Jacobson Drama of Metaphysics

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Chapter7

Heideg Be\ Winnicott, andThe Velaeteen abbit

Anxiety, Toys,and theDrama ofMetaphysics

Kirsten ]acobson

TheVelveteen abbit:Or How ToysBecomeReal s achildren's story written

by Margery Williams in 1922.1The story tells the tale of a toy rabbit that isportrayedasprivatelyself-conscious, arrating he often diffrcult psychologi-

cal experienceshat the rabbit undergoes sa toy belonging o a youngboy.

The tale culminates n the rabbit's magic transformation nto a real rabbit. I

will argue hat, ust, by portraying he rabbit as a self-conscious ubject,Wil-

liams dramatizes the psychological and intersubjective dynamism through

which the child (who has he toy) is developing.Second,by presentinghis

tale asthe life of a toy, Williams showsus the true (educative) ole that the

toy is playing for the child. Third, by showinguswhat s involved n becoming

real and----correlatively-in experiencing heworld as rea7,Williams showsus

that our ability to experience eality as such s mediatedby our relations withotherpeopleand, ndeed,by our relationswittr toys (ol as D. W. Winnicott

calls them, "transitionalobjects"). The story of The Velveteen abbit, thus,

allows readers the opportunity to advance heir own understanding of the

natureand meaning of reality.

SITES OF REALITY IN TTIE WLWTEEN RABBIT

The VelveteenRabbit works to consider what makessomething eal. With its

subtitle-Or How Tbys Become Real-the story itself explicitly announces

that it is performing this "work." This issue s presenteddirectly at the very

start of the tale, when the toy rabbit is being compared avorably with a realrabbit: The toy has "real" whiskers, and it is fat and bunchy "as a real rabbit

should be."At the close of the tale. we read that the rabbit hassecured he



2 Chapter

very reality that was n question hroughout.There are ten distinct siteswhere

the work of discerningwhat is real is being set up (or performed) n the story.This chapter explains how these en siles lay out the essentialparametersor

the experienceof reality.

Site 1: At the startof the story, a velveteenabbit s presentedo fhe boy as a

Christrnas ift in his stocking.For somehours, he rabbit s the boy's favoritegift; but by the end of the evening,after many otherparcelsareopened, he

rabbit is forgotten.

Site 2: After the festivities are over, the toy rabbit is stored away in the toyroom-a relatively unnoticed tem amidst many other more modern toys.

At this point in the story, Williams's narrative shifts from a third-person

reportageof events n the household o a fictionalizeddepictionof the toys'

experienceas if they were to possess*y, if not all, elementsof humanconsciousness. he anthropomorphized oys arepresentedashaving views of

which toys count as superior to the others. Thosetoys that are favored pos-

sessmechanical tructures r are at leastmodelsof things hat arepractically

relevant o humans. n this context, he velveteen abbit s viewedasoutdated

and alsoas"made o feel himself very insignifrcantandcommonplace."

Site 3: This'pathetic" character fthe rabbit is refigured,however, hrough

conversations e is depictedas having with the "Skin Horse,"an anthropo-

morphized ocking horseportrayedas wiser than most of the present oys,

in partbecause e hasseenso many mechanical oys come andgo, breaking

due to their fragility, and n part because sthe Skin Horseexplains n onepivotal conversationwith the rabbit, he "was made real" through the ove and

care of one of the boy's uncles.At the conclusionof this scene, he rabbit is

describedas having becomeadreamer, magining andhoping for a time when

he, too, might bemade eal by the boy.

Site 4: The velveteenabbit s picturedagain rom an externalperspective s

something o cleanup, when heboy's caretaker,Nana, s tidying a room full

of "stuff." He also turns out to be somethingquick to grab and appropriate

for bedtimewhen Nana needs omething o replace he boy's missing oy ofpreferenceor cuddling.

Site 5: We look on as the rabbit becomes he boy's favorite toy. The boyplays directly with the rabbit, takeshim on outings,has the rabbit standby

while he does other things, and takes the toy to bed every night. The rabbit

is sometimes eft behind by the boy; but it is then searched or and foundbecauseherabbit matters o theboy and t hasbecomeapartof how he does

things. n describing hese ealeventsof a boyplayingwith andcaring or his



Heidegge6Wnnicott, andT\e Velveteen Rabbit 3

toy, Williams presents he relationship of the boy and the rabbit in tenns fit-

ting for arelationshipbetweenwo humanbeings.They aredepictedasdoingthings ogether,aswhispering o one another, nd asplaying gameswith each

other.Williams also describes he rabbitas f hepossesseshe ability to have

caresof his own: The rabbit is describedas missing he Skin Horseback n

the toy room, as struggling o get used o being nearly smothered nder the

boy's bed covers,asbeing happy o be accompanyinghe boy, and as snug-gling closer o theboy at bedtime.The boy's sense f the iving character f

his relationship with therabbit is capturedmostpointedly whenthe velveteen

rabbitgoesmissingone night and heboy imploresNana o find it. When she

exclaimswith frustration hat herecovered abbit,now dampwith dew from

thegarden,s ust a toy and hat heboy is makinga fuss overamere oy, theboy, indignant, esponds hat the rabbit s not a toy: His bunny s "real." The

narrative marks this announcement s a significant moment or the once againanthropomorphized abbit: The rabbit is described asrealizing that he hasat

last been ransformed rom a mere oy into something eal.

Site 6: Shortly after this depicted ansformation, the boy leaves hevelveteen

rabbit n a woodedareaand ive rabbitsapproachhe snrffed oy. The natural

rabbits and the toy-turned-real abbit arepresented s havinga conversation

and ultimately an argumentabout what they are. The natural rabbits argue

that the velveteen abbit cannotbe real because e cannotmove ofhis own

accordandhe smellsand ooks different han hey do.The velveteen abbit sportrayedas ndignantandsadat their rejectionof him asreal.He insists hat

he hasbeenmade ealby the boy and, hus,he onws heis real.

Site 7: Whenthe boy falls ill with scarlet ever, he rabbit s pushedhereandthere under the boy's bedclothes.The scene s narrated argely throughtheviewpointof the rabbit,who s described sbeing boredby the boy's inability

to play with him, aswhisperingsoftly into the boy's ear about what they will

do when the boy is well again,as knowing he needs o be there or the boy,

and as taking care not to be discovered by the adults who might take him

away rom the boy if discovered.

