Islamic Ideology’s Challenge to the Discipline of International Relations
24
No citations without express permission. Email contact [email protected]1 Islamic ideology’s challenge to the discipline of International Relations This paper articulates one of the key challenges between Political Islam and traditional International Relations, that is, the dichotomy between the state and umma construct. The relationship between umma and state is a lens through which we analyse the way in which the International Relations (IR) discipline struggles to account for alternative theories. First the paper places Political Islam or Islamism, the pursuit of politics on the basis of Islamic norms, in the context of ideologies. In doing so we distinguish between Islamism or Political Islam the ideology, and Islam the faith. With regards to IR we will explore how ideology is perceived in the dominant, neorealist structure of IR as a tool of the state, and then compare this to the more important status afforded to ideas in constructivist theory. The paper then moves to define one of the key features of Political Islam, the ummasocial construct, and summarises the points of contention between it and the state. Political Islam will be shown to be lacking in its conception of state-to-state interaction, its focus primarily on the domestic sphere. Following this the paper does not ask of Political Islam what it can do to accommodate the state in IR theory but rather, what can IR do to accommodate the umma. In doing so, we critique the IR discipline‟ s inability to satisfactorily deal with alternative theories. Distinguishing between Islam the religion and Islam the ideology Attaching a cultural label like 'Islam' to a state can be convenient in setting the context of that state's solidarity with other states or its legitimacy with its population.
Islamic Ideology’s Challenge to the Discipline of International Relations
Islamic Ideology’s Challenge to the Discipline of International Relations
Citation preview
1
International Relations
This paper articulates one of the key challenges between Political
Islam and
traditional International Relations, that is, the dichotomy between
the state and
umma construct. The relationship between umma and state is a lens
through which
we analyse the way in which the International Relations (IR)
discipline struggles to
account for alternative theories. First the paper places Political
Islam or Islamism, the
pursuit of politics on the basis of Islamic norms, in the context
of ideologies. In doing
so we distinguish between Islamism or Political Islam the ideology,
and Islam the
faith. With regards to IR we will explore how ideology is perceived
in the dominant,
neorealist structure of IR as a tool of the state, and then compare
this to the more
important status afforded to ideas in constructivist theory. The
paper then moves to
define one of the key features of Political Islam, the umma
social construct, and
summarises the points of contention between it and the state.
Political Islam will be
shown to be lacking in its conception of state-to-state
interaction, its focus primarily
on the domestic sphere. Following this the paper does not ask of
Political Islam what
it can do to accommodate the state in IR theory but rather, what
can IR do to
accommodate the umma. In doing so, we critique the IR disciplines
inability to
satisfactorily deal with alternative theories.
Distinguishing between Islam the religion and Islam the
ideology
Attaching a cultural label like 'Islam' to a state can be
convenient in setting the
2
What a label cannot do is tell us how that state is governed. At
least that is what
Fred Halliday states in his work, The Middle East in International
Relations.1 What
Halliday goes onto assert is that “ideology is a factor in foreign
policy, but as an
instrument of state, as much as it is an independent limit on what
the state does”.2 If
we examine this further with regards to Islam as an ideology; to
what extent does an
Islamic ideology demand certain actions of the state, on the
international scene?
We define ideology as standpoints that constitute “sets of belief
about how the
past shapes the present, its triumphs and, never far away, its
treacheries, how the
world works, and, equally important, about how it
should work”.3 This is contrasted to
Munsons definition of Islamic ideology as “a blue print for
political action”.4 Munsons
„blue print for politics is devoid of the holistic appraisal of the
world apparent in the
first, traditional view of ideology, a criticism that can also be
put to „newer ideologies
like Feminism or ecological based ideologies. Are such ideologies
which define
themselves around a singular issue be it the environment, womens
rights or the
shari’a comparable to the „classical ideologies total conceptions
of society? In the
case of the shari’a this could potentially be the case as,
depending on ones
interpretation, shari’a does have something to say about
every aspect of ones life.
Regardless of the status afforded to shari’a, or not, „Islam will
be shown to be unable
to represent a univocal stand point as “the symbolism and the
language is inherently
flexible and even ambiguous, one Muslims image can be anothers
“counter -
image”.”5 However, since there is no dominant interpretation
of Islams ideological
3
stand point, everything, so to speak, is there to play for.
