documents.worldbank.orgdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/pt/... · iv Introduction v Acronyms vi Glossary. Tab 1 Business as Usual? 1.2 Characteristics of post-conflict countries 1.4

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War to P

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The Transition from Warto Peace: An Overview

Room MC C2 – 137

Organized by the ESSD

Social Development Family (SDV)

Post-Conflict Unit

and the World Bank Institute (WBI)

in collaboration with InterWorks

April 13–15, 1999

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Administrator

26317

iv Introductionv Acronymsvi Glossary

Tab 1 Business as Usual?1.2 Characteristics of post-conflict countries1.4 Special operational requirements1.6 The World Bank’s role in war-to-peace transitions

1.11 Lessons learnedTab 2 Economic and Political Context

2.2 Historical factors2.3 Economic factors2.5 Political factors2.5 Nationalism, religion and ethnicity2.7 Dynamics of war-torn economies

2.10 Lessons learned2.11 Annex 2.1

Tab 3 Peacebuilding Strategies3.2 Making peace3.5 Keeping peace

3.10 Sustaining peace3.13 Lessons learned3.14 Annex 3.1

Tab 4 Managing Conflict4.2 Types of conflict4.3 Mechanisms to prevent, manage and transform conflict

4.10 Lessons learnedTab 5 Reestablishing Security

5.2 Peace negotiations and DRP planning5.3 Disarmament5.5 Demobilization and social reintegration of former combatants5.9 Demining activities

5.12 Conversion of military assets to productive sector5.13 Lessons learned5.14 Annex 5.1

Tab 6 Economic Reconstruction Strategies6.2 Economic policy issues6.6 Structural adjustment issues6.8 Economic reconstruction actions6.9 Lessons learned

Tab 7 Reintegration of War-Affected Populations7.2 Reintegration is more than relocation and resettlement7.3 Social assessments7.4 Gathering data7.4 Encouraging participation7.6 Assessment methods7.6 Gender analysis7.8 Rebuilding social and human capital

7.11 Lessons learnedTab 8 Making Transitional Aid Work

8.2 Monitoring countries affected by conflict8.5 Working within the bank’s legal and mandate restrictions8.7 Working with and strengthening counterparts8.8 Assessing needs and the optimal role for the World Bank

8.10 Administrative issues8.11 Tapping a range of World Bank specialists8.13 Lessons learned8.14 Annexes 8.1–8.4

Table ofContents

Organized by the ESSD

Social DevelopmentFamily (SDV)

Post-Conflict Unit

and the World BankInstitute (WBI)

in collaborationwith InterWorks

The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview

Acknowledgements

These eight modules were researched and written by InterWorks inconsultation with World Bank staff, particularly the Post-Conflict Unit.The colleagues at InterWorks are indebted to the World Bank reviewersfor their interest and continued involvement with the development ofthis training document. Editing, design, and desktop publishing serviceswere provided by Artifax; graphic illustrations and artwork were createdby InterWorks. Any material from this text may be copied, cited or usedfor training purposes as long as attribution is made to the World Bank.

Published by the World Bank, April 1999.Revised edition, September 1999.

Introduction

Development and internationalfinancial institutions have a critical

role to play, along with political,peacekeeping and humanitarianassistance agencies, in makingpost-conflict reconstruction and

development a success. But they mustbecome involved at an early stage inorder to prepare the groundwork forviable development plans and the

reintegration of displaced populations.Development agencies also have a roleto play in the prevention of conflicts by

seeking to remedy the economicinequities underlying conflict.

And in introducing development-oriented programs into actual conflict

situations, they can help displacedpopulations make more manageable

transitions out of conflict.— Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng

Masses in Flight, 1998

■ iv ■

IntroductionTHE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE: AN OVERVIEW

This module is a product ofa multi-year process todetermine both a framework

for Bank involvement in post-conflictenvironments and the learning needsof Bank staff involved in post-conflictactivities. The Bank’s organizationalexperience and knowledge related toworking in war-torn societies is largelylimited to staff with actual experience.In order to develop both institutionalmemory and capacity in post-conflictsettings, this module takes a first steptoward distilling and disseminatingthis information to a wide audienceof Bank professionals, governmentcounterparts and non-governmentalorganizations.

A prerequisite to developing areconstruction strategy is a thoroughunderstanding of what constitutesreconstruction. Reconstruction is notsimply replacing what existed beforethe conflict. Those involved in recon-struction must evaluate where thecommunity/country fits in today’sworld. This may require significantrevamping of systems and infrastruc-ture and may result in higher post-conflict standards for reconstructionthan those that existed prior to theconflict. For example, communicationnetworks destroyed by conflict willlikely be replaced with systems thattake advantage of new technologies,resulting in a more efficient andeffective network than was previouslyin place. The purpose of reconstructionis to (re)establish political order,physical infrastructure, institutions andproductive capacity in order to create abase for sustainable development.

The scope of this moduleextends beyond the mandate of theWorld Bank and of any one specificpost-conflict program because it iscritical to understand the political,social and economic environment thatovershadows all assistance actions inpost-conflict environments. As stressedthroughout the module, post-conflictenvironments challenge Bank staff to

TAB FOUR: Managing Conflict exploresvarious methods for managingconflict—from conflict prevention toconflict transformation—which are seenas underlying activities if any gains inpeacemaking are to be maintained.

TAB FIVE: Reestablishing Securityfocuses on the priority activities in theearliest stages of intervention in a con-flict situation. These include support todisarmament, demobilization and rein-tegration of excombatants, deminingand conversion of military assets.

TAB SIX: Economic ReconstructionStrategies analyzes the key economicpolicy issues concerning countries intransition form conflict to peace. Eco-nomic policies concerning, fiscal andbudegetary issues, inflation, foreignexchange, savings, investment, andstructural adjustment are all consideredin the context of delicate post-conflictsocial and political situations.

TAB SEVEN: Reintegration of War-Affected Populations explores themechanisms and options for socialreintegration programming, utilizingprocesses of social analysis to determinehow best to develop social capital andaddress the special concerns of womenand most vulnerable populations.

TAB EIGHT: Making Transitional AidWork identifies the activites (andrestrictions) required of individualsand the Bank in order to implementthe good intentions promoted in thepreceding Tabs.

If you are using this module as a self-study text, you are encouraged to use itas a workbook. There are study ques-tions in each section. Some are for yourown personnal reflection, and answersare to be based on your own experi-ence. Other questions are more closelyrelated to the text and/or World Bankexperience, and suggested answers areprovided. To get the most out of thismodule, you are encouraged to writeout your answers in the space provided.

think creatively about how to useBank resources most effectively.The main aims of the module areto promote understanding of:

■ the root causes of conflictand the design of appropriatepreventive strategies(e.g. early warning systems)

■ the relationship between economicpolicy and violence in order todevelop economic policies condu-cive to peacebuilding and stability

■ the effects of war on the economy,with a view to mitigating the cost tosociety and improving the prospectsfor early reconstruction

■ the various challenges of rebuildingpost-conflict economies, in waysthat promote a successful transitionfrom war to lasting peace andsustainable development

■ methods for assessing the interac-tions between external assistance,conflict, and reconstruction toimprove the impact and effective-ness of external assistance

Overview of themodules

TAB ONE: Business as Usual? identifiesthe unique nature of war-to-peacetransitions as a development challengeand the role of international organiza-tions, especially that of the WorldBank, in this process.

TAB TWO: Economic and PoliticalContext explores the contextual issuesthat need to be understood as a pre-requisite to the peacemaking andreconstruction process. Awareness ofthe conflict’s history is important, aseven several years or decades after theconflict the underlying issues may stillhave a bearing on local politics and,therefore, on the Bank’s planning.

TAB THREE: Peacebuilding Strategtiesidentifies the phases of peacebuildingand the role of the Bank in theseactivities.

■ v ■


Acronyms

APL Adaptable Program LendingCAS Country Assistance StrategyCMR Crude mortality rateCOPAZ Guatemalan government commission for peaceCTF Consultancy Trust FundDRP Demobilization and reintegration programECHO European Community Humanitarian OfficeECOMOG Military Observers of the Economic Community of West African StatesECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEDI Economic Development InstituteFCU Financial Crisis UnitGIS Geographic information systemsHRFOR Human Rights Field Operation for RwandaICRC International Committee of Red CrossIDF Institutional Development FundIDPs Internally displaced personsIFC International Finance CorporationIFOR Dayton Peace Implementation ForceIFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent SocietiesIGAD Intergovernmental Agency for DevelopmentILO International Labour OrganizationIMF International Monetary FundINGOs International non-governmental organizationsJPCF Japanese Post-Conflict FundLEDAs Local Economic Development AgenciesLIL Learning and Innovation LoanNGOs Non-governmental OrganizationOAU Organization of African UnityOCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOED Operations Evaluation DepartmentOFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (of USAID)OTI Office of Transition Initiatives (of USAID)PCF Post Conflict FundPCU Post-Conflict UnitPTA Preferential Trade AreaSADC Southern Africa Development CommunitySAL Structural Adjustment LoanSRSG Special Representative of the Secretary GeneralUNDOS UN Development Office for SomaliaUNDP UN Development ProgrammeUNHCR UN High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF UN Children’s FundUNMAS UN Mine Action ServiceUNPA UN Protected AreaUVAB Uganda Veterans Assistance Board

■ vi ■


Glossary

Note: There is not universal agreement on all of thefollowing definitions, and some agencies use theseterms in organizationally specific ways.

Conflict early warning Activities taken to identifyor monitor structural and proximate predictors of conflictin a particular setting. In practical terms, this generallyconsists of monitoring of field reports received fromlocally active organizations, UN agencies, and newsreports.

Demobilization Release of soldiers from militaryduty and return to productive civilian life. This entailsformal discharge from service, return to normal place ofresidence, closing of barracks and other military quartersand organizational structures.

Disarmament In the widest sense, the completeremoval of weapons from a military force. While this isseldom (if ever) achieved in the widest sense, the termis typically used to mean any program, movement oraction to disarm the military in general, and soldiersindividually and systematically, even if only on alimited basis.

Displaced People forced from their homes andlivelihoods by conflict, both within national borders andinternationally. This term as used in the widest senseincludes both refugees and internally displaced persons(see definitions for specific meaning of each below)

Dissaving Borrowing for the purpose of consumptionexpenditure.

Durable solutions Especially within UNHCR, theterm durable solutions refers to long-term resolution ofthe plight of refugees . There are generally consideredto be three primary durable solutions; 1) repatriation tothe home country—when safe and voluntary, 2) localsettlement in the country of refuge, or 3) resettlement toa third country.

Early prevention Early diplomatic and developmentinterventions taken to promote diffusion of potentiallyserious conflicts, or proliferation of weapons, in order tolessen the potential scale of eventual hostilities.

Emergency relief Immediate and short-term survivalassistance to the victims of violent conflict although insome cases the emergency may be prolonged.

Exclusion This term generally means social exclusionin which individuals or groups are wholly or partiallyexcluded from full participation in the society in whichthey live, including livelihoods, earnings, property,housing, education and welfare benefits, citizenship,social contracts or respect.

Human capital The sum total of the skills andknowledge a person, a community, or a society posseses.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) People whohave been forced to move from their home community,city, area, or district but remain within the recognizednational boundaries of the country.

International community Multilateral and bilateralagencies, intergovernmental organizations, internationalnongovernmental organizations (INGOs), relief agencies,and sometimes private firms involved in emergencyrelief, rehabilitation and development operations.

Interactive conflict resolution A process involvingsmall group problem-solving discussions betweenunofficial representatives of opposing groups or factions,facilitated by a third party.

Late prevention Typically, diplomatic interventionstaken after some period of conflict escalation, taken toprevent all-out war. As currently practiced, it oftenincludes aspects of brinkmanship or pushing demandsand threats to the edge of war, while still in a nominallydiplomatic mode.

Peacebuilding Long-term support to viable political,socioeconomic and cultural institutions able to addressthe root causes of conflicts and establish the necessaryconditions for peace and stability. In the wide sense it isan overarching activity consisting of: peacemaking,peacekeeping, and peace sustaining.

Peacekeeping This part of peacebuilding includes:implementation of peace accords, promotion of goodgovernance through democratization and institutionbuilding, support of reconciliation efforts, public security,and protection of human rights. This is often consideredin the narrower meaning of the deployment of UN (orother , such as NATO, or ECOMOG) forces for thepurpose of placement of armed buffer forces betweenand among former military opposition forces.

■ vii ■


Peacemaking Activities to bring peace to a conflictsituation, These include: negotiations, design of peaceaccords, strengthening the role of civil society.

Reconciliation The healing process dealing with thepsychological damage of conflict, especially betweenperpetrators and victims of violence

Reconstruction Reestablishment of the political order,institutions and productive capacity to create a base forsustainable development.

Refugees The definition of who is and who is not arefugee is part of international law and is closely relatedto the mandate of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees, which was created to facilitate internationalprotection for them. The official definition states thatrefugees are people who are outside of their country oforigin and who, due to a well-founded fear of persecution,are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of thatcountry’s protection.

Rehabilitation Actions taken in the aftermath of adisaster or war to enable basic services to resumefunctioning, assist victim’s self-help efforts to repairdwellings and community facilities, and revive economicactivities, including agriculture.

Reinsertion Activities targeted for ex-combatants,demobilized soldiers and their families after sometype of peace agreement or accord has been reached.Reinsertion programs are “stepping stone” activitiestowards reintegration, specifically for ex-combatantswithin the community. They provide a safety net toprovide support for excombatants betweendemobilization and full reintegration.

Reintegration Return to normal functioning society.This term may apply to returnees both military andnon-military who must rebuild family and social lifewithin the community.

Resettlement A long-term solution for those whocannot for other reasons be repatriated and reintegratedinto their home communities. Particularly in regard torefugees, it carries the additional meaning of beingresettled to a third location from their current situationof refuge in a second country.

Shadow economy Economic activities operatingoutside of formal or government-controlled structures.Black market, bartering systems, ad hoc and informalarrangements for generating income which do not appearas a part of the Countries recognized GDP.

Social capital The norms and social relationsimbedded in the social structures of societies that enablepeople to coordinate action to achieve desired goals.

Watching Brief World Bank’s term for the monitoringof a country by the World Bank in conflict or risk ofconflict, even if there is not an active Bank portfolio inthe country.

Weapons control Any activities used to reduce thetotal amount of arms among the population, or totransfer their control to peacekeeping forces.

■ 1.1 ■

1

K E Y P O I N T S

Post-conflict environments are very different from traditionaldevelopment environments. Accordingly, the Bank must modifyits standard operations when working in post-conflict situations.

The Bank must act in a timely fashion if assistance is to be effectiveand contribute to peacebuilding and reconstruction.

Bank staff must develop special knowledge and skills regardingwar-torn societies in order to work effectively.

Business-as-usual?

■ 1.2 ■

The World Bank was born outof conflict and the need for adevelopment agency to play a

catalytic role in reconstruction afterWorld War II. Yet, since the Bank’sfounding, conflict has taken on en-tirely new dimensions—with differentplayers and vastly different circum-stances and consequences. In the post-Cold War era, deepening structuralpoverty and the flare up of local ani-mosities have led to internal conflictsin many countries.

Civil wars are liable to be moredamaging than international wars asthey are fought entirely on the territoryof one country and are likely to under-mine the state in terms of its institu-tions and organizations, such as thejudicial system and law enforcementagencies. In addition, the social fabricof a society may be irreparably torn asneighbors and even families turnagainst each other. In contrast, interna-tional wars can strengthen the state,invigorate collective action and bolstersome economic sectors, despite thephysical and human losses that occur.

Development agencies have experi-enced firsthand the terrible impact ofcivil conflict. They have seen years ofdevelopment work destroyed and havelearned that providing assistanceunder these circumstances is difficult,if not impossible, without understand-ing and addressing the root causes ofconflict. After decades of developmentwork, global politics has required theBank to refocus its mission on helpingrebuild countries wracked by conflict.

Characteristics ofpost-conflict countries

The collective wisdom and experiencegarnered from years of developmentwork may find application in post-conflict environments. The differencesbetween post-conflict situations andtraditional development settings,however, will require new approachesin the planning, design and implemen-tation of Bank and other developmentagency interventions. While eachpost-conflict situation is unique,evaluations of many war-torn societieshave identified a number of commonfeatures. Some of these characteristicsare also found in non-post-conflict

The sustainablereconstruction of

countries emergingfrom long periods of

conflict is a challengewe ignore at our peril.

This is not anissue we can

relegate to the sidelinesof development.

— James D. WolfensohnPresident, World Bank

countries, but their impact in post-conflict countries is usually morepronounced and the ability to addressproblems significantly curtailed.

■ Dominance of elites particularlythe military, but also an oligarchyof government and the wealthy.

■ Fragile peace-consolidation pro-cesses and continuing local rivalriesbetween former enemies that breedpolitical instability. In addition, theculture of violence inherited fromwar coupled with an abundantavailability of weapons may giverise to widespread criminality.

■ Lack of confidence among socio-economic actors. Owners of capitalmay be reluctant to invest insectors where it is most needed,that is, in fixed productive assetssuch as agricultural infrastructure.

■ Weak judicial, financial, fiscal,administrative and regulatorycapacities of the state. This dependson the pre-conflict situation aswell as the extent to which publicinstitutions have been affected bythe war. In Somalia, for example,government and public institutionsvirtually disappeared over severalyears. On the other hand, it can beargued that institutional weaknessmight, in certain cases, be accom-panied by a plethora of “superflu-ous” departments, agencies andparastatal organizations created orstrengthened during the war toregulate the economy.

Business-as-usual?

■ 1.3 ■

Business-as-usual?THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE: AN OVERVIEW

■ Large shadow economy (informalsector), parallel markets and/orcriminal activities, operating out-side of state control. An example isthe alliance between traders, armsdealers and some governmentofficials that often develops duringconflict. These groups may have acommon, vested interest in perpe-tuating an environment of scarcityand maintaining war machinery.They might even be tempted torevive hostilities to the extent theystand to lose from peace.

■ Bad macroeconomic record oftencharacterized by high inflation,large budget deficit, low tax base,balance-of-payments deficit andrelatively heavy debt burden.

■ Widespread unemployment. Thelabor supply may sharply increaseas ex-combatants are demobilized,and as refugees and internallydisplaced people return home. Thereinsertion of these potentiallydestabilizing groups requires urgentand costly ad hoc programs.

■ Displacement can be sudden andmassive, sometimes requiringequally massive internationalassistance for an extended period.

■ Dramatic lack of skilled labor.Education has been neglected,skills have been diverted by waror qualified personnel have fledabroad and not been replaced.

■ Damaged/obsolete physical capitaland production facilities. Infra-structure such as power plants,transportation and telecommunica-tion networks, harbors andairports have been destroyed ornot maintained. In some countries,landmines constitute a majorimpediment to rural developmentand food production.

Differences amongpost-conflict countries

Although war-torn societies may sharesome common characteristics, theextent to which a particular society isaffected by them varies considerably.The Operations Evaluation Department

(OED) of the World Bank analyzednine countries emerging from conflict.They determined that war-torn societ-ies differ based on the duration andintensity of the conflict, the scope ofdestruction, the relative military andpolitical strength of opponents, andthe degree to which different classeswithin a society are affected.

The extent of destruction amongthe nine countries varied widely.For example, the percentage of thepopulation displaced as a result ofconflict ranged from six percent inHaiti to 60 percent in Bosnia andHerzegovina. Similarly, the percentageof the population killed ranged fromtwo percent in El Salvador to 24 per-cent in Cambodia. Although these twomeasures of loss can easily be quanti-fied, the total destruction to acountry’s tangible and intangibleresources as well as to its social andeconomic progress is incalculable.

TIME

GD

P Conflict

Another characteristic of post-conflict countries is the severe negativeeffect of conflict on the economy. Forexample, in Rwanda in 1994 the GDPwas 46 percent of its pre-conflict peak.In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Leba-non, the GDP plunged to 27 and 24percent, respectively, of pre-conflictlevels. Economic recovery for thesecountries has been slow and thegrowth foregone as a result of conflictis an even larger opportunity costassociated with civil strife.

Unlike countries undergoing tradi-tional development processes, thoseemerging from conflict must also dealwith the underlying causes of theoriginal conflict if they hope to suc-cessfully make the transition from warto peace.

Case of Mozambique

The tragedy of Mozambique, anation with great natural resourcesand now with socioeconomicindicators at the bottom of theworld economic ladder, offers agraphic illustration of some of themost straightforward linkagesbetween poverty and conflict. Thenature of the conflict, the longgrinding years of war, the shadowsupport of outsiders, the sporadicinterest of the outside world,reflected Mozambique’s low levelof development. The decades ofwar left untold destruction in theirwake and Mozambique emergedfar behind countries that beganwith similar assets. In craftingdevelopment strategies for apostwar future, reality comes backagain and again to the fact thatthe lost human capital (deaths,disruptions, foregone education,and demolished schools and clinics)is an even more binding andlasting impediment than damagedroads and bridges and buried land-mines. This figures centrally in thechallenge of development, as thegeneration that missed its chanceat education and basic health care…. strives to catch up with decadesof delayed human investment.Extraordinary efforts are called fornow to recapture the time lost asMozambique faces the challengeof operating in today’s competitiveglobal environment.

Source: “Emerging from Conflict,” 1997 by Katherine Marshall

Destruction in Afghanistan – ICRC/James Nachtwey

■ 1.4 ■


In spite of the many obstacles thatpost-conflict countries must overcome,once a peace accord is reached thereoften is an outburst of high expecta-tions that peace will quickly lead torecovery. These often unrealistic ex-pectations lead to the risk of bitterdisappointments and the danger ofregression into conflict.

Special operationalrequirements in post-conflict environments

Because the political, social and eco-nomic realities of war-torn societiesare so different from countries atpeace, the purpose and approaches ofassisting in these environments mustalso be different if they are to beeffective. For example, developmentagencies face greater investment risksin supporting activities such as peace-building that are not based on feasibil-ity studies which indicate a high likeli-hood of success.

■

Building peacerequires knowing and

addressing thecauses of conflict.

■

The World Bank’s experience withwar-torn societies indicates that abroad understanding of the contextand history of the conflict is requiredto increase the probability of aproject’s success. Building peacerequires knowing and addressing thecauses of conflict.

In war-torn societies, developmentpriorities are less predictable. Instead oftraditional support to primary educa-tion, basic health care, water supplyand improved agricultural production,for example, the priorities may beensuring public safety and security,rebuilding institutions that havecrumbled, and developing mechanismsfor reintegrating child soldiers into asociety that has no experience withsuch endeavors. Therefore, at theearliest stages of post-conflict programplanning, priorities must be identified.Due to their inter-dependency, manypriority activities must be executedsimultaneously and in parallel if recon-struction programming is to succeed.

Each agency needs to focus onactivities for which it has a compara-tive advantage and ensure that otheragencies undertake the remainingrequisite activities. Sometimes, agen-cies need to alter their traditional roles.For example, the UN High Commis-sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) does notengage in normal development work.After conflict, however, UNHCR maywork side-by-side with other agenciesand NGOs that focus on rehabilitationand reconstruction. Engagement inpost-conflict environments requiresthat relief agencies take into accountthe long-term consequences of theiraid, while development agencies mustcapitalize on the experience and insti-tutional arrangements set up duringrelief operations.

War-to-peace transitions also re-quire agencies to form new partner-ships to reinforce each other’s actions

Understanding Conditionality

There are three types of condition-ality: economic, peace andpolitical. Standard World Bankconditionalities applied to projectand policy-based lending aretypically economic. An example isinstituting cost recovery policies forwater and sewerage services. Anexample of peace conditionality isdonor financing of economicactivities that promote reconcilia-tion and avoid aggravatingtensions or undermining thelonger-term sustainability of thepeace process. In the RepublikaSrpska, for instance, donor moneyshould not be used to help/rewardindividuals who obtained owner-ship of land, property andbusinesses by means of killing,stealing or expropriation. On abroader scale, peace conditionalityis ultimately about finding the bestway of delivering broad-basedpeace dividends, and ensuringeconomic sustainability andsoundly based local participation.Finally, political conditionality issimilar to sanctions in that donorfinancing is made dependent onexplicit expectations of desiredbehaviors/outcomes.

Conditionalities in post-conflictsituations must be applied morecautiously and flexibly than innormal Bank operations. Thedifferences between post-conflictcountries suggest that condition-alities be applied on a case-by-caseanalysis. The country’s implementa-tion capacity, the degree of socialcollapse and the political environ-ment may indicate that it is notappropriate to introduce wide-ranging conditionalities all at once.

Identify a post-conflict country you are familiar with, either personally or through the news.Which characteristics described here apply to that country??

■ 1.5 ■


and build reconstruction programsthat, when coordinated, will havegreater impact than programs imple-mented in isolation. These new part-nerships may include the World Bank,UN operational agencies, bilateraldonors and regional developmentbanks. Coordination is an essentialsupport activity; the Bank needs toclearly identify its role as either leadagency or participant in a coordinationprocess.

In post-conflict environments, theinternational community has estab-lished a right to condition assistanceon compliance with peace accords.Other conditionalities, e.g., compliancewith macroeconomic reforms, cessa-tion of human rights abuse, are morecontroversial and need to be utilizedwith caution. (Also see Tab 8.)

Personal skills

Development agency staff needspecial skills and attitudes to workin post-conflict environments whichoften pose great personal risks. Morethan elsewhere, they need to be goodlisteners and willing to engage indialogue with all segments of theaffected population in order to under-stand priority needs. They also needanalytical skills to assess the uniqueproblems facing the recovery effort aswell as the relative merits of alterna-tive solutions. Staff need to be creativeabout utilizing available developmentinstruments, such as the World Bank’srange of credit and lending programs.Implementing a comprehensive andproactive peace-building approachrequires the analytic capacity toidentify the underlying and structuralcauses of conflict, blended with a highdegree of political judgment in orderto develop appropriate responses.

Staff must ensure that assistancealways reinforces but never substitutesfor recipients’ own recovery efforts.Participation of local people in thedesign, implementation, and monitor-ing of transition programs is importantfor success and should result in their“buy in” to the process and selectionof the right priority actions. In addi-tion, focusing on the development ofcivil society in all aspects of program-ming will enhance the potential for

From your personal experience, what lessons have you learned that distinguish workingin a war-to-peace environment from a normal development environment??

sustained reconstruction activities. Insome cases this may require decentral-ized decision making. This may alsorequire capacity building to ensurethat central and local government andcommunity organizations are able tomanage the assistance provided. Theurge to move quickly with implemen-tation must be carefully balanced withthe deliberateness of capacity building.

Although reconstruction is anopportune time to make improvementsin obsolete systems and infrastructure,care must be taken to preserve andstrengthen positive attributes of aculture. Since women are key to theprocess of reconciliation and are lesslikely to be implicated in continuingviolence and more likely to beinvolved in the start-up of micro-economic enterprises such as small-scale farming, they should be targetedfor reconstruction assistance.

■

Coordination is anessential support activity;the Bank needs to clearlyidentify its role as either

lead agency orparticipant in a

coordination process.

■

■

Although reconstruction isan opportune time to

make improvements inobsolete systems and

infrastructure, care mustbe taken to preserve and

strengthen positiveattributes of a culture.

■

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The World Bank’srole in war-to-peacetransitions

Among the reasons for Bank involve-ment in post-conflict environments isthe Bank’s obligation to assist coun-tries struggling for survival to recoverfrom the trauma and destabilizingeffects of conflict. In addition, it hasresources that can, if strategicallyused, be an important catalyst forrecovery. Finally, the Bank can provideleadership during the transition fromwar to sustainable peace.

The Bank’s classic role in post-conflict reconstruction has been anoperational response of urgent,accelerated investment programsfocused largely on rebuilding physicalinfrastructure damaged by conflict.The attempt was to accelerate andsimplify traditional Bank proceduresand actions in terms of preparation,appraisal and implementation. TheBank’s historical responses, however,were predicated on conditions afterpeace was in place, as after WorldWar II. The political environments thatsurround post-Cold War conflicts arequite different in nature and require adifferent response.

In post-conflict environments, theneed to respond quickly is temperedby the gaps in information that charac-terize crisis situations combined with ahigher degree of uncertainty, institu-tional weakness in and a situation offlux where institutional arrangements

may be subject to change. Furthercomplicating the response are dramaticchanges in global communications, therole of the media, the multitude ofactors involved in humanitarian crises,and the evolution of the Bank’s role inthe world.

Non-traditional roles forthe World Bank

Beyond the Bank’s traditional financ-ing role, there are at least four otherareas where the Bank can be involvedin war-to-peace transitions. The first isin strategic and policy planning. Withits significant information resources,networks and experience in economicand social development issues, theBank can play a central role in strate-gic thinking for reconstruction anddevelopment. The Bank can providerapid, objective analyses of socioeco-nomic issues and define the economicand social tools that can guide deci-sion making. In the Guatemalan peacenegotiations, for example, the Bankwas invited to give advice on theeconomic feasibility and consequencesof proposed articles of the peaceagreement.

The Bank can also support theprocess of building new aid partner-ships and coordinating large numbersof actors. The World Bank’s Consulta-tive Group and Aid Consortiummechanisms offer precedents for aidpartnerships needed in post-conflictsituations. The aid coordination

mechanisms can be a source ofcontinuing information sharing anda framework within which specificsectoral mechanisms can be organized.

In addition, the Bank can providepolicy and technical support on post-conflict issues. The Bank can serve asa source of information to post-conflictcountries, sharing the experiences ofother countries and the lessons thatthey have learned as a result of theirtransition from war to peace—informa-tion that may otherwise be hard tocome by. In particular, the Bank canshare program design information onthe full range of post-conflict needs,from demobilization of soldiers tosupport for child-victims of war.

Finally, the Bank can providesubstantial support in the form ofsocioeconomic data and tools foranalysis to help fill policy and analyticvacuums in many sectors. In someinstances, disseminating informationon the social costs of war maycontribute to the impetus for peace,help shape consensus and formagreements. In Angola, for example,the World Bank’s objective was to urgecivic and government leaders to con-sider social and economic objectives asthey worked for peace and reconcilia-tion. The Bank did this by highlightingthe immense investments that wouldbe needed to rebuild damaged infra-structure and improve the overallhealth of the society as a result of thedramatic decline in social indicatorsduring the years of conflict.

What other roles do you think the Bank can effectively pursue in war-to-peace transitions??

■ 1.7 ■


Framework for Bankinvolvement

Post-conflict reconstruction projectsand programs that are disconnectedfrom each other, or that do not takea long-term view, may advancerecovery only slightly. A strategicframework that identifies the objec-tives, approaches and sequence ofreconstruction activities is necessaryand should be developed early in theprocess. The Bank has developed a“Post Conflict Operational PolicyFramework” to structure its involve-ment in post-conflict reconstruction.The timing and scale of Bank activitieschange in each of the four post-conflictphases as the Bank moves toward itsultimate goal—resumption of normallending status.

1. Watching BriefThe monitoring of a country inconflict or at risk of conflict, evenif there is not an active Bank port-folio in the country. The WatchingBrief keeps track of developmentsand builds a knowledge base thatcan be used to prepare for futureinterventions. This includes evalu-

ating the capacity of implementingpartners, consulting with humani-tarian agencies on the long-termimplications of short-term reliefstrategies, and countering theproblems from refugees and otherspill-over effects. (See Tab 8 for amore detailed discussion.)

2. Assessment and planningBased on consultations with thegovernment and other majorpartners, detailed damage andneeds assessments are conductedand a transitional recovery plan isdeveloped that includes entry, exitand funding strategies. Whenestablishing a budget and plan foroverall reconstruction, programplanners must consider whetherthere will be adequate donor sup-port. For example, in Bosnia andHerzegovina enormous resourcesbecame available because of itsimportance to Europe.

3. Early reconstructionSmall-scale, but essential activitiesare undertaken quickly.

– early reconstruction activities(repair of vital infrastructure,

generation of critical employ-ment, design of social safety nets)

– provision of short-termemergency support, includingbudget support

– reintegration of displacedpopulations

– disarmament, demobilization andreintegration of ex-combatants

– reasonable economic stabiliza-tion (for instance, inflation)

4. Comprehensive reconstructionLarge-scale reconstruction pro-grams, carried out when securityconditions and government com-mitment allow. These include:

– appropriate economicadjustment

– nurturing an environment forprivate sector development,public/private partnerships andemployment generation

– capable public sector manage-ment and governance, judicialreform, institution building

– adequate investments in humanresource development, povertyalleviation and natural resourcemanagement

Breaking the cycle of conflict and resuming the path of development

Normal lending Normal lendingEnsure that inter-ventions do not exacerbate conflict; adjust interventions to address inequities in distributive policies, excluded groups, etc.

Four-stage framework1. A watching brief in conflict countries2. Assessment and planning3. Early reconstruction activities4. Comprehensive reconstruction

Dev

elo

pm

ent

pro

gre

ssC

ou

ntr

yst

atu

sW

orl

d B

ank

inp

ut

Protracted cycle of violence

and failed peace initiatives

Increasing violence; failure of conflict management

Decreasing violence, ceasefire, etc.;opportunity for external interventions

Ondevelopment

path

Atrisk

Inviolentconflict

Postconflict

Back ondevelopment

path

■ 1.8 ■


Revising the Country Assistance Strategy for Cambodia

The peace settlement of 1991 pavedthe way for the Bank to re-enterCambodia after a 20-year absence.During this time the citizens hadsuffered civil war, persecution by theKhmer Rouge, massive populationdisplacements, and isolation fromthe international community.Recovery required not only physicalreconstruction but also majorinstitutional and policy reform andrevival of social services. SevenInternational Development Assoc.credits were extended to Cambodiain three overlapping phases.

Following the establishment of an“Agenda” in 1992 and a PolicyFramework Paper in 1994, theBank’s first Country AssistanceStrategy (CAS) was drafted in early1995. Recognizing that many donorswere operating in Cambodia, theBank sought activities that comple-mented the work of others. Thestrategy moved the Bank wellbeyond its initial resource transfer/budget support cum managementrole. Although the CAS singles outroad rehabilitation as a priority, anddespite the Bank’s comparativeadvantage in this regard, roadprojects did not figure into the firstround of infrastructure credits andwere undertaken partly by otherdonors.

Cambodia made remarkable progresstoward economic reforms andstabilization. The economy wasgrowing at 6%, inflation had beenreduced and the transition to amarket economy was on track.Accountability and transparencyproblems along with weak gover-nance, however, threatened toundo what had been achieved inthe economic sector. One basicfailure of the core macroeconomicstrategy was that the governmentsought to bring deficit financing andinflation down by squeezing publicsector non-salary expenditures. Thisaction produced progress on themacroeconomic balances at the costof the continued erosion of the non-maintained infrastructure of health,education and other services.

A second CAS was issued in January1997 extending the directions laidout in the first one. This CAS,however, developed scenariosranging from optimistic to pessimis-tic and proposed three possible levelsof Bank response to the countrycontext—high, intermediate and lowlending. The scenarios helped toreveal important issues that haveemerged in Cambodian economicmanagement and in generalgovernance. This CAS also includedroad development, which will

proceed when a road maintenancebudget has been earmarked.

The second CAS could have beenfurther strengthened if it hadincluded:

■ Proposals for education reform—a compelling need in Cambodia

■ More information on thedynamics of post-conflictCambodia for use in sectoralplanning, particularly the rolesand problems of women

■ Ways to meet the needs forpsychological and culturalrehabilitation stemming fromlegacies of the past 20 years, andways in which the Bank couldcontribute to the efforts of otheragencies in meeting these needs

■ A set of time-phased prioritiesto assist the government withplanning

■ A more in-depth explanation ofoptions, problems and the reasonsfor the options taken or rejectedto improve institutional memory

Source: “The World Bank’s Experience withPost-conflict Reconstruction,” 1998

by Alcira Kreimer, John Eriksson,Robert Muscat, Margaret Arnold,

and Colin Scott

What are some of the reasons for imperfections in any CAS?What steps might help to ensure that important points are not overlooked??

See suggested answers on page 1.10

■ 1.9 ■


Sequencing reconstruction

Bank experience has shown that “out-of-sequence” assistance can be ineffec-tual at best, and counter-productive atworst. Reconstruction requires a flex-ible approach that is responsive to theopportunities present in each situation.

Physical reconstruction is the firstpriority in a post-conflict program.Providing for physical infrastructureand the productive sectors, with aspecial emphasis on agriculture andrehabilitation of rural economies, isthe “safest” beginning step for meetingimmediate needs and reestablishing afunctioning community and state. It isa clearly understood need and requiresthe least change in the state’s economyand the ways that the state and societyconduct their business.

Institutional reconstruction followsphysical reconstruction. Governmentsand assistance agencies must confrontthe fundamental institutional changesthat are required for the country tomeet the challenges of a moderneconomy and society. Institutionbuilding is much more difficult thanreconstructing physical infrastructure.Typically, reforms (often massive) arerequired of the banking sector, socialprograms (reallocation of resources),and governance and judicial systems.If these activities are started too soonwhen the country is still recoveringfrom the trauma of violence, govern-ments may not be able to implementthem. The result may be a seriousset-back in the reconstruction process.

