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It’s all in the mind:

How social identification processes affect neurophysiological responses

Naomi Ellemers Félice van Nunspeet Daan Scheepers

Leiden University

In many situations people think of themselves and others not as separate individuals, but

as representatives of social groups. As a result of shared group memberships, the characteristics

and actions of other group members also reflect upon the image of the self in one’s own eyes and

in the eyes of others – one’s social identity. Social identification processes - the tendency to

associate the self with particular others or groups - can be seen as indicating a specific mindset.

People can think in terms of shared identities even in the absence of instrumental

interdependence or interpersonal similarity concerns, and different identities can become salient

in different contexts. In our lab we have started to examine the impact of social identification

processes on neurophysiological responses to the behavior of individuals in group contexts. We

present data from different studies to illustrate how group memberships are visible in people’s

minds.

The group self

The self is a central construct in human psychology. The way people reflect upon

themselves impacts on the way they feel, the goals they try to pursue, and the things they

communicate to others. The implicit assumption underlying most theory and research on the self,

however, is that individuals can be understood as separate entities that are guided by their own

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personal concerns, needs, and goals. Although this approach helps explain many aspects of

human behavior, it does not fully take into account that people seldomly operate in isolation, and

essentially are social animals living together in groups. Indeed, more often than not people

primarily perceive themselves and others as representing distinct social groups. This has

important implications for their behavior, and has been identified as a key factor in the

emergence of contemporary societal problems that emerge when relations between groups are

more important than inter-individual similarities or interpersonal liking, such as soccer

hooliganism, inter-ethnic and religious tensions, or hate crimes against homosexuals.

Approaching people as group members also helps understand more day-to-day problems

concerning communication, motivation, cooperation and effective leadership at work (Haslam et

al., 2003).

To better understand these issues, in the nineteen-seventies Henri Tajfel and John Turner

developed what later became known as ‘social identity theory’ (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also

Branscombe & Postmes, 2011), to complement insights that can be derived from individual-level

explanations of the self. This theoretical approach specifies when the self can be transform to a

different level – so that the group self becomes more important than the individual self – and

how this is likely to impact upon the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses of individual

group members (Turner, 1987). The theory specifies social categorization, social comparison

and social identification as key elements in this process of transformation. It details conditions

under which either the individual self or the group self is likely to become primary, and predicts

how people are likely to respond when the group self is under threat (see also Ellemers &

Haslam, 2011).

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Social categorization is a cognitive process used to organize and understand social

information by clustering individuals into specific groups. At the same time, classifying the self

and others into distinct categories tends to enhance perceived differences between members of

different groups while emphasizing similarities between members of the same group. Social

comparisons between members of different groups are used to understand the value implications

of group membership. Evaluating how specific features of a particular group compare to the

characteristics of other groups helps to assess the distinctive value of the group, and informs

expectations about behaviors that can typically be expected from members of that group. Social

identification speaks to the crucial difference between social categories as compared to object

categories. Considering groups of humans always has implications for the self, in that it is not

possible to conceive of a certain class of individuals without immediately being aware whether

the self is included in or excluded from this group.

In principle, each of us can be considered in terms of multiple cross-cutting or

overlapping groups (Ellemers & Rink, 2005). Which of these group selves is activated has

important implications for the way we see ourselves and relate to others. For instance, we (NE

and FvN) can classify ourselves in terms of a common identity as we both are Dutch, women,

and psychologists. However, we may just as well focus on the differences between us, when we

consider tenured vs. untenured scientists, parents vs. non-parents, or computer whizzes vs.

computer dummies. Depending on which of these group-selves becomes important, we may

think of ourselves as being similar or different, feel good or bad about ourselves, or

communicate differently with each other. These effects of the group self may impact upon the

way we relate to each other, even if our individual preferences and features, ‘objective’

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similarities or interdependencies between us, or feelings of interpersonal liking and appreciation

remain the same.

In this way, the social identity approach aims to identify the processes through which the

individual self is transformed to the group level, as a way to understand human behavior in group

contexts. The theory specifies conditions under which the group self can become the primary

source of self-definition, self-reference, and self-esteem. An essential feature of this approach is

that social identification processes literally make people think differently, as they consider

themselves and others in group terms, instead of in individual terms.