If, according to the definition offered by Eickelman and Piscatori,
the political
is the setting of boundaries, a contest between actors who “seek to
draw lines
between public and private, government and civil society,
obligatory and forbidden,
moral and immoral”6, and ideology serves as the „blueprint for such
political action,
then ideology has huge bearing on how one governs; governance being
the explicit
emphasis of this definition of the political.
The return, “by state and social movements alike, to the espousal
of a more
traditional set of values, associated with religion”7, is linked
perhaps to a more
general ideological trend whereby people no longer identify with
broad social
movements like they may have done in the past. It is argued that
one of the reasons
for this is the pervasive hegemony of neo-Liberal ideology, which
has led to a
situation where the „politics of identity has replaced the
„politics of ideology, as the
latter is no longer an area for contestation.
However, there is a conception of ideology, albeit a Marxist one,
that sees an
ideologys primary purpose as giving one a sense of
identity. This identity is a false
one in Marxs criticism of the capitalist ideology, “[papering] over
the real conflicts in
society, making what is artificial and coerced appear natural and
free”.8 Nonetheless,
the idea that the main purpose of ideology is as an identity broker
does not mean it
falls outside of the more traditional view of it having a total
conception of how society
should work. Indeed, a total conception of society will include
categorising of peoples
into one group or another, there-by conferring some kind of
identity onto these
4
groups even if it is as basic as „us and „them.
Ideology however, can only be responsible for so much. Identity is
dependent
on far more than just ideology. To illustrate, how many non-Jewish
Zionists or non-
Muslim Islamists exist in the world? Or even simpler, how many
Feminists are of the
male gender? This theory is articulated as „intersectionality by
Crenshaw. She writes
about different „axes of analysis when talking about identity. In
her example she
discusses two axes, that of race, and gender. She claims that
academia fails to
account for Black women, who lose out both in feminist debates
where they are
counted as „Black, and in anti-racist policies where they are
considered women.9
Similarly, there is a weakness in claiming that an ideological
commitment can define
an individual. Being an „Islamist does not preclude being a parent,
student, male,
female or any other of the multitude of identities we all hold, all
at the same time. So,
rather than the sole purpose of ideologies, we would say that it is
definitely a
component of an ideology to confer identity to the groups who
subscribe to it, but
there is more than ideology at work when talking about
identity.
Even so, a peculiar trait of the Islamic ideology is its ability to
incorporate so
many of these axes of identity. It is seen to have such a strong
draw because it can
appeal to almost every societal class you can think of, at the same
time, without
contradiction.10 However, this statement is only true amongst
Muslims, and has
notable exceptions (like homosexuals, for example), but adds to the
reasons why
Islam is seen to be in resurgence in modern times. So if Islam can
confer to
someone an identity, is it therefore an ideology as well?
5
Religion and ideology are common in some respects. Both, for
example,
speak from a position of dominance; both are
“politico-tutorial”11 and have an
element of universalism about them. In the case of religion, it is
only „our way, not
the alternatives that lead to salvation. In the case of neo-Liberal
ideology, it
represents an “unalterable framework for social and political
life”.12 The fact that
religion and ideology might operate in the same ontological space
does not mean
they are capable of coexisting in that space. In fact, the very
term „ideology was
coined as an oppositional notion to religion. Its originator,
Antoine Destult de Tracy,
wanted in 18th century revolutionary France to “set the human
understanding of
ideas on a scientific footing”13, as opposed to the metaphysical
source of knowledge
offered by the church. Schwarzmantel is even more critical of the
trend of religions
resurgence in the place of ideologies. To him, religious ideologies
“[emphasise]
religion as a divisive factor which functions as a basis of
cultural identification and
undermines the wider unity offered by secular ideologies of
politics”.14 But as
intersectionality theory shows us, an ideology cannot serve to
provide societal unity
by virtue of the identity it affords someone.15
The aforementioned „secular ideologies are however, tolerant and
accepting,
at least in the case of the hegemonic form of Liberalism. Religious
ideology on the
other hand, especially Islamism, is not. This is not meant to be an
inflammatory
statement, but can easily be substantiated by looking at the
jiziya, exemption tax,
which is explicitly divisive of society. This is a tax on
non-Muslims living under
6
Muslim governance who pay to be exempt from military service.
