J.-P. Himka, 'West Ukraine between the Wars

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Canadian Slavonic Papers

Western Ukraine between the WarsAuthor(s): John-Paul HimkaReviewed work(s):Source: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 34, No. 4 (December1992), pp. 391-412Published by: Canadian Association of SlavistsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40869428 .

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John-Paul

Himka

WesternUkraine between the Wars

Recent

developments

n

Ukrainehave continued o

underscorehe

persistent

importance

f

regionalism

n

that

ountry.

he west f Ukraine till xhibits

political

complexion

unmistakably istinguishable

rom he norm

n

the

republic.

Although

all

regions

of Ukraine voted

in

favour

of

national

independence

n

the eferendumf

1

December

991,

he

ercentageoting yes"

was

highest

n

thewest.

n

thewestern blasts f vano-Frankivsknd

Ternopil

over 8per ent f thosewhovoted upportedndependencecomparedo90per

cent

in

Ukraine

as a

whole).

During

the

presidential

lections,

held

simultaneously,nly

Ukrainians

n

thewestern

art

ended o

support

heformer

dissident

iacheslav horno

il

over heformerommunisteonidKravchuk.1

Butcurrentvents

nly

erve s a reminderhat

egionalism

s "a

key

feature

of

Ukrainian

istory.""

he

purpose

f the

nterpretive

ssay

that

ollows s to

examine

a crucial

component

of historical Ukrainian

regionalism

the

experience

f

WesternUkraine

n

the nterwar

eriod.

The

approach

o the

problem

iffers

rom hat frelated tudies

y

treating

ll theUkrainian-inhabited

territorieshatfound hemselves utsidethe USSR in the nterwar ra and

comparing

he ndividual

xperiences

f the maller ubunits ithin he

arger

region.

The

study

xamines,

n

turn,

he

nuances f the

political eography

f

Western

kraine,

he

policies

of

Poland,

Romania nd Czechoslovakia owards

their

krainian

minorities,

conomic nd social

developments,

nd

the

hanging

West

Ukrainian

olitical pectrum.

THE

POLITICAL

EOGRAPHYF

NTERWAR

ESTERN KRAINE

Theconcept f "Western kraine"s not ntirelystatic ne. As a validunit f

historical

nalysis

t first

ppears

n

the late

eighteenth

entury,

hen

the

Habsburgmonarchy

ddedGalicia

1772)

andBukovina

occupied

774,

nnexed

1787)

to its collectionof

territories;

lready

part

of the

collectionwas the

Ukrainian-inhabited

egion

f

Transcarpathiadepending

n how

one

counts,

t

had been

Habsburg

ince as

early

s

1526 or as late as the

earlyeighteenth

1

PeterJ.

Potichnyj,

The Referendum

nd Presidentiallectionsn

Ukraine,"

Canadian lavonic apers 3.2 1991):123-38.2 DavidSaunders,Modern krainian

istory,"

uropean

istory

uarterly

1.1

(1991):

85.

Canadian Slavonic

Papers/Revue

canadienne

des

slavistes

Vol.

XXXIV,

No.

4,

December

1992



392

JOHN-PAUL

MKA

century).3Of course, one can also read back certainfeaturesunifyingWestern

Ukraine

prior

to

the

1770s,

such

as the

culturally

formative

nfluence on all

three

regions

of the

medieval

Rus'

principality,

ater

kingdom,

of

Galicia and

Volhynia,

as well

as the

presence

of the

Carpathian

mountains,

which

was much

more

than a

matter f

mere

geology

(hence

the

Russophiles'

preferred

ame for

Western

Ukraine

Caipathian

Rus').

Still,

in

the

centuries

prior

to their

incorporation

nto

the

Habsburg

monarchy,

he three

regions

had

experienced

such

disparate

political

histories

Galicia as

part

of

Poland,

Bukovina of

Moldavia,

and

Transcaipathia

of

Hungary

that

here s

little

validity

n

treating

themthenas a historicalunit.

The

incorporation

of Western

Ukraine

into the

Habsburg

monarchy

went

hand

in

hand

with the

destruction of

the

Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth

(1772-95)

and

the

absorption

of all

the

rest of

Ukrainian

territory

nto the

Russian

empire,

so

that at the

turn

of

the nineteenth

entury

ll

Ukraine was

divided

between

the

Habsburgs

and the

Romanovs,

with the

latter

njoying by

far he

ion's

share.

Perhaps

the real

key

to

understanding

Western

Ukraine

s to think

f

it as a

unityby

negation,

as

those

Ukrainian

territories

ot

under

Russian

rule.

In

the

nineteenth entury,heage of thenationalrevival, heUkrainiansunderRussian

rule

were

stunted

in

their

national

development

by

legislation

aimed at

suppressing

a

Ukrainian

national

identity

the

prohibition

of

the

use of the

Ukrainian

language

in

print,

chools or

administration)

s

well as

by

the

long

absence of

basic

civic

liberties.

n

the

Habsburg

monarchy,

Ukrainians

were

much

freer o

develop

their

national

culture and

political

life,

although,

to be

sure,

after

1867 the

Ukrainians in

Transcaipathia,

in

the

Hungarian

part

of

Austria-Hungary,

ived under

conditions

imilar

to

those

of

tsarist

Russia as far

as the

development

f their

ationality

was

concerned.4

The exclusion fromRussia, in additionto itsentirely ositiveaspects with

relation

to

national

development,

lso

had a

negative

side,

since

this

meant that

3

A

note on

terminology:

alicia,

as

an

Austrian

rovince,

had

about as

many

Poles

as

Ukrainians;

the

west

was

largely

Polish,

the east

largely

Ukrainian.

Similarly,

Bukovina had

about as

many

Romanians s

Ukrainians;

he

north

was

largely

Ukrainian,

the

south

largely

Romanian.

In

Bessarabia,

which will

be

discussed

later,

he

Ukrainians

were a

minority.

enerally

when

referring

o

these

regions

mean

only

their

Ukrainian-inhabited

ortions.

4

On

the state

of

the Ukrainian

ational

movement

n

the

Russian

empire

nd

in

Galicia,

see Ivan

L.

Rudnytsky,

The

Ukrainian

Movement n

the Eve

of

the First

WorldWar," nEssays inModernUkrainianHistoryEdmonton: anadian nstitute

of

Ukrainian

Studies,

1987)

375-88. On

Transcaipathia,

ee

Ivan

Zeguc,

Die

national-politischen

estrebungen

der

Kar

pato

Ruthenen

1848-1914,

Veröffentichungen

es

Osteuropa-Institutes

München,

28

(Wiesbaden:

Otto

Harrassowitz,

965).





394

JOHN-PAUL

MKA

It is difficulto say howmanyWest Ukrainians herewere between he

wars,

because the censuses of most interwar ast

Europeans

states

were

notoriously

naccurate.

According

to officialPolish

statistics,

here were

3,898,431

Ukrainians

n

Poland

n

1921

and

4,441,622

n

1931,

ccounting

or

about

14

per

centof Poland's

total

population.7

hese

figures

re

certainly

oo

low

and

Ukrainian

demographersrgue

that herewere fiveto six million

Ukrainians

n

Poland

in

1931.8 Abouttwo thirds

f

the Ukrainiansived

in

Galicia

(the

palatinates

województwa]

f

Lviv,

Ternopil

nd

Stanyslaviv);

he

rest ived

mainly

n

the

palatinates

f

Volhynia

nd

Polissia,

lthough

herewere

also Ukrainianopulations earChetmKholm) ntheLublinpalatinatend n

theLemko

region

n

theWestern

arpathians

Cracow

palatinate).9

here

was

also a Ukrainian

olony

n

the

Polish

capital

of

Warsaw,

but this

consisted

primarily

f Petliurist

migrés

rom krainian erritories

hat

had fallen

nder

Soviet ule ather

han f WestUkrainians

roper.

Romanian

tatistics,

ikewise ot

very

eliable,

ecorded

82,1

5 Ukrainians

in

the

country

n

1930,

about

3

per

cent of Romania's total

population.10

Ukrainian

demographers ut

the

figurehigher,

t about a million.11 he

majority

f the Ukrainians

ived

in

Bukovina,

ut therewere also Ukrainian

populationsn Bessarabiaespecially earKhotynndAkkermanBilhorod])nd,

much maller

nes,

n

the

Marmure§egion.

