James Barham University of Notre Dame ISHPSSB Brisbane,
Australia July 14, 2009
Slide 2
Teleology Is Back Remarkably, it has recently become almost
respectable to argue that a proper understanding of human beings
requires taking teleology seriously Not just in human thought and
action, but in biology generally Foot (2001), MacIntyre (2006),
McLaughlin (2001), Nagel (forthcoming), Okrent (2007), Schueler
(2003), Sehon (2005), E. Thompson (2007), M. Thompson (2008), Walsh
(2006), Weber & Varela (2002), Zammito (2006) Of course, the
first thing one might ask about this claim is what it means to take
teleology seriously
Slide 3
Taking Teleology Seriously? Epistemological Approach
Teleological explanation in biology is non-optional, But this tells
us more about the peculiarities of human cognition than it does
about life as such Disunity-of-Science Approach Unity of science is
a chimera; many different forms of explanation flourish
independently Teleological explanation in biology is just one of
these Realist Approach Teleological explanation in biology is
non-optional, Because it corresponds to an objectively real,
physical principle
Slide 4
What Teleological Realism in Biology Means Realism about
teleology in biology essentially means: The explananda
corresponding to teleological explanations enjoy metaphysical
parity with those corresponding to mechanistic explanations (Walsh
forthcoming) In other words, realism about teleology in biology is
the claim that: Teleology is not just an explanatory principle
There is also a corresponding metaphysical principle that ought to
be investigated as an explanandum in its own right
Slide 5
Assuming the Realist Approach In this talk, I will assume the
realist approach I will not argue for its superiority over the
other two main approaches However, I acknowledge that the realist
approach is the most controversial one, with the heaviest burden of
proof Two main aims of this talk: To motivate a particular
characterization of teleology in biology To argue for the
plausibility of this characterization
Slide 6
Teleology and Consciousness I will ask you to take one more
assumption for granted: Although our paradigm of purposiveness is
human conscious action, nevertheless, the purposiveness of human
action and its conscious, subjective, or experiential quality are
conceptually distinct See Bedau (1990) Therefore, the teleological
phenomena associated with life as such may or may not be
essentially linked to consciousness, as a matter of nomological
fact Here, I will simply bracket the question When I speak of
teleology in biology, no assumption of accompanying subjective
experience ought to be inferred
Slide 7
Is There a Normative Survival Principle? At the heart of the
realist approach to teleology in biology is the claim: Biological
survival* is a normative concept; therefore, on the assumption of
realism, there exists some real physical principle corresponding to
the normativity of biological survival Let us look at some
arguments pro and contra this highly controversial claim Note: The
notion of survival as I use it here encompasses both metabolism the
functional organization ensuring the perpetuation of the token
physical system and reproduction the process (which is itself a
particular instance of metabolism) ensuring the perpetuation of the
type physical system.