Hand-pump in Kabul – ICRC/T. Gassmann

The assessment and planning andearly reconstruction phases of post-conflict assistance should contributeto a significant stabilization of thecountry, its society and economy.Only after stabilization is it practical toundertake the more challenging (andpotentially disruptive) reforms that arerequired to position the country tomeet the demands of the global mar-ketplace and to establish a just society.

While traditional economic analysismight suggest that appropriate macro-economic adjustments should be madefirst, the stress of a post-conflict situa-tion requires that the priority be on astabilization program that explicitlytakes into account changes in thebehavior of households and firmsunder conditions of fiscal stress, for-eign exchange shortages and increaseduncertainty. This will not only sustainessential economic activity but willalso protect more vulnerable groupsfrom unnecessary hardships.

Policy interventions need to becarefully sequenced and coordinatedwith the provisions of the peaceaccords as well as with local planningand implementation capacity. Priorityactivities include skill development,employment creation, and privatesector development in both formal andinformal sectors. The objective is toreduce poverty and offer peacefulincome generation alternatives. ■

■

Only after stabilizationis it practical to undertake the

more challenging(and potentially disruptive)

reforms that are requiredto position the country to

meet the demands ofthe global marketplace

and to establisha just society.

■

From your experience in post-conflict countries, which parts of the strategic framework are themost difficult to follow? Is it indeed possible to follow strict sequencing guidelines in the recon-struction process? If not, why? What actions could you take to make sequencing more feasible?

?

■ 1.10 ■


What are some of the reasons forimperfections in any CAS? Whatsteps might help to ensure thatimportant points are not overlooked?

Suggested answers: The needs of acountry may be extensive and overwhelming;the urgency of the situation may pressurethe development of the CAS; the Bank’sabsence from a country may limit itsunderstanding of the historical under-pinnings as well as the workings of other

L E S S O N S L E A R N E D

A set of principles to help guidepost-conflict reconstruction haveemerged from the World Bank’sexperience in war-torn societies.Keep these principles in mind whilereading the rest of this module.

1. Reconstruction is a specializedactivity with its own dynamics,mandate and costs. The primaryobjective of reconstruction actions isto build a base for development. Itrequires a clear internationalmandate and adequate funding,whether from existing or newbudget lines.

2. Effective reconstruction is acomprehensive undertaking.A reconstruction strategy mustinclude short- and long-termconsiderations, public and privateroles, and an impact analysis forall sectors of society with a viewtowards an integrated multi-sectorapproach.

3. Reconstruction is psychologicaland social as well as physical.It is vital to involve war survivors inrebuilding activities wheneverpossible. They should be regardedas active participants in theplanning and implementation ofreconstruction, rather thanspectators of others’ actions.

4. A realistic timetable andsequence for transition activitiesis essential. Initiatives should notbe launched before political andlogistical prerequisites are met.

5. Political issues are dominant andrequire priority attention. Peaceand financial assistance are mutuallydependent, and not sequential. Arequirement of achieving peacebefore making funds available is notappropriate. Instead, there must bethe political will to take risks(financial and political).

6. Governments must be allowedto select their own paths torebuilding institutions. Eachsociety needs to decide how it willdeal with issues such as elections,bringing perpetrators of atrocities tojustice, social reconciliation, andreforming the military and securitysectors. International organizationsneed to accept the country’s pointof view and cultural underpinningsregarding its approach toreconstruction.

7. Reconstruction must takeaccount of dynamics insurrounding countries. Regionaleconomic linkages can supportreconstruction in post-conflictcountries. This may require thecooperation of neighboringcountries in the reintegration ofdisplaced people.

8. Post-conflict relationshipsmay impact the reconstructionprocess if ethnic, religious or otheridentities were among the factorsleading to the conflict. Conflictsurvivors may retain strongattachments to identity groups soall responses must consider theserelationships.

9. Conditionalities should beused sparingly in post-conflictsituations. It is important todetermine what conditionalitiesare appropriate and when theyare counter-productive. The Bankdid not impose conditionalities inRwanda because of the participatoryprocess and strong governmentcommitment. Conditionality wouldhave slowed things down.

agencies and capabilities; when governmentinstitutions are weak it reduces theprogram’s overall effectiveness and makescoordination difficult; short-term develop-ment objectives of some donors may conflictwith the Bank’s longer term perspectives.

The Bank might call on scholarly anddiplomatic communities and NGOs with aknowledge base to strengthen its strate-gizing; strategy should focus on need andassessment of likely performance of the

government based on early evidence; theBank should design strategies that do not defacto reduce social capital recovery; the Bankshould identify critical needs that are notbeing addressed by other agencies; allinvolved agencies need to be aware thatprogress in the areas of accountability,transparency, and other supporting featuresof governance need to keep pace witheconomic reform.

?

■ 1.11 ■


R E F E R E N C E S

Bushra, Judy El and López, Eugenia Piza. 1993. Development inConflict: The Gender Dimension. Report of an Oxfam AGRA Eastworkshop, Pattaya, Thailand, 1-4 February, Oxfam.

Cohen, Roberta and Francis Deng. 1998. Masses in Flight: TheGlobal Crisis of Internal Displacement. Washington, DC: TheBrookings Institution Press.

Collier, Paul. 1998. “On the Economic Consequences of CivilWar.” Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies. Mimeo.

Kostner, Markus, Taies Nezam, and Colin Scott. 1997. From CivilWar to Civil Society: The Transition from War to Peace inGuatemala and Liberia. The World Bank and the Carter Center.

Kreimer, Alcira, John Eriksson, Robert Muscat, Margaret Arnold,and Colin Scott. 1998. The World Bank’s Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction. Draft. Washington, DC: World BankOperations Evaluation Department.

Marshall, Katherine. 1997. “Emerging from Conflict: What Rolesfor International Development Finance Institutions?” Cambridge:Harvard Institute for International Development, DevelopmentDiscussion Paper No. 587.

World Bank. 1998. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of theWorld Bank Washington, DC: The World Bank.

■ 2.1 ■

2

K E Y P O I N T S

When working in war-torn countries, staff need to identifyhistorical, political and economic root causes and context ofsituations that influence current realities.

Staff need to understand the dynamics and effects ofwar on the economy.

It is important to understand the challenges of post-warreconstruction and learn how to increase the probability ofsuccessful transitions from war to peace.

Economic and Political Context

■ 2.2 ■

While the World Bankhas accumulated muchexperience with regard

to financial and economic policy,analyzing economic issues in war-tornsocieties requires an understanding ofthe political, social, structural andpsychological dynamics of each situa-tion in order to implement effectivereconstruction and development pro-grams. In trying to comprehend theeconomics of a war-torn society, thegreatest challenge is working in acontext where politics takes prece-dence over economics during civil warand in its direct aftermath.

Working in these environmentsrequires the recognition that many ofthe original causes of conflict can re-emerge, even after the fighting is over.In these environments, it is crucial toassess economic policies not only interms of their economic viability andeffectiveness, but also in light of theirimpact on conflict and peace. Prioritymust be placed on addressing the rootcauses of the conflict, not just onaddressing the visible post-conflictcharacteristics of the society. The rootcauses of conflict fall into five maincategories:

■ historical factors

■ economic factors

■ political factors

■ nationalism, religion and ethnicity

■ exclusion

A European economist whoserved as an adviser to theRwandan Government from

1990 to 1994 was laterinvited to assess his

performance in retrospect ofthe 1994 Genocide. He

insisted on the fact that hisadvisory job in Rwanda was

strictly confined tomacroeconomic issues.

Although he was fully awareof the gravity of ethnictensions and knew that

conflict could burst out againat any time, he admitted that

these issues were neverdiscussed nor referred to in

the framework of hismandate. As soon as violence

flared up in April 1994,he left Rwanda to go back tohis capital, transmitted hisfiles to other colleagues in

charge of humanitarian andpolitical affairs, and wasthen assigned to a similar

position in anotherdeveloping country.

— Gilles CarbonnierConflict, Postwar Rebuilding

and the Economy, 1998

Historical factors

Two important historical legaciesaffecting many war-torn societies areimperialism and colonialism. Imperial-ism is the exercise of economic andpolitical power by one state overanother. Colonialism, on the otherhand, is the formal control by a stateover a territorial possession. Althoughimperialism and colonialism aredistinct, the result is the same: “tradewith informal control if possible, tradewith rule when necessary” (Gallagherand Robinson 1953 cited in Nafziger1996, p. 11). From the mid-nineteenthcentury on, these tactics dominatedrelationships between several high-income countries and the lesserdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia andLatin America.

Imperialism and the end of colonial-ism have played a major role in thedestabilization of some countries andhave led to civil conflict in many in-stances. Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopiawere pawns of the superpowers in theCold War, each receiving military aidthat contributed to the conflicts thathave plagued these countries through-out the 1990s. The United States andother Western powers supportedMabutu Sese Seko in Zaire from 1965virtually until his downfall, in spite ofthe systematic corruption and dysfunc-tion of his government. The U.S. alsoplayed a major role in the humanitar-ian crises in Guatemala, Nicaragua andEl Salvador, supporting the rightist

Economic andPolitical Context

■ 2.3 ■

Economic and Political ContextTHE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE: AN OVERVIEW

forces against the leftists in decades-long conflicts.

The collapse of the Soviet empirein 1991 created a new military andeconomic relationship between Russiaand the former Soviet republics—muchlike the one between the United Statesand Central America. Russia’s vitalinterests in neighboring countries aretied to the rights of ethnic Russians,friendly relations with the regimes ofthe Commonwealth of IndependentStates, continuance of trade and eco-nomic ties, and avoidance of Westernchallenges to Russian influence.

Although the effects of colonialismand imperialism have played outdifferently in various countries, thereare some common results:

■ At the end of colonialism and inthe aftermath of the breakup of theSoviet Union, existing governmentsystems were disbanded leaving apower vacuum in the affectedcountries. Frequently, those withcompeting interests sought theopportunity to take control of thegovernment. Most civil conflictshave been fights for control of thegovernment and, accordingly, thecountry. Establishing stable govern-ments with the trust of the majorityof a country’s population hasproven difficult but is imperative ifa country is to have a lasting peace.

■ Both colonial and imperial powersimposed artificial boundaries—often by force—on the territoriesthey controlled. When these pow-ers withdrew, conflicts surroundingthese borders erupted, frequentlyaccompanied by mass populationdisplacements.

Economic factors

Wayne Nafziger of the World Institutefor Development Economics Researchhas identified a number of economiccauses of conflict. They are stagnation,unequal growth, scarcity and environ-mental degradation, sudden shifts inassets and subsidies, and failedagricultural development schemes.Each is described below.

Stagnation and protracteddeclines in income

Most countries that experience civilconflict have several years of negativeor stagnant real growth of GNP orGDP per capita before conflict breaksout. Continued income reductionstrigger greater competition for scarceresources, jobs and opportunities.The situation deteriorates faster if bothincome and asset distributions worsen.

When food or resource scarcitybecome chronic, an economic Darwin-ism emerges. Darwinist behavior canlead households or social groups tobypass or ignore normal legal andsocial constraints on access to re-sources and respect of property rights.Protracted stagnation can also reducesociety’s commitment to its weakergroups; leading elites to violentlyexpropriate the assets and resourcesof weaker social communities.

Unequal growth

Conditions of positive economicgrowth and expanding resources,where one group benefits dispropor-tionately, often lead to increased socialtension and possibly conflict. Inegali-tarian growth increases the relative

■ European commerce and colonial-ism supported and used—if notcreated—inequalities among ethnicgroups. In Rwanda, for example,the minority Tutsis were favored bythe French colonizers, leading tothe extreme antipathy and ultimatecampaign of genocide by theHutus. Staff working in post-con-flict environments where the con-flict was a result of extreme in-equalities must be careful to ensurethat post-conflict activities do notexacerbate these inequalities and,where possible, support activitiesthat will reduce them.

■ Both colonialism and imperialismwere detrimental to human capitaldevelopment in affected countries.The human capital of nationals wasnegatively affected by colonizerswho did not allow them to manageand plan government policy orplay a role in other productivesectors of the country. Therefore,they were not equipped to takeover the country’s managementafter the departure of imperialistpowers. Capacity building andhuman capital development areessential components of post-conflict reconstruction.

A country’s history affects its cur-rent internal and international politicalrealities. It is imperative, therefore,that those working in war-torn societ-ies have an understanding of the his-torical factors that led to the conflict.Staff must consider how such factorsmay affect planned post-conflict activi-ties and ensure that these activities donot re-ignite conflicts.

Select one of the following countries, then identify 3-4 historical factors that contributed to itsdestabilization and outbreak of violent conflict: El Salvador, Cambodia, Liberia, Mozambique orBosnia and Herzegovina.

?

■ 2.4 ■


deprivation of certain segments of apopulation, adding to perceptions ofsocial injustice and dashing hopes fora greater share of the economic pie.

Relative deprivation can lead toanger, which in turn increases thepotential for collective violence, andmay escalate into civil conflict. Therisk of political disintegration increaseswith surges in income disparities byclass, region, and community, espe-cially when these disparities lacklegitimacy among the population.Class and communal (regional, ethnic,and religious) economic differencesoften overlap, exacerbating perceivedgrievances and potential strife.

Population growth, scarcity ofnon-renewable resources, andenvironmental degradation

Rapid population growth, as has oc-curred in sub-Saharan Africa, results inreduced agricultural shares per personand contributes to degradation of land,water, forests, and other environmen-tal assets. These problems can reduceproductivity and contribute to conflict.Market imperfections, misguided gov-ernment interventions, the overuse ofcommon-property resources, andundefined user rights contribute tooveruse, waste, and inefficiency ofenvironmental resources, facilitatingtheir degradation, and exacerbating thepolitical struggle for land and otherresources. Competition for naturalresources is a root cause of manyconflicts and may be used by thewarring faction that controls them toprolong the conflict once it has started.

Sudden shifts in the distributionof assets and governmentsubsidies

Stabilization and adjustment programsare usually introduced by governmentsin response to chronic macroeconomicimbalances and external deficits aswell as negative or slow growth. Theseprograms redistribute the timing andextent of costs and benefits amongeconomic actors and affect real wagesand staple commodity prices. This, inturn, affects the distribution of powerwithin a country.

Social conflict can erupt when thereare inadequate funds or social servicesto compensate for the loss of incomefor those hurt by stabilization andadjustment programs. In addition,adjustment programs can benefit (orbe seen to benefit) the political, mili-tary or dominant elite, thereby increas-ing tension within a country.

Failed agricultural development

In sub-Saharan Africa, there have beenlinks between failed agricultural devel-opment projects and urban unrest andconflict. Rural unemployment inducesmigration to cities, but lack of employ-ment opportunities and poor livingconditions in cities can result in un-rest. In addition, state policies andmarket forces have often reduced theagricultural production of food staplesby increasing cash crop productionand diverting agricultural developmentresources to more visible urbanprojects.

For each of the above five economic factors, identify at least one country wherethe factor was operative.?

Drought and desertification effects – UN photo

■

The emergence of apolitical economy that

includes asset transfer isextremely destructive and

creates ever-deepeningpoverty and misery.

Moreover, since subsistenceassets are a finite resource,once such an economy is

established it demands freshinputs as the wealth of

different groups is exhausted.Asset transfer becomes a

moving feast on an ethnictable … [and] once systemic,becomes synonymous withcultural genocide and the

destruction of group rights.

— Mark DuffieldComplex Emergencies and the

Crisis of Developmentalism, 1994


Stagnation anddecline of income

Unequalgrowth

Population growth,resource scarcity

Sudden shiftin assets

Failed agriculturaldevelopment

■ 2.5 ■


Political factors

Political ideologies play an importantrole in determining the degree towhich a community or nation is ableto maintain cohesion. Governmentsthat retain a commitment to equalrepresentation for different interestgroups may be able to withstand thepotentially divisive impact of structuralpoverty and environmental decline, ashas been the case in Tanzania. On theother hand, where the driving forcebehind government actions is the needto maintain the status quo, the repres-sion and abuse of minorities and po-litical opponents is often unrestrained,until challenged by insurrection. Otherpolitical factors that create a climatefor violence include military domi-nance, historical antagonisms, global-ization and democratization.

Military dominance

In countries where military resourcesare used to support authoritarianpolitical structures, the opposition isoften driven to desperate action whichmay include their own military build-up. When governments deprive afaction of political involvement andthere are inadequate mechanisms forsettling grievances, the likelihood ofa full-scale rebellion increases.

Civilian regimes in less developedcountries often face an unsavorydilemma: even though a strongmilitary is as likely to overthrow acivilian as an authoritarian regime, thepolitical instability and conflict thatwould ensue make policymakers afraidto cut back on spending for powerfularmed forces. They may even increasemilitary spending as a protectionagainst threats from the opposition.This leads to further discontent andincreases the risk of rebellion.

Historical conflict

Countries with a history of massmobilization for conflict, such asColombia, Rwanda and Burundi,are more susceptible to new conflictevents than more historically peaceful

countries. A society subject to chronictension resulting from periodic publicviolence may rely on the outbreakof rebellion as a “normal” copingmechanism.

Unclear or changing ideologies mayincrease the risk of destabilization,especially for governments trying tomaintain cohesion in transitionalperiods. For example, the collapse ofthe former Yugoslavia resulted inconflict within the newly formed stateof Bosnia and Herzegovina and theprovince of Kosovo. While the forma-tion of the state of Eritrea was off to agood start, the political disintegrationwith Ethiopia resulted in a new out-break of conflict in 1999.

Globalization

The creation of world markets hasbeen a principal human instrument forthe production of wealth. Nation-statesoften do not have control of the infor-mation, technology, and transnationalcapital that affect their economies.In addition, markets distribute wealthunevenly among individuals andgroups and create inequalities thatare a source of social and politicaltensions. Currently 20% of the world’spopulation controls 80% of the wealth.Countries experiencing populationgrowth, many still suffering fromfamine and poverty, are increasinglyconscious of the wealth-producingcapacity of modern economies. Thisconsciousness can lead to an increasedlevel of frustration. Thus, globalizationoften produces hopelessness for thosewho do not benefit.

Globalization has also changed thenature of local conflicts. Such conflictswere formerly limited by access toweapons, but now, as the global scaleof arms making and marketing haschanged, arms producers can have adecisive impact on conflicts by regulat-ing the flow of arms to factions. Fur-thermore, states motivated by theirown security and welfare interestsfrequently furnish weapons tobelligerents.

Democratization

While legitimate governments areincreasingly challenged to meet therequirements of democracy, certainmanipulations of mass-based democra-cies can lead to conflict. For example,populations have been mobilized forwar or in opposition to other groups(Arabs versus Jews) to justify violenceand to make way for democracy(WWI), or to increase resistance toinvolvement in other conflicts (Yugo-slavia, Somalia, Rwanda). Mass-baseddemocracies have also assumed au-thoritarian or totalitarian dimensions(e.g. Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s SovietUnion, Mao’s China, Pol Pot’s Cambo-dia) where populations were mobilizedfor governmental purposes and minor-ity and human rights were suppressed.

Nationalism, religionand ethnicity

When countries transform their politi-cal and economic structures, the sud-den de-legitimization of their socialsystem, without another to take itsplace, may cause a period of socialdisintegration. This situation mayprompt a process of ethno-nationalmobilization, or a strong resurgenceof ethnic identities, which can takethe form of cultural revivalism andcompetition to define new societalboundaries along ethnic lines. It canalso lead to demands for politicalautonomy, self-determination, separat-ism or irredentism (autonomy of theethnic nation split by state boundaries,such as the Kurdish nation), which areprone to resolution by conflict if thereis no forum for mediating issues.

Nationalism, religion and ethnicityare often a root cause of civil conflict.Usually one faction feels oppressed bya larger rival or, conversely, a factionhas the political and military strengthto impose its will on a minority, who isblamed for the problems plaguing themajority. Exemplifying the former isthe struggle between Catholics andProtestants in Northern Ireland and theethnic-based clashes between the Tutsi

■ 2.6 ■


and Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi. Anexample of the latter is the decades-long civil war in Sudan where themajority Arab population in the northis trying to control the Christians andanimists in the south. Another case isthe Indian Hindus attacking the IndianMuslims.

Underlying many of these cases,however, are issues other than nation-alism, religion and ethnicity. Competi-tion for scarce resources, politicalcontrol of a territory, large disparitiesof income and social exclusion (seebelow) may be the real spark thatignites the flames of violence. It maybe easier to rally support and recruitmore fighters, however, when thetarget of the anger can be character-ized as an identifiable enemy such asa national, religious or ethnic group.

Exclusion

Some may argue that exclusion is asubset or a characteristic of the previ-ously discussed root causes of conflict.But exclusion can also be a separatecause of destabilization that can leadto violence.

Social exclusion has been definedas the process by which individuals orgroups are wholly or partially excludedfrom full participation in the society inwhich they live. These individuals orgroups may be excluded from liveli-hoods, secure and permanent employ-ment, earnings, property, housing, aminimal consumption level, education,welfare benefits, citizenship, demo-cratic participation, public goods,family, social contracts or respect.

Groups often regarded as excludedinclude the long-term unemployed,those employed in precarious andunskilled jobs, the low paid and poor,minorities, foreigners, the politically

Competition for scarce resourcesand the role of developmentinterventions

In some instances, the real roots ofconflict may be the scarcity ofresources and the rules about obtain-ing access to or allocating them.According to this hypothesis, the poormay become willful followers of ambi-tious leaders who promise them prefer-ential access to scarce resources fromwhich they were previously excluded.Actions that change the availability ofresources (such as humanitarian aidor development projects) or alter therules about obtaining access to themmay contribute to conflict.

■

Actions that change theavailability of resources (such

as humanitarian aid ordevelopment projects) or alter

the rules about obtainingaccess to them may contribute

to conflict.

■

If development interventions do notmodify inequitable access to resourcesor restrict access to resources, they willincrease the marginalization of certainpopulation groups and hence increasethe risk of conflict as well as poverty.

The Bank’s anti-poverty focusimplies a concern with some key is-sues at the root of many conflicts—disparities in distribution of wealth,and the denial of access to resourcesfor certain population groups. It isclear from studies of past conflicts,that economic and distributionalpolicies and programs can help toavoid a slide into conflict withindeeply divided societies.

Analysis of civil conflictin nine countries

In their analysis of nine post-conflict countries, the World BankOperations Evaluation Departmentfound that:

■ Ethnic or regional tensions werethe underlying and immediatecauses of conflict in Bosnia andHerzegovina, Eritrea, Lebanon,Rwanda and Sri Lanka. Thedivisions in those countrieswere further aggravated byexclusionary government policiesfor political ends.

■ Ideological extremism playeda major role in Cambodia andEl Salvador, which was alsosubjected to a long legacy ofinequality.

■ Predatory government practicesof extracting resources as wellas providing ineffectual basicservices precipitated crises inHaiti and Uganda.

disenfranchised, recipients of socialassistance, the illiterate, school drop-outs, the mentally and physicallyhandicapped, delinquents, singleparents, and abused women and chil-dren. When a critical mass of peopleregard themselves as excluded and areable to act collectively to fight againsttheir condition, their protests may takethe form of civil violence if it is seenas the most “productive” means ofimproving their situation.

For each of the economic factorsdiscussed in the text, identify atleast one country where the factorwas operative.

Possible answersStagnation and protracted declines inincome: Rwanda, Angola, Liberia, Sudan,Somalia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq,Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Algeria, Afghanistan.

Unequal growth: Nigeria (Biafra), Congo(Zaire), Bangladesh (East Pakistan), Rwanda,Burundi, Sri Lanka

? Population growth, scarcity ofnon-renewable resources andenvironmental degradation:Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan

Sudden shifts in the distributionof assets and government subsidies:Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Former Yugoslavia

Failed agricultural development:Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Cambodia

■ 2.7 ■


Dynamics of war-torneconomies

Understanding the historical, political,and economic causes of a conflict isthe first step for those working in post-conflict environments. Another impor-tant aspect to consider is the underly-ing economic motivations in war-tornsocieties. While these dynamics arenot always easy to ascertain, research-ers are increasingly finding that learn-ing about these realities is fundamen-tal to peacebuilding and reconstructionstrategies. One place to begin is look-ing at who stands to win or lose as aresult of a conflict, and why.

Since the end of the Cold War,foreign financial and military supporthas decreased significantly makinglocal economies and assets increas-ingly important in civil wars. Rebelgroups seek control of natural re-sources and other assets as a means offinancing their operations and denyingthe government the benefit of theseresources. Even humanitarian aidbecomes a target and a tool for exploi-tation and control over populations, asoccurred in the civil war in southernSudan. Just as economic survivalstrategies are central to conflict, theyalso become an important componentof any peacebuilding framework.

In addition to the economic motiva-tions underlying conflict situations,there are many economic conse-quences to take into consideration.Civil war generally has a considerableimpact on both the level and types ofeconomic activity. Military conflictusually depresses GDP growth rate andper capita income. The costs of warare generally greater when a govern-ment is unable to collect taxes andprovide basic services. The economicimpact of a conflict is influenced bythe prevailing characteristics of theeconomy before the war, particularlythe initial import dependence ratio, thelevel of subsistence production in thecountry, and the percentage of peopleliving near the poverty line or survivallimit. International wars typically have

less harmful effects on participatingcountries if governments are able tosustain basic social services through-out their countries. Some other factorscorrelated with the economic costs ofwar are:

■ duration, intensity, magnitude andgeographical spread of a conflict

■ existence of an internationaltrade embargo

■ absence of alternative supportnetworks such as family, rebelforces or humanitarian agencies

These negative factors can be par-tially offset by a flourishing informaleconomy and the development ofsocial networks for the purpose ofestablishing some form of economicsecurity. Rebel groups and/or humani-tarian agencies can also contributesignificantly to war-time economies.

■

Rebel groups and/orhumanitarian agencies

can also contributesignificantly to war-time

economies.

■

Economic impact

Conflict generally impacts a country’seconomy in the following five ways:

1. Destruction of the physical andsocial infrastructure. Post-wareconomies are characterized by theneed to rebuild physical infrastruc-ture in order to revive overalleconomic health. Countries arefaced with the need for immensefinancial and human investmentsat a time when industry has likelybeen destroyed and a large part ofthe labor force killed or injured.

2. Disruption of development. Warmay have dramatic implications forlong-term development. The socialand cultural disintegration of awar-torn society has a dramaticimpact on its economy. In theabsence of political stability,mutual trust, respect for property,and the rule of law, economicrelations break down. This disinte-gration may also negatively affectdomestic production and income.Most human misery and deaths inpoor countries are not a result ofdirect violence, but of the moregeneral effects of protracted conflicton economic and administrativestructures, such as the collapse ofbasic public services, famine andlarge-scale forced migration.

3. Diversion of public expendituresfrom output-enhancing activities.An expansion of the army, forexample, may well be done at theexpense of a civilian police force,thereby diminishing the rule of law.Schools, health care and foodproduction may also suffer.

4. Dissaving, which occurs whenincome losses from diversions areregarded as temporary. The effectof this is similar to the destructionof capital stock.

5. Portfolio substitution occurs wheninvestors move their assets—finan-cial, human and physical—out of acountry in response to a deteriorat-ing economic environment.

Shopping queue during a lull in the fighting inSarajevo– UNHCR/E. Dagnino

■ 2.8 ■


Recent economicreconstruction researchat the World Bank

In the last three years, the WorldBank has cultivated an entirely newfield of research, looking squarelyat armed conflict and state collapsewith economic tools. This has led tonew insights into the forces at workand the duration of civil wars andhelps elucidate the economic spoilsthat post-conflict settlements re-volve around.

In his current working paper on“Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seekingin Civil War,” Paul Collier, with AnkeHoeffler, (1999, World Bank draftpaper) compares different socialissues that might underpin the riskof conflict, including social exclu-sion, social fractionation, and the“free rider problem.” Statisticaltests found the following:

■ Over the range relevant formost countries, the larger is thenatural resource endowment,the greater is the risk of con-flict. There is some evidence thatexperiences of slow growth inthe previous decade increase therisk of war. There is also someevidence that the higher is theproportion of the populationmade up of males aged 15-24,the greater is the risk. Highinflation, the rate of growth ofthe population, and populationdensity, … have no significanteffects.

■ Unlike looting rebellions, justicerebellions face a time-consis-tency problem, since the ben-efits only accrue after the effortof rebellion has been made. In

order to defeat the government,rebel supporters must createa rival, hierarchical militaryorganization. If the benefitsof rebellion only accrue aftervictory, the rebel leader oncevictorious must be trusted tobehave differently from thepresent government, and, inparticular, to honor promisesto his supporters.

One of the hardest problems for aidorganizations working in conflict-affected areas is knowing how longthe conflict may last; in particularwhether, at any given time, conflictwill grow yet worse. In the recent“On the Duration of Civil War,” PaulCollier, with Hoeffler and Soderbom(1999, World Bank draft paper) findthat those countries with two orthree ethnic groups suffer pro-longed wars whereas those whichare either homogenous or highlyfractionalized have short wars.

■ Once wars are under way, theirduration is determined by thescope for the government todivide the rebel organization.

■ There is a good chance that acivil war will end during its firstyear. Thereafter, the probabilityof peace is radically lower.Beyond the first year there areno strong durational effects onthe hazard of peace.… Due tothe systematic over-optimism ofrebels, stalemates can be endedby negotiated settlements, butthey encounter a time-consis-tency problem, with the govern-ment being unable credibly tocommit to settlement terms. Asa result, military stalematespersist.

■ A possible effect of durationis the exhaustion of the com-batants. The very long war inMozambique, for example, issaid to have left participantswith a desire for peace. Thepeace settlement had provisionfor a substantial army ofnational unity. (But) this hadto be scaled down because mostof the combatants opted forcivilian life.

The economic costs of conflict

In “On the Economic Consequencesof War” (1998, World Bank draftpaper), Paul Collier finds, “Duringcivil wars, GDP per capita declines atan annual rate of 2.2 % relative toits counterfactual. …” due in partto direct loss of production and inpart to a gradual loss of capitalstock as a result of destruction,dissaving, and the substitution forportfolios abroad. Manufacturing,construction, transportation, distri-bution and finance contract morerapidly than other sectors of theeconomy. In contrast, arable subsis-tence agriculture expands relativeto GDP. Collier writes, “Peace doesnot recreate either the fiscal or therisk characteristics of the pre-wareconomy: there is a higher burdenof military expenditure and agreater risk of renewed war.Empirically, if a civil war lasts onlya year, it was found to cause a lossof growth during the first five yearsof peace of 2.1% per annum, a lossnot significantly different from hadthe war continued.”

Just as conflict has direct effects ona country’s economy, the cessation ofconflict can also yield distinctive eco-nomic impacts. In conflicts that havelasted ten or more years, for example,GDP may jump as much as six percenton top of the natural growth rate as aresult of pent-up demand and thefunding of reconstruction programs.For short-term conflicts, however, thecessation of hostilities may result incontinued negative growth rates, possi-

bly because of a fear that the countrymay remain unstable and resumeconflict, wiping out the benefits ofnew investment.

War typically produces economicwinners and losers. Resources are oftenreallocated among sectors and institu-tions as well as among households andsocial groups. As a consequence of thisshift in resources, a small minoritydevelops a vested interest in the con-tinuation of conflict, reaping consider-

able profits because of market short-ages or because of illegal and preda-tory activities, while the vast majoritysuffers economically.

Poor people resort to a variety ofstrategies to cope with their plight. Forexample, some household membersmay have to get a job in the publicsector or armed forces in order to haveaccess to public entitlements and/orsecurity. Sometimes the state does notadequately pay its soldiers, so they

■ 2.9 ■


In 1978, the UN Security Councilapproved a resolution outlining aplan for Namibia’s transition toindependence. However, ten moreyears of bitter warfare occurredbefore the resolution was finallyimplemented through a peaceagreement signed by Angola, Cubaand South Africa in December1988. The demobilization ofopposing forces in Namibia tookplace in the context of a UN-supervised transition after twenty-five years of armed struggle forindependence.

Economic growth since indepen-dence has been constrained by theeconomy’s previous dependence on

What economic effects of conflict does the case study of Namibia illustrate??


The Case of Namibia

the military as well as by globalrecession which has reduced theprices of its primary exports ofuranium, gold and diamonds.Some 25,000 workers in thenorthern provinces—over half thelocal formal sector wage earners—lost their livelihoods when SouthAfrica’s occupying army departed.The return to civilian life of anestimated total of 57,000 ex-combatants further strained thelabor market. The job absorptioncapacity of the formal sector inNamibia was already low, resultingin approximately 37 percent of thelabor force being formallyunemployed in 1993.

The public sector, which has 67,000Namibians on its payroll, has been,by far, the largest single employer.The number of employees in thepublic sector has increased by atleast 50 percent since indepen-dence. This is partly due to the factthat the peace accord specifiedthat none of the civil servants whohad worked for the South Africancolonial administration could beretrenched; therefore, the newgovernment had to place itsmembers into the existingstructures. The formal privatesector employs only 5 percent ofthe labor force.

This population largely “pays” for thewar when the increasing fiscal deficitis met through inflation instead ofincreased taxation or external financ-ing of the conflict. The real budgetdeficit is contained through inflation,which reduces the real wages paid bythe government to public sector em-ployees, and also severely affects thepopulation’s living standards.

There is also an economic compo-nent to the impact of conflict on acountry’s social systems. For example,the issue of child combatants needs tobe understood in terms of future impli-cations, such as their future social

resort to systematic corruption andlooting to improve their situation. As alast resort, the most vulnerable groupsmay be forced to sell or pledge theirsubsistence and production assets,such as land and livestock or personalassets like jewelry, to other people atrock-bottom prices. Those moststressed economically or physicallymay migrate, or flee the country asrefugees.

The worst economic impact ofconflict at the household level is usu-ally felt among the urban poor whooften do not have access to an infor-mal economy or to a social safety net.

adjustment and employability. In ElSalvador, for example, there weretwice as many killings in 1998 as therewere during the civil war more thana decade earlier. The cause is believedto be the large number of young men,former combatants aged 18-24, with-out education who know more aboutpower derived from guns than accept-able forms of employment. Anotherexample is the corruption that oftenresults from civil conflict. Thisaspect of social disintegration has animpact on institutional reforms andreconstruction for years to come. ■

■ 2.10 ■



There is no “blueprint” for rebuilding war-torn societies; anunderstanding of the origins, rationale, complexities and dynamicsof each conflict situation is needed in order to design appropriateresponses.

Some of the most fundamental aspects of post-conflictreconstruction are overlooked because they do not fit existingeconomic paradigms. Political stability should prevail over economicefficiency in post-conflict reconstruction strategies to restoreinvestor/consumer confidence and avoid restarting conflict.

The objectives of socioeconomic rehabilitation and reconstructionare to lay the foundation for lasting peace and sustainabledevelopment, not to restore the economy to its pre-conflict state.

Politics play a larger role than usual in post-conflict situations; staffworking in this area must understand them.

Agencies working in post-conflict situations must understand howsocial and economic inequalities affect the peacebuilding andreconstruction phases.

What economic effects of conflictdoes the case study of Namibiaillustrate?

? Suggested answersThough not quantified, 25 years ofconflict caused extensive destruction tothe physical and social infrastructure;

high unemployment; public expenditureswere diverted after the conflict to expandthe bureaucracy as a condition of thepeace agreement.

■ 2.11 ■


From its work with populations whohave been involuntarily displaced bydevelopment programs, the WorldBank can apply cross-program lessonsto refugees and other groups madevulnerable by conflict.

For example, relief agencies tend to tryprimarily to “restore” the population toits pre-crisis conditions, even if thoseconditions were dysfunctional. Aid toRwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistanand other countries has arguablyreinforced conditions that lead torecurring collapse and conflict. A fewtimes in the last fifteen years aidagencies have recognized the impor-tance of commercial markets as coun-tries attempt to rebuild. In Somaliaand Mozambique, aid agenciesattempted to monetize food aid (sell itto local wholesalers) in order to jump-start the chain of trade within thecountry for staples. In Sudan andEthiopia, aid agencies experimentedwith using cash to buy local foodsin one region to meet the food needsof refugees and conflict-victims inanother region. Such measures haveremained rough approaches to acomplicated problem.

In the 1970s and 1980s, a number ofaid agencies tried to train refugees innew skills that were felt to be moresustainable—away from pastoral herd-ing, for example, into fishing—withminimal success. Arguably the affectedpopulation itself needs to be involvedin the market analysis and the com-parison of strategic options for theireconomic future.

Populations dislocated by conflict areat times brilliant at negotiating localaccess to land and other capital forproduction. Whether they find they areable to produce maize, fruit, crafts, oroffer automobile repair, the questionthey often ask—with no answer—is:what is the market for these goods/services? How do we compare theoptions? How do we know which tospecialize in?

NGOs have mounted extensive pro-grams of providing micro-credit help toreturning refugees and IDPs (internallydisplaced persons) and war-wrackedcountries now undergoing reconstruc-tion. Indeed, in many peace accords,such as in El Salvador, the provision ofmicro-finance to refugees or ex-com-batants was seen as a vital element ofsuccess in building a peaceful future.Too often, unfortunately, the strategystops at providing micro-credit tohouseholds without a broader view asto the economic options of the society.The supply of small-scale creditsgrows, but information about marketsand economic options remains limited.Little has, as yet, been written abouthow to carve out a new economicstrategy for dislocated populations andthese populations are rarely involvedin the analysis directly.