According

o the

relatively

redible fficial tatistics f

Czechoslovakia,

therewere

61,849

Ukrainians

Ruthenians,

usyns)

n

the

ountry

n

1921

and

549,169

in

1930,

accounting

for 3-4

per

cent of the total

population

of

Czechoslovakia.12

ver 80

per

centof theUkrainiansived

n

the

province

f

Subcaipathian

us' and over 15

per

cent

ived

n

the

djacent

re§ov

region

n

the

province

f Slovakia13

the

division

f

Transcarpathia

nto

Subcaipathian

Rus1 nd the

Presov

region

was an innovationf

the

nterwar

ra).

Therewas

7

Joseph

Rothschild,

ast Central

Europe

between he Two WorldWars

Seattle:

University

f

Washington

ress,

1974)

36.

8

Volodymyr

ubijovyö [Kubiiovych]

stimated

,902,000

Ukrainians

n

Poland

in

1931.

WesternUkraine within oland 1920-1939

(Ethnic

Relationships)

(Chicago:

Ukrainian

Research and

Information

nstitute,

963)

26.

In

a

recent

monograph, prominent

olish

scholar

estimated hat herewere about 5.1 or 5.2

million

Ukrainians

n

Poland

n

1929.

Ryszard

orzecki,

Kwestia

ukraiñska

w

Polsce

w

latach 1923-1929

(Cracow:

Wydawnictwo

iterackie,

989)

11.

9

Mirostawa

Papierzyríska-Turek,prawa

ukraiñska

w

Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej

1922-1926

(Cracow:

Wydawnictwo

iterackie,

979)

20.

w Rothschild,ast Central urope284.

11

D.

Prutsk'yi,

Ukraintsi

'Velykii

Rumunii,'"

Nova

hromada

Vienna)

1.3-4

(1923):

16,

estimated

hat

herewere

900,000

Ukrainians

n

Romania

n

1923.

12

Rothschild,

ast Central

urope

89.

13

Magocsi,

Shaping

of

a National

dentity

54.



WESTERNUKRAINE

BETWEENTHE

WARS

395

also a sizable Ukrainian colony in Prague which, like the one in Warsaw,

consisted

argely

of Ukrainian

political

émigrés

from

utside WesternUkraine.

In

sum,

the total Ukrainian

population

of

Poland,

Romania

and

Czechoslovakia

in

1930-31 was

just

over five and a

half

million

according

to

official

tatistics,

ut

the actual number

f

West

Ukrainians

may

have been more

on the order of seven million. For

comparison,

he

population

of

Soviet Ukraine

at this

time,

also a

subject

of some

controversy

but

fordifferent

easons),

was

over

thirty

million,

of whom over

three

quarters

were Ukrainians

according

to

the

1926

census,

therewere

23,218,860

Ukrainians

n

the

Ukrainian

SSR).14

Like much of East Central and Eastern Europe, Western Ukraine was a

palimpsest

of

political

cultures

eflecting

he

past

fortunes f

various

conquerors.

Parts of Western

Ukraine,

for

xample,

had known

Lithuanian nd

Turkish

rule,

although

reminiscences of these

were no

longer

relevant

by

the twentieth

century.

The

heritages

of

Polish and Moldavian rule

were also not

particularly

relevant to West

Ukrainian

political

culture

n

the

twentieth

entury,

ince

they

were

eclipsed by

and

subsumed into the

dominant cultures of the Polish

and

Romanian states

that

ncorporated

much of Western

Ukraine between the wars.

However,

therewere three

political

cultures

ust

below the historical

urface of

WesternUkraine that ontinued o affect evelopmentsnthe nterwar ra. These

were the

political egacies

of

Austria,

Hungary

nd

Russia.

The former

Austrian territoriesof

Galicia and

Bukovina

undoubtedly

demonstrated

the

highest

levels

of

national

consciousness

in

all of

Western

Ukraine. This was a direct

resultof Austrian

policy.

In

the

period

of

enlightened

absolutism,

an

imperial

decision to

educate the Greek

Catholic

clergy

created a

Ukrainian

intelligentsia

in

Galicia

(this

process,

however,

bypassed

largely

Orthodox

Bukovina).

In

1848 the

peasantry,

who made

up

the

overwhelming

majority

f the Ukrainian

population

of Galicia

and

Bukovina,

was

emancipated

from erfdom.Perhaps mostcrucially,from he 1860s until 1914 theAustrian

Ukrainians alone had

the

right

o

publish

Ukrainian

periodicals,

to form

egal

Ukrainian

voluntary

associations,

including political

parties,

and to

attend

educational

institutions

n

their

wn

language.

This

produced

the most

literate,

mobilized and

self-assured

Ukrainian

population

of

the first alf

of the

twentieth

century.

The level of

national

consciousness

was,

however,

higher

n

Galicia than

n

Bukovina,

largely

because of

the

ong-standing

nfluence

f and

rivalry

with

the

well

developed

Polish

national

movement. The

rivalry,

and

consequent

intensificationfnationalconsciousness,reached a culmination fter hecollapse

14

Bohdan

Krawchenko,

ocial

Change

and

National

Consciousness n

Twentieth-

Century

kraine

London:

Macmillan,

985)

48.



396 JOHN-PAUL

IMKA

ofAustrian 1918-19whenGalicianUkrainians aged n armed truggleor

independence

gainst

he oles.

The

Hungarianegacy

was shared

y

all the

Ukrainians f

Transcarpathia:

theUkrainians f

Subcarpathian

us' and

thePresov

egion

n

Czechoslovakia

as well as

those of the

part

of the former

Maramaros

ounty

hat

went to

Romania nstead

f

to

Czechoslovakia,

he

Marmure§

egion.

Here

Ukrainians

had

experienced

hebenefits

f Austrian

nlightened

bsolutism,

incehere oo

Greek

Catholic

seminarians ttended

nstitutions

f

higher

earning;

the

Ukrainians f these

egions

were

lso

liberated rom

erfdomn

1848.

However,

theHabsburgmonarchy'sonstitutionaleformsfthe1860s xerted negative

effect n the

Ukrainian

ationality

n

Transcaipathia,

hich ecame

part

f the

autonomous

ungarian

ortion

f the

Austro-Hungarian

onarchy.

he

Magyar

gentiy

hat

ontrolled

ungary

n

thewake of

the

Compromise

Ausgleich)

f

1867 did

little to

spread elementary

ducation,

resisted

even modest

democratizationf the

political ystem

nd

strove o

Magyarize

he

Ukrainians

under tsrule.The

resultwas a Ukrainian

opulation

lmostwithout

national

intelligentsia,largely

lliterate

easant

olk

without

clear

sense of national

identity.

What national

consciousness

did

develop

under he

unfavourable

conditions fHungarian ule was notunequivocally krainiannorientation.

Most

often t took

the form f

Russophilism,

.e.,

identification ith the

Russian

nation,

r whathas

been alled

Rusynophilism,

.e.,

a

purely

ocal or at

most

trictly

est

Ukrainian ational

onsciousness.

n

Galicia

and

Bukovina,

already y

the

beginning

f the nterwarra

the

overwhelming

ajority

f the

Ukrainian

population

considered tself

Ukrainian, .e.,

part

of the

larger

Ukrainian

ationwhich

nhabited

lso

Dnieper

Ukraine

nd

whichwas distinct

from heRussiannation

and

thePolish

nd

other

ations).

ubcarpathian

us'

only

developed

Ukrainian

onsciousness

n

the

nterwar

ra,

by

theend of

which heRussophilendRusynophileurrentsad tillnotdisappeared;ndthe

Presov

egion

emained

redominantlyussophile

nd

Rusynophile

hroughout

the

years

etween hewars.

The third

olitical

egacy

was

that f

Russia,

which

ffected

olhynia,

Polissia

and the Chetm

region

n

Poland and

Bessarabia

n

Romania. Here

enlightened

bsolutism ad

brought

o benefit

o the

Ukrainian

ationality

nd

the

peasantry

emained nserfed

ver a

decade

longer

han n

the

Habsburg

monarchy,

.e.,

until

1861. The Valuev

and Ems

decreesof

1863 and 1876

prohibited

he

use of the

Ukrainian

anguage

in

publication.