Slide 8
Arguments Pro a Normative Survival Principle It certainly seems
as though survival were a normative concept Colloquial function
talk Feeding, fleeing, fighting, reproducing, struggle for
survival, etc. Biological talk Goals, purposes, functions,
information, messages, signals, codes, computing, proofreading,
editing, etc. (see any textbook) Increasing use of term
intelligence Capacity to choose appropriate means to an end Bray
(2009), Jonker et al. (2002), Shapiro (2007) All of these ways of
describing biological phenomena are normative They all imply a
standard of success/failure, correctness/error, etc. Ultimately,
they all presuppose the normativity of survival
Slide 9
Lowes Analysis of Action In addition, it is striking that many
conceptual analyses of human action may be applied more or less
without alteration to living processes as such Consider, for
example, E.J. Lowes analysis of practical action, in the broad
sense of instrumental rationality: Just as a true belief is one
which corresponds to fact, so a good action is one which
corresponds to need. In another idiom, just as facts are the
truth-makers of true beliefs, so needs are the goodness-makers of
good actions. (Lowe 2008; 209; original emphasis)
Slide 10
Survival and Needs Obviously, the concept of needs in Lowes
account is itself in need of further analysis Lowe postpones that
question, but says he holds out no hope that a naturalistic account
of need can succeed (Lowe 2008; 212) For our purposes, needs may be
understood in relation to survival A dog has need of water in order
to survive; thus, drinking water is a good for the dog because it
contributes to its survival What is important is to see that
conceptual analyses of human instrumental rationality are directly
applicable to living processes as such I will pursue this idea
further in a moment But first let us begin the task of looking at
the notion of survival from a physical point of view
Slide 11
Survival as Dynamic Stability A living thing is a physical
system of the nonequilibrium- thermodyamic (dynamic) type
Hurricanes, candle flames, other dissipative structures For a
living system to survive is for it to persist as the kind of
dynamic physical system that it is With a lifespan that is long
compared to its thermodynamic relaxation rate For any sort of
physical system to persist is for it possess a sort of stability
For a dynamic system to persist is for it to possess a type of
dynamic stability Therefore, a living system possesses a type of
dynamic stability
Slide 12
The Notion of Functional Stability However, the type of dynamic
stability possessed by a living system is different from that
possessed by any non-living system The latter always boils down to
free energy minimization In contrast, living systems draw on
internal energy stores to act on the world to satisfy their needs
The type of dynamic stability possessed by living systems implies
the concept of action Individual goal-directed actions may be
termed functions Therefore, we may call the type of dynamic
stability possessed by living systems functional stability
Slide 13
The Normative Nexus Survival is ultimately normative for living
systems Normativity of survival implies ultimate goal-state
(purpose) to be aimed at Call it Z Survival (functional stability)
cannot be achieved without specific actions (functions)
Action-requirement implies needs (such as drinking water) Call it X
Needs imply means-end relation and hypothetical necessity X is
needed (required) for Z Hypothetical necessity implies instrumental
ought If Z is to obtain, then X ought to occur Needs and means-end
relation give rise to value ( la Lowe) X is good in case it
contributes to Z Drinking water is good (e.g., for a dog) in case
it contributes to survival Call this web of relations among
survival, action, purpose, need, instrumental ought, and value, the
Normative Nexus This analysis works equally well at any level of
the functional hierarchy
Slide 14
Example: Bacterial Chemotaxis For example, take bacterial
chemotaxis (Stock & Surette 1996) An E. coli bacterium
transitions between two motility states, running and tumbling
Running is smooth, linear motion produced by turning the flagella
counterclockwise Tumbling is random motion produced by turning the
flagella clockwise When a cell senses it is moving up an attractant
(or down a repellant) gradient, it reduces the rate of tumbling,
resulting in net movement towards (or away from) the source It is
quite natural to say: A bacterium needs attractants (typically, a
food source) to survive Similarly, it needs to avoid repellants
(typically, poison) to survive Its purpose in swimming up (or down)
a gradient is to find and consume attractants (or avoid repellants)
The flagellar mechanism is the means to this end A bacterium ought
to move toward attractant and away from repellant sources Moving up
an attractant (or down a repellant) gradient is good for a
bacterium All of this presupposes that bacteria can distinguish
attractants from repellants Bacteria partition their world into
axiological categories: Yum and yuck (Kauffman et al. 2008)
Slide 15
Arguments Contra a Normative Survival Principle Incredulous
stare The Normative Nexus is just anthropomorphic projection It
trades on equivocation Normativity is properly attributable only to
human reason Survival, properly understood, is not a normative
concept Organisms are simply machines whose parts were put into
place by natural selection By accident, some organisms happen to
attain novel configurations of their parts that happen to result in
differential reproduction Call this the Reduction Claim Functional
stability does not correspond to any single physical principle, but
is only a congeries of disparate physical and chemical processes A
normative survival principle is inconsistent with everything we
know about biology and physics Call this the Science Objection
Slide 16
Reply to Incredulous Stare The charges of anthropomorphism and
equivocation essentially beg the question Whether normativity is
properly attributable to survival and other living processes is the
issue Besides, the Normative Nexus analysis works Normative
language makes perfect sense applied even to bacteria Indeed, it is
indispensable It is virtually impossible to avoid normative
language in biology Why would this be the case, if the Normative
Nexus were nothing more than an equivocation? But what about the
Reduction Claim?