One recent Bank publication, “TheEconomics of Involuntary Resettlement”edited by Michael Cernea (1999),draws on the experiences of over 100million people who have been dis-placed in the last decade from damand urban infrastructure development,not including those displaced fromforests and reserve parks, mining andthermal power plants and other

projects. A survey of World Bankresettlement experience finds theunder-financing of resettlement opera-tions in project after project. Theeffects are striking. Analysis showedthat resettlement projects with highfinancial allocations were free of majordifficulties, while virtually all of theprojects with a low allocation rateexperienced serious implementationdifficulties.

Other findings include:

If one cannot specify in precise termsthe nature and sources of baselineincome flows and asset holdingswithin households to be displaced,one has a very limited basis, if any,upon which to formulate a resettle-ment options package. Whereas volun-tary resettlement projects benefitedfrom involvement by agricultural andlivestock specialists, agronomists, soilscientists, foresters and commodityprocessing experts, Bank-supportedinvoluntary resettlement projects didnot enjoy significant technical analysis.

On relocation, traditional communalrules and regulations may break downas traditional leaders lose their powerover the allocation of rights to huntand fish, to land, and so on—rightsthat effectively become the provinceof the government agency handling theresettlement. Resettlement projectsoften treat the displaced communitynot as a social unit, but as an aggre-gation of individuals and families,paying little attention to the socialstructure of the community.

A N N E X

2.1

Livelihood restoration for conflict-affectedpopulations remains a dilemna

■ 2.12 ■


R E F E R E N C E S

Carbonnier, Gilles. 1998 Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and theEconomy: A Critical Review of the Literature. Geneva: The War-TornSocieties Project.

Collier, Paul. 1998. “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War.”Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, University ofOxford.

de Hann, Argan. “Poverty and Social Exclusion: A new researchagenda.” Institute of Development Studies, n. pag. Online, Internet.February 11, 1999, www.ids.ac.uk/ids/research/food/povsem2.html.

Duffield, Mark. 1994. “Complex Emergencies and the Crisis ofDevelopmentalism.” IDS Bulletin: Linking Relief and Development25 (3).

Kreimer, Alcira, John Eriksson, Robert Muscat, Margaret Arnold, andColin Scott. 1998. The World Bank’s Experience with Post-conflictReconstruction. Draft. Washington, D.C.: World Bank OperationsEvaluation Department.

Nafziger, E. Wayne. 1996. The Economics of Complex HumanitarianEmergencies: Preliminary Approaches and Findings

Nafziger, E. Wayne and Juha Auvinen. 1997 War, Hunger, andDisplacement: An Econometric Investigation into the Sources ofHumanitarian Emergencies. Helsinki: The United Nations Universityand World Institute for Development Economics Research.

■ 3.1 ■

3

K E Y P O I N T S

The Bank can play a vital role in the peace process by fostering conditions conduciveto successful negotiations—promoting trust and being sensitive to timing issues.

Bank staff should be active advisors, rather than observers, in peace negotiations—offering advice on the economic development dimensions of peace accord options,including economic benefits and costs of alternatives.

Bank staff should draw on previous peacebuilding experiences: negotiations inGuatemala, rehabilitation in Ethiopia, and needs assessment and organizationalresponse in Bosnia.

The Bank’s activities should be politically realistic, recognizing the importance ofother facets of the post-conflict development process such as reform/rebuilding ofgovernance, justice, and public security systems. Adjunct programs should addressrelated needs such as promoting secure land tenure and fighting corruption.

Peacebuilding goals should include strengthening civil institutions while optimizingresources available from local and international sources. Adequate resources shouldbe allocated to ensure complete recovery especially for vulnerable groups.

Peacebuilding Strategies

■ 3.2 ■

International agencies must maintain a realistic perspective of theirrespective roles in peacebuilding.

Recent interventions indicate thathumanitarian agencies are relativelyignorant about the complex causes ofconflicts, how to resolve them, and thebest means of peacebuilding. Since theultimate responsibility for peace lieswith a nation’s citizens and govern-ment, the international community’srole is necessarily one of support.

Throughout the peacebuildingprocess, humanitarian organizationscan provide support by helping war-affected populations meet their basicneeds; protecting their rights; andfacilitating the processes of reconcilia-tion, reintegration and rehabilitation.Each phase of the peacebuildingprocess—making, keeping andsustaining peace—requires a mixof political, security, humanitarianand economic activities.1

Making peace

Peacemaking consists of a series ofactivities that include negotiatingpeace, designing the peace accord,strengthening the role of civil society,and identifying the appropriate role ofthe international community.

The nature of wardetermines thenature of peace.

This means that thefactors which produce

and sustain theconflict will directlyimpact the ensuingpeace settlement.

— Markus Kostner, et al.From Civil War to Civil Society, 1997

In order to minimize discontent,make progress, and reach the broadestpossible consensus, the negotiationprocess must be comprehensive, trans-parent and inclusive. All aspects of theconflict—social, political and eco-nomic—must be addressed in an openforum, allowing all interested membersof society an equal opportunity toparticipate, including women’s associa-tions, civil society and even combat-ants. Each group should have a nego-tiator with a clear mandate. No sectorshould be allowed to dominate, and nogroup should be marginalized, as suchsituations may lead to more violence.

The Bank served as a technicaladviser to the peacemakers in Guate-mala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and tothe West Bank and Gaza. The Bankgave advice on the economic develop-ment dimensions of peace accordoptions and helped plan post-conflictrecovery with a longer-term vision bycreating a coherent framework forreconstruction and recovery.

The peace accord

The signing of a peace accord is onlythe beginning of a lengthy process ofrebuilding a non-violent society, inwhich the divergent needs and time-tables of various groups must beaddressed. Although it is importantto realize that no accord can addressall demands, it is a critical step inrestoring confidence.

Peacebuilding Strategies

Negotiating peace

The essential elements of a peaceprocess are political willingness by allwarring factions to enter into negotia-tions and a security framework tomaintain the peace. Each requiresextensive investments of time andmoney before the parties come to thenegotiating table. The parties mustovercome the lack of trust that devel-oped during the conflict and learn toview negotiations as a way out of theconflict—recognizing that all demandscannot be met and a compromise mustbe reached. It may take years beforenecessary levels of trust exist andsuccessful negotiations can occur.

1 This chapter draws significantly from thedocument “From Civil War to Civil Society: TheTransition from War to Peace in Guatemala andLiberia,” 1997.

■ 3.3 ■

Peacebuilding StrategiesTHE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE: AN OVERVIEW

Peace agreements must reflect, or atleast not conflict, with the history,tradition, cultures and values of theinvolved populations. The plan shouldreflect the activities necessary to rein-force peacemaking and peacekeeping,including the precise role of interna-tional assistance and the role of peace-keeping operations, if applicable.

The Guatemalan peace process

Activities should be designed in con-sultation with all relevant national andlocal authorities and bodies, UN agen-cies, donors and NGOs. Even thoughpolicy decisions may not be technicallyoptimal or solutions may be secondbest, the integration of all players andtheir perspectives into the peace-building process must take priority.

That the incredible political eventsof the 20th century in Guatemalawould lead to eventual peace seemslike a miracle. Six coups d’etat, fiveconstitutions and 35 different gov-ernments (15 of them military jun-tas) in 96 years left the Guatemalanpeople with wide-scale social frag-mentation and polarization. Thecivil war began in 1960, with a failedrevolt of army officers who thenformed a guerrilla movement ini-tially aligned with Cuban revolu-tionary forces, and later united withindigenous groups into UnidadRevolucionaria NacionalGuatemalteca (URNG).

The transition to peace began in theearly 1980s with a new constitution,the election of a civilian president,political pluralism, and restorationof personal liberties such as freedomof speech. In 1987, the Guatemalanpresident, along with other CentralAmerican heads of state, signed adeclaration out-lining proceduresfor sustainable regional peace. Animportant component of this agree-ment for Guatemala was the estab-lishment of the National Reconcilia-tion Commissions (NRC).

Preparation for the negotiations tookthree years and included a series ofNRC consultations with political par-ties, the private sector, religiousgroups, academics, labor unions andother members of civil society. TheCatholic Church and a UN observermediated these meetings. In 1991,formal discussions began between theUNRG and the newly formed govern-ment commission for peace (COPAZ).

Three years later, civil society wasexplicitly brought into the negotiationswith the establishment of a Civil Soci-ety Assembly. The peace agreement,which was signed in December 1996,had taken almost six years to reach. Itcontained accords on democratization,human rights, displaced populations,indigenous rights, and socioeconomicissues. It defined the roles of civilsociety and the military.

The World Bank was invited into thenegotiations as a technical adviser tohelp determine the economic feasibil-ity of the proposed socio-economicaccords. The Bank performed economicmodeling to help identify what wouldbe affordable within a realistic budget.

Some of the proposals proved tooambitious, either in cost or timeframe. Learning this during thenegotiation phase allowed thenegotiators to better structure therefinancing of public expenditures.

The Guatemalan peace processoffers multiple lessons:■ Transparent processes increasedtrust and reduced suspicion.■ Participation by most of thestakeholders built a sense ofpartnership among the variouscomponents of society, legitimiz-ing the process and outcome.■ The agreements addressedthe root causes of the conflict,providing a blueprint for socio-economic development.■ The agreements extended be-yond the military arrangements toprovide a comprehensive packagefor a new nation.■ The peace was brokered by theGuatemalans themselves and notimposed by outsiders.

Source: From Civil War to Civil Society:The Transition from War to Peace in

Guatemala and Liberia, 1997by Markus Kostner, et al.

■

Even though policy decisionsmay not be technically

optimal or solutions may besecond best, the integrationof all players’ perspectives

into the peacebuildingprocess must take priority.

■

From your experiences in post-conflict countries, identify instances where internationalassistance arrangements stipulated in peace agreements have failed. What werethe reasons for these failures and how might they have been avoided?

?

■ 3.4 ■


The role of civil society

Civil society refers to all the non-stateactors that make up a free society.Although it is presumed to be basicallypeaceful in nature, it can also includeextremists and groups promotingviolence. Civil society is critical to theachievement of practical results inpeacebuilding—helping to amplify thevoices of minority groups, bringingdivergent groups together, and wield-ing political influence. Civil societycan be a powerful force in psycho-social healing by re-establishing trustand a sense of community throughboth formal and informal networks.

Conflict-induced displacement anddestruction usually have an adverseeffect on civil society but many aspectsare likely to survive or possibly bestrengthened. In Somalia, for example,civil society carried out the previousfunctions of government institutionswhile local NGOs carried on the workof evacuated international NGOs inproviding relief and rehabilitationassistance. In Guatemala, participationin the peace process by COPAZ andthe Civil Society Assembly helped toensure maximum support for thesocial and political changes resultingfrom the peace process.

The participation of civil societyhelps to legitimize the outcome of thepeace process. Civil participants canensure that discussions and recom-mendations take into account theneeds of the larger society, as well asmonitor the implementation of theserecommendations.

For civil participation to succeed,institutional mechanisms must be inplace to guarantee that all interestedmembers of society are allowed toparticipate and that resources areavailable to support local peace-building and conflict managementefforts. Furthermore, and most impor-tantly, factions must be willing to openthe peace process to civil participation.These conditions may be difficult tomeet in a highly militarized society.

The role of the internationalcommunity

It is crucial to ensure that externalintervention does not contribute toor exacerbate the conflict, or imposea peace process that cannot be sus-tained, such as occurred in Angola.External solutions are unlikely toremedy the sources of the conflicts;therefore, a more comprehensivedialogue is needed. Donors shouldestablish linkages to the agenciesengaged in peacebuilding in order togain an understanding of problemsand to monitor progress.

In addition to providing criticaltechnical and financial support, theinternational community’s role in-cludes promoting civil participation by“creating peace” for civil society torealize its full potential in the process.This may involve, for example, encour-aging local methods of dispute settle-ment, reconciliation and institution-building. Collaborative, multi-countryorganizations that support assistanceefforts in developing countries can beimportant reinforcement for conflictresolution (e.g. “Group of Friends”in Guatemala; “Friends of IGAD”—the Intergovernmental Agency forDevelopment—for seven countriesin the Horn of Africa). InternationalNGOs that were operational in acountry well before, and during, theconflict understand local conditionsand can be instrumental inpeacebuilding efforts.

The United Nations can play ameaningful role only if it is invited todo so by all warring factions and if itsparticipation is based on an under-standing of, and sensitivity to, theproblems. The Special Representativeof the Secretary General (SRSG) canhelp ensure coordination and avoidduplication of efforts by UN agencies,donors and NGOs; hold regular brief-ings of the international communityon the implementation of the peaceagreements; and assist through diplo-matic channels in securing financingand resolving political difficulties in

Supporting local capacitiesfor peace through aid

How can international and localaid agencies be instrumental intransforming the “rhythms of war”to the “rhythms of peace” andchanging a “culture of violence” toone of peaceful conflict resolution?

Peace capacities exist in all people.Even in the midst of conflict, somepeople exemplify peace throughtheir attitudes and actions andthrough processes or systems thatinterconnect groups. Tapping intothese capacities, aid agencies canundertake activities to promotesimilar capacities in others by:

Providing space—places wherepeople can act in non-violent waysor where they can engage in jointendeavors with people on the“other side.” Confidence-buildingmeasures for peace include hiringstaff from both sides of the con-flict, promoting joint cultural anddevelopment activities, creatingsafe green spaces.

Providing voice—forums wherepeacebuilding can be discussedand issues of reconciliation andinclusion addressed. Otherexamples: sponsoring publications,conferences, songs, and playspromoting peace.

Providing incentives—rewards forpeaceful actions, or access to mediaand positions of power to countermisinformation.

Source: Do No Harm, 1996by Mary B. Anderson

Eritrean Women participating in civic education.Jenny Mathews/Network/Matrix

■ 3.5 ■


negotiation and implementation ofthe agreement.

Regional organizations may be wellplaced to assist peace processes, par-ticularly where refugees and regionalsupport for different factions havecreated a regional dimension to theconflict. In Central America, theContadora Group influenced thesettlement of several conflicts. In EastAfrica, IGAD works with Somali clanleaders to help settle territorial dis-putes and repatriate refugees, and theOAU (Organization of African Unity)sponsored a conflict resolution centerin Ethiopia to train regional profession-als. On the other hand, in West Africa,regional politics hindered attempts byECOWAS (the Economic Communityof West African States) and ECOMOG(the Military Observers of the Eco-nomic Community of West AfricanStates) to help resolve the LiberianCivil War by military intervention.

Keeping peace

The peacekeeping phase includesimplementing the peace accord,promoting good governance throughdemocratization and institutionbuilding, fostering a representativegovernment, strengthening justicesystems, supporting reconciliationefforts, enhancing public security, andprotecting human rights. During thisperiod, when government agenciesmay be weak and conditions changingrapidly, chances for successful Bankinterventions are greatly enhanced bythe presence of a resident mission.The absence of missions and special-

ized staff limited the effectiveness ofoperations in Cambodia, Eritrea, Haiti,and Lebanon.

Implementing the peace accord

Implementing a peace accord is achallenging task. The end of fightingsignifies what may be the beginningof a long road to improving livingstandards. A return to violence isinevitable unless the post-war societyrecreates itself through a new set ofbehaviors, mindsets and institutionalframeworks. While peace accordsconsist of the political discourseneeded to achieve consensus, resourceconstraints have to be addressed whentranslating the accord into practicalactions and realistic timetables. Amajor challenge of implementing apeace accord is ensuring that expecta-tions are met and that unrealisticexpectations do not develop.

Promoting good governance

Good governance promoted throughdemocrataization and strengtheningpublic institutions is essential to theprocess of reestablishing legitimacy,confidence and normalcy in thesystem. It consists of:

1. Transparency – disclosing budgets,debts, expenditures and revenuesso that payments and beneficiariesare known to all

2. Accountability – ensuring that thegoverning body is responsible forhow it generates income and allo-cates expenditures

3. Rule of law – implementing a legalframework by which governmentand society are guided

4. Participation – involving andempowering citizens to participatein government

5. Institutional pluralism – support-ing the above conditions, is prefer-able to a unitary structure

The process of democratization isconsidered vital to peace- and capacitybuilding. International agencies canhelp strengthen this process by sup-porting a system of political partiesand initiatives to develop or reformthe constitution.

Public institutions are the bridgebetween the state and civil society,enabling citizens to communicate theirinterests and needs to the government.They are the means through whichgovernments implement policies. Civilservice reform is frequently a crucialdimension of strengthening institutionsas existing policies may be weak orused to favor groups or individuals.

Decentralization can help increasecivil participation and promote localcapacity-building and sustainablecommunity-centered development.It may be very difficult to bring about,however, as those in control may seediffusion of political power as a threat.Support of decentralization effortsrequires understanding the nature ofincentives facing politicians andofficials, clarifying responsibilitiesand resources at different levels ofgovernment, and creating a workingsystem of accountability.

List at least three advantages gained from a resident mission or a continuing agencypresence for peacebuilding in a post-conflict country.?


■ 3.6 ■


Fostering representativegovernment

Elections are markers of progress indemocratization but do not, by them-selves, create democracy. History hasdemonstrated that elected regimes donot always perform better thanunelected regimes. Furthermore,democracy can take many forms suchas power sharing arrangements orcouncils of elders. Popular participa-tion in decision making encouragestransparency and accountabilitywhich, in turn, contribute to socio-economic development. Therefore, arepresentative government and elec-tions, as a means of achieving it, areimportant considerations for post-

A study of election processes atthe end of the protracted civil warsin Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia,Angola and Mozambique indicatedthat international presence cannot bea substitute for a genuine commitmentto peace and the cessation of hostilitiesby well-armed factions. Successfulelections are contingent on effectivedisarmament and demobilization,as well as the peaceful leveling ofhistorical differences. The electoralstage should focus on supporting thepolitical performance of local actorsand on quality, rather than quantity,of assistance from the internationalcommunity, whose presence should belimited to the minimum necessary andbased on its cost effectiveness.

While most federal states result from acentralization process, or a search forunity by a voluntary alliance of previ-ously autonomous units, Ethiopia is acase where the center is “devolving”to regions in a form resembling afederal system. Devolution, one typeof decentralizing strategy, occurswhen authority is transferred fromcentral government to autonomouslocal-level governmental units holdingcorporate status granted under statelegislation. Ethiopia’s adoption of thissystem in 1991 was partly prompted,after thirty years of war and centuriesof inter-ethnic conflict, by the need toaddress concerns of regions dominatedby the country’s major ethnic groups.Only one other country, Belgium, hasdevolved to local level units based oncultural linguistic lines.

The transitional strategy to devolutionis fraught with risks. These include thepossibilities that secession demands by

conflict societies. Early considerationsfor successful elections include:

■ How to guarantee the involvementof all factions in civil society,including refugees and displacedpersons, in order to build trustand legitimize the process

■ Determining the role of the politicalloser in order to promote powersharing and avoid manipulationof benefits based on politicalaffiliation

■ Whether to involve internationalactors to allay suspicions of riggingor intimidation

List at least three advantages gainedfrom a resident mission or acontinuing agency presence forpeacebuilding in a post-conflictcountry.

Possible answersEnhanced flexibility and expediency to alterprogramming in response to changingconditions and needs; adequate time andstaff to devote to NGO liaison and external

? relations; increased cost effectiveness;enhanced commitment by staff who are ableto focus on local circumstances and problemsolving; increased consistency in monitoringand evaluation.

Decentralization in post-civil war Ethiopia

certain ethnic groups will be rein-forced, violence may erupt if ethnicgroups are intolerant of minorities intheir jurisdictions (Ethiopia has over 90distinct cultural-linguistic groups),centralized efforts to build a demo-cratic government will be hampered,or ethnicity might limit the mobility ofcapital and labor needed to promoteeconomic opportunities. With theadditional burden of rebuilding itswar-torn society, Ethiopia faces prob-lems of limited personnel and financialresources, and weak central agencies.Simultaneous reforms include estab-lishing an electoral system; rebuildingthe judiciary; building a modern armyand police force; and formulating newfiscal, monetary and economic policies.

The struggle to clarify the overallstructure, organization and allocationof powers to the federal and devolvedregional governments is likely to takemany years. The debate reflects the

various groups involved, includingbureaucracies, political parties, opposi-tion groups, and civic associations.They have differing:

■ expectations about the possibilitiesand difficulties of empoweringlocal populations

■ experiences in managing large-scale institutions other thanmilitary units

■ understandings of the difficultiesof formulating policies for regula-tory mechanisms, providing basicgoods and services, and planningsustainable development programs

■ appreciations of the complexitiesof public sector planning forrevenue generation, budgeting,expenditure, and accountingprocedures in line ministries andagencies.

Source: Decentralization and EthnicFederalism in Post-Civil War Ethiopia, 1997

by John M. Cohen

■ 3.7 ■


Strengthening justice systems

National justice systems are often inruins after war because judges, attor-neys, police and investigators havebeen killed or have fled, and physicalinfrastructure has been destroyed. Thelack of a local justice system mayconstrain the effectiveness of peace-keepers and police and reduce long-term prospects for rebuilding society.Rebuilding effective legal systems andlaying the institutional foundation forthe rule of law provide a crucial under-pinning for peace and stability bygiving legitimacy to those who mustwield force (such as the police) andmake judgments (courts of law).

Justice systems obtain authoritybased on the recognition of the legiti-macy of laws and the system of justiceby citizens of the state. To gain thisauthority, the system must recognizeand protect the rights of the indi-vidual, be accessible to all, and beimpartial and politically independent.Ineffective systems and laws encour-age people to “take the laws into theirown hands.”

International assistance can betargeted at formal law and justiceinstitutions. Specific interventionsmight include:

■ Identifying requirements for facili-ties and equipment

■ Determining the level of localexpertise and identifying meansto mobilize human resourcesand provide capacity buildingand training

■ Identifying the need for new orrevised legislation

■ Establishing/maintaining mecha-nisms for conflict prevention orpeaceful resolution of conflicts

■ Establishing—when necessary—a transitional criminal justicesystem with capacities to arrest,hold and—if necessary—trycriminal suspects

Supporting reconciliation

Reconciliation, or the process of forgiv-ing past wrongs and putting awaygrievances—on an individual, commu-nity, and national level—is crucial tothe peacebuilding effort. Psychosocialhealing is a necessary process follow-ing the trauma of war and the break-down of social institutions. Whilethose affected by war are ultimatelyresponsible for the healing process,international organizations can alsoplay an important role by implement-ing programs to prevent further violentoutbreaks, increase communication,build an inclusive and strong socialstructure, assist and rehabilitatevictims of human rights violations,and trace missing persons—normallythe role of the International Committeeof the Red Cross (ICRC).

Judicial reconciliation can createa more palpable sense of justice forcitizens who have been the victims ofwar crimes and human rights viola-tions. This requires insuring individualaccountability for war criminals viacriminal prosecution or mechanismsof accountability in the form of aninternational tribunal, a commissionof inquiry, or a “truth commission.”A significant shortcoming of the tribu-nals established for Rwanda and theformer Yugoslavia is that they arepowerless to enforce arrest warrantsand subpoenas. A mechanism isneeded to ensure a quick response toboth immediate and longer-term reha-bilitation needs of the justice system.

Enhancing public security

For peacebuilding to succeed, citizensmust feel secure and have some free-dom of movement. The abundance ofweapons in post-war societies mayresult in increased crime. Neutralforces may be needed to keep peacewhile new security arrangements aredeveloped. Immediate arrangementsinvolve separation of opposing forces,demobilization and demining and,eventually, reintegration of ex-combat-ants—all in the context of efforts topromote reconciliation. (See Tab 5.)Palestinians voting in Gaza City – Sharon Abbady/

BlackStar

The Truth Commissionin South Africa

Forgiving the perpetrators ofviolence is one of the most difficultchallenges for a society emergingfrom violent conflict. Adheringto the principles of human rightsis one of government’s centralresponsibilities and essential fora society to come to peace withitself. Similarly, reconciliationrequires concrete activities tocreate harmony among thosewho have fought each other.The Truth Commission in SouthAfrica exemplifies one approachto reconciliation. Its objectiveswere to promote national unityand reconciliation in a spirit ofunderstanding, transcending thedivisions of the past by:

■ determining the possiblecauses, nature and extentof human rights violationscommitted from 1960 to 1993

■ facilitating amnesty for personswho disclosed acts associatedwith political objectives

■ determining the fate of victims,informing their relatives, andrecommending reparationmeasures

■ compiling a report with itsfindings and recommendations

■ 3.8 ■


Near the end of El Salvador’s 12-year civil war, a stalemate devel-oped between the Salvadoreangovernment and the FarabundoMarti National Liberation Front(FMLN) following a failed finaloffensive in 1989. A complex seriesof political agreements had to bereached before a cease-fire couldoccur. Police reforms were centralto the peace process and bridgedan impasse regarding the status ofgovernment armed forces.

Crime became the top concern ofthe population. By 1995-96, thecountry’s newspapers were virtualcrime reports. Homicides and otherviolent crimes rose dramaticallyand groups wanting to de-legiti-mize the new political systemcaused local communities to takethe law into their own hands.These circumstances made itdifficult for the newly reformedpolice forces to be effective andgain experience.

In 1992, national and internationalactors set about revamping thepolice and public security. Reformsto the public security system in-cluded the removal of internalsecurity responsibilities from themilitary except in exceptionalcircumstances, and the creation ofa new National Civilian Police(PNC). Additionally, an ad hoccommittee was created to review

Police reform, human rights and democratization in El Salvador

the files of military officers chargedwith human rights violations.

International advice regarding themix and composition of the PNCwas valuable. Policing should berepresentative of parties whichwere not in the conflict but whomight be left out of institutionalarrangements. A decision to set aminimum of 60% noncombatantswithin the PNC increased courtesyand transparency and provided forinclusion of women and indigenousand other groups. Due to screeningprocedures for demilitarized troopsin the PNC, mixed training ofex-combatants from both sides ledto cooperation between them onthe new force.

A significant problem was the slowdevelopment of a criminal investi-gation unit and other supportingmechanisms such as the justice andthe prison systems. Judicial reformswere far less specific in thenegotiations and did not occurquickly or completely. The absenceof far-reaching and rapid judicialreforms was capable of undermin-ing police reforms.

Meanwhile, those who benefitedfrom the old public security system,such as the economic elites andstate institutions, resisted reformefforts. During the period of nego-tiations, the elites realized that

their interests would no longer beprotected. The military activelyplaced road blocks in the way andrestructuring the new force wasundermined by creation of parallel“special protection” units fundedby businessmen.

Highlighted lessons:

1. Police reform reflects thepolitical context rather thanshapes it. Political will mustexist among those who signthe peace agreement.

2. Despite constraints, new publicsecurity institutions can helpconsolidate peace and areimportant elements of peaceagreements.

3. International support should beplanned realistically based onthe time required for develop-ing new public security institu-tions, as well as judicial supportmechanisms. These arrange-ments should be stipulated inthe peace agreement.

4. NGOs and the press canhelp support public educationprograms to ensure that newmodels of policing are under-stood and given a chance bycitizens and organizations ofcivil society.

Source: Police Reform, Human Rights andDemocratization in Post-Conflict Settings:

Lessons from El Salvador, 1997 by Charles Call

What steps might Bank staff take to address the serious socio-economic problems ofmicroinsecurity (e.g. petty thievery and other public security issues) and injustice??


■ 3.9 ■


Where the military has played aprominent role in internal security, areduction in military prerogatives andresources may be necessary to furtherthe process of democratization. Creat-ing a police force independent of themilitary may help change the image ofthe police from oppressor to publicservant. Questions from the Overseas

Lessons learned from the human rights emergency in Rwanda

The human rights disaster in Rwandaand the way it was addressed bynational and international communi-ties will be the subject of scrutiny formany years. Between April and Julyof 1994, ethnic violence resulted in:the killing of 500,000 to one millionpeople, two million refugees inneighboring countries, and onemillion internally displaced people.

A comprehensive security strategywas needed to disarm the insurgentshidden among the refugees, isolatethose suspected of committingviolations of international humani-tarian law, promote an economicand social environment conducive torepatriation, and monitor possibleborder clashes between governmenttroops and rebel groups. In response,

the Human Rights Field Operationfor Rwanda (HRFOR) was estab-lished. Unfortunately, the operationwas plagued by a multi-facetedmandate, inadequate administra-tive capacity, and insufficientlytrained field officers.

One of the greatest problems in theUN field operation was the failureto address the political obstacles to“restarting” Rwanda’s justice systemwhich suffered from a lack ofresources and from the internalpolitical dynamics of the newlyreconstituted government. Delays inprosecution—over 50,000 personsimprisoned and not formallycharged—occurred while the newrulers looked for answers to suchquestions as: What will be the

response of the military and thepublic? Who should be punishedand who should be grantedimmunity? What is the appropriatepunishment?

A major political obstacle to thecommencement of the trials wasa delay in appointing members ofthe Supreme Court and Council ofMagistrates. High level politicalnegotiations were needed tobreak the impasse. For example,an emissary might have beenappointed by donors to meet withRwandan officials to determinewhat was needed to get theprosecutions underway.

Source: “Protecting HumanRights in Rwanda,” 1997

by Peter M. Manikas and Krishna Kumar

Development Council can help deter-mine whether the political will existsto reform the security sector.

■ Has the government namedreform-minded individuals tokey posts?

■ Do these officials have sufficientpower and commitment to confrontthose who oppose reforms?

How are strengthening the justice and public security systems, promoting societal reconcilia-tion and protecting human rights related? Why are these activities crucial to peacebuilding??


■ Is the new force engaged in abuses?

■ How willing are the leaders todiscipline and prosecute those whoengage in abuse?

■ What is the track record forinvestigating cases of politicalviolence and organized crime?

■ How transparent are the defenseand security budgets?

■ 3.10 ■


What steps might Bank staff take toaddress microinsecurity (e.g. pettythievery and other public securityissues) and injustice?

Possible answers: The Bank can raise theissues of insecurity and the need tostrengthen the justice system in dialoguewith the government and other donors. Itcan support workshops and seminars andencourage other donors to provide supportfor NGOs and other groups working toreform the systems.

? How are strengthening the justiceand public security systems,promoting societal reconciliationand protecting human rightsrelated. Why are these activitiescrucial to peacebuilding?

Possible answers: These four facets ofpeacebuilding are needed to promotesocietal reconciliation of deep-rootedhatreds and resentments; without thempeace will be short-lived and peacebuilding

? activities undermined. Many crimes andatrocities will not result in prosecutionbecause of inherent weaknesses in the justicesystem or lack of indictment, leading victimsto find a way to personally reconcile injustices;they must feel that their rights and the rightsof others will be upheld in the future in acourt of law; they must feel that their right tosafety and security is also upheld and thatthey are safe to move about.

Protecting human rights

Starting with the peace accord, bothsecurity and justice systems mustdemonstrate respect for human rightsand incorporate necessary measures toprotect indigenous identity and rights.If a human rights field operation isneeded, the roles of human rightsmonitors need to be carefully defined.Human rights monitors can providea dissuasive presence in rural areas,facilitate the return of internallydisplaced populations and refugees,and promote judicial institutionaldevelopment. National agencies andinternational development agenciesmust join forces to promote measuresto enhance human rights, as well asto increase social cohesion, and toprevent escalation of tensions.Specific activities may include:

■ Incorporate international humanrights standards in nationallegislation, e.g. guarantees forthe protection of human rightsrelated to the treatment ofprisoners and detainees, indepen-dence of the judiciary, and theright to a fair trial

■ Enhance or establish the legalprotection of human rights ofwomen and children, disabledpersons, indigenous people andthose belonging to national, ethnic,religious, or linguistic minorities

■ Establish a national human rightscommission or ombudsman

■ Collect information about humanrights violations and distribution tonational and international humanrights bodies and the media

■ Encourage the role of nationalNGOs and national authority fig-ures in maintaining human rightsand undertaking public education

■ Provide human rights training forpolice, military and all officialswho administer justice

■

Starting with thepeace accord, both security

and justice systemsmust demonstrate

respect for human rightsand incorporate measures

to protect indigenousidentity and rights.

■

Sustaining peace

Post-conflict society quickly begins tosearch for a “peace dividend” usuallyin the form of improved standards ofliving. Achieving this dividend requirestime and patience and is particularlychallenging for poor, multi-ethnicstates. One means of achieving socialpatience and consensus is throughburden sharing as well as sharing ofrewards among civilians. In Guate-mala, for example, a national consen-sus emerged that taxes needed to beraised to pay for the reconstruction. Inorder to meet a society’s expectationsand sustain peace, a wide range ofconfidence-building measures must beput into effect.

Reforming the economic sector

Jump-starting the private sector iscritical in post-conflict countries. Itrequires the reduction of three typicalpost-war constraints: lack of businessconfidence, lack of capital, and lack ofinfrastructure. Of these, the mainconcern is boosting business confi-dence, which in turn reduces the othertwo constraints. Typically post-conflicteconomies undergo a long period ofrecovery and slow return of businessconfidence and local investment.

Innovative policy frameworks,approaches and programs are neededto develop programs to create employ-ment in the peacebuilding phases. Forexample, the International LabourOrganization (ILO) promotes employ-ment development strategies throughLocal Economic DevelopmentAgencies (LEDAs) to plan smallenterprises and monitor their imple-mentation. The LEDAs function asfinancial intermediaries to channeldevelopment bank loans and otherfunds from donors to small enterprisesand cooperatives. Multi-facetedprograms consist of skills training,counseling, promoting access to credit,and coordination with a broad rangeof assistance agencies.

■ 3.11 ■


Reforming land tenure

Access to land can be both a rootcause of conflict and a major con-straint to peacebuilding. High concen-tration in land ownership—as in Gua-temala where 2% of the populationholds 60% of the land—and failedland reform can spur renewed politicalviolence. Once-effective, traditionalland ownership mechanisms or legalownership are often de-legitimizedduring conflict, or property may havebeen destroyed or relegated for war-time uses. Conflict-displaced personsmay return home to find their land inuse by others and may have no meansto secure access to arable land. Atten-tion must be given to issues of accessand land tenure as part of the reforma-tion process and as a basis for legiti-mizing rehabilitation inputs.

Combating corruption

Corruption is usually defined as theabuse of public office for private gainthrough bribery, patronage, nepotismor theft of state assets. It is also under-taken by private agents to circumventpublic processes for profit. Corruptionis a global problem, undertaken sys-tematically in some countries, whichnegatively impacts social and eco-nomic development. The costs are feltdisproportionately by the poor butalso burden the private sector, foreigninvestors and the environment.

Corruption results from complexcauses and the means to control it arenot well understood. It thrives onpoorly designed economic policies,low education levels, underdevelopedcivil society, and weak public institu-tions—conditions often prevalent indeveloping countries and in post-conflict situations. Corruption under-mines necessary confidence in gover-nance during peacebuilding, reducingthe effectiveness of aid and erodingpolitical support for it.

Fighting corruption is neither easynor quick and requires the politicalcommitment of national leaders andcivil society. Corruption is controlledonly when citizens no longer tolerateit. Strengthening government andjudicial systems and increasing trans-parency in government processes, asdiscussed in the section on “KeepingPeace,” are key aspects of a nationalanti-corruption strategy.

A growing number of partnercountries are asking for Bank assis-tance in fighting corruption. TheWorld Bank uses the followingpro-active approaches in planningand implementing its programs.

1. Ensuring that projects andoperational procedures set anexample of best practice, whiletaking into account their effectson borrowing countries.

2. Raising the issue of corruption indialogue with borrowers.

3. Including methods to addresscorruption in country strategiesand taking account of the risks ofcorruption in project design.

4. Building the knowledge base onthe dynamics of corruption andsuccessful reduction measures.

5. Filling critical skill gaps in finan-cial management, procurementand public sector management.

6. Building productive working rela-tionships with national, regionaland international partners.

7. Becoming an active partner inmultilateral efforts, such as theOrganization for EconomicCooperation and Development(OECD) initiative to coordinate thecriminalization of transnationalbribery and elimination of its taxdeductibility in member states.

Replacing emergency aid withdevelopment assistanceprograms

Meeting people’s basic needs is criticalduring a humanitarian emergencywhen lives are at risk, but it is notoften thought of as strictly related tothe political goals of peacebuilding.Providing transitional assistance whereresources and services are lacking is acrucial component of confidence build-ing and, therefore, of the process ofsustaining peace. Relatively peacefulconditions in the post-conflict periodprovide an opportunity for rehabilita-tion, paving the way for development.The overriding concern is to ensurethat the rehabilitation process strength-ens the vulnerable and promotes recon-ciliation rather than rewarding violenceor causing political tension.

■

The overriding concern is toensure that the rehabilitation

process strengthens thevulnerable and promotesreconciliation rather than

rewarding violence or causingpolitical tension.

■

Ex-combatants, refugees, IDPs, andthose who remained in their communi-ties are all likely to require some formof assistance. Other vulnerable groupsinclude women, the elderly, childrenand minors, and people with disabili-ties. They all have special needs. Typesof assistance include food distribution,health care, temporary shelter andemployment opportunities, educationand training programs, and psychoso-cial treatment for victims of trauma.(Tab 5 covers the needs of ex-combat-ants; Tab 7, social and economic reinte-gration of war-affected populations.)

■ 3.12 ■


What indicators might signal a returnto stability in a post-conflict country?What response might assistanceagencies make to these indicators?

