutlichen Unterschied zwischen Plotins kritischem Blick fŸrdie begrenzte Reichweite logischer GesetzmŠszligigkeiten der Ruhe des Mystikersder um die Existenz dessen weiszlig was Ÿber alle Vernunft erhaben ist und derspŠteren neuplatonischen Schulweisheit fŸr die es nichts zwischen Himmel undErde ja nicht einmal Ÿber Himmel und Erde gibt was nicht ihren logischenRegeln unterliegt59

But of course Proclus has a point PlotinusOtilde ingenious construction clasheswith the laws of causation which hold that the effect is implied in thecause and that the product reverts to its cause It is indeed questionablewhether his position is tenable on late Neoplatonic principles Even if itis granted that the descent of the soul and the resulting generation of mat-ter is not yet evil itself from where could evil get its evil nature if notfrom its principle

D OOtildeMeara concedes that Plotinus is confronted with a dif cult para-dox60 One could say that Plotinus tries to have it both ways in claiming

58 Resp 2 379B15-16 oeacutek ra plsaquontvn ge aagravetion tograve gayntilden llŒ tCcediln mcentn eiumlcurrenxntildentvn aagravetion tCcediln dcent kakCcediln naUcirction

59 F-P Hager OcircDie Materie und das Bšse im antiken PlatonismusOtilde MH 19 196296-7 Cf W Beierwaltes OcircDie Entfaltung der Einheit Zur Differenz plotinischen undproklischen DenkensOtilde Th ta-Pi 2 1973 154 156 160 n 2 Steel OcircProclus on theexistence of evilOtilde 84-5 OgraveIn this context it is not surprising that the more incoherentview of Plotinus now nds more defenders than ProclusOtilde own exposition It is said thatat least Plotinus had a deeper respect for the harsh intractable character of evil Com-pared to the vivid language of Plotinus ProclusOtilde words seem pale and too rationalisticOacute

60 D OOtildeMeara Trait 51 109 111

172 JAN OPSOMER

that matter is an intrinsically evil principle and the source of all evil andthat it is not an independent principle in any dualistic sense as it is pro-duced by the good Or as D OOtildeBrien puts it

Plotinus has left embedded in his philosophy a remnant of the old Platonic andAristotelian dualism of two eternal and independently existing principles Proclusoffers a clearer notion of the total dependence of nite existence upon the OneHe achieves this by freeing matter from its role as the primary evil and as causeof evil in the soul From this broader point of view we may like to say thatPlotinusOtilde conception of matter as evil and as part cause of evil in the soul is atodds with the general direction of his metaphysics Taken more narrowly how-ever PlotinusOtilde conception of matter and the soulOtildes weakness as part causes ofsin is skillful and consistent61

What we have here seems to be an irretrievable difference of philosophi-cal styles both between ancient philosophers and some of their moderncommentators62

In a recent article D OOtildeBrien has made the valuable observation thatthe causal relation by which matter is produced differs from other causalrelations Ogravethe origin and nature of matter have to be understood as verydifferent from the double process of emanation which lies at the origin ofIntellect and of SoulOacute63 Indeed the One does not simply create intellectrather it generates something indeterminate The latter constitutes itself as intellect when it returns towards its origin The generation of the soulis to be understood analogously With matter however the situation iscompletely different For here we have reached the lowest point of theemanation matter is Ogravenon-beingOacute Ogravethe lifeless offspringOacute Ograveabsolute inde-terminatenessOacute Out of itself this lifeless non-being is not capable ofreturning to its principle That is why the soul has to come down a sec-ond time in order to invest its product with form by projecting its imageon it without being able however to change the nature of its productSo contrary to the One and Intellect that produce by their immobile activ-ity and can leave their product to its own activity the (lower) soul thatgenerates matter has to move itself in order to produce and it even needsto take the initiative a second time Being itself an image of the higher

61 D OOtildeBrien OcircPlotinus on EvilOtilde 14662 A similar remark concerning the difference between Proclus and Plotinus has also

been made by OOtildeMeara Trait 51 32 more speci cally regarding the questionwhether the soul is itself responsible for its vices every time it fails to reach the goodwithout there being a principle that constantly harasses the soul (Proclus) or whetherthere is such a malicious principle at work in the world (Plotinus) The differencewould be that between an optimistic and a pessimistic outlook on the world

63 D OOtildeBrien OcircLa mati re chez PlotinOtilde 45 See also 67-9


soul the lower soul wants to imitate the latter by producing its own imagebut contrary to what happened at the higher levels of production thisimage is completely unlike its producing cause up to the point even thatit is utterly lifeless64

Plotinus was very conscious of what he was doing when he describedthe production of matter as being fundamentally different from all otherforms of production For the same reasons he stressed the incapacity ofmatter to receive the forms that it gets from the soul matter remains unaf-fected by them It cannot return and cannot assimilate itself to its originIn order to make this argument Plotinus had to reject the Aristoteliannotion of matter by identifying the substrate with privation having priva-tion actively oppose the forms and making matter the contrary of theforms and the contrary of substance

ProclusOtilde conception of matter could not be more different Accordingto him matter is produced by the good and its mode of production is notfundamentally different from that of other beings His account of the gen-eration of matter is mainly based on the Philebus yet he has a veryAristotelian65 conception of what matter is and what its function is Inorder for us to understand why he so utterly disagrees with Plotinus weshould take a look at the chapters where he explains his own doctrine

IX

The ultimate reason why matter cannot be the principle of evil is onto-logical matter derives its existence from the One in other words it is produced by god66 Proclus fully integrates matter in his Neoplatonistontology and avoids making its generation an exception to the laws ofcausality According to these laws higher causes are to a greater measurecausative of a given product than its proximate cause and their in uenceextends further down the ontological scale67 Proclus holds that matter is

64 Enn III4 [15] 16-765 I refrain from taking a position in the Ograveprime matter debateOacute among contempo-

rary Aristotelians The ancients at least from as early as Alexander took the Platonic-Aristotelian pedigree of the doctrine of prime matter for granted

66 The creation of matter is of course not to be understood as generation in timebut as dependence on a cause since divine production is eternal and motionless CfDe Haas John PhiloponusOtilde New De nition of Prime Matter 7-8

67 Cf L Siorvanes Proclus Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science Edinburgh1996 183 De Haas John PhiloponusOtilde New De nition of Prime Matter 15 See Elemtheol prop 56-7 70-2