Site E: As theboy becomes ealthier, here s discussion y adults n the oom

of an upcoming trip to the seashore,where the air will help the boy's furtherrestoration.There s also discussionof the need o burn all the bedding and

toys that surrounded he boy during his illness. The rabbit is portrayedas not

recognizing himself as a toy or as something hat might be burned: He is con-

vinced that he, too, will accompany he boy on the seashorerip. Returningto the evel of the third-personnarrativeof the story, Williams describesherabbit as being gatheredwith other bedroombelongingsandput into a bag



4 Chapter

to be burned at a later time by the gardener.As the velveteen abbit is tossed

out, the boy sleepsn a new bed with a new toy rabbit he hasbeengiven.Theboy is described s not evennoticing thedisappearancef the velveteen ab-

bit, perhaps,he story recounts,because fhis enthusiasmor his upcoming

travels to the seaside-*itself sucha wonderful thing that he could think of

nothing else."

Site 9: The rabbit is now describedas suffering n the garden,as cold, wet,

and alone. The rabbit remembers he wonderfrrl things that he shared with

the boy and recognizes hat thoseeventsarecomingto an end.He laments:

"Of what use s it to be loved and ose one's beauty and becomeReal if it

all end[s] like this?" From a tear that falls down the rabbit's face,a flower

blooms andbears orth the "nursery magic Fairy." The fairy turns the rabbit

from somethinghat was"Real to the Boy . . . because e oved [therabbit]"

into something"Real to every one." This thread of the story continuesas thefairy escorts he rabbit to the company of other rabbits, instructing them to

be kind to him and to teach him what he needs o know to live in Rabbitland,

and as encouraging im to run andplay. The velveteen abbit s describedas

experiencinghimself as not yet ready to do this becausehe is immersed n

rememberinghis reality as the stuffed rabbit that could not move ike these

living ones. ndeed, t is not of his own volition that he is presented s mak-

ing new movements:Rather,his leg is portrayedasmoving spontaneously o

scratchat a tickle he feels; from this event,he is describedas realizing his

new statusas a living, self-movingbeing. He is presented s ecstaticat this

movement: "He wasa ReaI Rabbit at last, at home with the other rabbits."

Site 10: Many months after this fictionalized transformation, here is

an encounterdepicted between the former-velveteen abbit and the boy.

The boy sees two rabbits peering at him from the bracken, and he

notices that one of the rabbits looks 'Just like my old Bunny that was

lost when I had scarlet fever " The story ends with a further articu-

lation of the former-velveteen abbit as having an experience of the

encounteras well: "But [the boy] never knew that it really was his own

Bunny, come back to look at the child who first helpedhim to be Real."

What we see n thesepresentationsf ten different vantage ointson real-

ity is not merely anengagingand entertaining ale, but also anastuteworking-

through of the themes and issues hat do, in fact, have to be recognizedand

negotiated n developing he abiliry to experience he world as "real." [n thesections hat follow, the chapterwill first summarize he basic hrust of Wil-

liams's presentation f reality through hesevarying ten sites.The last two



Heidegge4 Winnicon, andThe Velveteen Rabbit 5

sectionsdiscuss he deeperexistential andpsychoanalyticdimensions of this

processof coming o experienceeality.The story of The VelveteenRabbit presentsa developingaccount of the

significance of both sef-definedness and other-deftnednessor securing a

thing's characteras somethingboth distinct from and integratedwith other

things, as a partof reality. Irt us begin with the senseof self-definedness,

which is taken up both objectively (with the senseof self-motion) and subjec-

tively (with the sense f self-conscious elf-interpretation).

In Physics,Book I[, Chapter 1, the GreekphilosopherAristotle (38+322

BC) distinguishes etweena naturalsubstance nd an artifrcial substance.2

Somethingnaturaland hus real in a moreprimary sense, e says, s something

that moves tself. This issueof being a self-movingbeing s thematicized n

a numberof sites nThe VelveteenRabbit. When the rabbit s still housed n

the oy room,he and he other oys aredepictedashavingconversations bouttheir internal workings [sites2 and 3]. Themoderntoys affirm their superior-

ity to the stuffed rabbit, owing to their modern mechanical workings. While

it is not true that the other toys are strictly speakingself-moving-indeed,

they are precisely artificial things-the theme of self-motion is nonetheless

at play here through the conEastbetween the characteristics of these toys

and the characteristics f the velveteen abbit. Such toys, when wound-up,

for example, appear o have a characteristic action, in contrast to the inert

and static characler of the rabbit. This theme returnsafter the velveteen rab-

bit has beenmade"real" by the boy andhas,oneday,been eft behind n a

wooded area where he meets natural rabbits [site 6]. The velveteen rabbit is

presentedastrying to discernwhere the "clockwork stuck out" of these ab-

bits becausehey movedof their own accord ike those oys that were wound

up by someone lse. The issueof movement s recognizedby the velveteen

rabbit whenthenaturalrabbits askhim to move and he cannot.The velveteen

rabbit insists o them thathe "can ump higher than anything," but he omits

telling them that this umping occurs when the boy throws him. While theboy

and the velveteen abbit both nsist at varyingpointson the rabbit's realness

[sites5 and6], we seeat the endof the story hat even hey recognize hat heyhave both beenoperatingn the realmof the maginary sites9 and 10]. Forthe velveteen abbit, this recognitionarriveswhen,having been made rulyrealby the fairy, he discovers e n fact can move of his own accord site9].Indeed,as we sawearlier, this revelation comesabout when the rabbit's hindtoe lifts to scratchan itch without his thinking: His body now possessesninternalprinciple of motion of its own. For the boy, this revelationhappens

when he no0eshat a natural rabbit he sees n the woods (in fact, his formerstuffed rabbit now become eal) is like his former velveteen abbit [site 10].Overall, then, we see n the story a progressiveeducation nto the way in



6 Chapter l

which the possession f the internalprinciple of motion is a significant ele-

ment in a thing's characteras a self-defrned iece of reality, and, thus, asnaturally real rathet than as fabricated.

We find an amplificationof this self-definednessn theexistence f subjec-

tive beingswho arecapable f self-conscious elf-interpretation. ere,we are

dealing not only with a being hatpossessestself (soto speak),owing to its

ability to define itself from within through its motions of growth, nutrition,

and locomotion. We arenow dealingwith a being thatpossessesn ability

to consciouslydefine its character,ts actions,and, ultimately, its ways of

engaging he reality around t. This theme s perhaps he most prominent

theme of The VelveteenRabbit. From the start to the end of the story, the

velveteen abbit s depictedasquestioningwhathe is, as striving to be real,

and as consideringwherehe fits into reality. At a numberof points,both the

boy and he rabbitpushback againstothers'claims hatoppose heir sense freality. This insistence s apparentmost notably n the scene n which Nana

challenges he boy's sense f what his velveteen abbit s [site5] and n the

scene n which thevelveteenabbit s confrontedby natural abbitswho deny

he is real like they are [scene6]. While Nanaand the anthropomorphizednat-

ural rabbitsare ultimately correct n their interpretations f objective reality

at thesepoints,we see,nonetheless, ignifrcantsubjectiveand self-defining

actions n the claims of the boy andthe anthropomorphizedvelveteen rabbit.

