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Islam in Defence ofConstitutionalism
& Democracy:A Political Biographyof Iranian Ideologue
Mehdi Bazargan
Saeed BarzinUniversity of Exeter, Phd. 1992
Islam in Defence ofConstitutionalism
& Democracy:A Political Biographyof Iranian Ideologue
Mehdi Bazargan
Submitted by Saeed Barzin to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctorof Philosophy in Politics in the Faculty of Social Studies, May 1992.
The thesis is available for library use on condition that anyone who consults it is understoodto recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation taken from the thesisnorany information derived from it may be published without the author's written consent.
1 certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own has been identified and that nomaterial is included for which a degree has previously been conferred upon me.
Contents ... 3Acknowledgements ... 5Summary ... 6
1 Introduction ... 8
2 The Roots ... 15Family and early education ... 16France ... 23The civil servant ... 34
3 Islamic Work Ethics ... 49Social Developments (1940-53) ... 50Socio-political Activity ... 65
Religious currents ... 66Political currents ... 72
The Pamphleteer ... 78Moralism or the critique of secularism ... 84Labour or critique of traditionalism ... 90Moderation or the critique of Marxism ... 102Islamic work ethics ... 111On Colonialism ... 121
4 Historic and Social law ... 130Social Developments (1953-60) ... 131The National Resistance Movement ... 140
Nationalism ... 145Freedom and constitutionalism ... 149Charismatic leadersip ... 152Non-alignment ... 154Organization ... 156Religion ... 159Internal conflicts ... 162
Law & Social Evolution ... 164Evolutionary cause of religion ... 166
Natural Law of Society ... 177
5 Islamic Mass Appeal ... 185Social Developments (1960-63) ... 186The Freedom Movement of Iran ... 190
Islamic identity or the ideology of appeal ... 193Consciousness ... 200The religious establishment ... 202Constitutional and democratic government ... 209Tactical issues ... 216The White Revolution ... 223
Negation of Tyranny ... 226Tyranny as the source of social instability ... 230Tyranny as the source of moral corruption ... 236Tyranny as rejection of religion ... 239Tyranny as the cause of underdevelopment ... 249
6 Constitutional Islamic Ideology ... 254Social Developments (1963-77) ... 255Making of an Ideology ... 266
Natural Law ... 274Freedom ... 282Social obedience and rebellion ... 301War and peace ... 313Economics ... 325
7 The Liberal Defeat ... 352Social Developments (1977-80) ... 353
The Revolutionary offensive and the royal defence ... 356The Provisional Goveriunent ... 366
The appointment ... 367The events ... 373The liberal strategy ... 377Reform of the state ...378Democracy and political freedoms ... 387Challenge of the popular revolutionary movement ... 396Challenge of the radical Islamic tendency ... 404Challenge of the Left ... 417Bazargan and Khomeini ... 421
8 Conclusion ... 428
9 Bibliography ... 438Bazargan's worksSelected bibliography
Acknowledgements
For the preparation of this thesis I have had the good fortune of
relying on the assistance of a number of distinguished scholars
and I am in debt to them all. My particular gratitude is for my
supervisor and friend, lain Hampsher-Monk whose intellectual and
personal support proved essential through out the period of my
study. What he taught me most were the stuff of academic life;
hard work, scientific thoroughness, scholastic vigour, impersonal
critique, and intellectual honesty. Mention should be also made of
Dr. Tim Niblock and Dr. Nazih Ayubi (both of the Department of
Politics, Exeter) whose initial guidance in the field of Middle
Eastern Studies was vital for my work. I would also like to thank
and pay my respect to all those scholars whose work I have used
and whose names appear in the bibliography. It is this community
of men and women whose efforts have shed light on the contemporary
Iranian political history and whom the student of Iranian
politics, no doubt respects dearly. But I would like to
particularly mention the restless Iranian scholar, Dr. Homa
Katouzian (Oxford) as well as Dr. Ervand Abrahamian (New York) and
Dr. Houshang Chehabi (Harvard) for reading and commenting on parts
of my work. This study would not have been possible without the
support of my parents. Dedication to education and intellectual
progress is a way of life for them and I can only hope to maintain
their standards. Last but not least I would like to thank my wife,
Ladan. Without her compassionate patience I would have found it
difficult to finish this work. For her kindness I dedicate this
work to her.
Summary
Contemporary Iran has experienced a variety of authoritarian
rules; initially with the ancient house of the Qajars, followed by
the modernist rule of the Pahlavis and then the religious republic
of the clerics. Throughout these periods a significant number of
Iranian intellectuals, of all persuasions, have provided the
rational for despotism, iron fist authoritarianism and absolutist
rule. By contrast constitutional and democratic notions of
government have been marginal on the theoretical level and have
had little influence on the exercise of power. This work seeks to
understand the political ideas of the Iranian theoretician and
activist, Mehdi Bazargan, whose membership in the latter tradition
(in a country where "liberal" politics constitute a recent
phenomenon) is a matter of controversy. The study therefore seeks
to identify whether Bazargan in fact belongs to this current of
thought and whether he has a significant political position within
the context of social developments of post-WWII Iran. To achieve
this aim the study sketches out the general course of contemporary
developments in a number of periods (1941-53, 53-60, 60-63, 63-77,
77-79) corresponding to the manner and nature of authoritarian
rule. The study also looks at the political ideas of the
organisations with which Bazargan cooperated throughout his career
(the National Resistance Movement, and the Freedom Movement of
Iran). This is followed by a detailed, descriptive, analytical,
and functional discussion of Bazargan's own ideas in each period.
The study thus hopes to establish the content and form of
Bazargan's discourse as well as his interaction within the general
course of intellectual developments.
Othello: Soft you; a word or two before you go.
I have done the state some service, and they know't-
No more of that. I pray you, in your letters,
When you shall these [...] deeds relate,
Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate,
Nor set down aught in malice.
[Scene II, Act V]
7
8
Introduction
Contemporary Iran has been in the midst of great changes touching
every aspect of its social heritage. The events of the past one
hundred years including the constitutional revolution, the
emergence of a modern state, the role of the Pahlavi autocracy and
the Islamic revolution have taken place through increasing
challenges to the country's historic and modern institutions. One
feature of this process has been efforts by Iranian intellectuals
to deal with the conflicting forces and ideas which have
legitimized their role in the socio-political arena. The tensions
are numerous but the dominant ones include arbitrary authoritarian
rule of the state in opposition to demands by various social
classes for a right in determining their own destiny, forces of
tradition favouring the status quo in opposition to those seeking
change, indigenous movements working against external influences
and efforts to develop a prosperous functioning economy against
the magnitude of an underdevelopment which perpetuates poverty.
In this context one could ask how contemporary Iranian
intellectuals have responded to the problems of tyranny,
colonialism and underdevelopment and how successful have they been
in this regard? Furthermore what political ideas and ideological
language have they presented to the people so as to help towards
articulating the great ideals of justice, freedom and well being?
It is with these questions in mind that the political ideas of
Mehdi Bazargan are of interest.
The main features of Bazargan's ideas, written over five
decades are; efforts at synthesizing various and often
contradictory intellectual movements, adaptation of rational
methods (in place of repressive measures) towards conflict
resolution, continuity and moderation in place of a spasmodic and
violent change, an ability to establish dialogue and (a degree of)
a common language with various intellectual currents, and a
willingness to work with others instead of trying to monopolize.
Of course these characteristics (even if he was to adhere to them
consistently) could and would bring about political and
ideological weakness, for to sit on the fence often means
alienation from both sides. Rationalism could lead to idealism,
moderation is often unrealistic in terms of third world politics,
continuity has little glitter for the masses, dialogue is scorned
by those holding authoritarian ideas and a willingness to work
with others is shunned as appeasement.
The challenge of studying Bazargan's ideas is of interest
also for it opens a new area in Iranian studies. Much of the
underdevelopment which the country suffers in economic and social
spheres is also evident in the field of Iranian studies. Although
Iranian studies seem to have made advances in European and
American educational and research institutes (particularly
following and possibly as a consequence of the 1979 revolution)
there still remains a large area to be covered. The body of the
existing literature on contemporary Iran is based extensively on
political history and a degree of political economy but there is a
lack of work particularly in the field of the history of political
ideas.
The secondary source material for the present research was
based on this body of literature, which principly shaped the views
presented here on the historical, political and intellectual
10
context of contemporary Iran. However it was a matter of great
privilege and good fortune that a significant amount of primary
sources on Bazargan was available. His articles, pamphlets and
books have been reproduced a number of times by several publishing
houses, including the Sherkat-e Sahami-ye Enteshar (Tehran) and
the Book Distribution Centre (Houston, TX) both of which have
political affiliation to Bazargan's political associates.
Furthermore the Freedom Movement of Iran (Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran)
had produced over 10 volumes of documents in the early 1980s,
providing abundant material for research. Even more material was
made available for this study in the form of private collections
of pamphlets, statements, and press releases. The writing of
political memoirs by elder Iranian statesmen and intellectuals,
which has become fashionable in the post 1979 revolution period as
an effort to reassess the more recent history, has been of
tremendous help in this regard. A number of interviews,
particularly with the person of Bazargan in Tehran have provided
valuable data and analysis.
The existing studies of Bazargan's political career are
haphazard. His role in the initial stages of the 1979 revolution
has insured him a part in all history books and political studies
of the period. Almost all books discussing the Iranian revolution
refer to him in one way or another. However there is only a single
book which deals with Bazargan in greater details and depth.
Chehabi's Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation
Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini 1 is a historic and
1 Chehabi, H. Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: TheLiberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini (Tauris,London, 1990). I have preferred to use the word freedom instead ofChehabi's liberation in translating Azadi for the fact thatfreedom is closer to the movement's more liberal notion of"freedom to choose" rather than "liberation from restraint."
11
analytical study of the Freedom Movement and those associated with
it. In his lengthy eight-year study Dr. Chehabi has done great
justice to the movement and I have made ample use of his research.
However I have tried to present my study as a complimentary piece
to Chehabi's. While he has emphasized the political,
organizational and historic aspects of Bazargan's activities and
associates I have tried to concentrate on the intellectual and
ideological content of his discourse.
To determine the scope of the present thesis I have been
conservative rather than not, and for good reason. I chose to
concentrate on the descriptive, functional and methodological
reconstruction of Bazargan's discourse, rather than the
comparative, with the awareness that non-availability (bordering
on poverty) of studies on intellectual development in twentieth
century Iran demands procrastinating efforts. The first step is to
identify the main arguments and distinguish the spectrum of the
ideas. This would provide concrete grounds on which further
studies, including the comparative, could be based.
The current study then suffers from two limitations.
Firstly a lack of extensive comparative analysis with other
thinkers and reformers, not only in Iran and other Middle Eastern
countries, but those from the Western political heritage, where
reformation of the Christian church as well as the liberal
discourse on democratic and constitutional government provide
ample cases of symmetry and parallel study. Secondly Bazargan's
political pose in the 1990s, following his fall from government,
has not been included for a lack of time and space. By all
standards, and most of all to the man himself, this is an
12
injustice which has to be addressed in future reviews of this
work.
The methodology of the study developed as the work
progressed and although I have revised certain sections of the
work, discrepancies might be evident between various chapters. 2
The methodology included the identification of: principal ideas,
the main method of argumentation, the source of intellectual
inspiration, the author's intellectual innovations, the areas of
juxtapositioning, synthesis and/or logical contradictions, the
function of the discourse vis-a-vis socio-political currents, the
audience, as well as the examination of the historical and factual
evidence, classification of Bazargan's general methodology and
detection of the general political consequence of his ideas. In
parallel the social, political, economic and intellectual context,
as he saw it and further, was sketched out.
The first chapter looks at the early circumstances in
which Bazargan grew as a youth and the influence of his family,
early schooling, university and European life. Bazargan's early
reaction to the first Pahlavi monarchy is also studied. The second
chapter follows Bazargan's intellectual development in the 1940s
and early 1950s within the Iranian experimentation with political
2 On establishing a methodological paradigm the followingstudies were used: Skinner, Q. Meaning and Understanding in theHistory of Ideas, in History and Theory, 8 (1969), pp. 3-53. &Motives, Intentions and Interpretation of Texts, in Philosophy. Politics, and Society, series IV, ed. Laslett, P. Runciman, W.G. &Skinner, Q. (Blackwell, Oxford, 1972) pp. 136-57. Tully, J.Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics (PolityPress, Cambridge, 1988). Furthermore parallels were drawn from:Hampsher-Monk, I. The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke(Longman, London, 1987) and Rhetoric and Opinion in the Politicsof Edmund Burke in History of Political Thought, V.IX, No.3,winter 1988, pp.455-484.
13
tolerance. The third chapter looks at his early reaction to the
authoritarian return of Mohammad Reza Shah to the seat of power in
the 1950s. The fourth chapter discusses the ideology of Bazargan's
Freedom Movement as well as his Islamic defence of democracy
following his arrest at the end of the early 1960's liberalization
period. The fifth chapter reconstructs Bazargan's ideological
ensemble as he tries to address the various intellectual trends
during the Shah's autocratic rule and build an Islamic political
discourse. The sixth chapter identifies the main arguments of
Bazargan as he rises to power as the first prime minister of the
Islamic regime and tries to pursue a liberal reformist line of
action. A comprehensive bibliography of his work which includes
the dates of composition, details of the first publications and
details of the available editions follows.
The Roots
Family & early education 1908-27
Civil war had broken out between Constitutionalists and
Royalists (1908) when Mehdi Bazargan was born in Tehran. His
father Haj Abbasqoli Tabrizi (1868-1954) came to the capital, from
Azarbaijan at the age of eighteen to marry and had five sons all
of whom were brought up in the Persian culture of the capital. 1
Aqa Tabrizi was a self-made merchant who, before the age of
eighteen, had participated in the annual Muslim pilgrimage to
Mecca, as was required of affluent men of faith. In Tehran's
Bazaar he had advanced to become the head of two independent
Guilds of Merchants. 2 There are no accounts of his wealth but his
social activities indicate that he ranked among the propertied
classes and it was he who chose the family name, Bazargan,
literally merchant. 3
Aqa Tabrizi was active socially. In the year of drought
and famine, 4 he joined a group of merchants in organizing an alms
house. At the time of the 1906 Revolution, he supported the
Constitutionalists and once, acting on behalf of the Azarbaijani
merchants stood as a candidate for the National Consultative
1 Little remained of Azarbaijani culture particularly sincethe mother was from Kashan. No one spoke Azarbaijani in the houseand Mehdi never learned to speak the language. What was left ofAzarbaijani culture was a popular belief in hard work andentrepreneurialism. In his later writing there were to be noreferences to his ethnic roots.
2 Hey'at Tojjar, and Otaq Tojjar. Both associations, alongwith others, were later forced to close at the time of Reza Shah.
3 Bazargan, M. Interview, Tehran, December 1989. A series ofconversations were held with Bazargan during a trip to Tehran.Notes of the meetings are in the position of the author.
4 During the nineteenth century Iran faced periodic droughtwhich would cause decimation of flock leading to mass famine anddeath. The longest recorded case of drought and famine was in1869-72. However after the WWI famine, typhus and typhoid are saidto have carried off 50,000 people in Tehran out of a population of300,000. Lambton, A.K. Qajar Persia (I.B.Tauris, London, 1987).p.48. & Lenczowski, G. (ed.) Iran Under the Pahlavis (HooverInstitution Press, Stanford, 1978) p.88.
16
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Assembly, Majlis (parliament) but failed to gain enough votes. His
political connections were good and included links with the
Monarch, Ahmad Shah, 5 and the distinguished parliamentarian Hasan
Modarres. 6 He consulted with several of the senior religious
figures including Haj Abdolkarim Esfehani on social matters. 7
During the government of Mohammad Mosaddeq (1951-53) Aqa Tabrizi
lobbied on behalf of the prime minister to attract the support of
the senior Ayatollah, Mohammad Hosain Borujerdi 8 for National
Bonds which were to strengthen the government in the face of the
British trade embargo. 9
Aqa Tabrizi was a practising Muslim. He had traditional
religious schooling at a Tabriz maktab (school) and read the
Koran. His religious activities included holding philosophical
meetings in his house between Muslim scholars and their
5 Ahmad Shah succeeded to the throne at the age of 11 (1909)and in later years showed little ability in carrying out hisduties. He managed to pass through the turmoil of the post-constitutional period and the WWI, but fell victim to Reza Khan'spolitical ambitions and was deposed, bringing down the house ofQajar. For a study of the dynasty see Bosworth, E. Qajar Iran (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1983).
6 Modarres, D.H. (d.1938) clerical Majlis leader opposed toReza Khan's ascent to power. Staunch supporter ofconstitutionalism and nationalism and known for his fieryspeeches. His opposition to Reza Shah landed him in jail where hewas murdered. Modarres, V.1 & 2 (Bonyad-e Tarikh-e Engelab-eEslami-ye Iran, Iran, 1987).
7 Apparently Bazargan's reference in the interview was tothe middle ranking cleric Sayyed Jamal al-Din Isfehani who had alarge following among artisans and labourers of the Bazaar duringthe Constitutional Revolution. He is known as an unorthodoxreformer and freethinker. Martin, V. Islam and Modernism: The 1906 Iranian Revolution, (Tauris, London, 1988) p.39 & 56.
8 Ayatollah Mohammad Hosain Borujerdi (d.1960) the mostsenior Shiite cleric leader in Iran until his death. Followed aconservative and quietist approach to politics and is reported tohave been on friendly terms with the Shah.
9 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.17
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opponents. 1° Comparatively speaking, it seems he was not a
traditionalist. The holding of open debates shows a critical
attitude, and (as we shall see) agreeing to have his son sent to a
European university indicates an absence of xenophobia. He was
fond of the relatively new social phenomenon of newspapers and
kept foreign books in his house. 11
Aqa Tabrizi saw to the welfare of his family through the
turbulent times that witnessed the disintegration of the
traditional order, the 1906 revolution, the first world war, and
the three nationalist rebellions 12 which increased social
tensions to near total collapse of the state. By the time his son,
Mehdi, entered secondary school Reza Khan had staged a coup to
pursue a new authoritarian trend under the banner of Modernism,
centralism, nationalism, secularism and political quietism. From
the view of the Aqa Tabrizi's family what must have been of
importance were the anti-religious campaign and the controls
imposed on the traditional Bazaar merchants. Reza Shah's religious
persecutions are said to have had two aims; the destruction of
Iranian Shiism as a symbol of backwardness and the removal of the
independent social religious institutions as autonomous channels
of public association and communication. 13 Furthermore during the
reign of Reza Shah the traditional merchant classes suffered on
10 Bazargan, M. Modafe'at Dar Dadgah-e Ghair-e Saleh-eTajdid Nazar Nezami, Defence in the Non-jurisdicto Military Court of Appeal (Modarres Publications, Bellville, Ill. 1978) p.75.Henceforth Defence.
11 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.12 Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani in Tabriz, Mirza Kuchek Khan in
Gilan, Colonel Pesiyan in Khorasan.13 Katouzian, H. The Political Economy of Modern Iran
(Macmillan Press Ltd. London, 1981) Refer to Shah's absolutism.18
The Roots
account of heavy tax burdens, state monopolies over foreign trade
and government interference in matters of the guilds. 14 The
independent Guild of Merchants which Bazargan senior headed for a
term was shut down by government order.
However it would be a mistake to think of Aqa Tabrizi as a
member of the traditional class. It would be similarly wrong to
place him within the ranks of the emerging modern classes of early
twentieth century Iran. During the rule of Reza Shah, when both
the religious and the merchant classes were under pressure, Aqa
Tabrizi seems not to have been greatly disturbed. While retaining
his religious ideas and Bazaar position he was fond of the
monarch, the symbol and ruler of the new order. 15 In many ways he
represented the attraction and the conflict between the
traditional and the emerging social classes.
Mehdi Bazargan's education was privileged in the sense
that he attended, not a traditional Islamic maktab, but a European
style school of which only several hundred existed in the
country. 16 The head of the secondary school, Abu al-Hasan Khan
14 Abrahamian, E. Iran Between Two Revolutions (PrincetonUniversity Press, New Jersey, 1982) p.151.
15 He seems to have been genuinely attached to both Pahlavimonarchs, a cause of embarrassment to his son. See his role in theAzarbaijani crisis. Bazargan, Interview, 1989.
16 There were 56 primary and secondary European styleschools in 1917 in Iran and 724 in 1924. Bharier, J. Economic Development in Iran: 1900-1970 (Oxford University Press, London,1971) p.38. The first date corresponds to Bazargan's entrance toSultani primary school and the latter to his attendance at Dar al-Moa'lemin secondary school. Bazargan, A. Moshkelat va masa'el-eAvalin Sal-e Engelab, Problems and Issues of the First Year of theRevolution (Freedom Movement of Iran, Tehran, 1982) inside cover.
19
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Forughi 17 played an important role in forming the ideas of the
young student. Forughi was a man of philosophy and history as well
as religion and faith. He taught classes on "Geographical
Discoveries" and Philosophy as well as "Interpretation of the
Koran". In one class he spoke of social issues and ideas and in
the other he would familiarize the mind of the student with the
religious text. The Koran verse he would often write on the
blackboard; "Verily never will God change the condition of a
people until they change it themselves" 18 was to become one of
the political slogans that Bazargan used in later years. Forughi
would use scientific theories in support of Koranic verses, such
as the theory of optics in explaining the Sura (chapter) of
Light. 19 In contradiction with a dominant view among the Muslims
that took naturalism to be atheistic, Forughi often said that God
must be sought through the study of nature. These ideas influenced
Bazargan significantly and he was to stay close to this
interpretation of religion throughout his life. In support of this
view and with Forughi's encouragement Bazargan read God in Nature,
a treatise by the French Catholic astronomer, Camille
Flammarion.20
At the age of nineteen Bazargan was sent to study in
Europe with one of the first groups supported by government
17 The brother of Mohammad Ali Forughi, the last primeminister of Reza Shah and the author of Sir-e Hekmat Dar Urupa TheHistory of European Philosophy.
18 The Koran (translated by Yusuf Ali, A. 1946) XIII, 11.19 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.20 Astronomer Camille Flammarion (d.1925) established the
Juvisy observatory (1883) and the French Society for astronomy(1887). Won the French Academy's Montyon Prize for popularizinghis subject (1885). Wrote a number of books including God inNature (1869) and The World Before the Creation of Man (1885).
20
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grants. The students were chosen through exams. Bazargan came
fifth and chose to read electrical engineering. 21 The conflict
between the religious and the non-religious that was to haunt
Bazargan throughout his life, surfaced before his departure for
Paris. His parents (in addition to himself) were concerned that
the modern world might rob the young man of religious and moral
standards. To show his determination in staying true to religious
sentiments Bazargan argued that France could only be a challenge
in strengthening his beliefs. Furthermore he asked Ahmad
Nakhjavani, a low grade neighbourhood mulla and a distant
relative, for a Fatwa (religious decree) on the matter of a Muslim
living among infidels. Nakhjavani replied that if the purpose was
to propagate the true faith among Christians, the visit would be
permisable. 22 Thus Bazargan became further determined to uphold
his religious views.