Indeed under the
Ottoman system a non Muslim could not serve in the military and so
the tax was not
an option but obligation.16 Though in
actuality jiziya is a policy not an ideology, it is
a
policy which helps order society and so one can assume, given our
understanding of
ideologys role in constituting society, that the jiziya is at
least partly derived from this
(Islamic) ideological standpoint.
The previous arguments hinge on an interpretation of the shari’a
which is all
encompassing, allowing for the „total conception of society that is
definitive of an
ideology. Such a view is but one interpretation amongst many.
Another popular
notion would see Islam relegated out of the ideological and
therefore political scene
altogether, much in concordance with neo-Liberalisms take on
religion. This
interpretation of the shari’a sees Islams guidance as
spir itual in nature, separate
from the temporal affairs of man. As Ziya Goklap, the so called
“Grand Master of
Turkism”17 believed, much of the „Islamic rulings on the
structure of society were
derived from Arab culture and further, „true Islam, “was a religion
that demanded of
its followers „faith, and it did not confine its followers to any
form of social
organization”.18 Indeed, “personal piety is one thing and
ideological commitment to
the goal of a strictly Islamic state is another”.19 The fact
that Islamic ideologues have
to stress so much that there is no distinction between religion and
politics is perhaps
due to the fact this is not how the majority of Muslims view
their religion.20
7
Political Islam vs. Realism: An Ideological Competition?
In international relations “realism, by most accounts the dominant
paradigm in
international relations theory”21, views ideology as a tool to be
wielded by the actors,
states, in an anarchical world. Realism, and there are varied
nuanced versions of the
theory, presupposes the pursuit of power, material and social, is
the primary
motivator for state behaviour. Ethics, morality or ideologies are
products of power
and these material interests, not the other way around. So unlike
our previous
conception of ideology, the idea that it informs ones view on how
the world works
and how it should work, in the realist interpretation ideology does
not necessarily
constitute an individuals appraisal of the world but is a tool used
to influence
individuals towards the aims of states. Influence extends outwards
from the state
and ideology does not or should not influence it or impinge on its
capacity to act in
international relations. Such a scenario need not be as amoral as
is often implied by
the literature on realism. It can be said that patriotism, the
suspension of self for the
benefit of a collective, is one of the most altruistic gestures an
individual can make.
When a collective is so roused and inspired to action, then self
interest for the benefit
of that collective is equally the most moral action a state can
take to protect its
population and help them prosper.22
The central debates in International Relations have traditionally
been between
the realist perspective and liberalist, teleological
viewpoints.23 Constructivism is
relatively new to the fray and claims not to contend with what
these more traditional
8
scholars say or do, but tries to shine a light on what they ignore,
in this case “the
content and sources of state interests and the social fabric of
world politics”.24
Constructivism informs the methodology of this paper as unlike the
neorealist
interpretation of Arab and Muslim politics, ideology is in this
region, and perhaps the
world over, more than just a tool used for self benefit.
Here we channel Barnetts arguments in his book Dialogues in
Arab Politics:
Negotiations in Regional Orders, where he also places an emphasis
on
constructivism to highlight the shortcomings of neorealist analysis
of the Middle East.