174 JAN OPSOMER

the lowest manifestation of Unlimitedness (apeiria) which itself as a prin-ciple is the immediate manifestation of the in nite power of the One68

As the nal and indeed most powerful counter-argument against the the-sis of matter as the principle of evil Proclus comes to speak of its gen-eration His account is based on his interpretation of Philebus 23C9-10Ogravewe agreed earlier that the god had revealed a division of what is into theunlimited and the limitOacute (tograven yeograven currenliexclgomiexcln pou tograve mcentn peiron deYacutejai tCcedilnoumlntvn tograve dcent piexclraw) where Ograveto revealOacute (deYacutejai) is in standard Neoplatonicfashion interpreted as Ograveto produceOacute69

In the Philebus however he produces matter itself and the whole nature of theunlimited from the One and in general places the divine cause before the dis-tinction between limit and the unlimited (349-10)

The same doctrine is explained at length in the third book of the PlatonicTheology but also in various passages in the commentaries

Socrates says in the Philebus that god brings into existence limit and unlimited-ness and that he has generated all beings by mixing these elements70

If then as we have explained god brings all unlimitedness into existence Healso brings matter into existence which is the lowest form of unlimitedness Andthis is the very rst and ineffable cause of matter71

It has been demonstrated elsewhere that Plato founds the rst unlimitedness ndashthe unlimitedness before the mixtures ndash at the summit of the intelligibles andthat he extends its irradiation from up there as far as the last of things so thataccording to him matter proceeds from the One and from the unlimited that isprior to the one-being if you wish and that it proceeds from the one-being inso-far as it is potentially a being Therefore it is a good thing in a sense and unlim-ited although it is utterly vague and without form because those two (the Oneand the unlimited) too are prior to the forms and their manifestation72

68 Cf Elem Theol prop 92 Theol Plat 33215-23 De Haas John PhiloponusOtildeNew De nition of Prime Matter 80-1 n 93

69 Cf Theol Plat 33610-1970 Cf Theol Plat 33019-21 liexclgei toUcircnun otilde currenn FilregbAuml Svkrlsaquothw Eacutew ra yeogravew

piexclratntildew currensti kaUuml peirUcircaw ecircpostlsaquothw kaUuml diŒ toaeligtvn lsquopanta tŒ oumlnta mignccedilw parreggage71 in Tim 138430-3853 eTHORN oiumln Eumlsper eagravepomen otilde yeogravew psan peirUcircan ecircfUcircsthsi

kaUuml tmacrn igravelhn ecircfUcircsthsin currensxlsaquothn oiumlsan peirUcircan kaUuml aigraveth mcentn prvtUcircsth kaUuml rrhtowaTHORNtUcirca tdegw igravelhw

72 in Tim 13859-17 diexcldeiktai dƒ currenn lloiw divideti tmacrn prAringthn peirUcircan tmacrn prograve tCcedilnmiktCcediln currenn traquo krntildethti tCcediln nohtCcediln aacutedruse kaUuml currenkeYacuteyen aeacutetdegw diateUcircnei tmacrn brvbarllamcinxri tCcediln currensxlsaquotvn Eumlste katƒ aeacutetograven sup2 igravelh prntildeeisin brvbark te toegrave yennogravew kaUuml currenk tdegw peirUcircawtdegw prograve toegrave yennogravew oumlntow eTHORN dcent boaeliglei kaUuml pograve toegrave yennogravew oumlntow kayntildeson currenstUuml dunlsaquomei oumlndiograve kaUuml gayntilden psup1 currensti kaUuml peiron kaUuml mudrntildetaton oslashn kaUuml neUcircdeon diograve kaUuml taegravetaprograve tCcediln eTHORNdCcediln kaUuml tdegw currenkflsaquonsevw aeacutetCcediln


God not only produces the unlimited he is also the cause of its mixturewith limit as can be derived from the Philebus73 This allows Proclus toclaim

For god is the cause both of the existence of limit and the unlimited and of theirmixture This ltunlimitedgt therefore and the nature of body qua body must bereferred to one cause namely god for it is he who produced the mixture Henceneither body nor matter is evil for they are the progeny of god the one as amixture the other as unlimitedness (359-14)

Even the lowest form of unlimitedness namely matter is produced bygod for all the forms of unlimitedness derive from one single causeEspecially in the case of sensible matter godOtildes power is necessary as mat-ter cannot out of itself taking the initiative engage in any mixture Evenmore than at the higher levels god is now needed a second time sincehe is the cause of both the existence of limit and the unlimited and theirmixture (Theol Plat 33620-24) This means that both matter and mate-rial bodies are produced by god matter as the expression of his unlimit-edness body as a mixture brought about by god of constituents (viz mat-terunlimited and formlimit) also produced by him Hence neither of themcan be evil

The evil in material bodies can therefore not be due to their materialcomponent Every physical body of a hylemorphic structure by its mate-rial aspect resembles the unlimited its form corresponds to limit

For what else is the unlimited in body but matter And what else is limit in it butform What else but the whole is that which consists of both these (3519-21)74

However the unlimited at this level is no longer power (daelignamiw) butsheer potentiality Matter is indeed the lowest expression of in nity it iseverything potentially (dunlsaquomei dcent sup2 igravelh tŒ plsaquonta)75 but is is incapable ofentering into any mixture by itself which is why godOtildes power is requireda second time In this analysis of the hylemorphic structure Proclus is ofcourse blending Platonic and Aristotelian elements76

73 Phil 26C4-27C174 Theol Plat 3341-3 kaUuml progravew toaeligtoiw aiuml tCcediln faeligsei ginomiexclnvn sectkaston katŒ mcentn

tograve eaumldow tOgrave piexclrati prosiexcloike katŒ dcent tmacrn igravelhn traquo peirUcircamp Cf in Tim 138428-3075 Theol Plat 3347 See also in Parm 84313-23 Compare chapters 4 and 5 of

PlotinusOtilde essay On what exists potentially and what actually esp II5 [25] 43-4 and55-7 (tograve toUcircnun dunlsaquomei oeuml ti llŒ dunlsaquomei plsaquonta mhdcentn dcent oslashn kayƒ aecirctograve llƒ dividecurrenstin igravelh oumln oeacutedƒ currennergeUcircamp currenstUcircn) OOtildeBrien Plotinus on the Origin of Matter 31-4