Cognitive, Emotional, and Behavioral Implications

Research in support for this view (for overviews see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999;

2002) has established that emphasizing the importance of group affiliations affects cognitive

processes relevant to social judgment. For instance, different features are considered as

prototypical for the group, depending on how the group compares to other relevant groups in that

context (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Likewise, the same features group products

or outcomes are evaluated differently, depending on whether these are associated with members

of one’s own group (the ‘ingroup’) or members of another group (the ‘outgroup’).

Group affiliations also affect reported emotions. For instance, when confronted with

previous misdeeds of their group (e.g., in the history of colonialization) individuals experience

feelings of guilt and shame, even if these misdeeds were perpetrated before they were born

(Doosje & Branscombe, 2004). Likewise, sports fans can experience pride at the successes of

their home team, even if they personally were not involved or might think of themselves as being

responsible for this outcome in any way.

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Behavioral responses too are affected by the group self. People generally try to achieve

outcomes that may help their group stand out from other groups, preferably in a positive sense.

As a result they may exert themselves to help their group outperform other groups, or sacrifice

their own physical safety or well being to achieve collective goals by enforcing political change

or working towards the improvement of the rights or outcomes of their group.

In support of a social identity account, all of these responses have been found to be more

pronounced as individuals feel stronger ties with the group – their subjective identification as

group members. This is consistent with the notion that a definition of the self at a group level

implies a different conception of self and others, which is associated with different emotional

and behavioral responses. Nevertheless, departing from the assumption that the individual self

tends to have primacy over the group self (Gaertner, Sedikides & Graetz, 1999) alternative

explanations for the observed effects have proposed that the operation of individual level goals

(the desire to affiliate with others who are liked or similar to the self), concerns (desire for

positive self-esteem), or outcomes (interdependence between self and other ingroup members)

may also account for these results.

To examine the validity of such alternative explanations, prior research has sought to

disentangle the subjective importance of the group for the definition of self from the fulfillment

of objective group inclusion/exclusion criteria or outcome interdependence. Most notable in this

respect are the so-called ‘minimal group studies’, in which social interactions are simulated in a

laboratory context, while individuals are randomly assigned to experimental groups, have no

interpersonal knowledge of each other, and have no way to monitor each other’s behaviors or

influence reciprocal outcome allocations (Diehl, 1990). Any effects of differential group

membership observed under such controlled circumstances indicate the operation of social

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identification processes, as these cannot be explained from differential interdependencies or

familiarity with ingroup vs. outgroup members, nor from greater interpersonal similarity to or

liking for other ingroup members compared to outgroup members.

As another way to exclude alternative explanations, prior examinations have compared

public vs. private displays of individual’s willingness to commit to the group. Different effects

have been observed when individuals are confronted with different (e.g. ingroup vs. outgroup)

audiences, making clear that impression management plays a role (Ellemers, Van Dyck, Hinkle,

& Jacobs, 2000). Nevertheless, it has also been established that people may truly be willing to

sacrifice pursuit of their own personal goals to benefit the group. That is, when their subjective

feelings of identification with the group are sufficiently strong, group members display

commitment to the group and its norms, even when their responses are anonymous (Barreto &

Ellemers, 2000).

Methodological Challenges

This prior work has been taken as initial evidence that the group self impacts upon

people’s responses in ways that cannot be explained from outcome interdependence,

interpersonal similarity and liking, or impression management tendencies. Nevertheless,

traditional research methodologies relying on self-reports or behavioral observations have not

allowed for a more direct examination of the operation of social identification processes as such.

Measures. Specific limitations are that it is difficult if not impossible to assess whether

overt statements about characteristic properties of the group or ratings of its value should be

interpreted as reflecting perceived properties of the social context, or indicate an adaptive way of

coping with the realities of this context. For instance, when members of underperforming groups

fail to acknowledge their group’s inferior position, does this indicate lack of awareness of the

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group’s current outcomes, perceived irrelevance of this particular comparative context, or should

it be seen as a way to convey confidence in the group’s ability to improve in the future? Prior

discussions about the relative primacy of the individual vs. group self for instance have suffered

from this interpretational ambiguity, as some have argued that the maintenance of high self-

esteem under group-based threat indicates the primacy of the individual self over the group self,

while others interpret these same findings as indicating a strong motivation to defend the group

self.