Slide 17
Reply to Reduction Claim To repeat: the Reduction Claim is that
we already have a successful mechanistic reduction of teleology and
normativity in biology Namely, we know that organisms are simply
machines put into place by natural selection Three ways of
replying: Argument from History Argument from Petitio Argument from
Extreme Plasticity
Slide 18
Argument from History History (in this case, selection history)
is not the right kind of concept to explain a dynamical property
like functional stability To speak of the history of a physical
system is a short- hand way of referring to the sequence of states
it traverses But it is the dynamics of the system and surround that
explain this sequence, not the other way around Examples: amorphous
solids (glass) vs. crystals, stars In one sense, they are
history-dependent But that just means they are dependent on the
particular details of their dynamical evolution
Slide 19
Argument from Petitio It has been pointed out repeatedly that
the theory of natural selection presupposes the functional
organization of organisms, and so cannot explain it A functionally
coherent organism must already exist before it can be selected See,
e.g., McLaughlin (2001), Walsh (2000, 2007) It is equally
well-known that the concept of a machine also begs the question of
normativity Machine is a normative concept A machine is something
that performs a function But nothing in the concept of a machine is
capable of explaining which system state counts as the functional
state See, e.g., Nissen (1997)
Slide 20
A Recent Elaboration of the Petitio Argument Recently,
West-Eberhard (2003, 2005) has further refined the Petitio Argument
Even if genetic changes are always random,* phenotypic changes
never are Because between the genotype and the phenotype is the
teleological process of phenotype construction Therefore, whatever
is subject to natural selection has already been teleologically
constructed This is a general point about all living things
However, it is powerfully demonstrated by examples of extreme
plasticity *Note: This now seems questionable (Jablonka & Raz
2009; Shapiro forthcoming), but there is no time to discuss this
issue here
Slide 21
A Note on Terminology The phenomenon in question goes by many
different names: Robustness, plasticity, adaptive capability,
phenotypic accommodation, etc. Terminology inconsistent The basic
idea is spontaneous compensation following perturbation to maintain
viability Two ways: Recovery of old steady state (robustness)
Homeostasis, healing Attainment of new steady state (plasticity)
Three-legged dogs gait A term to encompass both is metastability
Equifinality Bifurcation
Slide 22
Examples of Extreme Plasticity Cases of successful compensation
following massive perturbation of: visual system in humans
(Bach-y-Rita 1995; Ptito et al. 2005) in mice & ferrets (Tropea
et al. 2009; Von Melchner et al. 2000) in flies (Heisenberg &
Wolf 1984) locomotory system Slijpers goat (West-Eberhard 2003,
2005) Involves extensive remodeling of neural, skeletal, and
muscular systems single cells Adaptation in isolated hepatocytes
(Baker et al. 2001; Elaut et al. 2006) These capacities are
inexplicable on mainstream view These specific capacities cannot
possibly have been selected for Positing selection for such a
general capacity would concede the point at issue: Life as such has
a universal capacity for goal-directed compensation
(metastability)
Slide 23
Reply to Science Objection The Science Objection says: A
normative survival principle is inconsistent with everything we
know about biology and physics Three ways of replying: A simple
argument to show that a stability principle for living things
should be expected System-level models of cooperative phenomena in
biology Theoretical proposals for a normative survival principle
Together, these responses show that the existence of a normative
survival principle is not implausible in light of contemporary
science
Slide 24
A Stability Principle Should Be Expected The following simple
argument shows that we should expect there to be a physical
principle underlying the functional stability of living things: All
naturally stable systems derive their stability from an underlying
physical principle Organisms are naturally stable systems
Therefore, organisms derive their stability from an underlying
physical principle The idea that organisms lack any unifying
principle is highly suspect, from a physical point of view
Slide 25
System-Level Models of Cooperative Phenomena in Biology