Even when

Ukrainian-languageublicationwas permitteds a result f therevolution f

1905,

Ukrainian-language

ducationwas not.

n

any

ase,

tsarist

ussiadid ittle

to

educate ts

population

n

any anguage.

The Ukrainian

opulation

n

these

regions

ad

even ower

iteracy

ates han

he

Ukrainiansf

Transcaipathia.

In



WESTERN UKRAINE

BETWEENTHE

WARS 397

Polish Galicia, 29 percentofLviv palatinate,39 percent ofTernopilpalatinate

and 46

per

cent of

Stanyslavivpalatinate

were lliterate

n

1921;

in

Volhynia

and

Polissia, however,

the

respective

rates were 69 and

71

per

cent.

In

Romania,

Bukovina was 34

per

cent illiterate

n

1930,

while Bessarabia was

62

per

cent

illiterate.

Subcarpathian

Rus' was 50

per

cent

illiterate

n

192

1).15

The former

Russian sectors of interwarWesternUkraine

displayed

a low level of Ukrainian

national

consciousness,

with a

significant ercentage

of Ukrainians

dentifying

themselves on the census as

merely

"locals"

(tutejsi)

in

Polish Polissia or as

Russians

in

Romanian Bessarabia.

These borders beneath borders figured n the Ukrainian policies of the

interwar

olish and Romanian

régimes.

Both

sought

to undo certain features f

the

previous

Austrian

régime.

Both the Poles and

Romanians,

for

example,

repealed many

of

the laws that

had

protected

Ukrainian

rights

n

education and

administration.

he

lack of national

rights

for

Ukrainians

n

the formerRussian

territorieswas

exploited by

both

régimes.

The Polish

government

n

particular

developed

a

consistent

olicy

of

isolating

the former ussian territories rom he

former

Galicia,

separating

them

by

the so-called

Sokal border.16

Although

this

policy

is

generally

ssociated

with

the name of

Henryk

Józewski,

who served as

voivode of Volhynia from1928 to 1938,17thepolicy in factgoes back before

Józewski to

the

very

first

ears

of

Polish rule

in

the

region

concessions

offered

to Ukrainian

politicians

outside

Galicia

if

they

refrained

from

oining

the

Galician Ukrainians1

boycott

of

the

parliamentary

lections

in

1922).18

This

isolation of

formerly

ussian from

formerly

ustrian erritories

as a cardinal

point

in

the Polish

regime's

Ukrainian

policy;

in

fact,

for

all their

outward

devotion to

the Catholic

church,

the Polish

authorities

referred

o hinder

the

diffusion f

Greek Catholicism

into

predominantly

rthodox

Volhynia,

Polissia

and the

Chelm

region

lest the

Galician-based

church,

which

had become

firmly

identified with the Ukrainian national movement,

change

the

political

complexion

of the

regions.19

5

Rothschild,

ast Central

Europe

44, 285,

92.

16

The namederives rom

he own f

Sokal on

theBuh river.

or more n

theSokal

border,

ee A. Zieba's

article nder

hat itle

n

Encyclopedia f

Ukraine,

vols.,

ed.

Volodymyr

Kubijovyõ

(Toronto,

Buffalo,

London:

University

f

Toronto

Press,

1984-93).

17

The voivode eft

nteresting

emoirs:

Henryk

ózewski,

Zamiast

pamietnika,"

Zeszyty

Historyczne

9

(1982):

3-163;

(1982):

65-157;

63

(1983):

3-75. There s a

recent Polish

monograph

n

the

Volhynianpalatinate:

Wlodzimierz

Medrzecki,

WojewództwoWoiyrískie, 921-1939.

Elementy rzemian

ywilizacyjnych,

spolecznych

politycznych

Wroclaw:

Zaklad

Narodowy

m.

Ossoliñskich,

988).

18

Ivan

Kedryn,

Zhyttia-podii-liudy.

Spomyny

komentari

New

York:

Chervona

kalyna,

1976)

126-27.

19

Torzecki,

Kwestia

ukraiñska

w

Polsce

319-22.



398

JOHN-PAUL

MKA

STATE POLICIES TOWARDSUKRAINIANS

The

policies

of the Polish and

Romanian

governments

oward theirUkrainian

minorities were

basically

similar:

assimilatory.

This is not

surprising

considering

he

similarity

f the two

states

s

they merged

fter he FirstWorld

War. Both

were

distended

tates hathad

acquired by

conquest

and to some extent

by diplomacy

much

more

territory

han

hey

ould

integrate.

oland extendedfar

enough

to the west that

it

managed

to

ingest

a German

minority

f over a

million

(about

4

per

cent of the total

population,

1921).

Although

his

particular

minority

was

to

figure

o

prominently

n

Poland's destruction

n

1939,

it

was

but a fraction f theminority opulationsthatPoland absorbed in its eastward

expansion

Lithuanians, Belarusians,

Ukrainians and Jews.20 ven

by

its own

count,

which

greatly downplayed

the size of national

minorities,

Poland was

only

69

per

cent Polish.

Romania,

in

the aftermath

f the Great

War,

acquired

Bukovina and

Transylvania

from

Austria-Hungary

nd

Bessarabia fromRussia.

The result was

a

country

hat,

gain

by

its own not

unimpeachable

count,

was

only

72

per

cent Romanian

in

1930.

Although only

about two thirdsof both

Romania

and Poland were

composed

of citizens of the state

nationality,

oth

states

constitutedthemselves as centralized national

states and devoted their

energiesin theyearsbetween the wars to the assimilationof national minorities

(the

Jewish

minority

onstituted

partial exception,

since both the

Romanian

and the Polish

régimes by

the ate

1930s

came to

prefer

mere

persecution

f the

Jews without

rying

o assimilate themto the state

nationality).21

Both states took

pains

to

rework

dministrative-territorialoundaries so as

to

integrate

nd

assimilate

Ukrainian territories. he

autonomy

hatGalicia had

enjoyed

under

Austria,

and which the Polish state

had

promised

the Western

powers

in

1919

and

1922

that it would

maintain,

was

unceremoniously

abolished,22

nd Galicia

in

any

form

disappeared

as an

administrative

nit.

The

20

Two useful nd

complementary

urveys

f national

minorities

n

interwar oland

are:

Stephan

Horak,

Poiana and Her National

Minorities,

919-39: A Case

Study

(New

York:

Vantage

Press,

1961);

Jerzy

omaszewski,

zeczpospolita

wielunarodów

(Warsaw:

Czytelnik,

985).

For an excellent rief

urvey

f the

Ukrainian

uestion

n

particular,

ee Bohdan

Budurowycz,

Poland

and

the

Ukrainian

Problem,

1921-

1939,"

Canadian

Slavonic

Papers

25.4

(1983):

473-500.

For a

thoughtfulurvey

f

the relevant

iterature,

ee

Hans-Jürgen

ömelburg,

Die

polnisch-ukrainischen

Beziehungen

1922-1939:

Ein

Literatur- nd

Forschungsbericht,"

ahrbücher

lir

Geschichte

Osteuropas

39

(1991):

81-102.

21

For a well

researched,

xceptionally

alanced

tudy

f the

nationalityolicies

of

the various Polish governments,ee Andrzej Chojnowski, Koncepcje polityki

narodowosciowej zçdówpolskich

w

latach 1921-1939

(Wroclaw,

Warsaw,Cracow,

Gdansk:

aklad

Narodowy

mienia

ssoliiiskich,

979).

22

See

Stepan Ripetskyj,

Ukrainian-Polish

Diplomatic Struggle

1918-1923

(Chicago:

UkrainianResearch nd Information

nstitute,

963).



WESTERN

UKRAINE

BETWEENTHE

WARS

399

veryname Galicia disappearedfrom olish officialanguage, nd EasternGalicia,

where the

majority

f the Ukrainians

ived,

was

renamed,

without

ny

historical

precedent,

Eastern Little Poland

(Matopolska

Wschodnia).

Ukrainian-inhabited

Galicia was divided into

three

alatinates,

he

borders f whichwere drawn

up

so

as to

encompass

as

many

non-Ukrainians

s

possible

(Stanyslavivpalatinate

was

70

per

cent

Ukrainian,

Ternopil

50

per

cent and Lviv

36

per

cent).