The influence of religion over the ideas and life of
Bazargan must be seen within the context of the domination of
religion over public culture and perceptions. In the first quarter
of the twentieth century for the majority of Iranians, both in
cities and rural areas, life had only started to change since the
Middle Ages. They had little means of communication with each
other let alone the outside world. There was little chance of
travel for there were no proper roads. The telegraph system was
limited and only between major cities. Life, even in urban
conditions, was basic. Illiteracy and superstition were
21 The other choices were education, natural sciences,medicine and law. Bazargan, Defence p.39.
22 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.21
The Roots
widespread. 23 In the mid 1920s, when Reza Shah had consolidated
his position and was to initiate his state building campaign,
there were only some 700 modern European style schools for Iran's
10 million population.
In accordance with tradition, religious institutions such
as the mosque, the theological school (madreseh) and the Sufi
retreat (Khanqah) were the centres of local, social and political
information, and in addition to their religious functions, moulded
the ideas and perceptions of the people. Even the merchant guilds
and the athletic associations (zur Khaneh) had religious
associations, best evident in their responsibility in organizing
public religious events. The traditional schools, on which the
clerics relied, had an unsophisticated curriculum: basic reading
and writing, recitation of the Koran, Arabic grammar, and some
Persian poetry.
Changes to public culture started to take place when the
press began to have a greater impact on the urban population. In
the 1910s, following the weakening of the state despotism due to
the victories of the constitutional movement and until the rise of
Reza Khan to power, the press flourished and European ideas began
to filter through to the public. Reading aloud of newspapers, even
old copies became common practice throughout the country.
Nevertheless it was only among the small intellectual urban
classes that there was any understanding of the theoretical basis
23 No data is available but take into account that somefifty years later, in the 1970s, the illiteracy rate was estimatedto be around 60-70%.
22
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of the ideas that were filtering into Iran. 24 The majority of the
people remained attached to their traditional way of life and
religious perceptions. The popular mind maintained its attachment
to a culture based on fatalism as divine providence, and coloured
by the tragic versions of the lives of saints, particularly Imam
Hosain, and myths of semi-supernatural beings intervening in the
daily life and events. It was to be many decades before the
trickle of modern education could substantially change some public
perceptions.
Before Bazargan's departure for Europe two distinct
clusters of ideas are detectable in his intellectual makeup; on
the one hand a religious view of life, although somewhat non-
traditional, and on the other hand an influence of natural
sciences explaining the workings of the universe in modern terms.
While his school teachers, particularly his headmaster Forughi,
were responsible for the formation of both ideas, it was his
family, particularly his father who contributed to the formation
of the former. The young man left for France via the Soviet Union
in 1927. 25
Prance (1927-34)
In France Bazargan's ideas on religion and sciences
developed and a new element, a socio-political one, attracted his
24 Avery, P. (Ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran V.7,p.768, 840. Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi, pp.21-36. Sutton, Modern Iran, p.63. Lenczowski, G. (ed.) Iran Under the Pahlavis, p.86,304.
25 Document of the Ministry of Education. A copy of thedocument is in the position of the author.
23
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attention. Expected or not, the impact of the seven years of
living in France was tremendous and many of Bazargan's later ideas
on social affairs, politics and religion have their roots in this
period. Even when forty years later Bazargan wrote his memoirs,
all the expressions indicate the depth of shock when entering
Europe:
Everything was very interesting, strange, and confusing
... with extraordinary voracity we looked at things around
us ... may the creator be glorified 26 ... the mind of the
European did indeed surprise us their advanced
cultural values left a deep impression. 27
It is natural to expect that the modern Europe of the
1920's should have a significant effect on persons coming from a
traditional country, particularly if they are young and
intelligent. Indeed many were to totally abandon their former
ideas in favour of new ones believing liberation from backwardness
demanded that "from head to toe - we should turn European". 28 But
Bazargan's case was different; despite the impact of French
society, he resisted change at a time when such resistance was a
rare phenomenon among Iranian students. Furthermore the resistance
was a conscious one. In his first public speech entitled "Souvenir
28 Jalal-Khaleq!27 Bazargan, Defence p.42.28 A quote popularized by Sayyed Hasan Taqizadeh (1879-).
Taqizadeh was educated in Egypt, member of the first IranianParliament (1906), leader of the Democratic Party, held a numberof ministerial posts, ambassador to Britain, lecturer at CambridgeUniversity. Chand Pardeh Az Zendegi Rejal Scenes From the Life of the Elite (amid Publications, Tehran, 1945).
24
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From Europe" he blamed his fellow students for surrendering too
much to the European way of life.
Iranians have a wrong impression of Europe. Europe is not
at all a heaven of comfort, love, cinema and novels. There
is also misery, poverty, injustice and war ... It is not
correct to Europeanise Iran because on the one hand it is
not clear what we mean by European ... and on the other
hand Europe is not good in every respect ... Superficial
imitation of culture in dress and behaviour [is wrong. We
must] take up the spirit of creativity rather than the
product of [their] creation ... To be European we have to
be creative not imitative. There has to be initiative,
creativity. 29
Although European culture and civilization soaked Bazargan
to the skin, it failed to change him totally. New ideas were
introduced to him but they did not lead to total destruction of
the former ones. Rather a new combination of the old and the new
was created.
Here the study of Bazargan's religious ideas is important
for two reasons; on the one hand they were to be of importance in
the formation of his political ideas, on the other hand religion
was to play a significant role in future Iranian politics. In the
later stages of the Third Republic (1871-1939) two political
29 The address was made at a student meeting in Iran's ParisEmbassy May 3, 1943. A copy of the text is in the position of the
author.25
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trends, among others, were of significance in France; the Catholic
and the Republican. The former represented the bastion of the
conservative right and the latter that of the centre and the left.
Surprisingly both were to influence Bazargan's social perspective.
For the Catholics the last ten years of the Third Republic
were a time when their political and social attitudes were in a
state of confusion because despite a more general decline in
religious thought there was a temporary revival of Catholicism.
The popularity of the revival was apparent in the moral and
intellectual atmosphere as well as the socio-economic conditions
of the time. The loss of attraction of the scientific pretensions
of modernism, dominance of the Einsteinian concepts of relativity,
decline of nineteenth century positivism, and the growth of
Freudian ideas of the unconscious had all contributed to undermine
the critique of religion and promoted a revival of Catholicism.
Politically, horrified with the growth of the Republicanism and
Socialism, Catholics favoured either the conservative or the
reactionary right. The Catholics enjoyed an urban bourgeois social
support rather than that of the rural peasantry or the industrial
working class. Tactically there was a significant emphasis on
social work, rather than overt political activity. This logically
followed the awareness that de-Christianisation was widespread,
and that to many Catholics, religion was merely social
conformism.30
30 Bernard, P. & Dubief H. The Decline of the Third Republic (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985) pp.253-257.
26
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The revival of religious thought in the 1926-36 period saw
the emergence of Catholic organizations and trade unionism on a
number of social levels. These associations included ones for
peasants, teachers, and workers. The one for students; Jeunesse
Etudiant Catholique was formed in 1932, 31 at the time when
Bazargan had settled down in university life and French society.
Bazargan was impressed by the Catholic activity of urban France to
the extent that the formation of Islamic Associations, including
that of students, engineers, doctors, etc. was to become a life
long preoccupation in Iran.
Taking into account his religious background, drawing
close, interacting and being influenced by French Catholic circles
and ideas was useful for Bazargan in a number of ways. First, the
existence of a religious vision in Europe re-enforced Bazargan's
own religious convictions. When he pointed out -later- that
contrary to what Iranians thought, he had not seen atheism in
Europe, 32 he was in fact indicating the degree of his involvement
with the religious environment. This allowed him not to feel the
need for change in his basic religious views since the French, an
advanced European people, were also a religious nation. For a
student from a traditional and non-developed country the
availability of such a defensive position was significant. Thus
the existence of religion in Europe became a defence against the
secular and anti-religious Iranians. The presence of Catholic
thought among the young, urban, prosperous and educated classes
31 Bernard, The Decline of the Third Republic, p.254.
32 Bazargan, Defence p.73.27
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was a relief. One of his first impressions of France was the Paris
Notre-Dame cathedral:
A great number of people, in very chic and modern cloths,
were kneeling, praying in silence. A co-traveler murmured
'amazing, these Europeans also pray, and with such
sincerity'. 33
Furthermore, the Catholic interpretation of religion
became a weapon against the traditionalist Iranians with the logic
that the worship of God can have an active role in a modern and
progressive society without any need for the frameworks that the
Muslim traditionalists insisted on. The fact that 76% of students
at the University 34 belonged to the Association of Catholic
Students -which Bazargan frequented- the fact that the Association
was more active in social work than any non-religious group, 35
and the fact that all this took place within a framework of
devotion and prayer presented an exciting alternative for
Bazargan. 36 There was no need for the orthodox interpretations
that the traditionalists back home called for. Bazargan thus
became entrenched in opposition to a purely traditional Muslim
interpretation of religion. 37
33 Bazargan, Defence p.43.34 Bazargan first attended Lycee Clemenceau at the city of
Nantes and then Ecole Centrale, Paris, one of the France's best
schools.35 Bernard, The Decline of the Third Republic, p.253.36 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.37 Bazargan, Defence, p.24.
28
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Finally, Bazargan found a suitable framework within which
he could explain, at least to himself, the progress of European
civilization. He came to believe that the motive of the European
progress could "not be material pleasures or self interest [rather
it] could only be that of religion and the worship of God." 38 It
was through the acceptance of "religion as an element in
civilization" that the French were able be enjoy moral virtues of
strength, social planning, co-operation, righteousness,
selflessness, hard work as well as freedoms of association and
expression.
Such functional interpretations of the Catholic position
led Bazargan to further insist on his own Islamic vision of
things. One report indicates that he embarrassed his more secular
compatriots by constant performance of his daily prayer rituals.39
On Saturdays when the French students participated in the Military
Exercises, Bazargan read French books on Islam, including Life of
Mohammad by Emile Dermengham. He also attended a series of
lectures on the history of the Shiites and the Druze by the great
French Orientalist Louis Massignon. 48 When the colonial magazine
Afrique Noire printed an article in criticism of Islam, Bazargan
wrote a defensive tract and had it published in the same magazine.
38 Bazargan, Defence p.63.39 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.458.40 Louis Massignon (1883-1962) distinguished Catholic French
Islamist scholar, whose life long research on the tenth centurymystic martyr Hallaj has made him popular among Islamicmodernists. He had a number of Iranian associates includingMohammad All Forughi (see note 17). In the early 1930s, whileBazargan was in Paris, Massignon was seeking ways of bringingChristians and Muslims together. Holy Land, Louis Massignon,Summer 1991, pp.60-70.
29
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The interaction between the semi-traditional Muslim ideas
of an emerging modern Iranian society with that of revival of
French Catholicism led to a new vision. In his later writing
Bazargan said that by the time he returned to Iran it was with
greater religious faith than when he had left, but it was no
longer the "deviated Islam of superstition, ritualism, and
individualism, but the original, vital, social and creative Islam"
that he was keen to follow. 41 Although the remark is somewhat
exaggerated and can not be taken as a true measure of change (for
instance take into account that the material he was to publish for
the next ten years had no such radical reinterpretations of Islam)
it is nevertheless questionable how he could have discovered the
original Islamic faith in Paris after frequenting Catholic
associations and studying French orientalist literature. Clearly
European civilization had left its mark on the young man and had
altered his beliefs. He saw in Europe a more civilized way of life
but instead of abandoning his original identity and totally
accepting the western, he had internalized the modern concepts
into his own language. He had experienced a mixture of traditional
Muslim faith and modern Catholic society and wished to reconcile
the two.
A new element that entered Bazargan's frame of mind was
the purely political. Enjoying the social freedoms of Europe, he
developed an interest in social and political matters and found
41 Expressed some thirty years after the original events.Bazargan, Defence p.64.
30
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that he "had a knack for it." 42 The little political conditioning
that he had left him open to various influences. Interestingly
enough it was Catholicism's fierce rival, Republicanism, that was
to influence him most.
In the early 1930's, when presumably Bazargan was
sufficiently interactive with his environment, the French Socio-
political make up as presented in the Chamber of Deputies indicate
the largest block (40%) being controlled by the right, while the
Radical Socialists and Republican Socialists had a second place
(30%) and the Socialist Party the third (20%). 43 Radical
Socialism and Republican Socialism, were primarily committed to
the defence of Republicanism rather than socialist Ideas. After
the shortlived experience of the first and second republics the
new Republicans wished to protect the fragile third by rooting it
in the hearts and minds of the people. Thus educational
establishments became the missions of the Republican thought,
presented over and above the political system as a cultural
atmosphere and a secular ritual with its own symbolism, hymns,
festivals, and emblems. While the ideological and theoretical
orientation of the Republican Socialists kept them close to their
socialist roots, their electorate, that of middle classes,
peasants, shopkeepers, and small businessmen, tended towards
distinct social conservatism. Such a centrist position made the
Republican Socialists the indispensable element in the formation
of almost any coalition of the left or the right. While throughout
42 "Saram dard mikard bara-ye in jur chizha." Bazargan,Interview, 1989.
43 Bernard, The Decline of the Third Republic, p.302.31
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the 1920's power rested with the right, the political scene
gradually changed in the face of leftist unity that ultimately led
to the socialist-communist Popular Front coalition of 1936.
However the Leftist advance was not without serious and violent
challenges from the right, including efforts by the Fascists to
take over power (February 1934) as they had already done in
Germany and Italy. 44
It was within such an atmosphere that Bazargan attended
meetings of almost all political associations on the campus,
including that of the Socialists and the Royalists, but
particularly that of the Republicans. His first socio-political
activity, some ten years later, indicates the significant
impression that these free associations had left upon the young
student. He tried to understand the spectrum of French politics by
reading the quality morning newspapers which at the time were the
principal source of information. These included that of the
Communist Party, L'Humanite, the Socialist Party, Le Populaire, as
well as the Monarchists', L'Action Francaise. 45 Furthermore he
would attend campaign meetings for electoral candidates. Under the
influence of the Republicans, Bazargan started reading their
literature and even started to dress as a young republican. At the
same time the communists' anti-religious propaganda left him with
a bitter experience and a dislike for the communists took roots."
44 Jackson, J. The Popular Front in France DefendingDemocracy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988) seeintroduction and part one: section two, passim.
45 Bernard, The Decline of the Third Republic, p.262.46 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.
32
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Mention should be made of Bazargan's field of study;
thermodynamics, which constitutes a fundamental part of all the
physical sciences and which (particularly its concept of
equilibrium) was to be a source of inspiration for Bazargan's
subsequent reflections on social relations, as we shall see later.
Thermodynamics is the systematic study of the relationship between
heat, work, temperature and energy, encompassing the general
behaviour of physical systems in a condition of equilibrium. A
central consideration of thermodynamics is that any physical
system, whether or not it can exchange energy and material with
its environment, will spontaneously approach a stable condition
(equilibrium) that can be described by specifying its properties,
such as pressure, temperature or chemical composition. If the
external constraints are changed (for example the system is
allowed to expand) then these properties will generally alter. The
science of thermodynamics attempts to describe mathematically
these changes and to predict the equilibrium conditions of the
system. 47
The subject was developed in the nineteenth century when
much interest existed on the question of the efficiency of heat
engines, in which heat is converted into useful work. In all such
devices there is an irreversible dissipation of useful energy
because heat can never be converted to work with 100 percent
efficiency. The law of conservation of energy, known as the first
law of thermodynamics, states that whatever energy is converted in
47 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, V.11 (EncyclopediaBritannica, Chicago, 1991) p.701.
33
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form its total quantity remains unchanged. The second law states
that in a closed system, the entropy does not decrease. The third
law states that as minimum temperature is approached, the further
extraction of energy becomes more and more difficult.
Bazargan completed his studies of thermodynamics at
Paris's Ecole Centrale and went on work training in a number of
factories around the country. In 1934 with great anticipation he
left France to return home. Modern France had made deep
impressions on the young Bazargan encouraging him to revise his
understanding of traditional Iranian religion and to acquire
modern socio-political ideas. For years to come Bazargan was to
speak with respect of the French and maintain his fondness of the
French language.
The Civil Servant (1934-40)
Upon his return to Iran Bazargan came to face with what is
commonly termed, by both political scholars and activists, Iranian
Modernism. 48 He adapted the idea (as we shall see) with some
modifications and gave it a leading role in his intellectual
framework. In understanding the context within which Bazargan
developed his subsequent social discourse it is sufficient to
identify three core clusters in the Modernist ideological make up
of the first Pahlavi monarch and the forces that generally
supported him: 1. Statism. 2. Nationalism, 2. Secularism.
48 Tajadod Talabi.34
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At the time of Reza Shah the dominant interpretation of
Modernism was found in the effort to create a modern national
state. However the roots of the concept and its most distinct
initiation were in the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. The
revolution has been analyzed as a democratic movement of the urban
middle class, where the dominant ideological element was that of
constitutionalism and the basic source of inspiration for the
modern educated intellectual element in the leadership that of the
French Revolution. 49 This dominant ideological element developed
primarily as the result of the European influence exerted upon
Iran throughout nineteenth century and followed the conclusion
reached by the intellectuals that there was a need for a proper
code of law to which government would be accountable. This
perception was based on the fact that there was a lack of written
law 50 which meant that government was unsystematic and that
judicial judgment was subject to arbitrary actions of powerful
men. 51 In other words the Constitutional Revolutionaries demanded
freedom in the form of the ending of official lawlessness and the
establishment of the rule of law and an independent legal
49 Adamiyyat, F. Fekr-e Demokrasi Ijtema'ye The Concept ofSocial Democracy (Payam, Tehran, 1984) p.3. There have been fiercedebates within the Iranian intellectual community as well asIranian specialists on the meaning of the Constitutionalism of therevolution and the freedoms it bestowed. The Marxist interpreterssaw the anti-feudal bourgeois elements playing the dominant role.The Modernist Pahlavi apologists saw the movement in itsopposition to the corruption of the Qajar dynasty and a foundationof legitimacy for the Pahlavi's constitutional monarchy. Theliberals have emphasized the constitutionalist (legalistic) anddemocratic aspects of the movement. For a standard historicnarrative see Browne, E.G. The Persian Revolution of 1905-09 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1910).
50 Except that of the Shari'a religious canon which was thenconcerned mainly with customary rather than civil code.
51 Martin, V. Islam and Modernism, The 1906 Iranian Revolution (Tauris, London, 1988) pp.4-10.
35
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framework. They hoped that the division and sharing of the
absolute power of the state, through constitutionalism, would lead
to some form of check on the rule of government and thus the
establishment of law and subsequently a democratization process.52
Within this framework and upon the success of the 1906
Revolution attempts were made by the Majlis to implement reform in
the realms of judiciary, finance, military and state
organizations. 53 However the centrifugal force of the
revolutionary upheaval allowed the re-emergence of the ancient
mosaic of fragmented Iranian society paralyzing the little
existing state leverage that the revolutionaries might have hoped
to employ. 54 Furthermore the outbreak of the First World War with
its foreign invasions and nationalist rebellions undermined the
already fragile state. 55
These constraints forced the mainstream of the political
intelligentsia to revise their idea of the evolution of the modern
state so by the time of the emergence of the first Pahlavi monarch
they were seeking, at any cost, the establishment of the rule of
law as well as social reform and progress, not necessarily through
liberal representative institutions but through a centralized
52 Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran, p.58.53 Amir Arjomand, S. Turban for the Crown (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1988) pp. 40-62.54 For an analysis of Iran's social mosaic, based on tribal,
religious, cultural, ethnic, geographical and urban divisions seeAbrahamian, E. Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran, inInternational Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, V.5, 1974.
55 For a study of the Reza Shah see Sutton, L.P.E. ModernIran (George Routledge and Sons, London, 1941) and Wilber, D.N.Riza Shah Pahlavi (Exposition Press, New York, 1975).
36
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system of a national administration. This is the reason that the
initial political tendency used by Reza Shah to establish himself
in power was constructed not only by the younger generation of
politicians associated with reformist and radical politics of the
1920s but also the old constitutional elite of the 1900s. 56 The
continuation of the ideas from the initial liberal constitutional
movement into the authoritarian rule is well evident in the fact
that both generations initially portrayed the coup leader as a
modernist reformer representing the constitutional ideals.
It was with this background that Reza Shah constructed
from a skeleton of several thousand men, a modern national army,
based on a professional officer core and compulsory national
conscription as the spearhead of his modernization movement that
was to lead to the establishment of military, bureaucratic and
economic state monopolies. Better organized, better disciplined
and better equipped than any military force the country had seen
for centuries, Reza Shah used it in the elimination of opposition
and the creation of the nation state. The new bureaucratic
standards which applied for military discipline were also used for
the organization of the work force in the government bureaucracies
and state industrial monopolies (including the production of tea,
sugar, tobacco, opium, as well as the running of the national
railway and the control of the foreign trade). Reza Shah and his
Modernist entourage encouraged the building of these mass
producing industries, and the related services, with the aim of
capturing what they thought was the secret of success of European
56 Amir Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, p.62.37
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civilization, but also meeting the requirements of his military
supported state. 57
Reza Shah's tendency towards industrial statism, which
included a programme of financial and legal reforms, is reputed to
have been directed by Ali Akbar Davar, a leading member of the
government. Davar is believed to have picked up the concept of
state monopolies and the role of state in directing the economy
while studying law in Europe. 58 In the implementation of these
programmes Davar pushed forward a programme of financial and legal
reforms, the bulk of which 59 were copied from or at least
inspired by French and Belgian institutions and laws. However
elements of traditional Islamic law was kept within the new
framework. 60 The economic strategies of the newly founded Soviet
Union with their emphasis on centralized development plans were
also influential in this regard. The Soviet influence in the
development strategies of the Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk,
including those of statist mercantalism, is well documented and it
is sufficient to point out here that Reza Shah was encouraged by
Ataturk's example.
57 On Reza Shah's industrial drive see Avery, Modern IranChaps. 14-18, or Keddie, Roots of Revolution, pp.93-112.Maclachlan, K.S. Economic Development 1921-1979, in Cambridge History of Iran, V.7. pp.608-639.
58 Tabari, E. Jame'eh-e Iran dar Doran-e Reza Shah Iranian Society at the time of Reza Shah (np 1977). p.99.
59 Particularly the first civil laws and parts of the legaland criminal code as well as regulations concerning establishmentof organizations. See Tabari, Iranian Society, p.99.
60 Keddie, N. Roots of the Revolution (Yale UniversityPress, New Havens, 1981) pp.95-98. & Tabari, Iranian Society,p.100.