While the boy and the toy may be objectively incorrect, they are demonstrat-

ing theability to shape hemselves f their own accord-that is, to inaugurate

self-consciously self-definedpinciple of motion.These acetsof the story

point to the ontological rreducibility of self-conscious ubjectivity. As the

themeof objective ncorrectnessmakesclear,however, he educafion nto the

natureof self'-consciouseality s not completesimplywith the recognitionof

its existence.As the story shows,we need o go beyond his simple experi-

ence of self to ttre integration of this experiencewith that of others, through

negotiatingwith their ways of defining us.

The reality of a thing is wrappedup in a context in which certain thingsmafter and other things do not mafter. Though it is significant that the natu-

ral rabbits can move of their own accord, he significanceof this reality is

demonstratedwith and in relationship o other things (i.e., in a reality thatinvolves perceptionby other things). The anthropomorphizedvelveteen rab-

bit is depictedagainand again as trying to figure out his reality. He doesso preciselyby engagingwith other beings who can et him see something

abouthow he countsor doesnot count. The boy, too,goes hrough a similar

strugglewhen he assertshis own view of reality in the face of his Nana's[site 5]. [n thesestruggles,both the boy and he rabbit arepreciselycaptur-

ing the struggle or mutual recognition hat Hegel describesas essential or



Heidegge4 Wnnicott, andTheYelveteen Rabbit 7

developing self-consciousness.3hevelveteenabbit begins o achievean nitial

sense f himself asa notablepieceof reality ttrough theboy's care or him; therabbit experiences imself asmade eal by the boy through his care sites4, 5,

and 61.The velveteen abbit is depictedasfinally achieving rue reality, when

at the end of the story, he has not only been urned nto a natural, self-moving

real rabbit, but alsoparakes in the motions"as the othen did" lsite 9]. Reality

arisesnot only throughhis motion, but also through his motion that is akin to

and accepted y othersascounting as eal. As described reviously, herabbit s

turned rom something hat was"Real to theBoy. . . because e oved [therab-'

bitl" into something ReaI to every ond' [site 9, emphasismine]. Sening aside

thefact that this transformations accomplishedn thestoryby a fairy, the activ-

ity that s associatedwith this transfonnation s the mmersion nlo theworld of

otherrabbitsand the learning of what he needs o know to live in Rabbitland.

The velveteen abbit is made securely eal at last when he is not only amongthe live rabbits,but also when he is partakingof their rules, their motions and

actions,and their waysof being-when he is at home n a reality both self- and

otherdefined. As we saw in site 9, he became a Real Rabbit at last,a lnme

with the other rabbits' (emphasismine).

This development of the rabbit making a home n reality with others)distin-

guishes he rabbit's realiry from the Skin Horse's.The Skin Horsehad earlier

told the rabbit that he had himself beenmade eal through he ove of the boy's

uncle; and this history, indeed, mportantly points to the significance of mat-

tering to another. Nonetheless, he Skin Horse remains n an arena--the toy

room-where his reality is securedonly by one imagining child, and indeed

by a child who has ong sincegrown old and eft the Skin Horseand this idio-

syncraticand childhood-bound reality" behind[site

3]. In contrast, he rab-

bit" who has become eal, has his reality secure, ndependentof the whim of

one individual's imagination. In recognizing he limit of private imagination,

we see he demand or self-conscious eality emerge nto the sharedsenseof

a public reality.n Without this emergence,self-consciousness annot sustain

itself adequately; r, if it does, t is consigned o the realm of theprivate.Suchprivacy can maintain tself only in a highly insulatedsituation--one protected

from the inevitable challenges f others.The boy's privatereality with his vel-

veteen abbiL for instance,quickly encounteredhe challengeofhis Nana, and

ultimately was endedwhen his doctor andparentsdetemrined he stuffed rabbit

needed o be burned. n doing so, his doctor,parents,and caretakercared ess

about the possible(and, at this point, unuttered)demands hat the boy might

have madeof them to respect his" reality [sites5 and 8] thanabout he objec-

tive demandsof natural reality. The securingof reality requires wo things: thatwe maintainour internalprinciple of definition and thatwe work to coordinate

this self-definition with the demandshatothersand their self-definition make



8 Chapter I

uponus. Our reality is, thus, establishedn our work of makinga home both

within ourselvesand within others, n recognizing he ireducibility of ourself-conscious ubjectivity.At the same ime, we hold our reality answerable

to the perspectivesof others and thus to the publicly recognizable world of

naturally self-moving ealities.

The variousepisodes f The VelveteenRabbit teachus to recognize hese

basic aspects f what it means or something o be real, and for us to expe-

rience something as such. As we will now turn to see, he story also opens

up other crucial existentialandpsychoanalytic spects f our experience f

reality.

HEIDEGGE& T}IE WLWTEEN RABBIT,

AND THE ANGUISH OF REALITY

In her anthropomorphicporrayal of the toy rabbit, Williams dramatizes he

experience f a subjectgrapplingwith its own sense f itself-grappling with

thequestionof what t is. In so doing, he authorputson display he struggles

of every subject.Though we are not toy rabbits, we nonetheless row up

by struggling with the questionof what reality is and, ndeed, whether we

are real.s Thus the toy rabbit's experienceputs on display for us the very

struggles that the boy in the story is likely going through. Furthermore, the

emotional eaction eaders ave o thisbook arguably eflects he fact thatwe

all can mplicitly recognizeour own story n the storyof therabbit'sstruggleto establishhis own proper participation in reality.

As wasdiscussedn the first part of this chapter,much of the sruggle of

becoming eal is learning o negotiate he "dialecticof recoglition," that s,

learning to negotiatewith the perspectives f othersand thus to establisha

senseof our own self-worthand the worth of our interpretationof things

that is coherently ntegratedwith evaluationsmadeby others. "Becoming

real," andproperlyexperiencing he world as real are developed ractices.