The Polissian

palatinate

was

designed

so that

Ukrainians made

up only

18

per

cent

of the

population.23

(These

figures

are

from the

official statistics of

1921.)

The

Romanian "Law on

Administrative nification"

f

1925

redrew

ounty

ines so

as to eliminate some largely Ukrainiancounties altogether nd to dilute the

Ukrainian

percentage

n

other

ounties. The

constitution f

1935 did

away

with

provinces

as administrative

nits,

ncluding

he

province

of

Bukovina.24

Both

states made a

practice

of

hiring

primarily

members of

the state

nationality

nto the civil

service.

They

dismantled he

Ukrainian school

system

that had been

inheritedfromthe

Austrianera and

replaced

it with

a

bilingual

system

n

which Ukrainian was

treated s

a

stepchild.25

hey

used

their and

reformsfor

nationalist aims. When

large

estates

were

parcelled

in

Ukrainian-

inhabited

territories,

much

of the land was

given

to

Polish and

Romanian

colonists instead of to the land-hungryocal Ukrainianpeasantry.26 hey gave

support

to the

Russophile

vestiges

in

Galicia and

Bukovina,

artificially

prolonging

heir

ife

spans

as

part

of a

policy

of

divide-and-rule.

Both

régimes

also

pursued

nationalistic

religious

policies.

The

Ukrainians

in

Bukovina were

mainly,

and

in

Bessarabia

exclusively,

of the

Orthodox

confession,

as were most

Romanians. The

Orthodox

church

in

both these

regions

was

Romanized

in

the nterwar

eriod.

n

Bukovina,

the

Ukrainian

vicar

who had been

nominated

for

piscopal

office

uring

World

Wai* was

dismissed,

a church

ouncil of

1921 renamed

what had

been known

officially

s

the "Greek

Orientar* hurch he"Orthodox-Romanian" hurch, nd in 1925 theautonomous

Bukovinian

metropolis

was

subordinated o the

Romanian

patriarch.

Ukrainian

clergymen

were denied

higher

ffice

n

the

church

nd

Ukrainian

spirants

o the

priesthood

were

frequently

enied

admittance

o

seminaries.27

n

Poland

such a

23

Papierzyríska-Turek,prawa

ukrainska0.

-4

Bukovyna.

H

mymtle

suchasne,

ed. D.

Kvitkovs'kyi,

T.

Bryndzan,

A.

Zhukovs'kyi

Paris,

Philadelphia,

etroit:

Vydavnytstvo

Zelena

Bukovyna,"

1956)

331-34.

25

On

Bukovina,

see H.

Piddubnyi, ukovyna.

i

mymtie

suchasne

(SuspiVno-politychnyi arys...) [Kharkiv],1928) 141-57.

26

For

a

contemporary

ommunist

ritique

f the

Romanian

and

reform,

ee H.

Piddubnyi Gregori

Grigorovich],

ukovyns'ke

elianstvo

v

¡anni

(Vienna:

Nove

selo, 1925)

18-24.

27

Bukovyna,

ed.

Kvitkovs'kyi

8-24.



400

JOHN-PAUL

MKA

powerful ehicle forPolonization id notexist, incethe Poles were Roman

Catholics and Ukrainians ither

Greek Catholics

in Galicia)

or

Orthodox

(elsewhere).

till,

he

Polish uthorities

ursued

consistent

olicy

f

trying

o

weaken

heUkrainian

ational

spect

n

the

hurches,

y supportingussophile

tendencies

n

the

Greek Catholic

church

n

the

Lemko

region

nd also

by

intervening

n

Ukrainian rthodox

hurch ife to the

detrimentf

Ukrainian

national

ims.

By

far he

most rastic ction n

the

part

f the

Polish uthorities

was the

"revindication"

conversion

nto

Catholic

churches)

nd

outright

destructionf hundreds

fOrthodox

hurches

n

the

Chetm

egion,

olhynia

nd

Polissia nthe ate 1930s.28

Perhaps

hemost

gregious

nti-Ukrainian

ncident

n

East

Central

urope

between hewarswas

the

pacification"

fthe

Ukrainian

opulation

f

Poland

n

1930,

n

action haracterized

ybeatings

ndthe estructionf

property,large-

scale,

tate-sponsoredogrom.29

The result

of such

policies

in

both

Poland and

Romania was the

accumulation

f

political

rustrationn the

part

f the

Ukrainians,

hich

would

eventually

e released

n

the orm

f

political

iolence

terrorism)

nd

orientation

on the

leading

revisionist

power

of the

age,

Nazi

Germany.

However

chauvinistic he policies of the Polish and Romaniangovernments,t is

important

o

bear

n

mind

hat

hey

topped

hort f the

ystematic

nnihilation

of theUkrainian

ntelligentsia

nd the

mass murder

y

famine

mplementedy

the

Stalinists

n

Soviet

Ukraine

n

the

1930s. This meant

hat he

Ukrainian

population

f Poland and

Romaniawas

constantly

nsulted nd

frustrated

n

its

efforts,

utnever

ffectively

roken.

omparing

he reatment

f Ukrainians

n

Stalin's Soviet

Union nd

n

interwaroland nd

Romania,

ne s

reminded f

Machiavelli^ dictum: Men must ither

e caressed relse

annihilated;

hey

will

revenge

hemselves or mall

njuries,

ut annot

o so for

reat

nes;

the

njury

thereforehatwe doto a manmust e such hatweneednot ear isvengeance."

Czechoslovakiawas

quite

differentase.

n

1848the

eading pokesman

f

theCzech

national

movement,

rantiSek

alacky,

ad

declared hat

f

Austria id

not xist t would

have been

necessary

o nventt. When

Austria-Hungary

id

28

A

useful

urvey

f

Orthodoxy

n

the Polish

sector f

Western

Ukraine

s

Ivan

Vlasovs'kyi,Narys

istorii Ukrains'koi

ravoslavnoi

Tserkvy,

ol. 4:

(XX

st.),

part

(New

York: Ukrains'ka

ravoslavnaTserkva

v

SShA,

1966)

5-177.

A

recent olish

monograph

oncerns Polish

government

olicy

towards

Orthodoxy

etween the

wars: Miroslawa

Papierzynska-Turek,içdzy

tradycjç rzeczywistos'ciç.

añstwo

wobecprawoslawia1918-1939 Warsaw: anstwoweWydawnictwoaukowe, 989).

29

Emil

Revyuk,

Polish Atrocities n

Ukraine

New

York:

United Ukrainian

Organizations

n

the United

States,

1931).

V.J.

Kushnir,

olish

Atrocities

n the

West Ukraine:

An

Appeal

to the

League for

the

Rights f

Man and

Citizen

Vienna:

Gerold,

1931).



WESTERN

UKRAINE

BETWEENTHE

WARS

401

cease to exist in 1918, the Czechs in fact mmediately et about reinventingt.

Czechoslovakia consisted

of Austrian Bohemia

(i.e.,

the Bohemian

Lands,

including

Moravia and Austrian

Silesia)

and

Hungarian

Slovakia

and

Subcarpathian

Rus1,

a

simplified, thnically

ess

heterogeneous

version

of

the

late

Habsburg monarchy.

Of the three uccessor

states of

Austria-Hungary

hat

shared Western

Ukraine,

nly

Czechoslovakia

had its

capital

n

a former ustrian

city, Prague,

really

Austria's second

greatest ity

afterVienna. Poland's

capital

was

Warsaw,

late of the Russian

empire.

Romania's was

Bucharest,

a

Wallachian

and,

before

that,

Ottoman-Phanariot

ity.

The

Habsburg

monarchy

thatthe Czechs reinventedwas firmly uided by enlightenedPrague; therewas

no

equivalent

of the

Magyar

domination hat ast a dark shadow over half of the

Dual

Monarchy.

In

the

twentyyears

of

Czechoslovak

rule,

the Ukrainians of

Transcarpathia

aught

up

on much that

hey

had missed after he 1860s. This is

not to

say

that Czechoslovakia was a model

state,

but then

neither

was

the old

Austria.