76 One may compare some of the re exions made by De Haas John PhiloponusOtildeNew De nition of Prime Matter xii 5

176 JAN OPSOMER

X

When Proclus nally gives his own view on the nature of matter heexplains that it is something that is necessary for the generation of theworld

If we consider matter itself from this perspective we will see that it is neithergood nor evil but just necessary in having been produced for the sake of goodit is good but as such it is not good and as the lowest of beings it is evil ndash ifindeed what is most remote from the good is evil ndash but as such it is not evil butnecessary as we have explained (371-6)

In a loose way of talking matter can be called both good (as contributingto the whole) and bad (as de cient with respect to the higher levels) butsensu stricto it is neither When Proclus admits that matter as the last ofbeings could be called evil or when he says that Ogravewhat is most remotefrom the good is evilOacute he obviously refers to Plotinus who claimed thatOgravethis last after which nothing else could come into being is evilOacute 77

Proclus agrees with Plotinus78 that since the good had to produce (it isbetter to produce than not to produce) and could not produce an exactduplicate of itself (but only something that is different and therefore infe-rior to its cause) it was inevitable that there had to be some kind of imper-fection and what is more an imperfection that increases as the realitiesthat produce become more distant from the good And he also fully agreesthat this decrease in perfection is not yet evil And of course the emana-tion has to stop somewhere there must be a lowest level after which noth-ing can exist Plotinus says it stops at the level where the good is com-pletely absent This is the level of matter which he de nes as absoluteprivation and complete opposition to the good Therefore matter must beevil (I8 [51] 716-23) This is not acceptable for Proclus matter is thelowest hypostasis but it is not to be identi ed with privation and it is notcompletely opposite to the good

For the cause of all good things had to produce not only beings that are goodand that are good by themselves but also the nature that is not absolutely andintrinsically good but that desires the good and through its desire ndash and as itwere by itself ndash gives other things the possibility of coming into being Indeedthrough its need for good things this nature ltie mattergt contributes to the cre-ation of the sensibles (3623-8)

77 Plot I8 [51] 636-59 719-20 78 Eg V1 [10] 628-39 I8 [51] 72-5


Proclus holds that even the lowest level that receives existence from theOne participates in the good The emanation does not proceed down to apoint where the good is entirely lacking79 Absolute non-being does notexist at all A fortiori absolute evil does not exist since it is not the con-trary of being but of that which is beyond being (the Good) Absoluteevil if it existed would therefore even be below absolute non-being 80

Hence nothing that exists can be the absolute evil Since matter exists itcannot be irretrievably evil Instead by desiring the good it contributes tothe generation of the world

If we carefully look at ProclusOtilde reasoning in chapter 36 we should nowsee that it is rather subtle It starts out as a dialectical argument if oneregards matter as simply the last stage of the emanation [as Plotinus does] then one could admit that matter is evil ndash although it would be bet-ter just to say that it is not good81 Then Proclus moves over to his ownpositive doctrine of matter as being necessary for the generation of theworld matter is in a sense good Proclus implies that matter is not justthe last stage of an emanation process whereby increasingly less perfectcauses produce increasingly less good products82 His account of emana-tion is different the higher the causes the further down their in uencereaches83 which entails that the lowest reality is directly produced by thehighest cause Matter is therefore the (lowest) manifestation of the power(daelignamiw) of the One As an offspring of the One it is part of the cycle

79 And moreover the mere absence of good is not yet evil as Plotinus elsewhereconcedes (II9 [33] 1325-33) See Steel OcircProclus on the Existence of EvilOtilde 88-9

80 Cf 31-3 Plotinian matter is non-being but not in the sense of the non-existentIn PlotinusOtilde interpretation of the Sophist (based on a variant reading) matter is Ogravethatpart of otherness that is opposed to real beings ie to the formsOacute It is then equatedwith the substrate and with privation it is a privation that is not in the substrate butis the substrate It persists through all change (contrary to Aristotelian privation butin accordance with the function of the Aristotelian substrate) and is not only the cor-relate of form but also that which opposes form For PlotinusOtilde view of matter as non-being see OOtildeBrien OcircLa mati re chez PlotinOtilde 56-66 62 n 49

81 See esp 361-6 quoted above82 Cf E Schršder Plotins Abhandlung POYEN TA KAKA (Enn I8) Leipzig 1916

199 n 783 This concept of emanation is a post-Plotinian development yet de nitely older

than Proclus Cf Syr in Metaph 5917-18 Procl Elem Theol prop 57 ER DoddsPROKLOU DIADOXOU STOIXEIVSIS YEOLOGIKH Proclus The Elements of TheologyOxford 1963 230-2 J Opsomer OcircProclus on demiurgy and procession in theTimaeusOtilde Reason and Necessity Essays on PlatoOtildes Timaeus edited by RM WrightLondon 2000 n 97 p 140 See esp Dodds oc 231 OgraveThe direct ascription ofsterregseiw to the causal agency of the One bold as it is was the only possible view

178 JAN OPSOMER

of procession and reversion84 although it may not be able to revert byitself alone

Let us take another look at the dilemma that Proclus presents to theproponents of the doctrine of evil matter and especially at the dramaticconclusions that are said to follow for those who like Plotinus hold thatmatter is not an independent principle ndash God as the cause of evil will beevil and evil as the product of the Good will be good It is now clear thatthe second half of this conclusion which is based on the idea that prod-ucts revert and assimilate to their causes ndash is fairly harmless for Plotinuswho was not committed to the view that matter engages in reversion Butthe rst part which is based on the idea that causes are in an eminentway what their products are does confront Plotinus with a bigger prob-lem85 as he is generally committed to this premiss He tries to get awaywith it by referring to the peculiar way in which matter is produced notby the One but by the lowest soul But that does not solve the dif cultyof course And the idea that matter is the very last level of the emana-tion and hence a reality that is no longer able to produce and hence isno longer good (for everything that is good has to produce)86 does not

if they were not to be attributed (as both Aristotle and Plotinus sometimes seem toattribute them) to an active power of resistance resident in MatterOacute