38
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The nationalism of the Reza Shah period, better known as
"nation-worship" 61 was the dominant theme in the body of
Modernist ideas. The nation-worship appealed to the pre-Islamic
golden age of the autocratic rules particularly that of the
Achamenids and Sassanian empires. This emphasis on the pre-Islamic
heritage as the foregone glorious age was a pragmatic exaggeration
aimed at stabilizing the emerging national bureaucracy at the cost
of existing traditional institutions, particularly the religious.
Furthermore it had an element of Persian Chauvinism in that it
aimed at undermining the diversified ethnic component of the
Iranian society and it was thus particularly anti-Arab. 62 Here
nationalism aimed at the transformation of primary communal
identity from parochial ethnic communities to that of nationhood.
Indeed it was the intense identification with the idea of the
Iranian nation which generated the fierce determination needed to
carry out policies of rapid social change during the period. 63
This nationalism drew considerably -though not entirely-
on European culture and historic resources and was thus similar to
its European counterpart. 64 The publications of several books
including Old Iran 65 and the three volumes of Ancient Iran 66 by
Moshir al-Doleh Pirniya and the translation of Iran at the Epoch
61 Mihan Parasti.62 For instance the Iranian Academy was commissioned to
purify the Persian language from Arab words and to prepare adictionary of modern Persian words.
63 Elwell-Sutton, L.P. Modern Iran (George Routledge,London, 1941) Chap. VII, passim. Cottam, R. Nationalism intwentieth Century Iran in Bill, J.A. & Louis, R. (eds.) Mosaddeq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil (I.B.Tauris & Co. London, 1988). p.25.
64 Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran, p.82.65 Iran-e Qadim.66 Irane Bastan
39
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of Sassanian 67 by the Danish author Christensen, as well as new
publications of old literature, particularly Ferdowsi's heroic
nationalist epic, the Shah-Nameh influenced the development of
these national concepts. 68 The theme was also vitalized by a
number of composers of political poetry. 69 including Mohammad
Reza Eshqi, Abolqasem Aref, Farrokhi Yazdi and Abolqasem Lahuti.70
The secularism of Reza Shah was the culmination of a
process that had its roots in the nineteenth century. Secularism
67 Iran dar Zamane Sassanian, Rashid Yasami (trans.)68 Tabari, E. Iranian Society at the time of Reza Shah,
pp. 98-108.69 Katouzian, Political Economy of Modern Iran, p.82.
70 Here it is necessary to clarify a point with regard tothe fact that there have been four different and at times opposinginterpretations of nationalism in twentieth century Iran and sincethe four lay claim to the term national (Melli) and itsderivatives, this has become a source of formalistic andcontextual confusion. The concept of Melli became prominent at thetime of the constitutional revolution (1906) and again at the timeof Mosaddeq (1951). (The Majlis-e Shuora-ye Melli, the NationalConsultative Assembly was the achievement of the constitutionalmovement while Mosaddeq was supported by Jebhe Melli, the NationalFront.) A number of groups continue to lay claim to the heritageof this tradition, for example the Jomhurikhahan-e Melli-e Iran,the National Republicans of Iran (formed 1983). The main elementsof this tendency, albeit fluctuations, include constitutionalism,anti-colonialism, and democratic government. The other currentfinds its articulation in the ideology of the Pahlavi dynasty,with its main elements being the revival of an ancient Iranianidentity, Persian supremacy, anti Islamic/Arab mentality,industrialism, and centralized authoritarian government. Forclarification it might be useful to deal with the former asliberal or popular nationalism while referring to the latter asauthoritarian nationalism. The third tendency has been under thedistinct influence of pan-Islamism and thus its most recentvanguard, the Islamic Republic's claim to "Islamic motherland" orthe identification of nation with that of religious symbols. Itseems while the first current has the most classic interpretation,the second has had difficulty in establishing a claim in thisdomain, while the third has been the most successful in mobilizingthe national/mass potential. The fourth interpretation of Mellibelongs to the Marxist-Leninist groups who equated Melli withvarious interpretations of the bourgeois class. Throughout thisstudy we shall be looking at the various aspects of the fourcurrents as far they interact with the political ideas of MehdiBazargan.
40
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came with the European influence and the main catalyst for
European ideas were the western educated reformers and writers.
They saw Islam, as the bastion of the traditional society, the
cause of backwardness and an obstacle to progress. In their effort
to move the country towards social reform and progress they sought
to undermine the traditional culture and institutions,
particularly that of the clerics. Although the participation of
the clergy in the 1890 Tobacco uprising and later in the
Constitutional Revolution against the house of the Qajar had
reduced antagonism between the traditional and modern elites, the
subsequent opposition of a group of clerics to the constitutional
movement had reversed the trend. The inability of the clerics to
introduce reforms within their own ranks further aggravated the
situation. The fundamental features of the secularization process
were the reduction of the influence of the clerics in their
traditional spheres of authority ie. the judicial and educational
domains. Reza Shah's drive against the religious community, and
thus the secularization process, came in the context of his
efforts to curtail the political influence of the clergy as a
rival and impose the state hegemony. By late 1930s he had totally
excluded the clerics from the judicial procedure (although
elements of Islamic law continued to be exercised) education had
come under the control of the modern sections of society and the
cleric's source of finance (endowments) were under the effective
rule of the state. Vigorous efforts were also made in the
secularization/modernization of popular culture, including the
Uniform Dress Law (1928), the banning of women's veils (1936) as
well as the harassment and prohibition of religious ceremonies.
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Developments in the region were also significant in
determining Reza Shah's opposition to religion. The disintegration
of the Ottoman Empire, the collapse of Pan-Islamism and the
formation of secular Turkish and Arab states with nationalist
ideologies and Western secular tendencies are significant in this
respect. Indeed Reza Khan's earlier and unsuccessful effort at
creating an Iranian republic was reinforced by developments on the
western borders of Iran and it was after his trip to Turkey (1934)
that he intensified his secularization drive.
It was within this framework of emerging secularism,
statism, and nationalism that Reza Shah maintained his despotism.
Initially the modern intellectuals who constituted the rank and
file of Reza Shah's regime and who were weary of the slow process
of parliamentary and judicial deliberations (scorning the
corruption and selfishness which it sometimes involved) and
impatient with the pace of the modernization drive, had given Reza
Khan support in his anti-democratic policies. 71 And once
established in power Reza Shah undermined the political
achievements of the 1906 revolution by banning political parties,
dispersing independent politicians, controlling the media and
turning the parliament into a rubber stamp body. He did not allow
the creation of political institutions for the modern middle
classes that had supported and maintained his state machinery.
Neither did he establish a political environment where power could
be delegated or transferred peacefully once he was gone. The
71 Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran, p.82.42
Th. loots
period between the return of Bazargdn from France dnd the fall of
Reza Shah (1934-41) coincided with the absolute exercise of power
by the Monarch.
Bazargan's reaction to the various components of the
Modernist social thought shall be studied at later stages and in
detail, here it is sufficient to sketch Bazargan's reaction to the
regime of Reza Shah. Referring to his own intellectual position at
the time Bazargan (later) wrote:
I belonged to that social tendency which despite its
reservations, entered government service with the hope of
reform and modernism. 72
Indeed after passing his compulsory military service he
had thrown in his lot with the establishment and joined the ranks
of the civil service with good pay. 73 During the rule of Reza
Shah the growing number of civil servants alongside other modern
educated social segments (as the backbone of the new middle class)
had supported the monarch en route to power. Although it would be
an exaggeration to say that Bazargan identified with the ideas of
the ruling establishment, it would be correct to say that Bazargan
72 Bazargan, Defence, p.92.73 He served five months at Military Academy, seven months
at the barracks and the rest of his period at the engineers corps,translating military documents. At the invitation of the ministerof culture Hekmat, he joined the Teacher's College of Technologyas a lecturer in Thermodynamics. At the same time he was employed-for two years- by a state owned engineering company before itpacked up. Seeking better opportunities he started (with sevenEuropean educated friends) Iran's first consultative engineeringcompany; Ettehad-e Mohandesin-e Iran. Bazargan, Interview 1989.
43
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did believe the main force of reform and progress to be that of
the state and it was within this context that he later wrote (even
some three decades later):
With the initiative and leadership of Reza Shah, a general
offensive had been launched towards reform. Great
achievements had been gained in the creation of a powerful
modern army, a national railway (masterpiece of industry
and art) modern industries, government ministries and
educational establishments. As with regard to customs and
practices - without considering their positive or negative
points - great changes were made as in the dress code, the
veil, etc. 74
The person of Reza Shah too seems to have impressed
Bazargan. He was privileged to see the monarch, once, before his
departure for France. The impression of the King addressing the
selected students at the Royal Palace was strong enough that
Bazargan was to remember, with respect, his very words by heart.
With a calm yet assuring expression and with his typical
gaze that seemed both watchful and hazy, His Majesty the
King addressed us for a quarter of an hour: "You will be
surely surprised that we are sending you to a country
whose regime is different from ours and is democratic and
74 Bazargan, Defence p.98. Of course it has to be kept inmind that Bazargan spoke these words in a militarily tribunalaccusing him of un-constitutional activities.
44
The Roots
republican. But they are also patriots. You shall bring
back home their patriotism and technical know-how". 75
However his working within the establishment did not mean
unconditional surrender or obedience without criticism. Initially
the return home of the sensitive graduate had been tinged with
bitterness. Humiliating treatment at the hands of the customs
officers and payment of bribes to the highway gendarme, little
official attention paid to the new graduates and the harsh nature
of the military service "was enough to make one regret one's
return". 76 He was critical of the ruling elite's shallow
understanding of progress and European civilization. His
cosmopolitan eyes saw little of significance in the state reforms
and he preferred to call the reforms a veil of cosmetic modernism
behind which the establishment hid its face:
Reforms did not go further than white-washing the walls
and changing peoples' clothes. It was a shallow and
childish imitation of foreigners. Rarely was any attention
paid to the foundations. 77
Such criticism was natural for a young European educated
engineer returning home. Having in mind the modern social
institutions of Europe and having lived at the heart of an
industrial society, he now found only poorly educated men running,
without plans, dis-organized establishments. What the regime
75 Bazargan, Defence p.39.76 Bazargan, Defence, p.67.77 Bazargan, Defence p.69.
45
The Roots
introduced as modernism was not acceptable to Bazargan and this
criticism was to take significant proportions in times to come.
Bazargan was also disturbed by the Modernist disgust with
all affairs of religion which were interpreted as a symbol of
backwardness and underdevelopment, and as already noted, the
articulation of such a vision was the suppression of the religious
establishment by Reza Shah. 78
It was very painful to witness the distancing and the
disgust shown towards religion, morals and ethics in the
name of reformism and modernism. 79
Although this claim is questionable, for there seems to be
no reason why Modernists or even pseudo Modernists should
necessarily be opposed to morality and ethics, it is without doubt
correct to say that many of the Modernists within and outside the
establishment wished and worked towards the destruction of Shiism
and its social institutions.
When Bazargan left France several clusters of ideas
preoccupied him: His ideas of Islam (so far as their social and
political implications are of significance to this study) were
mainly concerned with national identity as well as social (though
not political) activity. To a lesser extent Republicanism had left
a mark. Years of study in mechanical engineering gave him a strong
78 look at the section on family.79 Bazargan, Defence, p.72.
46
The Roots
background in sciences. In contrast to the French period, in the
years between 1934 and 1940 the idea of Modernism came to dominate
the mind of the young civil servant. It seems Bazargan accepted
the dominant Modernist view of the establishment although there
were certain reservations (as discussed above) on: 1. the meaning
and interpretation of modernism and 2. the persecution of the
religious community.
The acceptance of the dominant Modernist view could well
have been due to several reasons. Bazargan's familiarity with the
non-political Catholicism of the early 1930's made the acceptance
of Reza Shah social order - where political activity was limited -
much easier. 80 His religious views, with emphasis on social
activism and critique of traditionalism, made him attracted to
modernism rather than rebellious against it. His training in
natural sciences inclined him towards a position in the
establishment, which he thought would be the only outlet for his
specialization. Finally after living in a modern European country,
he now faced a traditional society with it's bitterness of
underdevelopment. The attraction towards some form of modernism
was therefore natural.
With regards to his concept of Islam and as far as social
issues were concerned it is fair to say that the idea of Islam
lost its predominance. In contrast with the university days when
Bazargan's concern was to develop an Islamic identity in the face
80 Compare this with other Iranian students who becamepolitically active while in Europe.
47
The Roots
of an imposing European civilization, in Iran now, his urgent
concern was with the meaning of Modernism. His interpretation of
the social role of religion which in France had become non-
traditional (by Iranian standards) now took a somewhat more
traditionalist position in the face of the secularist offensive of
the ruling establishment.
Such were the elements in the intellectual framework of
Bazargan when World War Two ushered the allied invasion and the
overnight collapse of Reza Shah. The fall of the monarch was a
"tremendous shock that awakened" Bazargan to question the ongoing
process.
Like a locomotive, the country was passing from one gorge
of progress to another. Then all of a sudden, a barrier
and a crash. The train and its passengers were badly
shaken, wagons were derailed. Amid the dead and the
wounded, amid the screams and the groans, nothing was left
of hope ... [but] it was only then that people decided to
stand on their own feet and to get the train moving
towards the destination. 81
With the exile of Reza Shah a chapter was closed in Iran's
contemporary history. From a new vantage point Bazargan, now aged
32, began to look at his environment. It was time for active
revision, both in thought and action.
81 Bazargan, Defence p.100.48
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Social Developments 1941-53
From the fall of Reza Shah (1941) to the military coup
that consolidated the position of his son Mohammad Reza (1953) the
most significant socio-political development was the collapse of
the old political order and the struggle for shaping the emerging
one. This process was set in motion and to a degree shaped, by the
Allied military invasion of the country. Two events typified the
trends of this period: First the emergence of the Tudeh party
leading to the rise and fall of the Azarbaijan Autonomous
Government (1946) and second the formation of the National Front
in the later parts of the decade culminating in the
nationalization of the oil industry and the strategic defeat of
the liberal and constitutional tendency. The two movements were
typical in the sense that they were highlights of the efforts to
change and reshape the political structure.
The events of the period, that is the foreign invasion of
Iran, the collapse of the old order, the emergence of new
political forces, the appearance of economic difficulties, the
Azarbaijan crisis, the nationalization of the oil industry, and
the 1953 military coup and their various consequences have been
the subject of a number of studies and it is not intended to
discuss these issues in detail here. However this study seeks to
look briefly at Iran's social structure, the conflict between the
emerging conservative and radical tendencies, and the political
impact of the economy in the 1941-53 period. It is against this
backdrop that the particularities of Bazargan's political thinking
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and activities will be subsequently discussed. 1
At the beginning of the 1940s Iran's population stood at
around 14.8 million rising to 19 million by 1953. Of this some 25%
were urban dwellers, residing in several major cities including
Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Mashhad. For the purpose of this study
the structure of Iranian society could be divided to rural and
urban sectors. A vast army of poor peasants and a relatively small
elite of large and small landlords made up the former while the
urban population was split into the traditional Bazaar merchants,
urban craftsmen, modern middle classes (ie. civil servants,
professionals) and a large body of unskilled labourers.
In the rural areas the nomadic people constituted 10-15%
of the total population. With an end to the rule of Reza Shah who
had systematically enforced settlements there was an upsurge and a
return to nomadic life. However the general historic trend was to
their disadvantage and the nomadic people were to disappear
gradually altogether. The peasants made up the largest segment of
Iranian society and the most deprived. Their wealth and life was
1 The study in this section is an effort in synthesizingdata and arguments presented in the following works: Abrahamian,Iran Between Two Revolutions, chaps. 6-8 passim., Amjad, Iran FromRoyal Dictatorship to Theocracy, chap. 4 passim, Bharier, J.Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970 (Oxford University Press,London, 1971) chaps. 2-3 passim, Bill, J.A. (ed.) Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil (I.B.Tauris, London, 1988) pp.23-47,Najmabadi, A. "Hazards of Modernity and Morality: Women, State andIdeology in Contemporary Iran" in Kandiyoti, D. (ed.) Women, Islamand the State (Macmillan, London, 1991) pp.48-77, Ratouzian, ThePolitical Economy of Modern Iran,.pp.141-183, Reddie, The Roots of Revolution, pp.113-142, Nyrop, F. (ed.) Iran: A Country Study (TheAmerican University, Washington, D.C. 1978) pp.55-60, Ravasani,Sh. Dulat Va Hokumat Dar Iran, Government and State in Iran (Sham'Publications, Tehran, nd.) pp.142-165.
51
Islamic Work Ethics
determined by the landlords who generally maintained them on basic
subsistence. 2
During the 1940s and 1950s the development of a cash
market, expansion of central government apparatus and the general
deterioration of national economy (particularly increases in
prices and interests) undermined the peasant position. 3 True to
its historic practice the rural population was non-political.
Geographical isolation, 4 poverty, illiteracy, cultural simplicity
and apathy kept the Iranian peasant away from greater social
matters and that of politics.
The landowners were possibly the richest and most powerful
class outside those involved in the running of the state. Reza
Shah himself had become the biggest landowner, through forceful
confiscation of other people's property, and was reported to have
had some 5,600 villages by the time he was exiled. The landowners
2 Historically the vast majority of peasant population ofIran were crop-sharing peasants, tenants or landless labourers.By the virtue of a contract, written or merely often verbal, acertain area of land was handed to the farmer on a share croppingbasis for a specified or unspecified period. The peasants providedthe seed, drought animals and agricultural implements, or only oneor two of these, in addition to the labour, whereas the landlesslabourer, although he might have been paid by a share of the crop,was differentiated from the crop sharing peasant by the fact thathe provided only labour and could be dismissed at will. Securityof tenure was a matter of vital concern to the peasant. Someslight security was given to him by law with regard to any cropwhich he may have sown but in practice in the majority of areas hehad no real security of tenure. The landlord could in fact, turnhim out at will, except in a few areas. Custom, however, gave thepeasant a measure of protection in some areas. Lambton, A.K.S.Landlord and Peasant in Persia (Oxford University Press, London1953) p.295 & 393.
3 Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p.122.4 There were an estimated 32,000 villages spread in Iran's
1.5 million square kilometers.52
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were generally absent from their property and were little inclined
to re-invest substantially to modernize the traditional farming
practices. They resided in the major cities or abroad and managed
their wealth through delegation. The Bazaar, the ancient urban
Iranian institution, continued to maintain its political and
economic existence in the 1940s. The bulk of the Bazaar merchants
constituted the lower middle class and their position in domestic
trade and distribution made it vulnerable to the influx of foreign
goods. Their traditional status and their closeness to the
religious community made them further anti-foreign.
The political elite or the ruling class was a small circle
of upper bureaucrats, senior army officers as well as a number of
merchants and industrialists close to the Royal Court. From 1941
to 1953 the political efforts of the ruling class were the re-
imposition of the hegemony they had enjoyed prior to Reza Shah's
departure. Alongside these classes were the modern professional
middle classes. A product of the period following the 1906
constitutional revolution and particularly the rule of Reza Shah,
the middle classes were comparatively small but expanding. These
classes were fundamentally dependent on government bureaucracy
(ie. bureaucrats in search of Bureau as well as contractors and
traders dependent on government licenses) and in terms of social
perception looked for economic stability and efficiency of
government. The middle class exercised little political
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influence .5
The working classes too were small but growing. The
industrial workers constituted only about 0.5% of the population.
A slightly higher number (of about 67,000) were employed by the
British oil industry in the south. The largest industry employing
waged labour was the carpet weaving where some 130,000 workers
were involved in the production of the traditional item. In the
1940's the working classes gained political significance and were
organized in unions and federations demanding radical social
changes. 6
The politically conscious and active sectors of the
population who dwelt in the cities could not have been more that
5% of the total population. These came from the ranks of the
military/bureaucratic elite, the landowning and merchant
aristocracy or the newly articulated, modern educated professional
middle classes.
Beside the horizontal social stratification of class there
were the vertical stratifications of ethnicity, language and
5 The political limitations of the middle class in the 1941-53 is exemplified by the number of cabinet minister who came froma salaried, professional modern educated middle class. Of the 148minister only 15 belonged to the above categories, the rest wereof wealthy aristocracy or landowning classes. See Abrahamian, IranBetween Two Revolutions, p.170.
6 The first labour law was passed in 1949. For a view onIranian labour movement see Abrahamian, E. The Strengths andWeaknesses of the Labour Movement in Iran in 1941-53 in BonineM.E. & Keddie N.B. (ed.) Continuity and Change in Modern Iran (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1981) and alsoQassemi, Sandikalism dar Iran Trade Unionism in Iran (Bonyad-eMosaddeq Publications, Paris, 1985).
54
Islamic Work Ethics
religion. Structurally the most important segment of the
population were the Persian speakers who constituted about two
thirds of the population. 7 The Persians, with the Azarbaijanis
along side them, made the core of this socio-political elite. They
had had modern education more than other social segments and
filled the majority of positions in government and finance. Beside
them the Kurds, the Bakhtiaris, the Arabs and other ethnic
minorities made up the richly fragmented mosaic of Iranian social
structure. During the Rule of Reza Shah the domination of romantic
Persian nationalism 8 had meant glorification of the ancient Aryan
and Persian empires 9 at a cost to other cultural communities. But
the collapse of Reza Shah's order and active foreign military
interference highlighted ethnic identity and politics. Since the
twenty-year-old domination of state was over, society was
manifesting its ethnic undercurrents and remolding the platform of
political conflicts.
Political players and institutions
The conflicts of the 1941-53 period can be seen as efforts
by various social classes to obtain a greater share of the state's
political power. Unlike the period under the rule of Reza Shah,
when the exercise of power and regulation of social affairs had
7 Brewer, M. Atlas of the Middle East (Macmillan, New York,1988) p.89.
8 For a discussion on the romantic aspect of Iraniannationalism in literature see Katouzian, H. Iran, in Ostle, R.(ed.) Modern Literature in the Near and Middle East 1850-1970(Routledge, London, 1991) pp.130-161.
9 These included the Achaemenids Empire (550-330 B.C.) andthe Sassanian Empire (A.D. 226-641). The former extended as far asNorth Africa and was in constant state of war with the Greeks andwas finally defeated by Alexander the Great. The latter enjoyedsimilar expansion and was overthrown by the Muslim Arab army.
55
Islamic Work Ethics
The same case holds true for the religious establishment which had
suffered extensively at the time of Reza Shah. The collapse of the
old order encouraged them to try to re-establish their religious
influence. But once a degree of respect and authority had been
achieved, the senior clerical figures representing the traditional
community tended towards the conservative power bloc and
collaborated with them in ending the democratic process in 1953.11
In the five parliaments of the 1941-53 period, the
conservatives continually had the majority. The lack of
established political processes and institutions meant almost
daily shifting of alliances between the various factions that
emerged with the tide of political events. Such was the unstable
and unpredictable nature of things that at times even a small
determined political minority could initiate radical policy in the
parliament and despite the conservative majority achieve its end
(as in the case of the National Front in the 17th Majlis). However
regardless of their factionalism and weakness the conservative
forces exercised a significant degree of power and were to
ultimately bring back an authoritarian regime to power.