So whereaswe often treat reality as somethingsimply given, whose basic

character s one of enduring ixity, we can see,on thecontrary, hatreality is

better understood s the achieved ituationof a mutual belongingof subjec-tivity and objectivity. The experience of reality is not given, but rather it is

dependent n how we takeup our own dynamic elationship o the world. In

short, eality is an experience vailable o a self-consciouslyreebeing. Rec-ognizing this correlation of freedomand reality is experientiallychalleng-

ing. The recognition equiresus to let go of our sense f the fixed and aliencharacter f the real and,simultaneously,o feel the responsibilitywe have n

constitutingthe real. GermanphilosopherMartin Heidegger(1889-1976),



Heidegge4 Wnnicott, andTlrc Velveteen Rabbit 9

in Being and Time,argues hat anxiety s theprimary experience f this cor-

relationof freedomand eality. This chapterposits hat this anxiety s at theroot of the emotional eaction hat readershave o the storyof the velveteen

rabbit.6This chapternow turns o Heidegger's iscussion f anxiery,n order

to understand he experienceof the velveteen abbit (and, thus, of the boy

whoseexperiences thereinmodeled)and the experience f the reader.

The story of The VelveteenRabbit is about he near-death f a child and

also of a rabbit. Both boy and abbit survive,but thestory doesnot leave he

readerwith a memoryof triumph or oy. Rather, t is a storyof loss,of being

torn away from previous forrns of closenessand intimacy, of radical shifts

in what counts as important, and of the often arbitrary happenings hat can

sparksuchchanges.T he story confrontsus with what we might describeas

the "magic-like" characterof reality. Reality is not fixed from the outside;

instead, his story brings out ways n which it can sometimes eemmore asthough something ike whimsy or magic is at the helm of reality---{r at least

involved in its steerage.Reality, this story suggests, s contextualizedby

somethingelse.Reality s not as solid and mmediateaswe typically take t

to be. While the founding of reality is not, of course,basedon magic,Martin

Heidegger'sanalysisof humanexistencen Being and Time allowsus to see

that there s indeeda certain unfounded"element o reality, a certainway in

which reality cannotsupport tself.8

We are not beings set against a prefonned world.eRather,Heidegger

argues,t is preciselyour ability to care hatprovides he basiccontextwithin

which anythingcanmatter.Thus even heabiliry to countas eal s an ssueof

"mattering," a matterof how we careaboutsomeaspectof our experience.lo

The world, in other words, is ontologically incapable of forcing its nature

upon us as subjects.The world needsus to care about t in a certainway if

it is to have the experiential characterof being somethingreal. This is not to

say hat we simply makeup theworld we desireor need.Thereare,of course,

factual realities hat we encounterand o which we must respond.That said,

the way in which these ealitiesare held togetherby us in a meaningfuland

orientedwhole-in a world-is madepossibleonly because e arebeings/or

thesakeof which other things are-the beings by which anything (including

ourselves) an count as"being" at all.

In our daily lives, however, we do not typically think of ourselvesas

making he world possible n this way, andwe typically do not feel the deep

existential anxiety accompanying his recognition. nstead,we think of the

world and its contents as ndependent rom us and "out there," and, thus, as

something we are simply running up against.When we think of the world asfixed and out there n this manner.we also end to think of ourselvesas"in"

the world like water s in a glass-the relationshipof an isolatableobject n



10 Chapter

an independentlydefined container. We are so habituated to ttris everyday

way of thinking about ourselves hat it is unusual or us to recognize hatwe are as being in the world-that we are the meaning-givers hat make the

world possible.The VelveteenRabbit helps o illustrate his often unnoticed

characterof our creative engagementwith the world. We are at homein the

world, in the senseof having establisheda familiar, coherent,and coordinated

relationshipwith natureandwith othersubjects. t the same ime,we arealso

not at home in the wodd, in the senseof having to exercisean irreducible

freedomand creativity n making our experiencemeaningful.rr

The rabbit regularly reflects this uncercaintyor the not-at-homecharacterof

our way of being.He repeatedly inds himself on the outsideof where hings

seem eally to count.Hepreciselystruggleswith shaping is own sense f the

worth of himself and of things. Through the rabbit, we are confronted with

the experience fsubjectivity, as well as he anxiety ofexperiencing oneselfas "not belonging." Though we who are reading the story recognize he

subjectivity of the rabbit,the rabbit s typically treatedby the boy's parents,

Nana, and the doctorasa mere hing to be storedaway,movedaround,and,

indeed,desffoyedfneed be. This "thing" perhaps eld a sense fspecialness

on the day of its presentationo the boy, but otherwise, t seems t is largely

that samestuffed abbit from beginning o end or them [sites1, 4, 5, and 8].

In the uxtapositionof these wo perspectives n the rabbit's reality, we see

the terrible misapprehensionnvolved in treating a subject as a mere thing.

Though the subjectivity of the rabbit is a mere fiction, the subjectivity of

the boy is not. We are thus alerted to the demand nvolved in accurately and

fairly respectinghe reality that s theboy's subjectivity. ndeed, his failure

to appreciate he boy's subjectivity s presumablywhat is at stakewhen the

boy challengesNana'sportrayalof the rabbit asa mere hing. In treating he

rabbit in this way, Nana ails to appreciatehe mportanceof the boy's feel-

ings; she fails to appreciate he way the rabbit matters to him.

In insisting hat he rabbit s a mere hing, Nana s relying upon he'bbjec-

tive" interpretation of reality. It is certainly true that the maturity of ourperspectivedoesrequireus to recognize he public and objective characterof

the natural world as winning out over our merely private imaginings. At the

same ime, however, he merely objective view of realiry fails to recogrize

the subjectivity-the care-that Heidegger dentifiesas behind this experi-

ence of objectivity (and, ndeed, he dialectic of intersubjectiveecognition

that we saw to be integral o this experience).On onehand,Nana eflectsan

appropriatelyadult perspective n that she has earned he lessonof objectiv-

ity. On the other hand, however, Heidegger'sphilosophyand the narrativeof The VelveteenRabbit point precisely o the insufFrciency f this "adult"perspective,or it is a denialof the essentialityof subjectivity; hat is, it is



Hei.degge4Winnicott,ndT\eYelve0eenabbit ll

a denial that prior to reality is "meaning."r2Nana's attitudecan actuallybe

seenas a kind of resistance, n attitudeclosed o revisiting the possibilitiesinherent n the meaningsof things.