84 Cf in Tim 120913-2101485 As is recognised by Narbonne La m taphysique de Plotin 129-31 and

C SchŠfer OcircProklosOtilde Argument aus De malorum subsistentia 315-12 in der modernenInterpretationOtilde Philosophiegeschiche und Logische AnalyseLogical Analysis and Historyof Philosophy 2 Antike Philosophie 1999 178 However the examples that SchŠferoffers in defence of Plotinus (life Ogravebringing forthOacute death and 1 Ogravebringing forthOacute 0 ina mathematical series of natural numbers proceeding by the abstraction of one unit atevery step) are of little help They merely show that one should not be committed tothe view that nothing can be derived from its contrary (or in the Neoplatonic lingoof causation that causes always produce like effects ndash but then the analysis of theseexamples in terms of causation is hardly acceptable in any contemporary account ofcausation) The question is rather what if you do hold this view SchŠfer should there-fore have shown either that Plotinus was not committed to the premiss at all and nextexplain what PlotinusOtilde view on causation actually is (under what conditions are effectslike their causes and why is this not the case for matter) or else show how Plotinuswould justify his contention that matterOtildes evil nature is not already contained in itscauses despite the rule that causes contain their effects and are eminently like them(but from where then does matter get its evil nature if not from causes) It is more-over very unlikely that Plotinus would analyse the examples in the same way asSchŠfer does (1) does life producecause death (2) Plotinus could never conceive adownward mathematical series ending in 0

86 The bottom line of an analysis made by D OOtildeMeara at a one-day conference inLeuven on 24 November 2000


help much either all this argument could prove is that matter is OgravenotgoodOacute not that it is evil If it were evil then its causes too would haveto be evil The only way out is to say with Proclus that it is Ogravenot goodOacute87

XI

It has been remarked that ProclusOtilde conception of matter ready and eagerto be informed is Aristotelian rather than Platonic whereas Plotinus hasa conception of matter that is de nitely un-Aristotelian and possibly morePlatonic

Il sOtildeagit chez Proclus dOtildeune lecture pluttradet aritstot licienne du Tim e la mati reest con ue de mani re ˆ voquer la compl mentarit aristot licienne de la formeet de la mati re dans laquelle la contrarit ne peut avoir de place Or le Tim ede Platon semble envisager pluttradet la mise en ordre par lOtildeintellect (en fonction des Formes) dOtildeun d sordre ant rieur d sordre li ˆ un milieu un r ceptacle quireste r fractaire ˆ la forme dans lequel les formes apparaissent sans vraimentlOtildeapprivoiser Dans ce sens la lecture plotinienne parardquot plus proche du texte dePlaton88

I would agree that ProclusOtilde view of matter has an overall Aristotelian out-look but do not concede that Plotinus is closer to the conception of mat-ter in the Timaeus It is true that there is a refractory element in theTimaeus and this is associated with the receptacle However withoutwanting to open the discussion about the nature of the receptacle and itsrelation to Aristotelian matter89 I should at least say that it is far fromobvious that this refractory element needs to be identi ed with matterThis is however the step Plotinus takes when he equates matter with the

87 Although there may be new problems in store for this view too similar to thosethat I discussed in OcircProclus on demiurgy and procession in the TimaeusOtilde decrease ofperfection is already hard to analyse within the Neoplatonic theoretical framework(stating that there always is a decrease of perfection does not explain how this comesabout) and complete loss of perfection even more so ndash let alone the passage from acause to its contrary Therefore the view that matter is Ograveless goodOacute is easier to defendthan the view that it is Ogravenot goodOacute and to say that it is evil may well turn out to beuntenable on Neoplatonic premisses See also R Chiaradonna OcircEssence et pr dicationchez Porphyre et PlotinOtilde Revue des sciences philosophiques et th ologiques 1998601 603

88 Cf OOtildeMeara Trait 51 33 See also R Beutler OcircProklos 4 NeuplatonikerOtilde RE45 Hb (XXIII-1) 1957 24229-35 Erler daggerber die Existenz des Bšsen 104(-5) n 2

89 See the most illuminating discussion by K Algra Concepts of Space in GreekThought Leiden ndash New York ndash Kšln 1995 ch 3 Also De Haas John PhiloponusOtildeNew De nition of Prime Matter 50-5

180 JAN OPSOMER

OgravenecessityOacute of the Timaeus90 But that is a rather dubious thing to do91

Even the precosmic disorder does not seem to be due to matter alone92

XII

Proclus concludes the section on matter by another argument in which heuses and defends the Aristotelian view against Plotinus Plotinus hadargued that evil is contrary to all the forms and hence to the Good Proclusinsists on distinguishing between these two if Plotinus wants to maintainthat absolute evil exists he should make the case that it is contrary to theGood not just to being Moreover whereas a contrary of a form existsit is impossible for something to be entirely contrary to all the forms orto the Good Now if evil is that which is contrary to the good that existsin other things and not to the good on its own evil like its contrariescan only exist in other things and not on its own Hence evil cannot bematter for matter exists on its own (376-13) Ogravematter is a substrate andnot in a substrateOacute as Proclus had said earlier (305) when he paraphrasedthe view of his opponents They indeed concluded that if matter is evilit can only be Ograveessential evilOacute (katƒ oeacutesUcircan kakntilden) and not evil as an acci-dent (302-8) Therefore if Proclus can prove that evil does not exist onits own he has refuted the identi cation of matter and evil

If matter is absolute evil he argues it has to be contrary to the pri-mary good But this is impossible nothing can be contrary to the primarygood ProclusOtilde rst argument is that everything that exists exists becauseof the good But of course the contrary of the good would not existbecause of the good it is rather the opposite contraries are mutuallydestructive (3715-17)

The second argument is based on the Aristotelian de nition of contrarietycontraries belong to the same genus So if the rst good had a contrary

90 Enn I8 [51] 72-791 Proclus has an entirely different explanation not entirely acceptable either to mod-

ern Plato scholars I am afraid He maintains that necessity is the motive cause of bod-ies also called eszligmarmiexclnh acting jointly with the demiurge (De Providentia 1313-17Theol Plat V31) Theologically it is the monad of the hypercosmic-encosmic Moiraiwhich itself is situated in the intellective diakosmos See HD Saffrey (amp LGWesterink dagger) Proclus Th ologie platonicienne Livre VI (CUF) Paris 1997 102 n 2 (p 181) At any rate for Proclus unlike Plotinus OgravenecessityOacute in the Timaeus hasnothing to do with the OgravenecessityOacute of evils of Theaet 176A

92 According to Proclus precosmic disorder is caused by the in uence of the intel-ligible Forms whose activity is logically prior to that of the demiurge (and the intel-lective forms that he contains)


both would belong to the same genus But there can be no genus prior tothe Good since the Good is the very rst principle (3718-23)