Within the 1941-53 period two reformist and radical
popular urban movements developed. Both the Tudeh Party and the
National Front which had roots among the modern middle and working
11 The tribal chiefs had a similar position. In bitteropposition to the first Pahlavi court, they rose to reassert theirprevious position. Foreign powers specially Britain saw anopportunity in helping their cause as instruments of pressuringthe central government. However the times had changed and thetribal chiefs were never able to recover their lost heritage.
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Islamic Work Ethics
classes, sought social change, fought against the state and the
conservative power bloc and were finally defeated by them. The
Tudeh emerged immediately after the abdication of Reza Shah 12 and
was initially formed on a broad national and democratic programme.
The party's growth was unprecedented in Iranian history. Within a
year and by the time of the party's first Provisional Conference
the party had some 6,000 active members and this number was to go
as high as 25,000 by the end of the decade. 13 The party programme
called for an internal structure of "democratic centralism" and
was designed to appeal to workers, peasants, women and the lower
ranks of the middle classes. 14 Despite the expansion of party
apparatus in northern and southern parts of the country, the party
suffered strategic set backs on the account of its policy of
alignment to the U.S.S.R. over the latter's demand for Iranian oil
concessions and the creation and subsequent fall of the Soviet-
backed Azarbaijan Autonomous Government. Forced underground in
February 1949, the party emerged during the rule of the National
Front (1951-53) but failed to establish a working relationship
with the Front on grounds of mutual suspicion over matters of
policies. 15
In its first twelve years of activity the Tudeh party had
challenged the political order and the power of the state as a
12 For the standard text on the Tudeh Party see AbrahamianIran Between Two Revolutions. Also Zabih, S. The Communist Movement in Iran (University of California, Berkeley, 1966).
13 Rahbar, the official organ of the Party quoting R.Radmanesh (30, January, 1943) and reproduced by Abrahamian, IranBetween Two Revolutions, p.284.
14 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.284.15 . Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Chap. six,
passim.58
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mass urban organization, representing the interests of the middle
and working classes. But its alliance with the Soviet Union as
well as its Marxist inspired radicalism distanced it from the
modern liberal, moderate and constitutionalist National Front.
Furthermore the radicalism and Marxism of the Tudeh party 16
caused fear amongst the more conservative social elements,
including the religious establishment and the landlords as well as
the western super powers, particularly the United States at the
time of cold war in the early 1950s. The ideology of the party 17
was dominated by Marxism and specially the Soviet interpretation
of it. Until the end of WWII the Tudeh party followed a policy of
conciliation with the 'national bourgeoisie'. But with the
emergence of the Cold War those who were not active friends of the
Soviet Union were seen as the enemy.
Subsequent to the demise of the Tudeh party the National
Front emerged in October 1949 and presented a new challenge to the
conservative bloc and the emerging political order. The National
Front brought together a wide selection of social forces who were
ideologically less homogeneous than Tudeh but whose political aims
as well as social base kept them together. The ideological
spectrum of the Front covered a wide range. The Iran Party
presented the liberal and constitutionalist view and based itself
on the support of the European-educated professionals. The Pan-
Iranist Party held ultra nationalist sentiments. Ayatollah Sayyed
16 Specially after the 1948 second party congress.17 Articulated by such men as Ehsan Tabari (leader of the
party's youth league and member of central committee) IrajEskandari (founding member and editor of party organ Rahbar),Abdol-Samad Kambakhsh.
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Islamic Work Ethics
Abolciasem Kashani and the Fadaiyan-e Islam in turn represented the
pragmatic and fundamentalist views of the Muslim community. What
brought these groups together was attachment to an Iranian/Islamic
and anti-imperialist identity and commitment to some form of
constitutional government which would ensure a degree of rights
for the individual and the rule of law. What separated them
however was tactical issues, commitment to a secular as opposed to
a religious concept of society and the direction as well as speed
of change. 18 The National Front held power for nearly two and a
half years within which the sweeping nationalization of the
British run oil industry was carried out. The Front's inability to
maintain is own ranks and to settle the oil dispute to end caused
its downfall.
From the fall of Reza Shah to the coup in support of his
son, the radical forces seeking change to the political order and
the conservative bloc wishing to re-establish the authoritarian
elitist regime were engaged in a series of shifting alliances and
conflicts. However by the end of the period the conservatives had
gained enough momentum to outweigh those seeking change towards
national independence, constitutionalism and democracy. In the
August 19 coup a bloc of military/bureaucratic elite, the
religious establishment, landowning classes and elements of the
middle class moved decisively against both the National Front and
the Tudeh Party. The move ended a period of experimentation with
18 On the causes of differences in the Front see Katouzian,Musaddiq & the Struggle For Power in Iran (I.B. Tauris, London,1990).
60
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constitutional government and led to the consolidation of the
government of the Shah.
Political Economy
The immediate political impacts of economic developments
within the 1941-53 period are of significance but not of such
strategic nature which lead to shifts in the social structure. The
two main events were the economic crisis brought about by the
Allied invasion in the first half of the 1940s and the
nationalization of the oil industry (in the early years of the
following decade) which functioned as the backbone of the Iranian
economy .
The war-economy policy was taken up under pressure by the
Allied armies who needed Iran's financial backing in their war
efforts. The policy included the devaluation of the Iranian
currency, from 68 to 140 Rials to the Pound Sterling, the four
fold expansion of the money supply and extension of credit to the
Soviet Union and Britain. Although in a treaty following the
invasion the Allies had promised to safeguard the Iranian economy
from negative effects of the war and to pay reparations once it
was ended, neither of the promises were kept. 19 As the result of
the policies there was a collapse in the growth of GNP in the
first half of the 1940s. High inflation and price hikes dominated
the economy. The cost of living index soared almost six fold in a
matter of four year. General urban activity declined, little
investment was taking place and unemployment was high. Famine set
19 Katouzian, Political Economy of Modern Iran, p.142.61
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in parts of the country. Bread riots broke out in the capital
(December 1942). The government was forced to spend all income on
current expenditure. There is no detailed data available on basic
economic factors such as the Gross National Product for the period
but projections from the later years suggest that the GNP suffered
its most disastrous crisis of the 20th century as the result of
WWII and the economic policies adopted following the allied
invasion. 20
However there were sections of the economy which
flourished during the period. A boom of sorts took place in
sectors servicing the demands of foreign troops. The purchasing
power of the foreign troops further stimulated black market
speculation and the hoarding of goods. While in the rural areas
there was a relative decline in productivity, high demand for
goods in the cities pushed up the prices in favour of some
landowners who could supply the urban markets.
Throughout the period oil became the increasingly
significant source of financial support for the state without
which the political structure could have collapsed. The
significance of the oil industry in the Iranian economy has been
the subject of a number of studies and it is not intended to re-
open the debate here. 21 However, it is necessary to point to some
general trends with regards to the role of oil in the economic
20 Bharier, Economic Development in Iran, p.58.21 For instance see Amuzegar, J. Iran: Economic Development
Under Dualistic Conditions (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1971)& Karshenas, M. Oil State and Industrialization (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1990).
62
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activities of 1941-53. Oil exports and the revenue from their sale
constituted the main foreign earnings for the government and oil
remained the centre piece of the economy. Non-oil exports and
imports followed closely the rise and fall of the oil sales, with
the exception of the 1952-53 period when the government was
pursuing a policy of "Non-oil Economy". Despite the internal
economic crisis oil exports kept a steady increase, from 1,000
million Rials (1941) to 17,100 (1948) and then jumping to 22,300
m. (1950). The oil exports then collapsed to almost zero following
the nationalization of the oil and the embargo imposed by Britain.
However it is significant to note that the 22 fold increase in the
oil revenues in the initial eight-year period was the factor
maintaining Iran's economy and its dependent political structure
intact.
Political Thinking
In the decade following the Allied invasion the issues of
foreign intervention and colonialism became paramount. The anti-
colonial theme was elaborated by several groups. On the one hand
the old establishment felt embittered with the allied invasion and
the subsequent fall of Reza Shah, on the other hand the
Nationalists had long standing suspicions of the foreign powers,
but it was the third group, the communists, which gave the theme
vigour and drive. The campaign was led by the Tudeh party.
A series of works published by Tudeh party intellectuals
indicate that the main ideological drive was on the theme of class
struggle and its main manifestations in Iranian society. These
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manifestations included the question of imperialism. The party
believed that the most immediate threat to Iran came form Britain
which owned the country's main source of income and controlled
bases in Iran and the Persian Gulf. Britain was also seen as the
chief advocate of the conservative upper classes. Furthermore
Tudeh intellectuals who accepted the Marxist analysis of
international relations argued that only Britain with its
capitalist economy could constitute the imperialist threat. 22
It should be recalled that the theory of imperialism as
presented after WWII in the communist mainstream was more or less
within the framework that had developed in the 1930's. The concept
was synonymous with the oppression and exploitation of the weak
impoverished countries by powerful ones. The theory (within the
orthodox Marxist camp) was founded on the basis of the work of
Lenin and it referred to the process of capitalist accumulation on
a world scale. In his pamphlet on the subject Lenin had
characterized the phenomenon through emphasizing the export of
capital (and commodities) as the prime character of imperialism.
The concept also implied the mediating role of the pre-capitalist
ruling classes and thus the state in backward countries, who in
collaboration with the ruling classes of the advanced capitalist
countries, prevented the emergence of a local (ie. national)
bourgeois revolution. 23
22 Abrahamian, Between two Revolutions, Chap. 6, passim.23 Harding, N. Lenin's Political Theory, V.II (Macmillan,
London, 1981) p.76.64
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This theoretical background to the Marxist interpretation
of imperialism must be seen within the framework of the Cold War
that began shortly after WWII. With the Soviet Union and the
United States being the only countries capable of assuming
leadership of the world economy and given their different
interpretations of national security, political ideology and
international affairs, a polarization had emerged after WWII. The
first clash of the cold war (that was to last 45 years) took place
over Iran's Azarbaijan crisis (1946) and led to the formation of
(US president) Harry "Truman Doctrine" in the following year. 24
Working initially within the framework of the anti-Nazi-
German alliance and then within the context of the cold war and
"armed" with Leninist theory of imperialism Tudeh sympathizers saw
the picture in black and white. On the one hand were the British
and American imperialists supported by their domestic agents while
on the other hand were the Socialist Soviets (which by their
nature could not form an imperialist threat) and supported by the
working classes world wide and the intellectual vanguard. Over and
above this political consideration the struggle against
imperialism meant large scale nationalization and the redirecting
of foreign trade and cooperation with the socialist camp.
Socio-political Activity
Between 1941 and 1953 Bazargan became involved, directly
or indirectly in five organizations: the Islamic Centre of Tehran,
24 Kim, Y.H. Twenty Years of Crisis: The Cold War Era(Prentice-Hall International Inc. London, 1968) See preface andpart one on Iranian Issue.
65
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the Islamic Students Association, an engineers union, the Iran
Party and through the Party the National Front. The first two were
predominantly religious bodies while the latter were secular.
Bazargan's degree of affiliation and organizational commitment to
these bodies must not be overestimated. In most parts they were
loose associations and even when organization did exist, as in the
case of Iran Party, it seems Bazargan fought against party
discipline. In this period he published fifteen articles,
pamphlets and books, of which more later.
Religious currents
Bazargan started his social activities when he joined the
Islamic Centre (Kanun-e Islam) a year prior to Reza Shah's
departure and began working with two individuals who shared
similar ways of thinking. One was Mahmud Taleqani, a 30-year-old
cleric who was to become the maverick of the Islamic movement. 25
Talegani's father had been the person upon whose suggestion the
philosophical meetings were held at the house of Bazargan senior.
The new association however was not a result of the old ties. The
other acquaintance, Dr. Yadollah Sahabi was a geology professor at
25 Talegani (1912-80) was born to a poor clerical familywhere his father made his living from mending watches. He studiedat traditional seminaries in Qom and Najaf (Iraq) and was firstarrested in 1939 for failing to carry a permit for his clericaldress as was required at the time. He became increasingly activeafter the fall of Reza Shah and was a founding member of theFreedom Movement of Iran. He had a leading role in the 1979revolution and was the first Friday Prayer Leader of Tehran.Afrasiyabi, B. & Dehgan, S. Talegani Va Tarikh, Taleciani andHistory (Nilofar Publications, Tehran, 1981) p.25-61.
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Tehran university. 26 Both men were to stay with Bazargan
throughout their political struggles and their friendship was to
influence the course of Iranian politics almost forty years later.
The Islamic Centre was initially founded by two men
Hosaini and Mahyari (the latter a secondary school teacher) as
night classes for the illiterate. However soon after Reza Shah's
fall it turned into a socio-political focus where Talegani would
deliver sermons. Lecturers also came from the university to
address an audience which included university students, military
personnel, and civil servants. However the centre had no
organization, programme, or membership. When Talegani moved his
lectures to the Hedayat Mosque of the more modern neighborhood of
Istanbul Avenue the Islamic Centre practically packed up (1943).
In 1942 several Muslim students from the Medical School,
including some of those attending Taleqani i s lectures, established
the Islamic Association of Students. The IAS was to develop
fundamentally as a reaction to the communist and Baha'i activities
on the campuses but it never managed to compete with the Tudeh
Party who enjoyed the support of the majority of the students.
According to Bazargan IAS had no direct affiliations to any
political organization, but some of its members were individually
active in various political associations.
26 Yadollah Sahabi (1906-1986) studied at Dar ol-Fonun,Teachers Training College (Tehran) and University of Lille(France) where he trained as a geologist. He was to become activein a number of political organizations including the NationalFront, and the Freedom Movement of Iran. After the 1979 revolutionhe became a member of the cabinet and later a member ofparliament.
67
Islamic Work Ethics
Bazargan was not involved in the establishment of the
group but soon started giving his support by attending IAS
meetings and allocating them a payer room at the university. He
grew fond of the group whom he called well intentioned and
compassionate young men familiar with contemporary ideas and
modern concepts. 27 Bazargan was to address their meetings on a
regular basis and as we shall see later the associations were to
be the main recruiting ground for Bazargan's political
organization.
IAS's constitution called for the pursuit of Islamic
reforms (although their concept of reform is not clear), published
a magazine, held regular meetings and did some charity work. 28
Most members were from the provinces and of the middle classes.
According to the IAS constitution:
The Association is being established at a time when [our]
educators, standard-bearers, and leaders have disavowed
themselves of responsibility towards social education and
implementation of Islamic laws. At the same time another
group of individuals continue to hold, unjustly and un-
deservingly, the official positions [in government]
through which they impose their oppression. As the result
of these conditions Muslims and the whole of Iranian
27 Bazargan, Defence p.80.28 The magazine was Ganj-e Shayan "The Worthy Treasure". The
charity work included, on one occasion, the construction of homesfor the victims of an earthquake.
68
Islamic Work Ethics
society have been led astray. Corruption has reached such
dimensions that the enlightened and intellectual class
[including this] group of Muslim students have become
greatly disturbed. Now they have reached the conclusion
that the only solution would be the establishment of an
association which aims at educating the people specially
students, through regular meetings, about the principles
of Islam as well as responsibilities of each individual
and [social] class. Through this effort the association
will not allow the selfish and the ignorant to portray
superstitions as the fundamentals of Islam which gives the
[opportunists] the chance to disgust the simple minded
people with religion. 29
The statement is clear enough. The traditional leaders of
the Islamic community are criticized for their failure in leading
the pious, the ruling elite are criticized for their corrupt rule,
and the secular and/or leftists for taking the opportunity to
mislead the simple folk from religion. They call for the formation
of associations which would promote social action in the light of
Islamic law, supposedly yet to be interpreted. For the next ten
years several similar Islamic Associations were to be formed by
Muslim engineers, doctors, and teachers but none became
politically significant. The idea also caught attention in the
provinces (Esfehan, Tabriz, Mashhad and Shiraz) where student
groups were formed.
29 Bazargan, Defence, p.80.69
Islamic Work Ethics
Putting Bazargan in the context of the larger Islamic
currents highlights his political position and peculiarities.
Within the Islamic current of the period three trends can be
identified; the first current was politically conservative and was
led by the more senior clerics, including Ayatollahs Mohammad
Hosain Borujerdi, Sayyed Mohammad Behbahani and Mirza Abdollah
Chelsutoni, residents of the religious city of Qom and Tehran.
During the 1941-53 period these men who represented the orthodox
religious authority and supposedly enjoyed the largest share of
the followers, adopted a general conservative position while
making gradual advances in extending their influence. The sphere
of their influence which had suffered badly at the time of Reza
Shah was revived and the alignment between the clergy and the
state grew and lasted up to late 50's when the initiation of the
White Revolution put an end to their cooperation. 30 In the 1940's
Bazargan was too young and unknown to be accepted by the higher
clergy. However there was a degree of contact with the clerics
through his father who was in touch with several senior clerics
including Ayatollah Borujerdi. Bazargan was on friendly terms with
several junior clerics including Haj Mirza Ali Kamarehi and
Nakhjavani. We shall discuss Bazargan's criticism of the
traditionalist position. Here it is sufficient to say that his
critique of the traditional religious community fell within a
critique of political conservatism. Bazargan's noticeably limited
attack on the traditionalist position aimed at activating the
conservative religious element.
30 Akhavi, S. Religion and Politics, Chap. 3. passim.70
Islamic Work Ethics
The second current was led by Ayatollah Sayyed Abolgasem
Kashani, a cleric with a long record of anti-British activities in
Iraq and political involvement in Iran. It was he who is said to
be responsible for the initial politicalization of the ranks of
the clergy. He saw his role as a guardian of national and Shiite
interests against British imperialism and his role grew
significantly as he mastered mobilization tactics. 31 He has been
termed too pragmatic a politician to be religiously fanatical or
fundamentalist despite his commitment to Shiite traditionalism.32
However Bazargan was disturbed by the purely pragmatist position
of Kashani. He saw Kashani as an overambitious man whose
intentions were more in line with archiving power for himself
rather than guarding the interests of the religious community.
Bazargan also felt distaste at the alleged Kashani's financial
corruption including bribes received through his son, Mohammad,
for issuing permits for pilgrimage and trade. 33 However since
Kashani initially supported the nationalization of the oil
industry, Bazargan and his associates saw no reason why they
should oppose him at this stage. 34 Bazargan was not personally in
contact with Kashani although his associate, Talegani was. 35
The third and smaller current that was to become
ideologically significant (for it planted the seeds of
fundamentalism in Iran's political scene) was Fadaiyan Islam, a
fundamentalist group responsible for the assassination of several
31 Akhavi, S. Religion and Politics pp.60-61.32 Katouzian, Political Economy of Modern Iran, p.148.33 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.34 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.35 Afrasiyabi, Talegani and History, p.140.
71
Islamic Work Ethics
political and intellectual figures. With roots in the working
classes and the Bazaar the group has been termed as a violent
reaction to the failure of the intellectual leaders to provide the
nation with an ideological framework. In other words the failure
of liberalism and secularism to come to grip with an increasingly
difficult and complex world led the Fadaiyan to target Shiism, as
a bulwark of Iranian nationalism, in rejecting all that is foreign
as a symbol of imperialism. 36
The group was critical of the conservative position of the
clerical class and it was on this point that Bazargan found
himself close to them. Bazargan was impressed by the charismatic
personality of their leader Navvab Safavi. He also found an
understanding with the group's basic ideas and did not wish to
isolate them politically. Yet there were two elements which
distanced Bazargan from the Fadaiyan; one was their constant
criticism of the nationalist and popular platform of Mosaddeq and
the other was the different constituencies that they were
addressing. While Bazargan faced a modern middle class
constituency, the Fadaiyan had a traditional and working class
platform. Altogether and in comparative terms Bazargan seems to be
closer to the Fadaiyan rather than the conservatives or the
pragmatists. It must be noted that despite tactical differences
the activism and radicalisms of Fadaiyan proved attractive to him.
In conclusion we can positively identify Bazargan on the fringe
rather than the centre of the Islamic Political currents. He
36 Ferdows, A.K. Religion in Iranian Nationalism: the Studyof Fadaiyan-e Islam, (Indiana University Phd. 1967) pp.90-100.
72
Islamic Work Ethics
belonged to none of the main trends and as we shall see a main
segment of his arguments were in critique of the religious
mainstream.
Political currents
Bazargan's religious orientation did not restrain him from
becoming involved in secular political organizations. Indeed his
involvement with the latter seems to be of greater social
significance. He became active (1942) in the creation of an
engineer's guild (Kanun Mohandesin) which was purely a
professional body. For many years to come Bazargan was to be
elected a member of the guild's central council and its head for
two terms. Within three years the guild was strong enough to call
its members on strikes with the demand for greater role for the
professional personnel in government administrations in place of
traditional bureaucrats. The strike impressed Bazargan to the
point that he later referred to it as a revolution without masses.
In 1944 the guild entered parliamentary elections by sponsoring
two candidates. Although neither won a seat the process again
encouraged Bazargan towards socio-political activity. 37 A year
later the guild split into nationalist and leftist factions with
the nationalists acting as the core of the secular Iran Party. In
fact the majority of the founders and activists of the guild
became Iran Party members. The left faction split from the guild
and joined the Tudeh party.
37 Bazargan, Defence, p.102.73
Islamic Work Ithico
Although Bazargan never was an Iran Party card holder he
stayed close to the organization. In the first two years of the
party he intensified his pamphleteering and delivered several
papers addressed to party members. His later high level
appointments in government were also through party connections.
The Iran Party participated in two coalition governments. The
first (1946) was with the Democrat and Tudeh parties in Qavam's
cabinet and the second (1951) was as a member of the National
Front in the cabinet of Mosaddeq. Bazargan disapproved of the
first coalition but made no moves against it. He believed the
dominant party faction led by Gholam Ali Farivar was wrong to
think that the Tudeh was in such a strong position that distancing
away from it would have negative effects. When the self-styled
Azarbaijan Autonomous Republic collapsed after the Soviet
withdrawal from Iran, Bazargan was relieved. 38
In the Iran's party's participation with the National
Front, when one of the party's senior officials Karim Sanjabi
became the minister of culture it was Bazargan who became his
deputy. 39 Again at the height of Iran's nationalist movement
against the British ownership of the oil industry it was Bazargan
who was responsible for the takeover of the nationalized oil
38 Representing the capital's Azarbaijani communityBazargan's father saw off government troops from Tehran.Bazargan's associate Talegani representing the capital's clericalcircles accompanied the soldiers. Talegani later recalled how onthe night before the final attack he addressed the troops on thevirtues of martyrdom for the liberation of motherland and how onthe next day he said the prayers for the departing soldiers.