Triangulating self-reports and behavioral responses that may stem from strategic or

defensive concerns with measures that more continually tap responses that are less easily

monitored or controlled may help resolve such discussions. The recent introduction of alternative

measures such as cortisol elevations, cardio-vascular indicators of stress and coping responses,

and measures of brain activity in this area of research has great promise to move the field

forward. As an additional advantage, several of these measures can be taken continuously, so

that they can be used to document how people’s responses develop and change over time.

Group types. To the extent that recent research has started to include psycho-

physiological or neuro-physiological measures to examine implications of the group self, this

work has mainly focused on real social groups. An important advantage is that ethnic, gender, or

racial group identities are immediately visible from facial features, making it possible to examine

responses to ingroup and outgroup representatives in research paradigms that require large

numbers of stimulus-response combinations for reliable measurement. A drawback of this

approach is that the reliance on existing group memberships makes it difficult to rule out

alternative explanations for differential responses to ingroup vs. outgroup members, for instance

due to genetic overlap, ethnic or cultural similarity, familiarity, or liking.

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Additionally, some of these paradigms invoke reminders of actual physical danger

represented by members of another group as a way to tap into intergroup differences. A case in

point are the so-called shooter studies, in which research participants quickly have to decide

whether or not a black or white target individual carries a gun. While there is a lot to say for such

methodologies in the sense that they capture some of the real decision making that people

encounter in day-to-day intergroup encounters, they make it more difficult to determine whether

the observed effects stem from ingroup-outgroup differentiation or from alternative

considerations (e.g., concern for personal safety). Ideally, an investigation of social identification

processes would rule out these types of alternative explanations. This can be done either by

examining whether similar results are obtained with minimal groups, or by tapping into existing

group affiliations that have acquired meaning at a psychological level, but are not indicated by

specific genetic or physical features, nor represent an actual physical danger in everyday life.

Self-involvement. Another common characteristic of prior research using psycho-

physiological and neuro-physiological indicators to examine group processes, is that it has

mainly focused on issues having to do with stereotyping and discrimination. An important

implication of this research focus, is that the available data mainly reveal how people respond to

others, depending on whether or not they are ingroup or outgroup members. While this work has

made important contributions to understanding how social evaluations depend on group

affiliations, it does not reveal much about the way group affiliations impact upon the way people

view themselves. Yet, from a social identity perspective, an important concern would be to

directly examine the extent to which the self is involved when different group memberships

become salient. This is why there is added value in extending recently developed paradigms to

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include the examination of social identification as indicating self-relevance of particular group

memberships.

In our research reviewed in this chapter, we have sought to meet all three challenges. We

report studies using different psycho-physiological and neuro-physiological indicators across a

range of group types to examine how people respond to group-level information that might

implicate the self, or to situations in which their own reputation as a proper group member is at

stake. Our work incorporates a variety of measures, including cortisol elevations, cardio-vascular

indicators of threat vs. challenge, and brain activity assessed with ERP measures. We examine

natural groups, experimental groups, as well as minimal groups. For our studies relying on

immediate visibility of group membership we use pictures of women wearing a headscarf as a

group that is highly relevant in Dutch society, but is seen as an outgroup by native Dutch

participants due to the different moral/religious value system they represent. Thus, this group can

be seen as representing a threat to social identity rather than a threat to physical safety. Finally,

our research questions focus on the implications of self-involvement. We examine how people

respond to social identity relevant information, either because it speaks to the position of their

group compared to another group, or because it is likely to have implications for their own

acceptance and inclusion by other ingroup members.