To allow ourselves o be vulnerable o the opennessof meaning s to open

ourselves o a cer[ain "ungrounded"elementpresentat the basis of our being

in the world. It could be massivelyunsettling, or instance, or Nana to con-

sider that a stuffed rabbit could be anything other than a toy to be tidied ordelivered for the boy's arnusement,especially if she were to consider that

therewere evels of reality createdand securedby the small boy for whom shetends. ndeed,sheseemsa bit aghastwhen shenoticessomething hat loohsdifferent, almostwise, about he rabbit themorning after the boy has declared

the toy real [site5]. Theboy, t is true, s not an adult,andhis maginativeandplayful anitudetowardshis toysreflectsthe mmaturity of a child who has not

yet fully learnedo experiencehe world as eal. Nonetheless,he opennessonovel possibilitiesof meaning hat is revealed n play can tself be a corrective

to the objective attitude.As Heideggersuggests, ur true maturity or authentic-

ity lies n suchan openness.

Heideggerargues hat for at least two reasons, t is not surprising that wetend not to feel (andalsowantnot to feel) the trngroundedness" r the not-at-homecharacter f our existence.13irst, andperhapsmostobviously, t isliterally and profoundly unsettling to olu daily lives to feel the nothingness

of our being. There are countless iversionsby which we can anddo readily

distractourselveswhen we begin o feel out of sortsor anxious.Thesediver-sionsare our way of " . . . flee[ing] in the ace of the not-at-home"' hat s sounsettling o us.raSecond,even f we are not willfully distractingourselvesin suchways, our very way of havinga wodd is essentiallydistracting, or itis preciselyour nature o make or ourselvesa home, a world of familiarity.As Heideggerwrites:

Daseins proximallyand or themostpartalongsi.dehe borld" of its concem.This "absorptionn . . ." hasmostly he character f Being-lostn thepublic-ness f the they."Dasein as,n the ,rrstnstance,allenaway rom tselfasan authentic otentialityor Being ts Self,andhas allen nto the"world." . . .Not-Being-its-selfunctions s apositivepossibilityof that entitywhich, nits essential oncern,s absorbedn a world. Thiskind of not-Beinghas o beconceiveds hatkindof Beingwhich sclosesto Dasein nd n whichDaseinmaintainstself or themostpart.15

Thus, the world for the most part preventsus from noticing the meaning-

grounding characterof our existence. This occurs both when we wish toevade he responsibilities f our freedomand alsosimply owing to the very

structureof our way of being.r6



12 Chapter

Anxiety always belongs o us, in splteof our abilities or tendency o avoid the

feeling of worry that comeswith recognizingourselvesas at the coreof mean-ing. Heidegger lgues that "[t]he kind of Being-in-the-worldwhich is tanquil-

lized and familiar is a mndeo/Dasein's uncanniness, ot the reverse.From an

exisrcnrtaLontologicaloint of view, the 'not-at-home'must be conceived s

the moreprimordial phernmcnon."rTHeidegger argues hat this anxiety mostprofoundly presents tself to us in our experienceof our own mortality, our"being-towards-death."n grapplingwith the meaningof our own death,we areconfrontedwith our realityasmeaning-givers,s subjects.r8ne's death s notjust an objectivechangewithinthe world (as t wouldbe to an outsideonlooker);but rather it is, for the person, he very elimination of the phenomenon f theworld. The meaningof 'bne's" deathbrings to the fore the correlation of free-dom and reality.

When the rabbit is thrownout to be burned,hepreciselyexperiences formof anxiety-this time a deep sadness round the seemingmeaninglessnessfbeing made real-if it is all simply to end [sites8 and especially 9]. Here heseems losest o facing the utter nothingness ecuringhis reality. If we view therabbitas an llustration of thestruggles hat humansencounter n grapplingwith

reality, his anxiety reflectsa recognition hat s uniquely calledfor from eachofus, as ndividual subjects-that we know that we are not "settled" things, thatwe are he bearersof meaningand choice.

Thnrughthe experience f the velveteen abbit,the reader s brought nto anencounterwith thebasic stuggles that definehumanity's subjectivity. It is thisstruggle hat resonateswith readerswho feel troubled by the developmentsnthe story.The drama of negotiatingour senseof our own subjectivity with thedemandsof objective reality is not ust ageneralsffuctureof everyone'sexperi-ence,however; t is also he developmental rocesshatpreciselydefines he ifeof the child. To consider his point firther, considerpsychoanalyticheoristD.W. Winnicott's(1896-1971)analysis f tansitionalphenomenan the ives ofinfantsand children. His analysisconcerning he strugglewe have n grapplingwith the foundationsof reality conn@ts his struggledirectly backto childhoodexperience.Thus Winnicott's ideaspertainclosely to the distinctive theme ofThe VelveteenRobbit-namely, to the toy that inhabitsthe transitional realmbetween magination andreality.

PSYCHOANALYTIC INSIGHTS INTO THE TRANSTTIONATENGAGEMENT WTIH THE TOY

In his chapter TransitionalObjectsand TransitionalPhenomen4"D. W. Win-nicott varyingly describes his movement n the following ways: asthe move-ment from intemal life to external ife, the movement rom puresubjectivityto



Heidegger Wnnicott, andThe VelveteenRabbit 13

objectivity, the movement rom immersion o experience, r the movement rom

a world of "(magical) omnipotentconfiol" to reality.reWinnicott's analysisbearsdirectly on ssuesof differing ways weexperience r do not experiencehings as

reality, and especially on the crucial phaseof development n childhood when

there s aprofoundgrowth nto the world of realif. His analysis ocuses ntently

on the resistance ndpainsof comingto facereality.Further,he theorizesabout

thenecessary firggle we will continue o face throughoutour lives aroundour

desireand need o balance he ultimately unbalanceableensionbetweensubjec-

tivity andobjectivity. When speakingof thisstruggle,Heideggerusesexistential

and metaphysical erms ather hanpsychoanalytic nes.To consider he earliestpsychologicalsigns of our existential dentity, this chapter's discussion urns

now to look closely at Winnicott's analysisof fhe corequalitiesof life before,

during, andafter the earliestand most ntense ransitionalperiod-namely that

of our moving from infancy throughchildhood.This chapterwill also examinetransitional experiencesn what we could consider he adult stanceof being in

reality and experiencing ealiry.

Winnicott proposeshat an infant begins n a world of pure subiectivity. At

this scage,here s to a significant degreeno differentiation between he self and

other, between nfant andmother,andso forth.m Winnicott describes he rela-

tionship of motherand nfant in this way:

The mother,at the beginning, y an almost100percentadaptation ffords heinfant he oppormnityor tlrc llusion hatherbreasts partof the nfant. t is, asit were, nderhebaby'smagical onfiol.The same anbe said n termsof infantcaren general,n thequiet imesbetween xcitements. mnipotences nearlyafactof experience.2r

In contrast,adult ife involves he recognition hat here san external eality that

doesnot conform to one'spersonalwhims,desires,or comrnands. his external

reality in fact pressests demandsupon us. The adult attitude s one in which

we recognizeour regular need o accommodate urselves o what s beyond us,

rather han theopposite.