Regional order in the Arab world, according to Barnett, is achieved
not only by “a
stable correlation of military forces, but also because of stable
expectations and
shared norms”.25 His emphasis on shared norms and expectations
is what sets him
apart from neorealist thinkers and is where his emphasis on
Constructivism lies, as
these norms are not set in stone but are liable to be constructed
and reconstructed
by the various actors involved in the politics of the region. Given
his concessions to
realist theory Barnett could be described as a „weak or „soft
constructivist, but
anything less would represent an underdeveloped theory as realism,
whatever its
shortcomings, still explains a great deal in the Middle East, where
states ostensibly
seek security under anarchy; towards the end of the
20th century “the Middle East
remained the worlds largest non-OECD arms market, its total annual
defence
expenditure around $60 billion, compared with... $37 bn for Central
and South
America. At 7 percent of GDP, defence expenditure was the
highest for any region of
the world”.26
In international relations actors do not want their choices
constrained by
9
ideologies which are here seen merely as “useful adjuncts to
political power and are
nurtured for that purpose”.27 This of course resides in the
realist world view,
assuming the nature of the game is self interest. However, the
quintessential
constructivist Alexander Wendt claims that “[i]f self interest is
not sustained by
practice, it will die out”.28 Certainly Islams view of human
nature is sufficiently
different to bring about this change of practice; “[m]an is taken
as he is... Islam takes
into account human nature, his capacities, his virtues, evils,
strengths, and
weaknesses... It does not portray man as inferior, nor does it
denigrate his role on
earth”.29 To claim self interest is a practice that could die
out is a contentious
statement to say the least, but if self interest is a practice,
then is it reasonable to
assume that there is a theory behind this practice of self
interest? If so that theory
would have to be realism, which either through tragedy of the
system (Neorealism)
or evil of the agent (classical realism) emphasises self
interest.30
But why, then, does this one particular theory, one among many,
hold such a
lofty, universalistic appeal in international relations? It is
peculiar that a universal
theory such as Neorealism, supposedly detached from history, seems
to be, at least
in part, a product of its time; who can claim that the vision of a
bipolar world as “the
best of all possible worlds”31 is not an assertion heavily
influenced by the time of its
conception in the 1970s, and the Cold War. In the words of Nicholas
Onuf, the
emphasis on the realist paradigm means “international relations
[forms] a bounded
10
and distinctive social reality”.32 In fact, Onuf criticises
the very notion that realism
constitutes a paradigm theory as the base assumptions are something
you have to
be told (anarchy) not something you can prove, as in the natural
sciences.33 This
being true, which is not a claim easily substantiated, we would
posit that as well as
being a theory of international relations, realism is also an
ideology that one
subscribes to in order to gain agency and a distinct world view. In
this way political
Islam as a possible counter ideology represents a threat to this
„establ ished order of
things.
Having defined the term Political Islam as an ideology, and what is
meant by
an ideology in international relations, the paper moves to analyse
a possible method
of social organisation derived from that Islamist ideology, the
umma.
Umma vs. State
Driven by their ideological world view of how the world should be,
some Political
Islamists take issue with the structure of the international
system, especially the
centrality of the state. For them, Islam sees little that divides
persons except faith. In
this world view political association to a state which divides the
unity of believing
Muslims is problematic. Their solution: the umma, typical of
Medieval Islam, where
by one is affiliated to a political construct based on their faith.
This section outlines
the major differences between these two constructs, and how IR
might fail to
accommodate an Islamic body politic.
11
The European state developed through individualism, law and
justice. The
Islamic concept of body politic, which we refer to as the umma, is
based on justice,
group and leadership.34 This distinction is made by Ayubi, and
though highlighting
some of differences between the state and the umma, he fails
to grasp fully the
different terrain the two constructs rest upon. For the purposes of
his argument the
umma represents an Islamic equivalent to the state. He
proceeds to use the
differences he indentifies between state and umma to explain
the differing formation
and behaviour of the two. In fact, the umma is not an
equivalent to the state but an
alternative to it, as we will now explore.
Often used as justification for the particularity of the
umma chapter 2, verse
143 of the Quran states, “Thus have we made you an umma justly
balanced, that
you might be witnesses over the nations, and the Messenger a
witness over
yourselves”.35 In this verse the word umma, community, is used
in the same
sentence as nas, peoples or nations, signalling a distinction
between the two. The
umma does not represent, like the state, a defined territory
within which an authority
can govern. We can note that Western notions of rule are centred
very much on
„government, tied to sovereignty and ruling over a
specific and defined territory as
formulated by Webers notion of the state. Islamic jurisprudence
however, makes
little distinction over territory and is instead focused more on
rule over individuals,
regardless of where they live. When governance of Islamic lands was
relatively
centralised by way of the Ottoman Empire, direct rule was not
implemented over the
entire territory but over the people; “law was still... personal
rather than territorial”.36
12
In the less lucrative, geographically remote or strategically
unimportant regions in
was sufficient “to give recognition to local families of lords,
provided they collected
and transmitted revenue and did not threaten the routes by which
trade and armies
passed”.37
In this way we designate an umma as a community of believers
who are
bound by the laws of that community irrespective of territorial
boundaries. In such a
way Christians and Jews who partook of alcoholic drinks in Muslim
territory, an
otherwise punishable act for Muslims, as long as this was not done
in public, were
committing no offence as they were instead bound by the rules of
their own
communities.38 Conversely the state, as derived from the Peace
of Westphalia,
defines itself on the notion of territorial sovereignty39 and
in this very fundamental
way differs from the umma which has no such notion.