This is again clearly directed against Plotinus The latter had takenTheaetetus 176A to imply that evils must necessarily exist since there hasto be something contrary to the Good (tŒ gŒr kakŒ eaumlnai nlsaquogkuacute currenpeUcircpertoeacutenantUcircon ti deYacute eaumlnai tOgrave gayOgrave [I8 [51] 616-17]) Subsequently hedeveloped an argument to circumvent AristotleOtildes assertion93 that there isno contrary to substance It can indeed be plausibly inferred throughinduction that there are no contraries of particular substances thusPlotinus But it has not been demonstrated that this does apply to sub-stance in general As a consequence there may be a contrary to thesupreme unquali ed Good after all And indeed he continued the con-trary of substance is non-substance and the contrary of the nature of theGood is the nature and principle of evil Ogravefor they both are principles theone of evil things and the other of good things And all the things whichare included in one nature are contrary ltto those in the othergt so thatalso the wholes are contrary and even more so than the other things [ieparticular goods or evils]Oacute94 For other things still have something in com-mon they belong in the same genus or species Then how could one notcall contraries things that are furthest removed from each other and thathave absolutely nothing in common All the characteristics or rather pseudo-characteristics of evil are completely contrary to what is contained in thedivine nature (in a superessential mode) for even its being is false SoPlotinus claimed to have demonstrated that it is not universally true thatthere is nothing contrary to substance (636-48)95 In order to do so he hadto truncate AristotleOtildes de nition96 of contraries as Ogravethings which stand

93 Cat 5 3b24-32 Phys 16 189a32-394 I8 [51] 631-6 [llŒ tUcirc traquo kayntildelou oeacutesUcircamp brvbarstai currennantUcircon kaUuml dividelvw toYacutew

prAringtoiw micro traquo mcentn oeacutesUcircamp sup2 mmacr oeacutesUcirca traquo dcent gayoegrave faeligsei acutetiw currenstUuml kakoegrave faeligsiw kaUumlrxreg] rxaUuml gŒr mfv sup2 mcentn kakCcediln sup2 dcent gayCcediln kaUuml plsaquonta tŒ currenn traquo faeligsei yenkatiexclrampcurrennantUcirca Eumlste kaUuml tŒ dividela currennantUcirca kaUuml mllon currennantUcirca micro tŒ lla

95 Plotinus adds that it had even been possible for individual substances to be con-trary to each other were it not the case that (prime) matter provides a common sub-strate for the elements water could be the contrary of re I8 [51] 649-54 CompareSimpl in Cat 10725-30 and Dexipppus in Cat 525-10 water and re are not con-traries as substances to substances only their qualities are contraries

96 Cat 6 6a17-18 A problem however is 14a15-25 There it is said that contrariesare (1) either in the same genus or (2) in contrary genera (eg justice and injustice)or (3) are themselves genera eg good and bad Cf JL Ackrill AristotleOtildes Categoriesand De Interpretatione Oxford 1963 111 OgraveOcircContraries in contrary generaOtilde meansOcirccontraries whose immediate genera are contraryOtildeOacute This solves (2) [see also Elias in

182 JAN OPSOMER

furthest apart in the same genusOacute to Ogravethings which stand furthest apartOacute Anextreme contrariety would imply so he claimed that the contraries havenothing at all in common not even a genus (654-9)

This construction is completely rejected by Proclus he reaf rms theAristotelian axiom that contraries are always in the same genus In chap-ter 45 he also strongly renounces the idea that a substance could have acontrary

And in general all evil is outside the substance and is not substance For noth-ing is contrary to substance but good is contrary to evil (4515-17)

Proclus rmly re-establishes Peripatetic orthodoxy

XIII

ProclusOtilde own solution to the problem of evil will involve the notion of thesubcontrary which he derives from Theaetetus 176A There Socratesindeed says ecircpenantUcircon [and not just currennantUcircon] glsaquor ti tOgrave gayOgrave eUuml eaumlnainlsaquogkh a distinction Plotinus has failed to make and according to Proclusshould have made Subcontrariety as Proclus de nes it in this treatise isa special form of contrariety whereby a particular evil derives its beingand power from the good it is opposed to97 This notion allows Proclus to maintain a form of contrariety between partial ie relative98 evils and

Cat 25028-2514 Philop in Cat 1915-14] but (3) is more problematic IbidOgraveOcircGood and bad are not in a genusOtilde does Aristotle mean that they are not in any ordi-nary genus (but fall immediately under a category) or that they are not in any onecategory because OcircgoodOtilde like OcircbeingOtilde occurs in all the categories (Nicomachean Ethics1096a23-29 Topics 107a3-17) If the latter is AristotleOtildes point he does not express itvery well by saying that good and bad Ocircare themselves generaOtildeOacute Cf Philop in Cat1906-1915 I have a strong suspicion that AckrillOtildes comment was inspired by PhiloponusOtildeaccount However Ackrill has left out one element that is crucial for our purposesPhiloponus offers the additional comment that strictly speaking (kribologoumiexclnoiw)good and bad are not contraries but are opposed as disposition and privation (katŒstiexclrhsin kaUuml sectjin ntikeYacutesyai) For in order for them to be contraries both of themwould have to have a determinate nature but evil has no determinate existence (tograve dcentkakograven oeacutek brvbarxei Eacuterismiexclnhn ecircpntildestasin)

97 Cf Steel OcircProclus on the Existence of EvilOtilde 101 Ogravea privation which somehowcoexists with the good disposition of which it is the negation and which through thiscoexistence shares in that dispositionOtildes form and powerOacute

98 They are relative in that they are merely evil relative to a particular goodCompare H ChernissOtildes interpretation of Theaet 176A in its own right (OcircThe Sourcesof Evil According to PlatoOtilde Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 981954 24 n 7)


the good without attributing any independent being to them They are par-asitic on true being

This brings us to the concept of parhypostasis the kind of existenceattributed to evil in the Neoplatonic tradition from as early as IamblichusThis notion can only be understood properly in the context of causation99

Only that which is directly caused by a cause per se ie results from acause proceeding in accordance with its nature towards a goal that isintended has existence ndash hypostasis ndash in the proper sense (kurUcircvw) Wheneveran effect is produced that was not intended or is not related by nature orper se to the agent it is said to exist besides (parlsaquo) the intended effectthat is as a side-effect