Winnicott's analysisfocuseson the essential ntermediatestate in which

the infant is neither wholly absorbed n his or her subjectivity or "illusion," asWinnicott describest nor yet more or less accommodatedo the externalchar-

acterof reahry.n n this intermediatestage,what Winnicott calls "transitional

objects" figure largely. Transitional objects are objects not yet experienced

securelyas "not me" objects. But significantly they are objects hat no longer

fully give themselves ver to the shapingpower of the nfant. They are objects

that remain defined to a significant degreeby the private whim of the infant.But the infant's experienceof them is also characteizpdby "someabrogation

of omnipotence."23One key to this abrogation s that the transitional object

". . . seems o the nfant to give warmth, or to move,or to have exture,or to



14 Chapter

do something hatseems o show t hasvitaliry or reality of its own."2a his

object no longer gives way exclusively to the infant, but rather suggests,instead,somedegreeof an nternalprincipleof beingof its own. Because he

infant still is not dealing entirely with an object "from without," Winnicott

argues hat he nfant'sgrapplingwith such ransitionalphenomenamarks he

'lnfant's joumey from thepurely subjective o objectivity," and"the transi-

tionalobject(pieceof blanket,etc.) s whatwe seeof this ourneyof progress

towardsexperiencing.2s

While this 'Journey of progresstowards experiencing"may be most

explicit in the infant, Winnicoff describes he young child as continuing to

work on this transition. Indeed, Winnicott argues hat the taskof making thejourney from subjectivity o objectivity s one hat continues o somedegree

for the entiretyof human ife.26

It is assumederehat he askofreality-acceptances never ompleted,hatnohumanbeing s free romthe strainof relating nner andouter eality, and hatrelief from his strainsprovided y an ntermediate reaof experience hich snotchallengedarls, eligion, tc.).This ntermediatereas n direct ontinuitywiththeplayarea f thesmall hildwho s "lost" n play.27

Winnicott emphasizeshe "relief from strain" providedby both the child's

transitionalobjectand headult's engagementn what he describes s"inter-

mediateareas." n both the child's and he adult's cases, hekey relief is pro-

vided by two features of the transitional experience.First, in transitional or

intermediate henomena, e havean experience f the world asbeing united

with us, ather han esistingus; our subjectivity s thereby onfirmed.Second,

otherpeoplegive us eave o enjoy this sensewithout challenge" heparents

of thechild recognize,Winnicott argues, the strain nherent n objectiveper-

ception,anddo notchallengehe nfant n regard o subjectivityor objectivityjust here where here s thetransitionalobject."28 imilarly, adults,Winnicott

theorizes,allow other adults the room "to enjoy the personal ntermediate

area" as long as they arenot demanded o share hat view.a In other words,

these ntermediate areasare those n which agreements not required. Indeed,

these ntermediateareasmay end up being sites of intimate camaraderie nso-

far as they are optional arenas n which two adults may discover they share

commonviewsnot demanded f them by reality. Moreover,Winnicottargues

that "the intenseexperiencing hat belongs o the arts and to religion and to

imaginative iving, and o creativescientificwork" is in directcontinuitywith

the infant's transitionalphenomena. he infant's experience f play is, thus,

retained n the adult's productiveand creative play.":oWinnicott is carefulto note that t is not the object tself that s transitional; ather, or the nfant,

the "objectrepresentshe nfant's transition rom a stateof beingmergedwith



Heidegge4 Wnnicott, andTlre VelveteenRabbit 15

the mother to a stateof being in relation to the mother as something outside

and separate."3rn the older child, the need or transitionalobjectssubsides,especially,Winnicott observes,ascultural nterests evelop."32n boththese

points,we see he workingsof reality as boundup with an emergencento a

realm ofotherpeople as separaterom us. The experience freality depends

upon the existence f multipleperspectives,nd o find our standing n real-

ity, we need o accommodate urselves o thoseotherperspectives.Winnicott

writes:"Shouldan adult makeclaimson us for our acceptance f the objec-

tivity of his subjectivephenomenawe discernor diagnosemadness."33hus,

as concludedat theend of this chapter's irst section,what s really called or

in discerning reality is mutual recognition. We mustneitherprivilege our own

view nor that of the other, but rather work to understandand define together

theway that thingscount. At the core of this discerningof reality is the con-

tribution of a private,subjectivepoint of view; but this view mustbe abletofind resonances ith the views of others f it is to emerge rom fantasy nto

reality. As a result, he subjective iew will no doubtgo through hepainof a

loss of a certain orm of magicalomnipotence; ut, also asa result, he view

will grow to enter a realm in which actual effects arepossible.This growth

happensn partbecauseherewill be a wholeworld of personswho can sup-port the reality in which our individual view can operate.

In The VelveteenRabbit, the toy functions as sucha transitional object for

the boy. The boy begins in the realm of toys and demands hat reality con-

form itself to his imagination site5]. The boy ends n the realm of objective

reality, comparinghis sightingof a live rabbit to a toy rabbit he onceowned

[site 10]. This processs mediatedby his history with the velveteen abbit.

The boy treats he velveteen abbit as having some orm of agency site5].Indeed, not only doesthe boy talk to the rabbit, but he also "made nice tun-

nels for him under the bedclothes hat he said were like the burrows the real

rabbits ived in." Theboy fteats herabbit as f therabbit werecapableof car-

rying out 'teal" projectsof its own. But the boy also clearly manipulates he

situationaccording o his own desires,not caring, for instance,f the rabbit

is squishedor "pushedso far under the pillow that the Rabbit could scarcely

breathe."When Nana challenges he reality of the rabbit,the boy is angeredto the extent hat he demands hat shedeny this challengeand recognize he

rabbit's reality-behavior that s exactlyconsistentwith Winnicott's descrip-

tion of children's behavior owards ransitionalobjects site5].