The Group-Level Self Elicits Cardiovascular Arousal

As an unobtrusive way to tap identity implications at a physiological level, in some of our

studies we assessed cardio-vascular indicators specified in the biopsychosocial model, developed

by Blascovich and co-workers (Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). Based on a

threat and coping account, this model distinguishes between positive arousal (‘challenge’) vs.

negative arousal (‘threat’) to indicate different responses to situational demands. Positive arousal

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is characterized by increased blood volumes pumped out by the heart accompanied by dilation of

peripheral blood vessels (challenge response). This facilitates the transportation of oxygenated

blood through the body, physically preparing the individual to address and cope with the

situation. Negative arousal develops when individuals feel unable to cope with situational

demands. In terms of cardio-vascular responses this implies that an elevated heart rate is

accompanied by constriction of peripheral blood vessels (threat response). This indicates a

maladaptive stress response that is associated with the development of cardiovascular diseases

over time. In our research, we have included cardiovascular indicators to examine how

individuals respond to social identity relevant information.

A first study assessed whether people experience the same objective situation differently

depending on its implications for the position of their group. Research participants were

classified into minimal groups, after which they performed different rounds of a group task. The

feedback they received suggested either that their group had outperformed another group (high

status ingroup) or that their group’s performance was inferior to the other group (low status

ingroup). When confronted with this information, research participants displayed elevated blood

pressure indicating threat when they thought their group had low status. However, when the

experimenter announced a second round of the task, in which performance differences between

the groups might be changed, participants in the high status group displayed evidence of threat at

the prospect that their group might lose its superior standing. These results indicate a direct

connection between individual level responses and group level realities, suggesting the activation

of a group-self through social identification processes. That is, individual autonomous responses

are directly affected by group level information about intergroup comparisons as well as

conditions implicating the potential for changes in current relations between groups.

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Another set of studies further examined the occurrence of threat due to social identity

considerations. To rule out the possibility that the experience of threat stems from reminding

people of their experiences with stigma or social disadvantage, we addressed high status groups

only. We induced social identity concerns by making salient the possibility that their group

might lose its privileged position in the future. One study tapped into existing group

memberships, examining the responses of male participants who discussed changing gender

relations in society with women. One study examined experimentally created groups who had

acquired high status but were faced with the possibility of future status loss (Scheepers,

Ellemers, & Sintemaartensdijk, 2009). In both data sets we observed increased blood pressure

indicating the emergence of threat when their social identity was at stake, because their group

might lose its privileged position. These results offer further evidence that the awareness of

membership in social groups activate a conception of self at the group level, which causes group-

relevant information to impact directly on very basic autonomous responses, even in situations

that are in themselves not directly threatening or dangerous in a material way.

A final study in this series examined whether members of advantaged social groups

might respond differently to the prospect of social change depending on how this change was

communicated. In this study, native Dutch participants were reminded of the privileged position

of their group in the labor market. Subsequently, they were asked whether they would support

measures for affirmative action. However, the prospect of equal opportunities was either

described as a moral obligation that native Dutch would have to meet in order not to fail as a

group or as a moral ideal they might aim to achieve to improve themselves as a group. Here too

individual physiological responses to the group’s prospects suggest that group level realities

directly affect the self. That is, the possibility that the group might fail to meet moral obligations

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induced a cardiovascular pattern indicating threat, while the prospect of being able to achieve

moral ideals was accompanied by cardiovascular indicators of challenge.

Levels of Self-Definition and Coping Responses

In a further set of studies we more explicitly related people’s self-conceptions and

personal experiences in the situation to their involuntary responses relevant to group level

conceptions of self. In a first study white male Dutch participants anticipated having to work

together on a task with a woman with Moroccan features, wearing a headscarf. After having

completed an alleged test of their preferred work style, participants were informed that their

work style was either similar to or different from the style preferred by their interaction partner

(the woman wearing a headscarf). Cortisol levels were monitored and agreement with statements

indicating (blatant and subtle) prejudice against Moroccans immigrants was assessed. Results of

this study showed that when interpersonal dissimilarity led participants to construe the situation

as an intergroup context, cortisol elevations in anticipation of the joint task predicted self-stated

degree of prejudice. That is, participants who experienced stress due to the prospect of having to

collaborate with a woman wearing a headscarf were more likely to endorse negative views of the

group she represented. However, no such effect was observed when participants were led to

believe they preferred a similar working style as their collaborative partner. Presumaby this was

the case because the realization that the other was similar to the self made participants construe

the situation at an interpersonal level, so that cortisol elevations in anticipation of the interaction

did not affect their group-level judgements (Bijleveld, Scheepers, & Ellemers, in press).