For there is no other way of existing for that which neither is produced in anyway whatsoever from a principal cause nor has a relation to a de nite goal anda nal cause nor has received in its own right an entry into being since any-thing whatever that exists properly must come from a cause in accordance withnature ndash indeed without a cause it is impossible for anything to come about100 ndashand must connect101 the order of its coming about to some goal102

Evils are never intended as such by any cause there are no proper ef cientnor formal nor nal causes for them At least there is no antecedent orprincipal cause for their coming about They can only be caused by acci-dent103 That which is merely caused accidentally and in no way per se(principally) has parhypostasis (Ograveparasitical existenceOacute) as its mode ofexistence

Therefore it is appropriate to call such generation a parasitic existence in that itis without end and unintended uncaused in a way and inde nite For neither isthere one cause for it nor does that which is a cause in its own right and a prin-cipal cause produce something for the sake of evil itself and the nature of evilnor does anything which is not a principal cause nor a cause in its own right

99 For a more extensive analysis see Opsomer-Steel OcircEvil without a causeOtilde 244-57 Steel OcircProclus on the Existence of EvilOtilde 97-8

100 Cf Tim 28C2-3 101 ie everything that exists is produced by an ef cient cause but must also revert

to this cause which then simultaneously functions as its nal cause 102 DMS 503-9 (adopting D IsaacOtildes interpunction Proclus Trois ƒtudes sur la

Providence III De lOtildeexistence du mal (CUF) Paris 1982 ad loc)103 Proclus seems to be referring implicitly to AristotleOtildes analysis of accidental

causality Cf Metaph 62-3 530 118 Phys 24-6 Moreover ProclusOtilde interpretationmay be not too far removed from PlatoOtildes original intuitions Many observations ofgreat interest concerning PlatoOtildes views on evil can be found in H Cherniss OcircTheSources of Evil According to PlatoOtilde Proceedings of the American PhilosophicalSociety 98 1954 23-30 (esp p 28 on the accidental causation of evils)

184 JAN OPSOMER

No it is the exact opposite everything that is produced is produced for the sakeof the good but evil being from outside and adventitious104 consists in the fail-ure to attain that which is the appropriate goal of each thing105

XIV

When Simplicius in his commentary on the Categories expands on 3b24where Aristotle makes the claim that there is no contrary of substance106

the commentator not only refutes the view of Plotinus that the non-beingthat is matter is the contrary of substance as such107 but he also inserts aconcise summary108 of his own views on evil The latter are remarkablyclose to those of Proclus

Prior to his explicit criticism of Plotinus Simplicius had already explainedAristotleOtildes view refuting various objections substances do not have con-traries Contrariety is to be found in differentiae and qualities that inherein substances they are at the furthest remove from each other but belongto a common subject Then Simplicius comes to speak of those who sit-uate contrariety in the substance and more in particular those who saythat the principles (tŒw rxlsaquow) are completely opposed 109 having nothing

104 currenpeisodiCcedildew See also in Remp 13826-9 in Tim 330322 Simpl in Cat10929-1105 De dec dub 152 203 De prov 3411 Plut De an procr 1015BCQuaest conv 734C The metaphor derives from Aristotle Poet 1451b33-5 SeeOpsomerndashSteel OcircEvil without a causeOtilde 256 n 145

105 DMS 5029-36106 I thank Frans De Haas for having me let use his forthcoming translation of this

passage All translations from Simplicius are his107 This polemic is lacking in AmmoniusOtilde commentary108 A more elaborate exposition of his views on evil can be found at in Epict

Encheir 35 Cf AC Lloyd OcircThe Later NeoplatonistsOtilde The Cambridge History ofLater Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy edited by AH Armstrong Cambridge1967 317-19 I Hadot Simplicius Commentaire sur le Manuel dOtildeƒpict te (Philoso-phia antiqua 66) Leiden 1996 114-44 At in Phys 24926-2503 Simplicius vehe-mently condemns the view that matter is evil

109 Dexippus in Cat 5226-534 allows that form and privation are called contrariesbut they are not opposed as substances but rather as being to non-being as rst prin-ciple to last element and as good to evil The one is existent the other non-existentDexippusOtilde account then is characterised by some ambiguity as to the status of non-being he seems to say that it is simply non-existent but then he should neither callit Ogravethe last elementOacute nor OgraveevilOacute Dexippus claims that Aristotle in the Physics says thatform is contrary to privation and matter to form In fact Aristotle (190b27-34) saysthat a given quality and its privation are in a way contrary and in a way not as ispointed out by J Dillon Dexippus on AristotleOtildes Categories London ndash Ithaca NewYork 1990 95 n 77


in common because they have no relation to each other These principleswould be completely independent and would have no need of any otherprinciple to relate the two of them to each other Such people straight-forwardly state that the principles are contrary substances without therebeing a common subject not even being (10810-15) Their principles areopposed as being to non-being as the beginning to the last as good toevil Such indeed is the opinion of the great Plotinus says Simplicius whothen goes on to quote Enn I8 [51] 628-30 OgraveThat nothing is contrary tosubstance is credible with respect to particular [kinds of ] substances indi-vidual speci c and generic because it is proven by induction but it isnot proven in generalOacute

Simplicius refutes this claim arguing that substanceOtildes not having a con-trary is not only shown by induction but can also be proved by the methodof complete division (10833-35) Ogravegiven that all substances withoutexception are divided into primary and secondary substances and neitherof them possesses contrariety substance as a whole cannot possess con-trariety eitherOacute Moreover in the case of essential attributes and com-pleters of substance what is true in each case is also proved to be true ofevery case Therefore Ogravegiven that to exist in itself is essential to sub-stance Ogravenot to have a contraryOacute will also belong to it essentiallyOacute (1092-4 kaUuml traquo oeacutesUcircamp toUcircnun eagraveper tograve kayƒ aecirctmacrn eaumlnai oeacutesiCcedildew ecircplsaquorxei kaUuml togravemhdemUcircan brvbarxein currennantUcircvsin currenn aeacutetraquo katƒ oeacutesUcircan ecircplsaquorjei)110

Then Simplicius explicitly addresses PlotinusOtilde view that good and evilare related as being to non-being Simplicius rst develops a number ofcounter-arguments by way of divisions (10912-32)