Following are some system-level models of cooperative phenomena
(long-range coherence and coordination) in biology Brain Function
(Freeman 2001; Freeman & Vitiello 2006) Motor coordination
(Jirsa & Kelso 2004; Kelso 1995; Warren 2006) Cancer as a
tissue-level disorder (Sonnenschein & Soto 1999) Metabolic
networks (Barabasi & Oltvai 2004; Csete & Doyle 2004;
Wolkenhauer et al. 2005) Coordination of muscle contraction
(Pollack 2001)
Slide 26
Two Theoretical Proposals Two specific theoretical proposals
have been made for modeling a normative survival principle
Christensen & Bickhard (2002) Di Paolo (2005) Both of these
proposals involve cashing out the notion of autopoiesis
(self-production) in terms of nonlinear dynamics This is surely a
step in the right direction However, while something like these
proposals may be necessary for understanding a normative survival
principle, they are not sufficient
Slide 27
The Trouble with Nonlinear Dynamical Models No theoretical
proposals drawing on nonlinear dynamics alone can be sufficient for
modeling a truly normative survival principle Nonlinear dynamical
models as such are phenomenological We need to connect them up with
underlying physical principles Adding nonequilibrium thermodynamics
into the equation does not help, either Dissipative structures
still just minimize free energy We need a way to distinguish
functional stability from hurricanes, candle flames, etc.
Slide 28
A Way Forward Morrisons (2006) version of emergence* may offer
a way forward She points to what she calls theoretical principles
that are used to explain how stable states of matter can exist and
yet be autonomous (in the sense of insensitive to the details of
the lower-level dynamics) Spontaneous symmetry breaking
Renormalization Group Critical phenomena (phase transitions, etc.)
Effective field theories But why should we think that any of this
is relevant to biology? *Note: The notion of emergence is
many-faceted and controversial; however, the main objection that
any strong (ontological) version of emergence must violate Kims
causal exclusion principle has been persuasively rebutted by
Perovic (2007).
Slide 29
Aspects of the Living Phase of Matter Cytoplasm has the
following characteristics: Extreme crowding (Luby-Phelps 2000;
Wheatley 2003) Gel-like properties (Pollack 2001)
Liquid-crystal-like properties (Ho et al. 1996) Phase transitions
important to macromolecular function (Pollack 2001; Pollack &
Chin 2008) In addition, proteins are: Dynamically active
(frustrated) systems (Frauenfelder et al. 1999) Functionally
coupled to the cytoplasm (Frauenfelder et al. 2009) These facts
support the idea that Morrisons theoretical- principles-based
emergence may be involved in the living phase of matter
Slide 30
The Nature of Functional Stability The idea, then, is that the
universal theoretical principles would provide some continuity
across emergent levels Example: spontaneous symmetry breaking While
a new particular law and/or conservation principle would come into
existence with each new type of existent Life would require its own
conservation principle corresponding to the property of functional
metastability This statement by Hiroaki Kitano nicely expresses
what is needed: The key issue is whether it is possible to find a
formalism in which robustness and its trade-offs could be defined
so that robustness is a conserved quantity (Kitano 2007; 3;
emphasis added)
Slide 31
Normative Survival Principle Not Unscientific If such a
formalism could be found, then a rigorous theoretical explanation
of the normative survival principle might be possible Because the
functional metastability of life would be based on its own
conservation principle, this proposal would not be tantamount to
reducing life to another principle, like the conservation of energy
Given what we know about biology and physics, the existence of an
emergent principle governing the sui generis functional dynamics of
the living phase of matter is not out of the question (Laughlin et
al. 2000) The very existence of such theoretical proposals shows
that the idea of a normative survival principle is not absurd or
inconceivable
Slide 32
Conclusion Extending theoretical principles derived from
fundamental and condensed-matter physics to encompass the living
phase of matter seems to offer the best hope of giving an adequate
scientific account of the normative nexus and the functional
metastability of living things
Slide 33
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