Possible answersIndicators: macroeconomic stability and itslikely sustainability; recovery of private sectorconfidence measured by investment ratio;

the effectiveness with which institutionalarrangements and the political system arecoping with the root causes of the conflict;the effectiveness of justice and reconciliationefforts; restoration of basic infrastructure;reduction in need for transition assistance tomeet basic needs; considerable improvementin situations of vulnerable groups; readiness

? of civil society to support government’sefforts.

Response: reduction of special proceduresand resident mission staff; reduced need toaddress conflict-related issues in programdocuments; decline in humanitarian aidprovisions.

At a minimum, rehabilitation shouldencompass the restoration of basicservices and subsistence capacities,allowing most donated relief to bediscontinued. In addition, crucialsectors may have been destroyedor their infrastructure, human, and

financial resource bases diminished.Sectors typically requiring rehabilita-tion include housing, transport,agriculture, water and sanitation,and health. The removal of mines onland and in waterways may be aprerequisite for most other activities.

Rehabilitation in post-conflictenvironments cannot be expected toclosely follow developmental aidmodels, which are often premised onworking in strong states with strongeconomies, a situation which rarelyexists in war-torn societies. ■

What indicators might signal a return to stability in a post-conflict country?What response might assistance agencies make to these indicators??

See suggested answers below.

■ 3.13 ■



A peace settlement that does not take into account economic issues is liable to fail.There is a tendency for negotiators to be too ambitious in their objectives for the peaceaccords; if proposed ideas cannot work economically the accords may come apart.

The strategic plan to implement the peace accords needs to be linked with thecountry’s capacity. The resources (human, financial, material) need to be in place or thegood ideas of the accords will not work.

There is much more than economics in the peace process. For peace accords to work,many of the proposed activities need to be implemented in parallel. That is, economicactivities need to be implemented at the same time as reforms in governance, thejustice system, and civil society. Bank staff who design economic rehabilitation projectsneed to understand that the success of their projects is co-dependent on parallelactivities.

Donors and peace process agencies need to work together. If donors are not “onboard” with proposed peace accords, they will be reluctant to help support them.Involving donors at all stages of designing peace accords increases the probability ofdonor acceptance.

Empowering civil society is crucial. Civil society’s role in the design, implementation andmonitoring of transition programs is pivotal and helps to buy social patience.

Elections do not equal democracy. Elections are not an end in themselves; democracycan take many forms. To avoid failed elections, which may lead to renewed violenceand loss of faith in the democratic process, certain conditions should be in place, suchas assigning roles to the political losers.

Justice does not equal reconciliation. A tension often exists between moving aheadwith reconstruction and bringing those who have committed atrocities to justice.Justice systems may be weak, forestalling legal reconciliation. Other forms ofreconciliation such as social, community-centered, and individual also need to occur.

Human rights protection needs to be built into security and judicial systems. Theprotection of human rights is often an elusive goal in conflict, and post-conflict,situations. Judicial and security systems, as well as the larger society, require inputs toinsure pervasiveness of respect for human rights.

■ 3.14 ■


A N N E X

Re-establishing governance

3.1

Most bilateral and multilateral donorstend to propose a fairly standarddemocratic model for post-conflictcountries, encouraging open, competi-tive, national, democratic elections. Inrecent years, such elections have oc-curred. Where the results were notheeded, the country has been pun-ished by sanctions from western coun-tries (e.g., Haiti, Burma). Where theelected President has ruled success-fully, aid has been forthcoming(e.g., Uganda, Cambodia, Nicaragua,Mozambique, South Africa). In lieu ofdemocratic elections, the conflict isconsidered unresolved and long-termaid withheld (e.g., Afghanistan, Soma-lia). In the late 1990s, USAID under-took a series of evaluations of the roleof democratic elections in the after-math of violent conflicts (published asPost-Conflict Elections, Democratizationand International Assistance edited byKrishna Kumar 1998). On balance thestudies found that aid did permitdemocratic processes to take hold insome countries, such as Angola, Cam-bodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia,

Mozambique and Nicaragua. But theyalso find that too much credence isgiven to singular national elections,and not enough attention to the overallprocess of ongoing peace negotiations,monitoring of peace accords, demobili-zation, economic rebuilding and elec-tions at regional, district and munici-pal levels. Often a single party willremain in power and no real competi-tion exists for long periods (e.g.,Mexico, India, Uganda). Among thestudies’ findings:

■ The participation of refugees inpost-conflict elections is importantnot only to make the electionsrepresentative but also to promotepolitical reconciliation. Refugeesare often the worst victims of civilwars and therefore their activeparticipation in elections tends tostrengthen the peace process.

■ Elections can themselves bedivisive: In practically all casestudy countries, political partiesappealed to parochial loyalties togain votes. Post-election powersharing should be the object ofpre-election negotiations. Civicand voter education programs,when efficiently organized beforeelections, can help create a posi-tive atmosphere.

■ In Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia,Haiti, Liberia and Mozambique,the original timetable for holdingelections was based on unrealisticassumptions. The planners under-estimated the roadblocks createdby deficient transportation andcommunication systems, thelimited administrative capacity ofthe government, and the lack ofpolitical will of the leaders, aswell as the difficulties in donorcoordination. Political leadersoften harbored serious reserva-tions about elections and did nothesitate to create obstacles to gainadvantages.

■ 3.15 ■


Ahmed, Masood and Cheryl Gray. 1997. “HelpingCountries Combat Corruption: The Role of the WorldBank.” Poverty Reduction and Economic Management,The World Bank.

Anderson, Mary B. 1996. Do No Harm: SupportingLocal Capacities for Peace through Aid. Boston:Collaborative for Development Action.

Cairns, Edmond. 1997. A Safer Future: Reducing theHuman Cost of War. Oxfam

Call, Charles. 1997. “Police Reform, Human Rights andDemocratization in Post-Conflict Settings: LessonsLearned from El Salvador.” Mimeo.

Carbonnier, Gilles. 1998. Conflict, Postwar Rebuildingand the Economy. United Nations Research Institute forSocial Development.

Cohen, John M. 1997. “Decentralization and ‘EthnicFederalism’ in Post-Civil War Ethiopia” in RebuildingSocieties After Civil War edited by Krishna Kumar.Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 135-153.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).1998. “IGAD Sub-regional Disaster PreparednessStrategy.” Draft mimeo.

International Labour Organization. 1997. “ILO andWar-affected Peoples and Countries: Promoting LastingPeace through Employment Promotion.” Mimeo.

Kostner, Markus, Taies Nezam, and Colin Scott. 1997.From Civil War to Civil Society: The Transition from War toPeace in Guatemala and Liberia. The World Bank and theCarter Center.

Kumar, Krisha, editor. 1998. Post-Conflict Elections,Democratization and International Assistance. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher.

Langseth, Stapenhurst and Pope. 1997. “The Role of aNational Integrity System in Fighting Corruption.” EDIWorking Paper, The World Bank.

López-Pintor, Rafael. 1997. “Reconciliation Elections: APost-Cold War Experience in Rebuilding Societies AfterCivil War edited by Krishna Kumar. Boulder: Lynne RiennerPublishers, pp. 43-62.

Manikas, Peter M. and Krishna Kumar. 1997. “ProtectingHuman Rights in Rwanda” in Rebuilding Societies AfterCivil War edited by Krishna Kumar. Boulder: Lynne RiennerPublishers, pp. 63-84.

Overseas Development Council. 1996. “Making PeaceWork - Lessons for the International DevelopmentCommunity.” ODC Conference Report.

The Stanley Foundation. 1997. “Accountability andJudicial Response: Building Mechanisms for Post-conflictJustice.” Report of the Thirty-Eighth Strategy for Peace,US Foreign Policy Conference.

United Nations, Department for Economic and SocialInformation and Policy Analysis. 1996. An Inventory ofPost-conflict Peacebuilding Activities. New York: UN.

R E F E R E N C E S

■ 4.1 ■

4

K E Y P O I N T S

Given the intractable nature of most modern conflicts,the Bank should support development of international andindigenous conflict management institutions, and draw ontheir expertise.

The Bank can provide direct or indirect support forpreventive measures including early warning systems,official and unofficial preventive diplomacy, and cost-benefit analyses of various conflict intervention measures.

Managing Conflict

■ 4.2 ■

The cessation of hostilities, asper a peace agreement, doesnot necessarily mean that

conflicts have been resolved and thatsecurity will be established and main-tained. Ongoing programs to promoteconflict management and reconcilia-tion, as well as economic confidence-building measures, usually need to beundertaken over a long period of time.

Managing conflict means not onlyavoiding escalation in a crisis but alsocreating a durable basis for peacefulalternatives through democracies,market economies and civil institu-tions that promote human rights. Withan increasing number of decentralizedpower centers around the globe, deci-sion makers must be able to draw ondifferent techniques for preventing,managing, and transforming conflict.

Types of conflict

Since WW I, most conflicts havebeen intra-, rather than inter-state,and since WW II most armed conflictshave occurred at a regional or locallevel primarily in the developingworld. These conflicts are deeper,more pervasive and more intractablethan the Cold War super powerstruggle, which was driven largelyby geopolitical and ideological forces.Some, such as the Korean, Vietnamese,and Arab-Israeli conflicts, havethreatened world peace.

Conflict is one ofthe most pervasive andinevitable features of allsocial systems, howevercomplex they may be,

and irrespective of theirlocation in time andspace. This is true ofpersonal, group, and

organizational as wellinternational systems.

Wherever it occurs,conflict is significant,

newsworthy andchallenging. It can lead tomutual satisfaction andgrowth or may produceacrimony, hostility, and

violence. The goal ofstudying conflict is tolearn to manage it ina way that maximizesits potential benefits

and minimizesits destructiveconsequences.

— Jacob Bercovitch andAllison Houston

“The Study of InternationalMediation,” 1996

Edward Kolodziej and WilliamZartman (1996) describe modernconflicts in four general ways:

1) intrastate separatist or sub-nationalconflicts for self-determination,such as in Sudan, Eritrea, Cyprus,Sri Lanka, India, and the formerYugoslavia

2) intrastate ideological conflicts forcontrol or replacement of the centralgovernment with external support,as in Lebanon, Afghanistan,Mozambique, Angola, Chad, Zaire,Cambodia, Rwanda, Ethiopia,El Salvador, Iraq, Nicaragua, orwithout external support as inPeru and Colombia

3) intrastate rivalries over rank andrelations, including boundary dis-putes and structural rivalries be-tween neighboring states, such asin the Middle East, Southern Africa,and the Sahara

4) interstate claims on the sameterritories such as Ogaden, Kashmir,Kuwait, Sahara, Chad, Israel, andMauritania.

Conflicts range from dormant orincipient to immediate or urgent. Forexample, the ethnic conflict betweenArmenians and Azerbaijanis was dor-mant for many years when the tworepublics were under Soviet control.After the break-up of the Soviet Union,however, the conflict reemerged as

Managing Conflict

■ 4.3 ■

Managing ConflictTHE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE: AN OVERVIEW

nationalist tensions surfaced onceagain. Dormant conflict such as thedeep rift in China between the commu-nist party and the growing number ofpro-democracy supporters also has thepotential to develop into an urgentcrisis. Similarly, some incipient con-flicts may erupt, such as the separatistmovement in Kashmir, which hasrevived the Indo-Pakistani tensions.

Protracted social conflict theory,also referred to as deep rooted conflicttheory, describes the apparentlyirresolvable nature of disputes insuch locations as the Middle East,Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Cyprus,the Horn of Africa, Cambodia andKashmir. These conflicts are based onuncompromisable underlying needsrather than negotiable interests andpositions. The source of these conflictsis the denial of elements necessary tohuman development—namely security,identity, social recognition of identityand effective participation in determin-ing development requirements—usu-ally combined with economic underde-velopment, structural inequality, andunintegrated social and political sys-tems. Whereas “disputes” can beresolved through the process of nego-tiation, the use of formal negotiated orcoerced settlements may only prolongand exacerbate situations of deep-rooted conflict.

Mechanisms toprevent, manage andtransform conflict

Many traditional mechanisms formanaging conflict are inappropriatefor addressing modern conflicts. Inconflicts not deemed salient to worldinterests, the UN and other interna-tional bodies have often not takenaction, or have been unable to takeappropriate action until once manage-able conflicts become intractable andlarge-scale violence has occurred.

The need for broadening the globalrepertoire for dealing with violentconflict has led to a search for alter-nate, non-military means to achieveinternational security. These might bedivided into two broad areas: organiza-tional initiatives in world law andgovernment, and those involving non-violent conflict resolution. “Multi-trackdiplomacy” was developed based onthe recognition that different actors oractions (i.e. “tracks”) are needed atdifferent times during thepeacebuilding process. In this frame-work, Track 1 represents diplomaticand governmental activities. Track 2encompasses professional, non-governmental conflict resolution.Other tracks involve business, privatecitizens, research, training and educa-tion, activism, religion, funding, andcommunications media.

Select a post-conflict country. Identify the type of conflict, the key factors which influenced it,and the nature of the conflict. What positive consequences emerged from the conflict?Can the underlying reasons for the conflict be resolved?

?

The central unit of analysis inprotracted social conflict is the iden-tity group, defined in ethnic, religious,linguistic or other terms. The identitygroup facilitates the expression ofneeds in social and political terms.Factors such as race, religion,ethnicity, and militarism, however,are often mixed together in manyconflicts. Some conflicts labeled“ethnic” are in fact between people ofcommon ethnic origin. In Somalia,fighting clans were not necessarilyfrom different ethnic groups. BosnianSerbs and Bosnian Muslims havelargely common origins but centuriesago adopted different religions identi-fying them with different outsidepowers. Carefully identifying theactors in a conflict and their actualagenda is an important step in design-ing interventions.

■ 4.4 ■


Inter-group conflict interventionsmay occur at political, institutionaland social levels. By considering theseinterventions, we can begin to explorewhether methods of conflict analysisand resolution can be developed thatwill allow parties an earlier opportu-nity to meet their needs in a less costlyand more effective manner.

Conflict prevention

The goal of conflict prevention isstopping a dispute before it becomesviolent. Unfortunately, focus on theactual prevention of conflicts oftengets little attention and peacebuildingprocesses are often disrupted throughunforeseen or unmitigated, renewedviolence in post-conflict countries.When this occurs, development gainsand inputs accrued during a period ofpeace are lost. The international com-munity must decide how much it iswilling to spend on conflict preventionand whether it is willing to spend asmuch on it as on fighting or peace-keeping. For example, the conflictmanagement budget in Bosnia exceeds$8.7 billion. The question of whetherconflict prevention activities such asthe establishment and monitoring ofearly warning systems and preventivediplomacy could have been carried outmore effectively and at less cost needsto be seriously considered.

Early warning systems

Conflict does not follow a linear pathbut rather is a dynamic process inwhich numerous factors determinewhether it will escalate or de-escalate.Conflict early warning is the identifica-tion and monitoring of structural andproximate predictors of conflict in aparticular setting. It requires bothstrong local knowledge and technicaltraining. Early warning efforts ascurrently practiced usually consist ofmonitoring filed reports from localsources, UN agencies, NGOs, and newsreports. Data systems incorporatestructural sources that reflect long-term background processes—some-times obtained through “mapping” ofglobal conflicts and weapons stores—

and dynamic sources based on track-ing day-to-day developments. Analysisof indicators, however, has not beensupported by adequate tools to allowuseful interpretation, and has nottaken account of the tendency of con-flicts to evolve in different phases,with rapid transitions between them.

Many early warning networks areoperated by governments, NGOs, andregional organizations to producevulnerability assessments, especiallywith regard to food shortages. Somealso monitor conflict indictors, such asholding or canceling elections.

Many national and internationalagencies monitor global “hot spots”and recognize the importance of pre-paring responses to incipient conflicts.However, warnings do not alwaysresult in preventive actions. Effectiveearly warning depends on the politicalwill to strengthen networks to providetimely information, as well as the

capacity to follow up with timelyaction. Warning systems need to im-prove the usability of information for awide variety of audiences and makebetter use of the media and publicopinion in order to contribute posi-tively to conflict prevention efforts.

■

Effective early warningdepends on thepolitical will to

strengthen networks toprovide timely information,as well as the capacity to

follow up withtimely action.

■

Peace through Strength Peace through Cooperation(Military Security) (Alternate Security)

POLITICAL SYSTEMS APPROACHES

NEWER APPROACHES

INTERNATIONAL LAW

O L

D E

RN

E

W

E R

Deterrence

Arms Control

Diplomacy and Negotiations

Track 1 Diplomacy

Peacemaking

Peacekeeping

Role of Law

InternationalOrganizations

Third-PartyDispute Settlement

Behavioral Approaches

Internal Systems

World Systems

Track 2 Diplomacy

Unofficial Diplomacy

Tracks 3 to 9 Diplomacy

Peacebuilding

InteractiveConflictResolution

Conflict Resolution

Transnationalism

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

The Conceptual Domain of Approaches to Peace

Adapted from Interactive Conflict Resolution, 1997 by Ronald Fisher

■ 4.5 ■


Preventive diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy is defined in the1992 Agenda for Peace as “action toprevent disputes from arising betweenparties, to prevent existing disputesfrom escalating into conflicts, and tolimit the spread of the latter when theyoccur.” Preventive action may entailthe deployment of small politicalteams, human rights observers, civil-ian police, military observers or troops.The Security Council may call uponUN Member States to resolve theirdisputes peacefully and may recom-mend the method they should use.

Late prevention and early preven-tion are two quite different approachesto conflict prevention. Under lateprevention, the UN monitors situationsaround the globe until a situation isabout to develop into armed conflict,at which point the Security Councilintervenes to carry out preventiveaction. Past experience has shown,for example in the Iraqi invasion ofKuwait, that the last minute is rarelyoptimal for intervention. On the otherhand, early diplomatic efforts helpedto promote the bilateral negotiationsunder which North Korea agreed toabandon nuclear weapons activity.

Lessons learned from past effortsat preventive diplomacy include:

1) actions of the UN and otheragencies should be deliberatelytargeted, notwithstanding othersupporting activities such ashumanitarian aid, as part ofa strategy to prevent the out-break of violence

2) third party dispute resolutionwill work only if the partiesconsent to participation

3) timing is critical (timing and inter-ventions are centralized in the UNDepartment of Political Affairs)

4) the efforts of the UN must besupplemented by combineddiplomatic and other resourcesof the international community

Conflict management

The objective of conflict managementis to prevent further escalation ofviolence. One key component of con-flict management—peacebuilding—was discussed in detail in Tab 3. Otherconflict management strategies includepeacekeeping missions, sanctions,confidence-building measures andhumanitarian relief.

Peacekeeping missions

Whether implemented by the UN orregional bodies, multi-national peace-keeping is predicated on the consent ofall parties involved. Because they areimpartial, peacekeeping forces mustlimit their use of force to self-defense.Peacekeeping operations are mostsuccessful when they are deployedalong clearly demarcated boundariesand in the aftermath of cease-fires andpeace agreements. The missions serveto signal the interest and engagementof the international community, moni-tor the relations between the antago-nistic parties, and act as a deterrentagainst renewed fighting.

The involvement of a large numberof belligerent parties, lack of adher-ence to cease-fire agreements, rejectionof existing borders, numerous points offriction between parties, deliberateviolation of human rights, and a

tendency for conflicts to endure fordecades have posed major challengesto peacekeeping. Peacekeeping forceshave found themselves dependent onwarring parties for cooperation infending off starvation and otherdisasters. Nevertheless, multi-nationalmilitary operations under the UnitedNations may become more frequent asa result of a growing consensus amongmembers of the Security Council.New roles for peacekeeping forcesmay include arms control verification,election supervision, naval peace-keeping, and acting as a “tripwire”against surprise attacks.

Sanctions

Sanctions can play an important rolein supporting preventive diplomacy ifthey are part of a broader strategy toput maximum political and economicpressure on the offending parties,preferably ruling parties and not wholepopulations. Sanctions can serve threebroad policy functions: to signal inter-national concern to the offending state,to punish a state’s bad behavior, andto serve as a precursor to strongeractions. “Targeted” sanctions—such asfreezing the assets of leaders—offer away to focus the penalty more directlyon those responsible for the crisis.

Not only do few governments havethe capacity to impose and monitorsanctions, the use of arms embargoesand sanctions has produced mixedresults. Long-term economic sanctionsimposed on Cuba and Iraq have hadlittle impact on the ruling elite buthave negatively affected the health andnutritional status of poorer segmentsof the populations. Similarly, the armsembargo against the former Yugoslaviatended to favor the well-armed Serbsand thus was generally perceived to beineffective and not impartial.

UN peacekeeper – UN Photo

■ 4.6 ■


Conflict settlement

The goal of conflict settlement isreaching agreement among the partiesto the conflict. Mediation and negotia-tion are two critical activities in con-flict settlement.

Mediation

Third-party assistance, or mediation,is best seen as an extension of—nota replacement for—bilateral conflictmanagement. Mediation is a dynamicand flexible process and should be anextension of the parties’ own efforts.Use of generic principles must beviewed with caution. The nature andeffectiveness of mediation depends asmuch on who the parties are and thecharacter of the dispute as on who themediator is and his/her behavior.

The role of international bodies isgenerally mandated by agreementswith their member states. When inter-national bodies are involved in themediation process and departures fromtheir mandates arise, they face con-straints that do not apply to individualstates. For this reason, the UN’s effortshave produced mixed results.

Efforts at mediation of conflictswith ethnic dimensions can open upsome possibilities for peace, yet theyalways walk a fine line between thecontainment of conflict and its exacer-bation. Two common proposals todeal with the problem of inter-ethniccooperation have been partitions toenable hostile communities to live inseparate states (former Yugoslavia)and special bureaucratic arrangementsto enable parties to live within asingle state (Israel).

■

Efforts at mediation ofconflicts with

ethnic dimensionscan open up some

possibilities for peace,yet they always walk afine line between the

containment of conflict andits exacerbation.

■

Conflict resolution

The goal of conflict resolution is iden-tifying and resolving root causes ofconflict. Unofficial diplomacy andinteractive conflict resolution are in-strumental in resolving conflicts.

Unofficial diplomacy

Informal diplomacy, sometimes re-ferred to as “Track Two,” is the devel-opment of diplomatic relationshipswith private citizens or groups outsidethe formal power structure, and caninvolve leaders as well as grassrootspopulations. It is not a substitute forofficial diplomacy, but a supplementalmechanism by which non-bindingideas are tested, or by which partieswho would not be included in formalnegotiations may also find their griev-ances addressed. Frequently, unofficialdiplomacy is facilitated by NGOs. Forexample, the Burundi Policy Forumdiscusses policy and coordinationstrategies, thereby providing a mecha-nism for many agencies to share infor-mation. By sharing perspectives withofficials, the Forum indirectly influ-ences the process by which officialactors understand conflict and coordi-nate their interventions. Informalnetworks have blossomed in recentyears and have been instrumental inlaying the groundwork for interna-tional agreements, as between Israeland the PLO, that are eventuallysigned by “Track One” diplomats.

Virtual diplomacy is a U.S. Instituteof Peace project designed to explorehow the growth of telecommunicationsand information processing is trans-forming international relations. Virtualdiplomacy—political, social and eco-nomic interactions—occurs by elec-tronic means rather than face-to-facecommunication.

Security communities—too idealistic?

Some conflict management special-ists postulate that it may be manyyears, at least 20, before the worldis structured to cope adequatelywith intractable and deep-rootedconflicts. This and the unevennessof interventions and resources hasled to visions of alternative securityand conflict intervention arrange-ments for the world, or parts ofthe world.

The Stockholm Initiative on GlobalSecurity and Government outlinedproposals in 1991 for movingtoward development of commonsecurity, or a world neighborhood.This vision includes strengtheningthe UN’s ability to prevent andmanage destructive conflicts, and apledge by governments to reducemilitary spending and to allocatethe peace dividend to internationalcooperation and human develop-ment. The savings could reach $300billion annually by the year 2000and would come from the $600billion a year formerly used tosupport the Cold War (Fisher 1997).

In conceptualizing a commonsecurity system for Southern Africa,Nathan and Honwana (1995)summarize a new holistic thinking,which diverges from a focus onmilitary matters to incorporatepolitical, social, economic, andenvironmental issues. A commonsecurity regime, organized amongthe SADC (Southern Africa Devel-opment Community) MemberStates, would have many advan-tages including a regional earlywarning system, increased militaryconfidence through disarmamentand transparency, collaborativeprograms on security issues, multi-lateral security agreements, andpeaceful methods of managingconflict. Protocols and terms ofreference were designed to addressthese areas.

■ 4.7 ■


Interactive conflict resolution

Ronald Fisher developed the conceptof interactive conflict resolution in1997. It is a process involving smallgroup problem-solving discussionsbetween unofficial representatives ofidentity groups or states engaged indestructive conflict, facilitated by animpartial third party. Experience hasshown that once inter-group conflicthas escalated to a high intensity, it isresistant to de-escalation and resolu-tion because of solidifying mecha-nisms, such as commitment to pastactions, and structural changes thatsupport coercive strategies. Therefore,procedures that address low intensityconflict, such as fact finding or recon-ciliation are crucial to avoid escalation.

Interactive conflict resolution em-ploys an interdisciplinary approach tounderstanding and resolving conflictusing multiple levels of analysis. Ac-tivities include communication, train-ing, education/consultations thatpromote collaborative conflict analysis,and problem solving among partiesengaged in protracted conflict in amanner that addresses basic humanneeds and promotes the building ofpeace, justice and equality.

Cultural influences onconflict resolution

Culturally shared attitudes and beliefsinfluence conflicts. People may definetheir security in terms of perceivedthreats by neighboring people. Theseperceived threats—such as disputesover boundaries and territory that havehistorical or moral significance—maybe cultivated by mutual suspicions andhatreds which may be transmitted tonew generations. In some cases theperception of divergent interests orperceived threats may be erroneous,but may preclude local settlement ofthe conflict. Exploring cross-culturaldiversities in conflict resolution canopen up new possibilities becausepeople tend not to consider optionsoutside their own cultural repertoire.

Attention should focus on how peoplelearn to express conflict, and howsocial systems and institutions can beestablished to handle conflict moreequitably and at lower costs.

Conflict transformation

Conflict transformation changes theconditions that give rise to root causes,prevents further violence, and changesthe culture of violence to peacefulsystems. Such changes can occurthrough facilitated dialogue, nationalreconciliation, and psychosocialhealing.

Facilitated dialogue andnegotiation analysis

At the formal level mediation can bemost effective when used in conjunc-tion with other parallel processes suchas facilitated dialogue and negotiationanalysis. These parallel processesenable negotiating parties to trusteach other. When parties lock intopositions, they are not easily changed.Agreeing to talk may be seen as a signof weakness and ambivalence. Partiesmay perceive alternatives in a way thatbenefits them, or may be dividedinternally and unable to make or keepcommitments.

When engaging in facilitateddialogue, it is beneficial to work withboth sides separately at first and thenbring them together so that all partiesunderstand one another when theyenter the formal process. The facilita-tor should ask such questions as:What does each party really careabout? Do they understand theconcerns of the other side? The thirdparty’s role is to help each partypaint a picture of a world where bothparties are compatible. These futurevisions often differ from those whichthe parties had at the beginning ofmediation.

Culturally appropriatemodels of conflict resolution

Perceptions of conflict and stylesof resolution differ vastly betweencultures. For example, someAfrican styles of conflict resolutionvary significantly from a commonWestern style, particularly in theuse of traditional and community-level interventions. A study of oneAfrican cultural illustrates a stylethat tends to feature arbitration,the use of male elders to deter-mine the outcome, spiritualpractice, and indirect expressionof emotions. This African stylealso tends to:

■ Emphasize implications ofdecisions on other membersof the community

■ Involve a panel of mediatorsrather than one or two

■ Strike a balance betweengender, age and race inrelationships between media-tors and conflicting parties

■ Have mediation servicesavailable for each community,for example, through religiousor educational institutions

■ Use rituals that create bondsbetween parties in themediation forum

■ Enhance mediation mecha-nisms to include teachingand to promote healing anddifferent ways of behaving

Source: From material produced by ninepeacebuilders from East and West Africa,workshop at Iowa State University, 1995.

Crushed skulls bear witness to the violence inRwanda – USAID/BHR/OFDA/Regina Davis-Tooley

■ 4.8 ■


“Ethnic fissures” provide what seemslike an obvious surface explanationfor the violent conflict that haserupted almost continuously since1983 in Sri Lanka. A long history ofthe two main ethnic groups theSinhalese, comprising 75% of a na-tionwide population of 19 millionand the Sri Lankan Tamils at 12.5 %,comprise a minority in Columbo, aswell as up-country Tamils at 5.6% andMuslims at 7.4%. In examination ofthe past, however, one sees that thedeep-rooted conflict between thesetwo groups are tinged with religiousand language differences, as well asimbalances in economic advantages.Where Tamils held precedence interms of employment in the colonialera, the Sinhalese gained powerfollowing independence in 1948resulting in policies that excluded theTamil-speaking population. A majorexclusionary act in 1956 made Sinha-lese the official language, sharplyreducing the number of Tamils inpublic sector employment.

The time was ripe in the 1970s forformation of the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam (LTTE) which emanatedfrom depressed economic conditionsand high unemployment amongyouthful militant Tamil groups. De-spite periodic outbreaks of violence,some economic liberalization ofpolicy in the late 1970s made SriLanka seem like a model developingcountry. Nevertheless, ethno-political

tensions built up and resulted inviolent conflict from 1983-87, miti-gated by a brokered peace. An IndianPeacekeeping Force stayed in SriLanka from 1987-90 and was drawnincreasingly into the conflict. Despitecontinuing negotiations, the LTTEadopted more violent tactics. Talksheld in 1995 failed, although mostTamil and Muslim groups have sincebeen in dialogue with the govern-ment parties. LTTE, however, contin-ued guerilla attacks including hostili-ties against other Tamil groups.

The Bank has played a leading role indonor aid coordination for Sri Lankasince 1965. Having financed over 75operations since 1951, the Bank didnot become involved in operationsdirectly related to the conflict until1987, when the Bank and a SpecialAid Group helped the government(GOSL) prepare the Emergency Recon-struction and Rehabilitation (ERR)program. Program progress wastenuous and infrastructure that wasfinally rehabilitated was significantlydamaged by continuing conflict.

Some possible indicators that conflictwould continue and that ultimatelyinfluenced the development andreconstruction projects included:

1.Separatist Tamil groups who wereparties to the conflict were not par-ties to the Accord brokered by theGovernment of India in 1987. TheLTTE publicly disavowed the accord.

2.Involvement of NGOs and the localcommunity were lacking in the prepa-ration of the ERR project.

3.A ten month delay between requestfor ERR assistance and the ineffective-ness of unexpeditious procurementprocesses may have contributed toerosion of popular support.

4.The Mahaweli Basin developmentproject, between 1958-1986, mayhave reinforced rebel perspectives ofinequitable development. For manyyears, the GOSL resisted an approachto resettlement of each ethnic groupin proportion to its representation.

5.The LTTE sabotaged most of an ERRprogram they perceived as emanatingfrom and benefiting central agencies.

Given the warning signals that peacewould not last, emphasis might havebeen better placed on assistance tohouseholds for immediate survivaland rehabilitation needs, and provid-ing temporary forms of infrastructure.More attention could have beenplaced in policy dialogues with thegovernment on the costs to develop-ment of the continuation of theconflict as well as the benefits ofpeace. The Bank needs to be preparedto address technical and economicissues that will arise in implementinga peace agreement, such as possibledevolution to the regions, and involveall parties in planning for post-conflictreconstruction.

Source: The World Bank’s Experience withPost-conflict Reconstruction, May 1998.

Inequitable development and conflict in Sri Lanka

What are the factors that make the conflict in Sri Lanka a protracted social conflict? Whatstrategy might assistance agencies pursue to address the conflict??


■ 4.9 ■


The “tool box” approach

Agencies involved in conflict transfor-mation often use many overlappingtools at a time to produce a greateroverall impact. Included in the“tool box” used by the global networkof the organization Search for CommonGround are such tools as: forums androundtables, joint action projects

Why do you think that early warning and preventive diplomacy are often ineffective as conflictprevention mechanisms? What are the drawbacks of peacekeeping missions, sanctions, andmediation? Based on these answers, develop your own strategy for the most effective way toaddress modern violent conflict.

?

See suggested answers below.

among opponents, pro-active media-tion, conflict resolution institutionbuilding, policy coordination forumsand community organizing for peace-making activities. Training in conflictresolution is culturally adapted forschools and for the police and mili-tary. Less traditional methods areincorporated such as the production

of television and radio programs,songsand publications; and training of jour-nalists. Cross-ethnic team reporting,cross-ethnic cooperation withinprofessions, and workshops to reducenegative stereotyping help strengthenthe peacebuilding process. ■

?

What are the factors that make theconflict in Sri Lanka a protractedsocial conflict? What strategy mightassistance agencies pursue toaddress the conflict?

Suggested answer: Long-term unresolvedconflict has allowed hatred and prejudice tomove from one generation to the next; theidentity groups have become firmlysegregated; a culture of violence hasdeveloped among the rebels and somerefuse to negotiate; the Tamils lacked socialrecognition and participation in thedevelopment of their country.

Assistance agencies might take a multi-sectoral, coordinated multi-agencyapproach, both central and communitybased, that emphasizes creative andsustainable frameworks by developing a

? system of forums and networks, analyzingroot causes, and identifying principal actorsand the comparative advantages of agenciesin providing the needed inputs. Conflictresolution mechanisms might includeproblem-solving workshops, mediation,negotiation, conflict transformation,interactive conflict resolution, formal andinformal diplomacy.

Why do you think that early warningand preventive diplomacy are oftenineffective as conflict preventionmechanisms? What are the draw-backs of peacekeeping missions,sanctions, and mediation? Basedon these answers, develop your ownstrategy for the most effective way toaddress modern violent conflict.

Suggested answer: The effectiveness ofboth early warning and preventive diplomacyis contingent on early action in response towarning signs and the political will toaddress the situation. Reliable indicators arestill being developed for early warningsystems, which means that politicians canregard them with convenient skepticism. Indiplomatic circles, pressures exist to avoiddrawing attention to areas of conflict so asnot to provoke the conflict. Therefore, actionoften takes place when violent conflict isinevitable. The deep-rooted complexities ofmodern conflict render traditional remediessuch as peacekeeping, sanctions, andmediation only partially effective.

■ 4.10 ■



Conflict is normal, but violent conflict is not inevitable—the patterns ofcultural violence have to be altered.

Development institutions can play an important role in preventing andresolving conflict—as well as in stimulating it.

No method of managing conflict can fully address intractable or deep-rooted conflict. Various approaches must be employed on different levelssimultaneously by a variety of actors.

Culture is an important factor—in both conflict analysis and resolution.

Conflict prevention through timely intervention is much less costly thanreconstruction and is under-emphasized.

■ 4.11 ■


R E F E R E N C E S

Bercovitch, Jacob and Allison Houston. 1996. “The Studyof International Mediation: Theoretical Issues andEmpirical Evidence” in Resolving International Conflictsedited by Jacob Bercovitch.

Björkqvist, Kaj. 1997. “The Inevitability of Conflict but Notof Violence: Theoretical Considerations on Conflict andAggression” in Cultural Variations in Conflict Resolutionedited by Douglas P. Fry and Kaj Björkqvist. Mahwah, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. 1997.“Preventing Deadly Conflict.”.

DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and DevelopmentCooperation. 1996. “Draft Policy Orientations: The SpecialChallenges of Assistance in Crisis and Recovery – WorkingGroup II. Note by the Secretariat.

Davies, John and Barbara Harff. 1997. “Dynamic Data forConflict Early Warning” in Synergy in Early WarningConference Proceedings.

Diamond, Louise. 1998. “Addressing InterGroup Conflict:A Continuum” paper presented at the World Bank Officesfor Africa Inquiry: Conflict Impact Assessment Workshop.

Diehl, Paul F. 1996. “The United Nations andPeacekeeping” in Coping with Conflict after the Cold Waredited by Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger Kanet. Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Evans, Gareth. 1998. “Preventative Action and ConflictResolution” in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the NewCentury edited by Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle.

Fisher, Ronald J. 1997. Interactive Conflict Resolution.Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Fry, Douglas and C. Brooks Fry. 1997. “Culture andConflict-Resolution Model: Exploring Alternatives toViolence” in Cultural Variations in Conflict Resolution editedby Douglas P. Fry and Kaj Bjorkqvist. Mahwah, NJ: LawrenceErlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Gregorian, Hrach. 1998. Panel presentation at the WorldBank Offices for Africa Inquiry: Conflict Impact AssessmentWorkshop.

Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. 1993. “12 Principles ofMulti-Track Diplomacy” mimeo.

Kittani, Ismat. 1998. “Preventative Diplomacy andPeacemaking: The UN Experience” in Peacemaking andPeacekeeping for the New Century edited by Olara A.Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle.

Kolodziej, Edward A. and I. William Zartman. 1996. “Copingwith Conflict: A Global Approach” in Coping with Conflictafter the Cold War edited by Edward A. Kolodziej and RogerKanet. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

McDonald, John. 1993. “Guidelines for Newcomers to TrackTwo Diplomacy.” Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy.

Nathan, Laurie and Joao Honwana. 1995. “After the Storm:Common Security and Conflict Resolution in SouthernAfrica.” The Arusha Papers: A Working Series on SouthernAfrica Security, number 3.