(1) (1a) Either non-being does not exist at all (1b) or it is OgravesomethingOacuteBut then (1aOtilde) it has no relation whatsoever either not even one of con-trariety or (1bOtilde) it is not cut off in all respects from that which is as itparticipates in being

(continuing from option 1b)(2) Being and non-being are (2a) either separate as two substances or

(2b) they are Ograveseparately transcendent because of outstanding othernessOacute(10915 eTHORN dcent katŒ currenkbebhkuYacutean yenterntildethta currenjuacuterhmiexclnai eTHORNsUumln xvristCcedilw) In the rst case (2aOtilde) they have OgravebeingOacute in common in the second (2bOtilde)they have nothing in common and will not even share a relation of contrariety

(3) Not-being is either (3a) produced out of being or (3b) it Ogravesubsistedfrom the beginning per seOacute But if (3aOtilde) it is brought about by being it

110 Here Dexippus concurs in Cat 535-25

186 JAN OPSOMER

cannot enjoy any contrariety to it given that it has its entire existencefrom being (if it were to turn against its cause its cause would no longersustain it111) If on the other hand (3bOtilde) it has an entirely independentexistence it will be of equal dignity to being since it too would be pri-mary And there would be no reason to call the one being the other non-being It would have a principal existence (a prohgoumiexclnh ecircpntildestasiw10923-4 which is precisely what Proclus in DMS 50 denied to evil)Moreover it will not be evil since it has a primary existence It will alsobe dif cult to gure out how the two of them could ever Ogravecome togetherOacute

[Given (3b) only a third party can bring them together] Hence (3ba)if something else brings them together they will no longer be primaryBut if (3bb) they remain separate because (3b) they have neither comeinto existence the one out of the other112 nor from a prior principle113 Ogravegen-eration and this universe could not be fully establishedOacute ie the princi-ples could not be part of the same reality (they could not be used toexplain the presence of both good and bad in this world)

These objections are said to hold Ogravefor all those who posit evil and not-being at the beginning and most of all for Plotinus and for the others whostart from uni cationOacute (10930-2)

SimpliciusOtilde arguments are powerful indeed If as a Platonist you holdthat the One-Good is the principle of everything evil cannot be consid-ered a principle in its own right whether you consider this an ontologi-cally independent principle (which is actually already excluded by yourmost basic tenet) or a derived principle (PlotinusOtilde view but114 then theGood does not only cause good but also bad things) Non-being cannot

111 I would like to point out that this is not an argument against the Proclean notionof the subcontrary as for Proclus there is no such thing as a single substance that per-petually opposes the good It is the particular beings that intermittently participate thatderive power from their cause to become its opposite temporarily Hence one shouldavoid saying that the difference between Plotinus and Proclus is mainly terminologi-cal pace Beierwaltes OcircDie Entfaltung der Einheit Zur Differenz plotinischen und prokli-schen DenkensOtilde 158

112 For obvious reasons Simplicius does not even envisage the other option that thegood might be produced by evil

113 This follows from the denial of (3ba) as it is understood that a third party bring-ing them together could only do so if it produced both of them

114 Proclus therefore rejects the idea of a single principle causing evil However a problem remains whatever causes evil must itself be produced by principles in the hierarchy of the good so that the good could ultimately be held responsible afterall That is why Proclus irts with the idea that evil is in a way uncaused CfOpsomer-Steel OcircEvil without a causeOtilde 255-60 DMS 5031 non causatam aliqualiterentem


both be caused by the rst principle and be contrary to it115 SimpliciusOtildearguments are remarkably similar to those of Proclus that we examinedin sect VIII (DMS ch 31)116

Simplicius continues by saying that Ogravethose who start from uni cationOacuteare required Ograveto make the multitude that results from division adventi-tiousOacute (the problem of evil can indeed be reduced to this more funda-mental problem the transition from unity to multiplicity or in otherwords procession) and Ograveto claim that evil supervenes accidentally and hasno priority whatsoeverOacute117 This is the vocabulary and the theory that isfamiliar from DMS

Plotinus however is said to contradict himself (1102-25) Simpliciusrepeats the idea that nothing that has a derived existence ndash to be moreprecise a parasitical existence (parhypostasis 1105) ndash can be contraryto its own principle If something were completely cut off from its causeit would destroy itself Furthermore it would no longer be contrary as itwould have nothing in common with its cause any longer

It will not even be the case that the non-substantial is contrary to the substan-tial as they claim for the very substantiality will belong to them in commonand no longer will the one be being the other not-being They ought to have sub-tracted contrariety too from not-being for it to be truly not-being [ ] So nei-ther statement is to be made at all (1) that it both is-not and is a contrary and(2) that it is both ultimate and a principle ie that it creates contraries and can-not create anything at all (11013-20)

115 R Chiaradonna OcircEssence et pr dication chez Porphyre et PlotinOtilde 602 OgraveContrela s paration plotinienne de lOtildeoeacutesUcirca et la non-oeacutesUcirca Simplicius adresse des objectionssubtiles qui soulignent le caract re paradoxal dOtildeune telle doctrine du point de vue dela th orie de la participation Le commentateur observe quOtildeil est impossible dOtildeadmet-tre entre deux r alit s telles que lOtildeintelligible et la mat rielle une s paration commecelle quOtildeenvisage Plotin LOtildeun des deux termes de cette s paration d rive en effet delOtildeautre mais en m me temps le non- tre en vient ˆ avoir dans la conception plo-tinienne de lOtildecurrennantUcircvsiw une OcircconsistanceOtilde qui le rend irr ductible et le met au m meniveau par rapport ˆ ce qui en devrait tre la causeOacute

116 See esp 319-15 OgraveNow if matter stems from a principle then matter itselfreceives its procession into being from the good If on the other hand matter is aprinciple then we must posit two principles of beings which oppose each other namelythe primary good and the primary evil But that is impossible For there can be notwo rsts From where would these two come at all if there were no monad For ifeach of the two is one prior to both there must exist a single principle the Onethrough which both are oneOacute

117 in Cat 10932-1102 oethtoi gŒr tograve copyn kaUuml tgayograven currenn rxraquo protiyiexclntewcurrenpeisodiCcedildew ocircfeUcirclousi poieYacuten tograve pograve tdegw diairiexclsevw pldegyow kaUuml tograve kakograven katŒ sum-bebhkogravew currenpiginntildemenon kaUuml mhdamCcedilw prohgoaeligmenon pofaUcircnesyai Compare esp DMS5024-27 36