The Czechs

had

promised Subcaipathian

Rus'

autonomy,

but

postponed

granting

t

until the

troubled

wilight

f

the nterwar

ra,

when Hitler

began

his

dismemberment

f

the

country

n

the fall of

1938

(the

Munich

agreement

was

signed 30 September 1938, Subcaipathian RusVCarpatho-Ukrainebecame

autonomous

de

facto

on

1 1

October and

de

jure

on

22

November).30

The

procrastination

with

regard

to

autonomy

was one of

the two issues that oured

the

Transcarpathians'

ttitude owards

Prague.

The

otherwas the western

order

of the

province

of

Subcarparthian

Rus',

which left o

many

Ukrainians outside

their

wn

province

n

the Presov

region

of

the

province

of Slovakia.

Still,

there

had been

no

Ukrainian,

r

largely

Ukrainian,

dministrative nit

n

old

Hungary,

and the creation of

Subcarpathian

Rus'

represented

n advance

in

that

regard.

Moreover,

the

province

of

Subcarpathian

Rus' never

disappeared

as an

administrative

ntity,

s did Galicia and Bukovina in Poland and Romania; the

latter

regions,

furthermore,

ad been created

as administrativeunits

by

the

preceding

Austrian

régime. Finally,

Prague generally respected

the

essential

Ukrainian character of both

Subcarpathian

Rus' and

the Presov

region

and

recruited ocal Ukrainians nto the civil

service,

albeit

primarily

n

subordinate

and

auxiliary apacities.

In

no

sphere

was

the essential

difference etween the natures f

the

régimes

so

apparent

s

in

education.

Poland had

inherited Ukrainian

lementary

chool

system

fromAustria.

n

1924

therewere

2,151

Ukrainian

lementary

chools

in

Poland; in that ame year,however,theUkrainian school

system

fell victimto

30

See PeterG.

Stercho,

iplomacyof

Double

Morality:

Europe's

Crossroads n

Carpatho-Ukraine

919-39

(New

York:

Carpathian

esearch

enter,

971).



402

JOHN-PAUL

IMKA

the o-calledlexGrabski" hicheft nly 16 Ukrainianchoolsnexistence

five

years

ater,

most f therest

having

een onvertedo

bilingual

olish-

Ukrainianchools. omanianherited16 Ukrainianchools romheAustrian

period;

ithindecade

ll

hadbeen onvertedo

bilingual

omanian-Ukrainian

schools nd even

pure

Romanianchools. zechoslovakianheritedlmost

nothing

n

the

way

f

a Ukrainianchool

ystem

romhe ormer

ungary.

n

the

1913-14

chool

year

herewere

nly

34

elementary

chools

n

all of

Transcaipathia

ith ome ormf

Ukrainian

orRussian)

n

the urriculum.

y

1931

he zechoslovakuthoritiesad stablished25 schools

n

Subcarpathian

Rus' nwhich omevariantf the ocal anguageerved s the anguagef

instruction;

bout hundreduch chools lsoexisted

n

the re§ov

egion.

s

for

higher

ducation,

hePolish tate

eneged

n

its

promise

o theWestern

powers

o establish

Ukrainian

niversity,31

losed

down

he

pre-existing

Ukrainianhairstthe

University

f

Lviv,

estrictedkrainianttendancetthe

latternstitution

n

the

1920s

nd

drove he

nderground

krainian

niversity,

which adflourished

n

the

920s,

ut f xistence. o Ukrainiannstitutionf

higherearning

as

permitted

n

Romaniaithernd he

re-existing

hair f

Ukrainian

anguage

t the

University

fChernivtsias bolished.

y

contrast,

Czechoslovakia, ith Ukrainianopulationess than tenth he ize of

Poland's,

ostednd

artially

ubsidizedhe krainianree

University

n

Prague

(1921-30)

nd

he

Ukrainian

usbandlycademy

n

Podëbrady

1922-35).

The landreform

n

eastern zechoslovakia as

slow,

but t benefitted

primarily

he ocal Ukrainian

easantry;*"

he and

was not

parcelled

ut

o

Czech nd lovak olonists.tshould e

noted,

owever,

hat he

andowners

n

Transcaipathia

ere

Magyar,

hile

hose

n

Galicia nd

Volhynia

ere olish

and hose

n

Bukovina omanian.ence he olish nd

Romanian

égimes

ad

more o

ose,

romhe ational

oint

f

view,

han id he zechs romhe and

reform.

The

Czechoslovak

égime

id

meddle

n

he ebate ver ational

dentity

n

Subcarpathian

us1,

hifting

rom

Ukrainophile

o a

Russophile

o a

Rusynophileolicy.

he atter

olicy, ursued

n

the

mid-

930s,

was

ntended

to

nstill

oyalty

otheCzechoslovaktate s well s

to

weaken

upport

or he

31

Martha

Bohachevsky-Chomiak,

The Ukrainian

University

n

Galicia:

A

Pervasive

ssue,"

Harvard Ukrainian tudies

.4

(1981):

497-545.

*¿

In

Subcarpathian

us1

239,000

hectares ecame

subject

o

distribution

n 1920.

By

the

end of

1934, however,

nly

57,000

hectareshad

actually

been

distributed,

with he ocal Ukrainian easantryormingheoverwhelming ajorityfrecipients

(86

per

cent).

(Another

6,000

hectareswere eft

n

the

possession

of

the

original

owners).

Jos.

Jirkovsky,

Pozemková eforma

a

Podkarpatské

usi,"

n

Podkarpatská

Rus,

ed. Jaroslav Zatloukal

(Bratislava:

Klub

pfátel Podkarpatské

Rusi,

1936)

147-48.





404 JOHN-PAUL

MKA

1920sdwarf oldings f ess than wohectares ccounted or14per ent f the

farms

n

Volhynia,

3

per

cent

n

Lviv

palatinate,

5

per

cent

n

Ternopil

palatinate

nd 68

per

cent

n

Stanyslaviv alatinate.34

lthough

he andreform

helped

lleviateUkrainianand

hunger

n

Czechoslovakia,

his eliefwas

meager

and short-lived nd

pressure

n the land soon mounted

gain.

In

the late

nineteenth

nd

early

wentieth

enturies,

migration

romWestern kraine o

North

merica ad

helped

o reduce ural

verpopulation

nd

bring

xtra

money

into

the

region;

but betweenthe wars

both America and

Canada enacted

legislation

aimed at

restricting

he

immigration

f Southern

nd

Eastern

Europeans s well as Asians.Theclosing f this raditionalscaperoute ast a

pall

over

West Ukrainian ural ife between

he

wars.

There was also no

development

f

ndustry

n

Western

kraine

o

absorb xcess rural

opulation;

farms

rew

maller

nd smaller

s

they

weredivided

mong

hildren. he

great

depression

f the

1930s

only

ntensifiedhe

misery.

The

only aspect

of

Ukrainian conomic

activity

hat

flourished

n

the

interwar

eriod

was the

cooperative

ector. he

cooperatives

f

Galicia,

with

about

350,000

members

n

1930,

were

particularly

uccessful,

ut Ukrainian

cooperatives

lso

existed

n

Volhynia,

Bukovina nd

Subcaipathian

Rus'.35

Among hemost rofitablefthe ooperatives asMaslosoiuz,which xported

butter nd other

dairy products

cross

Europe.

The Ukrainian

ooperative

movement

n

Poland was able

to

employ

educatedUkrainians

who would

otherwise ave

been without

obs,

to fund

ublications

nd to

support

ther

political

and

cultural ctivities.The success of the

cooperative

movement

reflected,

nd was

dependent

pon,

hemobilization

f thefemale

opulation,

since

n

the

traditional krainian armstead

omenhad

responsibility

or he

cows and

poultry

whose

products

onstituted he

mainstay

f

cooperative

commodities.

Western krainianocietyonsisted,s already oted,rimarilyfpeasants.

They

had

only

ecentlymerged

rom

natural

conomy

nd

they

were

etreating

back nto t

n

the aceof the conomic

ifficultiesfthe nterwarra.

They

were

less mobilethan

hey

had

been before

914,

nd

n

Galicia and

Bukovina he

quality

f the

ducation vailable o them eclined. he cities

were

argely

on-

Ukrainian. olishwas

the

anguage

f Western kraine's

reatest

ity,

viv,

nd

non-Ukrainians

Poles, Romanians,

ews,

Czechs and

Magyars

formed he

majority

f Western

kraine's rban

opulation.