When the boy deals with his toy in these ways, Winnicott would argue

that the boy is working throughhis own developmentnto reality (assome-

thing always mediating he claimsof subjectivify and of objectivity).34 heboy practiceshis mediationby settingup for himself a toy that offers a safe

"partner" with which to work on the issuesof this mediation. Insofar as the



16 Chapter

boy imagines he rabbitasa subject n this way, the boy createsor himself a

foil to hisown subjectivity.The story suggests tpoints hat he boy imaginesthe inner life of his rabbit. Though we cannotbe certain, the boy may even be

imagining many of the trials of subjectivity that the rabbit undergoes n the

story. In this sense,hen, he narrativeof The VelveteenRabbit s effectively

the story mplicit in the child's treatinghis toy as real. The Velveteen abbit

showsus the work that s being doneby the transitionalobject of, precisely,

allowing the child to educate imself nto the experience f reality.

In this way, what s perhapsmost telling in the tale s the final scene site101, n which the child recognizes hat the real rabbitsare fike his lost toy

rabbit. It is precisely through the mediation of thetoy that he has becomeable

to experienceeal thingsas real; indeed, hey possesshe characterhe first

encountered, rotected,n his experiencewith his toy. Perhaps he ultimate

lesson hat The VelveteenRabbit teachesaboutreality is that playing withtoys is essential o our ability to have the experienceof reality. Playing with

toys is far from a frivolous activity for a child. Play is the essential usiness

of learning the practices nvolved in being both a subject and an object of

viewsand values. t is how we find a wav to be at home both with ourselves

and with others.35

CONCTUSION

The VelveteenRabbit is a story of the need for mutual recognition for the

establishment nd maintenance f reality. The book tells a story of the vul-

nerability implicit therein. The tale is painfirl and sad at thosepoints when

a tensionexists betweenhow a self-conscioushing-typically in this story,

the anthropomorphizedvelveteen rabbit-wants to "count," and how that

thing counts n the eyesof thosewho confer suchcounting.Both childrenand

adults who read his book watchpainfully the rabbit's various rials, suchashis strugglewith the claims of superiority of the mechanical oys. We feel

the vulnerability of his path to becoming real, first to the boy andthen in the

world at large. We are troubled when outside eyes and circumstance ead to

the rabbit's being ripped away from his reality with theboy. It is unsettling to

see he boy's indifference o the rabbit's removal rom his life uponhis over-

coming of a great llness and his anticipatingof his upcoming seaside isit.

The story raises hesequestions:What does t mean o be real?What does tmeanto have agency?What does t meanto matter or count to others? The

book reveals he crucial meanswe deploy to work through these ssues.Fur-ther, t reveals he anxiefy hat accompanies ur grapplingwith thesessues.

The story's "answers" to thesequestionsand anxietiesare far from offer-ing the fi.rmness f absolute ertainty.Indeed, he very securityof therabbit's



Heideggeq Winnicott, andl\e Velveteen Rabbit 17

realness at the end of the story comes from a magic fairy-that is, from

something that seemsat the other end of a specfinm from what we wouldthink countsas reality. Yet, the story leavesus with ageneralsense hat things

have been resolved. The resolution is similar to the way that we generally

live our lives feeling at-home, n spite of our ultimate way of being forever

not-at-home(or forever working on attemptingto find a match between our

subjectivityand he demands f objectivity).The tale eavesus with a general

sensehat hingshavebeen esolved-and in ahappy way-while also eaving

us with a profoundsense f life's sadness nd vulnerability.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle. Physics. n The CompleteWorks of Aristotle: TheRevisedOxford Transla-tion,Yol.l,3l5-M. Editedby Jonathan ames.Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity

Press,1984.

De Beauvoir,Simone.TheEthicsof Ambiguity.New York: CitadelPress,1948,1976.

Derrida, Jacques.Margins of Philosophy.Translatedby Alan Bass.Chicago:University

ofChicagoPress, 982.

Gallagher,Shaun. /ow the Body ShapesheMind. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

20n5.Hegel,G. W.F. Phercmcnologyof Spirir. Translated y A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford

UniversityPress,1977.

Heidegger, Martin. Basic Writings. Rev. and expandededition. Edited by David

Farrel Krell. New York HarperCollins,1993.

Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson.

Oxford: Blackwell, 1962.

Jacobson,Kirsten. "A DevelopedNature: A PhenomenologicalAccount of the Expe-rienceof Home;' ContincntalPhilosophyReview,42(2OO9):355-:73.

'The Experienceof Home and he Spaceof Citizenship." The SouthemJournal

of Philosophy,48(3) (2010):21945.

Laing, R.D. TheDividedSef. London: PenguinBooks,1969.

Peter,Paul, and Mary. "Puff, the Magic Dragon."Moving. 1963,WarnerBros.,WS

t473.

Potter,Beatrix. The Tale of Two Bad Mice. London and New York Frederick Warne

andCo., 1904.

Russon,John.Human Experience:Philosophy,Neurosis,and the Elements f Every-

day Lifu. Albany, NY: SLINY Press,2003.

Reading Hegel's Phenomenology.Bloomington, IN: Indiana University

Press,2004.

Simms, Eva-Maria. "Milk and Flesh: A PhenomenologicalReflection on Infancyand Coexistence." oumal of PhercmenologicalPsycholoSy,32(I) 2001):2240.



18 Chapter

Van den Berg, J. H. The Changing Nature of Man: Intoduction to a Historical

Psychology.New York Dell PublishingCo., 1961.Williams, Margery. The VelveteenRabbit: Or How Toys Become Real. New York:

HarpeCollins, 1999. Originallypublished1922).

Winnicott, D. W. Playing and Reality. London andNew York Routledge Classics,

197r,2005.

.NOTES

1. Margery Williams, The VelveteenRabbit: Or How Toys Become Real. New

York: HarperCollins,1999,originallypublished1922.

2. J. Bames, ed.,The CompleteWorksof Aristotle: The RevisedOxford Transla-

tion,Yol.I (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press,1984):3L5446.

3. For discussionof this concept of recognition, seeparagraphs178-196 ofG. W. F. Hegel's Phenomernlogy of Spirit (translatedby A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1977). See also John Russon's chapters"From Perception to

Philosophy" and "Death and Desire n Hegel's Epistemology" n Reading Hegel's

Phenomerwlogy@loomington, IN: IndianaUniversity Press,2004), and R. D. Laing's

discussion frecognition inThe DividedSeff(London: PenguinBooks, 1969),espe-

ciallypp. 35-38.

4. Indeed, there is a distinction made here about the reality of the child, which is

often wrapped up with imagination and, thus, largely self-defined, and the reality of

the adult, which hasgrown (through leaming of the demandsof others) nto a reality

that s both self-definedand other-dehned. his issuewill be discussedurther n the

chapter's ast section.