39 The two men had many things in common. They studiedtogether in France, they both taught at the university and bothwere religious although Sanjabi kept his faith away from politics.
74
Islamic Work nhics
industry. The position was a highly publicized one and it was
followed by his appointment as the first director of the National
Iranian Oil Company (June 1951). In southern Iran Bazargan spent
nine months supervising the departure of the British technicians
and managers while ensuring continuation of production. Bazargan
resigned his post apparently due to meddling in oil affairs by
Hosain Makki. 40 Upon returning to the capital (March 1953)
Bazargan went back to his post at the university and was later
appointed, again through Iran Party connections and by the person
of the prime minister, as the head of the Water Authority of
Tehran which was implementing the project for the first piped-
water-system. 41 He was at this position when the 1953 coup set in
a new trend in motion.
The Iran party was to become one of the few organization
to form and run the National Front. Although the most important of
the smaller political groups, it was not, however, so much a
political party but an elitist collectivity of mainly European
educated younger technocrats with European style liberal and
social democratic leanings. 42 Avery agrees on their common
educational background but calls them a group of frustrated
40 Asnad-e Laneh-e Jasusi V.18 Documents of the den ofEspionage (Daneshjuyan-e Mosalman, Tehran nd.) see item 2.
41 Claims that Mosaddeq ruled out the appointment ofBazargan as a cabinet minister in charge of educational affairs onthe grounds that he would first make all the school girls wearIslamic head scarves is apparently a case of misinformation.Bazargan states that Mosaddeq personally told him that whilecontemplating the possibility of appointing Bazargan as theminister of education someone had made the above statement to him.Personal interview, Tehran, December, 1988. For the original claimsee Adamiyyat, F. Ashoftegi Dar Tafakkor Tarikh Disorders inHistorical Thinking (n.p. Tehran, 1981).
42 Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran, p. 239.75
Islamic Work Ethic.
professional men of the middle classes significant for their
opposition to the Tudeh and support for Mosaddeq. 43 Abrahamian
covers their case in greatest detail;
Iran party was the country's main secular nationalist
organization. Its leaders came from the rank of the young
generation of the western educated intelligentsia residing
in Tehran and influential through their families. The
party supported Mosaddeq's general policies, advocated a
diluted form of French socialism. It called for a national
revolution against the feudal landlords to complete the
reforms initiated by the constitutional movement. It
argued that the main social conflict in Iran was between
the exploited people and the exploiting rulers, not
between the middle and lower classes. It encouraged the
state to implement a programme for rapid
industrialization, and claimed that agricultural
countries, being 'dumping grounds" for developed countries
could not be truly independent. It added that the state
should own all the major industries since laissez-faire
capitalism concentrated economic and political power in
the hands of a few illiterate robber-barons who not only
exploited the masses but have little respect for skilled
professionals and technicians. Moreover, it waged a
propaganda campaign against both the old and the new
wealthy families. As one party pamphlet on the Iranian
43 Avery, P. Modern Iran (Ernest Benn Ltd. London, 1965)p.432.
76
Islamic Work Ethics
aristocracy declared, "the main obstacle to national
progress is the privileged class. 44
The treatment of the National Front has been more complex.
At the height of its power the Front was constituted of several
political groups and a number of distinguished politicians. In a
classic Marxist analysis the Front has been sketched as the
representative of the national bourgeoisie holding a combination
of classes, including that of social reformists, petite
bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, the right wing bourgeoisie and
the anti British (religious) elements. 45 Abrahamian portrays the
Front as a coalition of the traditional and middle classes that
stayed together as long as Britain and Shah seemed dangerous. For
Avery the Front poses as an odd combination" of traditional and
modern classes which included the land-owners, merchants, tribal
leaders, Liberals and political extremists coming around a common
anti-Shah, anti-foreign, nationalist, liberal, and religious flag.
Frustrated at having failed to insure a part of the political
power and fearful of a communist takeover, they rallied around
uncontrollable nationalist passions and xenophobia. 46 Painting a
background of a re-emerging absolutist and arbitrary despotic
state, Katouzian pictures the Front as a democratic, popular and
44 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.188-190.45 Ivanove blames the Tudeh for failing to distinguish
between national bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie comprador and thusevaluating Mosaddeq as a comprador elements and pursuing aradically leftist attitude towards him. Ivanove, M.S. Tarikh-eNovin-e Iran The Modern History of Iran Tizabi, H. & Qaempanah, H.(trans.) (Tudeh Party Publication, nd. np .) pp.92-180.
46 Avery, Modern Iran, pp.331-440.77
Islamic Work ithics
revolutionary movement with its leadership aiming at uprooting
despotism and carrying out social reconstruction. 47
In comparative terms Bazargan's position within the ranks
of the Nationalist camp seems to have been of greater significance
than his position within the religious tendency. In the
Nationalist camp he had a minor leadership position but as we
shall see this position was to change radically in the following
decade.
The Pamphleteer:
As apparent from the above discussion from 1941 to 1953
Bazargan became increasingly politically active. He participated
in the activities of an Islamic association, an engineer's union,
the Iran party and the National Front. During the same period he
wrote and published thirteen articles and three books:
1942 Religion in Europe 48
Complimentary and Abusive Language in Iran 49
1943 Purities in Islam 50
1944 Pragmatism in Islam 51
1945 Coefficient of Conversion Between the Material
47 Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran p.165-187.
48 Madhab Dar Urupa (Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1965). Firstpublished in Danish Amuz, the publication of the Islamic Centre,Issues no. 9, 10, 11, 1942.
49 Fohsh va Ta'arof Dar Iran. No publication detailsavailable.
50 Muttaharat Dar Islam. No publication detail available.51 Pragmatism dar Islam, in Religion in Europe (Enteshar
Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1964).78
Islamic Work Ethics
and the spiritual 52
▪ The infinitely Small 53
▪ Industrial Thermodynamics 54
1946 Labour in Islam 55
1947 The Trodden Path 56
1948 The Source of Independence 57
1950 Heart and Mind 58
▪ The Great Consequences of Association 59
▪ The Secret of the Backwardness of the Muslim
Nations 60
▪ Islam or Communism 61
1951 Youthful Games With Politics 62
52 Zarib-e Tabadol Mian-e Madiyat va Ma'naviyat (EntesharCo. Ltd. Tehran, 1945).
53 Bi nahayat Kuchek-ha, in Religion in Europe (Enteshar Co.Ltd. Tehran, 1965). First published in the daily Kayhan.
54 No publication details available.55 Kar Dar Islam (Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1978).56 Rah-e Tey Shodeh. The book was an elaboration of a 1946
speech, and it seems that significant parts of the book were addedin the 1950s and this research thus studies the book in a laterperiod despite the publishing date. It is apparent that the nameis the Persian translation of the Arabic word "Sunna' (derivativeSunni).
57 Sarcheshmeh-e Isteglal, in The Secret of the Backwardness of the Muslim Nations. Elaborations on a 1948 speech.
58 Del va Damagh (Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1965). Firstpublished in the magazine Forugh 'Ilm 1950.
59 Athar-e 'Azim Intema" in Heart and Mind (Enteshar Co.Ltd. Tehran, 1965). First published in the monthly magazine Forugh'Ilm, 1950.
60 Sir-e Agab Uftadegi Melal-e Mosalman. First delivered asa speech in 1949. English version The Causes of the Decline andDecadence of Islamic Nations in Islamic Review, London, June 1951.Revised in 1960s and reprinted by Book Distribution Centre,Houston, 1976.
61 Islam ya Komunism. Speech at the Islamic Association ofStudents. Also published under the name Az Khuda Parasti ta KhudParasti Worship of God to the Worship of the Self.
62 Bazi-e Javanan Ba Siyasat (Aftab, Tehran, 1952).79
Islamic Work Ethics
Many of these writings were revised later and it became a
standard practice for Bazargan to review and upgrade his writings
as years went by. This makes accurate research into the social or
intellectual context of his ideas somewhat difficult, for
unfortunately the revisions are not identified. Neither Bazargan
nor the publisher possess copies of the original publications and
in almost all instances the author has no recollection of the
changes that he had made.
A good example is with The Secret of Backwardness of the
Muslim Nations. The article was originally written in 1949. It was
revised and translated into English for publication in the Islamic
Review (London) in 1951. Over fifteen years later a new Persian
version appeared in the United States (1976). A comparison between
the English version and the existing Persian copy indicates the
changes that Bazargan had made to the original piece. However the
publisher has continued to use the original publishing date with
no indication of further revisions. The present research indicates
that the revision to this writing was probably carried out some
20-years later 63 and under the inspiration of the popular
polemical classic of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, the Westoxication. 64 The
difficulty of revisions poses a challenge to research on the
earlier writings of Bazargan and there are no simple or accurate
solutions to it, let alone guesswork following thorough reading of
the texts.
63 In mid 1960s we find Bazargan involved extensively inwriting as well as revision of his earlier works.
64 Al-e Ahmed, J. Gharb Zadegi Westoxication (RavaqPublications, Tehran, Second Edition, 1977)
80
Islamic Work Ethics
Among the books, pamphlets and articles which Bazargan
wrote during the 1941-53 period, a number of works and themes have
been chosen here for analysis as to represent the major ideas that
Bazargan was dealing with and his main concerns in the socio-
political arena at the time. An overview of some of his works
might help to establish his main emphasis.
1- Religion in Europe: Bazargan defends religion from attacks by
secularists and Modernists with the argument that religion
continues to play an important role in modern Europe.
2- Complimentary and Abusive Language in Iran: Calls for greater
social morality. Argues that formality and exaggeration in
Persian, as in its profanity and complements, is an indication of
cultural dishonesty.
3- Purities in Islam: A study of the Islamic rituals (in this case
the rule that a pool of water more than 3.5 span across is pure
for ablution) through "modern scientific" language.
4- Pragmatism: In this argument Bazargan draws on pragmatism with
the intention of "comparing the true Islamic teachings with those
of pragmatist principles". According to Bazargan Islam and
Pragmatism have things in common for "in Islam that which is true
and pure necessarily has a utility . so that not only the
religion of Islam but even God is in that sense utilitarian".
81
Islamic Work Ethics
5- Coefficient of Conversion Between the Material and the
spiritual: Argues that the lack of individual religious morality
is the underlying cause of social problems. Even material poverty
is said to be sustained by a lack of spiritual and moral values.
In other words to solve social problems individual morality should
be addressed and altered. Bazargan argues that the material and
the spiritual do not exist in isolation from each other.
6- The infinitely Small: An argument to defend religious social
morality, moderation in politics, and the significant role of the
individual in society.
7- Labour in Islam: Despite the revisions made to the book at
later stages this piece best illustrates the intellectual position
of Bazargan in the 1940s with regards to the traditionalist,
secular Modernist, communist and Islamic Modernist tendencies. It
discusses the concept of labour as the central theme of social
evolution (of which more below).
8- The Trodden Path: A book of some 250 pages. Originally a
lecture in 1946, revised and expanded in prison in the mid 1950s.
The book therefore belongs to a later period despite the 1946 date
used by the publisher in different prints. The main argument of
the book will be studied in later sections, here it is sufficient
to point out that Bazargan argues that there is no distinction
between religious revelation of Islam and laws of the natural -
physical- world for they are both expressions of the divine will.
82
Islamic Work Ethics
9- The Source of Independence: Addresses the issue of colonialism
and calls for a revision in Iran's traditional work ethics as the
solution to unbalanced foreign trade -as the initial cause of
colonial influence (of which more below).
10- Heart and Mind: Another effort at maintaining the significance
of Islamic and religious morality. The argument concerns
epistomological issues and Bazargan states that intuition as a
source of religious experience is compatible with the modern
rationalistic/scientific methodology (of which more below).
11- The Great Consequences of Association: Argues in favour of the
creation of professional and cultural social associations in order
to help national progress.
12- The Secret of the Backwardness of the Muslim Nations: Bazargan
argues that the decline of Islamic countries lies in the wrong
interpretation of Islam. Return to the correct interpretation
would therefore encourage social progress.
13- Youthful Games With Politics: Discusses the role of the
younger generation in national politics and emphasizes the
necessity of their proper education before they enter the hot bed
of politics in the early 1950s.
This study establishes that the core cluster of ideas that
emerged in the 1940-53 period to dominate Bazargan's intellectual
make up were that of labour ethics, moderation, morality and
83
Islamic Work Ethics
economic initiative. The concept of labour ethics appeared in
dialogue with the traditionalist position and evolved in reaction
to the emerging communism of the Tudeh party. The basic idea was
that labour constitutes the foundation of the evolution of human
civilization. Therefore the cause of a country's underdevelopment
must be sought in the deficiencies of labour. The concept of
economic initiative built on the same argument but developed in
the context of the problem of colonialism. The concept of morality
evolved in dialogue with the dominant secular Modernist current
and it emphasized the necessity of ethics and ideals in society.
Moderation emerged as a reaction to the radicalism of the Tudeh
party. These elements were developed by Bazargan into what might
be categorized as Islamic modernism or Islamic reformism.
Moralism or the critique of secularism
There has already been a short discussion about the
strength of the secular thought and subjection of religious
culture as well as the clerical establishment during the rule of
Reza Shah. With the fall of the monarch and the lifting of
restrictions on religious practices, including holding of
religious gatherings, a revival in the defence of religion
emerged. This was both on the popular level where religious
customs and practices were revived and at the level of elites
where religious personalities initiated institutional and
political programmes. Bazargan participated in this movement and a
substantial part of his argument in the 1940-53 period is in this
direction.
84
z g larolo work Ethic.
Indeed all of Bazargan's books and articles in this period
are, in one way or another, in defence of Islam. What he meant by
Islam will be dealt with in the following sections but here his
mainline of defence against secularism will be highlighted.
Bazargan's early reaction to dominant Modernist ideology was an
unease at the Modernist disgust with all affairs of religion which
were interpreted as symbols of backwardness and underdevelopment.
Bazargan produced a number of arguments in dialogue with the
secularists. These were the necessity of religious morality for
social progress, 65 the European conduct towards religion, 66 and
an epistomological discussion of human faculty. 67 The first
argument is most typical of Bazargan's perspective and style in
this as well as subsequent periods.
In these arguments Bazargan's audience are clearly
identifiable: the modern middle classes who had distanced
themselves from the traditional segments of society and who had
failed to see the merits of Islam. At one place the uninformed
modernists and leaders" are addressed who "either through
ignorance or grudge are injecting the minds of the youth and the
progressive [elements] with the idea that worshiping God hinders
progress and contradicts the spirit of civilization." 68 At
another place the "progressive and modernist doctrines" are
criticized which are said to have no value for spirituality ..
65 In The Infinitely Small, The Coefficient of ConversionBetween the Material and the spiritual and Complimentary andAbusive Language in Iran.
66 Religion in Europe.67 Heart and Mind.68 Bazargan, Religion in Europe, p.16.
85
Islamic Work Ithics
and even go as far as to deny its existence altogether describing
it as an illusion or erroneous past practice ... [and] which they
wish to see only in the museums. 69
In the Infinitely Small Bazargan argues that the social
system is constructed by numerous seemingly mundane actions of
individuals and therefore the secret of social success or failure
lies in the direction and content of the daily activities of the
individual. Here lies the power of religion, Bazargan argues, for
in providing a code of morality/conduct for the individual it
shapes societies. To argue his point Bazargan states that
infinitely small quantities, although insignificant in themselves,
are of immense significant when multiplied by a large number.
Parallels are drawn with finite particles in physics, microbes in
biology, and integrals in mathematics. It is thus argued that
qualitative changes lead to quantitative changes. 70
In the Coefficient of Conversion Between the Material and
the Spiritual Bazargan again argues that morality is necessary for
social progress. Bazargan views religion leading to a morality
which gives cohesion to society and thus setting it off on the
road of progress. From within this context Bazargan searches for
causes of Iranian underdevelopment.
Lack of spiritual and moral qualities causes numerous
material losses while the existence of spirituality .
69 Bazargan, Coefficient of Conversion Between the Materialand the Spiritual, p.15.
70 Parallels exist in Marxism. The first law of dialecticconcerns transformation of quantitative to qualitative.
86
Imlamic Work Ethics
drastically increases the output of all social and public
works, possibly by ten or even a hundred percent. [For
instance] all the police budget can be put down to the
lack of the spiritual element in society. To compensate a
lack of righteousness and truthfulness, several million
Tomans 71 has to be spent every year. But if people were
sincere, trustworthy, and just, this budget would be saved
. In our country nothing is lacking in the material
sense but there is a shortage of truthfulness,
righteousness, and sacrifice. 72
It is significant to notice that Bazargan's arguments in
defence of what he called moralism as opposed to secularism, had
the distinct modernist element in that its function was in support
of and aimed at social progress. In other words Bazargan tries to
prove that without religion (which he supposedly believes to have
a social moral structure), social progress and modernization would
be difficult if not impossible to achieve. This might be a cause
of confusion in the sense that it is not clear whether he is using
Islam to strengthen social progress or trying to attract modernist
sections of society to Islam. But the question is solved if it is
noticed that he equates the presence of religious social ethics to
social development. Therefore he does not seem to be
instrumentalist in either way. It should be recalled that Bazargan
had seen the secret of the European progress in their social
71q edo Iranian unit of currency.72 Bazargan, Coefficient of Conversion Between the Material
and the spiritual pp.98-100.87
Islamic Work Ethics
values which he equated with the Christian ethics. Commenting on
Europe of his student years he had said:
The principal motive and the secret of social success and
progress [of the Europeans] can be nothing but religion
and the worship of God. 73
It should also be noticed that at this stage of writing
Bazargan makes no distinction between Islam, morality, or even the
Shiite clergy. They are all seen as a single parcel. This might be
taken as the cohesion of the traditional Islamic community, in the
eyes of Bazargan, and the lack of intellectual and philosophical
challenges to the centuries old traditional pattern.
Bazargan's other argument in Religion in Europe is solely
based on the idea that since religion is respected and active in
Europe, Iranians who look up to Europe for inspiration and
guideline, should follow the example and give the same treatment
to their own religion. For someone who had earlier condemned
imitation of the Europeans such a position might seem
contradictory, but it should be seen as an effort by Bazargan to
deal with the Modernist's treatment of religion on their own terms
and by their own standards. The argument of Bazargan's earliest
works is simple and the source is basically his own personal
experience in Europe. He argues that since for a number of years
[he] has been living in a European country and has had direct
contact with various French classes and has witnessed the European
73 Bazargan, Defence, p.63.88
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manner of worship and the influence of religion in the society" he
was now in a position to redirect the attention of the secular
Modernists to the significance of Islam as a crucial social
element. He speaks of the respect that Europeans have for
Christianity:
Not only the Europeans do not regard religion as a sign of
illiteracy, many of their contemporary scientists who have
been the vanguard of European civilization are amongst the
believers and worshippers ... even in the French Academy
of Sciences which is the assembly of the intellectual
elite, a group of clergy have seats next to historians,
writers, physicians, generals and politicians. 74
Bazargan's third type of argument in Heart and Mind is an
epistemological analysis of man's rational capacity as well as his
instinctive emotional (intuitive) idealism. Here again the aim is
to highlight the necessity of religion and morality. Bazargan
states that Man's idealism is based on emotions (intuition) rather
than logical capacity. Man has a hierarchy of ideas or goals
towards which he strives. His primitive ideal is physical survival
(ie. securing food and satisfying sexual desires) followed by
"matters of existence" (ie. enjoying the fruits of sexuality in
parenthood and extending the sense of parenthood to philanthropist
sentiments that go as far as patriotism). The highest form of
ideal is the worship of God which actualizes the best human
74 Bazargan, Religion in Europe, p.16-17.89
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qualities. Bazargan believed the reason for Iranians deprivation
of progress is their lack of a common national ideal.
[Our] great social poverty is that people have no common
aim, common faith, common doctrine, common national goal.
Each individual is indulging in his meagre personal
interests. But there is room for hope ... adopting the
worship of God, would allow the blossoming of their full
human potential. 75
It is possible to speculate that Bazargan's ideas here had
their origins in the schools of spiritual mysticism, a bastion of
Islamic tradition, where emotions and intuition (Eshraq) are
acknowledged as correct channels of perceiving reality and
acquiring knowledge.
Labour or Critique of Traditionalism
Beside criticizing the secularists for the supposed lack
of morality, Bazargan addressed the Islamic community and argued
against their traditional interpretation of religion and
particularly their lack of social vigour and political commitment.
This argument is best evident in parts of the book Labour in
Islam, which we are to study here. The book is an elaboration of a
1946 lecture at a meeting of the Islamic Association of Students
in Tehran. The lecture was later elaborated and published by the
Enteshar publications in 1965. The second edition of the book was
75 Bazargan, Heart and Mind, p.16-17.90
Islamic Work Ithics
printed in 1978 by the Book Distribution Centre of Houston. 76
When the book was being printed in the United States the
publishers gave it an English name on the back cover: Islamic Work
Ethics. The English name is revealing for it portrays the
intention of drawing parallels to the Protestant Work Ethics
presumably on the assumption that Bazargan's work was in the
spirit of Protestantism's challenge to the religious establishment
and calls for a new social order based on new morality.
It is not known how much revision was made to the initial
lecture before the work was originally published. In the
introduction of the book it is stated that additions and revisions
had been made but no details are given. The most clear indication
of changes are footnote references to books written by Bazargan at
later periods. These include references to; The Trodden Path
(revised in 1950s), 77 Love and Worship or the Human Thermodynamic
(1957), 78 Current Needs (1957), 79 Automation (1961). 80 The
contents of the book was not revised for the second edition.
76 This particular work as almost all other of Bazargan'sworks was first published by Enteshar Publications (Sherkat-eSahami-ye Enteshar) an organization run by Ezatollah Sahabi, theson of Dr.Yadollah Sahabi, both long time collaborators ofBazargan. The publishing house was to become an institution ofsome prestige in producing books in defence of modern, liberal andconstitutional Islamic interpretations in the next five decades.In the early 1970s the Book Distribution Centre of Houston Texas,an affiliated organization to the Islamic Association of Studentsof Europe and North America, which in turn operated under thepatronaae of Ibrahim Yazdi, a long time Muslim activist and closecollaborator of Bazargan published Bazargan's work. The IslamicAssociation was to train hundreds of cadres who became animportant element in the post revolutionary regime of Ayatollah
Khomeini.77 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.49.78 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.53.
79 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.49.
80 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.93.91
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It is probable that certain revisions of the original work
were carried out in mid 1960s and it is possible to pin-point this
date with regard to Bazargan's reference to the idea of natural
law. In the introduction Bazargan speaks about the religion of
Islam and natural law as being identical and only different in
being various expressions of the divine will. Indeed the whole
book, Labour in Islam, is built on this premise. Its four chapters
are an effort towards establishing the hypothesis that the divine
religion of Islam revealed to the prophet Mohammad is the one and
the same as natural law as identified through the rational and
modern study of history of man. The short discussion of the issue
of natural law in the introduction, as far as this study has
managed to establish, is most probably an addition of mid 1960s,
for it is in this particular period, as we shall see later, that
Bazargan starts to write definitely and clearly on the idea of
natural law. Here it is sufficient to point out that Labour in
Islam contains the earlier stages of ideas which were to be
developed by Bazargan to that of natural law and it is therefore
permissible to study the book, despite its later revisions, as
representative of Bazargan's ideas in the 1941-53 period.