Reinicke, Wolfgang H. 1996. “Can International FinancialInstitutions Prevent Internal Violence? The Sources of Ethno-national Conflict in Transitional Societies” in PreventingConflict in the Post-Communist World edited by AbramChayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. Washington, DC:The Brookings Institutions, pp. 281-337.

Ricigliano, Robert. 1998. Panel presentation at the WorldBank Offices for Africa Inquiry: Conflict Impact AssessmentWorkshop.

Roberts, Adam. 1998. “Communal Conflict as a Challenge toInternational Organization: The Case of the FormerYugoslavia” in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the NewCentury edited by Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle.

Search for Common Ground. Undated. “The Toolbox.”Internet address: http://www.sfcg.org/toolbox.htm

Smith, Anne-Marie. 1997. Understanding InternationalPeacemaking. U.S. Institute of Peace.

Solomon, Richard H. 1997. “The Information Revolution andInternational Conflict Management.” Keynote address fromThe Virtual Diplomacy Conference. U.S. Institute of Peace.

World Bank. 1998a. “Exclusion, Poverty, Conflict” Post-Conflict Unit, Social Development Department InitiatingMemorandum.

World Bank. 1998b. The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Vol. 1: Synthesis Report. Washington,DC: Operations Evaluation Department, the World Bank.

■ 5.1 ■

5

K E Y P O I N T S

While the Bank does not finance disarmament, staff shouldbe knowledgeable about the process as its success or failureimpacts demobilization and reintegration programs (DRPs).

DRP planning should be started ahead of the peace negotiations,to gather donor support, and so that activities can beginimmediately after a peace agreement is signed thus encouragingformer belligerents to comply.

Bank involvement in demining should focus on non-clearanceactivities; support for clearance should be integrated into specificdevelopment activities.

Bank staff must be aware that disarmament can facilitate short-term reconstruction, but long-term stability requires managementof weapons and munitions, and possible reprogramming ofmilitary resources to address development goals.

Reestablishing Security

■ 5.2 ■

Disarming, demobilizing andreintegrating ex-combatantsare key interventions for

achieving security. Removal of land-mines is also an essential componentof reestablishing normal developmentactivities and undertaking productiveinvestment as is the conversion ofmilitary assets to productive assets.As with all aspects of post-conflictreconstruction, the success of theseinterventions is contingent on thepolitical will of the former adversariesand the degree of collaborationamong donors, governments andtarget groups. Planning for ademobilization and reintegrationprogram (DRP) must begin early inthe peace negotiation process.

Peace negotiationsand DRP planning

Demobilization and reintegrationprograms are likely to be conditionsof peace agreements. Since theseagreements are essentially politicalcompromises, however, they may setunrealistic timetables for subsequentactivities, and may not even discussprogram design or implementationissues. This may result in a lack ofunderstanding about the resourcesand planning needed for an effectiveDRP. An incomplete, delayed, orpoorly executed DRP threatens thepeace process itself and can createlonger-term security problems.

Death,displacement anddisinvestment are

inescapable results ofinsecurity, in turn

negatively affectingtransaction costs andlabor mobility and,

hence, economicproduction …

The (re)establishmentof security is, thus,

one of thecritical tasks in thetransition phase.

— Nat Colletta et al.“Toward an Architecture for Sustainable

Peace and Development,” 1998

The timing of program planning iscrucial and can determine the successor failure of political negotiations,DRP implementation, and the degreeof donor support. Although the DRPcannot begin until the political situa-tion is conducive to its implementa-tion, greater dialogue regarding DRPduring the peace negotiations may

Reestablishing Security

allow lead-time to secure the resourcesneeded to avoid damaging delays. Allrelevant agencies should begin DRPplanning as soon as possible. This mayhelp avoid recalcitrance by combatantswho base their compliance for disar-mament on the unfolding conditions ofthe DRP. Once agreements are reached,implementation must follow rapidly toreduce the risk of relapse into conflict.

The DRP must be viewed within theentire context of national post-conflictreconstruction, including the processof institutional and military restructur-ing, and with a view toward the needsof other segments of the population,particularly displaced persons andother vulnerable groups.

Arms control and regionalsecurity arrangements

Excessive armament in the least devel-oped countries is the result, to a largedegree, of the arms buildup by thedeveloped countries during the ColdWar, the enmeshing of foreign anddefense policies, and donor support ofmilitary regimes. In order to reversethese trends, dialogue within the inter-national community must seek meansof assuring military security for allcountries, and must advocate a drasticreduction in arms exports fromindustrial to developing countries.

Political circumstances in neighbor-ing countries can also have a majorinfluence on the success and credibilityof national demobilization efforts.

■ 5.3 ■

Reestablishing SecurityTHE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE: AN OVERVIEW

Demobilized ex-combatants may be-come mercenaries in other conflicts,and arms can be transported andmarketed across borders. Regionalsecurity arrangements, such as control-ling cross-border arms traffic andpromoting adequate national legisla-tion and penalties for illegal armspossession, are needed to buildconfidence. The Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU) supports regionalcooperation to develop conflictmanagement mechanisms and peace-keeping arrangements.

■

Demobilizedex-combatants may

become mercenaries inother conflicts, and

arms can be transportedand marketedacross borders.

■

Disarmament

Disarmament, sometimes referred toas weapons control or demilitarization,is usually understood to be the processof completely eliminating the militarycapacities of warring factions.

Weapons control, more precisely,indicates a process by which the con-trol of weapons and military arsenalsis transferred from armed factions tothe peacekeeping forces. This controlmay be either temporary or indefinite.Weapons control can be applied indesignated zones and/or limited tocertain categories of weapons.

Disarmament is a fundamental, yetdifficult-to-implement, component ofdemobilization. It is almost impossibleto achieve complete disarmamentsince it is difficult to establish thenumber and types of weapons in

Disarmament and conflictresolution

In 1992, UN Secretary General BoutrosBoutros-Ghali formally argued thatthe role of arms regulation and disar-mament could be significant in thecontext of conflict resolution, peace-keeping and peacebuilding. The UNSecurity Council plays a basic role inestablishing the mandates of the ever-increasing number of peacekeepingoperations. This includes relateddisarmament aspects. Peace agree-ments are an ideal framework forbringing specificity to the mandatesof the Security Council. They arenegotiated at length between theparties and give some assurance ofconsensus, particularly regarding thedelicate matter of disarmament.

Weapons control plays a significantrole in most modern-day peace opera-tions, although the objectives varywith each operation. Weapons-controlactivities take three main forms:

1. Weapons control under acomprehensive peace settlement.Opponents are required to disarmand form a new army under anewly elected government, or onefaction is dissolved, usually withsome type of compensation forthe disarming party such as therestructuring of government troops.Under a comprehensive peacesettlement, disarmament is onecomponent of a larger processthat includes separation of forces,cessation of outside military assis-tance, withdrawal of foreign forces,regrouping of rival forces, canton-ment of rival forces, and formationof a national army.

2. Stability building measures.These are implemented as part ofa negotiated cease-fire or conflictsettlement and include weaponslimitations zones, concentrationof heavy weapons, demilitarizationof designated zones, zones ofseparation of armed forces, nounapproved troop movements,

circulation. In addition, if weaponsare viewed as an insurance policy,or if an “arms culture” has developedduring the period of conflict,combatants may be particularlyunwilling to disarm.

While the World Bank does notfinance disarmament because of thelimits of its mandate, staff should beknowledgeable about the process interms of:

■ its relation to peace agreements

■ the steps undertaken by the UNor other special monitors as aprecursor to the reinsertionand reintegration phases ofdemobilization

■ the historical problems associatedwith the failure or reversal ofdisarmament and their impact onthe sustainability of demobiliza-tion and reintegration programs

■ the economic impact ofdisarmament

Further, staff need to understandthat not only does disarmament pavethe way for short-term peace andreconstruction, but longer-term devel-opment and stability also requireattention to the management of theprimary tools of violence—weaponsand munitions.

Too many weapons – Reuter/Corrine Dufka

■ 5.4 ■


exchange of mine field maps, banson arms and ammunition imports,and disbandment of volunteerforces. In the Dayton PeaceSettlements they were defined as“Confidence and Security BuildingMeasures” and, although agreedupon by the parties, were enforcedunder the authority of Chapter VIIof the UN Security Council.1

3. Weapons control for violencereduction. This measure may beused for humanitarian purposesrather than conflict resolution.The disarmament requirements ofthe UN Protected Areas (UNPAs)in Croatia and the creation of theSrebrenica safehaven in Bosnia areexamples. This may be appropriatewhen a comprehensive peacesettlement does not exist andviolence reduction is considered anecessary precursor to peace nego-tiations. Measures include weaponscontrol, demilitarization, micro-disarmament2, and disarmament/disbandment of irregular forces.

Adherence to consensualdisarmament

Consensual disarmament occurs whenwarring factions agree to a cease-fireand surrender their weapons in ex-change for political normalization andeconomic compensation settlement.Voluntary disarmament in conflictresolution requires the presence of anexternal force, usually acting under theprovisions of Chapter VI of the UNCharter, to monitor, supervise or assistwith the process. The requirements forpeacekeepers are defined by manyvariables including the size of thecountry, the condition of its infrastruc-ture, and the number of combatants tobe disarmed. The deployment of

peacekeepers requires the full supportof the Security Council and full con-sent and cooperation of the parties.As opposed to the classic peacekeepingprinciple where force is only to beused in self-defense, the parties to theDayton Peace Settlements authorizedthe peace implementation forces(IFOR) to enforce the weapons controlmeasures.

■

Disarmamentmakes little sense if

disarming groups areable to rapidly reconstitutetheir military capabilitieswith arms supplied from

outside sources.

■

Consensus for disarmament tendsto be fragile and may erode during thepeace building mission. Problems canarise as a result of unclear mandates,deficient military capabilities, ques-tioned impartiality, and operationalshortcomings of the external monitor-ing force. For example, in Angola thedisarmament was assisted by MilitaryObserver teams only, which was inad-equate for achieving the objectives.In both Angola and Mozambique, thelate deployment of peacekeepers jeop-ardized the missions, and in Somalia,delays in weapons control implementa-tion led to an increased boldness bythe warring factions.

Parties to a conflict have manytimes illegally held back some militaryresources, such as an inventory ofweapons or elite fighting troops, asan insurance policy in case of a lastminute breakdown of the politicalnormalization process. This cancontribute to fears among combatantsdiminishing consent for disarmament.

The commitment of combatantsmay also begin to fade if they fearsurprise attack by other parties whomthey believe are not in compliancewith the terms of the agreement. Theymay then feel pressure to protectthemselves, as in Zimbabwe whenguerrillas were afraid that surrenderingtheir weapons would make themvulnerable to Rhodesian armed forces.Similarly, if combatants fear that theirparty may lose in the post-conflictelection, they may also stop support-ing the disarmament process.

The disarmament process can alsobe threatened when combatants usethe threat of not disarming as a bar-gaining chip for pursuing economicconcessions, as in El Salvador wheredemobilization of forces was linked toprogress on contentious issues such asland transfer to former combatants.

Improving conditions forconsensual disarmament

Ultimately, military and political lead-ership are the major forces in ensuringdisarmament. Disarmament makeslittle sense if disarming groups areable to rapidly reconstitute theirmilitary capabilities with arms sup-plied from outside sources. In thecases of Mozambique and Somalia,the lack of arms embargoes and thecontinuous influxes of new weaponsmade disarmament programs futile.

1 When a dispute is likely to threaten international peace and security, theSecurity Council may call upon the parties to the dispute to seek a solutionby peaceful means of their own choice. The provisions of Chapter VIauthorize the Security Council to investigate situations on its own accordand to make recommendations for settlement. Chapter VII actions, on theother hand, are mandatory, and may include the imposition of measures of

an economic nature, most notably sanctions and embargoes, as well asmeasures involving the use of military force.

2 The 1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace introduces the notion of“micro-disarmament” intended to collect large numbers of small armscirculating in a country emerging from war.

■ 5.5 ■


Methods for convincing the parties tofully implement disarmament obliga-tions include the following:

■ Economic incentives—Incentivesoffered to combatants on a macro-level might increase compliance, asin Nicaragua where the Contrasreceived land after disarming. Inaddition, programs that trade foodor agricultural implements forweapons are generally more suc-cessful than cash buy-backs. Food-for-guns was successful in Somaliabut was constrained by shortagesof food supplies. Weapons-for-cashin Mozambique met with limitedsuccess as it attracted mainly oldweapons and stimulated illegalmarkets in weapons. Buy-backprograms need to be followed upwith search and seizure programs.

■ Increased transparency—An in-creased flow of reliable informa-tion, including baseline informa-tion on actual troop and armamentholdings, with an impartial distri-bution among adversaries can helpto build confidence and provideconfirmation that the parties arenot cheating. Other methods forbuilding confidence and trustinclude face-to-face regular meet-ings between belligerents, and trustbuilding activities among the localpopulation.

■ Improved peace support opera-tions—Experiences in Cambodia,Angola and other conflict settle-ments have shown that the UN isunable to provide credible securityguarantees when peacekeepersare confined to Chapter VI rules ofengagement. To be credible, peacesupport forces need to be theappropriate size and mix of specialforces (such as military observersand infantry battalions) with equip-ment reflecting the disarmamenttasks at hand. Coalition or multi-national task forces are generallymore efficient than UN peace-keeping forces, since they are notsubject to the same constraintson using force.

Demobilization andsocial reintegration offormer combatants

Disarmament is only one componentof the larger process of demobilization,which is concerned with the transitionof combatants from soldiers to civil-ians. The Dayton Peace Settlementdefines demobilization as “removingfrom the possession of personnel allweapons, including individual weap-ons, explosive devices, communicationequipment, vehicles, and all othermilitary equipment. All personnel shallbe released from services and shall notengage in any further training or mili-tary activities.”

■

The challenge isformulating cost-effective

demobilization programs thatare satisfactory tothe ex-combatants

themselves.

■

The successful demobilization andreinsertion of former combatants incivilian life are keys to politicalstability and to rebuilding war-tornsocieties, and thus are often a highpriority with governments. If demobili-zation is conducted poorly, unpaid orundisciplined troops may turn tobanditry, preying on villagers and roadtraffic, or even re-mobilizing againstthe established regime. The challengeis formulating cost-effective demobili-zation programs that are satisfactory tothe ex-combatants themselves. Theymust feel that they have been fairlytreated and adequately rewarded fortheir years of service.

The World Bank actively supportsDRPs. In response to client requestsfor World Bank leadership and financ-ing in this area, the Africa Regionoffice established a working group in1992 and later the Post-conflict RapidResponse team to meet the growingdemand for DRP assistance both

From your experience in post-conflict countries, describe a situation where incompletedisarmament jeopardized reconstruction or demobilization programs. What incentivesworked or may have been successful in promoting compliance?

?

■ 5.6 ■


within and outside of Africa. Bankinitiatives in DRPs include studies ofmany programs in Africa, developmentand implementation of a model pro-gram in Uganda, support for DRP inEthiopia and Namibia, extensive plan-ning for DRPs in Rwanda and SierraLeone, and reintegration assistance inMozambique.

Assistance needs for phases ofthe DRP

The combatant-to-civilian transitioncan be divided into three phases:demobilization, reinsertion, and rein-tegration. The needs of ex-combatantsand the required support measures arequite different during each of thesecritical and highly interdependentphases. A successful DRP requiresseveral integrated actions:

■ Classifying ex-combatants accord-ing to need, skill level, and theirdesired mode of subsistence

■ Offering a basic transitional assis-tance package (safety net)

■ Finding a way to deliver assistancesimply, minimizing transitioncosts while maximizing benefits toex-combatants

■ Sensitizing communities andbuilding on existing social capital

■ Coordinating centrally yetdecentralizing implementationauthority to districts

■ Connecting the DRP to ongoingdevelopment efforts by retargetingand restructuring existingportfolios.

When planning DRPs, it is alsocrucial to identify groups that willrequire special programs, particularlyfemale and child soldiers and disabledcombatants.

Because the political context ofdemobilization is usually unpredict-able, the time period of assembly orcantonment is often difficult to esti-mate. While the actual discharge of theex-combatants usually depends on thesuccessful completion of other parts ofthe peace accord, the OECD recom-mends a short period of assembly toreduce health and security threats andcosts. The needs of assembled troops,including basic food, water, shelter,sanitation, and elementary health caremay increase if the duration of canton-ment is extended and if family mem-bers join the troops. At the close of theassembly, ex-combatants are normallyprovided transportation to their dis-tricts of destination.

Reinsertion segment

After discharge, a transitory “safety netpackage” has to be provided to bridgethe gap between demobilization andreintegration. Initial assistance mayconsist of allowances given as cash;vouchers; or in-kind transfers forshelter, medical care, food and clothingover a period ranging from severalmonths to two years. When support isprovided in cash, the payments shouldbe spread over several installmentsrather than made in lump sum dis-bursements. As reinsertion assistanceis not an indefinite entitlement, termi-nation dates should be made clear.

The OECD recommends that rein-sertion packages take account of thelocal cultural environment and modesof subsistence. For example, ruralex-combatants will require land foragricultural use. In Uganda, crimerates among demobilized soldiersincreased if they did not have access toland. Assistance is usually extended tofamily members and may includeeducation and housing support. Animportant function of the assistance isto reduce the burden that veterans andtheir dependents place on the commu-

Planning the reintegrationof ex-combatants in

Sierra Leone

The World Bank sponsored twostudies to ensure that the design ofthe planned DRP addressed demo-graphic realities. The “Socio-eco-nomic Profile of the Armed Forcesof the Republic of Sierra Leone” in1996 compiled information ongovernment troops. Another studyby Paul Richards and others exam-ined the characteristics of non-government combatants comprisedof the main insurgent group,irregular troops (many of whomwere underage recruits) and civil-ian militias, and offered proposalsfor demobilization options to theresponsible government body.

Demobilization segment

The demobilization process usuallybegins with the assembly of formercombatants in special camps, militarybases or assembly points (canton-ment) where they surrender theirweapons and await final discharge.This phase is often supervised by UNmilitary teams and allows them toaccount for combatants and theirweapons.

During the assembly, detailedsurveys are typically conducted of theex-combatants and they are givenspecial orientation or training sessionsto prepare them for civilian life.Medical screening may also be con-ducted. Pre-discharge orientationshould provide ex-combatants withinformation about reinsertion benefitsand the roles of supporting agencies.Socioeconomic profiles of the soldiersare compiled to identify their skills,needs, and expectations for the future.This information is combined with ananalysis of opportunities and institu-tional requirements to design andprepare reintegration programs.

■ 5.7 ■


nities that receive them. Upon arrivalat their destination, ex-combatants andtheir families should become ac-quainted with representatives of thelocal government and NGOs operatingin the area.

When designing and implementingDRPs, staff must be aware that theseprograms may provoke resentmentamong other war-affected populations.Communities may be reluctant toaccept former combatants whom theyhold responsible for wartime destruc-tion. Therefore, local communitiesneed to be sensitized and involveddirectly in decision making regardinglocal issues. Their participation willencourage community acceptance andsupport for the families of ex-combat-ants. Ex-combatants may also requirecounseling to facilitate psychologicaladjustments during their transitionfrom a military to a civilian lifestyle.

■

An importantfunction of the assistance

is to reduce the burden thatveterans and their dependents

place on the communitiesthat receive them.

■

Reintegration segment

Ex-combatants from the lower ranks orrebel forces may have low levels ofeducation or few marketable civilianskills. In many cases their absorptioninto the workforce will be contingentnot only on skills training, but onother factors such as economic stabil-ity, levels of unemployment, availabil-ity of public sector jobs, land tenureand land use issues, producer prices,and access to inputs and markets.Assistance must be targeted to pro-mote demand-driven training, which isthen linked to job placement.

Successful long-term reintegrationmeans that ex-combatants have as-sumed productive roles in their com-munity and contribute to its economicgrowth. This outcome will depend notonly on the ex-combatants’ particularskill sets but also on the macro-eco-nomic, political and social context ofthe country.

■

The interplay of acommunity’s physical and

social capital and a veteran’sfinancial and human capital

determine the ease andsuccess of reintegration.”

— Nat Colletta et al.Case Studies in

War-to-Peace Transition, 1996

■

Institutional structure

Coordination within the governmentand between governments and otherrelevant actors is important to maxi-mize the effectiveness of programinterventions. Responsibility for theoverall design and implementation ofDRPs is best served by establishing asingle specialized civilian institutionwhich can be dissolved after the pro-gram is completed. Such an institutionshould be outside the regular govern-ment structure but linked to it by aboard or advisory committee. Someminimal services—information, regula-tion, and advocacy—will need to beprovided in the post-program period.The government can integrate theseactivities into its mainstream develop-ment efforts, and other ongoing needscan be met through a combination ofgovernment offices, NGOs, and localcommunity-based organizations.

The DRP in Uganda:Learning the keys to success

After the defeat of the militaryopposition in 1991, the govern-ment of Uganda decided to shiftthe burden of public expenditureaway from defense through a DRPfor 36,400 soldiers (over one-thirdof the national army). The UgandaVeterans Assistance Board (UVAB)was set up as a civilian body underthe Prime Minister’s office tosupport the exercise. A phasedapproach, involving a trial run andthen three groups of soldiers,allowed the government to learnfrom the first exercise and to finetune the procedures. Some fea-tures that helped to strengthenthe program include:

■ Development of a dischargecertificate in the form of a non-transferable and incorruptibleidentification mechanism to pre-vent leakage, facilitate administra-tion, and reduce costs.

■ Rapid discharge and transport toreintegration areas, often withintwo days of notification, to avoiddifficulties and costs associatedwith long encampments.

■ Couples received joint pre-discharge counseling on entitle-ments, veteran’s experiences, legalrights and responsibilities, healthservices, and AIDS/HIV issues.

■ Post-discharge meetings forinformation and counseling wereorganized in district capitals forveterans and their spouses. Theywere attended by district reps foragriculture, health and education.

■ The program’s efforts to createresponsibilities at the district levelhelped turn communities intoactive players and promotedcommunity-initiated self-help andsupport groups by the ex-combat-ants and their families.

■ Financial management systemsand controls were meticulouslymanaged. This encouraged donorsto continue funding later phases atconsiderable levels.Source: Case Studies in War-to-PeaceTransition by Nat Colletta et al., 1996.

■ 5.8 ■


Some ex-combatants and theirfamilies have special needs thatcannot be met by a single demobili-zation package. They tend to facegreater reintegration problems andcannot always be absorbed bysocieties that have already beenstrained by years of conflict. Theseinclude:

Child soldiers—Children areincreasingly involved in armedconflict, sometimes forcibly re-cruited. Their involvement is influ-enced by poverty, wars and familybreakdown. While children’s eco-nomic situations may be no differ-ent before and after recruitment,they often are distrustful and evenmore marginalized in the after-math. DRPs must emphasize coun-seling for child soldiers, their fami-lies and communities, to help them

deal with low self-esteem, witnessedor committed atrocities, and needsfor reconciliation. Vocational training,education and opportunities foremployment are equally important.

Women soldiers—Women soldiersacquire new roles during war andhave trouble returning to sociallyaccepted roles afterwards. This isillustrated by a growing divorce rateamong former fighters in Eritrea,which had 13,000 female fighters. Instudies of DRPs in Namibia, Uganda,and El Salvador, women neededgreater financial assistance and someform of support mechanism to dealwith familial or community-widetensions. During the assembly,women should be surveyed to deter-mine perceived obstacles to reinte-gration and in order to account for

Issues and special programs for child and women soldiers, and wives of ex-combatants

them in the design of assistanceprograms.

Wives of excombatants—Wivesmay be overlooked in the DRPalthough they may bear the bruntof reintegration problems—facingdependency and sometimes rejec-tion. Divorce rates and break-upof families may increase dramati-cally, particularly if the wife is notfrom the same ethnic group as thecommunity. Spouses can benefitfrom specifically designed orienta-tion training to assist them in thetransition and inform them oftheir entitlements and opportuni-ties. They should form a targetedsub-group for assistance.Sources: Case Studies in War-to-PeaceTransition by Nat Colletta et al., 1996;“Demobilization of Female Ex-Combatants”by Claudine Meredith-Goujon, 1996.

The costs and economic returns of DRPs

The cost to demobilize a combat-ant varies from country to countrybased on differences in assistancepackages and cash payments. Forexample, in Uganda, the packageincluded the payment of schoolfees for children for one year. InMozambique, the ex-combatantsreceived six month’s severancepay as well as additional reinte-gration subsidies representing afurther 18 months’ pay. Adminis-tration costs can account for 10percent of the total costs, withsome donor agencies and NGOsrequiring much higher administra-tive outlays.

In Ethiopia, 476,000 demobilizedex-combatants represented ap-proximately two percent of thecountry’s labor force in 1992. Thefiscal returns to Ethiopian demo-

bilization are highly significant as theycoincide with the general transitionfrom a war-based to peace-orientedeconomy. In the three years prior todemobilization, the Ethiopian govern-ment on average spent 47 percent oftotal government expenditures ondefense. In the three years followingdemobilization, defense’s share de-creased to approximately 16 percent.Government’s social expendituresconfirm this dramatic change. In thethree years up to 1990-91 they ac-counted for 17 percent, whereas afterpeace they rose on average to morethan 24 percent. The micro-economicreturns are less impressive. The percapita income of each veteran isestimated at only 55 percent of thenational average for economicallyactive Ethiopians.

In Uganda, the defense budgetpeaked at approximately 39percent in 1989-90, falling toabout 26 percent in 1993-94 withdemobilization, but includedsome increases to deal withrecurrent insurgencies. The bud-getary returns to demobilizationwere impressive amounting to anaverage yearly budget savings of10 percent of recurrent expendi-tures with an increase in the ratioof social to defense spendingfrom 0.6 in 1989-90 to 1.1 withdemobilization in 1992-93. As inEthiopia, the average income ofdemobilized ex-combatants wasonly about half that of the aver-age Ugandan, reflecting theshort-term problems of economicreintegration.Source: Case Studies in War-to-PeaceTransition by Nat Colletta et al., 1996.

■ 5.9 ■


Field offices should be establishedto give beneficiaries easier access toprogram benefits and staff. Field of-fices also enable the government tomake programs more responsive tolocal needs. The use of ex-combatantrepresentatives in these offices and asoutreach staff amplifies these positiveeffects. Other institutional needs in-clude the installation of a managementand information system to providepublic accountability, and to monitor,evaluate and allow redirection of pro-gram interventions if necessary.

Demining activities

Though weapons of war, landminesconstitute a threat long after armedconflict has ended. The great majorityof landmine victims are innocentcivilians in pursuit of their livelihoods.The unpredictable security threatposed by mines is a major obstacleto resumption of normal life andeconomic, social and politicaldevelopment. In addition to mines,unexploded bombs or ammunition anddiscarded weapons pose an environ-mental and physical hazard. Besidesthe need for immediate care and physi-cal rehabilitation for mine casualties,two critical longer-term challenges facegovernments and assistance agencies:landmine removal, and prevention ofcivilian casualties from landmines.

The UN Mine Action Service(UNMAS) is the focal point within theUN System for all mine-related activi-ties and is responsible for coordinatingthe mobilization of resources, develop-ing technical and safety standards,advocating global ban and managingthe Voluntary Trust Fund for Assis-tance in Mine Clearance. Its major UNpartners are UNICEF for mine aware-ness, WHO for public health aspects ofvictim assistance, and OCHA for hu-manitarian implications.

The pressure to physically deminemay result in lack of attention to train-ing and institution building for anti-mine activities, insufficient preparation

and methodologies for site-selection,and inadequate attention to productiv-ity and cost-effectiveness. Studiesof demining programs have recom-mended the creation of a national“mine action authority” with anappropriate mandate and compositionto ensure that a portion of thenational budget is made available forthe country’s mine action activitiesand to ensure sustainability ofnational programs. A strategicdemining program might includemapping the location of mines,prioritizing the land to be cleared,training demining personnel, andpromoting mine awareness programs.

■

The cost of producing a mine is US $3–20whereas the cost of

removing it ranges from$300–1,000

■

Landmine surveillanceand surveys

The primary need in planning forlandmine removal is to establish theextent of the problem. Detailed sur-veys are necessary to establish thelocation of minefields and minedroads and to determine priorities formine clearance operations. Thesesurveys should include the physicalcharacteristics of the mined areas and

estimates of mine density in order toassess the feasibility of differentclearance techniques.

Surveys support decisions on whereto focus demining, demarcation, and/or mine-awareness efforts by measur-ing the extent of problems and riskfactors. Prioritization of areas to becleared, however, should be developedwith the advice and expertise ofpersonnel familiar with rural develop-ment and social issues in affectedcommunities. A critical finding of ademining study in Afghanistan, Cam-bodia, Mozambique and Angola wasthat an effective prioritization systemdid not exist and thus activities werenot always focused on helping thosewho were most victimized by themines. Better prioritization systemsneed to be developed to target thepoor, and support the coping capaci-ties of communities.

Training of demining personnel

The cost of producing a mine isUS $3–20 whereas the cost of remov-ing it ranges from $300–1,000. Whilethe use of expert personnel fromprivate demining companies or NGOsmay increase the cost of training, theyhave generally proven to be efficientas long as national counterparts areavailable and given maximum on-the-job training. Demining is primarily theresponsibility of national agencies andpersonnel; trainees can often be re-cruited from the military, or deminingjobs can be created for demobilizedsoldiers.

Trained de-miners may adopt a“toolbox” approach, choosing froma variety of suitable techniques. Ingeneral, however, demining is re-stricted to manual techniques thatare slow and labor intensive. Fastermethods used in military operationshave not been adapted for civilian use.Demining progress is best measuredby the number of hectares cleared oflandmines rather than the number ofmines removed. “International Stan-dards for Humanitarian Mine Clear-ance Operations” are available on-lineat www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/.

Demining training – UNHCR/H.J. Davies

■ 5.10 ■


Mine awareness programs

Mine awareness involves not onlyalerting people to the danger of minesbut also engaging affected communi-ties in activities to change attitudesand behavior. Mine awareness pro-grams, generally undertaken byUNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, NGOs, localRed Cross and Red Crescent Societies,and the ICRC, need to be an integralpart of mine action/clearance pro-grams—not just a peripheral activity.They should be coordinated by themain body responsible for mine ac-tions. Activities undertaken mightinclude media presentations, educationand training, poster campaigns, andvisits to mined areas. Other activitiesare centered around comprehensiverehabilitation of landmine victims.

Bans on use of anti-personnellandmines

In 1997, the OECD estimated that, onaverage, more than two million minesare laid each year while clearing op-erations remove only about 100,000. Acritically debated issue is whether themilitary utility of landmines outweighsthe injuries to civilian populations.The largely successful global campaignto eradicate anti-personnel landmineshas underscored the urgency of dealingwith the global landmine crisis and thestrength of the new internationalstandard against the weapons. TheMine Ban Treaty (formerly theConvention on the Prohibition of theUse, Stockpiling, Production, andTransfer of Anti-Personnel Mines andon Their Destruction) will enter intoforce faster than any other major treatyin history, becoming binding interna-tional law, in March of 1999.

3. Sector demining programs —targeted support of certain sectors,e.g. demining roads and bridges aspart of a general project to improvethe transportation sector.

■

The Bank can only finance landmine clearancewhen it is an integral part ofa development project to beadopted by the borrower.

■

Since Bank staff do not have theinstitutional or technical capacities toimplement mine clearance, Bankinvolvement should focus on indirect,non-clearance activities, such ascoordination, information and mineawareness, training, and institutionbuilding. Bank staff should consultwith relevant agencies, such as OCHA,UNHCR or ICRC as well as NGOs andother bilateral agencies to avoid dupli-cation of efforts and to benefit fromtheir expertise. Legal agreements thatthe Bank signs with borrower govern-ments should include a covenantunder which the government agreesnot to lay any new landmines any-where in the country that would inany way undermine the execution ordevelopment objectives of the project.

Bank financing of landmineclearance

For many post-conflict countries,demining is the obligatory prelude toall reconstruction efforts. (See theCroatian case study on page 5.11.)Because of the particular politicaland safety factors associated withdemining, however, requests tofinance such activities merit specialattention and approaches. The Bankcan only finance landmine clearancewhen it is an integral part of adevelopment project to be adoptedby the borrower. Other mine-relatedactivities that may be financed by theBank in the context of a developmentproject include:

1. Capacity building — support fornational or local demining centers(possibly through the InstitutionalDevelopment Fund) includingfacilities for lodging, conductingsurveys and disseminating updatedinformation on the status of mineclearance in targeted areas, equip-ping and training deminers, andproviding mine awareness training.

2. Area demining programs —support for the first phase of adevelopment project designed toreintegrate displaced populationsand reactivate the local economy,or through other activities that maybe funded by the Bank, UNHCR,UNICEF, or other agencies.Examples include UNHCR QuickImpact Projects for agriculturalrehabilitation and reconstruction ofhealth and education facilities.

■ 5.11 ■


Demining Croatia

The former Yugoslavia was a highlyprolific manufacturer of landminesfeaturing minimal quantities ofmetal, which makes their detectionand removal very difficult. Duringthe conflict, full-scale use of mineswas promoted, particularly inCroatia, resulting in approximately2.5 million planted mines, with thelargest concentration within theformer UN protected areas.

Towns and villages, located onvarious types of challenging ter-rain, suffered heavy destruction.To prepare a village for reconstruc-tion, all debris must be removedbut all of it must first be checkedfor unexploded ordnance. Tocomplicate matters, the soil isheavily contaminated with scrapmetal. Croatian deminers have theskills for manual demining, butmechanical demining skills arelimited, as Croatia lacks sufficientmechanical equipment.

Croatia has established a Croatian MineAction Centre (MAC), with the supportof the UN, to centralize and streamlinethe demining effort. Under the peaceagreement, one of the obligations ofthe fighting factions was to hand overminefield records to UNPROFOR. Earlyin the war, however, mines were laid byparamilitary units that did not keepaccurate minefield records. Uncertaintystill exists with regard to the extent ofthe mined area and total number ofmines, although the UN MAC databasehas a large number of records.

Some demining activities took placewhen the Zagreb Accord took effectin 1994. As the displaced returned totheir homes and began land cultiva-tion, however, casualties from mineaccidents rose. In 1996 a state companyfor demining, the Croatian army, andspecial police personnel begandemining on a large scale.

The government of Croatia eventuallyrewrote the Law on Demining, whichopened up operations to internationaldemining companies. Previously, onlystrictly regulated Croatian companies

had been allowed to bid for con-tracts. This resulted in only 20 sq. kmof 13,000 sq. km being demined in1997. Two projects funded by a Bankloan attracted both national andinternational bidders. It is hopedthat the presence of internationalcompanies in Croatia will revivewaning international interest tostrengthen demining capacities andrelated activities, for which fundingis inadequate. Other developmentsin the demining operation are:

■ A widespread mine awarenessstrategy has yet to be developedby the government, but somefunding is available

■ Mine detecting dogs are beingused successfully

■ Some mine-protected vehiclesare operating

■ A toolbox of various types ofmechanical demining equipmentis being built up

Sources: “Demining Croatia” by Slavo Baric,1997; “Transition and Capacity Building” byRichard Todd, 1998.

List some positive aspects and some problems in the Croatia demining operations.Which agencies would be instrumental in addressing these and future problems??


■ 5.12 ■


Conversion of militaryassets to productivesector

For industrialized countries, militaryexpenditures fueled by the Cold Warare no longer justified by strategicconsiderations; they now spend moreto address regional and internalconflicts. For countries involved inthe conflicts, losses of developmentopportunities and human andfinancial resources are enormous.Furthermore, the threat posed bynuclear weapons is heightened bythe refusal of some countries to signnonproliferation treaties.

Potential benefits of reducingmilitary spending on a global basisinclude the use of saved funds tobalance economic disparities in theworld (the root of many conflicts),and to improve environmental condi-tions. Arms reduction, however, isassociated with fears of possible

negative consequences, such asmassive unemployment3, reduction inthe growth of research and develop-ment, or loss of national security.Some analyses have shown that thesefears may be unfounded, and that thesectoral and regional imbalances thatoccur will be manageable.

Economic conversion from a mili-tary industrial to a civilian complexwas accomplished successfully inmany countries after WWII through adecentralized, plant-by-plant effortafter comprehensive planning. Conver-sion requires transferring militaryresearch and production processes tothe civilian arena, modifications in thelabor supply market, and job training.The costs, particularly in the formerSoviet Union, may outweigh the peacedividend because the military infra-structure is obsolete or not adaptableto other uses. Much more work needsto be done to understand conversionoptions and alternatives for the use ofthe released resources.

Donor coordination for reformof the military sector

Excessive levels of military spendingcan absorb scarce resources and im-pede the development of good gover-nance practices. Concerns raised byaid agencies on military and arma-ments issues are shared by a growingnumber of officials in the developingworld. Many have requested assis-tance from the World Bank and otherdonors for demobilization programs inparticular. Donors must pursue policycoherence and coordination to face thechallenge of creating conditions wherenegative aspects of military sectors canbe minimized without endangering acountry’s security. Participants at theInternational Round Table on Disarma-ment and Development identifiedpositive measures to facilitate thereduction of military expenditures.They suggested providing support for:

■ peacebuilding

■ demobilization

■ conversion of military assets

■ military-to-military dialogues toarrive at democratically legitimizedmilitary mandates

■ training of political civil servantsin security-related matters

■ reducing military expenditurethrough financial incentives forincreasing development activitiesand compensation for nationalefforts to reduce arms stocks

■ improving defense budgetingpractices

Which components of programmatic value to Bank staff should be included in peaceagreements and negotiations? How can staff ensure that these points are considered??