5. This point is perhapsmostpowerfrrllymadeby Laing, who describeshe pro-

cessof growing up as he processof establishing a senseof "ontological secudty" (in

Chapter 3 of The Divided Selfl.

6. For Heidegger'sprimary discussionsof anxiety and fear, seeBeing and Time(translated y J. Macquanie and E. Robinson,Oxford:Blackwell, 1962),sections39and 40; as well as H. 277, WR 321-22 andH. 34L46, M/R 39I-96. Future refer-

ences o Beingand Timewill be abbreviated sBT; "H." precedeshe correspondingparagraphnumbering n the German ext, and"[4/R" precedeshepagenumber n the

translationbeing usedhere).

7. Beatrix Poffer's The Taleof Two Bad Mice (London and New York Frederick

Warneand Co., 1904)and Leonard Lipton andPeterYanow's yrics for the Peter,Paul,

and Mary song"Puff, the Magic Dragon" (Moving. 1963,WamerBros., WS 1473)

have similar themesof multiple realitiesconvergingand creating ensionsamong heir

various charactersandcontexts.Thesestoriesalsoeitherpresent he threat of deathorthe actualdeathofrealities when one ofthese contexts supersedes nother.

8. CompareHeidegger's emark:



Heidegger,Wnnicott, ndTheYelveteenabbit 19

Dasein nderstandstself as Being-in-the-world,ven f it does o withoutontological

definiteness.. . Nomatterhow far removedromanontological oncepthe distinction

between xistencendRealitymaybe,no matter ven f Dasein roximally nderstands

existencesReality,Daseins notjustpresent-at-handuthasalready nderstoodtself,howevermythical or magical he nterpretation hich t givesmay be. For otherwise,

Daseinwouldnever live' in amlth andwouldnotbeconcernedithmagic n ritualand

cult' (BT,H. 312,M/R 361,emphasisn original).

Heidegger argues hat the very articulation of the wodd in terms of magic is a reflec-

tion of the inescapablehuman nclination to understand hemeaningof our reality.

9. For Heidegger'sprimary discussion of world, see BZ, Part I, Division I,

Chapter 3, '"TheWorldhood of the World." For his primary discussion of being-in-

the-world, seePart I, Division I, Chapter 2, "Being-in-the-Wodd in General as the

Basic Stateof Dasein."

10. SeeHeidegger,BT, H. l9I-200, M/R 235-44 for a fuller discussionof care.

For Heidegger'sdiscussionof reality as dependent n our care, seeBI, H.2IL-I2,WR 254-55, andH. 226-30, M/R 269-:73.

11. Heidegger discusses he not-at-homecharacterof our existence n 87, H.

188-89.WR233-34.

12. For discussions of the founding characterof language with respect to reality

and being, seeDerida's essay Diff6rance" (especiallyp l0) n Margins of Philosophy

(translatedby A. Bass, Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1982). Further, see

Heidegger'sessays Letter on Humanism"(especiallypp. 217-t8 and 259-65) and

"Building Dwelling Thinking" (especiallypp. 348-50) in Basic Writings (editedby

D. F. Krell, New York: HarperCollins,1993).

13.For Heidegger'sanalysisof thew, se.e eing andTime,ParlI, Division I, ChapterV.

B. '"TheEverydayBeing of the 'There,' and he Falling of Daseirl" and also Section40.

14. Heidegger,BT, H. I89, MIR 234.

L5.BT,H. L75-:76,WR22O, mphasisn original.

16. Moreover, Heidegger emphasizes hat the awareness f our being-in-the-world

that comes o us n anxiety s not a conceptualawareness r recognition.So even when

we do feel it, it may be difficult to recognize or articulate this mood. There s nothing

for us to hold onto, as there would be if we had a clearly articulated tause" for the

problem.For Heidegger's iscussion f this point,seeBZ, H. 187-88,WR232-33.

l7- BT, H. 189, v|/R234, frst emphasismy own, second mphasisn the original.

18. See BT, Part One, Division tr, Chapter 1 for Heidegger'sdiscussion of

being-towards-death.

19.D. W. Wirmicoa' Playingand Reality(-ondon andNew Yotk: RoutledgeClassics,

1971,2005).p. 12. Future eferences Playing and Reality will beabbreviated sPR.

20. Some contemporary studies argue there is a greater distinction made by the

infant between self and other than it seemsWinnicott's a.rgument uggests.See, or

instance, ShaunGallagher's chapter"The Earliest Senses f Self andOthers" in How

the Body Shapeshe Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2005). Yet, even f thereis a degree of a senseof self early in infancy, it remains the case hat substantially

speaking hereremainsweight to Winnicott's observationsof the infant as mmersed



20 Chapter

in the mother at the outset.For Winnicott's discussionof this issue, see especially

pp. 15-18 ofPR.21. PR, 15, emphasisn original. Seealso Eva-Maria Simms, "Milk andFlesh: A

PhenomenologicalReflection on Infancy and Coexistence,"Joumal of Phenomeno-

logical Psychology,32(1)(2001):2240.

22. For Winnicott's discussion f transitionalphenomena nd hesignificance hey

play in the development f "reality-acceptance,"e€pp. 3-19 of PR.

23. Winnicott,PR,7.

24.Winnicott,PR,7.

25. Winnicott, PR, 8, my emphasis.

26. For relevant discussions f the significanceof and tensionsbetweenbeing-

at-home in what is familiar and also venturing into what is "other," see Kirsten

Jacobson's"fhe Experienceof Home and the Spaceof Citizenship," The Southern

Journal of Philosophy, 48(3) (2010): 21945, and also "A DevelopedNature: A

Phenomenological Account of the Experience of Home," Continental Philosophy

Review,a2 QN9): 355-37 3.

27. Winnicott, PR, 18.

28. PR, 18.

29. PR, 8.

30.PR, 19.

31. PR, 9-20.

32. PR.19 .

33. PR, 18.

34. For a compatible discussion of the tensions and work involved in making the

transition from the childhood world into the adult world, see J. H. van den Berg's

chapter "Adults and Children" n The Changing Nature of Man: Introduction to a

Historical Psychology New York Dell Publishing Co., 1961),and JohnRusson's

chapter "Others" in Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of

EverydayLife (Albany,NY: SUNY Press,2003).35. On the significance of the activity of play in childhood experience andon into

adult years),seealso Simone de Beauvoir's Ethics of Ambrgurry(New York Citadel

Press,1948, 1976,especianypp.3542) and Edith Cobb's chapter Wonder as the

Genesisof Knowledge" n The Ecology of Imagination n Childhood(Dallas,TX:

Spring Publications,1977).

Documents

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