Indeed a functional analysis of the text Labour in Islam
is most rewarding for it reveals that in terms of meaning and
context the work fits well in the 1941-53 period rather than later
stages. Through identifying the functions of the arguments it is
possible to detect the socio-political ideas that Bazargan was
addressing. This allows not only the pin-pointing of Bazargan's
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social and political stance with regard to other social and
intellectual currents, it helps the identification of the period
in question. The final objective of this analysis is the
identification of the manner in which Bazargan tries to influence
and change political events. In other words the study tries to
establish his writing as a political act.
The study of Bazargan's works reveals that, at this
period, he was preoccupied with the problem of the general
backwardness of Iran and the fact that this problem was generally
blamed on the traditional sector of the society. Furthermore
traditional was identified as religious. This perspective seems to
have been significantly dominant at the time and an analysis of
the literature of the period reveals the dominance of the theme.
All major writers addressed the issue of Iran being at the
crossroad between "oldness" and "newness" and identified the theme
as the major undercurrent of Iranian society. Furthermore most
major writers, in keeping within the mainstream of Iranian
modernism blamed the traditional sectors of the community for the
backwardness and expressed various degrees of disgust towards
them. 81 We have already pointed out that on his return, Bazargan
joined the state-led Modernist drive with the hope of reform from
within the government bureaucracy and the aim of modernizing
Iranian society. In the 1940s the issue of backwardness
preoccupied Bazargan and he built a number of arguments in order
to address and deal with the issue.
81 Ramazani, R.R. Intellectual Trends in the Politics andHistory of MUsaddiq Era in Bill, Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism andOil pp.307-329.
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Indeed up to 1940 Iran's underdevelopment had been
chronic. Iran was not only backward in comparison to European
countries, its social and economic development was even at a
slower pace than its main regional partners, such as Turkey, Egypt
and India with whom the Iranian economy stood at comparable levels
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Although a significant
drive was made during the rule of Reza Shah in terms of effort and
the results achieved, Iran lagged behind. Economic problems
continued throughout the 1940s in terms of trade, production and
development. Furthermore pre-occupation with political issues
arising from WWII overshadowed economic matters and limited their
scope of expansion. 82
Bazargan looked at this problem from the point of view of
public culture. He seems to have believed that the main problem
lay in the absence of modern work ethics in the national culture
and that if this element were to be introduced into the popular
mind, it would make the necessary change towards social and
economic progress. To introduce the necessary change to the public
culture, Bazargan linked modern work ethics to Islamic beliefs and
proposed modern work ethics as a main element in the religion of
Islam. It is this argument (ie. the mobilization of the productive
forces through establishing a modern code of labour in an
underdeveloped society experiencing its first decades of
bureaucratic national state) which we try to address in this
section.
82 Lenczowski, G. (ed.) Iran Under the Pahlavis (HooverInstitution Press, Stanford, 1978) pp. 129-135.
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Islamic Work Ethics
Bazargan's argument in Labour in Islam is fourfold. First
he builds a chronicle of human civilization in which labour plays
the key role in determining the direction and the content of its
evolution. Secondly he introduces an argument about the
physiological role of labour in determining the physical nature of
man. Thirdly he argues that labour is a fundamental element in the
Islamic perspective of life and that it is through labour that man
creates his welfare, both in the material and spiritual worlds.
Having established the overriding significance of labour he then
looks at the popular notions of labour in Iran and expresses
concern over the lack of significance that is given to it. The
argument is thus designed to attract the popular mind towards the
significance of labour and through this help the advance and
growth of economy and society.
Bazargan's history of civilization is discussed in the
book's first chapter under the title of The Evolutionary Process
of Labour in Human History. 83 The discussion covers the history
of human civilization, categorized into 13 periods. These stages
are said to be the ages of Wilderness, Husbandry, Beasts of
Burden, Family, Tribe, Slavery, Agriculture, Village life,
Aristocracy, Professionalism, labour, Democratic Government, and
finally government of labour. It is said that the transformation
from the most primitive state of affairs to the most complex stage
has taken place through labour. Further it is through the
alteration in the nature of labour that social status based on the
83 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, pp.4-42.95
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division of labour and specialization is created and thus
exploitation given birth to. The increasingly complex relationship
between producers creates the community, weakens the family unit
and intensifies exploitation. Development leads to the emergence
of the aristocracy relying, for their rule, on the warrior class.
With the increase of trade, the village turns into the city giving
birth to industry and centralized government. The conflict between
the producer and exploiter continues into the industrial age where
despite establishment of greater rights for the workers, the
owners of capital clash with organized labour. Socialist regimes
are then born providing a degree of welfare for the working
classes.
Through this historic process labour has advanced against
those elements against which it once competed, that is
blood relations, aristocracy, social power [coercion] and
finally capital. The day too will come when labour becomes
the dominant principle. 84
Utilizing his historic framework of The Evolutionary
Process of Labour in Human Society 85 Bazargan expresses his
critique of [traditional] Iranian society which he considers to be
at the age of slavery and agriculture. 86 In the culture of this
underdeveloped society, it is said, labour ethics have no place
and work is considered suitable only for servants and clerks. Less
84 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.37.85 In the following section, on Bazargan and Marxism, we
shall study the context and the source of inspiration for thisparticular argument.
86 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.79.96
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attention is paid to the ability of the individual to produce than
to his social class and status. All behaviour relating to
productivity is frowned upon by the traditional elite (ie.
landlords, clerics, merchants) who are themselves non-productive
and at best delegate their responsibilities to involve themselves
in classical (literary) studies. All things are static and there
is reluctance to change the status quo. Fatalism which in older
days put all in the hands of God has turned into a belief that all
social events are determined by the will of outside powers. 87
Bazargan believes the problem is a historical one and to
show the depth of the difficulty in Iran's history Bazargan quotes
the nineteenth century Muslim activist Sayyed Jamal Assad-Abadi
(Afghani), a forerunner of Islamic modernism.
The Iranian elite are experts in the politics and industry
of talking, but their knowledge lacks practice. If they
were to spend one percent of the energy they use for
talking in action, Iran would be in the category of the
great governments, in terms of progress, wealth and
power.88
The problem continues to persist in the modern period for
that which exists of modern living has not been achieved through
modern social organization and productivity but a skin deep
imitation of the Europeans. In other words the other side of this
87 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, pp.80-82.88 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.81.
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unproductive traditionalism is unproductive pseudo modernity which
runs across all sections of society. The younger generation,
specially the women, waste time in "reading novels, going to the
cinema and roaming city streets". The political activists are
happy to attend fiery debates as long as it involves no duties or
work. The Muslim faithful's involvement in religion is more of an
entertainment. 89
This state of affairs is in contrast to labour ethics in
Europe, Bazargan believes, where in all social systems, be they
capitalist or socialist, democratic or fascist, labour is the
foundation of all social life. In other words Bazargan tries to
point out the importance of labour in Western culture, to which
Iranian society looks as a model, in order to encourage a change
in the Iranian's concept of labour. Bazargan's views must have
been strengthened by his experience of living in France where he
was aware of the higher sense of duty and responsibility of a more
modern work force. Furthermore Bazargan was a natural scientist
trained in engineering with strong views on the necessity of
planning and organization. The training which made him a leading
technocrat in the modern section of Iranian society led him to
demand a highly specialized work force that was basically non-
existent in Iran's traditional agricultural society.
With regards to the cause of the problem, ie.
underdevelopment due to a lack of labour ethics, work and
creativity, Bazargan points to three natural and historical
89 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.84.98
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factors which aggravate the situation. Initially it is the
geographical condition of the country (particularly the central
deserts) which are said to make agricultural activity non
rewarding. Secondly the despotism of Iranian regimes, which
support social advance through favour and not merit, has reduced
all interests in creative work. Finally foreign invasions leading
to unstable governments, little security and thus un-
productivity."
Bazargan's argument seems to have several causes and
several sources of inspiration. However in the analysis of the
causes of underdevelopment, there seems to be some form of
inspiration from a book that was to affect Bazargan's perception
of Iranian national character; Siegfried's The Character of
Peoples. 91 Bazargan follows the above argument in a pamphlet
Iranian Adaptability which he wrote a few years later (1967). 92
In this work he tries to sketch the characteristics of Iranian
people, in line with Siegfried's book where an attempt is made to
understand the psychology of nations and the reasons for their
differences. Siegfried suggests that there exists a certain
permanent character in each nation's psychology depending on the
geographical and climatic conditions. This influence is said to
90 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, pp.90-93. Here there is apossibility of influence from Lambton, A.K.S. Landlord and Peasantin Persia (Oxford University Press, London 1953).
91 Siegfried, A. The Character of Peoples Fitzgerald, E.(tran.) (Jonathan Cape Publishers, London, 1952). Originallypublished in French in 1950.
92 The piece was originally intended as an introduction toSiegfried's book but was later published independently. Seepublisher's note in Iranian Adaptability Sazgari-ye Irani (BookDistribution Centre, Houston, 1977).
99
Islamic Work Ethics
determine the nature of race and culture. Upon this basis the
author distinguishes between Latin Realism, French Ingenuity,
English Tenacity, German Discipline, Russian Mysticism and
American Dynamism.
Siegfried's idea is said to go back to the 18th century
European enlightenment and especially to the ideas associated with
Montesquieu. Montesquieu tried to develop a sociological theory of
government and law by showing that these two depend for their
structure and functioning upon the circumstances in which a people
lives. The circumstances include physical conditions, such as
climate and soil, which he supposed to have a direct influence
upon national mentality, the state of the arts, trade, and the
modes of producing goods, mental and moral temperaments and
dispositions, the form of the political constitution and the
customs and habits that have become ingrained in national
character. 93
Bazargan took up Siegfried's view and attributed the cause
of the non-existence of an Iranian work ethic to the harsh
climatic conditions and terrain that made agricultural work non-
rewarding. He later distinguished the characteristic of Iranian
people as their adaptability (thus the name of the pamphlet.)
"Adaptability" referred to the Iranian people's supposed ability
to adapt themselves to unstable geographical as well as social
conditions. Bazargan believed sharp unpredictable changes in
climate and open terrains which ease if not invite foreign
93 Sabine, G.H. A History of Political Theory, p.508.100
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military campaigns went to contribute to the make up of the
Iranian spirit. 94
Going back to Bazargan's main argument with the
traditionalists and within the political context of the 1940s it
is of significance to note that although Bazargan's criticism of
traditional religious community falls generally within the
discourse on labour ethics it is within a critique of political
conservatism that Bazargan initially faced the traditionalists.
Bazargan's first and noticeably limited attack on a traditionalist
Muslim position, was articulated in his paper on Pragmatism and
Islam (1944). The work aimed at activating the Muslim elements who
are believed to be following the conservative and quietist
tradition. 95 We have already referred to Bazargan's position vis-
a-vis the main Islamic political trends of the period. The
critique of the quietist and conservative position here is aimed
at motivating the powerful traditional Islamic community into the
political mainstream. In his Pragmatism and Islam Bazargan only
targets the Sufi tradition by name, but the implication of the
argument, without doubt, was intended to include the even more
powerful theological tradition. Quietists are criticized for their
deviation from the true faith through concentrating on prayers,
recitations, and rituals in place of pursuit of social
productivity and functions. Here Bazargan's main concern with the
traditional Muslims is on account of their social passivity and
political conservatism. The criticism is concerned with their
Bazargan, Iranian Adaptability, last section.95 Bazargan, Pragmatism and Islam in Religion in Europe
(Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1964).101
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evasion of social activity, in general, and with politics, in
particular.
Now what could be done to deal with the situation?
Bazargan points the finger at "less talk and more hard work" as
the key to social advance. The practical step must be taken to
form associations and societies which would teach their members
the merits of modern social behaviour, including hard work. 96
Bazargan's proposals for the formation of social associations
towards establishing a new set of social behaviour seems to have
its roots in his personal experience with the associations,
particularly the Catholic and Republican, while studying in
France. It should be recalled that at the time the revived
Catholicism's doctrine emphasized missionary work rather than
overt political activity. This followed an awareness that de-
Christianisation was widespread and that to many people religion
was merely social conformism. The intention was to penetrate the
social fabric through social work of non-political nature.
Although Bazargan's reasons for calling for the creation of social
associations had different reasons than those of the French
Catholics and Republicans of the 1930's, it is quite clear that
frequenting the French circles was sufficient to persuade him in
modeling their form of organization.
Moderation or critique of Marxism
It would be correct to say that one other main concern of
Bazargan during the 1941-53 period (and particularly in the first
96 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.94.102
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half) was the threat of the advance of communist ideology in
general and that of the Tudeh party in particular. It is worth
remembering that Bazargan had acquired anti-communist sentiments
in France after witnessing the anti-religious propaganda of the
extreme left. 97 With such a background he faced the emergence and
rapid growth of the Tudeh party. Indeed the expansion of the party
was unprecedented in the history of Iran's experience with
political organizations. Bazargan's first hand experience with the
Tudeh was on the university campus, where as a professor and later
the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering, he saw the trailblazing
spread of communist ideas. For various reasons, but most of all
because of Tudeh's radicalism and anti-religious propaganda
Bazargan resented their presence.
Managing the university was no easy task. More difficult
than the educational and personal aspects of the work was
the battle against Tudeh. The party had turned the
university into its central base and exerted its utmost
pressure there. Tudeh students had taken over the
university club and were ordering the staff [even] to go
on strike. They wanted a role in the university council's
process of decision making. There was no discipline, only
abuse. The Ministry of Education was in despair. Those
were dark days. 98
Bazargan's response to the communist advance was unique in
that he did not directly criticizes the Marxists, nor did he
97 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.98 Bazargan, Defence p.116.
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involve himself in the daily political issues. Rather he exerted
his efforts towards the creation of an argument, even an
intellectual framework, as an alternative to the communist idea.
The aim was to put into the political arena an alternative that
would diminish the attraction of the leftist ideology, specially
for the youth. This method was the consequence of Bazargan's
analysis of the elements that had prepared the ground for the
expansion of the Tudeh party:
The ideological strength and attraction of [Marxist
ideology] was due to its progressiveness and particularly
its dynamic nature; stimulating the intellect and giving
it a philosophical and scientific foundation
[furthermore] at the advance of the communists almost no
political doctrine or hope of salvation was offered to the
youth. 99
It was on this basis that Bazargan found it necessary to
introduce a parallel argument, in this case a religious idea:
The educated youth need [intellectual] food . . [but]
beside materialism and the programme of the Tudeh Party
nothing else was on offer. As a result [communism] was
advancing like an army with no opposition or obstacle in
its path. 100
9 9 Bazargan, Defence, p.123.100 Bazargan, Defence, p.124.
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Islamic Work Ethics
Bazargan's main address to the communist issue of the
period is in his Labour in Islam, and it is in the first chapter
The Evolutionary Process of Labour in Human History where an
effort is made to undermine Tudeh's Marxist influence. We have
already looked at the chapter in the previous section in terms of
the introduction of the idea of labour and critique of the
traditional society. Now the work will be studied in relation to
the Marxist position.
Bazargan's main argument is that although labour
determines the form and function of the social structure and that
it is in conflict with owners of capital, the historic process
does not move through revolutionary leaps and that ultimately the
means of production do not come under the absolute ownership of
the workers but rather there is a modification in the extent of
ownership. The function of the argument seems to be to maintain
certain elements of Marxist thinking, such as historicism, which
Bazargan might have thought attractive, both personally and for
his audience, but refute other elements which gave the Marxist
movement its distinction.
To argue his case Bazargan puts forward the idea that
human civilization has gone through a process in which the
primitive commune has been transformed to the modern society
through the act of labour. The process passes through a number of
stages including that of family rule, aristocracy, and democracy.
Conflict between the producer and exploiter develop and continue
into the industrial age where despite the establishment of greater
105
Islamic Work Ethics
rights for workers, the owners of capital clash with organized
labour. Socialist regimes are then born providing a degree of
welfare for the working classes. At the final stage of conflict
between the producers and the owners of capital, the producers
triumph and create governments of labour. This historical
narrative presented by Bazargan might be considered a somewhat
simple imitation of a historical study that he must have had
access to, it is nevertheless the basis on which he builds his
later discussions.
As stated above although the argument in the Evolutionary
Process of Labour in Human History is intended to undermine
Marxist influence, it is possible to detect the influence of a
number of Marxist ideas including that of labour, historical
development and class struggle in it. The Marxist influence is
also evident in the use of terminology. In fact with minor literal
adjustments to Bazargan's terminology one would be left with a
near copy of the Marxist concepts. Bazargan modified the Marxist
terminology, possibly in the course of translation from (probably)
French texts into Persian, but that provides little camouflage.
For instance in place of the Persian word Estesmar usually used
for exploitation, the modified Bahreh-e Bardari (to reap the
benefit of) was used. In place of the word Bourgeoisie, directly
and commonly used by the Persian speakers, the word Eshteghal
(occupation) was chosen. However such changes have no impact on
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the substance of the discourse and the trace of the Marxist
influence is clear. 101
At this time Bazargan's understanding of Marxism was at a
popular rather than a scholarly level. His studies were limited to
secondary sources; including books by the Iranian communist
essayist Taqi Arani 102, several French articles, and a number of
university textbooks. 103 However the insight to the sources used
by Bazargan, in this case Marxism, is not sufficient in
understanding his intellectual make up. Indeed placing emphasis on
the adoption of Marxist ideas and terminology could be misleading
since the function of these ideas was fundamentally if not
exclusively anti-Marxist. This functional and instrumentalist
approach to the Marxist perspectives gives a strong hint of
Bazargan's pragmatic use of ideology. However even this
explanation, although necessary, fails to suffice. For in the
process of adapting Marxist ideas to fight Marxism Bazargan was
influenced to a degree by their discourse, particularly the ideas
of labour and historical evolution.
101 The findings of this study in that the source of theargument was Marx was hesitantly acknowledged by Bazargan in the1989 interview. Hesitant in the sense that the Islamic Modernistshave had to shield themselves against accusation of sycreticism byfundamentalist Muslims and do not wish to acknowledge their non-Islamic sources of inspiration. This problem comes through many ofBazargan's works, where although large sections of works areborrowed no acknowledgement is made of their source. For instancesee Encielab-e Iran dar Du Harekat where the last chapter is a nearcopy digest of Brinta, C. Anatomy of Revolution (Vintage Books,New York, 1938) but with no indication of the source.
102 Dr. Taqi Arani (d.1939) Marxist theorist and founder ofthe famous 53-group which was to establish the Tudeh party. Hewas arrested for his communist views and subsequently killed inprison.
103 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.107
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As is evident Bazargan did not accept the Marxist vision
in toto. He had objections to three significant elements in
classical Marxism and had his own views on these points. These
differences put Bazargan outside the Marxist tradition and close
to the European Social Democratic tradition with its emphasis on
evolutionary socialism.
Bazargan's main departure from Marxism concerned the
ownership of the means of production. As indicated earlier he had
already implicitly accepted the idea of class struggle, calling
for the emergence of the "government of labour". However he then
expresses the view that an end to exploitation and the subsequent
distribution of wealth will not emerge in the manner that Marx had
predicted. In other words it was said that the absolute ownership
of the means of production by the working classes will not come
about, rather a "sort of modification in the forms and limits of
ownership" will take place which will be supposedly sufficient in
ending the conflict between labour and capital. 104
A second point where Bazargan differed from the mainstream
popular Marxist theories was on the concept of rapid social change
or revolution. He contributed to the idea of the inevitability of
class struggle, stating that the rule of capital and private
ownership was nearing its end, but denied the Marxist vision of
rapid social transformation from one historical stage to another.
Rather apparently a non-violent transformation was suggested (upon
104 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.38.108
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which a modification in the ownership would take place) allowing
the historical process to follow a "natural" course.
Labour has advanced against those elements which it once
competed against, that is blood relations, aristocracy,
social power [coercion], and finally capital ... The day
will come when labour becomes the dominant principle.
However this process will not be achieved in the way that
political radicals and revolutionaries suggest. Rather, it
will take place in the same manner that patriarchal
practices gave way to the rule of the bureaucracy and
military. At the [coming] age the ownership of property
will find its natural social position. At the age of
labour the position of the individual will be determined
according to his labour. 105
The third point where Bazargan differed from the leftist
mainstream of the 1940's was in his criticism of the claim by the
Soviet Union to be a proletarian state, an idea which was
aggressively propagated by the Tudeh party. Terming its government
as one based on capitalist economics and political coercion,
Bazargan expresses the opinion that the Soviet government had not
been able to solve class contradictions in favour of the element
of labour and that the element of capital continued to exploit the
former. Here Bazargan's explanations were (again) limited to a
minimum and he failed to expand on the subject but insisted that
105 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.37.109
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the emergence of communist government had not been the outcome of
conflict between the factors of labour and capital.
[In USSR] the factor of labour has not yet managed to win
over power from its old and new rivals (ie.family
relations, aristocracy, coercion and capital). In the
Proletarian Countries the government continues to be based
on capital, coercion and even aristocracy. 106
As far as it is known the principal criticism (in the
1940's) of the Soviet Union as a capitalist country -although
State Capitalism- was voiced by the Toilers Party of Iran led by
Khalil Maleki. 107 Maleki wrote several articles on the subject
and published them later in book form under the title of
"Socialism and State Capitalism". In the book Maleki referred to
"Return From the Soviet Union" by the French author Andre Gide and
elaborated his argument on highlighting contradictions between the
realities of Soviet society and the theories of Marx and Engels.
108 It is possible, though not certain, that Bazargan picked up
some ideas from Maleki and added them to the later revisions of
his book.
In conclusion it is possible to say that in dialogue with
Marxism Bazargan pragmatically used Marxist ideas towards non-
106 mazargan, Labour in Islam, p.36.107 Katouzian, H. & Pishdad, A. (ed.) Yad Nameh-ye Khalil
Maleki In Memory of Khalil Maleki (Enteshar, Tehran, 1991) &
Maleki, Kb. Khaterat-e Siasi Political Memoirs, Katouzian, H.(intro.) (Ravaq, Tehran, 1979).
108 Maleki, Kh. Susialism va Kapitalism-e Dulati, Socialism
and Stat e Capitalism (publisher, date and place of publication
unknown.)110
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Marxist positions. He drew on Marxism to fight it. He used Marxist
terms of analysis and adopted certain Marxist terminology in
presenting his historical analysis. Obviously he was hoping to, or
believing that he could resist the polemical positions which
normally go with these sets of ideas. But he might not have been
aware that there is a certain logic contained within the
terminology adopted, and that despite himself, he was influenced
in a certain direction by them. In other words in the process of
fighting Marxism with its own terminology he accumulated certain
Marxist ideas into his intellectual framework.