3 It is estimated that 3-4 percent of the workforce is employed by the military in developed countries where2-3 percent of the GDP is for the purchase of military goods and services (Chatterji 1992b, p. 135).

■ 5.13 ■


List some positive aspects and someproblems in the Croatia deminingoperations. Which agencies wouldbe instrumental in addressing theseand future problems?

Suggested answers

Progress: Mine clearance requirementsstipulated in the peace accord; trainednational staff; Bank loan to supportdemining operations; a new law fordemining; establishment of the MAC;UN MAC database; new techniques andenhanced toolbox machinery for deminingand mine detection.

Problems: Mines difficult to detect(UNMAS, specialized demining groups,

? agencies concerned with weapons controland manufacture, human rights organiza-tions); delays in implementation of theaccord resulting in increased civiliancasualties (OCHA, all involved parties); lackof minefield records (UNMAS, militaryorganizations; agencies upholding interna-tional humanitarian law—ICRC—surveysundertaken by national and UN agencies,NGOs); demining bottlenecks hold upreconstruction efforts (government, donors);Insufficient funds to address mine-relatedissues due partly to waning internationalinterest (donors); no comprehensive mineawareness program (government ministries,UNICEF, NGOS, ICRC, local Red Cross).

Which components of programmaticvalue to Bank staff should beincluded in peace agreements andnegotiations? How can staff ensurethat these points are considered?

Suggested answers: Definitions of theroles of government, civil society, interna-tional agencies and other players in fundingand implementing the peace agreement, aplan of action and timetable for allprograms, specific steps to successful armsregulation and disarmament. Staff shouldwork on planning Bank programs as soon aspossible, before or concurrently withnegotiations, to obtain support so thatprograms can begin as soon as possible.

?


Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and demining all contribute to the sustainabilityof post-conflict reconstruction. Since planning for a DRP must begin during peacenegotiations, the peace agreement should reflect program components and parameters.

DRPs will fail if warring factions are not committed to, or choose to violate, the peaceagreement. National security requires a credible central authority; regional securityarrangements should also be enacted.

The DRP must be included in national reconstruction and assistance to all vulnerable groupsas well as in reconciliation efforts, particularly to improve civilian-military relations.

Demobilization is conducted under time pressures. Well-timed planning and financing, aswell as cooperation among agencies undertaking various segments, are crucial to success.

Transparency is crucial with regard to arms collection and storage.

Assistance needs for target groups, classified according to data collected in the assembly,should be matched with relevant programs based on existing opportunities.

Cash or in-kind assistance is vital to support the families of ex-combatants and it promotescommunity acceptance. Demand-driven job training, counseling, and information improvestheir capacity to contribute permanently to community and economic growth.

Communities accepting demobilized combatants and their families require sensitization andopportunities to participate in decision making.

Training and supervision of demining activities must aim to enhance national capacities.Demining sites should be prioritized.

■ 5.14 ■


5.1

Cambodia has a population today of12 million people, with a GNP percapita of roughly $250-300. Life ex-pectancy is one of the lowest in Asia,and malnutrition is second in Asia toNorth Korea. Agricultural productivityis very low, as is the proportion ofarable land that is irrigated. An esti-mated 3 million people died during therule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975-78.During the 1970s and 1980s, hundredsof thousands of Khmer lived in dis-placed persons camps, primarily inThailand. Factions of Khmer battledwith a Vietnamese-supported govern-ment throughout the 1980s. Vietnam-ese troops withdrew in 1989. A peaceagreement among factions was signedin 1991 and national elections wereheld in 1993. UNHCR’s goal was torepatriate all refugees from Thailandback home in advance of the elections.In 1994 the newly elected governmentscored battlefield successes against theKhmer Rouge, and another 20,000

civilian refugees fled to Thailand. Thecoalition government did not hold andnew elections were held in July 1998.

In approaching the Cambodia demobi-lization, the World Bank team candraw on experiences from loans forcomparable programs for 150,000combatants in Central America andsome 700,000 in Africa who weredemobilized in the 1990s, followinginternal conflicts. In these programs,there were several components thatwere seen to be necessary for success:housing support, land distribution,referral services, job placement, legaladvice, wage subsidies, creditschemes, managerial and technicaltraining, building materials, householdutensils, civilian clothing, food/cashpayments, seeds and agriculturalimplements, and counseling.

In addition, one USAID evaluation ofdemobilization programs found:

Disarmament and demobilization aresensitive logistical exercises, requiringeffective management and resources

A N N E X

Case Study

The challenge of designing a demobilization program:Looking at war veterans in Cambodia, 1999

for accommodation, registration, trans-port and provision of basic needs. InAngola in late 1991, for example, livingconditions and provision of basicneeds in some of the camps wereextremely poor. This contributed towidespread desertion. In assemblyareas, health care and orientation maybe provided. In Uganda, the ex-soldiersand their dependents went throughpre-discharge briefings, providing themwith details on opening a bank ac-count, starting income generatingactivities, environmental and legalissues, family planning and AIDSprevention. The package also includedthe payment of school fees for veter-ans’ children for the periodof one year. In Mozambique, the com-batants received six months severancepay at demobilization as well as reinte-gration subsidies, representing further18 months pay. Considerable supportis often required to transport ex-com-batants to where they will resettle.

■ 5.15 ■


Africa Policy Information Center. 1998. “Landmine Treaty Ratified by FortyCountries in Record Time.” n. pag. Online. Internet. September 17, 1998.http://www.africapolicy.org

Ball, Nicole. 1993. “The Role of the Armaments Issue in Development Policy” inDisarmament and Development. Report of the International Round Table organizedby the Development Policy Forum of the German Foundation for InternationalDevelopment, Berlin, 23-26 February 1993.

Baric, Slavo. 1997. “Demining Croatia.” Landmines – Demining News from theUnited Nations, pp. 4-7.

Chatterji, Manas. 1992a. “Third World Disarmament and Economic Development”in Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace edited by MansChatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey. New York: Praeger.

______. 1992b. “Prospects and Problems of a Change from Military to CivilianIndustrial Complex” in Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management ofPeace edited by Mans Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey. New York: Praeger.

Colletta, Nat, Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer. 1996a. Case Studies inWar-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants inEthiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. Washington, DC: The International Bank forReconstruction and Develoment/The World Bank.

______. 1996b. The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa.Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Develoment/The World Bank.

Colletta, Nat, Markus Kostner, Josie Bassinette, Patricia Cleves and JohannaMendelson. 1998. “Toward an Architecture for Sustainable Peace andDevelopment: Lessons from the World Bank’s Experience.” Paper preparedfor the International Conference on Peace and Development. Mimeo.

Collier, Paul. 1994. “Demobilization and Insecurity: A Study in the Economics of theTransition from War to Peace.” Journal of International Development 6(3):343-351.

Development Policy Forum. 1993. “Summary” in Disarmament and Development.Report of the International Round Table organized by the Development PolicyForum of the German Foundation for International Development, Berlin, 23-26February 1993.

Eaton, Robert, Chris Horwood and Norah Niland. 1997. “Study Report: TheDevelopment of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities.” Report prepared for theUnited Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

R E F E R E N C E S

■ 5.16 ■


Gamba, Virginia. 1996. “Project Introduction” in Managing Arms in the PeaceProcess: The Issues. New York: United Nations Institute for DisarmamentResearch, pp. xiii - xv.

Kandeh, H.B.S. and J.R. Pemagbi. 1997. “Socio-Economic Profile of the ArmedForces of the Republic of Sierra Leone.” Draft report.

Kingma, Kees. 1996. “The Role of Demobilization in the Peace and DevelopmentProcess in Sub-Saharan Africa: Conditions for Success.” Mimeo.

McCallin, Margaret. 1995. “The Reintegration of Young Ex-Combatants intoCivilian Life.” Paper prepared for the Vocational Training Systems ManagementBranch of the International Labour Office, Geneva.

Meredith-Goujon, Claudine. 1996. “Demobilization of Female Ex-Combatants.”New York University School of Law, International Development Clinic. Mimeo.

OECD. 1997. “DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation.”Mimeo.

Organization for African Unity (OAU). 1994. “Workshop on Post-conflictDemobilization in Africa: Issues Paper.” Paper prepared for the Workshop on Post-conflict Demobilization in Africa sponsored by the OAU. Mimeo.

Richards, Paul, Ibrahim Abdullah, Joseph Amara, Patrick Muana, Teddy Stanley andJames Vincent. 1996. “Reintegration of War-Affected Youth and Ex-Combatants:A Study of the Social and Economic Opportunity Structure in Sierra Leone.” Reportto the Ministry of National Reconstruction.

Sötje, Peter. 1993. “Address by Peter Sötje, Deputy Director General of the GermanFoundation for International Development” in Disarmament and Development.Report of the International Round Table organized by the Development Policy Forumof the German Foundation for International Development, Berlin, 23-26 February1993.

Tanner, Fred. 1996. “ Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament” in Managing Armsin the Peace Process: The Issues. New York: United Nations Institute forDisarmament Research, pp. 169-204.

Todd, Richard. 1998. “Transition and Capacity Building,” Landmines — DeminingNews from the United Nations, pp. 7-15.

UNHCR. 1995. “A UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations.”Geneva.

World Bank. 1997. “Demining—Operational Guidelines for Financing Land MineClearance.” World Bank Operational Memorandum, February 7, 1997.

Zawels, Estanislao Angel. 1996. “Specificity in Peacekeeping Operation Mandates:The Evolution of Security Council Methods of Work” in Managing Arms in thePeace Process: The Issues. New York: United Nations Institute for DisarmamentResearch, pp. 1-33.

■ 6.1 ■

6

K E Y P O I N T S

Economic reconstruction plans must consider the socialand political context of a country.

Implementation of standard structural adjustment policiesmay have unintended and counter-productive effects inpost-conflict environments.

The Bank must ensure that a country’s government hasthe capacity to plan, implement and manage economicadjustment programs.

Economic Reconstruction Strategies

■ 6.2 ■

Economic reconstructionactivities must be tailored tofit each country’s unique

requirements. The specific circum-stances will determine whether thefirst priority is restoring the publicsector, seeking macroeconomic stabil-ity, or achieving political stability.

Planning for post-conflict economicreconstruction must take into accountthe potential to turn natural wealthinto a real stimulus for reconstructionand development and, accordingly,increased welfare for the population.This objective needs to be balancedwith preservation of environmentalquality and biodiversity. The Demo-cratic Republic of the Congo is anexample where a wealth of naturalresources creates the potential forregional development, but such devel-opment has not happened, and en-claves within the country are stillwithout access to either neighboringregions or the outside world.

Economic policy issues

The Bank has a comparative advantagein macroeconomic issues, but is notaccustomed to working in post-conflictenvironments. A summary of the keyissues regarding economic policychallenges and options facingwar-torn countries follows.

One does not have tospend long in Bosnia, orGaza or the lakes district

in Africa to know thatwithout economic hopewe will not have peace.Without equity we will

not have global stability.Without a better sense ofsocial justice our cities

will not be safe and oursocieties will not be

stable. Withoutinclusion, too many ofus will be condemnedto live separate, armedand frightened lives.

— James D WolfensohnPresident, World Bank

EconomicReconstruction Strategies

Fiscal and budgetary policies

During conflict, budget deficits in-crease and the allocation of govern-ment resources tends to shift towardmilitary expenditures and away fromother public investments such as edu-cation and health care. Although peacesettlements allow for a reduction inmilitary expenditures, this reduction isusually accompanied by an increase inspending for priority reconstructionand restoration of basic services,thereby generating a need to raiserevenue and contain the budget deficit.Limited tax bases mean that govern-ments face politically unpopular alter-natives—such as increasing indirecttaxation via sales taxes or import du-ties, or increasing user fees for publicgoods and services—which may alsoresult in increased inflation and a moreregressive tax system.

In some countries Bank and Interna-tional Monetary Fund insistence on arapid increase in tax effort (ratio of taxrevenues to GDP) may have beencounter-productive. These policiesseem to have resulted in constraininggrowth of the economy and the size ofthe tax base. For example, Uganda hada history of predatory government taxpolicy during conflict periods. Pressurefrom the Fund and the Bank to in-crease taxes reduced private invest-ment, which diminished economicactivity or drove investors abroad.

■ 6.3 ■

Economic Reconstruction StrategiesTHE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE: AN OVERVIEW

Raising revenue for the recoveringstate is a critical issue. Two optionsfor raising revenue in post-conflictsituations are:

■ Strengthen and modernizeadministrative, auditing andfiscal control capacities

■ In post-conflict countries withhistories of ineffective taxadministrations and high levelsof tax evasion, declare a one-timetax amnesty to encourage re-entryinto the tax system

■

Although peace settlementsallow for a reduction inmilitary expenditures,

this reduction is usuallyaccompanied by an increase

in spending for priorityreconstruction and restoration

of basic services, therebygenerating a need to raiserevenue and contain the

budget deficit.

■

Inflation and monetary policy

Inflation generally rises during warwhen governments engage in deficitspending while trying to maintainsome essential services. In post-con-flict environments price stabilization isa priority as it is necessary to protectthe poor and to restore confidenceamong economic actors. Governmentsshould avoid money targeting, whichtypically fails to keep prices constantbecause of large and unexpectedshocks in the demand for money.

Possible actions to contain inflationinclude:

■ Limit the supply of money

■ Encourage commercial investmentrather than consumption

Foreign exchange

There is a wide range of experiencewith foreign exchange in post-conflictcountries. In some countries, barterand/or foreign (hard) currency tend toreplace domestic currency when it haslost most, if not all, of its value. Inparts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, forexample, the Deutschmark became theaccepted form of payment. On the

Aside from the two methods for raising revenue described above, what other actionscan you suggest to raise revenue in transitional states?

What other actions can you suggest to contain inflation?

?

?

Pacing economic reforms

The impact of early measures toliberalize and restructure post-conflict economies has sometimesbeen negative. The OED evaluationfound that in most cases, liberaliza-tion of the exchange rate has beenan early and successful reform.However, sharp reductions intariffs, liberalization of interestrates, elimination of subsidies, civilservice reform, and sweepingprivatization have sometimes beencounter-productive if implementedat the wrong time in the process.The political environment of a newpost-conflict government may betoo fragile and unstable to imple-ment a broad reform program thatgoes beyond stabilization. TheBank found that too muchemphasis was put on a rapid paceof reforms in Haiti, Rwanda, andUganda. A better approach wouldhave been to concentrate onmaintaining low inflation and aconvertible currency, approachingother reforms incrementally.

■ 6.4 ■


other hand, in El Salvador a largeinflux of worker remittances, coupledwith increased demand for domesticcurrency by international agencies,led to an appreciation of domesticcurrency and an overvalued exchangerate.

During the early stages of thetransition from war to peace, under-valuation of a country’s currency canencourage substitution of nontradablefor tradable goods and help correct thebalance-of-payments problem. It alsoencourages nationals that hold foreignassets to bring part of their capitalback into the country to financedomestic investment. In the long-term,it may help make exports profitablewhile discouraging smuggling andblack market activities.

Savings

During a conflict, savings, in absoluteterms, are likely to decrease as a resultof falling income and the need to usesavings to maintain consumptionlevels. For some, however, the uncer-tainty linked with political instabilitymay lead to “hoarding” such as hidingassets in a safe place in their homecountry, sending money to a safehaven, such as a Swiss bank or politi-cally stable nation, or investing inprecious metals, like silver and gold.

Investment

There is generally a decrease inprivate investment in conflict and post-conflict situations because of distrustand uncertainty. Higher risk, greatertransaction costs, and higher interestrates also discourage investors.

After hostilities cease, there areseveral scenarios for investors.Macro-level instability, combined witha high level of criminality and politicalinsecurity, often discourages invest-ment in visible assets and perpetuatesthe premium on liquidity that emergedduring the war. Potential investorstend to adopt a wait-and-see attitudebefore switching from liquid assetsto domestic fixed investments. Whenprivate investors do make the switch,they are likely to invest in quick-yielding, mobile assets such as trans-port equipment and light machinerythat can be easily redeployed in caseof renewed conflict. Investors arereluctant to invest in the most criticalneeds—that is, fixed, productiveassets like agricultural infrastructure.

In the case of privatizing stateenterprises, it is essential that they besound enough to attract private inves-tors or managers. The evaluation inRwanda illustrated a case where theBank pushed privatization of themajor utility before the government

One typical foreign exchange action is to devalue the currency. What other actions can yousuggest that may be effective?

Are there other issues to address when attempting to restore the confidence of local investors?

?

?

Macroeconomicrules-of-thumb in

post-conflict settings

Many macroeconomic rules ofthumb for dealing with post-conflict settings are not yet docu-mented. Following are some keylessons from recent Bank experi-ence, particularly in Africa:

■ During conflict there is netdissavings: wealth is consumed,capital is not invested, facilities arenot built or maintained

■ There are shifts in the portfolioof production activity away frommaximal production efficiency

■ Both financial and human capitalare lost as citizens flee to othercountries

■ Hyperinflation is common inmany conflicts; post-conflict policymust deal with inflation early;

■ Fiscal discipline and restructuringgo hand in hand: if there is a peacedividend from reduced militaryspending, this should be immedi-ately channeled to social expendi-tures. Practices of accountabilityand transparency should be estab-lished immediately

■ Financial markets and trade net-works will depend on the restora-tion of legal and judicial processes

■ 6.5 ■


had the knowledge and capability toproceed, and before the managementand operation of the utility was suffi-ciently strong to attract a private sectormanager or investors.

The restoration of local investorconfidence can also be a difficult task.Some techniques that can be used totry to restore local investor confidenceand promote investment are:

■ Political and macroeconomicstability

■ Restoration of the rule of law■ Access to credit at reasonable rates■ Inflation

Trade policy and regionaleconomic integration

War usually leads to a decrease inexports. Trade routes are disrupted;transportation systems and infrastruc-ture are destroyed. Unofficial andillegal cross-border trading tend toincrease during and after conflict,perhaps becoming the main formof interregional trade activity. Armsand drug trading usually rise, andborder controls or embargoes may beimposed. Having become accustomedto high profits during the conflict,illegal traders resist reintegrating intothe formal sector. Customs corruptionand administrative burdens furtherdiscourage formal trade.

The World Bank should considersupporting regional economic integra-tion mechanisms as a means of solving

■ Promote regional economic integra-tion as a means of reducing thetransaction costs of regional tradeflows and increasing the vestedinterest of neighboring countries inpolitical stability

Agriculture

Agriculture is a priority sector for post-conflict economic support because itcontributes to self-sufficiency in foodproduction, reduces the need for im-ports and foreign aid that may havedeveloped during the conflict, and isan important source of employmentfor the reintegration of excombatants.In some countries, agriculture maybe an important source of exports,foreign exchange and governmentrevenue. Possible actions include:

■ Improve credit and transportconditions

■ Settle questions of land ownership

■ Ensure that farmers can spend theirharvest earnings on producer goodssuch as fertilizers or agriculturalmachinery

■ Encourage governments tomake necessary investments innon-tradable capital and leasethose to private entrepreneurson short, but renewable tenure

■ Suggest that governments subsidizethe act of commitment of privateinvestors in irreversible agriculturalassets

Can you suggest any additional actions to facilitate regional economic integration?

What actions can you suggest to improve development potential in the agricultural sector?

?

?

Women are often the primary agricultural force.United Nations Photo

political crises. The Arias Peace Planencouraged Central American coun-tries to deepen regional economiccooperation. Other existing regionalgroups such as the Preferential TradeArea for Eastern and Southern AfricanStates (PTA) and the Inter-governmen-tal Authority on Development (IGAD)in the Horn of Africa could be instru-mental in strengthening regionalintegration. Possible actions related totrade policy and regional economicintegration include:

■ Improve customs administration

■ Promote trade liberalizationthrough reducing or removing tariffand non-tariff barriers to trade

■ 6.6 ■


Structural adjustmentissues

Considerable controversy exists regard-ing the role of structural adjustment aspart of the reconstruction strategy for apost-conflict country. Since most post-conflict countries have low- or low-middle income conditions, externalfinancial support is vital. For thesecountries, addressing macroeconomicimbalances is often at odds with, oreven contradicts, peacebuilding andreconstruction priorities.

■

Addressingmacroeconomic imbalances

is often at odds with,or even contradicts,peacebuilding and

reconstruction priorities.

■

The main creditors of countries inconflict or post-conflict are often inter-national financial institutions. Theseinstitutions play a crucial role in influ-encing a country’s economic policy byrequiring economic reforms to allow acountry access to foreign funds. Someanalysts believe that these interna-tional institutions are not equipped tooperate in post-conflict situations.

According to Giles Carbonnier(Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and theEconomy, 1998), “Economic adjust-ment involves both stabilisation andstructural adjustment. Short-termstabilisation policies as designedprimarily by the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) traditionally aimto reduce inflation, restore currencyconvertibility and renew debt service.They involve expenditure-cuttingmeasures as well as sharp tighteningof fiscal, credit, and monetary policies.Structural adjustment lies rather inthe realm of the World Bank andthe regional development banks. Itinvolves economic liberalisationthrough the removal of controls andregulations, privatisation, and theimplementation of export-orientedpolicies.”

ening the state’s capacity to mediateconflict, secure law and order, andrebuild essential infrastructure andservices. Structural adjustment haswidened inequalities, thereby aggravat-ing political tensions. Experience hasalso shown that for economic reformsto work there must be commitment onthe part of the government to make ithappen, not just the imposition ofpolicies by external actors.

An evaluation of Cambodia foundthat the Bank continued to push fordownsizing the civil service when thepolitical coalition arrangement underthe peace accords was based in part onincreasing civil service to absorb largenumbers of the incoming politicalparties’ functionaries. The Bank’sposition was not politically realistic.

Although privatization is often apriority, the case of Cambodia andHaiti showed that the degree of corrup-tion and cronyism within or betweenthe private and public sectors may notenhance the prospects for sustained,equitable development, and may evenmake them worse.

There are also risks involved withadjustment policies or a developmentprocess that produces large or abruptshifts in income and wealth distribu-tions. Adjustment programs redistrib-ute the timing and extent of costs andbenefits of reforms among economicactors. Most expenditure-reducingpolicies tend to impose immediatewelfare costs, while the benefits maynot be evident for one or two years.The risk is that the perceived griev-ances of classes and regions maymount during this time and mayrekindle tensions that jeopardize thepeace process.

■

Experience has also shownthat for economic reforms to

work there must becommitment on the part of the

government to make ithappen, not just the

imposition of policies byexternal actors.

■

Structural Adjustment Loan(SAL) in El Salvador

The structural adjustment loan(SAL 1) for El Salvador, approved in1991, was widely viewed to havebeen successful in accomplishing itsobjectives. SAL 1 focused on fiveprincipal areas that were closelyaligned with the government’seconomic program: 1) trade policy,centered on narrowing the tariffband, 2) fiscal policy, aimed prima-rily at introducing the Value AddedTax (VAT), 3) monetary policy andfinancial system reforms, withspecial emphasis on liberalizationof interest rates and the restructur-ing and privatization of the bank-ing system, 4) agricultural sectorreforms, focusing on the liberaliza-tion of producer prices and thedivestiture of assets of agriculturalmarketing agencies, and 5) socialreform, with primary attentiongiven to nutrition programs.

The nutrition programs were putinto place as countervailing mea-sures to the possible social hard-ships that might be caused by theadjustment operation. Althoughthe nutrition pilot programs posedmanagement-intensive implemen-tation problems, two out of threewere successfully implemented.

“They tend to take for granted thebasic underpinnings of the economy,with a well-established legal system toenforce property and contracts andwell-defined social norms. But thesehave often been shattered by civil war,if indeed they ever existed” (Boyceand Pastor 1997 cited in Carbonnier1998, p. 33). Even though macroeco-nomic stability and fiscal disciplineare required of post-conflict countries,economic policy should also promoteadjustment toward peace. Indeed,sustainable development is onlyfeasible when minimal stability andpredictability has been established.

The implementation of structuraladjustment policies in post-conflictcountries has often been criticized foreroding public institutions and weak-

■ 6.7 ■


Orthodox economic adjustment packages sometimes are counterproductive when implementedin war-torn societies. What are your economic policy recommendations for each situation below?

1) A country’s currency has been devalued to prevent inflation. Unfortunately, the cost of devaluationhas been passed entirely to increased consumer domestic prices, since imports are largely debtfinanced. Also, export volume has not increased at all as supply is limited by lack of investment.

2) Trade restrictions have been relaxed but the result has been reduced sales for competingdomestic enterprises and an increase in imports of non-essential goods and services.

In your experience in post-conflict countries, what are some of the other unintendedconsequences of traditional economic policies?

?

?

A review of the Bank’s efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina identified factors that contributedto successful reconstruction:

Of special importance, given the political complexities of the situation, were contributionsmade by the Bank during the negotiation stages, as well as during the immediate implemen-tation stages. Because of the coordination role assumed by the Bank, it was able to facilitatethe creation of a coherent framework for reconstruction and recovery. Delivering this frame-work to donors contributed to the overall success of the Bank’s intervention.

Successful Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina

■ Early establishment of a resident mission

■ Streamlined project processing andprocurement procedures

■ Pilot projects and project preparation

■ Sector diversification

■ Local ownership and implementationoversight

■ Widespread participation

■ Good public relations

■ Priority for the program within the Bank

■ 6.8 ■


Economicreconstruction actions

There are many reconstruction actionsthat can facilitate the transition fromwar to peace. The chart below listssome interventions for which theWorld Bank may hold a comparativeadvantage. It also cites examples oflessons learned that can assist Bankstaff in strategy development.

Economic activities for earlytransition programs

Agencies that have experience work-ing in conflict and crises have devel-oped a toolbox of programs to applywhen populations have been dis-placed, and/or when normal copingstrategies and market networks havefailed. Some interventions that can beinitiated before, during or immediatelyfollowing conflicts include:

Uganda Economic Recovery Credit—demand management, liberalizationof trade policies and public sectormanagement reform

Eritrea Recovery and Rehabilitationprogram; Strategic planning in Liberia

Northern Reconstruction and PovertyReduction Strategy in Namibia; PublicWorks and Employment Projects in BiH

Avoid privatization of state-ownedcompanies – Eastern Europe

Revitalization of agriculture inGuatemala; Concentration ofreconstruction assistance in Beirutdid not work in Lebanon

Tajikistan Post-conflict EmergencyReconstruction Project

Tajikistan Post-conflict EmergencyReconstruction Project

Eritrea Recovery and RehabilitationProject; BiH Emergency FarmReconstruction

Rehabilitation of financial institutions;restoration of legal and regulatoryframeworks; support of conditions forresumption of trade

Balance of payment support; handlingarrears; rescheduling debt; longer-termnormalization

Training and job creation; expansion ofthe private and informal sectors; creditschemes

Private sector investments; private sectorassessments; property rights advocacy;privatization

Promote inclusion and economicopportunities; target regional exclusion

Restore water, sanitation,transportation, communicationsand utility networks

Restore and maintain educationand health facilities, etc.

Restore domestic food and otherproducts production and marketingsystems; rehabilitate infrastructure

Intervention

Institutional reform

Macroeconomic stabilization

Income-generating activities

Private sector support

Exclusion

Physical infrastructure repairs

Social infrastructure

Agricultural production systems

E C

O N

O M

I C

S E

C T

O R

A L

Description Examples and notes

■ Food for Work—for public worksprojects, efficient at targeting themost vulnerable, including theunemployed or recently repatriatedor demobilized. FFW projects tendto be for infrastructure repair or forimprovement of land (contouring,terracing, erosion control, cropsalvaging, etc.).

■ Food/Cash for Training—for newskills development for start-upindustries.

■ Micro-finance—revolving loanfunds self-target to the poor as theymust agree to put in time at weeklymeetings to collaborate with othermembers of the fund; credit pro-grams for ex-combatants are fre-quent ingredients of peace accordsand fraught with difficulty: smallerloans are more manageable.

■ Quick Impact Projects—used forshort time-frame support for popu-lations returning home; a UNHCRinvention designed to fill a needwhile not extending UNHCR’sscope of responsibility into long-term recovery.

■ Public works programs in construc-tion, irrigation repair, road re-surfacing, and ports. In the short-term, NGOs and UNICEF oftenundertake new construction ofprimary schools, district healthclinics and counterpart NGO of-fices. The government often under-takes construction for public utili-ties, and larger infrastructure.

■ Seeds, tools and agroforestry—address the problems returningfamilies have with getting back intothe agricultural cycle (most popula-tions lose or sell their farm assets

■ 6.9 ■



The period of reconstruction is an opportune time to implementmajor political, economic, and administrative reforms as well as themodernization of production capacities. The economic reforms,however, are often in conflict with needed political reforms and thepeace process. The challenge is to develop an integrated andcoherent approach that addresses all of these and to see and seizethe opportunities presented out of tragedies.

Traditionally sound Bank approaches to supporting adjustmentprograms may not work in fragile post-conflict situations whereachieving political stability is paramount.

Before the Bank undertakes support for a program, especially onethat involves major structural changes in a system, the Bank shouldensure that the government has adequate capacity to plan,implement, and oversee the process.

in the course of flight). These arecommon interventions by NGOslike CARE, World Vision, and theFood and Agriculture Organization,as well as the International Fundfor Agricultural Development(IFAD).

■ Large food rations that can last upto six months, frequently given todemobilized soldiers, returningIDPs, and repatriating refugees(as well as clothes and otherhousehold goods in some settings)to support their startup efforts torepair homes and plant fields, andto achieve the means for self-reliance.

■ Subsidies and voucher programsstimulate demand, can be an effi-cient way to deliver resources tothe poor while re-establishingmarket structures, and can simulta-neously secure a safety net forthings like staple grains.

■ Land reform in conjunction withthe provisions of a peace agree-ment; rapid implementation hasbeen found to be critical to foster-ing peace by ensuring trust thatpeace agreement provisions aregoing to be upheld.

■ Social healing—inclusion of diversegroups in programs—for examplehaving public health extension.

teams include members from bothsides of warring factions—hasbeen a common feature ofprograms in the 1990s in an effortto promote reconciliation. (SeeMary B. Anderson, 1999, Do NoHarm—How Aid Can SupportPeace or War.)

■ With capital loss during conflict,there is much effort to get morecurrency of one form or anotherinto local economies. Any contract-ing, new demand, and the subse-quent infusion of purchasingpower is felt to have an importantlocal multiplier effect—to “jumpstart” trade and production.

■ 6.10 ■


Carbonnier, Gilles. 1998. Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy.United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Kreimer, Alcira; Eriksson, John; Muscat, Robert; Arnold, Margaret; Scott, Colin.1998. The World Bank’s Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction, draftWorld Bank Operations Evaluation Department. Washington, DC

Post-Conflict Unit. 1998 Toward an Architecture for Sustainable Peace andDevelopment: Lessons from the World Bank’s Experience, InternationalConference on Peace and Development.

Scott, Colin. January 1997 Reconstruction and Complex Emergencies: A Review ofLiterature and Policy. Washington, World Bank Operations Evaluation Department.[draft 1/8/97: not for quotation or publication]

Wallich, Christine. March 9, 1998. “Post-Conflict Lessons from the BosniaExperience” summary of presentation. World Bank. Washington, D. C.

World Bank. 1998 The World Bank’s Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction:Volume III: El Salvador Case Study. Washington, DC, World Bank.

R E F E R E N C E S

■ 7.1 ■

7

K E Y P O I N T S

Begin work in post-conflict environments with asocial assessment.

Consider the history of the conflict and the needs ofall parties to the conflict when developing reintegrationprograms.

Pay special attention to the needs of female-headedhouseholds as traditional gender roles may be significantlyaltered by conflict.

Work to rebuild social and human capital to facilitatethe transition from war to peace.

Reintegration ofWar-Affected Populations

■ 7.2 ■

A key component of achievingthe transition from war topeace relates to the success-

ful social and economic reintegrationof war-affected populations. Thesepopulations include not only repa-triating refugees and ex-combatantsbut also internally displaced peopleand populations affected by conflictwhose social and economic systemshave been destroyed as a result ofthe conflict.

Reintegration is morethan relocation andresettlement

Reintegration is a concept thatextends far beyond the physical pro-cess of relocating affected populations.Resettlement, as used by the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refu-gees (UNHCR) and agencies assistingrefugees, refers to the durable solutionin which refugees move to and settlein a third country rather then repatri-ate to their home country or settle intheir country of asylum. Reintegrationis a situation in which formerly dis-placed populations and their receivingcommunities are able to co-exist,sharing both economic and socialresources, with no greater conflictthan existed within the communitybefore the displaced populationreturned. Experience indicates directcompensation is frequently not enough

We have learnedthat without properanalysis of social

contexts and structures,and without involvinglocal populations indefining short-term

priorities andlong-term goals,

the services offered by aBank-financed operationmay not be ones that the

intended users findbeneficial or that they

will help sustain.We also know well

from past and painfulexperiences that

failure to take intoaccount how localinstitutions work,

what communities need,and how theirparticipation is

incorporated has beena frequent cause of

failure in manydevelopment projects.— Johannes Linn and Ismail Serageldin

Social Assessments forBetter Development, 1997

Reintegration ofWar-Affected Populations

to prevent people from eventuallybeing impoverished as a result ofdisplacement. A more developmentalapproach is required. The World Bankhas found that access to arable landand supportive social capital are themain determinants of successful ruralreintegration. Low unemploymentand crime rates for both previouslydisplaced populations and receivingcommunities may be indicators ofsuccessful urban reintegration.

Economic reintegration refers to theprocess whereby affected populationsgain economic self-sufficiency in thecommunity in which they settle. Inpost-conflict countries, entire economicsystems, such as the banking system,may have been disrupted by the con-flict. Restoration of these systems, asexplained in Tab 6, will be crucial tothe eventual economic reintegrationof affected populations. In rural areas,resolution of land tenure disputes maybe key to the process of economicreintegration. In addition, the provisionof seeds and tools may enable farmersto begin the process of recovery byplanting and harvesting their owncrops. Other methods for achievingeconomic reintegration includemicro-credit programs to enable entre-preneurs to start-up small businessesand achieve economic self-sufficiency,and job training to provide the skillsneeded for participants to obtainemployment in local labor markets.

■ 7.3 ■

Reintegration of War-Affected PopulationsTHE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE: AN OVERVIEW

Social reintegration is the processwhereby formerly displaced popula-tions and their receiving communitiesshare and hold respect for social insti-tutions, such as a shared belief in theability of the judicial systemto protect all citizens. The existence ofsuch shared beliefs and values—some-times referred to as social capital—facilitate the process of social reinte-gration. Key mechanisms for achievingsocial reintegration include:

■ conflict resolution

■ psychosocial healing

■ community building

■ education and human capitaldevelopment

When Bank project staff considerthe social design of projects, they mustthink about how to translate generalsocial policy concerns and locallyidentified needs into project-specificmeasures. Bank experience with socialassessments indicates that such mea-sures include equitably distributingproject benefits, reducing poverty,eliminating social exclusion, and in-creasing social cohesion. They mayalso include provisions for expansionof social services, human resourcedevelopment, and building socialcapital. Social design may also involvegender-specific provisions and theprotection of indigenous and othervulnerable groups.

■

The World Bankhas found that access to

arable land and supportivesocial capital are the maindeterminants of successful

rural reintegration.

■

shown, however, that ignoring socialfactors in project design may ulti-mately be more costly than consider-ing the social impacts of World Bankinvolvement (see for example, Kottak1985, Cernea and Kudat 1997).

■

Ignoringsocial factors in

project design mayultimately be more costly

than considering thesocial impacts of

World Bank involvement.

■

Working in a post-conflict environ-ment requires an extra effort to under-stand social issues. Protracted civilconflict often destroys social institu-tions. Communities are torn apart bywar; neighbors who previously livedside-by-side often commit terribleatrocities against one another. Deepfeelings of mistrust may build upamong members of different ethnicgroups, clans or tribes. Some commu-nity members leave their homes forreasons of safety or for better eco-nomic opportunities; others remain intheir homes throughout the conflict.

Returning community members facemany challenges. Someone may nowoccupy their land and home, resultingin disputes over land tenure. Also,community members who did notleave during the conflict may resentthose who did leave and who are nowcoming back to reclaim their property.Those who left may have discardedsome of the cultural practices of theirhome community or may haveadopted new cultural practices that areforeign to and perhaps resented by thereceiving community. A necessary stepin designing social and economic

Social assessments

The World Bank has years of experi-ence with resettlement related toinfrastructure projects such as damconstruction. Social and economicreintegration are integral componentsof these projects since one group ismoved to another location and sharesthat location with existing residents.While reintegration in post-conflictsituations poses many challengesthat do not exist in traditional Bankresettlement projects, such projectsoffer many lessons which can beapplied in a post-conflict situation.The need for social assessments whenplanning and designing Bank inter-ventions is one of the lessons learned.