If we presume the units that constitute political Islams concept of
the
international sphere are ummas not nation-states, then is it
necessary for political
Islam to develop a more substantive theory of international
relations, or find a place
to „fit within the current discipline? This is the question that
drives this paper, for as
much as the state can be described as a Western or European
construct, so too is
the discipline of IR. IR, using as its unit of analysis the
nation-state, demands that
political Islam define itself in similar terms to be accepted by
the discipline. Put
crudely, political Islam must „play the game, at least a little,
to be considered a
„legitimate theory.
13
It follows that we will attempt to challenge commonly held beliefs
about IR in
light of its specific historical development. Specifically, the
centrality of sovereignty
and territoriality inherent in the discipline will be subjected to
this procedure, labelled
genealogy by French poststructuralist Michel Foucault.
Political Islam’s inadequate rendering of the international
sphere
The distinction between ideology and political theory in regards to
realism may be
semantic, but lends to our discussion as we have conceptualised
Islam throughout
this paper as more ideology than theory, and so defining realism in
the same terms
makes comparison between the two easier. Such conceptualisation may
however be
in vain as it can be observed that political Islam is very much
concerned with the
domestic.40 Its vision of the international sphere is in fact
quite underdeveloped as
the state defines itself on what it is and thusly looks very
much into itself, not its
place in the international structure or system. For example, Sayyid
Qutbs definition
of the Islamic state sees that “in the final resort it is concerned
with the observance
of the religious law, with the care of society in every respect,
with the establishment
of justice and equality in society and with the allotment of wealth
according to the
principles which are accepted by Islam”.41 This definition
deals explicitly with the
states relationship with its citizens but not its relationship with
other states. The
Islamic conception of an international structure sees the world
crudely demarcated
into „domains, most commonly that of war and peace, dar al-harb and
dar al-Islam
14
treaty, dar al-ahd . Fazlur Rahman unwittingly highlights this
problem in his rather
vague description of international relations in his article,
Implementation of the
Islamic Concept of State in the Pakistani Milieu.42 In it,
Rahman refers simply to an
overarching peaceful intent citing a Quranic verse, “Enter ye all
into peace, O,
mankind”.43 Beyond Quranic injunctions to honour treaties,
even with enemies, there
is little offered regarding an Islamic theory or structure to
international relations.
Whereas constructivism has “succeeded in broadening the
theoretical
contours of [international relations]”44, allowing ideology and the
realm of ideas to
play more of a role in how one constructs and implements a world
view, we have
shown that political Islam fails to keep up in this regard.
Constructivism helps to blur
the lines between different disciplines, Sociology and
International Relations in
particular, helping also to penetrate the barriers between
„domestic and „international
levels of analysis. Political Islams rudimentary conception of the
international
sphere could thus capitalise on a constructivist approach to
international relations,
helping it „construct a more comprehensive world view from its
existing
religiopolitical foundations.
The Westphalian Narrative in International Relations
Presuming IR to begin with states as the „who and war as the „how
(acknowledging
this as a realist presumption) it is not unreasonable to believe in
the anarchic system.
This assertion is one that Nicholas Onuf makes to highlight that
this most central of
IRs presumptions, is not falsifiable. We have to be told about the
anarchic system, it
15
cannot be proved. He elucidates, “[w]hile it was claimed that
anarchy is the
distinctive condition to which the discipline responds, it is by no
means clear that the
Western state system is the only concrete instance of international
relations
available for study”.45
The emphasis on anarchy, sovereignty and territoriality stems from
the
„beginnings of international society and the Peace of Westphalia.
It is claimed by
Kayaoglu that the emphasis on Wesphalia as the formation of modern
international
society gives an undue bias to European norms and values. “This
bias maintains that
Westphalia created an international society, consolidating a
normative divergence
between European international relations and the rest of the
international system.”46
From this divergence IR has stipulated that to be considered part
of international
society is to be part of this European normative heritage.
In a study of post colonial African states Herbst shows that the
African
continent boasted varying political organisations in pre-colonial
times. These are
simplified into two notions of pre colonial African rule; 1. Rule
over people, not
territory. In this instance land was plentiful and population the
constraining resource.
2. A notion of rule in which sovereignty was shared. It was common
for land to be
owned by one organisation, and people another, hence “such were the
limits of
territorial authority that the central government was often not
concerned with what
outlying areas did as long as tribute was paid”.47 This is
reminiscent of the Ottoman
example given earlier, where the Empire exercised direct control
only in strategically
important or lucrative areas, satisfied with tribute from the
other, more remote or
16
unimportant regions.48 What Herbst describes as the paradox of
African states
independence is that they joined the international community simply
as a result of
decolonisation; “It was immediately assumed that the new
states would take on
features that had previously characterized sovereignty, most
notably unquestioned
physical control over a defined territory”.49 Ironically in
the African case, as too with
the Middle East, even those who defined themselves in opposition to
Europe and the
West adopted the Western political organisation, the state, to
rule. The only way
Herbsts African states would be accepted in the international
community was to
adopt the Westphalian narrative, which coincidentally, or not,
treats “the West as a
perennial source of political and religious tolerance in
international society”.50
To conclude as Fred Halliday does that “[t]here is no such thing as
the
'international relations of Islam'”51 is perceived as
inadequate to the IR discipline; as
was the case with post colonial African states, we can surmise that
political Islam
„must develop an increased conception of the international sphere
because if it does
not, it cannot join the international community. To further explain
this position we
look to Mutalib and his analysis of the Malaysian state. He claims,
“[a]s in other types
of political systems, those who do not subscribe to the ideological
or philosophical
basis of the state (in the case, the non-Muslims) are not to be
given leadership
positions in government”.52 While he is explicitly describing
the domestic situation in
Malaysia we can extrapolate his argument to the international
level; those that do not
subscribe to the ideological or philosophical basis of the
international system (the
Westphalian narrative) will not be accepted as part of that
system.
17
The most striking points of contention between political Islam and
the state
are sovereignty and legitimacy. When we analyse political Islam on
the international
level, comparing it to the Westphalian narrative, the main point of
contention remains
the issue of sovereignty. Unlike discussions on the domestic level,
we do not mean
who or what institution can reign sovereign in a territory. Rather,
how does a
construct like the umma, with dubious territorial boundaries and
supposed
jurisdiction over its subjects even in other, non-Muslim
territories, interact with these
territories? Such supposition will not be attempted in this paper,
we will instead
continue our exploration of the limits of IR theory and other
possible effects such a
bounded political reality has on political Islam, and the
challenges political Islam puts
to traditional IR theory.
Challenges to the Discipline
It is said that while Foucault proved that “an IR freed from the
totalizing discourse of
Western, capitalist modernity remains impossible, this does not
mean that we should
abandon the task of excavating the “genealogical fragments” of
those pre-Liberal
voices “silenced” by the onward March of Western Reason”.53 If
political Islam
represents such a „pre-Liberal voice then it does not necessarily
need to be
excavated, or perhaps should not be excavated, as another of
Foucaults
contributions to IR was a critique of universalism. Political Islam
represents not just
another pre-Liberal voice but, possibly, an all
encompassing conception of the world
on a par with that offered by IR theory (and the dominant strands
within it, neo-
realism or neo-liberalism).
18
Certainly those architects of contemporary political Islam, Qutb,
Mawdudi and
Khomeini, all envisioned total and comprehensive change; “They saw
no possibility
of coexistence between Islam and other political and social
systems”.54 If political
Islam is to be articulated in such a confrontational way, perhaps
there is cause to
leave it semi articulated, an incomplete ideology that cannot
challenge the status quo.
Here we draw on Onuf and his constructivist stance that society,
including
international society, is one which we create for ourselves. Unlike
Realisms
assertions about the nature of man and other such universalistic
claims, Onufs
constructivism acknowledges that the system which IR currently
serves is one
created by man, perhaps for the benefit of the
majority, perhaps the minority,
dependant of course on ones point of view. On the centrality of the
state he
comments, “a number of such violently erected centers of peace
[states] emerge,
each a threat to the others, all vying ceaselessly and indecisively
for influence. In the
logic of the Leviathan, these centers are locally peaceful because
questions of
influence have been forcibly settled”.55 While his centres of
peace are locally
peaceful, it is implied that the struggle between different or
competing centres results
in conflict and violence.
There is, plausibly, substantial benefit to IRs limited scope in
that by forcing
recognition of states and only states, albeit in the image of a
European construct,
there is less of a reason for different centres of peace to come
into conflict. In this
way, the local has transcended national boundaries so that we can
consider entire
continents (North America and Europe) as „local centres of peace,
in Onufs
19
language. Of course this was the same claim made of the Westphalian
narrative
before the chaos of two world wars.
The stronger argument would be to claim that the “total,
comprehensive, and
revolutionary” 56 change demanded by political Islam could
potentially create
considerable conflict as the progress made in transcending the
local would be
bounded by those who maintain the current, Westphalian order and
those who would
adopt a new, Islamic order.
Such an argument echoes the inter-war religious thinker, Reinhold
Niebuhr.
Credited for developing what is described as Christian Realism,
Niebuhr was critical
of the international careers of states, seeing them as primarily
egoistic and self-
important. However, and somewhat begrudgingly, he alludes to the
fact that the
British Empire might have be achieving the best that any nation
can, in that the
international aims of the Empire are simultaneously congruous with
her domestic
aims; that her self interest is in the best interest of other
nations. His stance is
qualified by the fact that “[i]t is questionable whether her [the
British Empire]
achievement is great enough to make the attainment of international
justice, without
conflict, possible”.57 First published in 1932, it is clear
now that the attainment of
international justice was indeed unattainable by the British
Empire. It may be
possible however that the dominant forces of IR, chiefly realism
and the primacy of
the market, are now the modern „equivalent of the British
Empire. While these
dominant IR paradigms might well be to the benefit of some states
more than others,
much in the same way the British Empire primarily benefited the
British Isles, they
20
could represent the best chance at international justice without
the application of
violence.
The point remains that the state is a European construct and it
does conflict
with some non-European peoples, in this case, Muslims. If political
Islam cannot or
need not develop a more substantial concept of the international
sphere then it is up
to IR theorists and Islamic scholars to find a method by which the
umma and the
state could do more than co-exist but co-operate in such a way that
an umma might
conceivably join an organisation such as the European Union or any
other
organisation that operates with states as units for admission.
Dar-al-ahd is still a
stones through away from dar-al-harb and therein lays the
problem with political
Islams conception of the international sphere.
It must also be mentioned that this is only a „problem for those
(non-Muslims)
found on the „wrong end of an Islamic world order. As far as
din-wa-dawla (faiths
inseparability from the state) ideologues are concerned Islam is a
religion for all
peoples of the globe and the preferred order for international
society. As such, being
compatible with the state is meaningless as in this hypothetical
world order the state
would no longer exist.
Conclusion
As Onuf attempts to demonstrate, we are able to accept the
politics of Realism
without subscribing to the otherwise inherent universalism within
the theory. This is
achieved by acknowledging the origins of international society and
charting the
21
possible to „construct an alternative system that could
give credence to concepts like
the umma or dar-al-Islam. However, such an alternative system
might very well
come into conflict with the incumbent realist order and as such, it
would be better to
find a way for these two systems to move beyond their zero-sum
relationship and
exist together.
Thinking that goes beyond the boundaries stipulated by „political
modernity
will begin to acknowledge alternative forms of international
relations. The concept of
political modernity is a bounded, European reality which other,
non-European
cultures, must adopt and adapt to in order to achieve legitimacy in
international
society.58 Alternative forms of international relations could
stem from any number of
other cultural heritages such as Arab, African or Chinese
traditions. Only when
modernity is un-hinged from the normative dominance of Western
states, inherent in
a system created by those same states, can a truly multicultural
and „international
society develop. As it stands these „pre-Liberal voices of other
cultures are seen as
antithetical to reason and modernity. The universality of the
current system needs to
be challenged so that the same „pre-liberal voices can be seen as
co-contributors
rather than down right competitors. Senturk summarises thusly,
“there should be
room for the advocates of different ideas, because none represents
the truth in its
totality despite the sincerity of the claims of their
advocates”.59
In the case of Islam, as the international system is challenged so
too can
Muslim scholars attempt to unpack religious ideas into a more
complete conception
of „Islamic international relations. Muslims face, in addition to
the boundaries of
58 Though we have taken this as our starting point, it is by
no means set in stone that we
22
political theory, the boundaries represented by the faith of Islam.
Between the two,
Muslims find little room to manoeuvre when conceiving a form of
governance. Either
a Muslim can challenge the extent of Islams „reach in public life,
as Ali Al-Raziq
famously attempted in Islam wa usal al hukum60 or he can
challenge the norms that
underpin political modernity, or both. In challenging the norms of
modernity,
genealogy, the tool used by constructivists to detach IR from
universalism, could not
possibly be used to the same effect with political Islam.
Genealogical treatment of
Islam creates an acute problem in that it threatens to remove the
divine will that is
the universalist foundation of political Islam. Postmodernist tools
like this “[threaten]
to deconstruct religious messages into mere fairy
tales”.61 Such is the dilemma when
trying to integrate or account for a religious based order in the
secular discipline of IR.
60 Al-Raziq, A: Islam Wa Usal Al Hukum (Beirut:
Dar Maktab al-Hayat, 1966),
61 Turner, B: Orientalism, Postmodernism and
Globalism (London: Routledge, 1994), pg. 78
23
Bibliography
Al-Raziq, A: Islam Wa Usal Al Hukum, (Beirut: Dar Maktab
al-Hayat, 1966)
Ayubi, N: Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the
Middle East , (London: IB
Tauris, 1996)
Ayubi, N: Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab
World , (London: Routledge,
1991)
Barnett, M: Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in
Regional Order , (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998)
Bill, J.A, and R Springborg: Politics in the Middle
East . 5th ed, (New York: Addison
Wesley Longman, 1999)
Butko, T: "Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the
Rise of Political Islam",
( British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1,
2004), pg. 41-62
Checkel, J: "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations
Theory", (World Politics, Vol.
50, No. 2, 1998), pg. 324-48
Choueiri, Y: "The Political Discourse of Contermporary Islamist
Movemets", In A Sidahmed
and A Ehteshami (eds): Islamic Fundementalism, (Boulder:
Westview, 1996)
Copeland, D: "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A
Review Essay",
( International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000), pg.
187-212
Cox, R : "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond
International Relations Theory", In
R Keohane (eds): Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York:
Columbia University Press,
1986)
Crenshaw, K : "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics", In D
Weisberg (eds): Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations, pg.
383-98, (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1993)
Davidson, R : "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim
Equality in the Nineteenth
Century", In A Hourani, P Khoury and M Wilson (eds): The Modern
Middle East: A
Reader , (London: IB Tauris, 1993)
Eickelman, D, and J Piscatori, (eds.): Muslim Politics,
(Princeton Princeton University
Press, 1996)
Festenstein, M, and M Kenny , (eds.): Political Ideologies: A
Reader and Guide, (Oxford
Oxford University Press, 2005)
Haddad, Y: "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival", In J
Esposito (eds): Voices of
Resurgent Islam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1983)
Halliday, F: The Middle East in International Relations: Power,
Politics and Ideology ,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
Herbst, J: "Responding to State Failure in Africa",
( International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3,
1996), pg. 120-44
Hourani, A: A History of the Arab Peoples, (London: Faber and
Faber, 1991)
Houston, C: Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State,
(Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2001)
Kayaoglu, T: "Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations
Theory", ( International
Studies Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2010), pg. 193-217
Kessler, C: "New Directions in the Study of Islam: Remarks on Some
Trends and Prospects",
( Jurnal Antropologi Dan Sociologi, No. 18, 1990)
Mardin, S: "Religion and Secularism in Turkey", In A Hourani, P
Khoury and M Wilson
(eds): The Modern Middle East: A Reader , pg. 347-74, (London:
IB Tauris, 1993)
Munson, H: Islam and Revolution in the Middle East ,
(New Haven: Yale University Press,
1988)
24
Mutalib, H: Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic
State?, (Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 1993)
Niebuhr, R : Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in
Ethics and Politics , (London:
Continuum, 2005)
Onuf, N: World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and
International Relations ,
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989)
Qur'an
Qutb, S: Social Justice in Islam, (New York: Octagon Books,
1970)
Rahman, F: "Implementation of the Islamic Concept of State in the
Pakistani Milieu",
( Islamic Studies, Vol. 6, 1967), pg. 205-24
Schwarzmantel, J: Ideology and Politics, (London: Sage
publications ltd., 2008)
Senturk, R : "Toward an Open Science and Society: Multiplex
Relations in Language,
Religion and Society", ( Islam: Arastirmalari Dergisi, No. 6,
2001), pg. 93-129
Shani, G: "De-Colonizing Foucault", ( International Political
Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2010),
pg. 210-12
Spirtas, M: "A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory",
In B Frankel (eds):
Realism: Restatements and Renewal , pg. 385-423,
(London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.,
1996)
1999)