As stated earlier Bazargan wrote the original version of
the book Labour in Islam in the 1940s (and in terms of context the
argument it correctly belongs there), but the problem of Marxism
continued to preoccupy Bazargan and the fact that revisions were
made to the original piece and published in the early 1960s
testifies to this fact. Indeed Bazargan was to continue to address
Iran's communist current of thought at various levels. The issue
became particularly acute in the early 1970s when an inside coup
in the Muslim Mojahedin Khalq Organization pushed aside Islamic
elements in the leadership and changed the ideology of the
organization to Marxism. In a short space Bazargan produced two
books in response to the situation: The Scientificality of
Marxism, and A Review of the Ideas of Eric Frumn. The books were
designed to refute the ideological constructs of Marxism and Neo-
Marxism and limit their influence among Iranian intellectuals. But
of these more later.
111
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Islamic Work Ethics
It is with a background of criticism of the then dominant
modernism for its shallow interpretation of modern society,
criticism of Marxism on the issues of ownership and violent change
and criticism of traditionalism for its conservatism and lack of
productivity, that Bazargan puts forward his idea of Work in
Islam, or what in a political study might be termed Islamic work
ethics. The cluster of ideas around the theme of labour which had
been used till then in interpretation, analysis and critique of
the ideological trends of modernism, communism and traditionalism
was then analyzed within the language of Islam. 109
Bazargan's basic argument here is that from the point of
view of the Koran the world was created as a framework within
which man must work. The prophets are said to have been
commissioned to prepare themselves for the purpose of work. The
Koran is said to have a concept of work (that focuses on educating
and selecting the best persons) and that it is within this concept
that the idea of the final judgment (and of heaven and hell) gain
their meaning.
To support his argument Bazargan makes ample use of the
Koran. Three Koranic themes are chosen to highlight the point: the
goal of creation, divine guidance to the faithful, and promises of
heaven/ hell for the day of judgment. In all three themes Bazargan
tries to highlight the element of work.
1" Bazargan, Labour in Islam, pp.55-76.112
Islamic Work Ethics
On the goal of creation 110 Bazargan states that according
to the Koran the world was created for "competitive work" 111
where the role of natural events is to provoke activity, education
and selection of the best of persons. 112 The two ideas are said
to correspond to the view of evolution of civilization in the
sense that they indicate that the ultimate purpose of human effort
is to value labour and develop its scope. Furthermore life is said
to be nothing but effort and suffering in this process. 113
With regard to the theme of guidance to the faithful 114
Bazargan believes that the prophets (the most valued individuals
in the Koranic perspective) were commanded to prepare themselves
for righteous deeds, to engage themselves in righteous deeds and
to use deeds as the act of worship. 115 Similarly the eternal fate
of the individual after death is directly determined by his deeds
and the judgment day is the natural consequence of his actions
before death. 116
Bazargan obtains his concept of Islamic work from the
Koran's idea of 'Amal or deed. Bazargan believes that the idea of
110 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, pp.55-59."He created death and life, that he may try which of you
is best in deed." The Koran, LXVII, 2.112 "That which is on earth we have made but as a glittering
show for the earth, in order that we may test them - as to whichof them are best in conduct." The Koran, XVIII, 7.
113 "Verily thou man! Verily thou art ever toiling ontowards thy Lord - painfully toiling - but thou shalt meet him.The Koran, LXXXIV, 6-12.
114 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, pp.60-62.115 "Enjoy things good and pure and work righteousness."
XXIII, 51. "Oh my Lord, grant me that I may be grateful for thyfavour which thou hast bestowed upon me, .. and that I may workrighteousness." The Koran, XLVI, 15.
116 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, 62-65.113
Islamic Work Ethics
righteous deeds is a centre piece in the Koranic vision of things
and that is why in the 128 Koran verses which promise heaven to
believers three conditions are put forward: faith, righteous deeds
and piety. In harmony with his earlier use of terminologies
Bazargan's interpretation of Koran's idea of righteous deed seems
to be pragmatic and flexible:
The [righteous] deed is the correct and befitting action,
taken prudently according to existing conditions, and
[meant to be] effective and useful ... [Of course] it is
faith which determines the [ultimate] aim and movement
towards the desired goal. 117
Here it is necessary to point out that as Bazargan pursues
his argument there is a terminological ambiguity in that there is
a switch from the term labour (kar), to activity/work (fa'aliyat),
to deeds ('Amal). The three terms are used in arbitrary fashion
without reference to the original context from which they have
been selected.
In the interpretation of the concept of labour in Islam,
Bazargan puts forward the argument that since labour was the
fundamental factor in determining the Evolutionary Process of
Human Civilization (as already indicated in critique of Marxism)
then it would be correct to say that labour must be seen as the
centre piece of human life. But more importantly Bazargan states
117 Bazargan, Labour in Islam p.68.114
Islamic Work Ethics
that the idea that human life should be spent in productive labour
is similar to Islam's concept of work.
Human history has various forms but one underlying
current. While forms are secondary, the current is the
principle. There is no aim to life but labour and work ...
The world compares to a playing field where players push
back and forth a football, trying to pass it through the
goals. Here the ball, the goals and the field are the form
while the aim is the exercise ... [similarly] it seems on
the surface of things that the motive for this long
process [of Historical Evolution of Human Civilization] is
nothing but the force of nature, that is the need for
food, clothing and reproduction. However in truth it is
the instinct for improvement, advance and perfection, in
other words the spiritual need and divine guidance which
are the driving force. 118
The above argument is significant in that it constitutes
the basic juxtaposition of the Marxist influenced concept of
history with Bazargan's idea of Islamic labour. On the one hand
Bazargan accepts that labour is the source of historical social
change and on the other hand he sees the exertion of labour as an
effort towards reaching some form of perfection. The first
perspective argues in favour of the idea that labour shapes the
mode of production which in turn shapes the formation of social
118 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, pp.41-42.115
Islamic Work Ethics
organization, including classes as well as its value system. 119
Here no place is envisioned for faith in the divinity or piety of
the worshipper. The second perspective however argues that the
labour of the individual (itself defined by his ultimate value)
determines his everlasting destiny (ie. life after death).
Bazargan thus views labour as the factor determining both
the spiritual fate of the individual and the social destiny. While
the concept of labour, as the determinant of individual fate, had
its roots in the Koran's righteous deeds, the concept of labour as
defining the course of history had its roots in Marx. What seems
to have happened here is that Bazargan turned Marx's historicism
on its head by taking out the materialistic conception and thus
reflecting a more Hegelian vision. The two ideas, from Marxism and
Islam, had been combined and blended so the actions of the
individual had personal as well as social significance.
It is of interest to note Bazargan's effort at developing
a methodology to deal with the two sets of discourses that he is
drawing inspiration from. In the introduction to his book he
explains how he developed a method towards his efforts in finding
common grounds between Islam and modern scientific thought.
On the one hand he uses the scientific method where
"deductions are made after observation of the natural
119 It is interesting to note that Bazargan has reshapedMarx in claiming that labour shapes the mode or production whilein Marx the mode of production and hence the forms of labour, aredetermined by the forces of production, ie. raw materials, tools,level of technology etc.
116
Islamic Work Ethics
phenomena o no and on the other hand he studies the same phenomenon
through the teachings of divine revelation. The two methods, he
believes, could not be contradictory since the source of divine
revelation is itself the very law of nature, based on the order of
universe. 121 In support of the argument it is said that the logic
and the style of expression of the Koran is based on an empirical
observation of natural phenomena and historical processes.
Bazargan builds this idea on the premises that God has two
forms of expression: The first is the natural language that finds
its expression in natural phenomena and social laws (the general
and final manifestations of the divine will). The second is the
divine language specified in the books of the prophets. The former
is indirect, while the latter is the direct expression of
divine. 122 Bazargan therefore sees no reasons why his object of
enquiry, in this case labour, should not be studied from the two
points of view. Clearly Bazargan was mixing three traditions that
he was familiar with; scientific methodology obtained in his
training as an engineer, Marxist historicism and the Koran as
Islam's traditional source of interpretation. 123
120 Which is said to have been applied in the study ofEvolutionary Progress of Labour in the History of Mankind.
121 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, see introduction.122 Bazargan, Labour in Islam, p.3.123 The influence of the scientific methodology is obvious
in Bazargan i s elaborations on several themes. With regard tolabour Bazargan applied a mechanical analysis of human body basedon the idea of thermodynamics. He brought together the idea withthat of faith, worship and love. Here even a touch of Marxistconcept of man's alienation from his product of labour is evident.(See Labour in Islam, chap. two, A Physiological Analysis of HumanThermodynamics.)
117
Islamic Work Ethics
In drawing out Islam's view of labour, Bazargan had a
simple if not straightforward method. He referred to the Koran as
the absolute divine document, while giving little attention to the
other traditional sources including those of Feqh (jurisprudence)
or Hadith (traditions of the prophet and the sinless Imams). The
emphasis on the Koran, at the expence of other principal
traditional sources of interpretation, constituted a new approach
in Islamic methodology. Reference to the Koran was said to be
sufficient in that it explained the process of the human
civilization in a "couple of sentences".
With regard to the position of Bazargan within the Islamic
circles several points are in order. Bazargan was one of the
earliest Muslim authors to start an extensive and continuous
dialogue with various secular currents and traditions within the
Islamic community. Others, notably Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari,
and later Dr. All Shariati were also active in this respect.
However Ayatollah Motahhari came from the heart of the Islamic
seminaries and represented the reformist trend within the
religious establishment. Although he too initiated his social
criticism in the 1950s, the mainstream of the religious community,
as represented by the seminaries, were only to adopt a noticeably
modernist pose, appealing to the educated classes as of the mid
sixties. 124 Shariati was also to have a tremendous impact on the
state of social thinking in Iran, however he was to enter the
124 For a comparative discussion on the modernist pose ofthe religious establishment through their publications see Barzin,M. Matbu'at-e Iran Press in Iran (Tehran, 1966) p.120-135.
118
Islamic Work Ethics
arena in the late 1960s and was therefore two decades junior to
Bazargan.
Furthermore it is of significance to note that Bazargan
lacked the training of the Islamic seminaries. He therefore seems
to have developed his ideas relying on his own resources. On the
one hand he relied on the Koran as the source of inspiration and
was to build a substantial part of his arguments with reference to
the Muslim holy book. On the other hand he relied on Western
scholarly works on Islamic history and the life of the prophet
Mohammad. These works included Emile Dermenghem's La Vie de
Mahomet, Regis Blachere's Le Probleme de Mahomet, and Montgomery
Watt's Mohammad: Prophet and Statesman. 125 In dealing with the
Koran Bazargan seems to have elaborated its themes rationally and
pragmatically as evident in the above discussion and other
argument in later periods. It is interesting that the theological
schools which had seen a revival of the exegesis of the Koran
after the 1920s did not object to Bazargan, although they had
shown great sensitivity to thinkers such as Kasravi and were to
display opposition to Shariati. There has been no comparative
study of the Modernists' critique of the traditional community but
it might be possible to speculate that the fact that Bazargan
refrained from attacking the clerics but relied on creating
parallel arguments might have been a factor in this respect.
However these issues were only to become of political significance
some forty years later when the clerics established their power
over the government.
125 Bazargan quoted by Chehabi, Iranian Politics andReligious Modernism, p.51.
119
Islamic Work Ethics
Historically several schools have existed on the correct
manner of interpretation of the Koran. Traditionally the orthodoxy
has viewed the Koran as the earthly reproduction of an un-created
external heavenly original and believed that the correct
interpretation can be achieved only through the use of Hadith, or
the examples set by the prophet. The Mu'tuzilites. who sought to
introduce philosophical principles from Greek rationalism to
Islamic thought saw the Koran as the creation of God. The majority
and popular belief however has always directed its reverence
towards the Koran as a physical book, as in oaths taken on it, or
passages from it written on paper for magical or superstitious
purposes.
In the religious schools the correct interpretation of the
Koran became the object of a special branch known as Tafsir or
Koranic exegesis. To help the process a number of conditions were
set: the study of the historical circumstances surrounding the
revelation of certain passages, the study of the utterance of the
prophet, reliance on the Koran itself as the ultimates source of
authority as well as the study of language and grammar. A number
of renowned interpretations have continued to be used in
theological schools include those by Tabari (d.923), and
Zamakhshari (d.1143) but various theological traditions, as well
as the Sufis had their own commentaries.
120
Islamic Work Ethics
As of late nineteenth century Islamic Modernists 126 who
had tried to revive and reconcile Islam with western scientific
traditions called for a return to the source of authority in order
to shed the weight of what they saw as historical deviation. Upon
this basis they condemned a large part of the traditional exegesis
as false traditions, but did not go as far as questioning the
absolute authority of the holy book itself. A number of reactions
have been typical among the Islamic Modernists. For one thing they
tried to show that the results of modern sciences and ideas were
already present in the Koran. In order to prove the point they
have twisted interpretation in order to read modern ideas in the
language of the Koran. 127 Furthermore they studied the Koran in
the backdrop of the social and political environment. These
efforts were opposed by the orthodoxy and the traditional
leadership, for instance in their dislike for translation of the
Koran or the recitation of prayers in languages other than
Arabic 128
It might be possible to compare these developments in the
treatment of the Koran to the tradition of Biblical studies in the
west. Here the scholars have concerned themselves with textual,
philological, literary, and form criticism. The scientific
principle on which modern criticism is based has depended in part
126 Including Mohammad Abduh of Egypt and Mulana Abol-KalamAzad (d.1958) of India.
127 A typical case already cited was efforts to interpretthe Koran's chapter Light with theories of optics.
128 On the interpretation of the Koran see Montgomery Watt,W. Introduction to the Koran (Edinburgh University Press,Edinburgh, 1970) and Jeffery, A. The Koran as Scripture (AmosPress, New York, 1980).
121
Islamic Work Ethics
on viewing the Bible as a suitable object for literary study,
rather than an exclusive sacred text. 129
On colonialism
There has already been a brief discussion of the general
intellectual atmosphere of the period and the significance of the
issue of colonialism. It was within such an ideological climate
that Bazargan elaborated his theme on colonialism and national
independence. Bazargan's main elaboration of the theme comes in
the article The Source of Independence, a 1949 speech which was
later revised and published first inside Iran and then in the
United States. 130 Although it is probable that the piece was
revised in either the mid 1950s or mid 1960s, as with many other
works by Bazargan, there is a sufficient number of arguments
typical of Bazargan's 1950s style that it would be safe to discuss
the article within the 1950s context.
At the time the issue of colonialism must have been
prominent in Bazargan's mind for he states "these days (1949)
there is great deal of talk about independence and its antithesis,
colonialism". 131 Basically speaking Bazargan argues that
colonialism comes about as the result of unequal economic
capacities between nations and that the cause of weaker economies
lies in their underdeveloped work ethics. To remedy the problem
129 Cambridge History of the Bible V.II (CambridgeUniversity Press, London, 1970).
130 Bazargan, Sarcheshmeh-e Isteglal "The source ofIndependence" in The Secret of the Backwardness of the MuslimNations. (Book Distribution Centre, Texas, Houston, 1977).
131 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations, P.59.
122
Islamic Work Ethics
the indigenous work ethics have to be remoulded to give greater
importance to the nation's productive initiative. In other words
Bazargan states that once members of a society lose their
psychological and intellectual independence, they so lose economic
initiative. As a consequence there is a fall in production of
goods which ultimately brings about an imbalance in external
trade. The weaker country is then forced to accept unjust
conditions of trade and this gives birth to colonial relations.
It is interesting to note that Bazargan's
conceptualization of independence is not only expressed in the
language of economics but it also has an economic logic. This
interpretation further contains within it a concept of national
identity, in the sense that there are national units in trade with
each other. Although this understanding is not elaborated by
Bazargan the core of the concept is basically there.
The structure of Bazargan's argument has several main
themes: 1. loss of intellectual independence and initiative, 2.
loss of productivity, 3. imbalance in international trade. To one
degree or another the first two themes have already been discussed
in the earlier sections. The first theme came in the context of
Bazargan's position on the Modernists. He had criticized the
Modernists for their loss of intellectual independence through the
superficial interpretation and poor imitation of modern European
society. But while in the initial argument the criticism was
concerned with the Modernist's disregard for morals and religious
institutions, now the superficial imitation of the West is said to
123
Islamic Work Ethics
be the cause of national un-productivity. As with regards to the
second theme it should be also recalled that the concept of labour
was the core of Bazargan's elaborations in the earlier arguments.
Here Bazargan again brings up the issue of labour but now puts it
in a new context, ie. colonialism and independence.
The third theme, ie. colonialism, is so close to a basic
Leninist interpretation that it seems necessary to point out the
parallel. Although it might be wrong to accuse Bazargan of taking
the core of his idea (ie. foreign trade as the imperial linkage)
directly from Lenin, who had developed the idea from Marx 132 the
closeness of interpretation compels one to conclude that there is
something of Lenin here. This elaboration is significant in that
we have already identified similar patterns of influence in
Bazargan's earlier arguments. It should be recalled that there
seems to be a clear influence and re-interpretation of
Marxism/Leninism in Bazargan's historicism.
Bazargan begins his argument on independence by refuting
the possibility of an absolute state of autonomy. It is said that
such a condition would mean international isolation and would be
therefore unrealistic. The argument seems to be addressed to those
who wanted a complete break in relations with colonialists and who
believed that economic and political progress in one country was
not only possible but desirable.
132 Although non-Marxist liberals, eg. the Englishsociologist L.T. Hobhouse, argued on similar lines, ie. foreigntrade as the imperial linkage, the author has found no evidence ofthis line of influence on Iranian political thought in the 1940s.The evidence of the Marxist influence are, however, abundant. Forthe ideas of Hobhouse see The Principle of Sociology.
124
Islamic Work Ethics
Independence is not absolute for an absolute independence
is equal to isolation. This is neither possible nor
prudent ... independence in the sense of full detachment
is impossible to obtain. No being, individual or communal
(except God) is without a need for another. 133
Bazargan believes that the impracticality of absolute
independence is due to the limited means available to any given
society and therefore its inability to meet all its own demands.
The need for various commodities, limited resources and different
capabilities are the reasons that lead to the division of labour a
practice that has been in existence since the ancient times.
National independence is said to be gained when trade
between a country and its partners are just and free. It is clear
that Bazargan's understanding of these two important concepts are
the free market, the place where goods are supplied on the basis
of free competition and where a just price is reached through the
agreement of the two sides. 134 In elaborating his concept of just
133 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations, pp.61-62.
134 The idea of an "ideal mean" in economic exchange has anextensive history in Islamic thought. There the conception ofmoney is akin to the idea of a sublime equivalence, establishedbetween things until a mean is established between them in theprocess of exchange. Currency in general, then evaluatestransitions with a view to establishing their just equivalence.This as in the ideas of Muslim philosopher Ibn Khaldun, is amoralizing conception and not a part of the modern labour theoryof value. Here the theories in the realm of economic life fallwithin the boundaries of the ideal mean which determine themeaning of all virtues, including justice and beauty. Al -Azmeh, A.Arabic Thought and Islamic Societies (Croom Helm, London, 1986)pp.31-41. However there is no evidence of the influence of theIslamic tradition in Bazargan's economic ideas, rather moderneconomic theories.
125
Islamic Work Ilthics
and free Bazargan adds:
Whenever the total needs of an individual equals the total
needs of others to him, then such an individual (legal or
real) is independent. 135
Thus an imbalance in economic and social international
trade and interaction brings about a condition known as
colonialism. A condition of trade superiority of one country over
another which ultimately leads to political concessions.
As soon as our need of others increases by a degree over
their need of us, we have to surrender a point. Once a
backward step has been taken we shall lose two steps in
competition. They will then bully us even more. Gradually
they will take away all our rights and the source of
meeting our requirements. Soon they will be riding over
us. 136
To maintain a continuous balance of trade it is necessary
for a society to have adequate economic and military assets.
However it is not possible to rely on "God-given natural resources
or unearned inherited wealth", as in the case of Iran's oil. They
will end one day. It is necessary to have a national labour force
capable of productivity.
135 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations,
p.62.
p.63.
136 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations,
126
Islamic Work Ethics
Before every thing else independence is a matter of
production . Independence does not belong to a land
rather to a people. A people who have the necessary
defensive capacity based on continuous productivity. 137
Here the question may arise on how to increase
productivity so as to have the upper hand in international trade.
Is it necessary to increase the level of training and
specialization? Or should attention be paid to the accumulation of
capital? Or is obtaining the means of productions the necessary
element? According to Bazargan however the increase in the level
of productivity depends on the initiative, creativity and
intellectual independence of the individual:
Productivity is itself a derivative of initiative ... [It]
is not only synonymous with independence it is it's very
source . A country where people are creative and
innovative enjoys self-respect. Such a country would be
independent and would have the necessary means of
maintaining its independence. 138
Bazargan expresses regret that creativity, initiative and
productivity in Iran are scant. Instead, imitation of the
Europeans is extensive. An imitation which is in fact a clumsy
137 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations,
p.66.
p.72.
138 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations,
127
Islamic Work Ethic.
trailing of the European way of progress. Once again Bazargan is
addressing the so-called Modernists for their superficial
impression of Europe. We have already discussed Bazargan's
criticism of the Modernists. The earlier critique was for the
Modernist's apparent lack of respect for religion and ethics as
well as the religious institutions. Here the root of economic
stagnation and the subsequent colonialism is blamed on them.
Our condition is a clumsy and repulsive replica of Europe
and America ... There is no reluctance or objection to the
imitation of foreigners. Indeed there is widespread and
habitual pride [in such a practice] •139 The modernization
and the development that is an imitation will bring about
no more than skin deep satisfaction and will even
strengthen the conditions of dependence and backwardness.
The ropes of servitude will only tighten. 140
According to Bazargan the root of the Modernist's
misunderstanding lies in their inability to comprehend the
difference between Iranian society and modern European
civilization. He believes that there are "environmental and
racial" differences between the two societies which makes
unhindered borrowing of little effect.
They [Modernists] are negligent of the fact that two
environments are never similar and two situations have
139 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations,
pp.75-76.140 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations,
p.78.128
Islamic Work Ethics
never similar conditions. Each dilemma and every
difficulty has its own particular solution. 141 Taking into
account the racial structure, environmental conditions and
particular needs of every nation, there is one type of
discipline suitable and effective. [Furthermore] this
discipline is only tangible and applicable by the people
of that society. 142
In fighting the problem of imitation (which once
eradicated should lead to creativity, increase in productivity and
national independence) Bazargan asks his audience to adopt
original methods and indigenous solutions. Accordingly he asks the
Modernists to revise their plans.