34 Papierzyríska-Turek,prawa ukraiñska24, 26. Magocsi, haping fa National

Identity

55.

35

On the

cooperative

movement

n

WesternUkrainebetween

he

wars,

see Illia

Vytanovych,

storiia ukrains'koho

ooperatyvnoho

iikhu

New

York:

Tovarystvo

ukrains'koi

kooperatsii,

964)

315-496.



WESTERNUKRAINE

BETWEEN

THE

WARS

405

There was a small but dynamic Ukrainian intelligentsiaable to provide

national

eadership

and

develop

the national

ulture.

n

Poland and

Romania this

intelligentsia

was

frustrated

n

its

advancement

by

the

discriminatory olicies

of

the

régimes,

which

tended to

exclude Ukrainiansfrom he

civil service and also

curtailed

opportunities

or

Ukrainians to be

employed

in

educational

and

other

cultural nstitutions

unded

by

the state.

There were also

several thousand

clergymen

in

Western Ukraine who

enjoyed

an influence

uite

disproportionate

o

theirnumber.The

Greek Catholic

clergy

of Galicia and

Bukovina and the

Basilian order

n

Transcarpathia

ended

o

be nationally onscious Ukrainians.36 he Orthodox lergy,however,was often

drawn into

anti-Ukrainian

political

orientations. The

Orthodox

clergy

in

Transcarpathia

was almost

exclusively

Russophile,

a

good

portion

of the

Orthodox

clergy

in

Bukovina and

Bessarabia succumbed

to

Romanization and

some Orthodox churchmen n

Volhynia

and

Polissia,

particularly igher

lergy,

preferred

o

preserve

he

traditional ussian

character f their

hurch.The

secular

Greek Catholic

clergy

in

Transcarpathia

tended to be

Rusynophile

n

national

orientation,

ometimes with

pro-Hungarian

lant as well.

In

Galicia Ukrainian

society

was

highly disciplined.

When Galician

Ukrainianpolitical leaders issued a call in 1922 to boycottPolish parliamentary

elections,

so as

not to

imply

recognition

of

Polish rule over

Western

Ukraine,

the

people obeyed;

while

in

the

mainly

Polish

palatinates

f

Warsaw

and Poznan

84 and 87

per

cent

of

the

eligible

voters

took

part

in

the

elections,

the

participation

n

Lviv

palatinate

was 52

per

cent,

n

Temopil

35

per

cent and

in

Stanyslaviv

32

per

cent.37

Galician

Ukrainian

ociety

was

also

highly

rganized.

Some of the

most

important

rganizations

were: the

adult-education

society

Prosvita,

which had

1

1,065

members

n

1925

and

sponsored

2,036

reading

halls

with a

combined

membership

of

121,651;

the

Ridna

shkola

society,

which,

in

theface ofgovernment arassment,stablished ndmaintainedUkrainianprivate

schools

(23

elementary

chools

and 10

secondary

chools in

the

1926-27 school

year);

the

scouting

organization

Plast,

which

had

about

6,000

members

in

Western

Ukraine

when it was

banned

by

the

Polish

authorities

n

1930

(it

continued to

exist

underground);

and the

Union of

Ukrainian

Women

(Soiuz

ukrainok)

which was

able to

organize

an

impressive

mass

demonstration

n

36

See Andrew

Dennis

Sorokowski,

The

Greek-Catholic arish

Clergy

n

Galicia,

1900-1939"

(Ph.D.

diss.,

U of

London,

School of

Slavonic and

East

European

Studies,

1991).

-u

Papierzyñska-Turek,prawa

ukrainska

35.



406

JOHN-PAUL

MKA

Stanyslavivn 1934.38With he xceptionf thewomen's rganization,ll the

associations

amed bove had been

founded ack

n

the

Austrian

eriod,

s

had

been the

Maslosoiuz

cooperative.

After

Galicia,

Bukovina was

the most

organized

f the West Ukrainian

erritories.

n

Transcarpathia

ost

types

f

organizations

xisted

n

duplicate

r

even

riplicate,

ecause f

the

ivalrymong

the

national

rientations.

hus,

for

xample,

wo

significant

dult-education

societies

ompeted

n

the

egion

Prosvita,

ith Ukrainian

rientation,

ndthe

Russophile/Rusynophileukhnovych

ociety.

THE

POLARIZATION

F WEST

UKRAINIAN

OLITICAL

IFE

Whatwas

true f

European olitics

s a

whole

n

the nterwar

ra was

true lso

of Western

kraine: herewas an

intense

olarization

etween

eft nd

right

nd

a

drastic ecline

by

the

1930s

n

the

ize and

effectivenessf

democraticnd

moderateorces.39

Communism

igured

rominently

n

Western

Ukraine,

specially

n

the

1920s.WestUkrainian

ommunism as

essentially

f

two

ypes.

he

first

ype

was that f

the former ustrian

erritoriesf

Galicia

and Bukovina. n

these

regionsCommunismwas nota mass movement,speciallynotamongthe

Ukrainian

opulation,

ut t

did exert

powerful

ttractionn

intellectuals.

What

attracted

hem,

besides

the radical

political

doctrine

hat

ought

to

transform

uman

relations,

were

the

developments

n

neighbouring

oviet

Ukraine. he Ukrainian

oviet

Socialist

Republic

was a

state-like

ntity

here

the tate

pparatus

as

being

ystematically

krainianized

n

themid-

920s nd

where

vibrant

krainian ulturewas

being

reated.

t

appeared

much

more

attractive

hanPoland and Romania.A

number

f Galician

and

Bukovinian

intellectuals

ctually

migrated

o

the USSR

in

the

twenties.

side from

he

Sovietophilentelligentsia,herewere lsohardcore arxistevolutionariesho

worked

in

the

illegal

Communist

parties

of

Poland and

Romania. The

Communist

arty

f Western

Ukraine,

n

autonomous

nitwithin

he Polish

Communist

arty,

ad

a

particularlyistinguished

istory.40

n

1928

t

became

38

Martha

Bohachevsky-Chomiak,

Feminists

despite

Themselves:

Women n

Ukrainian

Community

ife,

1884-1939

(Edmonton:

anadian

nstitute f

Ukrainian

Studies,

1988)

149-280.

39

Programmatic

olitical

documents rom

nterwarWestern

kraine

an be

found

in Ukrains'ka

uspiVno-politychna

umka

v

20

stolitti,

aras Hunczak

Hunchak]

nd

Roman Solchanyk Sol'chanyk]eds., II ([Munich]: Suchasnist',1983). Ukrainian

political

parties

n

interwar oland

are

surveyed

n

Jerzy

olzer,

Mozaika

polityczna

Drugiej

Rzeczypospolitej

Warsaw:

Ksi^zka

i

Wiedza,

1974)

241-53,

531-51.

40

Janusz

Radziejowski,

The Communist

arty of

Western

Ukraine

1919-1929

(Edmonton:

anadian nstitute f Ukrainian

tudies,

1983).

Roman

Solchanyk,

The



WESTERNUKRAINE

BETWEEN

THE

WARS

407

thefirst ommunistparty o correctly ssess thedanger posed by Stalinism and

in

the

following

year

ts

eaders were

expelled

from he Comintern or

objecting

to

Stalinist

nationality policy

in

Soviet Ukraine.

Among

the

party's

theoreticians

was the brilliant Marxist historian and

interpreter

f

Marx's

thought,

Roman

Rosdolsky.41

Stalinism

put

an end to the

popularity

f Communism

among

Galician and

Bukovinian intellectuals.

In

the 1930s some of the leaders of the Soviet

Ukrainianculturalrenaissance were

killing

themselves

n

protest gainst

Stalin's

policies; many

more, however,

were

perishing

n

the White Sea

region

and other

places of punishment.The West Ukrainian ntellectualswho had emigratedto

Soviet Ukraine were rounded

up

and condemned

to death. Worstof

all,

in

1932-

33,

in

connection with the total collectivization

of

agriculture,

man-made

famine took five to

six million

lives

in

Soviet

Ukraine.

The

infatuationwith

Communism

was

over for he Ukrainian

ntelligentsia

f

Galicia and

Bukovina.