A second study examined responses of female participants who were asked to parallel-

park a car in a computer simulation. Social identity threat was induced by emphasizing gender

differences in car parking ability. Participants were provided with the possibility to affirm their

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feelings of self-worth either at the individual level (by reassuring them of their individual

abilities) or at the group level (by reassuring them of their group’s abilities), to cope with this

threat. The cardio-vascular indicators we monitored revealed that participants respond differently

to these experimental manipulations depending on the extent to which they identify with their

gender group (Derks, Scheepers, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2011). That is, whereas low gender

identified women showed a pattern indicating challenge after individual self-affirmation,

cardiovascular responses of high gender identified women indicated challenge after group-level

affirmation. This study offers further evidence that subjective conceptions of self at the

individual or group level result in differential autonomous responses to otherwise identical

situations. Once again, this suggests that biological processes are affected by psychological

realities.

The Threat and Challenge of Group Membership

So far, we have mainly considered studies investigating how information about the

position of one’s group reflects upon the self. However, another crucial implication of

conceiving of individuals in terms of their social identities is that we should also be concerned

about the way our own characteristic features, achievements, and behavioral choices are regarded

by other members of our group. Notably, the tendency to think of the self as a member of a

social group requires that the individual is respected by others and included as a ‘good’ group

member.

We know from prior research that shared moral values define the essence of people’s

shared identity (Kouzakova, Ellemers, Harinck, & Scheepers, in press), while diverging moral

values is experienced as a threat to the self – as is evident from cardio-vascular indicators

(Kouzakova, Ellemers, Harinck, & Scheepers, submitted). Based on this knowledge, we devised

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an experimental paradigm in which research participants were asked to reveal personal

information to their fellow participants, allegedgly as part of the process of getting acquainted

with their prospective team mates. Subsequently, they were informed how their team mates

evaluated their prior behavior in terms of competence or morality.

A first study in this series revealed that being considered as lacking in morality raised

more of a cardiovascular threat response than being seen as deficient in terms of ones

competencies. In a second study, the moral and competent behavior of a fellow ingroup member

was evaluated by one’s team mates. This study revealed that having someone else in the group

who is lacking in morality is equally as threatening as when the moral behavior of the self is

devalued. That is, when moral evaluations pertained to another ingroup member, research

participants also displayed a cardiovascular response indicative of threat, while they showed

evidence of being challenged when a fellow ingroup member was criticized for their lack of

competence (Van der Lee, Ellemers, & Scheepers, in prep.).

Together, these studies show that social identifications not only cause people to

experience concern about the way they are evaluated by their fellow group members, they also

cause them to respond to criticism concerning other members of the group as if it pertains to

themselves. Again, the fact that we obtain these effects with experimentally created groups, and

that we find evidence for the operation of social identification in autonomously occurring

cardiovascular responses support the notion that the psychological meaning of the relation

between different individuals changes depending on how they relate to the group self.

Social Categorization in the Brain

Prior studies that included measures of brain activity, mainly focused on the

neurophysiological processes underlying people’s automatic tendency to differentiate ingroup

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from outgroup members. Studies using event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to record the time

course of person perception, have revealed that the social categorization of ingroup and outgroup

members occurs within hundreds of milliseconds when viewing a face (as indexed by for

example the N100, P200, and N200 potentials – the number stands for the time in milliseconds

after stimulus presentation that the positive [P] or negative [N] potential occurs; e.g., Ito &

Urland, 2003, 2005; Kubota & Ito, 2007). Studies addressing racial groups have revealed that the

differentiation between own-race and other-race faces, as well as early increased attention

towards other-race faces is evident in both light and dark skin individuals (e.g., Dickter &

Batholow, 2007). These studies also found evidence that the level of social categorization is

associated with intergroup differentiation, in the form of ingroup favoritism and outgroup

derogation.

