IT&C Safety Planning Update

Planning the work to minimize hazards

• IT&C has undergone a third major revision

M1 assy area clear

TMA accepted

Science verification

Initial alignment

M1, M1 cell

Transfer optics coudé

VBI

WFC

TEOA

Transfer optics OSS

DL NIRSP

Cryo-NIRSP

VTF

VISP

FLIOperationalAcceptance

Instrument lab ready

Coudé ready

TEOA pre-assembly

M1 coating prep

M1 Cell pre-assembly

M1 coating

Transfer optics pre-assembly

WFC pre-assembly

AEOS coating lab available

VBI pre-assembly

VISP pre-assembly

VTF pre-assembly

Cryo-NIRSP pre-assembly

DL NIRSP pre-assembly

Non-Critical ActivitiesNon-Critical Activities

Critical Path ActivitiesCritical Path Activities

ATST IT&C Schedule OverviewATST IT&C Schedule Overview

Lower GOS + enclosure install

Upper GOS install

1/1/2017 6/30/2019

4/1/2017 7/1/2017 10/1/2017 1/1/2018 4/1/2018 7/1/2018 10/1/2018 1/1/2019 4/1/2019

Critical Path

Non-Critical Path

Planning the work to minimize hazards

• IT&C has undergone a third major revision

• Level of fidelity in schedule 1-2 week duration

Network Diagram

Currently populated through to FLI December 2018

Sample of Network Diagram

IT&C “Activity Planner” (Work Definition Sheet)

Sample of Network Diagram

Work Definition Part One – General Information

WORK DEFINITION SHEET

WBS Ref: 7.1.2.4.1.6 ISSUE:

Date:

SHEET:

of

WBS Title: IT&C - M1 Assembly

WBS Subordinate To: Telescope IT&C WBS Ref: 7.1.2.4.1

Start Event: M1 CS to TCS integration and testing and rework

WBS Ref: ITC0130

End Event: Calibrate & tune temperature control system

WBS Ref: ITC0170

Work Package Manager:

Organisation Responsible:

ATST

Special Requirements:

Sub-System Status: Specialists: Test/Special Equipment: Handling equip

Enclosure operational Systems PFWFS M1 cell cart

TMA accepted Optics Laser tracker M1 lifter

M1 assembly accepted

Telescope operator

WBS Inputs:

ITC0130 M1 CS to TCS integration and testing and rework

ITC0175 Transport M1 Coated Mirror to ATST

Work Definition Part II – Detailed Work Breakdown

Sub WBS: Description: Safety P/E/n Specialists Equipment Duration

ITC0135 Install M1 assembly into telescope P

M1 cell cart, Laser tracker

ITC0140 Functional test M1 n Laser

tracker

ITC0142

Exchange the M1 Coated Mirror with Dummy Mirror

P/E M1 cell cart, M1 lifter, Laser tracker

ITC0145 Install PFWFS on parent axis P/E PFWFS

ITC0150 Align M1 with respect to PFWFS n PFWFS

ITC0155

Determine optimal M1Z position (night)

n

ITC0160

Check actuator force to figure matrix (night)

n

ITC0165

Create first elevation-figure table (night)

n

ITC0170

Calibrate & tune temperature control system

n

WBS Outputs:

ITC0180 M1 Mirror Integration Complete

Safety: Personnel Equipment ITC0135 Pinch, overhead load None (Dummy mirror)

ITC0142 Pinch, overhead load M1 handling

ITC0145 Working at prime focus PFWFS handling

Hazard Analysis & JHA

Special Circumstances and Risks during IT&C

• More people on site during IT&C than during routine operations. • Pressure to work in parallel to maintain schedule. • Reduced time to complete to maintain schedule. • Many complex activities will be performed for the very first time. • There will be personnel in hazardous areas while systems are energized

and operating. • There will be personnel in hazardous areas while interlocks are disabled. • There will be nighttime work that will need to be performed at very low

light levels, sometimes in precarious positions. • There will be personnel within the telescope enclosure and in close

proximity to the light beam when we are pointing at the sun. While many of these activities are not unique to IT&C, the frequency of exposure to these risks will be highest during IT&C.

Access to Hazardous Areas

• During normal routine observing in the operations phase, access can be controlled and interlocked.

• During ITC many hazardous areas will need to be accessed under a variety of non-optimum conditions.

Safety Mitigation during IT&C

• Detailed planning and scheduling of activities. – Identifying hazardous conditions

• Work prioritization – Close control and coordination of multiple activities.

• Personnel arrival – Briefing

• Absorb best practice from site construction

• Dedicated safety monitoring by IT&C management safety personnel.

Safety Mitigation during IT&C

• Work prioritization

– Close control and coordination of multiple activities.

• Quarterly, Monthly planning meetings

• Weekly briefing – overall activities,

– Hot work permitting

– hazards (who, what, how, when, where? JHAs)

– overall priorities

• Weekly debriefing – What’s planned for next week

Safety Mitigation during IT&C

• Personnel arrival

– Check in with site manager immediately on arrival (or IT&C manager later in the schedule)

– Sign-in/out board (electronic scanning?)

– Must attend daily site briefing before commencement of activities.

• Sign-off sheet

Safety Mitigation during IT&C

• Daily Site briefing. – Close control and coordination of multiple

activities. • Daily briefing

– Brief description of ongoing, new activities. (POD)

– Hot work permitting

– Current hazards (who, what, how, when, where? JHA)

– Priorities of the day

– Sign-off sheet

• Additional briefings if warranted – Late arrivals/shift handover

– Change management

• Site walk rounds by manager and safety personnel

Hazard analysis and recognition

Hazard analysis processes

• SPEC-0061 – Initial analysis uses Mil STD-882, System Safety

– Further analysis if appropriate

• Progression of design hazard analysis – Mil STD-882, System Safety

– ANSI/RIA, 15.06 Robotics Safety

– IEC 62021, Safety of machinery

– EN ISO 13849, Safety of machinery

– IEC 61511, Process Safety …

System Safety MIL-STD 882

Severity/

Probability

Value Category Frequent 1-A 1 2-A 3 3-A 7 4-A 13

1 – 5 High Probable 1-B 2 2-B 5 3-B 9 4-B 16

6 – 9 Serious Occasional 1-C 4 2-C 6 3-C 11 4-C 18

10 – 17 Medium Remote 1-D 8 2-D 10 3-D 14 4-D 19

18 – 20 Low Improbable 1-E 12 2-E 15 3-E 17 4-E 20

CriticalCatastrophic NegligibleMarginal

Hazard Recognition

Mishap Risk Assessment Value

Mishap Risk Category

Mishap Risk Acceptance Level

1 – 5 High AURA / NSF

6 – 9 Serious NSO Director

10 – 17 Medium ATST Program Manager, Director,

System Engineer and Safety

Manager 18 – 20 Low

From SPEC-0061:

Requires: escalation and traceability Electronic approval process

Hazard Analysis Team Update

Hazard Analysis Team

• R. Hubbard is leading the HAT (was S. Shimko)

• Recent key activities

– Getting instrument teams up to speed on Hazard Analysis

– Sun avoidance!

Instrument Teams

• Conduct dual analysis examples with teams

• Review at PDR, CDR

• Liquid Cryogens

– Burn

– Asphyxiation

• All cryogenic applications now use closed cycle refrigeration

– Hazard eliminated

• Vibration issues being addressed (non-HAT activity)

Sun tracking/avoidance

• Direct illumination of the primary mirror must fall within the Heat Stop.

• Hazard

– Outside the heat stop there is a hazard of focusing sunlight on structure (12kW power)

– Fire

– Burn

Prime Focus

Gregorian Focus

Sun tracking/avoidance

• There is a science driver to observe in daylight away from the Sun

• Hazard Analysis

– Mitigation • Mirror covers can only be

open when within 1.5 solar radii or at an angle that the sun will not illuminate the primary mirror

– Failure triggers closure of: • Safety Shutter (SIL 3)

• Mirror Covers

• Enclosure aperture

Sun tracking/avoidance

• There is a science driver to observe in daylight away from the Sun

• Hazard Mitigation A. Within 1.5 solar radii?

• Location detection of solar disc (SIL3 rated)

B. At an angle that the sun will not illuminate the primary mirror? • Calculate exclusion zone based

on current position of Sun (calculated within Allen Bradley Guard Logic system)

• Visual check prior to opening mirror covers

– If A or B false initiate closure sequence.

– Observing efficiency requires TCS to navigate around exclusion zone (non-HAT activity

Questions?