The second

type

of Communism survived nto the

thirties. ts

geographical

base

was

Transcarpathia

and

Volhynia,

i.e.,

territories f the

Hungarian

and

Russian

legacies,

poor regions

with more than the normal

West Ukrainian hare

of

illiteracy.

Here,

as

in

Western

Belarus,

Communism was a mass movement.

In the last reasonably free elections of interwarPoland, those of 1928,

Communistfront

arties

n

Volhynia

received 48

per

cent of the vote

(in

Eastern

Galicia

they

received 13

per

cent).

In

Subcarpathian

Rus' the

Communist

party,

which was

legal

in

Czechoslovakia,

received 39

per

cent of the

vote

in

1924,

while the victorious

government

oalition

only

received

40

per

cent;

in

1935

the

Communists were still

able to

poll

24

per

cent of

the vote.

In

these

regions

not

Soviet

nationality

policy,

but the social

Utopian appeal

of

Communism

determined the

loyalties

of the

adherents,

and-hungry

nd

poorly

educated

peasants.

The centerof thepoliticalspectrumwas occupied bytheUkrainianNational

Democratic

Alliance,

best

known

by

its Ukrainian

acronym

UNDO. It

was

formed

n Lviv

in

1925

by

a union of

moderate

nationalist

roups.

It

published

an excellent

daily newspaper,

Duo,

dominated Ukrainian

representation

n

the

Polish diet and

enjoyed

close relations with

the

cooperative

sector

and other

voluntary

associations,

especially

with

Prosvita and

the Union of

Ukrainian

Foundation f

the Communist

Movement

n

Eastern

Galicia, 1919-1921,"

Slavic

Review 30.4 (1971): 774-94. Roman Solchanyk, "The Comintern and the

Communist

arty

f

Western

Ukraine, 919-1928,"

Canadian

Slavonic

Papers

23.2

(1981):

181-97.

41

Janusz

Radziejowski,

Roman

Rosdolsky:

Man,

Activist nd

Scholar,"

cience

&

Society

42.2

(1978):

198-210.



408

JOHN-PAUL

MKA

Women.UNDO was theUkrainianmainstreamartynGalicia. nthe1930s t

began

to lose

the

bility

o attract

outh,

ot

only

because most

places

in

the

leadership

were

occupied,

butalso because ts

moderate

oliciesproved

both

ineffective

is-à-vis he

Polish

régime

nd

unsatisfying

o a new

generation

f

frustrated,

ngry oung

men ndwomen.

n

1935UNDO embarked

n a

program

of

"normalization,".e.,

an

attempt

o reach

modus

vivendi

with he

Polish

state.This foundered

adly

because the state uthorities

ade no substantial

concessions o the

Ukrainians.

onetheless,

nd

in

spite

of

opposition

o the

normalization romwithinUNDO

itself

among

the editorsof

Dilo),

this

attemptt accommodationingeredn until 939.Therewas a partyimilar o

UNDO

in

Bukovina,

heUkrainian

ational

arty,

hichwas founded

n

1927

and asted

until

938,

when ll

political arties

n

Romaniaweredissolved.

he

weeklyRidnyi

rai

was associatedwith heUkrainian ational

arty.

he so-

called "national-democratic"

endency,

hichUNDO andtheUkrainian

ational

Party epresented,

as a survivor

rom he Austrian

eriod,

o

which t was

better

uited.

Also

surviving

rom he

previous

ra

were

moderate

ocialist

arties.

he

radical

party,

whichwas

in

fact he oldestUkrainian

olitical arty

founded

1890),was ananticlerical,grarianocialist arty ased nGalicia. nthemid-

19208

tunitedwithwhat emained

fthe

Ukrainian

ocialist-revolutionaryarty

in

Volhynia

to form he UkrainianSocialist Radical

Party.

The radicals

constitutedmore

r

ess

loyalopposition

o UNDO within alicianUkrainian

society.42

krainian ocial democratic

arties

were

ctive

n

both

Galicia and

Bukovina,

s

they

ad been incebefore heworldwar.

n

the nterwarra social

democracy

n

both territories

avered

between

pro-

and anti-Communist

programs.43

In

discussing

he

moderate

urrents

n

Ukrainian

olitics,

t

s

necessary

o

mention hat herewere lsoWestUkrainianolitical ctivists ndgroupswho

cooperated

with,

ather han

pposed,

he

governmentarties.

ecause

in

both

Romania nd Czechoslovakia

Ukrainians ormeduch small

percentage

f the

total

population,

it made some sense

for

Ukrainians to work

within

Czechoslovak r Romanian

arties.

his

was,

of

course,

much

more ruitful

nd

muchmore

widespread

n

Czechoslovakia han

n

Romania. he fewUkrainian

politicians

n

Poland

who

oined

the

Non-Party

loc for

Cooperation

ith he

Government

ere stracized

y

theironationals.

42

See the memoirs

f an interwar adical activist: van

Makukh,

Na narodnii

sluzhbi

Detroit:Vydannia

Ukrains'koi

il'noi

hromady meryky,

958).

43

The

memoirs of

an

interwarGalician social democrat:Antin

Chernets'kyi,

Spomyny

moho

zhyitia

London:

Nashe

slovo,

1964).



WESTERNUKRAINE

BETWEENTHE

WARS 409

Althoughmoderate,Austrian-bomnationaldemocracyseemed to dominate

West

Ukrainian

political

life,

this

appearance

became more

clearly recognizable

as a

mirage

as

the interwar ra

advanced.

Already

in

the

early

1920s

a

new,

postwar ideology

Communism was

demonstrating

onsiderable

dynamism

and

even,

in

the formof

Sovietophilism, penetrating eeply

into

the

national

democratic

camp.

In

the

1930s

national

democracy

lost even more

ground

to

another

pecificallypostwar

deology:

the nationalism f the

radical

right.

Before

turning irectly

o an account of

radical-right

ationalism,

t

will

be

useful to sketch ome of the nternal

ources

of

its

deological

and

organizational

formation.44 The leading theorist of radical-right nationalism, Dmytro

Dontsov,45

took some of his

ideas from he conservative

Ukrainian

right.

This

conservative

right

had two

distinguishable,

but

often

over-lapping

currents:

monarchist

urrent,

ssociated with

he

deologue

Viacheslav

Lypynsky,46

nd a

conservative

Catholic

current,

he

outstanding epresentative

f which was

Osyp

Nazaruk,47

editor of the

newspaper

Nova

zoria.

Ukrainian monarchismwas an

entirely

postwar

(or

more

precisely: postrevolutionary)phenomenon,

while

Catholic conservatismhad

its

predecessors

n

prewar

Galicia. As was

the

pattern

elsewhere

in

Europe

at the

time,

the radical

right

n

Western

Ukraine borrowed

certain deological principlesfrom he conservativeright, ut was bothwilling

and

able

to harness to its

deology

a mass movement. he conservative

ight

was

content o remain a

numerically

imited lite.

The most

important

rganizationalpredecessor

of

radical-right

ationalism

was

the

Ukrainian

Military Organization,

known

by

its Ukrainian

acronym

UVO.48 After the

suppression

of the Ukrainian

National

Republic

in

both

44

See the

special monograph

evoted to this

problem:

Alexander

J.

Motyl,

The

Turn to the

Right:

The

Ideological Origins

and

Development of

Ukrainian

Nationalism, 919-1929 (Boulder:East EuropeanMonographs,980).

45

Mykhailo Sosnovs'kyi,

Dmytro

Dontsov.

Politychnyi

portret.

Z istorii

rozvytku

deolohii ukrains'koho

natsionalizmu

New

York:

Trident

nternational,

1974).

46

The

Political

and

Social Ideas

of VjaÖeslav

Lypyns'kyj,

d. Jaroslaw

elenski

{Harvard

Ukrainian

tudies

.3-4)

(Cambridge,

MA.,

1985).

47

Ivan

Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi,

Nazaruk

i

Lypyns'kyi:

storiia khn'oi

druzhby

a

konfliktu,"

n Viacheslav

Lypyns'kyi.

Arkhiv

VII:

Lysty

Osypa

Nazaruka

do

Viacheslava

Lypyns'koho,

van

Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi,

d.

(Philadelphia:

Skhidn'o-

evropeis'kyi oslidchyi

nstytut

m. V.K.