Some studies have documented evidence for differential brain activity with category

dimensions that are less directly associated with physical or genetic differences than race, such

as age or gender (e.g., Wiese, 2012) or gender (e.g., Ito & Urland, 2005). Converging results

were even obtained in research addressing a categorization cross-cutting racial differences. Here

participants were presented with same-race or other-race individuals who either were students at

the same university as the participant or at another university. Results revealed that both types of

social categorizations (according to race and university) resulted in increased brain activity on

the N200 (race and university; Hehman, Stanley, Gaertner, & Simons, 2011).

Converging evidence for differential brain activity due to the mere group membership of

target individuals was obtained in studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)

to examine activity in the fusiform gyrus (also called the fusiform face area [FFA] because it is

associated with face recognition). This brain area shows more activation when viewing ingroup

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faces rather than outgroup or unknown faces. Importantly, these results were obtained with

groups of mixed race, again showing that these responses emerge because people think

differently about ingroup compared to outgroup members, not because they are more similar to

them (Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2011). Likewise, research with minimal groups

showed that a brain network consisting of the amygdala, fusiform gyri, orbitofrontal cortex, and

dorsal striatum, is more activated when viewing novel ingroup compared to novel outgroup faces

(Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008).

Mimicry and Empathy

Besides such evidence of social categorization in differential brain activity, other types of

psychophysiological processes also indicate intergroup differentiation and social identity

formation. Gutsell and Inzlicht (2010) for example, showed that brain activity in the motor

cortex – measured using electroencephalography (EEG) and indicating the coupling of

perception and action – was evident in participants while observing actions of (racial) ingroup

but not outgoup members. This phenomenon, which is referred to as ‘motor resonance’ and

thought to involve activation of the mirror neuron system, is also seen in facial mimicry.

Research using facial electromyography (EMG) has shown that people are more likely to

mimick negative emotions when these are displayed by ingroup and not outgroup members.

Again, the groups used in this research rule out the possibility that alternative explanations in

terms of interpersonal liking or physical similarity play a role here, as these effects were not only

obtained with native vs. immigrant ratings, but also with outwardly similar targets said to

represent a favored vs. unfavored political party, or students with different majors (Bourgeois &

Hess, 2008; Van der Schalk et al., 2011). In fact, rather than interpersonal liking or familiarity

predicting differential mimicry of ingroup vs. outgroup targets, the reverse relation was shown.

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That is, facial mimicry was found to increase liking for ingroup compared to outgroup members.

(Van der Schalk et al., 2011).

Like mimicry, empathic concerns for others are considered to differentiate between in-

and outgroup members. For example, research has shown that activation in the anterior cingulate

cortex (ACC, a brain structure that is part of the network involved in the experience of physical

pain) is increased when viewing painful stimulation applied to racial ingroup compared to

outgroup members (Xu, Zuo, Wang, Han, 2009). Furthermore, reassurance by an ingroup

member concerning the pain inducement during an experiment is more effective than reassurance

by an outgroup member, as was indicated by reduced physiological arousal (measured by

Galvanic skin responses; Platow et al., 2007). This last study is also an example of how to tackle

one of the challenges in social psychophysiological research: Measuring physiological states

during social interactions.

A few studies have studied interpersonal interactions in neuroimaging research. For

example, Rilling, Dagenais, Goldsmith, Glenn, and Pagnoni (2008) showed that a different

neural network is activated during a social interactive task compared to a non-social control task.

Moreover, some regions in this network (the temporal parietal junction and the dorsomedial

prefrontal cortex, regions associated with the understanding of others) were more activated when

interacting with ingroup compared to outgroup members (Rilling et al., 2008).

Social Identification and Response Monitoring

For our own research (Van Nunspeet, Ellemers, Derks, & Nieuwenhuis, submitted), we

developed a new version of an implicit association test (IAT) to assess brain activity associated

with social identity threat. In this test pictures of women with a headscarf and women without a

headscarf were associated with positive and negative images. When the target pictures were rated

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as separate individuals by non-Muslim participants, the women with a headscarf were perceived

as equally kind, trustworthy and intelligent as the women without a headscarf by non-Muslim

participants. However, when the same target pictures were categorized as representing two

different social groups, the IAT results revealed a significant negative bias against women with a

headscarf. Additionally, ERP measures taken while performing the IAT revealed evidence of

enhanced social categorization (as indexed by the N100 and P200) when viewing the pictures of

the women with a headscarf (Van Nunspeet, Ellemers, Derks, and Nieuwenhuis, submitted).

We used this paradigm to study how people monitor their responses when being aware

that others can evaluate their performance. We increased the social implications of the

experimental task, by leading participants to believe that their performance reflects upon their

morality (compared to their competence, in the control condition). This was inspired by our prior

research showing that people are more inclined to adapt their behavioral choices to accomodate

to moral (compared to competence) ingroup norms (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008).

Indeed, participants in our prior studies indicated that they thought they would earn intragroup

respect and be considered a ‘good’ group member when they adhered to moral ingroup norms

(Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011).

Building on this knowledge, we hypothesized that people would be inclined to monitor

their performance on a moral task rather than a competence task. However, we argued that they

should be more motivated to monitor and control their moral task performance when being

evaluated by an ingroup compared to an outgroup member. We used a minimal group paradigm

leading participants to believe that they were categorized according to their preferred style of

problem solving (P-style vs. O-style). Participants in all conditions were shown the same picture

of the person that would allegedly evaluate their performance on the IAT task. Group

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membership was manipulated by labeling this picture as representing an ingroup member (P-

type) or outgroup member (O-type; group labels P vs. O type were counterbalanced across

experimental conditions). This procedure enabled us to rule out that participants would attend to

an ingroup rather than an outgroup evaluator for reasons other than social identification with the

ingroup. After each trial of the IAT, participants were shown a picture of this alleged ingroup or

outgroup member. She smiled and showed a ‘thumbs up’ gesture after a correct response, and

frowned and showed a ‘thumbs down’ gesture after an incorrect responses or failure to respond

on time. We conducted two studies with this methodology, to examine behavioral responses as

well as ERP data.

Both studies confirmed that participants who thought they were being evaluated by an

ingroup member were more inclined to control their behavior (i.e., they showed less bias on the

IAT) when the test was said to assess their moral values rather than their competence.

Importantly, participants who thought they were being evaluated by an outgroup member did not

show increased response monitoring when reminded of the moral implications of their task

performance. Additionally, the ERP results revealed that the emphasis on the moral implications

of the test was associated with increased perceptual attention and response monitoring during the

IAT. Importantly, this was especially the case when participants were being evaluated by an

ingroup compared to an outgroup member Van Nunspeet, Derks, Ellemers, & Nieuwenhuis, in

prep.). In sum, results of these studies show that procedures that enhanced the social identity

implications of one’s task performance (i.e., because the task was said to indicate one’s morality

rather than competence, and because responses were allegedly monitored by an ingroup rather

than an outgroup member) resulted in increased attention and response monitoring. This was

evident from a reduction in displays of behavioral bias, as well as from brain activity indicated

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by ERP measures. At the same time, both the stimulus materials we used (pictures of women

with or without a headscarf) and the social categorization that was made salient (referring to

minimal groups in the lab) enabled us to rule out alternative explanations for these findings.

Conclusion

In this chapter we introduced the social identity approach as a way to think of and

examine the group-level self. Prior research suggests that thinking of the self and others as group

representatives can alter the way we think, feel and behave. We outlined a number of empirical

challenges faced by researchers in this domain, and explained how recent research incorporating

neuro-biological measures attempts to address such challenges. Results from research with

natural groups as well as in more controlled minimal group conditions indicate that invoking

people’s social identities impacts upon the way they feel about themselves, and how they

respond to others depending on whether these are seen to represent ingroup or outgroup

members. Empirical data indicate that making people aware of different group memberships can

literally change the way we think about ourselves and others, and show that this is evident from

responses that occur at very early stages of information processes, and emerge autonomously.

This suggests that social identification processes and the psychological implications of social

realities these imply have real implications at a neuro-biological level.

Notes

The research reported in this paper was made possible due to the KNAW/SNS-Reaal Merian

Award and the NWO Spinoza Award granted to the first author, and an NWO VENI award

granted to the third author.

21

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