188 JAN OPSOMER

The arguments partly overlap with those of Proclus and are partly newthat is to the reader of Proclus Also they are elaborated in a slightly dif-ferent way At any rate all of the arguments are compatible with ProclusOtildeviews Simplicius may very well have devised the arguments himselfHowever it is equally possible that he relied on earlier sources such asIamblichusOtilde commentary on the Categories Further down in his own com-mentary Simplicius once again clashes with Ogravethose who make evil analternative principleOacute He mentions Iamblichus Ogravewho polemically devel-oped many beautiful arguments designed ltto showgt that one ought toassume that evil lies in parhypostasis and failure [ie to reach oneOtildes goal]Oacute(4185-6 tograven polloccedilw kaUuml kaloccedilw katateUcircnanta lntildegouw progravew tograve currenn parupostlsaquoseikaUuml potuxUcircamp tograve kakograven oagraveesyai deYacuten) Presumably then it is Iamblichus notProclus who is to be credited with all of these nice arguments againstPlotinus118

Department of PhilosophyUniversity of South Carolina

118 One could have argued that Simplicius imposes his own late-Neoplatonic vocab-ulary on Iamblichus (see also in Cat 13014-18 3617-12) were it not that there isindependent proof for a more ancient provenance of the parhypostasis doctrine SeeJulian ETHORNw tmacrn mhtiexclra tCcediln yeCcediln 1121 Greg Nyss in Eccl 53569-15 De opif hom1646-8 Contra Eun 37582-6 (cf Basil Hom 1721 6360) 3951-3 For po-tuxUcirca see Epict Ench 27 It is not a coincidence that Neoplatonists use parhyposta-sis language when they are discussing the Stoic doctrine of incorporeals they mayhave understood that their own term OgraveparhypostasisOacute was perfectly suited to explainthe ontological status of Stoic incorporeals (Ogravebeing parasitic on bodiesOacute) but it isequally possible that the Stoics themselves coined parhypostasis as a technical termSee OpsomerndashSteel OcircEvil without a causeOtilde 249 G Bechtle OcircDas Bšse im Pla-tonismus daggerberlegungen zur Position JamblichsOtilde Bochumer Philosophisches JahrbŸchfŸr Antike und Mittelalter 4 1999 esp 79-82 shows that many of ProclusOtilde argumentson evil were pre gured by Iamblichus Bechtle seems to have overlooked Simpl inCat 4185-6 On SyrianusOtilde use of the notion of parhypostasis (in Metaph 1078-9)see ADR Sheppard OcircMonad and Dyad as Cosmic Principles in SyrianusOtilde in Souland the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism Syrianus Proclus and SimpliciusPapers and discussions of a colloquium held at Liverpool 15-16 April 1982 editedby HJ Blumenthal and AC Lloyd Liverpool 1982 10


Proclus knew well3 as he was the author of a commentary of the Enneadsnow lost in which he must have paid special attention to the problem of evil4

It is commonly understood that when Proclus in the De malorum sub-sistentia criticizes the view that matter is the principle of evil he isaddressing the view of Plotinus Yet Proclus nowhere in the entire trea-tise on evil explicitly mentions his predecessor Indeed he refers to noneof his predecessors by name (except Plato and the interlocutors of the dia-logues) However there can be no doubt that Plotinus is ProclusOtilde maintarget This is demonstrated by the numerous passages in which Proclusparaphrases and sometimes quotes almost literally from Ennead I85 It iscon rmed by the parallel text in Simplicius where Plotinus is explicitlymentioned in a strikingly similar context (cf sect XIV) When we lookat the text more closely it becomes clear that throughout ProclusOtilde entiresection on matter (and privation) PlotinusOtilde presence is constantly felt inthe background This does not mean that when Proclus polemicizes against

3 JM Rist (OcircBasilOtildes OgraveNeoplatonismOacute Its Background and NatureOtilde Basil ofCaesarea Christian Humanist Ascetic A Sixteen-Hundredth Anniversary Symposiumedited by Paul J Fedwick Toronto 1981 137-220 and esp 137-79) has cast doubton the assumption that PorphyryOtildes edition of the Enneads (presumably 301 AD)became widely available soon after its publication He links PlotinusOtilde comparativelyslight in uence ndash in the East as well as the West ndash during the fourth century to hissurmise that PorphyryOtildes edition was hardly known or available from about 324 untilthe last quarter of the century Probably only a few copies of a very small number ofworks circulated However by the time of Proclus Athens was equipped with goodphilosophical libraries cf HD Saffrey and LG Westerink Proclus Th ologie pla-tonicienne Livre I (CUF) Paris 1968 xlviii Proclus wrote a commentary on theEnneads which proves that he had a Porphyrian edition at his disposal See the fol-lowing note

4 This can be inferred from a scholion to in Remp 13723 (237110-18 Kroll) thescholiast who is obviously well-informed is referring to other texts where Proclus dis-cusses evil DMS (tograve mcentn currenn tOgrave perUuml tdegw tCcediln kakCcediln ecircpostlsaquosevw monobUcircblAuml) a com-mentary on the speech of Diotima a commentary on Theaetetus 176A and a com-mentary on the third () Ennead OcircWhence come evilsOtilde (kaUuml currenn toYacutew eTHORNw tmacrn trUcircthncurrennnelsaquoda pntildeyen tŒ kaklsaquo) P Henry (ƒtudes plotiniennes I Les ƒtats du texte de PlotinParis-Bruges 1961 [= 1938] 8 n) suggests reading prAringthn for trUcircthn R Beutler (seebelow) considers this emendation unnecessary pointing out that the reference couldbe to Enn III2-3 [47-8] PerUuml pronoUcircaw ProclusOtilde comments on the Enneads (not nec-essarily a full-blown commentary on all of them) are further mentioned in a few otherplaces See R Beutler OcircProklos 4 NeuplatonikerOtilde RE 45 Hb (XXIII-1) 1957 1984-52 LG Westerink OcircExzerpte aus ProklosOtilde Enneaden-Kommentar bei PsellosOtildeByzantinische Zeitschrift 52 1959 1-10

5 The opening phrase and rst chapter of DMS unmistakably echo the Porphyriantitle and the rst chapter of PlotinusOtilde text Other parallels are pointed out below

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Documents

Jan Opsomer - Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter