13
14 Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017 Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire LIU Zhongmin & SHU Meng ķ (Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University, China) Abstract: Early modernization reform from the 19th century to the early 20th century led to the secularization of the Ottoman Empire in respect to politics, law, and education. Competition between contradicting secular and Islamic thoughts has occurred since then, and it has produced the divisions of pan-Islamism, Modernism, and Turkism in the ideological field of the Ottoman Empire. Such phenomenon is the manifestation of political and ideological chaos of the late Ottoman Empire, which has intertwined with the contradiction of tradition and modernity, between the Orient and the West, presenting the developing trends of diversification, complexity, and variability. Intensified ideological struggle occurred in the late Ottoman Empire previous to its collapse. Social and political reforms began to transform the country from a traditional empire to modern nation-state. Due to the relationship between trends of political thoughts and Islam, nationalism could not get rid of the impact of Islam in the late Ottoman Empire. Islam has not only perpetuated pan-Ottomanism and pan-Turkism in the form of pan-Islamism, it has also exerted a wide range of effects as a relative individual trend of political and social thoughts. Key Words: Ottoman Empire; Pan-Islamism; Modernism; Turkism; Turkish Politics Early modernization reform has produced the secularization of the Ottoman Empire in respect to politics, law, and education, since the competition between the contradicting secular and traditional Islamic thoughts has led to the divisions of pan-Islamism, Modernism, and Turkism in the ideological field of the Ottoman Empire. The goal of pan-Islamism is to strengthen the cooperation among Muslim nations through Islamic beliefs and unite all Muslims under the banner of the Sultan. From the pan-Islamic perspective, the empire can only be revitalized through Islam. Such thoughts once became an important tool for officials to enhance their rule over the empire. Conversely, radical modernism holds that Western civilization should be fully accepted and that there is no other civilization other than the European civilization. The word “civilization” means specifically European civilization. Therefore, Turkey should be reformed according to the European model. From the Turkish perspective, Turkish nationalism includes Turkification, ķ Dr. LIU Zhongmin, Director and professor of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University; Dr. SHU Meng, assistant researcher of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University. This paper is the stage research outcome of the project “New Development of Islamic Extremism in the Middle East and China’s Strategic Response” (16JJDGJW010), a project of 2016 Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences of Chinese Ministry of Education.

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14

Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017

14

Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late

Ottoman Empire

LIU Zhongmin & SHU Meng (Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University, China)

Abstract: Early modernization reform from the 19th century to the early 20th century led to the secularization of the Ottoman Empire in respect to politics, law, and education. Competition between contradicting secular and Islamic thoughts has occurred since then, and it has produced the divisions of pan-Islamism, Modernism, and Turkism in the ideological field of the Ottoman Empire. Such phenomenon is the manifestation of political and ideological chaos of the late Ottoman Empire, which has intertwined with the contradiction of tradition and modernity, between the Orient and the West, presenting the developing trends of diversification, complexity, and variability. Intensified ideological struggle occurred in the late Ottoman Empire previous to its collapse. Social and political reforms began to transform the country from a traditional empire to modern nation-state. Due to the relationship between trends of political thoughts and Islam, nationalism could not get rid of the impact of Islam in the late Ottoman Empire. Islam has not only perpetuated pan-Ottomanism and pan-Turkism in the form of pan-Islamism, it has also exerted a wide range of effects as a relative individual trend of political and social thoughts. Key Words: Ottoman Empire; Pan-Islamism; Modernism; Turkism; Turkish Politics

Early modernization reform has produced the secularization of the Ottoman Empire in respect to politics, law, and education, since the competition between the contradicting secular and traditional Islamic thoughts has led to the divisions of pan-Islamism, Modernism, and Turkism in the ideological field of the Ottoman Empire. The goal of pan-Islamism is to strengthen the cooperation among Muslim nations through Islamic beliefs and unite all Muslims under the banner of the Sultan. From the pan-Islamic perspective, the empire can only be revitalized through Islam. Such thoughts once became an important tool for officials to enhance their rule over the empire. Conversely, radical modernism holds that Western civilization should be fully accepted and that there is no other civilization other than the European civilization. The word “civilization” means specifically European civilization. Therefore, Turkey should be reformed according to the European model. From the Turkish perspective, Turkish nationalism includes Turkification, Dr. LIU Zhongmin, Director and professor of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International

Studies University; Dr. SHU Meng, assistant researcher of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University. This paper is the stage research outcome of the project “New Development of Islamic Extremism in the Middle East and China’s Strategic Response” (16JJDGJW010), a project of 2016 Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences of Chinese Ministry of Education.

Trends of Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire

15

Islamization, and modernization. It advocated the keeping of the national culture while at the same time introducing Western culture and technologies: advocating the separation of church and state, pan-Turkism, the secularization of national politics, law, and education, and the Turkification of cultural life. Throughout the reform of the empire in the 19th and 20th century, one finds that the social status of Islam declined due to secularization. However, pan-Islamism still seriously influenced the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Islamism, together with pan-Ottomanism and pan-Turkism, constituted the main factor that shaped the social and political thoughts of the empire before its collapse.

I. Islam in the Era of Ottoman Empire

According to Carl Brockelmann, a German scholar on Islam, ancestors of the Turks were nomads living in the Southern Siberian plains and areas between the Caspian and Altai Mountains. He holds that the Turkish nation emerged out of a racial and linguistic community which in primeval times may also have comprised the Mongols and Tungus, among others. At their entry into history, as they pressed forward from the slopes of Tien Shan out into the central Asiatic steppes, they already bore well-marked ethnic traits designated by anthropologists as Turanian. In the 6th century, the Turkic people established two powerful countries in Central Asia. However, these two countries did not exist for a long time. After the collapse of them, around the 13th century, a powerful country emerged in Asia Minor — the Ottoman Empire, which would last longer than any other Turkish country and become the leader of all Islamic countries for almost 500 years.

The Ottoman Turks were a nomadic tribe originating from Turkistan. A massive westward invasion of the Mongolians forced the elder generation from the time the empire was founded to immigrate to the Tigris & Euphrates. Some of them entered the Anatolian region, which was ruled by the Seljuks at that time, and were accepted by the Seljuks due to their attacks on the Byzantine Empire. Because of the attacks from both the Byzantine Empire and the Mongolian Empire, the Seljuks couldn’t fully control the Anatolian region, and the Ottoman tribe gained more independence. After 1299, when the Seljuk country collapsed under the attack of the Mongolians, the Ottomans declared independence and established their own country, which became the Ottoman Empire. During this process, impacted by the Seljuks, the Turkish people converted to Islam. While the conversion of the Ottomans was impacted by the Seljuks to some extent, the decision was also affected by the relationship between the Osman family and mystical religious groups. After the founding of the Ottoman Turkish nation, Islam played an important role in the strengthening and expanding of the empire. The Ottoman Turkish people have a unified

Stanford Shaw, Ezel Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.2, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp.302-304. Carl Nrockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979,

p.163. See P. Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain &

Ireland, 1938; H.A. Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, A History of the Osmanlis Up to the Death of Bayezid I: 1330-1403, Oxford, 1916. See He Jingxi, “Evolution of Turkish Islam,” World Religious Information, Issue 4, 1983; Jin Yijiu, eds.,

History of Islam, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990, p.286.

15

Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman EmpireAsian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017

14

Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late

Ottoman Empire

LIU Zhongmin & SHU Meng (Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University, China)

Abstract: Early modernization reform from the 19th century to the early 20th century led to the secularization of the Ottoman Empire in respect to politics, law, and education. Competition between contradicting secular and Islamic thoughts has occurred since then, and it has produced the divisions of pan-Islamism, Modernism, and Turkism in the ideological field of the Ottoman Empire. Such phenomenon is the manifestation of political and ideological chaos of the late Ottoman Empire, which has intertwined with the contradiction of tradition and modernity, between the Orient and the West, presenting the developing trends of diversification, complexity, and variability. Intensified ideological struggle occurred in the late Ottoman Empire previous to its collapse. Social and political reforms began to transform the country from a traditional empire to modern nation-state. Due to the relationship between trends of political thoughts and Islam, nationalism could not get rid of the impact of Islam in the late Ottoman Empire. Islam has not only perpetuated pan-Ottomanism and pan-Turkism in the form of pan-Islamism, it has also exerted a wide range of effects as a relative individual trend of political and social thoughts. Key Words: Ottoman Empire; Pan-Islamism; Modernism; Turkism; Turkish Politics

Early modernization reform has produced the secularization of the Ottoman Empire in respect to politics, law, and education, since the competition between the contradicting secular and traditional Islamic thoughts has led to the divisions of pan-Islamism, Modernism, and Turkism in the ideological field of the Ottoman Empire. The goal of pan-Islamism is to strengthen the cooperation among Muslim nations through Islamic beliefs and unite all Muslims under the banner of the Sultan. From the pan-Islamic perspective, the empire can only be revitalized through Islam. Such thoughts once became an important tool for officials to enhance their rule over the empire. Conversely, radical modernism holds that Western civilization should be fully accepted and that there is no other civilization other than the European civilization. The word “civilization” means specifically European civilization. Therefore, Turkey should be reformed according to the European model. From the Turkish perspective, Turkish nationalism includes Turkification, Dr. LIU Zhongmin, Director and professor of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International

Studies University; Dr. SHU Meng, assistant researcher of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University. This paper is the stage research outcome of the project “New Development of Islamic Extremism in the Middle East and China’s Strategic Response” (16JJDGJW010), a project of 2016 Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences of Chinese Ministry of Education.

Trends of Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire

15

Islamization, and modernization. It advocated the keeping of the national culture while at the same time introducing Western culture and technologies: advocating the separation of church and state, pan-Turkism, the secularization of national politics, law, and education, and the Turkification of cultural life. Throughout the reform of the empire in the 19th and 20th century, one finds that the social status of Islam declined due to secularization. However, pan-Islamism still seriously influenced the Ottoman Empire. Pan-Islamism, together with pan-Ottomanism and pan-Turkism, constituted the main factor that shaped the social and political thoughts of the empire before its collapse.

I. Islam in the Era of Ottoman Empire

According to Carl Brockelmann, a German scholar on Islam, ancestors of the Turks were nomads living in the Southern Siberian plains and areas between the Caspian and Altai Mountains. He holds that the Turkish nation emerged out of a racial and linguistic community which in primeval times may also have comprised the Mongols and Tungus, among others. At their entry into history, as they pressed forward from the slopes of Tien Shan out into the central Asiatic steppes, they already bore well-marked ethnic traits designated by anthropologists as Turanian. In the 6th century, the Turkic people established two powerful countries in Central Asia. However, these two countries did not exist for a long time. After the collapse of them, around the 13th century, a powerful country emerged in Asia Minor — the Ottoman Empire, which would last longer than any other Turkish country and become the leader of all Islamic countries for almost 500 years.

The Ottoman Turks were a nomadic tribe originating from Turkistan. A massive westward invasion of the Mongolians forced the elder generation from the time the empire was founded to immigrate to the Tigris & Euphrates. Some of them entered the Anatolian region, which was ruled by the Seljuks at that time, and were accepted by the Seljuks due to their attacks on the Byzantine Empire. Because of the attacks from both the Byzantine Empire and the Mongolian Empire, the Seljuks couldn’t fully control the Anatolian region, and the Ottoman tribe gained more independence. After 1299, when the Seljuk country collapsed under the attack of the Mongolians, the Ottomans declared independence and established their own country, which became the Ottoman Empire. During this process, impacted by the Seljuks, the Turkish people converted to Islam. While the conversion of the Ottomans was impacted by the Seljuks to some extent, the decision was also affected by the relationship between the Osman family and mystical religious groups. After the founding of the Ottoman Turkish nation, Islam played an important role in the strengthening and expanding of the empire. The Ottoman Turkish people have a unified

Stanford Shaw, Ezel Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.2, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp.302-304. Carl Nrockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979,

p.163. See P. Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain &

Ireland, 1938; H.A. Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, A History of the Osmanlis Up to the Death of Bayezid I: 1330-1403, Oxford, 1916. See He Jingxi, “Evolution of Turkish Islam,” World Religious Information, Issue 4, 1983; Jin Yijiu, eds.,

History of Islam, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990, p.286.

16

Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017

16

belief, a religious passion, and a strong spirit of Jihad. Such spirit has been carried forward by generations of Sultans and played a vital role in territorial expansionist movements.

After the death of Osman, the efforts of generations of Ottoman Turkish people paid off, and Constantinople, the capital of the East Roman Empire, was captured in 1453. After more than a hundred years of expansion, the empire reached the peak of its development, and became a huge empire. It stretched from the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf in the east, to Morocco in the West, to Vienna in the north, and to Egypt and Sudan in the south – reaching across Europe, Asia, and Africa. Islam played an important role in the expansion of the empire, like Bernard Lewis, a famous Western Middle East studies expert, said: the territory of the empire is the territory of Islam, the emperor or the empire is the P dish h of Islam, the army of the empire are Islamic soldiers, and the religious leader of the empire is the Shaykh of the Islam; the first status of the people in the empire is Muslim. However, the Ottoman Empire also became the protector of Islam. “From its founding to its collapse, the Ottoman empire had been committed to promote and protect the belief and rights of the Islam.”

As a feudal state established through military expansion, the Ottoman Empire kept its political system defined by political and religious unity. Islam played a vital role in political life of the empire. The governor of the empire was called Sultan (meaning authority and power). After Sultan Selim I (1512-1520) conquered Egypt in 1517, the last Caliphate of the Abbasid dynasty was forced to abdicate. From then on, the powers of the Sultan and the Caliphate were given to the emperor. A series of political systems based on Sharia with political and religious unity were established. The supreme executive of the empire was the Caliphate and his representative Grand Vezir (prime minister). The empire formed the Islamic Council with the Sultans as nominal leaders and with the Grand Mufti as actual leaders. The Grand Mufti worked alongside the Sultans as the top leaders in the council. The Islamic Council members were Muftis, all levels of judges, and scholars on Sharia law. As the spiritual pillars of the empire, these members were responsible for judicial judgment and judgment based on Sharia, mosque management, holding religious ceremonies, managing welfare undertakings and religious funds, and carrying out various religious education activities. The empire also had institutions to cultivate full-time religious people.

During the expansion of the empire, the Islamic council played an important role in war mobilization, wartime prayers, and organizing religious lives after the wars. The highest muftis enjoyed supreme political power nationally. For instance, on important issues, Sultans were expected to seek support from the muftis; the law and rules would be submitted to the muftis for review before their implementation. In short, “It was the Ottomans who made Sharia the official laws at the first time. The Islamic council based on muftis were the first established state authority throughout the history of the Islam. It has played role in maintaining belief and supervising the implementation of the Sharia.” As a state established based on its military forces that included people from various nations with various religious beliefs, the Millet system was established to provide order in governance.

Jin Yijiu, eds., History of Islam, p.287. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968, p.13. Jin Yijiu, eds., History of Islam, p.298.

Trends of Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire

17

It divided residents of the empire to groups according to their tribes and religious beliefs. As long as the minority groups paid taxes and performed the military services, they were allowed the freedom to practice their own religions, languages, and cultures. The Millet system was not just an autonomous system; it was also a racial and social isolation system. It separated the non-Muslims from Muslims and limited them in certain social circles.

In the middle and late period of the Ottoman Empire, due to both the corruption and dictatorship within the empire, and the invasion of then emerging powers such as tsarist Russia, the British Empire, and France, the Ottoman Empire inevitably began to decay. Facing these internal and external problems, the Ottoman Empire turned to reform movements that had lasted for more than 100 years. After entering the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire’s despise of European civilization increased after being defeated by the West. They began to understand the importance of reforms. However, their reforms at that time were limited only to military areas, because they believed that the reforms were only useful in jihad against pagans. Sultan Mahmud II, who came to power in the 19th century, carried out reforms beyond just military areas. The first step was the destruction of the Janissary system and the introduction of European training methods to train and equip the army. The tax system and political system also imitated Europe. Mahmud II’s reform enhanced the centralized power of the government, weakened the religious conservative forces, and promoted the secularization of the empire.

In the period 1839 to 1876, the Ottoman Empire entered the era of Tanzimat. The reforms of the Sultan in this period were supported by emerging intellectuals with bourgeois thoughts. The intellectuals, represented by Rashid Pasha, believed that the deep-rooted reason for the declining of the empire was the violation of Islamic principles and laws. However, they simultaneously held that the old law was outdated and new orders should be formed under the acquiescence of Allah. The Sultan carried out reforms in many areas during the Tanzimat including administrative, financial, judicial, and educational fields.

The Tanzimat was an Islamic modern reform movement that imitated the West with strong secularization tendency. It weakened the foundation of traditional religious beliefs, and so it was seriously resisted and opposed by Islamic traditional forces. In 1839, the Ulema class instigated revelations in Anatolia and other places. From 1853-1956, the Ottoman Empire fought against Russia in the Crimean War. Britain and France saw that the Ottoman Empire was preoccupied and took the opportunity to interfere and tried to control it. They forced the Ottoman Empire to carry out more Westernized reforms: promoting the secularization of the empire’s politics, economy, law, and education. Due to multiple limitations, especially because of the intervention and control of Britain and France, the empire never fully revived, nor could the crisis of the empire be resolved. “Neither in political organization, nor in social life, or in the cultural and intellectual spheres, can we

Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, 1956, p.14. Discussions on the reforms in the late Ottoman Empire see: Huang Weimin, “Historical Analysis on

Social Reforms of the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Northwest University, Issue 4, 1999; Peng Shuzhi, eds., Islam and the Middle East Modernization Process, Xi’an:Northwest University Press, 1997.

Peng Shuzhi, eds., Islam and the Middle East Modernization Process, Northwes University Press, 1987, p.47.

17

Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman EmpireAsian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017

16

belief, a religious passion, and a strong spirit of Jihad. Such spirit has been carried forward by generations of Sultans and played a vital role in territorial expansionist movements.

After the death of Osman, the efforts of generations of Ottoman Turkish people paid off, and Constantinople, the capital of the East Roman Empire, was captured in 1453. After more than a hundred years of expansion, the empire reached the peak of its development, and became a huge empire. It stretched from the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf in the east, to Morocco in the West, to Vienna in the north, and to Egypt and Sudan in the south – reaching across Europe, Asia, and Africa. Islam played an important role in the expansion of the empire, like Bernard Lewis, a famous Western Middle East studies expert, said: the territory of the empire is the territory of Islam, the emperor or the empire is the P dish h of Islam, the army of the empire are Islamic soldiers, and the religious leader of the empire is the Shaykh of the Islam; the first status of the people in the empire is Muslim. However, the Ottoman Empire also became the protector of Islam. “From its founding to its collapse, the Ottoman empire had been committed to promote and protect the belief and rights of the Islam.”

As a feudal state established through military expansion, the Ottoman Empire kept its political system defined by political and religious unity. Islam played a vital role in political life of the empire. The governor of the empire was called Sultan (meaning authority and power). After Sultan Selim I (1512-1520) conquered Egypt in 1517, the last Caliphate of the Abbasid dynasty was forced to abdicate. From then on, the powers of the Sultan and the Caliphate were given to the emperor. A series of political systems based on Sharia with political and religious unity were established. The supreme executive of the empire was the Caliphate and his representative Grand Vezir (prime minister). The empire formed the Islamic Council with the Sultans as nominal leaders and with the Grand Mufti as actual leaders. The Grand Mufti worked alongside the Sultans as the top leaders in the council. The Islamic Council members were Muftis, all levels of judges, and scholars on Sharia law. As the spiritual pillars of the empire, these members were responsible for judicial judgment and judgment based on Sharia, mosque management, holding religious ceremonies, managing welfare undertakings and religious funds, and carrying out various religious education activities. The empire also had institutions to cultivate full-time religious people.

During the expansion of the empire, the Islamic council played an important role in war mobilization, wartime prayers, and organizing religious lives after the wars. The highest muftis enjoyed supreme political power nationally. For instance, on important issues, Sultans were expected to seek support from the muftis; the law and rules would be submitted to the muftis for review before their implementation. In short, “It was the Ottomans who made Sharia the official laws at the first time. The Islamic council based on muftis were the first established state authority throughout the history of the Islam. It has played role in maintaining belief and supervising the implementation of the Sharia.” As a state established based on its military forces that included people from various nations with various religious beliefs, the Millet system was established to provide order in governance.

Jin Yijiu, eds., History of Islam, p.287. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968, p.13. Jin Yijiu, eds., History of Islam, p.298.

Trends of Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire

17

It divided residents of the empire to groups according to their tribes and religious beliefs. As long as the minority groups paid taxes and performed the military services, they were allowed the freedom to practice their own religions, languages, and cultures. The Millet system was not just an autonomous system; it was also a racial and social isolation system. It separated the non-Muslims from Muslims and limited them in certain social circles.

In the middle and late period of the Ottoman Empire, due to both the corruption and dictatorship within the empire, and the invasion of then emerging powers such as tsarist Russia, the British Empire, and France, the Ottoman Empire inevitably began to decay. Facing these internal and external problems, the Ottoman Empire turned to reform movements that had lasted for more than 100 years. After entering the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire’s despise of European civilization increased after being defeated by the West. They began to understand the importance of reforms. However, their reforms at that time were limited only to military areas, because they believed that the reforms were only useful in jihad against pagans. Sultan Mahmud II, who came to power in the 19th century, carried out reforms beyond just military areas. The first step was the destruction of the Janissary system and the introduction of European training methods to train and equip the army. The tax system and political system also imitated Europe. Mahmud II’s reform enhanced the centralized power of the government, weakened the religious conservative forces, and promoted the secularization of the empire.

In the period 1839 to 1876, the Ottoman Empire entered the era of Tanzimat. The reforms of the Sultan in this period were supported by emerging intellectuals with bourgeois thoughts. The intellectuals, represented by Rashid Pasha, believed that the deep-rooted reason for the declining of the empire was the violation of Islamic principles and laws. However, they simultaneously held that the old law was outdated and new orders should be formed under the acquiescence of Allah. The Sultan carried out reforms in many areas during the Tanzimat including administrative, financial, judicial, and educational fields.

The Tanzimat was an Islamic modern reform movement that imitated the West with strong secularization tendency. It weakened the foundation of traditional religious beliefs, and so it was seriously resisted and opposed by Islamic traditional forces. In 1839, the Ulema class instigated revelations in Anatolia and other places. From 1853-1956, the Ottoman Empire fought against Russia in the Crimean War. Britain and France saw that the Ottoman Empire was preoccupied and took the opportunity to interfere and tried to control it. They forced the Ottoman Empire to carry out more Westernized reforms: promoting the secularization of the empire’s politics, economy, law, and education. Due to multiple limitations, especially because of the intervention and control of Britain and France, the empire never fully revived, nor could the crisis of the empire be resolved. “Neither in political organization, nor in social life, or in the cultural and intellectual spheres, can we

Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, 1956, p.14. Discussions on the reforms in the late Ottoman Empire see: Huang Weimin, “Historical Analysis on

Social Reforms of the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Northwest University, Issue 4, 1999; Peng Shuzhi, eds., Islam and the Middle East Modernization Process, Xi’an:Northwest University Press, 1997.

Peng Shuzhi, eds., Islam and the Middle East Modernization Process, Northwes University Press, 1987, p.47.

18

Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017

18

find any substantial change in the older Ottoman system, which was then in a state of corruption and disorganization. In the political field, sultanism still reigned as a political-military-fiscal system of the Ottomans.”

Looking at the relationship between Islam and the reforms in the late Ottoman Empire, two important points are worth noting: firstly, as the leading ideology of the empire, mainstream Islam at that time opposed the reforming thoughts and the innovation movements. Upper class Islam obstructed the reforms. Carmel Sue, a Turkish historian pointed out that one of the reasons for the Ottoman Empire’s stagnation is that religion had intervened in the state’s affairs; some people opposed the emerging reforms due to their religious beliefs. During the Tanzimat, the Ulema class stood with the conservatives, and continuously harried the reforms. Secondly, the reformers of the Ottoman Empire knew that they faced influential religious conservatives and the Islamic traditions, so the officials of the empire who advocated reforms would compromise with the traditional beliefs, or try to make use of Islam to help their reforms. Some of them carried out the reforms under the banner of Islamic revival and utilized Islam as a tool to strengthen social governance. After the Tanzimat, although the political life of the empire had been Europeanized, Sharia and religious rules about social and family issues were still irrevocable. Issues revolving marriage and divorce, property and inheritance, as well as the status of women and slaves, had not been truly changed, nor had the reformers changed the religious institutions of the period.

II. Abdulhamid II’s Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism

After the Tanzimat, constitutional activities began to take place in the Ottoman Empire. The first constitution of the Ottoman Empire was enacted during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1876. It declared the empire a constitutional monarchy with Turkish as its national language, and citizens of the empire were born equal under law. However, Sultan Hamid II did not actually support this constitutionalism. Instead, he tacitly consented to it while waiting for a chance to abolish it. The constitution only remained in effect for two years. In 1877, under the excuse of the Ottomans’ defeat in the war by tsarist Russia, Hamid II announced the dissolution of the Congress and the abolition of the Constitution. The Young Ottomans’ constitutional activities ended in failure.

During the reign of the Hamid II, there was a lot of ideological debate between Ottomanism, Islamism, and Pan-Turkism. Ottomanism was the dominant ideology. Ottomanism, in short, was an ideology that acknowledged only the Ottoman nationality, and it believed that all other nations should be “Turkificationized”. In other words, Niyazi Berkes, ed. and trans, Turkish Nationalism and West Civilization, Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp,

seen in introduction, p.16. Carmel Sue, History of the Republic of Turkey, Chinese edition, Kunming: Yunnan University Press,

1978, p.194. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p.265. Ibid. p.104. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1990, p.8.

Trends of Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire

19

Ottoman nationalism was the doctrine, and the Ottoman Empire should enjoy unique and unmatched sovereignty and territorial integrity. All people should be patriotic. Pan-Islamism at that time served only as a tool for Hamid II to maintain his rule over the empire.

An anonymous pamphlet, named Unit Islamique that was possibly written by a Christian, pointed out that pan-Islamism could neither save the empire nor unite the Muslims. The pamphlet wrote that pan-Islamism “was dangerous as a political school, which would not only be unable to save the empire, but rather would destroy it; on the religious level, it would be impossible to unite the disparate groups and sects; on the political level, the Sultan-Caliph would fail to impose himself on all Muslims, only provoking international opposition, especially from the powers ruling Muslim populations.”

However, impacted by the pan-Islamic thoughts and perpetuated by Hamid II, pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire was still influential and was widely discussed by academic circles. For instance, as Landau mentioned, “A number of government-sponsored newspapers increasingly supported a version of internal and external pan-Islam, the main objectives of which were, respectively, to assure the loyalty of non-Turkish Muslims (Arabs, Albanians and others); and to attract political and financial support from those in India and elsewhere, as a first step, and their union with the empire, as a future one modelled perhaps on the recently successful unifications of Italy and Germany.” Hamid II also asserted that “he was the Caliph of all Muslims”, and convinced “the European powers that his own spiritual leadership of Muslims everywhere was a significant contribution to his temporal power.” The specific policies of Hamid II were: Firstly, he carried out a policy of Islamism, which increasingly favored the central government against the periphery, and the Ottoman Empire’s Muslims at the expense of others-mainly in public office, education, and economic opportunities. Through his efforts, religious institutions were repaired and new ones built; religious schools were inaugurated; contributions to religious fraternities and charity were increased. Moreover, by emphasizing the Christian threat to Islam, this approach succeeded in attracting support from the people, who were concerned about the future of their religion and the state. Secondly, he shaped the image of the empire as the representative of Muslims. He opposed the territorial invasion from the Western Christians on behalf of Muslims. Therefore, it could be found that the pan-Islamism which Hamid II had publicized was simply aimed at uniting the Ottoman Empire.

III. Pan-Nationalism of Young Turks and the Islam

Hamid II showed his true colors after the constitution that was initiated in 1876 failed. Wu Yungui and Zhou Xiefan, Modern Islamic Thoughts and Movements, Beijing: Social Sciences

Academic Press, 2007, p.228. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, p.23. Ibid. pp.23-24. See Tawfiq, “Ali Barru, al-’Arab wa-’l-Turk fi al’-ahd al-dusturi al-’Uthmani 1908-1914,” pp.34-37,

cited from Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, pp.36-37. Ibid. pp.37-39.

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find any substantial change in the older Ottoman system, which was then in a state of corruption and disorganization. In the political field, sultanism still reigned as a political-military-fiscal system of the Ottomans.”

Looking at the relationship between Islam and the reforms in the late Ottoman Empire, two important points are worth noting: firstly, as the leading ideology of the empire, mainstream Islam at that time opposed the reforming thoughts and the innovation movements. Upper class Islam obstructed the reforms. Carmel Sue, a Turkish historian pointed out that one of the reasons for the Ottoman Empire’s stagnation is that religion had intervened in the state’s affairs; some people opposed the emerging reforms due to their religious beliefs. During the Tanzimat, the Ulema class stood with the conservatives, and continuously harried the reforms. Secondly, the reformers of the Ottoman Empire knew that they faced influential religious conservatives and the Islamic traditions, so the officials of the empire who advocated reforms would compromise with the traditional beliefs, or try to make use of Islam to help their reforms. Some of them carried out the reforms under the banner of Islamic revival and utilized Islam as a tool to strengthen social governance. After the Tanzimat, although the political life of the empire had been Europeanized, Sharia and religious rules about social and family issues were still irrevocable. Issues revolving marriage and divorce, property and inheritance, as well as the status of women and slaves, had not been truly changed, nor had the reformers changed the religious institutions of the period.

II. Abdulhamid II’s Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism

After the Tanzimat, constitutional activities began to take place in the Ottoman Empire. The first constitution of the Ottoman Empire was enacted during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1876. It declared the empire a constitutional monarchy with Turkish as its national language, and citizens of the empire were born equal under law. However, Sultan Hamid II did not actually support this constitutionalism. Instead, he tacitly consented to it while waiting for a chance to abolish it. The constitution only remained in effect for two years. In 1877, under the excuse of the Ottomans’ defeat in the war by tsarist Russia, Hamid II announced the dissolution of the Congress and the abolition of the Constitution. The Young Ottomans’ constitutional activities ended in failure.

During the reign of the Hamid II, there was a lot of ideological debate between Ottomanism, Islamism, and Pan-Turkism. Ottomanism was the dominant ideology. Ottomanism, in short, was an ideology that acknowledged only the Ottoman nationality, and it believed that all other nations should be “Turkificationized”. In other words, Niyazi Berkes, ed. and trans, Turkish Nationalism and West Civilization, Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp,

seen in introduction, p.16. Carmel Sue, History of the Republic of Turkey, Chinese edition, Kunming: Yunnan University Press,

1978, p.194. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p.265. Ibid. p.104. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1990, p.8.

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Ottoman nationalism was the doctrine, and the Ottoman Empire should enjoy unique and unmatched sovereignty and territorial integrity. All people should be patriotic. Pan-Islamism at that time served only as a tool for Hamid II to maintain his rule over the empire.

An anonymous pamphlet, named Unit Islamique that was possibly written by a Christian, pointed out that pan-Islamism could neither save the empire nor unite the Muslims. The pamphlet wrote that pan-Islamism “was dangerous as a political school, which would not only be unable to save the empire, but rather would destroy it; on the religious level, it would be impossible to unite the disparate groups and sects; on the political level, the Sultan-Caliph would fail to impose himself on all Muslims, only provoking international opposition, especially from the powers ruling Muslim populations.”

However, impacted by the pan-Islamic thoughts and perpetuated by Hamid II, pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire was still influential and was widely discussed by academic circles. For instance, as Landau mentioned, “A number of government-sponsored newspapers increasingly supported a version of internal and external pan-Islam, the main objectives of which were, respectively, to assure the loyalty of non-Turkish Muslims (Arabs, Albanians and others); and to attract political and financial support from those in India and elsewhere, as a first step, and their union with the empire, as a future one modelled perhaps on the recently successful unifications of Italy and Germany.” Hamid II also asserted that “he was the Caliph of all Muslims”, and convinced “the European powers that his own spiritual leadership of Muslims everywhere was a significant contribution to his temporal power.” The specific policies of Hamid II were: Firstly, he carried out a policy of Islamism, which increasingly favored the central government against the periphery, and the Ottoman Empire’s Muslims at the expense of others-mainly in public office, education, and economic opportunities. Through his efforts, religious institutions were repaired and new ones built; religious schools were inaugurated; contributions to religious fraternities and charity were increased. Moreover, by emphasizing the Christian threat to Islam, this approach succeeded in attracting support from the people, who were concerned about the future of their religion and the state. Secondly, he shaped the image of the empire as the representative of Muslims. He opposed the territorial invasion from the Western Christians on behalf of Muslims. Therefore, it could be found that the pan-Islamism which Hamid II had publicized was simply aimed at uniting the Ottoman Empire.

III. Pan-Nationalism of Young Turks and the Islam

Hamid II showed his true colors after the constitution that was initiated in 1876 failed. Wu Yungui and Zhou Xiefan, Modern Islamic Thoughts and Movements, Beijing: Social Sciences

Academic Press, 2007, p.228. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, p.23. Ibid. pp.23-24. See Tawfiq, “Ali Barru, al-’Arab wa-’l-Turk fi al’-ahd al-dusturi al-’Uthmani 1908-1914,” pp.34-37,

cited from Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, pp.36-37. Ibid. pp.37-39.

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Against this backdrop, elites’ voices became increasingly louder about abolishing Hamid II’s authoritarian rule and carrying out reforms. In 1889, a secret society named the Committee of Union and Progress was established by medical students. The organization was influenced by Namik Kemal (1840-1888), a member of the Young Ottomans. Until 1896, members of the New Ottomans had already occupied a dominant position in the Committee of Union and Progress. Because most of the members who advocated for reforms were from the younger generation, these people were called the Young Turks.

The Young Turks secretly prepared to overthrow the rule of Hamid II. However, their plan was leaked and suppressed. Some members fled to Paris and Geneva, and the Committee of Union and Progress was also moved to Thessaloniki, the capital of Macedonia, due to security consideration. Vatan ve Hürriyet (“Motherland and Liberty”) for Young Turks was established by merchant Mustafa Elvan, and Mustafa Kemal, who later became the founder of modern Turkey, joined it later. In 1907, factions of the Young Turk Movement held a joint conference in Paris, where they formulated a program of actions including armed struggles. Also in that year, they launched a series of protests against Hamid’s authoritarian government.

In July 1908, the Young Turks announced a plan to restore the 1876 constitution, and marched to Istanbul. Under pressure, the Sultan was forced to restore the constitution and parliamentary elections, so the revolution of the Young Turks came to an end. The establishment of the constitutional monarchy was the only outcome of the revolution of Young Turks. In 1909 Sultan Hamid was overthrown, and Mahmoud V was elected as the new Sultan. However, the power and rights of the new Sultan were limited. The Young Turks participated in the reorganization of the government in order to control the power de facto. In 1913, the Committee of Union and Progress split and was renamed the Party of Union and Progress. The actual authority of the state was controlled by a small group of military officials, and the Sultan became simply an empty title. This situation was maintained until 1918.

Ideologically, the Young Turks advocated pan-nationalism, constituted by a mixture of pan-Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, and pan-Islamism. Different political sects had various ideological tendencies, which reflected the chaos in the Ottoman Empire’s ideology during its transformation into a modern nation-state. The Young Turks inherited pan-Ottomanism from Sultan Hamid and made it the guideline of the state and the party. According to this principle, non-Turkish nations must use a Turkic language, and people could only be elected to Congress if they spoke a Turkic language. Minorities had only the right to maintain their own religious beliefs. Pan-Ottomanism was clearly the national chauvinism. After its implementation, pan-Ottomanism was seriously resisted and opposed by Arabs. Pan-Turkism had a close relationship with pan-Ottomanism. It was reflected in the diplomatic level of pan-Ottomanism: aiming to combine nations and tribes who spoke the Turkic language in West Asia and Central Asia into one political entity. Both pan-Turkism and pan-Ottomanism made use of Islam as a tool; however, their ideas on political construction still had a complex relationship with Islam.

Namik Kemal’s nationalistic thoughts have also impacted the Young Turks, as it is the

Trends of Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire

21

“combination of political liberalism and religious conservatism”. He introduced modern thoughts, such as patriotism, freedom, equality, and sovereignty from Western liberal nationalism. However, his thoughts were still limited in the Islamic political framework, which fully reflects the contradictions and complexity of Turkish political thoughts prior to its establishment as a modern nation-state. He recognized the major obstacle to the establishment of a modern state. “He attempted to show the original, or rather idealized, forms of the religious, moral, and legal institutions which were associated with Islam, and the original, or idealized, forms of the political institutions of the old Ottoman tradition at the time of its prime; and at the same time, those aspects of civilization of the West which had given progress, prosperity, and superiority to the European nations.” However, he made the conclusion that “these were no basic contradictions among them”. “Islam would provide the moral and legal bases of society; the Ottoman tradition of statecraft, together with its multinational and multi-religious cosmopolitan policy of toleration, would be the political framework of the Ottoman state; and Western civilization would furnish the material and practical methods and techniques to enable this system to survive in the contemporary world of power and economic progress.” “The most important factor in the failure of the Tanzimat was the mental confusion with regard to these three elements.” The contradictions between “Political Liberalism” and “Religious Conservatism” are mainly concentrated in two fields as follows:

First, the concept of the state. Impacted by modern European liberal nationalism, Namik Kemal established the concept of “patriotism”. It was Namik Kemal who introduced the modern concept of “state” to the Ottoman Empire. However, Namik Kemal’s “state” was different from the modern state due to religious colors in his concept. Influenced by European modern enlightenment thoughts, Namik Kemal, together with other thinkers, expected to establish a free, democratic, and progressive country. However, due the close relationship between their thoughts and Islam, they refused to have their system fully westernized, advocating that the reforms of political systems should be based on Islamic culture. Namik Kemal traced the origin of the Western political system in Islamic culture, in an effort to demonstrate that Western thoughts, such as separation of powers, representative government, freedom, equality, fraternity, and property inviolability, had already been written or illustrated in the Quran. Namik Kemal’s political vision was that the future country would remain an Islamic country with the traditional religious law as its basis, instead of a secular nation-state with the separation of church and state. He had clearly expressed that the Ottoman Empire could not survive without its Islamic character, and Sharia was the soul and essence of the country. Therefore, the political ideas of the Young Turks represented the contradiction between modern political ideas and traditional religious values, as well as the characteristics of the social ideologies prior to the dramatic social change. E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p.28. Niyazi Berkrs, ed. and trans, Turkish Nationalism and West Civilization, Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp,

seen in introduction, p.18. Wu Yungui and Zhou Xiefan, Modern Islamic Thoughts and Movements, Beijing: Social Sciences

Academic Press, 2007, p.230. He Jingxi, “Evolution of Turkish Islam,” p.54. E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern States, p.35.

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Against this backdrop, elites’ voices became increasingly louder about abolishing Hamid II’s authoritarian rule and carrying out reforms. In 1889, a secret society named the Committee of Union and Progress was established by medical students. The organization was influenced by Namik Kemal (1840-1888), a member of the Young Ottomans. Until 1896, members of the New Ottomans had already occupied a dominant position in the Committee of Union and Progress. Because most of the members who advocated for reforms were from the younger generation, these people were called the Young Turks.

The Young Turks secretly prepared to overthrow the rule of Hamid II. However, their plan was leaked and suppressed. Some members fled to Paris and Geneva, and the Committee of Union and Progress was also moved to Thessaloniki, the capital of Macedonia, due to security consideration. Vatan ve Hürriyet (“Motherland and Liberty”) for Young Turks was established by merchant Mustafa Elvan, and Mustafa Kemal, who later became the founder of modern Turkey, joined it later. In 1907, factions of the Young Turk Movement held a joint conference in Paris, where they formulated a program of actions including armed struggles. Also in that year, they launched a series of protests against Hamid’s authoritarian government.

In July 1908, the Young Turks announced a plan to restore the 1876 constitution, and marched to Istanbul. Under pressure, the Sultan was forced to restore the constitution and parliamentary elections, so the revolution of the Young Turks came to an end. The establishment of the constitutional monarchy was the only outcome of the revolution of Young Turks. In 1909 Sultan Hamid was overthrown, and Mahmoud V was elected as the new Sultan. However, the power and rights of the new Sultan were limited. The Young Turks participated in the reorganization of the government in order to control the power de facto. In 1913, the Committee of Union and Progress split and was renamed the Party of Union and Progress. The actual authority of the state was controlled by a small group of military officials, and the Sultan became simply an empty title. This situation was maintained until 1918.

Ideologically, the Young Turks advocated pan-nationalism, constituted by a mixture of pan-Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, and pan-Islamism. Different political sects had various ideological tendencies, which reflected the chaos in the Ottoman Empire’s ideology during its transformation into a modern nation-state. The Young Turks inherited pan-Ottomanism from Sultan Hamid and made it the guideline of the state and the party. According to this principle, non-Turkish nations must use a Turkic language, and people could only be elected to Congress if they spoke a Turkic language. Minorities had only the right to maintain their own religious beliefs. Pan-Ottomanism was clearly the national chauvinism. After its implementation, pan-Ottomanism was seriously resisted and opposed by Arabs. Pan-Turkism had a close relationship with pan-Ottomanism. It was reflected in the diplomatic level of pan-Ottomanism: aiming to combine nations and tribes who spoke the Turkic language in West Asia and Central Asia into one political entity. Both pan-Turkism and pan-Ottomanism made use of Islam as a tool; however, their ideas on political construction still had a complex relationship with Islam.

Namik Kemal’s nationalistic thoughts have also impacted the Young Turks, as it is the

Trends of Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire

21

“combination of political liberalism and religious conservatism”. He introduced modern thoughts, such as patriotism, freedom, equality, and sovereignty from Western liberal nationalism. However, his thoughts were still limited in the Islamic political framework, which fully reflects the contradictions and complexity of Turkish political thoughts prior to its establishment as a modern nation-state. He recognized the major obstacle to the establishment of a modern state. “He attempted to show the original, or rather idealized, forms of the religious, moral, and legal institutions which were associated with Islam, and the original, or idealized, forms of the political institutions of the old Ottoman tradition at the time of its prime; and at the same time, those aspects of civilization of the West which had given progress, prosperity, and superiority to the European nations.” However, he made the conclusion that “these were no basic contradictions among them”. “Islam would provide the moral and legal bases of society; the Ottoman tradition of statecraft, together with its multinational and multi-religious cosmopolitan policy of toleration, would be the political framework of the Ottoman state; and Western civilization would furnish the material and practical methods and techniques to enable this system to survive in the contemporary world of power and economic progress.” “The most important factor in the failure of the Tanzimat was the mental confusion with regard to these three elements.” The contradictions between “Political Liberalism” and “Religious Conservatism” are mainly concentrated in two fields as follows:

First, the concept of the state. Impacted by modern European liberal nationalism, Namik Kemal established the concept of “patriotism”. It was Namik Kemal who introduced the modern concept of “state” to the Ottoman Empire. However, Namik Kemal’s “state” was different from the modern state due to religious colors in his concept. Influenced by European modern enlightenment thoughts, Namik Kemal, together with other thinkers, expected to establish a free, democratic, and progressive country. However, due the close relationship between their thoughts and Islam, they refused to have their system fully westernized, advocating that the reforms of political systems should be based on Islamic culture. Namik Kemal traced the origin of the Western political system in Islamic culture, in an effort to demonstrate that Western thoughts, such as separation of powers, representative government, freedom, equality, fraternity, and property inviolability, had already been written or illustrated in the Quran. Namik Kemal’s political vision was that the future country would remain an Islamic country with the traditional religious law as its basis, instead of a secular nation-state with the separation of church and state. He had clearly expressed that the Ottoman Empire could not survive without its Islamic character, and Sharia was the soul and essence of the country. Therefore, the political ideas of the Young Turks represented the contradiction between modern political ideas and traditional religious values, as well as the characteristics of the social ideologies prior to the dramatic social change. E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p.28. Niyazi Berkrs, ed. and trans, Turkish Nationalism and West Civilization, Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp,

seen in introduction, p.18. Wu Yungui and Zhou Xiefan, Modern Islamic Thoughts and Movements, Beijing: Social Sciences

Academic Press, 2007, p.230. He Jingxi, “Evolution of Turkish Islam,” p.54. E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern States, p.35.

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Second, the concepts of freedom, equality and sovereignty were important elements of Western liberal nationalism, and they influenced Young Turks including Namik Kemal, to a large extent. However, Namik Kemal and other thinkers interpreted the concept of “natural rights” according to Islamic traditions, holding that the concepts of freedom, equality, and sovereignty had already existed in Islamic culture, although they were introduced from the West. Freedom in their eyes meant political freedom instead of freedom of personal will and personality. As long as the country had a constitution that represented public opinion and implemented a constitutional system, it needed no more political freedom. Equality meant that everyone was born equal in the eyes of the law. However, it was just empty talk, because according to Sharia there was no equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Even Muslims were not all equal among themselves. There were two types of sovereignty: national sovereignty and public sovereignty. Namik Kemal believed that national sovereignty belonged to Allah, and it could be exercised by Allah’s agents in the temporal world, the Sultans. Although the constitutional system was an imitation of the West, Namik Kemal explained it as the production of Shura in Islam. Therefore, Namik Kemal’s viewpoint on national sovereignty was still limited to the framework of Islamic political culture. He also attributed national sovereignty to Allah, just like modern Islamic fundamentalism did. He also contributed public sovereignty to Islam instead of to the West. He believed that Baya, a Shariah term, meant the sovereignty of the people, when it was actually the oath to express allegiance and obedience to new elected Caliph. Muftis viewed the oath as the legally-binding contractual relationship between the emperor and the citizens. Namik Kemal’s introducing of the Western concepts of freedom, equality, and sovereignty was a historical progress. However, he interpreted them according to the Islam and created a gap between his understandings and the original liberal nationalist values.

IV. Pan-Islamism in the Era of Young Turks

The impact of Islam on the political thoughts on the Ottoman Empire in the era of Young Turks was not just in pan-Ottomanism. It was also in the notion that pan-Islamism itself was an influential social thought in ideological circles, public opinion, and intellectual circles, and it served pan-Ottomanism. As a scholar said “A part of the press and special publications-not necessarily government-inspired-continued to argue about the merits of pan-Islam and the means for achieving world-wide Muslim solidarity and unity, in order to forge the forces which would save the Ottoman Empire.”

Mehmed Akif (1873-1936) was a famous poet, writer in the late Ottoman Empire. In his article entitled “Islamic Union and Nationalism”, he pointed out that “although Islam had commanded the Muslims to be united, they were divided-despite the Prophet Muhammad’s warning that division was certain to bring about the annihilation of the Muslims by their enemies.” He also believed that the division of Muslims were caused by Christian nationalism on the one hand, and by the invasion from the enemies from Europe

Reference to Mr. Wu Yungui’s viewpoints in Modern Islamic Thoughts and Movements, pp.230-231. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, p.73.

Trends of Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire

23

on the other hand, aimed to “take over our country (memleketimiz)”. “Therefore, all groups should unite immediately against the enemies, otherwise, the throne of the Sultanate would be in danger”. “If they did not preserve this Sultanate, they would be annihilated, which is what their enemies wished. Nonetheless, they had not united in order to set up and energetic Muslim Government-although this government and this Caliphate were the last hope of Islam”.

Another influential pan-Islamism thinker was Ahmed Hilmi (1865-1914), a Bulgarian Muslim, who had spent years in Libya carrying out pan-Islamic and anti-French propaganda. He had also lectured in philosophy at Istanbul University and had edited and published a pan-Islamic weekly in Turkish between 1908 and 1909. In an editorial he wrote, entitled “What in Our View Does the Union of Islam Mean?” he did not support political pan-Islamism, because “a plan to set up a state for all Muslims (contradicted) the laws of both history and human nature”, however, social pan-Islam should aim, instead, to raise and develop Muslim society. Hilmi’s thoughts were greatly influenced by the Young Turks, whose leitmotif was often repeated in favor of social and cultural development for all Muslims and all Ottomans, thus expressing Ottomanism, then popular with the new regime. In short, Hilmi’s early thoughts served as the essence for the Young Turks’ Ottomanism.

Later, Hilmi changed his attitude and began to support political pan-Islamism, calling on the world’s 300 million Muslims to unite and agitating Muslims against European powers. In 1911, Hilmi published an article named “A Guide to Politics for the 20th-Century World of Islam and for the Muslims of Europe”, in which he believed that “the Muslim elements in the Ottoman Empire were the only ones hoping for the empire’s survival. Their unity was the sole remedy for the empire’s troubles and the only guarantee for its independence. On the other hand, division would be disastrous”. At the same time, Hilmi also viewed the Ottoman Empire as the asylum of Muslims, holding that “The hope of all Muslims everywhere was in the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate… Should they remain divided, they would be exposed to two danger-conflicting interests and the cooperation of the power against them. Against these dangers, united Islam, enjoying the moral support of 400 million, would not be a force to be taken lightly”. After praising the historical glory of Islam in its early state, he also strongly advocated the unity of Muslims and an Islamic union, and listed the examples for successful unions of states like the US, the German Empire and Italy. Uniting all Muslim peoples would create a Great Power with the Caliphate at its center. Divisiveness among Muslims was harmful and the Quran, also, had recommended unity and condemned divisiveness. The union should become a state of Islam, capable of repulsing foreign aggression, compromising areas with Muslims are main residents and Muslims all obeying the Caliph. Therefore, Hilmi was still nostalgic about the Ottoman Empire. He viewed the empire as the foundation of Muslims, and he believed that the union of Muslims was the only hope to maintain the empire.

Ibid. pp.76-77. Ibid. p.77. Ibid. pp.78-79. ttihad-1 slam, 2 (December 24, 1908), I. Cited from Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam:

Ideology and Organization, pp.78-79.

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Second, the concepts of freedom, equality and sovereignty were important elements of Western liberal nationalism, and they influenced Young Turks including Namik Kemal, to a large extent. However, Namik Kemal and other thinkers interpreted the concept of “natural rights” according to Islamic traditions, holding that the concepts of freedom, equality, and sovereignty had already existed in Islamic culture, although they were introduced from the West. Freedom in their eyes meant political freedom instead of freedom of personal will and personality. As long as the country had a constitution that represented public opinion and implemented a constitutional system, it needed no more political freedom. Equality meant that everyone was born equal in the eyes of the law. However, it was just empty talk, because according to Sharia there was no equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Even Muslims were not all equal among themselves. There were two types of sovereignty: national sovereignty and public sovereignty. Namik Kemal believed that national sovereignty belonged to Allah, and it could be exercised by Allah’s agents in the temporal world, the Sultans. Although the constitutional system was an imitation of the West, Namik Kemal explained it as the production of Shura in Islam. Therefore, Namik Kemal’s viewpoint on national sovereignty was still limited to the framework of Islamic political culture. He also attributed national sovereignty to Allah, just like modern Islamic fundamentalism did. He also contributed public sovereignty to Islam instead of to the West. He believed that Baya, a Shariah term, meant the sovereignty of the people, when it was actually the oath to express allegiance and obedience to new elected Caliph. Muftis viewed the oath as the legally-binding contractual relationship between the emperor and the citizens. Namik Kemal’s introducing of the Western concepts of freedom, equality, and sovereignty was a historical progress. However, he interpreted them according to the Islam and created a gap between his understandings and the original liberal nationalist values.

IV. Pan-Islamism in the Era of Young Turks

The impact of Islam on the political thoughts on the Ottoman Empire in the era of Young Turks was not just in pan-Ottomanism. It was also in the notion that pan-Islamism itself was an influential social thought in ideological circles, public opinion, and intellectual circles, and it served pan-Ottomanism. As a scholar said “A part of the press and special publications-not necessarily government-inspired-continued to argue about the merits of pan-Islam and the means for achieving world-wide Muslim solidarity and unity, in order to forge the forces which would save the Ottoman Empire.”

Mehmed Akif (1873-1936) was a famous poet, writer in the late Ottoman Empire. In his article entitled “Islamic Union and Nationalism”, he pointed out that “although Islam had commanded the Muslims to be united, they were divided-despite the Prophet Muhammad’s warning that division was certain to bring about the annihilation of the Muslims by their enemies.” He also believed that the division of Muslims were caused by Christian nationalism on the one hand, and by the invasion from the enemies from Europe

Reference to Mr. Wu Yungui’s viewpoints in Modern Islamic Thoughts and Movements, pp.230-231. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, p.73.

Trends of Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire

23

on the other hand, aimed to “take over our country (memleketimiz)”. “Therefore, all groups should unite immediately against the enemies, otherwise, the throne of the Sultanate would be in danger”. “If they did not preserve this Sultanate, they would be annihilated, which is what their enemies wished. Nonetheless, they had not united in order to set up and energetic Muslim Government-although this government and this Caliphate were the last hope of Islam”.

Another influential pan-Islamism thinker was Ahmed Hilmi (1865-1914), a Bulgarian Muslim, who had spent years in Libya carrying out pan-Islamic and anti-French propaganda. He had also lectured in philosophy at Istanbul University and had edited and published a pan-Islamic weekly in Turkish between 1908 and 1909. In an editorial he wrote, entitled “What in Our View Does the Union of Islam Mean?” he did not support political pan-Islamism, because “a plan to set up a state for all Muslims (contradicted) the laws of both history and human nature”, however, social pan-Islam should aim, instead, to raise and develop Muslim society. Hilmi’s thoughts were greatly influenced by the Young Turks, whose leitmotif was often repeated in favor of social and cultural development for all Muslims and all Ottomans, thus expressing Ottomanism, then popular with the new regime. In short, Hilmi’s early thoughts served as the essence for the Young Turks’ Ottomanism.

Later, Hilmi changed his attitude and began to support political pan-Islamism, calling on the world’s 300 million Muslims to unite and agitating Muslims against European powers. In 1911, Hilmi published an article named “A Guide to Politics for the 20th-Century World of Islam and for the Muslims of Europe”, in which he believed that “the Muslim elements in the Ottoman Empire were the only ones hoping for the empire’s survival. Their unity was the sole remedy for the empire’s troubles and the only guarantee for its independence. On the other hand, division would be disastrous”. At the same time, Hilmi also viewed the Ottoman Empire as the asylum of Muslims, holding that “The hope of all Muslims everywhere was in the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate… Should they remain divided, they would be exposed to two danger-conflicting interests and the cooperation of the power against them. Against these dangers, united Islam, enjoying the moral support of 400 million, would not be a force to be taken lightly”. After praising the historical glory of Islam in its early state, he also strongly advocated the unity of Muslims and an Islamic union, and listed the examples for successful unions of states like the US, the German Empire and Italy. Uniting all Muslim peoples would create a Great Power with the Caliphate at its center. Divisiveness among Muslims was harmful and the Quran, also, had recommended unity and condemned divisiveness. The union should become a state of Islam, capable of repulsing foreign aggression, compromising areas with Muslims are main residents and Muslims all obeying the Caliph. Therefore, Hilmi was still nostalgic about the Ottoman Empire. He viewed the empire as the foundation of Muslims, and he believed that the union of Muslims was the only hope to maintain the empire.

Ibid. pp.76-77. Ibid. p.77. Ibid. pp.78-79. ttihad-1 slam, 2 (December 24, 1908), I. Cited from Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam:

Ideology and Organization, pp.78-79.

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Celal Nuri (1877-1939), a widely read journalist, was also of two minds regarding the relative merits of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. While acknowledging that Muslims could not be expected to form a single nation, he warned that Islam frowned on their division and condoned it only if this did not harm its own role as a bond between the Muslim nations. Neglect of Islam caused Muslim nations to draw apart from one another and thus facilitated foreign aggression against them separately. The Christian powers were stirring up mutual hatred between Muslim groups, as when they incited the Bosnians, then the Albanians, to demand independence from Turkish despotism, or French encouragement of a revival of the Berber language, to foster their separate identity; or the British, Italians, and French stirring up the Arabs against the Turks, so as to destroy the union of Muslims. Celal Nuri further pointed out that without Muslim solidarity, France and Great Britain would occupy more Muslim lands, thus separating Sultanate and Caliphate and dooming not only the Ottoman Empire but also Muslim unity. Therefore, only through achieving the unity of Muslims, enhancing contacts between Shias and Sunnis, dismissing the various groups’ disorder in their views and morals, thinking, and behavior, and opt instead for method and discipline. Muslims’ unity was not merely a requirement of the faith, but also an imperative to fight against the European powers.

After analyzing the necessity of Muslim unity, Celal Nuri provided a plan to achieve it. He believed that Muslim unity existed in faith and should be put into practice, just as pan-Slavism, pan-Latinism and Pan-Germanism had been. Pan-Islamism would be stronger than other unions, since unity is implied in it and since it would be based on Islamic sentiments of brotherhood and on common morals and customs. He said that “Muslims were making the same music, but they needed a conductor for their orchestra. Islam, a great force, past, preset, and future, could and should be a bond uniting all Muslims, despite foreign rule and differences of place, government, economics and language”. Therefore, “Muslims ought not to conceal their thoughts about an Islamic union, but rather demonstrate them openly”.

Celal Nuri had mentioned some elements common to all Muslims-and presumably, leading to an Islamic union: 1) The Caliphate: Both Turks and Arabs should be grateful for this, and it was, and would be, an immense force uniting all Muslims everywhere. 2) The holy pilgrimage (hajj): It was not only a religious duty, but also had social and political implications. 3) Islamic education: education with a common basis would promote the spread of the idea of the Islamic union. 4) A common religious literature: It could enter into all Muslims hearts, and was conductive to spread the idea of the Islamic union. For his part, the reason why he advocated pan-Islamism was that the Islamic unity would dam Christian hatred of Islam and smash European aggression. “Pan-Islam would not mean extending the Ottoman Empire to comprise all Muslims, but, rather, preserving the sentiments of unity in the hearts of Muslim and working jointly for the future of Islam.” “Islam could shake the entire world with its force, renascent in the near future in a young, united Islamic nation”.

Celal Nuri’s thought was quite representative in the Ottoman Empire in the era of

Ibid. p.81. Ibid. p.82. Ibid. pp.82-83.

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25

Young Turks. His book “was not only the most explicitly detailed work on pan-Islam in the Young Turk era, but is also characteristic of the way pan-Islamism ideology was being expressed before 1914”. It is a clear expose of the need for an Islamic union to oppose European aggression and Christian hatred by uniting Muslim forces on moral and intellectual bases, but also with very definite political and some economic implications. Looking at Celal Nuri’s pan-Islamic thoughts, against the backdrops of the turbulence of the empire and emerging nationalistic thoughts and movements, he continuously tried to unite Muslims through the promotion of pan-Islamism. He viewed it as a method to organize and fight against Europe. It was historically progressive to some extent in opposing European colonialism; however, such pan-Islamism with the promise of utopia was no more than empty words that were impossible to realize. Besides, Celal Nuri’s pan-Islamic thoughts in essence were aimed to serve the authoritarian rule of the Ottoman Empire as illustrated in his argument that “the Caliph would forge the Islamic union and lead it, using the pilgrimage, education and mosque propaganda for this end”. He attached the hope of the Islamic union to a declining empire. Limited by the rising nationalism, such proposal was doomed to be incompatible with the reality of the time period.

As the actual controller of the late Ottoman Empire, the Committee of Union and Progress’s attitude toward pan-Islamism had two sides: it opposed it while at the same time it took advantage of it. On the one hand, the Committee of Union and Progress opposed pan-Islamism, as the Kemal H. Karpat said, in era of rising nationalism, Young Turks did not believe in pan-Islamism as a Supra-national ideology. Conversely, the Committee of Union and Progress had used pan-Islam, because the pan-Islam was basically an expansionist policy, suited to the mood of Young Turks, as they were seeking compensation for their retreat from previous borders. Therefore, for the Committee of Union and Progress, commitment to Islam and pan-Islamism was a matter of political expediency, rather than a matter of principle. Of course, the Young Turks’ support for pan-Islamism was intended to seek moral support from the Islamic world to their regime, advocating that Muslims should establish an anti-European invasion front. After the outbreak of World War I, the Committee of Union and Progress adopted a more aggressive stance in pan-Islamic activities and propaganda. It attempted to draw close to Iran, as a part of its grand design to set up a union with Iran and Afghanistan as a first step to a wider pan-Islamism one.

In short, in the late Ottoman Empire, political thought was consumed by ideological chaos. With the declining of the empire and the political turbulence, ideologies at that time became diversified, complex, and changeable. This was shown in the intertwined relationships of pan-Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism. The contradictions and

Celal Nuri, “ ttihad-1, sl m: sl mn Mazs, Hali, stikbali,” Istanbul, 1331. Cited from Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization. p.83. Ibid., p.83. Kemal H. Karpat, “The Turkic Nationalities: Turkish-Soviet and Turkish-Chinese Relations,” in W. O.

McCagg, B. D. Silver, eds., Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979, p.124. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, p.87. Ibid. p. 88. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, pp.90-91.

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Celal Nuri (1877-1939), a widely read journalist, was also of two minds regarding the relative merits of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. While acknowledging that Muslims could not be expected to form a single nation, he warned that Islam frowned on their division and condoned it only if this did not harm its own role as a bond between the Muslim nations. Neglect of Islam caused Muslim nations to draw apart from one another and thus facilitated foreign aggression against them separately. The Christian powers were stirring up mutual hatred between Muslim groups, as when they incited the Bosnians, then the Albanians, to demand independence from Turkish despotism, or French encouragement of a revival of the Berber language, to foster their separate identity; or the British, Italians, and French stirring up the Arabs against the Turks, so as to destroy the union of Muslims. Celal Nuri further pointed out that without Muslim solidarity, France and Great Britain would occupy more Muslim lands, thus separating Sultanate and Caliphate and dooming not only the Ottoman Empire but also Muslim unity. Therefore, only through achieving the unity of Muslims, enhancing contacts between Shias and Sunnis, dismissing the various groups’ disorder in their views and morals, thinking, and behavior, and opt instead for method and discipline. Muslims’ unity was not merely a requirement of the faith, but also an imperative to fight against the European powers.

After analyzing the necessity of Muslim unity, Celal Nuri provided a plan to achieve it. He believed that Muslim unity existed in faith and should be put into practice, just as pan-Slavism, pan-Latinism and Pan-Germanism had been. Pan-Islamism would be stronger than other unions, since unity is implied in it and since it would be based on Islamic sentiments of brotherhood and on common morals and customs. He said that “Muslims were making the same music, but they needed a conductor for their orchestra. Islam, a great force, past, preset, and future, could and should be a bond uniting all Muslims, despite foreign rule and differences of place, government, economics and language”. Therefore, “Muslims ought not to conceal their thoughts about an Islamic union, but rather demonstrate them openly”.

Celal Nuri had mentioned some elements common to all Muslims-and presumably, leading to an Islamic union: 1) The Caliphate: Both Turks and Arabs should be grateful for this, and it was, and would be, an immense force uniting all Muslims everywhere. 2) The holy pilgrimage (hajj): It was not only a religious duty, but also had social and political implications. 3) Islamic education: education with a common basis would promote the spread of the idea of the Islamic union. 4) A common religious literature: It could enter into all Muslims hearts, and was conductive to spread the idea of the Islamic union. For his part, the reason why he advocated pan-Islamism was that the Islamic unity would dam Christian hatred of Islam and smash European aggression. “Pan-Islam would not mean extending the Ottoman Empire to comprise all Muslims, but, rather, preserving the sentiments of unity in the hearts of Muslim and working jointly for the future of Islam.” “Islam could shake the entire world with its force, renascent in the near future in a young, united Islamic nation”.

Celal Nuri’s thought was quite representative in the Ottoman Empire in the era of

Ibid. p.81. Ibid. p.82. Ibid. pp.82-83.

Trends of Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire

25

Young Turks. His book “was not only the most explicitly detailed work on pan-Islam in the Young Turk era, but is also characteristic of the way pan-Islamism ideology was being expressed before 1914”. It is a clear expose of the need for an Islamic union to oppose European aggression and Christian hatred by uniting Muslim forces on moral and intellectual bases, but also with very definite political and some economic implications. Looking at Celal Nuri’s pan-Islamic thoughts, against the backdrops of the turbulence of the empire and emerging nationalistic thoughts and movements, he continuously tried to unite Muslims through the promotion of pan-Islamism. He viewed it as a method to organize and fight against Europe. It was historically progressive to some extent in opposing European colonialism; however, such pan-Islamism with the promise of utopia was no more than empty words that were impossible to realize. Besides, Celal Nuri’s pan-Islamic thoughts in essence were aimed to serve the authoritarian rule of the Ottoman Empire as illustrated in his argument that “the Caliph would forge the Islamic union and lead it, using the pilgrimage, education and mosque propaganda for this end”. He attached the hope of the Islamic union to a declining empire. Limited by the rising nationalism, such proposal was doomed to be incompatible with the reality of the time period.

As the actual controller of the late Ottoman Empire, the Committee of Union and Progress’s attitude toward pan-Islamism had two sides: it opposed it while at the same time it took advantage of it. On the one hand, the Committee of Union and Progress opposed pan-Islamism, as the Kemal H. Karpat said, in era of rising nationalism, Young Turks did not believe in pan-Islamism as a Supra-national ideology. Conversely, the Committee of Union and Progress had used pan-Islam, because the pan-Islam was basically an expansionist policy, suited to the mood of Young Turks, as they were seeking compensation for their retreat from previous borders. Therefore, for the Committee of Union and Progress, commitment to Islam and pan-Islamism was a matter of political expediency, rather than a matter of principle. Of course, the Young Turks’ support for pan-Islamism was intended to seek moral support from the Islamic world to their regime, advocating that Muslims should establish an anti-European invasion front. After the outbreak of World War I, the Committee of Union and Progress adopted a more aggressive stance in pan-Islamic activities and propaganda. It attempted to draw close to Iran, as a part of its grand design to set up a union with Iran and Afghanistan as a first step to a wider pan-Islamism one.

In short, in the late Ottoman Empire, political thought was consumed by ideological chaos. With the declining of the empire and the political turbulence, ideologies at that time became diversified, complex, and changeable. This was shown in the intertwined relationships of pan-Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism. The contradictions and

Celal Nuri, “ ttihad-1, sl m: sl mn Mazs, Hali, stikbali,” Istanbul, 1331. Cited from Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization. p.83. Ibid., p.83. Kemal H. Karpat, “The Turkic Nationalities: Turkish-Soviet and Turkish-Chinese Relations,” in W. O.

McCagg, B. D. Silver, eds., Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979, p.124. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, p.87. Ibid. p. 88. Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization, pp.90-91.

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competition between the traditions and the modern, between the East and the West, also reflected the intensified ideology competition within the collapsing Ottoman Empire. Social and political reforms were also born, and they transported the Ottoman Empire from a traditional empire to a modern state. Looking at the relationship between the political thoughts in the late Ottoman Empire and Islam, various nationalist thoughts still could not get rid of the influence of Islam. The impact of Islam could not only be found in pan-Ottomanism and pan-Turkism; moreover, pan-Islamism itself was influential as a relatively interdependent political and social trend of thought.

Securitization and De-securitization: Turkey-Syria Relations since the Syrian Crisis

27

Securitization and De-securitization

Turkey-Syria Relations since the Syrian Crisis

Rahmouni Fatima ZAHRA (Department of World History, Shanghai University, China)

Abstract: The article focuses on the nature of the relations between Turkey and Syria during the Syrian crisis. Although the relationship between Turkey and Syria had undergone some ups and downs in the last several years, both countries tried their best to improve their economic, political, cultural, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, Turkey introduced its model, “Moderate Islamic ideologies”, through Syria in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The “Arab Spring” of 2011 was a very good opportunity for Turkey to introduce its democratic Islamic dogmas which were welcomed by the Muslim Brotherhood leaders in some Arab Countries. But, the President of Syria, Bashar Al Assad, and his allies were very critical of Turkey’s policy. Thus, the article mainly explores the role of Turkey in Syria’s internal affairs, in particular, Erdogan’s policy towards Syrian crises. Besides, it examines Turkey’s domestic challenges and how Turkey has presented itself as a big supporter of the Arab Spring in the MENA. However, the article has found out that the current policies of Turkey towards the Syrian crisis are critical within the Middle East region. In other words, the conflicts and the wars against the Islamic State (ISIS) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) weakened the bilateral relations. The Syrian refugees and the PKK are posing overwhelming challenges to Turkey’s economy and internal security.Key Words: Turkey-Syria Relations; Syrian Crisis; Turkey’s Foreign and Domestic Policies; Syrian Refugees; Securitization and De-securitization

I. Introduction

The bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria have, largely, included the areas of economy, politics and culture of both countries. Significantly, given their geographical locations, the two countries are connected with each other in their internal situations as well as the external conditions. Turkey is situated at the intersection of three continents and positioned between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea. It shares the longest border with Syria, which is about 822 kilometers. This position influenced largely the

Rahmouni Fatima ZAHRA, PhD candidate in global studies, Department of World History, Shanghai

University, China. Ellen Churchill Semple, “The Regional Geography of Turkey: A Review of Banse’s Work,”

Geographical Review, Vol.11, No. 3, 1921, pp. 338-350.