In 1984, the Bank developed guide-lines for conducting social assess-ments. The objectives include:

■ Identifying key stakeholders

■ Establishing a framework toensure the participation of stake-holders in project selection,design and implementation

■ Ensuring that project objectivesare acceptable to the intendedbeneficiaries

■ Ensuring that gender and othersocial differences are reflected inproject design

■ Assessing the social impact ofprojects and determining howadverse impacts can be overcomeor substantially mitigated

■ Developing ability at the appro-priate level to enable participa-tion, resolve conflict, permitservice delivery and carry outmitigation

Assessing the social impact ofprojects was relatively new to theBank when these guidelines wereimplemented. Many project managersfelt that the additional cost of con-ducting social assessments in additionto traditional economic analysescould not be justified. Experience has

■ 7.4 ■


reintegration programs for war-affectedpopulations, therefore, is to conduct asocial assessment of the affected popu-lations. Incorporating the results of anassessment into programming deci-sions will increase the probability thatthe affected populations will make asmoother transition from war to peace.

Gathering data

Social assessments do not have to be adaunting task. The World Bank hashad positive experiences in conductingsocial assessments when project man-agers have used the expertise of acountry’s own social scientists andnongovernmental organizations. Theseexperts have the advantage of knowinga great deal about the history andculture of the affected populations. Inaddition, it is usually more cost-effec-tive to use local experts rather thanexpatriates. The use of local expertscan have an additional benefit whensocial assessments are replicated orused for other development initiatives.In post-conflict situations, however,care must be taken to ensure thatexperts from both sides of the conflictare used. Otherwise, the results of asocial assessment could be extremelybiased for or against one side of theconflict. Consider these key variableswhen conducting social assessments:

■ Demographic characteristicsof the affected populations(number of men, women, children,elderly; ethnic, religious, tribalaffiliations; education levels)

■ Distribution of resources in thesociety (inclusiveness of oppor-tunities; geographic disparities;ethnic or other disparities basedon affiliation with a particularsocial group)

■ Social network and structures inthe community, both traditionaland modern (role of the family,schools, health care systems)

■ Political network and structures,both traditional and modern(decision-making processes as wellas the rights, responsibilities andaccountability implied by varyingpolitical positions; methods ofconflict resolution)

■ Community satisfaction withpolitical systems

■ Community perception of workperformed by the government,both central and local

■ Capabilities of existingcommunity organizations

■

The World Bank has hadpositive experiences in

conducting social assessmentswhen project managers have

used the expertise of acountry’s own social scientists

and nongovernmentalorganizations.

■

In your experience, how are the experiences of people displaced by conflict and those displacedby large-scale development projects similar? How are they different??

Encouragingparticipation

The Bank’s experience with socialassessments also indicates that the useof participatory methods is critical tothe success of these assessments.Whenever possible, members of theaffected populations must have avoice in the assessment process aswell as in deciding what types ofprograms will best support the reinte-gration process.

Participatory methods are morelikely to be successful if the needs ofall stakeholders are considered. Stake-holders in Bank-supported projectsinclude those negatively or positivelyaffected by the outcome or those whocan affect the outcome of a proposedintervention, including the following:

■ Government representatives

■ Directly affected groups(individuals, families, communi-ties, organizations, at-risk groups)

■ Indirectly affected groups(others with vested interestsincluding, NGOs, donors,religious and communityorganizations, private firms

Bank experience also indicates thatattempts to bypass powerful stake-holders often result in opposition fromthem and make it difficult to accom-plish project objectives. In post-con-flict environments, project managersmust exercise particular caution.Animosities that built up during theconflict can flare up again during thepost-conflict period. Those who

■ 7.5 ■


If you were considering establishing a microcredit program in a post-conflict environment,what social assessment data would you need to collect to decide on project feasibility?

What benefit do you see in promoting community economic development with a view toimproving inter-ethnic ties? Who is best placed to determine how this improvement would takeplace—international agencies or the individuals themselves? What steps might improve themicrocredit programs?

?

?

Microcredit programs in Bosnia and Herzegovinapromoting gender equity, ethnic pluralism, and community development

The Dayton Peace Agreement,brokered in 1995, created a nationalgovernment in the former Yugoslaviain which the three principal ethnicgroups—Serbs, Muslims, andCroats—each elect a member of athree-person Presidency. The na-tional structure combines two enti-ties—The Muslim-Croat “Federationof Bosnia and Herzegovina” and theSerb ‘”Republic Srpska” under theaegis of a weakened state. Throughthis arrangement, the Dayton agree-ment rejected ethnic cleansing andpopulation displacement, promotingthe notion of a pluralistic society.

The true geographical ethnic picturein the region, however, is much morecomplex than the two entities sug-gest, with other minorities strugglingto retain their cultural identities.Despite their division by the atroci-ties of the war, many families are stillinterested in inter-ethnic coopera-tion. This is evidenced by the forma-tion of more than 500 local associa-tions that are helping to nurture civilsociety. To tap this strength, somecommunity peace building activities

have encouraged local initiatives thatallow ethnic groups to cooperate ontheir own terms.

One effective approach is themicrocredit programs, such as thosemanaged by the Bank. Displacedwomen were one of the three targetgroups for the pilot phase of the LocalInitiatives Project, which supports themicrocredit programs. An evaluation ofthe pilot project reveals that in thisgroup, 99 percent of the borrowerswere women. The average loan sizewas 700 DM; 228 loans had beendisbursed; 185 jobs had been created;and repayment rates were 88 percenton an individual basis. Due to theirreliance on local organizations andsuccess in reaching beneficiaries,microcredit programs are highly re-garded by beneficiaries, NGOs, otherdonors, and Government officials

While the programs have successfullyserved socially vulnerable groups, thepossibilities for expanding interethnicties has also become more economi-cally viable. For example, the Tuzla-based Bosnia Support Group (BOSPO)

has shifted from individual togroup loans in an effort to improvethe rate of repayment. One suchgroup is comprised of a Croat, twoMuslims from Tuzla and two refu-gees from Srebrenica. By increasingthe loan amount to 1,500 DM andlending to groups, BOSPO raisedthe repayment rate to 100%.

Experience with microcredit andemployment generation in the BiHprogram so far shows that theBank can help the governmentwork with intermediaries at thelocal level to ensure that assistanceis delivered effectively and effi-ciently. This successful experienceindicates that the Bank may have acomparative advantage in workingwith government to facilitate thereplication of this kind of effectivelocal initiative.Sources: “Moving Beyond Ethnic Conflict:Community Peace Building in Bosnia andEastern Slavonia (Croatia)” by Iain Guest,1997; The World Bank’s Experience withPost-Conflict Reconstruction, Volume II:Bosnia and Herzegovina Case Study,1998


■ 7.6 ■


claimed “victory” may be interested inconsolidating their positions of powerat the expense of the “defeated.”Therefore, Bank staff need to considerhow their actions will be viewed by allparties to the conflict and recognizethat when resources are made avail-able to one group, this may potentiallybe to the detriment of other membersof the affected population. Bank staffneed to be aware of and evaluate thepotential “cost” of such choices whenmaking programming decisions.

■

Bank staff need toconsider how their

actions will be viewedby all parties to the conflict

and recognize that whenresources are made available

to one group, this maypotentially be to the detriment

of other members of theaffected population.

■

Assessment methods

There are many ways to conduct socialassessments. Among other factors, thechoice of technique, or combination oftechniques, depends on the local cir-cumstances, what is being assessed,financial resources, and time available.

Gender analysis

A recent World Bank study found that,in many post-conflict countries, a thirdor more of the working-age men havebeen killed, and women are the pro-ductive base for restarting theeconomy. In these environments,gender analysis takes on increasedimportance. Determining which com-munity members are responsible forwhich tasks will facilitate projectdesign. In addition, if women areresponsible for the well being of theirfamilies, steps must be taken to facili-tate their reintegration.

UNHCR developed the People Ori-ented Planning (POP) framework touse for gender analysis in refugeesituations. A critical component ofPOP is “activities analysis.” In a post-conflict environment, activities analy-sis involves asking questions aboutwhat people did before the conflicterupted, during the conflict, and whatthey are able to/must do in the post-conflict environment. This involvesasking questions about their role inthe production of goods and servicessuch as farming, domestic work,teaching and business activities. Italso includes house-building andhousehold production activities suchas meal-preparation, fuel collection,home gardening, food preservationand water collection. Finally, itincludes social, political and religiousactivities, such as traditional ceremo-nies and community meetings, whichin some cultures take considerabletime or resources.

Methods include:

■ Focus groups

■ Individual interviews

■ In-depth case studies

■ Quantifiable sample surveys

■ Reanalysis of data from pastresearch or of statistical/demo-graphic information

■ Stakeholder workshops

Whatever the chosen method(s),common questions that should beconsidered include:

■ Who are the stakeholders?

■ Are the objectives of the projectconsistent with their needs, inter-ests and capacities?

■ What social and cultural factorsaffect the ability of stakeholdersto participate or benefit from theproposed activities?

■ What is the impact of the pro-grams on the various stakehold-ers, particularly women andvulnerable groups?

■ What are the social risks (includ-ing re-escalation of conflict) thatmight affect the success of theprogram?

■ What institutional arrangementsare needed for participation andproject delivery?

What benefit do you see inpromoting community economicdevelopment with a view toimproving inter-ethnic ties? Who isbest placed to determine how thisimprovement would take place—international agencies or theindividuals themselves? What stepsmight improve the microcreditprograms?

? Suggested answers: The ethnic barriers tocross-entity trade are formidable and deep-rooted. The historical evidence is difficult tounderstand and often disputed as to causeand effect. Ultimately, it may be that only theindividuals themselves will be able tonegotiate the complexities and overcome thebarriers in their own ways. Internationalagencies, however, can promote the climatefor such development and help encourage

economic policy that will change attitudestoward a respect for ethnic differences. It isunlikely that outside-imposed measures toenforce pluralism would work and are likelyto be resisted. The success of the microcreditprograms might be compounded if loansbecome easier to get, are integrated into abroader economic strategy, and if commu-nity based economic organizations aresupported as well.

■ 7.7 ■


The main point of the analysis is todetermine how roles have changed asa result of the conflict. If the affectedpopulations consist of many female-headed households because the menwere killed during the conflict, womenwill have to take on new roles.

Restrictions on women’s ability toown property may also impede theirreintegration. In some countries, suchas Burundi and Rwanda, widowedwomen are particularly vulnerable asthey are unable to inherit land or otherimmovable property from either theirhusbands or parents and, unless theyhave sons, risk losing their property totheir deceased husband’s relatives.Bank managers must be aware of theserestrictions when planning programs.In addition, in its consultative role, theBank can work with governments toencourage them to alter laws that willnegatively affect the possibility for thesuccessful reintegration of women andother groups.

■

The Bank can work withgovernments to encourage

altering laws that willnegatively affect the

successful reintegration ofwomen and other groups.

■

Reintegration of women inpost-conflict situations

Since conflict inevitably changes tradi-tional gender roles, women play acritical role in the social and economicreintegration of war-affected popula-tions. Monitoring the economic suc-cess of women should be an importantpart of post-conflict programming.Skills training and income-generatingactivities are essential for women whomust assume responsibility for thewell-being of their families as a resultof the conflict. The breakdown oftraditional social welfare systems inmany war-torn societies also meansthat traditional social practices—suchas the responsibility of a husband’s

What types of interventions should you consider in a society where men are traditionally themain sources of income for their families, and female-headed households will have moretrouble gaining economic self-sufficiency?

In societies where men traditionally are responsible for plowing land and women are respon-sible for cultivation, what types of assistance might be required to facilitate reintegration andeconomic self-sufficiency among female-headed households?

?

?


Destination unknown – UNICEF/J.Isaac

extended family to care for his wifeand children after his death—can nolonger be expected.

The World Bank has a significantrole to play with regard to the eco-nomic reintegration of women. Sincewomen are often subject to genderdiscrimination with regard to obtainingcredit, the Bank can support theireconomic reintegration efforts bysupporting micro-credit programs forwomen or by placing conditions onexisting micro-credit programs suchthat a certain number of loans must bemade to women. (The case study onmicrocredit programs in Bosnia andHerzegovina is an example of this.)

In addition to their role in economicreintegration, women can also play animportant role in the process of socialreintegration. In the Bank’s 1998evaluation of assistance in post-con-flict countries, it was noted that “thepotential of women as strong commu-nity leaders who can facilitate therebuilding of social capital” should notbe overlooked. In fact, the WorldBank’s experience with post-conflictsituations indicates that women mustbe viewed “as agents of change intransitions from wars in which mostcombatants were male.”

■ 7.8 ■


Rebuilding social andhuman capital

Post-conflict societies suffer fromdiminished levels of capital—financial,social and human. World Bankinvolvement in developing andcontributing financial capital to post-conflict environments was covered inTab 6. Just as a country’s financialcapital is usually drained as a result ofcivil conflict—by budget diversion tomilitary spending, dramatic declines inproductivity, and fund transfers bywary investors—a country may sufferequally devastating losses in terms ofits social and human capital.

Social capital can be thought of asthose institutions that help to developa sense of social cohesiveness amongthe citizens of a country or commu-nity. The breakdown in trust thatoccurs as a result of civil conflict canbe a major obstacle to successfulreintegration of war-affected popula-tions. Families, neighborhoods,churches, local governments and othersocial structures can be destroyed as aresult of internal conflict. In the ex-treme case, husbands and wives ofdifferent ethnic affiliations can evendestroy their own families as a resultof ethnic violence such as that whichoccurred in the Rwandan genocide. Insituations where these types of severebreakdowns in trust and social struc-tures occur, those offering assistanceor support to reintegration must con-sider ways to rebuild social capital inthe project area.

For example, before ex-combatantsand displaced populations return to aparticular community, it is importantto consider whether they have anyexisting social networks, such as

The Bank’s role in rebuildingsocial capital

In addition to the World Bank’s rolewith regard to peacebuilding (dis-cussed in Tab 3), the Bank can con-tribute to the development of socialcapital by incorporating the results ofsocial assessments into programmingdecisions. Maynard (1997, p. 220) alsosuggests that “foreign organizationscan establish a milieu of commitmentand reliance through credit incentivesand joint small enterprise programs.Accordingly, they might encourageor mandate certain kinds of inter-action as a condition of funding. Forexample, small business startup creditmay be granted more readily to thoseproposing cross-conflict partnerships,to those hiring across identity lines,or those intending to locate in sharedareas, high-tension zones, or areastraditional to other groups.” Byencouraging parties from all sidesof the conflict to work together, theBank can support the developmentof social capital.

Education is normally thought toplay a critical role in the developmentof human capital, but it can supportthe development of social capital aswell. Bank staff should consider howeducation programs can contribute toconflict resolution and communitybuilding.

The stakes associated with rebuild-ing social capital and post-conflictreconstruction are high. “Not only

Peace education inLebanon and Rwanda

UNICEF established peace educa-tion programs within the normalschool systems of Lebanon andRwanda. All prewar educationalmaterials were scrutinized forbiased and unethical influence andsubsequently replaced with stereo-type-reducing curriculums thatsupported moral development.Training was conducted to helpteachers elicit and encourage cross-group sharing, discussion of moralprinciples, and appropriate,nonprejudiced behavior amongstudents.

Source: “Rebuilding Community”by Kimberly Maynard, 1997.

What types of interventions shouldyou consider in societies where menare traditionally the main sources ofincome for their families, andfemale-headed households will havemore trouble gaining economic self-sufficiency?

Suggested answer: Planners shouldconsider programs that specifically targetwomen, such as specific training for womenin income-earning skills or programsfocusing on women’s access to credit.

? In societies where men traditionallyare responsible for plowing land andwomen are responsible for cultiva-tion, what types of assistance mightbe required to facilitate reintegrationand economic self-sufficiency amongfemale-headed households?

Suggested answer: While female-headedhouseholds may need assistance in obtainingaccess to land, this may not be sufficient topromote their self-reliance. They may beunable to get their land cleared and plowedin order to begin cultivation. Some kind ofspecial assistance with these tasks may benecessary to get them started.

?

family members already residing inthat area. The process of reintegrationwill be facilitated when some socialbonds already exist between the re-turning and receiving communities.These bonds may provide a necessarysupport network for returnees—bothemotional and financial.

■

Where severe breakdownsin trust and social structures

occur, those offeringassistance or support to

reintegrationmust consider ways torebuild social capitalin the project area.

■

■ 7.9 ■


does failure discourage donors fromlater attempts when conditions againare propitious but, more fundamen-tally, it undermines confidence withinthe societies involved, thereby acceler-ating an exodus of the professionalsand businesspeople needed for recon-struction. The collective disposition ofsocieties is a critical element in thetransition out of conflict and a deter-minant of the further outbreak ofconflict. Assistance and developmentprograms that aim to strengthen thefabric and confidence of societiestherefore make an invaluable contribu-tion to prevention and to postconflictreconstruction” (Cohen and Deng1998, pp. 298-299).

The Bank’s role in rebuildinghuman capital

The loss of human capital may beparticularly problematic when rebuild-ing a post-conflict country. Humancapital is frequently decimated as aresult of conflict. Administrators andmanagement level professionals maybe targeted during the killing; as aresult many will either flee the countryor be killed. In addition, the disruptionof schooling that occurs during conflictmeans that the citizens of a post-conflict country are often lacking thetechnical knowledge necessary tofacilitate post-conflict reconstruction.Skills/job training programs as well asprograms supporting the return ofskilled professionals will be necessary.

The World Bank has found that adual strategy involving both buildingup human capital skills througheducation and training and providinglow-skill, labor-intensive jobs throughpublic works and micro projects willlikely be necessary in the early stagesof post-conflict reconstruction.

In addition, certain types of educa-tion and training will also contributeto the health of affected populationsand thus to their overall humancapital. A major problem in Rwandaafter the 1994 genocide was the de-struction of the health care system.Many trained health professionalswere either killed in the genocide orfled the country. As a result, a primaryobjective of rehabilitating the health

Based on your experience, how can the World Bank rebuild social capital in post-conflictenvironments? Give examples of programs that worked. What made these programs successful??

Investment in human capital, including education andhealth spending, is an important component of post-conflictwork. Violent conflict can extinguish the human resourcesof a country as people are killed, maimed, or displaced inlarge numbers. Human capital services are typically thefirst to be disrupted by conflict. Education, health, andcommunity services stop, bringing the realization ofhuman potential to a halt. Schools, hospitals, clinics, andcommunity centers are destroyed, as is the government’scapacity to administer services. Conflict also creates newvulnerable groups, such as the unemployed, ex-combatants,women-headed households, children, and the disabled,who are legitimate beneficiaries of reconstruction aid forsocioeconomic as much as humanitarian reasons. Therestoration and development of human capital in thepost-conflict phase is essential to establish a base forrebuilding the economy.

— Akira Kreimer et al. ”The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 1998.

Building a home in Côte d’ Ivoire – UNHCR/J.Crisp

■ 7.10 ■


systems included training in basicprimary health care. In addition,USAID supported the Rwandan Minis-try of Health by ensuring that healthcare staff be paid for their servicesthereby contributing to the long-termobjective of the Rwandan governmentassuming complete responsibility fortraining health care workers andpaying their full salaries.

Letting communities manage schools in El Salvador—The EDUCO Program

During the conflict, many ruralareas had no public education. By1989, national enrollment in basiceducation was only 76 percentand 1 million children were not inschool. In response, some commu-nities began organizing to repairschools and hire teachers fromtheir own resources. Recognizingthe potential, the government ofEl Salvador decided in 1991 todevelop a community-basedapproach to expand basic educa-tion in rural areas through itsEDUCO (Educación con Participa-ción de la Comunidad) program,supported by the Bank’s SocialSector Rehabilitation Project.

Self-management makes thisprogram distinctive. Schools areoperated by parents organized in alocally-elected community educa-tion association (ACE). ACEs hireand fire teachers, following Minis-try of Education (MOE) selectionguidelines, closely monitor theirattendance and performance,enter into annual contracts withMOE and receive funds monthly tocover teacher salaries and operat-ing costs. MOE provides teachingand learning materials and teachertraining programs; ACEs provideclassroom space, furniture andschool maintenance.

Despite class sizes averaging 36students—compared with 30 innon-program schools—and the fact

that students are among thepoorest, these schools performwell compared with traditionalschools. Even more important,however, is the fact that theEDUCO experience has playeda significant role in bringingelements of civil society and thepolitical spectrum in El Salvadortogether in their assessment ofan initiative of vital importancefor the future development ofthe country. This finding of‘common ground’ constitutesa contribution to the sustain-ability of the continuing peaceprocess.Source: The World Bank’s Experiencewith Post-Conflict Reconstruction,Volume III: El Salvador Case Study 1998.

What role can the World Bank play with regard to rebuilding human capital in post-conflictsituations? Why is rebuilding human capital in post-conflict situations different fromstrengthening human capital in traditional development situations?

?

The Bank’s experience in support-ing the development of human capitalin post-conflict situations is mixed.Promising results have been achieved,however, with support for the BasicEducation Modernization Project inEl Salvador. The World Bank’s evalua-tion of this project concluded that it

played a significant role in bringingelements of civil society and thepolitical spectrum in El Salvadortogether in their assessment of aninitiative of vital importance for thefuture development of the country. Thisfinding of ‘common ground’ constitutesa contribution to the sustainability ofthe continuing peace process. ■

■ 7.11 ■



Post-conflict situations, especially those related to internal conflict, arecharacterized by destroyed governmental, institutional and social structures aswell as physical infrastructure. In these environments, the challenge of economicand social reintegration of war-affected populations is particularly daunting.Nevertheless, the experience of the World Bank and other internationalorganizations has produced some lessons that can guide future actions insupport of the transition from war to peace.

Of primary importance is a full understanding of the war-affected populations,which can be acquired through social assessment. Social assessment is not a newtechnique for the Bank, which has produced numerous publications on this topic.Many of the lessons learned from social assessments conducted in traditionaldevelopment contexts apply in post-conflict environments as well. What isdifferent, however, is the low level of trust and social capital that so oftencharacterize post-conflict situations. Programs that fail to take account ofdeeply-rooted social conflicts may result in the resumption of civil strife.

A critical component of social assessment in a post-conflict environment isunderstanding the demographic characteristics of the war-affected populations.Civil conflict is devastating to families. Men are frequently killed resulting indramatic increases in the number of female-headed households. Since womenmay need to take on non-traditional roles to ensure the economic security of theirfamilies, program planners must understand the effect of conflict on families andconsider how to support women in developing economic self-sufficiency.

In addition to a shortage of financial capital, post-conflict environments aregenerally characterized by shortages of social and human capital as well.Supporting the development of social capital is crucial in an environmentcharacterized by deep mistrust and the breakdown of civil society. The Bank cansupport the development of social capital in many ways, including programsfocused on institution building, conflict resolution, and peace education.

Developing human capital contributes to the eventual economic and socialreintegration of war-affected populations. Training programs that help war-affected populations acquire income-generating skills are essential, as are creditprograms that allow participants to use and develop their human capital whilegaining economic self-sufficiency.

■ 7.12 ■


Anderson, Mary. 1994. People-Oriented Planning at Work: Using POP to Improve UNHCRProgramming. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Cernea, Michael and Ayse Kudat. 1997. “Social Analysis for Investment Projects: Rationale,Content, and Methods” in Social Assessments for Better Development: Case Studies inRussia and Central Asia edited by Michael Cernea and Ayse Kudat. Washington, DC:The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

Cohen, Roberta and Francis Deng. 1998. Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of InternalDisplacement. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press.

Guest, Iain, 1997. “Moving Beyond Ethnic Conflict: Community Peace Building in Bosniaand Eastern Slavonia (Croatia).” Mimeo.

Kottak, Conrad. 1985. “When People Don’t Come First: Some Sociological Lessons fromCompleted Projects” in Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Development edited byMichael Cernea. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kreimer, Alcira, John Eriksson, Robert Muscat, Margaret Arnold and Colin Scott. 1998.The World Bank’s Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction. Washington, DC: TheInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

Linn, Johannes and Ismail Serageldin. 1997. “Introduction” in Social Assessments forBetter Development: Case Studies in Russia and Central Asia edited by Michael Cernea andAyse Kudat. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

Maynard, Kimberly. 1997. “Rebuilding Community: Psychosocial Healing, Reintegration, andReconciliation at the Grassroots Level” in Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Rolesfor International Assistance edited by Krishna Kumar. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

United States Agency for International Development. 1995. “USAID HumanitarianAssistance Plan for Rwanda.” Mimeo.

World Bank. 1996. The World Bank Participation Sourcebook. Washington, DC:The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

______. 1998a. “The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Volume II:Bosnia and Herzegovina Case Study.” Report No. 17769. Operations EvaluationDepartment.

______. 1998b. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank. Washington, DC:The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

______. 1998c. “The World Bank’s Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction Volume III:El Salvador Case Study.” Report No. 17769. Operations Evaluation Department.

R E F E R E N C E S

■ 8.1 ■

8

K E Y P O I N T S

When no active lending portfolio exists in a country due to conflict, the Bank mustmaintain a Watching Brief to track circumstances and provide information foreffective programming. Staff must look beyond their normal counterparts and learnto work with, and sometimes strengthen, organizations that operate in conflict areas.

The Bank must follow legal, mandate, and administrative restrictions in post-conflictsituations. Recognizing political and other factors, all financing of rehabilitation andreconstruction activities must be justified on economic grounds.

During and after a conflict, staff need to mobilize funding sources to help get thecountry ready for standard long-term loans. Short-term grants, technical analysis,training of government officials and flexible phased loans are vital during this period.

In post-conflict settings, Bank staff must adopt a more flexible approach to socialassessments. A range of grant resources can be tapped for support.

Specialized units, such as the Post-Conflict Unit, as well as other personnel withinthe Bank, have experience in conflict areas and can provide critical guidance onthe special technical skills needed for reconstruction and peacebuilding.

Making Transitional Aid Work

■ 8.2 ■

Much has been learned inrecent years about how theBank can and should func-

tion in post-conflict countries: how toassess a conflict and its consequences,design and compare program options,mobilize resources, and frame theBank’s activities within its mandateand operational policies. Even duringthe conflict period, the Bank can domuch to analyze the situation andorganize future responses. In addition,skills about how to adapt standarddevelopment programming to thespecial needs, short-term urgencies,and uncertainties in conflict countrieshave been identified. Some skills havemore to do with being aware of oppor-tunities and tools; while others have todo with recognizing limitations andrisks. Most of the added skills requireinnovation and flexibility. Good man-agement in post-conflict situationsrequires lateral thinking and attentionto the rapidly shifting windows ofopportunity that open up.

Monitoring countriesaffected by conflict

As mentioned in Tab 1, a key Banktool for monitoring crisis areas is theWatching Brief, which the countrydesk initiates. The Watching Brief isa process for organizing existing

[Reconstruction] is amatter of the utmost

urgency and importancewhere we should,

therefore, press forwardto reach agreement on

methods and ondetails.... We should bebitterly failing in duty ifwe were not prepared for

the days of liberation.The countries chiefly

concerned can scarcelybegin to make their

necessary plans untilthey know upon whatresources they can rely.

Any delay, anyavoidable time lag will

be disastrous to theestablishment of good

order and goodgovernment.

— Lord Keynes, Opening RemarksAt first meeting of the

second commission on theInternational Bank for

Reconstruction and Development,Bretton Woods, 3 July 1944.

MakingTransitional Aid Work

information about a country anddrawing on secondary resources,supplemented by World Bank-commis-sioned research. The process alsoinvolves communication with potentialpartners—including the many multi-lateral and non-governmental organiza-tions working in the conflict country.Finally, it is a means by which theBank identifies and compares itsvarious options for engagement withthe country. The Watching Briefprocess may involve consultations,workshops, and negotiations.

“Watching Brief” also refers to thatperiod of time during which a countryis in non-lending status due to conflict.According to operational guidelines, acountry can be said to be in WatchingBrief status, even if no actual WatchingBrief document exists.

Much of the information needed fora Watching Brief can be obtained fromsecondary sources, some publishedand open, others obtained via confi-dential communications with otheragencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF,ICRC, and concerned governments.Economic information is more difficultto obtain than political information.Therefore, the World Bank may need tosponsor original data collection as partof the Watching Brief process. Otherelements of the Watching Brief arediscussed in the following sections.

■ 8.3 ■

Making Transitional Aid WorkTHE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE: AN OVERVIEW

Use existing data

Existing data can be very useful fortracking the shifting needs of countriesin crisis. Watching Briefs should in-clude this information in order todevelop as complete a picture as pos-sible of the current situation. Mediasources such as Reuters, Le Monde,CNN, AP, and AFP are good sourcesof information relevant to conflict andpolitical risks. More proprietary infor-mation sources can also be tapped.The World Bank subscribes to twomonitoring services that give riskforecasts: the Economic IntelligenceUnit, and Oxford Analytica, bothavailable on the Bank’s Intranet. Inaddition, a great store of informationon conflicts and political risk canbe found on the Web, includingcurrent data from many UN agencies,human rights NGOs and think-tankorganizations.

■

Economic informationis more difficultto obtain than

political information.

■

In severe conflicts, the UN Officefor the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA) is responsible forcollecting information on needs andactivities. In longer-term conflicts,specialized bodies may emerge, forexample, the UN Development Officefor Somalia (UNDOS) collects a rangeof economic and program informationon each region of Somalia from thesafe vantage point of Kenya. OCHAposts this type of information onits website—ReliefWeb—which isaccessible to Bank staff online athttp://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int.

First-hand information fromconflict-affected areas

While a tremendous amount of infor-mation is available by doing nothingmore than browsing the Web, WorldBank staff must also make directcontact with aid organizations in thecountry, most of whom have valuablein-house data. Other essential informa-tion sources are: UNHCR, UNICEF,UNDP, WFP, WHO, and major donororganizations, including the EuropeanCommunity Humanitarian Office(ECHO), and USAID’s Office of USForeign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

Humanitarian aid agencies can be avaluable source of timely informationabout vulnerable groups that are cutoff from markets, national networks,communication, transport systemsand, in the long-term, from prospectsfor economic development. NGOsworking in different parts of a conflictarea often have the best first-handinformation. NGOs such as CARE,the American Refugee Committee,Save the Children, and Médecins sansFrontières have valuable informationon trends in vulnerabilities andobservations about the conditions ofinfrastructure and local economiesthat are rarely documented or usedby longer-term development groupslike the World Bank.

Much critical information is avail-able just by asking, but some groupsmay have hesitations about sharinginformation. The InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC),for example, needs to ensure the confi-dentiality of some of its information.But the ICRC and its sister-organiza-tion, the International Federation ofRed Cross and Red Crescent Societies(IFRC) are willing to share informationabout their work examining ruraleconomies, livelihood and economicquestions in conflict-ridden areas.

Early warning indices

During conflict, early warningsystems can be used to measurechanges in disturbances.

They can also provide usefulinformation about the scale ofviolence, human rights violations,instability, and population displace-ments. One such system, the FamineEarly Warning System (a projectof USAID, located on the Internet athttp://www.fews.org), tracks newpopulation movements, food pricelevels, and abrupt asset sales as ad-vance indicators of impending crisis.Measures such as crude mortalityrate (CMR), excess mortality, andcross-border flight are reported asmeasures of realized crisis and can berough indicators of how far a countryis from being able to accept develop-ment programs. These same measuresmight also be used to track ongoingcrises or the return situation ofaffected populations in post-crisisenvironments.

UNHCR staff members monitoring a repatriationmovement to Chechnya – UNHCR/T. Bølstad

■ 8.4 ■


Contacts with commercial entitiesworking in a country, or handlingtrade to and from a conflict zone canprove useful. Some multinationals,including Royal Dutch Shell, Mobil,Bechtel, and transport companies havefirst-hand observations on conflicttrends, export flows and port capaci-ties/needs. The ability of commercialcontractors to respond competitivelyand transparently to bids, howeverinformal, can be extremely valuable indetermining levels and types of eco-nomic activity.

Survey information is helpful fordetermining priority sectors forWorld Bank involvement. Over-flightassessment data incorporated intogeographic information systems (GIS)technologies, crop surveys, and otherobservational surveys can be drawn onto tabulate the remaining infrastruc-ture capacities in an area—includingthe extent of destruction of education,health and transport systems. Forexample, many NGOs examine andreport on the level of health care avail-able in areas where they propose towork. Taken together, this informationcan be used to map the health infra-structure of a country.

Information about the locationand extent of planted landmines isextremely important in many post-conflict situations. Internationalorganizations have recently establisheda protocol for examining the extent oflandmine coverage and its effects onsociety, called “level one surveys.”These surveys help aid agenciesprioritize assistance to areas requiringdemarcation, where populations neededucation for landmine awareness,and where alternate infrastructure

might be built. Landmine surveillance,in contrast to surveys, monitorsongoing problems with landmines,including ongoing planting of newmines, trends in landmine injuries,and improvements in the ability ofhealth systems to provide emergencyhealth care in a timely manner.

Determine threshold conditionsfor Bank re-engagement

The Watching Brief process serves toflag when the Bank can and shouldbegin planning for regular lendingoperations in a country. Thresholds forentry into technical assistance, or todeveloping an active loan portfolio,ought to be developed with eachcountry’s particular case in mind.Such thresholds include the absenceof systematic violence; the signing of apeace agreement by conflicting parties;the re-entry of other organizations,such as UNDP and foreign embassies;and the return of foreign directinvestment. External triggers includerecognition by neighbor governmentsof the legitimacy and authority of thenational government in the conflict-affected country.

■

Bank staff must makejudgments about the

reasonableness of movingforward with new programsbefore time has tested thedurability of peace and

reconciliation.

■

Initiate contingency planning

Because it is never easy to know whena conflict may re-ignite, a governmentcollapse, or populations flee, Bankstaff must make judgments about thereasonableness of moving forwardwith new programs before time hastested the durability of peace andreconciliation. The first step incontingency planning in post-conflictsituations is to assess the risk ofregression or return to conflict.Transition programs should also beplanned to minimize the exposureof investments to loss.

Shifting and emerging windowsof opportunity for intervention

Bank staff have to pay particularattention to finding accurate andmeaningful data in their countrieswhich help decide when to sequencedifferent interventions and invest-ments, when to exit from strictly reliefwork, and when more conventionaldevelopment programming is prefer-able. Unfortunately, conflict indicatorsor indicators of transition opportuni-ties are still primarily site-specific.

Much attention, however, is focusedon the re-invigoration of civil society.Crude measures of civil society includecountable institutions, participation innational and municipal politics andthe number of counterparts, and somemeasure of freedom of expression.Often the apparent growth in civilsociety is correlated with flows ofdonor commitments.

What external agencies would you contact first in beginning to develop a Watching Brieffor a country where, for example, the Bank has not been involved in ten years??

■ 8.5 ■


Working withinthe Bank’s legal andmandate restrictions

The World Bank cannot seek to influ-ence the political course of events inpost-conflict settings. In this regard,the World Bank is less flexible in itsuse of resources than many bilateralfunders. In general, the World Bankcan be active in post-conflict settingsso long as there is agreement amongthe Bank’s governing members. Forexample, following the Dayton PeaceAccords in Bosnia, donors agreed thatBank funds would be applied, alongwith other donor aid, to reinforcethose cities that had shown ethnictolerance.

In Tajikistan, World Bank programswere targeted to areas specified in thepeace accords, at the encouragementof stakeholders, including the govern-ment. It was not a decision to targetaid on an ongoing monitoring basis.Instead, the targeting allowed for amore sustainable investment, from anational point of view, than alternativeprograms that might not have rein-forced peace.

■

Bank financingshould not be based on

or conditioned bypolitical or military goals;instead, the financing of

rehabilitation andreconstruction activities

must be justified oneconomic grounds.

■

The World Bank must take intoaccount all potential risk factors thatmay realistically endanger thesustainability of a project, includingforces and political trends. The basicprinciple is this: Bank financing shouldnot be based on or conditioned bypolitical or military goals; instead,the financing of rehabilitation andreconstruction activities must bejustified on economic grounds.

Restrictions on arranging loansto governments

The main work of the Bank is toprovide loans to its members that are,by definition, national governments.Where a government has collapsedthere is no counterpart to “ask” forBank loans. Furthermore, new lendingis barred unless there is a nationalgovernment that neighboring statesrecognize as sovereign.

While the World Bank cannot play arole in raising or promoting the ques-tion of when a de facto governmentbecomes recognized, the Bank canmeet and work with UNDP, with coor-dinating committees of donors and UNagencies and other monitoring bodies.The Bank is not barred from assistancethat involves applying its technicalexpertise or knowledge of bankingfunctions to the problems of failedstates. In addition, the Bank can stillprovide grants to external agencies,including UN organizations workingwithin or around the country.

The Bank cannot loan tosub-national political entities

Although a portion of a country mayhave a stable government, as well asassistance needs that merit assistance,the World Bank cannot approve a loanto a sub-national government withoutconcurrence from a recognizednational government. An example isSomaliland which has had a stablegovernment over an area relatively freeof armed conflict. Because Somalilandremains part of Somalia, which lacks anational government, no loans can beentered into with the sub-nationalgovernment of Somaliland.

The Bank has shown, however,that it can move quickly to work withpost-conflict areas where a govern-ment exists in a newly split-offcountry. Eritrea, created in the after-math of a long conflict in Ethiopia,began discussions with the Bank about

loans shortly after its independence.Azerbaijan, Armenia and Tajikistan areall war-torn countries where the WorldBank has been involved since theywere recognized as separate nations,after the 1989-1991 splintering of theSoviet Union.