Lypyns'koho,

976)

xv-xcvii.

48

Sribna

surma.

Spohady

i

materiialy

do

diiannia

Ukrains'koi

viis'kovoi

orhanizatsii,

Zbirnyk

1,

Zynovii Knysh,

ed.

(Toronto:

Sribna

surma, 1963]).

Zynovii Knysh,

Vlasnym

uslom.Ukrains'ka iis'kova rhanizatsiia id

oseny

1922

do lita

1924

roku,

Sribna

surma,

statti,

materiialy

dokumenty

o

diial'nosty

Ukrains'koi viis'kovoi

orhanizatsii,

Zbirnyk

4

(Toronto:

Sribna

surma,

1966).

Zynovii Knysh,

Na

povni vitryla

Ukrains'ka

viis'kova

rhanizatsiia

v

1924-1926

rokakh)

Toronto:

ribna

urma,

970).



410

JOHN-PAUL

IMKA

Galician and Dnieper Ukraine,the UVO continued n undergroundwar against

what

it

perceived

to be the Polish

régime

of

occupation.

Its methods of

struggle

assassinations and

assaults on Polish institutions n

Ukrainian ethnic

territory

were

to be

adopted by

its

radical-right

uccessor,

the

Organization

of

Ukrainian Nationalists

OUN).

The UVO took

part

n

the

founding ongress

of

the OUN

in

1929 and

gave

the new

organization

ts own

exceptionally ifted

nd

dedicated

eader,

evhen Konovalets.

Introducing

these

progenitors

does not

suffice s an

explanation

for the

phenomenal

rise of the

OUN

in

the

1930s.

So

many

factors

eemed to

conspire

to bringabout its creation and subsequentpopularity hatone can speak of the

rise of the

OUN as

being

to

borrow

concept

from reud and

Althusser)

over-

determined."

Some

of the crucial factors

n

its rise

have

already

been

alluded to: the

accumulation

of

political

frustration

n

Poland and

Romania,

the

great

depression,

he

damage

done to the eft

by

Stalinism

n

Soviet

Ukraine. To these

must be added the

collapse

of

democracy.Already

at the start f

the nterwar ra

Western

democracy

was

compromised

n

the

yes

of

West

Ukrainiansbecause of

what

theyperceived

as the

hypocrisy

f

the Western

powers;

while

proclaiming

the principle of national self-determination,he great democratic powers

France,

Britain,

America

nonetheless

gnored

and

opposed

the

aspirations

of

Ukrainians to

independent

tatehood49

nd,

in

particular,

warded

indisputably

Ukrainian Galicia to Poland. Then

democracies

began

to

disappear

from the

whole

continent

Italy

started he trend until

by

the eve of

the Second World

War

enervatedBritain

nd France were the

only

European

powers

to hold to the

old faith.

Throughout

Eastern

Europe,

with the

exception

of

Czechoslovakia,

dictatorships merged

in

the 1930s. The

generation

f

the

1930s

in

Poland and

Romania

learned

nothing

n

school about

democratic

rinciples

nd knew

of free

elections only throughthe tales of their

mpotent

elders.

They

had lost all

experience

of as well as all faith

n

democraticvalues.

Fiercely

nationalistic,

esperate,

unencumbered

y

democratic

cruples,

the

West Ukrainian

youth

of the

1930s could

only

take

cheer from he rise of

Hitler

in

Germany.

After

1933 there existed a

power

in

Europe,

increasingly

the

greatest ingle

power

in

Europe,

thatwas

openly

revisionist,

hat

unequivocally

stood

for

overturning

he

postwar

settlement hat he West

Ukrainians found so

hateful.Nazi

Germany,

with ts

concept

of

ein

Volk,

ein

Reich,

seemed to aim

at

redrawing

Europe's

borders

on the

ethnic

principle

which

is what Hitler

49

The Western

emocracies' ack of

sympathy

or

Ukrainian

ational

spirations

emerges

clearly

from

Anglo-American

erspectives

on the

Ukrainian

Question,

1938-1951:

A

Documentary

Collection,

ed.

Lubomyr

Y. Luciuk

and Bohdan S.

Kordan

Kingston,

ON.: Limestone

ress,

1987).



WESTERNUKRAINEBETWEENTHE

WARS

411

actuallydid untilMarch 1939). Hitler's anti-Communist,nti-Russian nd anti-

Polish

policies

could not

but

appeal

to the

youth

of

Western

Ukraine. OUN

grew

with

the

popularity

f

Germany

mong

West Ukrainian

youth.

They

chose

to close their

yes

to the

anti-Slavic racism of

the

Nazis,

although hey

aw

(and

generally

underestimated)

he

anti-Semitism,

which ended

up

infectingmany

of

them.50

The

key point

of

OUN'

s

ideology

was the

subordination of

absolutely

everything

o

the

goal

of

establishing

n

independent

Ukrainian

nation-state.51

Voluntarism,

rrationalism,

ocial Darwinism

and the

Führerprinzip52

ere also

ingredients in the heady ideological concoction that the nationalist youth

imbibed. The

young

nationalists

had their

own

tight

discipline,

salute,

code of

conduct,banner,

greeting

everything

hich went

with he

radical-right

olitical

style. They

had immense

faith

in

the

future,

great

hopes

for the

European

cataclysm

they

aw

coming. They

represented

heend

of the

nterwar

ra.

Western Ukraine

was,

in

sum,

in

an

unenviable

position

n

the

interwar

eriod.

Denied itsright o nationalself-determinationntheaftermathfWorldWar I, it

was

occupied by

neighbours

who

sought,

however

futilely,

o assimilate

it.

Only

Czechoslovakia

was better

isposed,

but

ts

Ukrainian

population

was the

smallest and

overall the

most

backward.

Economic

development

throughout

Western

Ukraine was

at best

stagnant

and

in

some

respects

retrogressive.

Peasants

without

hope

or with

wild,

transrational

opes

and a

profoundly

frustrated,

own-at-the-heel

ntelligentsia

rovided

fertile

oil for

the

growth

f

radical,

twentieth-century

deologies,

first f

the

eft,

henof

the

right.

Although

the overall

environment

was so

unfavourable,

nd

unhealthy,

ot all

that

was

50

Anti-Semitismn

Ukraine s a

poorly

esearched

opic.

t is

clear,

however,

hat

anti-Semitism as

never

prominent

n

the

platform

f

OUN or

Ukrainian

ationalism

generally.

n

this

respect

ight-wing

krainian

ationalism

iffered

rofoundly

rom

its

Hungarian,

olish

and Romanian

ounterparts.

51

For

a collection f

official

UN

documents,

ee OUN

v

sviili

postanov

velykykh

zboriv,

konferentsii

a

inshykh

okumentiv

boroVby

929-1955

r.,

Biblioteka

ukrains'koho

idpil'nyka,

(N.p.,

1955).

5"

"Ukrainian

ationalism ill

build the

structurend

social

life

of

the

state n

the

healthy

rinciples

f

leadership.

The foundation

nd

personification

f this

principle

will

be

the Head of

State, heLeader of theNation, s thebearer f sovereignty,he

symbol

of its

spiritual

nd

political

unity,

s its

highest

uthority

nd

helmsman."

"Peredmova,"

olitychna

rohrama

U trii

Orhanizatsii

krainskykh

atsionalistiv

(N.p.,

1940)

17. On

the

OUN's

"outright

dherence o

the

Fiihrerprinzip"

ee

also

John

A.

Armstrong,

krainian

Nationalism,

2nd ed.

(Littleton,

O.:

Ukrainian

Academic

Press,

1980)

39.



4

1

JOHN-PAUL

IMKA

nurturednWestern krainewas tainted. vital elf-reliance asforgednthis

era that arned ver

nto

he

migration

ndcontributeduch o the onstruction

of the

impressively rganized

Ukrainian

diaspora

in

NorthAmerica.

An

exceptionallyynamic

ational onsciousness as cultivated

n

this

eriod,

oo,

one which

has not

only

served

the

diaspora

well,

but which contributed

disproportionately

n

recent

years

o the urvival nd

revival

f

the

Ukrainian

national

dea

n

Ukrainetself.

Documents

J.-P. Himka, 'West Ukraine between the Wars