Communication with sub-nationalgroups may be permissible

Bank staff may find circumstanceswhere they have opportunities tocommunicate with factions that chal-lenge the sovereignty of a government.Indeed, communications with thesefactions might help signal the interna-tional community’s interest in seeing aresolution of the conflict. Such aninstance occurred when the democrati-cally elected government of SierraLeone requested that a World Bankcountry team speak with a militaryfaction that threatened to withholdpower from the elected government. Inthese circumstances, Bank teams maycommunicate in a non-political man-ner, or seek guidance from legal coun-sel and the operations committee.

Special grants can be targeted tonon-government organizations

The Bank has limitations in workingwith would-be breakaway regions,such as Kosovo, Southern Sudan, orthe Tamil-populated areas of northernSri Lanka. In such situations, the Bankmust work through the sovereignnational government and cannot enterinto discussions with authorities whocontrol contested territories. In somecases, however, special grants can betargeted to non-government organiza-tions. For example, in the 1990s, theWorld Bank provided an emergencygrant to UNICEF to develop watersources in war-torn Southern Sudan.At the time the grant was needed tosave lives, but it was also made onthe premise that the investment hadlong-term developmental value. Thisoccurred during a period when theGovernment of Sudan was in arrearsand, therefore, ineligible for Bankfunding.

■ 8.6 ■


Restrictions concerningstates in suspension

The World Bank, as well as regionallending institutions, cannot loan to agovernment that has failed to reconcileits payments to the IMF and the WorldBank. Inability to keep up with loanpayments is a recurrent problem incountries wracked by intense conflict,and is a particularly difficult dilemmafor new governments where the trea-sury may have been ransacked by theprevious government. Expediting theclearance of arrears is frequently a firststep toward reconstruction.

Assist with problems resultingfrom suspension

The World Bank may become involvedin resolving some of the problemsresulting from suspension, particularlywhere the counterpart governmentceases to exist (state collapse). When acountry goes into suspension, somecontractors may be left hanging. TheBank may become directly involved inhelping to resolve their payment crisis.As a result of such problems, a newBank policy requires counterparts toprovide advance notice if there is achance of going into suspension.

Coordinate international donorefforts to settle arrears

Because post-conflict countries maysee more monies committed thandelivered by international donors, theWorld Bank can play a pivotal role incoordinating donors to recognize theshort-term cash-flow difficulties of anew government as it makes efforts torepay past loans. A common way toclear arrears with the World Bank isfor bilateral donors to provide emer-gency funding so that the country canpay what is necessary.

The World Bank also plays a criticalrole in settling arrears for the shareddebt of newly divided states. In Ethio-pia and Eritrea, for example, the WorldBank established a standard formulafor determining how much of old-Ethiopia’s debt would be owed byEritrea, and how much by Ethiopia.

Land cannot be purchased withWorld Bank funds

Though Bank loans cannot supportprocurement of land for repatriation,resettlement or land redistribution,Bank lending can support activitiesrelated to land use. Funds may be usedto support the overall process by pro-viding micro-credit, land quality im-provements, shelter, and other inputsfor large populations moving to newlocations. In many forced resettlementprograms, the Bank has learned that alarge portion of the expenses related tothe provision of resettlement land isnot the purchase per se, but the recla-mation (e.g., clearing, enhancement)for which Bank funds can be used.

Bank loans are not meant tobe used for purchasing arms orsimple de-mining

As discussed in Tab 5, Bank fundscannot be used for weapons buy-backprograms during demobilization or forlandmine clearance itself. Based onevaluations of Bank reconstructionexperience in mine-contaminatedareas, recent guidelines direct theBank to support capacity buildingof demining centers, area deminingprograms, and sector deminingprograms (for example, as part of anagricultural rehabilitation program).In addition, the Bank can play apivotal role in funding alternativeinfrastructure (schools, roads) thatskirt mine-contaminated areas. Inthis regard, the Bank may be relativelymore flexible than other donors.

■

Based on evaluations ofBank reconstructionexperience in mine-

contaminated areas, recentguidelines direct the Bank tosupport capacity building of

demining centers, areademining programs, and

sector demining programs.

■

■

World Bank loansare for long-termdevelopment and

must notgive preference

to one political partyor set of actorsover another.

■

Further limitations onthe use of Bank funds

The principle is that World Bank loansare for long-term development andmust not give preference to one politi-cal party or set of actors over another.Elaboration of this rule prohibits Bankloans from being used to buy arma-ments, purchase land, or help raiserevenue that would normally comefrom taxes. These kinds of restrictionshave made it difficult to address ur-gent needs in post-conflict settingssuch as the removal of landmines,disarming of combatants and provi-sion of loans where the governmentlacks matching contributions.

Bank loans cannot be used topay for taxes

When a government has little or norevenue, it is unable to provide even aminimal match for World Bank loans.The prohibition against using Bankfunds to pay taxes has posed a short-term impediment in some post-conflictsettings. In Rwanda, for example,World Bank funds were used to payfor tariffs and import duties relatedto procurement within projects. Thisexception to Bank rules was madebecause of the extreme difficultyfacing the counterpart. When excep-tions are made, the key task is todocument them clearly—explainingthe rationale for the exception, therequest, and the decision by thosein authority.

■ 8.7 ■


Working withand strengtheningcounterparts

The first step in working with counter-parts in post-conflict countries is todetermine which government repre-sentatives actually have the authorityto enter into programs with the Bank.In the past, Bank staff have workedwith national delegations, only to findlater that these delegations did nothave negotiating authority.

Government ministry structures,rules, and responsibilities may also beill-defined in post-conflict administra-tions where new ministries are beingorganized (or reorganized) and staffed.Post-conflict governments display amore rapid-than-average turnover ofofficials in positions of authority.Where government staffing is largelynew, subsequent political realignmentsare likely to result in sudden switchesin postings. Similarly, because of un-clear responsibilities, governmentcounterparts are frequently unpreparedto make decisions.

Train government counterpartsin skills of civil administration

Frequently, either former militaryofficers or former humanitarian reliefworkers obtain senior level positionsin post-conflict governments. Often,neither one is particularly trained orexperienced in the skills or conceptsof public administration, or in itslanguage and procedures. In addition,junior staff, perhaps also ex-military,may have insufficient technical skillsor lack discretion.

A lesson of Bank experience, there-fore, is to provide non-military publicadministration and management train-ing for middle managers with a focuson conducting business in civiliansettings. In addition, Bank teams areadvised to second consultants tocounterpart ministries and bringtheir representatives to World Bankheadquarters for training to enhancetheir decision making and manage-ment skills.

Facilitate re-establishmentof agreements withneighboring states

During protracted conflicts and statecollapse, formal arrangements withneighboring countries may havelapsed. Sector-specific programs atthe Bank can promote faster resolutionof potential inter-state conflicts ashappened during the disputes betweenSudan and Egypt over water manage-ment and the headwaters of the Nile.At the same time, however, Bankpolicy is clear that counterpart govern-ments must approve and supportBank programs.

For example, although food self-sufficiency is a top priority in Eritrea,the most straight-forward way ofachieving it depends on the agreementof both Egypt and Sudan. Agriculturaloutput could be increased throughimproved water management andretention by building small- to me-dium-sized check dams on mountainstreams (thus increasing arable landand reducing variance in water avail-ability). Unfortunately, all streams onthe western versant drain, ultimately,into the Nile. Egypt and Sudan say thatthey will go to war if anyone impingeson their (perceived) water rights. Sincethe Bank’s International Waters Poli-cies preclude investment in anythinginvolving water diversion when theinterested parties are not in agreement,the Bank’s options for addressing ruralpoverty and food self-sufficiencythrough agricultural assistance projectsare extremely limited unless the Bankcan foster successful negotiationsbetween Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea.

Encourage communityinvolvement

Community discussions about WorldBank programs can be an integral partof reconciliation and reconstruction.Community decision making, in andof itself, can be an important part ofgrassroots reconciliation, separatefrom decisions about how to investexternal resources in new programs.

Mozambican women holding a workshop on peaceand reconciliation – Christian Care

The PRODERE program inEl Salvador

In El Salvador, PRODERE providedmomentum for the peace accordsby stabilizing social, economic andpolitical conditions. Community-level discussions on developmentpriorities were initiated whichpermitted populations historicallyexcluded from the broad politicalprocess to have a voice in identify-ing community needs and decidingpriorities. By supporting thedemands of uprooted populationsto return home to demilitarizedcommunities, PRODERE helped toredefine the content and shape ofofficial policies. The program wasinstrumental in tipping the balanceof power away from military to-ward civilian authorities through-out the region. In Nicaragua and ElSalvador, PRODERE was able toaccelerate the shift of control overpopulation settlement policy.Source: Lessons of the PRODERE Experiencein Central America by Peter Sollis andChristina Schultz, 1995

■ 8.8 ■


Consensus-building efforts were acritical part of achieving peace and thereintegration of populations in CentralAmerica in the 1990s, after many yearsof war. The UNDP program in CentralAmerica, known as PRODERE, foundthat the process of working with vil-lages and municipalities had as muchof an impact as the actual projects thatwere implemented.

■

Community decision making,in and of itself, can be an

important part of grassrootsreconciliation, separate

from decisions about how toinvest external resources in

new programs.

■

Seek common ground withother international aid groups

Transition periods require greatercoherence and coordination among aidagencies for a variety of reasons. Onereason is the importance of a properhand-over between emergency activi-ties and longer-term reintegration anddevelopment work. For example, afailure to provide continuity betweenaid to refugees and their eventualreturn can be a trigger for renewedconflict. This is one reason that theWorld Bank and UNHCR now favormore cooperative working arrange-ments, including cross-secondments,joint training, and a working agree-ment to share information for Watch-ing Briefs.

In the 1990s, Azerbaijan had severalhundred thousand internally displacedpeople as a result of the armed conflictwith Armenia. When the World Bankbecame involved in long-term planningfor Azerbaijan, UNHCR was providingsupport to the internally displaced.Both agencies worked closely together,which proved to be pivotal for thesuccess of their joint programs. With-out the World Bank’s backing, UNHCR

would not have been permitted accessto front-line (near-conflict) areaswhere many of the displaced wereseeking resettlement. Without theBank’s support for a comprehensiveshelter program, various bilateraldonors would not have had a frame-work within which to effectivelyapply their semi-humanitarian, semi-development aid.

NGOs are not only a useful sourceof information, but they are alsovaluable counterparts for transitionprograms, particularly in health care,nutrition, basic agricultural services(seeds and tools), social services,education, and peace education (in-cluding ethnic tolerance). Becausethey were already doing these tasksduring the conflict period, they haveinvestments, experience and presencethat will be lost if the Bank fails to tapthem. In many other sectors, includ-ing infrastructure rebuilding, govern-ment training, and macroeconomicreform, the Bank needs to explorecreative ways for cooperating with thegrowing number of specialized com-mercial firms that work with bilateraldonors to help promote governance.

Assessing needs andthe optimal role forthe World Bank

Decisions about use of Bank resourcescannot be made strictly on a return-on-investment basis. Instead, effortmust be targeted toward those verytime-sensitive needs that are specificto the phase of the peace or recon-struction effort. More flexible socialassessments are required to identifythese needs.

Instead of thinking in terms ofconventional sector needs as de-scribed in earlier sections, Bank offic-ers must identify problem areas thatcan inhibit the entire progressiontowards stable, peaceful rehabilita-tion. For example, there may be spe-cific problems with a country’s lawsthat will hinder the successful reinte-gration of war-affected populations.Short-term reform of inheritance laws

might be urgently needed to accom-modate them. Similarly, the Bank canfacilitate the development of formalrelationships between humanitarian-aid NGOs and the government so thattransition work already begun byprivate aid groups is not preventedfrom going forward.

Perhaps one of the greatest advan-tages the Bank can bring to post-conflict settings is its knowledge ofcomparable situations. Local stake-holders benefit from hearing how thespecial problems of transition worked,or didn’t work, in other countries thathad similar problems. Bank experi-ences with social safety nets for vul-nerable populations can be proposedas interim measures to address pov-erty while a nation rebuilds.

Pinpoint gaps in theoverall aid portfolio

The Bank is generally not among thefirst humanitarian assistance organiza-tions to begin programming in post-conflict countries. Therefore, Bankstaff have the opportunity to surveywhat others are doing in order toselectively focus on sectors which aredisproportionately under-supported byother humanitarian assistance agen-cies. It is likely that the World Bank’scomparative strength will involvebuilding on household survival strate-gies, informal trade, rebuilding infra-structure that is critical to marketaccess, and informal credit systems.Few other agencies are capable of theeconomic analysis needed, particularlygiven the lack of statistics in post-conflict situations.

■

Few other agencies arecapable of the economic

analysis needed, particularlygiven the lack of statistics in

post-conflict situations.

■

■ 8.9 ■


Compare social sectors againstbaseline conditions

Increasingly, the Bank recognizes theneed for a social safety net that canhandle crises as well as address long-term structural poverty. The centralelement of the proposed safety net fordeveloping countries is a public guar-

How do social assessments need to be adapted for post-conflict environments?

What Bank resources are appropriate for aid in the rebuilding of “social capital”?

?

?

Mobilizing resources

Funds for humanitarian (emergency)aid tend to be separated at the donorlevel from funds for development aid.As a result, funding of “transition”programs tends to be in short supply.Resource mobilization for post-con-flict settings is late and long drawn-out, whether managed via DonorRound Tables, Consultative Groups orcountry-specific Trust Funds. Ad hocpledges by donors are often notmatched by timely appropriations anddisbursements. Indeed the WorldBank’s normal development lending istoo slow to meet post-conflict transi-tion program needs.

Yet, the Bank can play an importantrole in helping to coordinate resourcemobilization among donors, and toprovide key resources of its own. Themore appropriate lending tends to bethe Social Fund kinds of investmentfor community-based activities, in-cluding public works rebuilding.

Two recent lending instruments havebeen developed to help expeditequicker disbursal and greater flexibility.The most notable—the Learning andInnovation Loan (LIL)—is smaller andeasier to design and disburse than mostloans. It encourages learning by doing,which is fitting for the shifting terrainof post-conflict settings. These loans,however, are limited to $5 million insize. The new Adaptable ProgramLending (APL)—pronounced like’Apple’—is also geared for shorterproject cycles and allows for mid-courseadjustments. But the APL is somewhatless flexible than the LIL in that itrequires better coordination in-country.

The Bank can also raise resources fornon-loan assistance, including policyadvice, capacity building for new gov-ernment staff, and technical assess-ments. An example is the InstitutionalDevelopment Fund (IDF), which hasproven particularly useful for upgrad-

ing the professional capacity of newgovernments, most recently in Liberia.

The Post Conflict Fund (PCF) exists topromote the Bank’s efforts in develop-ing transitional support strategies,Watching Briefs, and cross-cuttingresearch among its partners toexchange information and lessons.

The Japanese Post-Conflict Fund(JPCF) is another recent resource, inthe range of $15 million per annum,to help support the Bank’s technicalefforts in post-conflict settings. TheJPCF is oriented toward Asian coun-tries. Some tasks, such as the develop-ment of a Transition Support Strategy,may be co-funded by both the PCFand the JPCF.

Another fund, the Consultancy TrustFund (CTF), is useful for bringing inkey technical assistance for surveys,analysis and technical assistance inproject design and monitoring.

antee of low-wage work on commu-nity-initiated projects. For example,the federal or state government mayannounce its willingness to finance aspecified number of days of work oncommunity projects for any adult,at a wage rate no higher than a certainpercentage of the market wage forunskilled manual labor in a normal

year. The work is available to anyone,at any time, crisis or not. This typeof safety net extends the coverage ofpublic works schemes, often found inrelief efforts, to include normal timeswhen demands for such work wouldbe much lower.

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Administration issues

The unique nature of post-conflictsituations requires creativity withregard to programming decisions aswell as the administration of projects.The precarious peace in some post-conflict countries may require quickdisbursement, or disbursement tonon-traditional entities. As a result,Bank administrative processes mayneed to be adapted to facilitate work-ing in these situations.

Disbursement

The main problem encountered withdisbursement is not the Bank’s poli-cies or procedures but the capabilityof counterparts to receive, track andmanage accounts received. Therefore,many of the solutions to disbursementproblems involve training post-conflictgovernment personnel in accounting.

Bank staff need to be creative indisbursing loans. In some post-conflictcountries there is no central bank orthe government prefers to draw froman international bank, for example, inNew York. There can be advantages toworking with external banks wherecurrency controls and money suppliesare weak. Liberia and Malawi havepresented interesting cases where thelack of Central Bank capacities led theBank to find alternate sites for manag-ing aid accounts.

Due to weak legal infrastructures, aclimate of uncertainty, and poor gov-ernment supervision, the Bank haslearned that it is better to support thedevelopment of new banking systems,as opposed to the reinforcement, orreform, of existing state-owned banks.Banking reform should stress decen-tralized, institution building and pen-alties for weak banks (Claessens1996).

Accounting

In the field, it is less important to havesophisticated accounting software inplace, than it is to have a competentperson keeping basic records, evenwith pencil and paper. Because excep-tions to accounting procedures occurin these settings and needs are great,it is all the more important to ensurethat decisions are made at theappropriate level and are thoroughlydocumented.

■

In the field,it is less important

to have sophisticatedaccounting software in place,

than it is to havea competent person

keeping basic records,even with

pencil and paper.

■

Bank staff recommend bringinggovernment personnel from post-conflict countries to World Bank head-quarters for weeks or months of expo-sure and training. Funds spent onimproving their skills pay better divi-dends than do resources spent onmore controls or recording systems, orfor conducting Bank reviews.

Procurement

In post-conflict settings, the domesticcommercial sector often cannot deliveradequately, so normal standards forcompetitive bidding may need to bemodified with approval from the coun-try director. For example, in Bosnia,the Bank adopted simplified procure-ment procedures that had importantrepercussions. The threshold for inter-national competitive bidding wasraised and the Bank was able to use

“limited international bidding,” whichinvolves “shopping” for project quota-tions rather than the Bank’s standard“public bidding” process that can takeup to six months to complete. Notonly did the limited internationalbidding process save time, it alsoallowed transition programs to beginsooner. Bosnia was the first instancewhere the Executive Director wasdirectly involved in order to influenceprocurement processes. The change inprocedures required the Bank to takeextra steps to ensure standard auditingpractices to counter-balance therushed procurement procedures andto check processes and prices.

From similar experiences in Africaand elsewhere, Bank procurementofficers have learned that they needsufficient advance warning to designadaptations to normal procurementprocedures. Normally, internationalbidding requires a “public bid open-ing” (international competitive biddinginvolves advertising widely for fair-ness) and a 45-day window just toallow for replies (bids). Even after theproject is designed, the contract sign-ing process can take 4-6 months. Thisis an unreasonably long period to waitfor urgent transition support projectsneeded in the immediate aftermath ofconflicts.

In post-conflict settings and forsmall projects, however, the processcan proceed faster with “shopping” (orlimited international bidding) wherebythe Bank invites five companies tosubmit a quotation by fax in roughlytwo weeks’ time. Bank staff workingin post-conflict settings should takeadvantage of the shopping processby ensuring that small projects aredesigned and that, when necessary,the country office makes a request toraise the threshold for internationalcompetitive bidding.

■ 8.11 ■


■

Even after the project isdesigned, the contract signingprocess can take 4-6 months.This is an unreasonably long

period to wait for urgenttransition support projectsneeded in the immediateaftermath of conflicts.

■

Supervision and monitoring

Bank staff and Government officialstend to treat resettlement and reinte-gration programs as one-strike efforts,though monitoring and supervisionmay be needed for several years. Inone recent population resettlementprogram, the Bank was faulted forinadequate supervision of projectimplementation. Payments to villagerswho were moved did not resolveinsecure land tenure arrangements,which Government offices had beenestablished to oversee. “There was afailure to make the transition fromrelocation assistance to rehabilitation,and the government agencies thatwere entrusted to provide follow-updid not do so” (World Bank 1998).Bank operations should have beenmonitoring the accomplishment of theprogram’s objectives.

Based on your own experience, what administrative measures work effectively tominimize corruption in post-conflict countries??

Tapping a range ofWorld Bank specialists

For the Bank to improve its perfor-mance in post-conflict settings, it mustpromote, throughout the Bank, greaterinteraction among those with sharedexperiences in war-torn societies.Informal networks and thematicgroups may be valuable tools forsharing experience and expertise.

The Post Conflict Unit

The Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) of theWorld Bank, created in late 1997,provides advice, references, links, andcross-support. The PCU developspolicy guidelines, instruments, andapproaches to work in different post-conflict settings on all continents.PCU staff can advise on, or help makecontacts with external agencies thatspecialize in post-conflict humanitar-ian analysis or implementation.

In 1998 the Bank’s European Officein Paris hosted a conference of donorsinvolved in post-conflict transitionplanning—such as the Office of Transi-tion Initiatives (OTI), a part of USAIDthat specializes in analyzing the transi-tion from war to peace—in order todevelop closer working relationshipswith them. This network can betapped through the Post-Conflict Unit.

■

For the Bank to improve itsperformance in post-conflictsettings, it must promote,

throughout the Bank, greaterinteraction among those with

shared experiences in war-torn societies.

■

In addition, the Post-Conflict Unit isin frequent and regular contact withUNHCR, the Red Cross, and variousNGOs. The PCU also has knowledge ofand contacts with a wide range ofresearch organizations worldwide thattrack conflicts and can commissionfield-level research. Examples rangefrom the OECD Informal DAC TaskForce on Conflict, Peace and Develop-ment Cooperation to the Foundation-supported Carnegie Commission onthe Prevention of Deadly Violence.

Post-Conflict Unit staff can alsoprovide direct cross-support as part ofcountry teams. PCU staff understandsocial assessment techniques, partici-patory appraisal techniques, and theoptions for using experts in non-quan-titative methods who can deal with thespecial assessment and appraisal prob-lems that transition settings pose.

■ 8.12 ■


The Financial Crisis Unit

The Financial Crisis Unit (FCU) worksclosely with the country offices of theSoutheast Asian countries affected bythe 1997-1999 collapse in exchangerates, investments, and equity mar-kets. This unit specializes in rapidprogram planning in support of re-structuring banking, capital controlmarkets, currency boards and othermacro-economic policies. The FCUalso analyzes and proposes plans thathelp address the short-term surges inpoverty, as seen in Indonesia. Theanalytic skills of this unit may applywell to other crisis settings, includinggovernments coming out from underintense conflict.

The DisasterManagement Facility

The Disaster Management Facilityfacilitates innovative Bank aid in thoseexceptional circumstances character-ized by natural disasters, includingclimate change, earthquakes, floodand fire hazards. The Facility’s goalsinclude the provision of operationalsupport, promotion of capacity build-ing, and establishment of partnershipswith both the international andscientific communities to work ondisaster issues.

Thematic groups

The World Bank Thematic Group onEconomics of War-to-Peace Transitionprovides theoretical and technicalsupport on post-conflict economics.In order to lend greater discipline tothe analysis and interpretation of post-conflict situations, the group includeseconomists from all parts of the WorldBank. In addition to this thematicgroup, the Bank also has experiencetailoring micro-credit programs to theunique financing and insurance needsof reintegration populations. TheResettlement Thematic Group or anyof the Bank’s Regional Resettlementcoordinators can also provide valuableresettlement expertise.

■ 8.13 ■



The Bank is often among the last aid agencies to come into a country affectedby conflict. Therefore, in meeting the urgent needs of the country, the Bankneeds to understand what other organizations are already doing and wheretheir programs begin and end.

The Watching Brief serves four key purposes: to forewarn the Bank about thelikely time when operations can re-commence; to improve understanding ofthe special political risks, and economic and social needs that occur in conflicts;to identify the areas of comparative advantage where the Bank should plan towork; and, to examine and compare potential counterparts that the Bankshould work with.

In obtaining information for the Watching Brief and for the Transition SupportStrategy, Bank staff need to look outside the Bank more, in collaboration withother non-governmental organizations including the UN. Health, agriculture,education and vulnerability data can be garnered from humanitarian NGOs.Information about production, trade, credit and infrastructure are more likelyto require in-field research initiated by the Bank.

In designing the Transition Support Strategy, Bank staff need to be aware ofthe full range of options and legal restrictions for Bank lending. Creativity andpolitical sensitivity will be needed in order to design programs that reinforcepeace, population return, and social rebuilding. Experience has taught thatthere are many ways for the Bank to address a problem.

Procurement and disbursement procedures can be modified in simple ways toallow for more rapid initiation of new projects during the post-conflict period.In particular, the budget threshold for which international competitive biddingbecomes necessary can be raised, allowing for more programming to be doneby informal and rapid shopping.

The Post-Conflict Unit was created as a center of expertise and resource for therest of the Bank. The PCU maintains routine communications with a wide arrayof external entities that can be helpful in analyzing conflicts and in designingand implementing reconstruction.

■ 8.14 ■


8.1

Environmental conservation representsa large and growing sector for WorldBank programs, and for thousands ofnon-governmental organizations aswell. The Bank’s lead role in support-ing the Global Environmental Facilityis testament to the primary role theBank plays in coordinating technicallessons and programming to protectthe environment.

Yet there is a large gulf between theknowledge and practice of effectiveenvironmental programming in conflictversus non-conflict settings. Mosthabitat-protection programs take manyyears to develop, foster and seethrough. Indeed, by their nature, theyimply a very long-term outcome ofprotracted protection. But in complexemergencies, environmental and con-servation implementing agencies areparticularly incapable of knowing howto react, and tend to exit the setting. In

their place, a plethora of emergencyaid organizations, such as UNHCRon the UN side or CARE, as an NGO,become involved in a whole differentset of environmental programs thatattempt to mitigate environmentaldamage by providing fuel (fuelwoodor charcoal) to displaced populations.

The table below illustrates some ofthe general types of environmentalconsequences that have resulted fromemergencies, mass migrations andfailed states.

Most of the work of emergency groupshas been directed toward short-termremediation. Common programs thatare implemented include the provisionof fuel-efficient stoves to refugeehouseholds in order to decrease theirenergy consumption, and environmen-tal education to explain to displacedpopulations the importance of avoid-ing the indiscriminate killing of local

A N N E X

Environmental conservation in conflict and post conflict

wildlife. There have been few suchprograms that have continuity or link-age with the longer-term efforts ofgovernment ministries, the WorldBank, the GEF, UNEP or environmentalNGOs to demarcate and establish lawsand regulations to protect fragile habi-tats or keystone species.

UNHCR has a growing environmentalprotection section, which has recentlypublished a series of guidelines, gearedtoward minimizing short-term environ-mental harm. The World Bank, how-ever, can play a critical role in provid-ing the bridge between short- andlong-term, particularly to fill in wheregovernments are weak. In Pakistan,the World Bank and UNHCR teamedup for a large, unique reforestationprogram in the hills of Baluchistan,which had been degraded by largecamp-based populations of refugeesfrom Afghanistan.

Wooded Fragile habitats General Endangeredbiomass loss, as distinct wildlife speciesland cover whole

Large refugee camps High Sometimes High Sometimes Small

Government collapse,no ministry Low relationship High Modest High

Armed factions,invading armies Low Modest Moderately high Moderately high

Economic collapse/desperation Moderate Moderate Modest Moderate

Withdrawal ofconservationorganizations Low High Low High

Environmental consequences resulting from emergencies

■ 8.15 ■


Primary or basic education is oftencut back during conflicts, particularlyas young people become recruited inconflict, families are broken up andforced to migrate, and state-supportedschool systems lose their budgetresources. Aid agencies tend to seeeducation as a lesser priority than foodand health and so it often is forgottenuntil the post-conflict transition.

Post-conflict reconstruction has seenthe greatest surge in attention in recentyears, including the roles for educa-tion, vocational re-training of demobi-lized soldiers, and activities thatpromote peace and reconciliation.Education and training initiatives arenow put forward as key elements inthe bridge from relief operations tolonger-term development. UNHCR,UNICEF, and UNESCO now emphasize“education for repatriation” in theirrelief programs. Primary education andvocational training foster knowledgeand skills that can improve economic

reconstruction, health and nutrition,family planning, income generation,and long-term self-sufficiency.The evidence suggests that perhaps itis in post-conflict settings where thereis the most opportunity to work inten-sively with adolescents, whose schoolattendance normally falls off withadvancing age. Adolescence is an ageat which young people begin to makeindependent decisions about theirhealth and to form attitudes and adoptbehaviors that influence their currentand future health, as well as the healthof their children. Schools may be keysentinel sites for monitoring psycho-social recovery of trauma-affectedchild populations. Given the numberof post-conflict and state-transitionsituations in Central America, Africa,and the Former Soviet Union, manyaid agencies have gained considerableprogramming expertise in the deliveryof vocational programs married withcredit provision. In Central Asia,Eastern Europe and other areas ofthe Former Soviet Union, the deter-ioration of educational services has

A N N E X

Education in the transition from conflict

led to youth unemployment as wellas a collapsing vocational educationsystem.

Much of the positive experience hasbeen in how in-service training ofteacher networks can be put in placein a very short period. With just a fewweeks of training, schools can beestablished in a decentralized mannerduring the immediate post-conflictperiod. The lessons of this kind ofhighly decentralized model have beenlearned from work in the 1990s inplaces like Mozambique, Rwanda,Cambodia, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

When populations are displaced toother countries for protracted periods,questions arise about the selection oflanguage for schools, the choice ofcurriculum, and the use of refugeeversus host-country teacher cadres.The World Bank’s Post Conflict Unitcan be a source of further insight andadvice on how these questions havebeen resolved in different settings.

8.2

■ 8.16 ■


In recent years the interactions amongwar, drought, mass forced migration,and the disruption of services andindustry have contributed to circum-stances where infectious disease andstarvation have led to millions ofavoidable deaths. The re-establishmentof health networks and of water andsanitation infrastructures is made moredifficult in complex emergencies be-cause of the massive dislocation ofpeople and the ongoing conflict andbanditry which makes access to vul-nerable groups difficult, if not impos-sible. In Bosnia, deliveries of drug andfood supplies suffered delays at check-points. Basic vaccines, necessary toprevent epidemics among children,were not delivered throughout Somaliabecause of armed robbery of the refrig-erators necessary to maintain the coldchain. Efforts to re-establish basichealth programs in complex emergen-cies are complicated by the need toaddress disease epidemics (cholera,shigella, HIV, Ebola), sporadic up-surges in war-related casualties andthe inability to accurately determinethe size and location of affected popu-lations, particularly internally dis-placed persons (IDPs).

While reaching populations who areon the move is hard enough, the deliv-ery and provision of assistance mayalso have to be discontinued in conflictsituations. Both during and followingcomplex emergencies, there is a rise inviolence, including armed robbery offood/medical convoys, and violentattacks on health professionals. Thegreat challenge in complex emergen-cies is reconstructing health systemswhen they are being torn down as fast

as they are being built up. Rarely is itpossible to know the long-term viabil-ity of implemented programs. In manycomplex emergencies, equipmentinstalled, clinics built, and personneltrained are soon lost with new roundsof conflict and displacement. It isdifficult to know when it is safe toinvest in different interventions, whichcould be lost. In conflicts, refugee,repatriation and post-conflict settings,humanitarian aid agencies have, overtime, learned to give priority to thefollowing programs (in order frommost important on down):

1. Location, measles immunizationand blankets. Address the threeurgent imperatives which are thebig killers in conflict: inappropriatecamp locations and densities (over-crowding), failure to vaccinate andhypothermia. Ensure that displacedpeople are located/encamped inthe right place, and moved onwardor home as soon as possible; vacci-nate for measles (and give vitaminA which reduces measles severity);and provide blankets to reducehypothermia.

2. Surveillance system. Establishsentinel sites and train the Ministryof Health to aggregate health re-ports and trends in order to imme-diately note important diseasetrends (e.g. shigella, meningitis,cholera, malaria, etc.)

3. Provide safe water supply—20 liters per person per day.Rehabilitate urban water systems;add chlorine everywhere. Safewater is the biggest gap in most aidprograms. Only Oxfam, MSF and

A N N E X

Health care program considerations inpost-conflict transition

the Red Cross routinely providewater and sanitation.

4. Set up community health teamsand referral systems. Train andsupport community health workerswho save far more lives than doclinics or hospitals. They arethe key not only to preventiveprograms—including educationand social mobilization—but arealso the basis for effective referralnetworks.

5. Primary health care for children.Establish maternal-child healthcenters with immunization andgrowth monitoring.

6. Contain infectious diseases.Test for, monitor, treat prophylaxand provide education to controlcommunicable diseases. Wherenecessary, reduce reservoirs orvectors of disease.

7. Food and nutrition. Provide 2,000kilocalories per day, plus essentialvitamins and minerals, and seedsand tools and other support foragricultural recovery and for house-hold gardens that provide dietarydiversity (micronutrients).

8. Clinical care. Organize rehabilita-tion of clinics, training of medicalstaff, stocking of essential drugs.

9. Reproductive health care forwomen. Train traditional birthattendants (TBAs), educate aboutsexually transmitted diseases, anddevelop a referral network foremergency obstetrics.

8.3

■ 8.17 ■


The psychosocial health of peoplewho have experienced complex emer-gencies has become an importantpublic health problem. The effects ofviolence and displacement on humanhealth and the subsequent need forpsychosocial services have attractedparticular attention since the experi-ences of the Great Lakes Regions ofAfrica and Eastern Europe. Expertsagree that psychosocial disability is avery prevalent problem, as docu-mented in epidemiological surveys inRwanda, Bosnia and El Salvador. Afew of the program recommendationsare as follows:

■ Utilize a pyramid of mental healthneeds and outline the types ofpsychosocial interventions neededto support people at those differentlevels.

■ Engage the community in address-ing the issues of persons at the topof the pyramid (unaccompaniedchildren, severely disabled persons)so that the community continues tobe involved in caring for its own.

■ Develop a base of competentpsychosocial professionals inagencies who can respond rapidlyto a crisis, and who can come withsome of their own resources.

■ Cull best practice guidance,including unconventional pro-grams, such as children’s soccerleagues.

■ Train para-professionals, suchas teachers, to provide supportto the community.

■ Utilize traditional art and musicto restore the community(e.g., traditional weaving oftextiles, puppeteers).

■ Promote groups for widows, etc.that are visible to the communityat large.

■ Foster economic gains as anessential component necessaryfor the sustainability of psycho-social gains.

Some organizations, such as MSF, IRCand UNICEF have implemented com-munity-oriented programs—theater,support networks, media—that reachlarge populations. The efficacy of suchefforts remains unknown. A recentbook by Save the Children critiquesthe clinical method, and presents arange of field experiences with com-batants, separated families and rapevictims caught in complex emergen-cies. The various contributors to the

A N N E X

Recent thinking on post-conflict psychological andsocial barriers to development

book dispute Western-based viewsabout trauma (and Post TraumaticStress Disorder—PTSD—in particular).They question their appropriatenessfor other cultures and challenge clini-cally-oriented approaches. “Rethinkingthe trauma of war means a shift awayfrom projects targeted at individuals,or specific groups of victims such aschild soldiers or victims of rape” andtoward community-based healing thatincorporates justice, listening, andrebuilding social structures that canrenew meaning for living. None of thefunctional consequences of psychoso-cial trauma has been quantified, so itremains unclear how to prioritize ordeal with this problem in long-termreconstruction. The World Bank hasconducted research on this veryquestion—looking at the connectionsbetween displacement, trauma, depres-sion, PTSD indices, current employ-ment, current expenditures, and cur-rent social participation. The researchis based on a national (representative)household survey completed in 1999 inBurundi—a country coming out ofdecades of conflict.

8.4

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Brown, Michael, Rosecrance, Richard. 1999. The Costs of Conflict: Preventionand Cure in the Global Arena. New York: Carnegie Commission on PreventingDeadly Conflict.

Claessens, Stijn. 1996. “Banking Reform in Transition Countries.” World BankResearch Paper.

Economic Development Institute (EDI) and the Austrian Center for Peace andConflict Resolution. 1999. Project Preparation and Management: A TrainingManual for Bosnia and Herzegovina (still in draft).

ESSD Network/Social Development Family. 1998. Involuntary Resettlement:Guidelines for Processing the Resettlement Component in World Bank Projects.Washington, DC. The World Bank pamphlet.

Gibbs, Christopher et al. 1998. Nongovernmental Organizations in Bank-SupportedProjects: A Review. Washington, DC: World Bank Operations EvaluationDepartment.

Loan Department.x July 1998. Disbursement Procedures Manual. Washington DC:World Bank.

Landau, Luis. 1998. Rebuilding the Mozambique Economy: Country AssistanceReview. Washington, DC: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department.

Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. 1997. Helping CountriesCombat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Washington, DC: The World Bank

Social Development Family. 1998. The Initiative on Defining, Monitoring andMeasuring Social Capital: Text of Proposals Approved for Funding. Washington, DC:The World Bank.

Sollis, Peter and Christina Schultz. 1995. Lessons of the PRODERE Experience inCentral America. Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, Focus Paper 3.

World Bank. 1998. Recent Experience with Involuntary Resettlement, TogoNangbeto. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. 1995. Emergency Assistance Program for the Occupied Territories(West Bank and Gaza). Washington, DC: The World Bank.

R E F E R E N C E S

Documents

documents.worldbank.orgdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/pt/... · iv Introduction v Acronyms vi Glossary. Tab 1 Business as Usual? 1.2 Characteristics of post-conflict countries 1.4