They should accommodate and change their programmes in
accordance with the local circumstances and the needs of
the customers ... They should not duplicate the style used
by others, but be original . . They should not feel
responsible nor proud in imitating the foreign methods.
They should detect the tradition in Iran and enquire about
the [existing] requirements and effective methods. We
should not imagine that foreign schools and social
doctrines are absolute principles applicable at all times
and places. 143
p.77.
p.78.
p.87.
141 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations,
142 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations,
143 Bazargan, The Secret of Backwardness of Islamic Nations,
129
Islamic Work Ethics
To conclude it is possible to say that the 1941-53 period
witnessed the entrance of Bazargan into the field of social and
political activity. In it he addressed the main currents of
thought and developed his own Islamic modernist interpretation of
social order and progress. He interacted with a number of
intellectual currents but his position, intellectually and
politically was marginal. Here the main element was his effort to
synthesize the intellectual traditions with an emphasis on the
concept of labour.
130
Historic and Social Law
Social Developments 1953-60
Politically the seven year period after the 1953 coup
witnessed a consolidation of power of the state ruled by the
person of the Shah and supported by the conservative social
classes. Both the radical and liberal trends bore the brunt of
this development. Prime minister Mosaddeq was to be jailed and
later to spend the rest of his life in exile, leaders of the
National Front were rounded up and imprisoned and the most brutal
treatment was given to the Tudeh and the religious fundamentalist
Fadaiyan Islam groups which lost a large number of their members
in executions.
The Shah's consolidation of power took place in the form
of the extension and centralization of the state machinery which
had suffered badly after the 1940 Allied invasion. The direct
instruments of control were expanded. The military forces grew
from 120,000 to 200,000 between 1953 and 1963 while the
bureaucratic apparatus increased to 260,000 in the same period. To
increase social surveillance the secret police, Savak, was
created.
In this period two parliaments and three cabinets were
formed. 1 Except for the two government-controlled political
organizations (Melliyun, Nationalists, and Mardom, People's) no
political parties were allowed to take part in the parliamentary
elections which were increasingly manipulated by the government. 2
1 Fazlollah Zahedi's cabinet (August 1953- April 55) HosainAla's cabinet (April 1955- April 57) Manuchehr Iqbal (April 1957-August 60).
2 The 18th Majlis (1954/56) the 19th Majlis (1956/60). TheMajlis duration was expanded from two to four years in the 19thsession while the number of deputies increased from 136 to 200.
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Prime ministers were appointed by the personal decision of the
monarch.
Relations between the state and the social classes varied.
Relations within the conservative oligarchy, including the landed
classes improved and the number of landowners in the parliament
increased from 49 to 52 percent. 3 The conservative Islamic
leaders who enjoyed the largest support among the religious
community continued to enjoy an extension of their sphere of
influence. 4 The compromise reached with the conservative elements
was based on the need of both sides for mutual cooperation. The
Shah also wanted the support of the modern middle classes but
failed to attract it. The same circumstance affected the working
classes. 5 Throughout the period the United States which had
become the leading foreign power gave its political and financial
support to the monarch. The aim was to secure the flow of oil and
ensure the anti-Communist and anti-Nationalist stance of the
Iranian government.
After the coup there was a general return to economic
normality. With the resumption of the export of oil and financial
help from the United States the stage of acute economic depression
was passed. A new contract was reached with the oil companies
which gave Iran a 50% share of revenues, after all deductions,
3 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.421.4 An example was the government approved ransacking of
Baha'i centre in Tehran. Akhavi. Religion and Politics inContemporary Iran, p.90.
5 The number of strikes fell from 79 to 3 in 1953-57 period.Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.351.
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taxes, etc. From then on the increase in the oil income was
phenomenal. The oil revenues jumped from $34m in 1954-55 to $181m
in the following years. By 1960-61 the income had reached $358 and
by the following year it passed the $437 mark. In less than ten
years the state revenue from the oil industry had jumped over 12
fold. 6
The increase in the oil revenue allowed the regime to
develop an interest in the modernization of the economy. This
meant domestic industrialization and an open door policy. Under
the influence of a fashionable and socialist inspired idea, which
had been carried out in the USSR in the quest for economic
development, Iran . embarked on a road of centralized economic
planning. At the top of the agenda came the creation of an
infrastructure, improvement of agriculture and expansion of
industry. To upgrade power generation and establish irrigation
networks for the agricultural sector, huge dams were built.
However things ran into difficulty because of flawed,
wasteful and expensive planning. Over-extensive bureaucratic
networks, corruption and lack of experience further deteriorate
the situation. Lack of credit control led to inflation. The open
door policy brought about balance of payment deficit, high
inflation and subsequent unemployment. The overall economic
picture in the 1953-60 period was that of increase in the oil
6 For the arguments on the economy see Cottam, R.W.Nationalism in Iran (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh,1979) p.292, Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p.143, Katouzian, ThePolitical Economy, pp.204-207.
133
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revenues, decline of traditional non-oil exports, massive increase
of foreign goods, and corruption at various levels of state's
financial distribution centres. A meagre harvest in 1959 did not
help to ease the situation. The following year the bubble of
growth burst and economic depression set in.
On the ideological level the establishment wished for a
more liberal image rather than totalitarianism. It was thus that
it opted for a two party system (1957). One party was given the
name Melliyun in an obvious move to re-use the nationalist
rhetoric since the Nationalists had traditionally been referred to
by that name. A propaganda campaign was set in motion to describe
the state ideology as Positive Nationalism which meant it was
directed towards providing the welfare of the people. Even an
anti-imperialist element was brought in, by Royal approval, when
Ahmad Aramesh initiated a series of anti-American articles (1958)
speaking the language of the radical wing of Nationalists. The
Shah was concerned with the "progressive democratic" image
specially the one created abroad and showed great interest in
making the country western in character. Among the rank and file
of the opposition including the National Front there emerged a
distinct apathy, of which more below. The prevailing attitude was
one of hopelessness combined with fear of the consequences of any
expression of opinion. 7
To have an understanding of the ideological rhetoric that
the government was conveying in the 1953-60 period it is worth
7 Cott&m, Nationalism in Iran pp.290-295, Keddie, Roots ofRevolution, p.143.
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studying the Shah's own account of events in his Mission For My
Country. 8 The Monarch's political thinking at this stage had
three main elements: positive alliance with the West, cultural and
economic westernization and the limitation of political
participation.
Positive alliance with the West was spelled out in
reaction to former prime minister Mosaddeq's Passive Equilibrium
principle in foreign affairs. Rather than following a non-aligned
stand vis-a-vis the two super powers, as Mosaddeq had tried to
achieve, the Shah criticized Mosaddeq's policy of closing ranks
with the "Soviets against the West in general and the British in
particular". Instead the Shah proposed his positive and pragmatic
foreign policy which called for good working relations with the
British who on the Shah's account had ceased to harbour
imperialist designs on Iran. The policy also meant that the United
States was viewed as a non-imperialist power in view of the fact
that it had given Iran financial and military assistance and had
business interests in the country. On the other hand however, the
USSR was viewed as the new totalitarian imperialist which was bent
on following a policy of communist subversion inside Iran. However
despite Soviet opposition to the anti-Russian Baghdad pact and the
Tudeh party's use of Radio Moscow, the Shah expressed the wish of
good working relationship with the Soviets. 9
8 His imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Shahanshahof Iran, Mission for My Country (Hutchinson, London, 1961). It isrumoured that the work was written by a number of Americanjournalists/academicians and approved by the Shah. The book wasoriginally serialized in the semi-official media in the 1960s.
9 His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Shahanshahof Iran, Mission For My Country, Chap. 6, My Positive Nationalism.passim.
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The second principle in Shah's political thinking was
Westernization. Following the steps of his father in what the Shah
saw as nation building, the Shah called for rapid economic
reconstruction of the country. The function of a policy of
economic development, agricultural reform and educational advance
was to save the nation from its underdevelopment. In the eyes of
the Shah westernization meant rapid social change in the process
of adjusting modern technology to Iranian culture and Iranian
culture to modern technology. Many observers have criticized the
Shah for what they see as economic development being designed to
bring political power and prestige rather than economic
productivity. However the Shah refuted the allegation. The actual
articulation of the westernization process was said to be the
construction of an infrastructure (particularly in the field of
transport, communications and power supply) a welfare system (eg.
education and medicine) and productive units (eg. oil, gas and
construction industry). 1 ° The Shah's industrialization was mainly
concerned with state controlled units which were said to account
for 40% of the nation's industry at the time. Although it was said
that the private sector was free to proceed with its activities,
it is of notable significance that little attention was paid, in
terms of political rhetoric, to the role of the private sector.
The third element in the Shah's political thinking was his
interpretation of democracy or the arrangement of participation in
10 His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah PahlaviShahanshah of Iran, Mission For My Country, chap. 7,Westernization: Our Welcome Ordeal. passim.
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political affairs of the country. 11 And that amounted to very
little. To begin with the Shah believed realistic political
democracy was not possible at least until economic progress had
been made. In other words things political were said to be
subordinate to the economic sphere. The function of the argument
was to deny political rights until an unknown future when
supposedly economic progress had been sufficiently achieved.
In former times free men thought of democracy as something
primarily political. But then modern science and
technology changed the way men lived and worked. [As
social awareness spread] thoughtful people realized that
political freedom would mean little where men continued to
live in dire economic want. 12
The Shah points out that his interpretation of the issue
is the same as his father's who "tended to subordinate the role of
parliament but contributed otherwise to the cause of democracy m by
linking the social role of the clergy in favour of the state, and
creating a centralized modern bureaucracy. The reason for the
subordination of the political to the economic was said to lie
with the country's underdevelopment. On the one hand a great many
people were illiterate and the concept of democracy was a newly
arrived idea. Furthermore the traditional culture, although
valuing individualistic virtues of tolerance and respect, weighed
His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah PahlaviShahanshah of Iran, Mission For My Country, chap. 8, Democracy AsI See It. passim.
12 His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah PahlaviShahanshah of Iran, Mission For My Country, pp.162-163.
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heavily so that it would be unrealistic to suppose that parties
could appear and flourish.
Political democracy can never operate like an electric
refrigerator: you can not just turn it on and let it run.
Effective political democracy needs intelligence,
maturity, tolerance and a sense of mission. 13
Once it was accepted that political participation was to
be postponed until sufficient economic and social development had
taken place, the role of the Shah became paramount. On the surface
the Shah accepted his role as a constitutional monarch whose
position had been spelled out in the 1906 constitution which was
drawn after the revolution against the Qajar autocracy had
'modified the monarchy to keep with representative government'.
However the Shah's exercise of power was very different. In the
study of Mission For My Country alone, one is struck by the
emphasis that the Shah gave to his own position in all processes
of decision making. The parliament and the cabinet have almost no
role in determining foreign policy, economic development and
political changes. Even when it came down to democracy it was the
way that "I [Shah] saw it" which was then taken as the criterion
and reference for social movement. Democracy in the eyes of the
Shah was the superficial existence of the constitution, the
parliament, and the cabinet under the personal control and veto of
himself. It was he who decided the nature, direction and speed of
13 His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah PahlaviShahanshah of Iran, Mission For My Country, p.178.
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social change and movement.
This position is well articulated in his discussion of
political parties. Since 1957, the Shah states, he had encouraged
the growth of a two party system, which were defined by him and
whose leaders had close ties to the crown or government. However
these facts, the Shah believed, do not make them instruments of
the state or unresponsive to demands by party members to change
the leadership or the organization. Indeed the spirit of party
activism was said to have spread on all social levels. The
reality, unfortunately, turned out to be different. The two state
supported organizations the National Party and the People's Party
failed to grow and find a social base. Their close ties to the
government was one of the reasons that they failed to become
popular. As the Shah's control over the state was to grow in the
following decade the two party experiment in establishing a social
base was abandoned for a single party state. An experiment of
equally if not more disastrous consequences.
The Shah at once appealed to both constitutional rhetoric
and non-democratic arguments. However it is the arguments in
defence of his one man rule which stand out. In one case he
compares his system to the 1950s US McCarthy campaigns which he
calls the core of American democracy. 14 Efforts to challenge this
14 Joseph, R. McCarthy led the indiscriminate investigationsagainst alleged communist sympathizers in the 1950s. The trialswere a manifestation of the general pressure for conformity aswell as intense and intolerant American nationalism of the period.A similar "Red Scare" had taken place in 1919. For a study of theinterdynamics of U.S. foreign policy in the first stages of thecold-war and internal domestic security see Freeland, R.M. TheTruman Doctrine & the Origins of McCarthyism (Alfred, A. Knopf,New York, 1975) pp.358-360.
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perception were termed unconstitutional and the reason for the
existence of the political Security Agency and toughness towards
"subversive negativism".
The National Resistance Movement
Immediately after the 1953 coup there was a marked change
in Bazargan's attitude towards political activity. While in the
year prior to the fall of the Nationalist government of Mosaddeq
there seems possibly to have been a downturn in the political
activities of Bazargan 15 with the coup regime in power, Bazargan
was one of the first to react to the change. Answering a friend
who had inquired about his change of heart he said that he no
choice.
I always believed that it is the national and political
responsibility of each individual to carry out his
professional duties with utmost seriousness and interest
15 For one thing Bazargan left his NIOC position, to whichhe had been appointed by the Prime Minister, following tension inHosain Makki. According to Bazargan Makki's unprofessional andpersonal dealings with the affairs of the company was the reasonfor the resignation. Furthermore upon his return to Tehran,Bazargan turned down a proposal by several members of the IslamicAssociations and the God-Worshipping Socialists to establish anIslamic party. (Bazargan, Interview, 1989) Soon afterwards hewrote an article Youthful Games With Politics calling onuniversity students to concentrate on their studies beforebecoming politically active. (Copy of the original text is in theposition of the author). These events tend to indicate a moreconservative approach to political activity in the last year ofMosaddeq. It would be certainly wrong to place Bazargan among theconservative and traditional religious community which took aposition of compromise towards the ruling elite and theestablishment at the cost to the popular reformist movement.However it would be wrong not to detect a certain cooling off onthe part of Bazargan's activity prior to the coup. Bazarganhimself might have wished to contradict this point!
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But when officials fail to carry out their
responsibilities and some have even become thieves and
traitors, every one is forced to act. A university
lecturer is forced to become a political activist. 16
The reaction was common to a number of lower ranking
members of the National Movement. It seems with the arrest of the
senior members of the opposition the initiative had fallen to the
lower ranks and within a month a group of activists formed the
National Resistance Movement (NRM). Some research has been carried
out by other scholars sketching out the activities of the Movement
and it is not necessary to repeat them here. 17 Thus follows a
brief portrayal of NRM activities and organization but a more
detailed account of their ideas. The structure of the organization
and the nature of activities indicate a small social movement, by
any standards. However what makes NRM of significance was the
political position it had taken. While the traditional elite, ie.
the bureaucracy, the landlords and the religious figures had given
tacit support to the 1953 coup and while within the ranks of the
opposition the Tudeh Party had adapted a cautious and quietist
approach and was soon paralyzed, it was only the NRM which showed
some form of continuous resistance inside the country. NRM was
joined by independent members and affiliated bodies of the
National Front. These included the Party of the Iranian People
(led by Dr. Mohammad Nakhshab) the Third Force Party (led by Dr.
16 Bazargan, Defence. p.161.17 For the standard text see Chehabi, H. Politics and
religious Modernism in Iran (I.B.Tauris, London, 1990), in Persiansee the forthcoming book, National Resistance Movement, by GholamRiza Nejati (Enteshar Publications, Tehran).
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Mohammad All Khunji) the Iran Party (led by Allahyar Saleh) and
the Iranian National Party (led by Dariush Foruhar). The two
latter parties however left in 1955.
The activities of NRM were meagre. In the few years of its
existence it managed to call for several demonstrations, created a
semi-underground network, demanded free elections and opposed the
1954 oil agreement. The demonstrations included one against the
coup, followed by another during the trial of Mosaddeq, one on the
visit of US vice-president Richard Nixon to Iran (1953) and one in
protest against political restrictions for the 18th Majlis
elections. 18 Possibly the most regular and significant of their
activities was the production of two publications and various
declarations. The irregular and semi clandestine publications
included Rah-e Mosaddeq, Maktab-e Mosaddeq, Nehzat-e Mosaddeq and
Hashyihi bi Hashyih. One of the last acts of NRM was the
publication (1957) of a letter critical of the consequences of the
new oil agreement.
The existing NRM documents indicate the naivete of early
activists with regards to their own organizational ability. An
early organization chart shows a Leadership Committee which
appoints the Executive Committee which in turn runs 13 executive
and regional bodies. The initial organizers had a cooperatist
strategy. Fifteen figures from the Majlis, the bureaucracy, the
university, political parties, the Bazaar and the clergy were
18 The Three Year Report to the Party Plenum, NRM Documents, V.5, p.254-293.
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invited to participate in the initial meetings. But discipline was
hard to maintain and differences soon reduced the membership of
the central council to eight. Comparatively the lower ranks seem
to have shown greater resolve and organization in the pursuit of
their political goals. 19 Once the early enthusiasm and spirit of
cooperation was gone, the situation deteriorated and there were
organizational as well as manpower shortages. Such were the
shortages that on one occasion two senior members (one being
Bazargan) had themselves to take a taxi driving through the
streets of Tehran to throw copies of a leaflet in protest at the
lack of democratic freedoms at the coming (18th) Majlis
elections 20
When the 1953 coup took place Bazargan was working in
Tehran's Water Authority. He was soon to become instrumental in
both organizing the NRM and running its affairs from a leadership
position. The initial idea for the formation of the group came
from Abbas Radnia, a Bazaar merchant and an activist with the
National Front. But it was Bazargan who was elected the secretary
for the central council and the person in charge of organizational
matters. 21 As the result of his activities with the NRM Bazargan
was arrested in spring 1955 and was imprisoned for five months
before being released prior to the beginning of the academic year.
The arrest however failed to reduce his commitment to opposition
activism. The second wave of arrests came in 1957 following which
19 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.20 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, See
Chap. 3, The National Resistance Movement.21 Bazargan, Interview, 1989 & Nazih, H. Interview, (London)
December 1991.
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Historic and Social Law
Bazargan, along with a number of NRM leadership cadres were kept
in prison for eight months. The arrests and continuous pressure
from the newly founded secret service, Savak, practically spelled
out the end of the movement.
The political ideas of NRM were articulated in their
official organ Rah-e Mosaddeq, as well as their internal
documents, including the organization's declarations, manifesto,
debate papers, training pamphlets, analytical pieces,
2correspondence and congressional statements. 2 It is not clear
who wrote the main ideological and political pamphlets of the
group. According to Bazargan the great majority of important
documents were written by Rahim Ata'i, 23 Abbas Radnia and at
times by members of the Iran Party. Another NRM activist, Hasan
Nazih, points to Mir Mohammad Sadeqi. 24 M.A. Khonji played an
important role especially in Rah-e Mossadeq. 25 Even though
Bazargan might not have been directly involved in the writing of
the main political tracts, his position as the senior member of
the central council means that the NRM propaganda reflected his
main ideas.
The ideology of NRM had several major and several minor
themes: the main themes were nationalism of an anti-colonial
22 NRM Documents, five volumes, (Liberation Movement ofIran, Tehran, 1983).
23 Mohammad Rahim Ata'i (1927-77), Bazargan's nephew readlaw and politics at Tehran university, cooperated with Iran Partyuntil 1946, was a member of NRM and FMI. Payam-e Mojahed, September 1977.
24 Sadeqi was the editor of Mosaddeq's Path. Naz1h,Interview, 1991.
25 This was pointed out by H. Katouzian, in a privateconversaion, 1992.
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nature, the assertion of political freedoms, and the idea of
charismatic leadership personality. The minor emphasis was on non-
alignment and the necessity of organized resistance. Even less
prominent themes were those of appeal to religion, the resolution
of class conflicts, opposition to the landowning classes and
increasing national productivity. Within the major themes the
anti-colonial nationalism seems to have been the most dominant and
one which continued at strength.
Nationalism
The nationalist theme in the ideology of NRM was the
continuation of the political ideology of the National Front and
the Leadership of Mosaddeq. In a nutshell it believed that there
Was a conflict between the Iranian people, as victims of
colonialism, and the colonial powers, in particular Great Britain.
The political articulation of this historic conflict was seen in
the issue of the nationalization of the oil industry and the
subsequent 1953 coup. It was said that the oil reserves and
industry belonged to the people of Iran and their ownership by the
British, going back to a concession in the first decade of the
century, was a usurpation of the Iranian natural rights by a
foreign power whose only legitimacy was the use of force. At a
cost to colonial interests the National Movement led by Mosaddeq
had tried to establish the rights of the Iranians. However the
colonialists had staged a military coup against this effort and
had put a puppet government in power. Therefore the main political
conflict lay between the Iranian nation and the colonial powers.
The role of the Iranian government was considered almost of
3.45
Historic and Social Law
secondary significance because it was seen as a direct instrument
of the colonialists and therefore subordinated to their designs.
The great and marvelous popular National Movement ... was
created to achieve true independence by ending foreign
influence and nationalizing the oil industry throughout
the country ... Under the leadership of our popular, wise
and able leader it achieved great triumphs
[Furthermore] It lit a burning flame in the hearts of the
people of this country and other oppressed nations of the
East. However the shameful and treacherous 19 August coup
which had been arranged from the early days of Mosaddeq's
government by the design and finance of foreign
politicians was carried out by [their] Godless agents in
collaboration with the Royal Court as well as the leaders
of the army and the 9th of Esfand clerics. 26 They
succeeded in temporarily extinguishing the light of
freedom and hope in the house of national inspirations
[and forcing] the people of the country to face the
darkest hour of their history. Millions were bewildered
and took to mourning ... However the age of slavery for
foreigners and acceptance of the injustice of [these]
rascals has passed. We shall find a solution to these
misfortunes and [shall] take control of the country. 27
26 In the later part of Mosaddeq's premiership as tensionbuilt between the government and the religious establishment theclerics strongly backed the Shah against Mosaddeq in what was tobecome known as the affair of the 9th of EIsfand (27 February1953).
27 Internal Training Document, Date unknown, NRM Documents, V.5, p.81.
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Historic and Social Law
The nationalism of NRM has the elements of other third
world nationalist ideologies which surfaced world wide after the
second world war. The main theme of these ideologies which
flourished with the de-colonialization period was anti-colonialism
and non-alignment. 28 In Iran the conflict over the issue of
nationalization of the oil industry had inflamed Iranian
patriotism and highlighted its ingredients of national
consciousness and identity. Viewing the world in almost black and
white, that is colonialists facing the nationalists, was the most
readily available and functionally applicable perception. Use of
force in the overthrow of the nationalist government of Mosaddeq
re-enforced this perception of affairs.
Indeed the anti-colonial nationalist perception was strong
enough that NRM identified its own position with that of other
anti-colonial movements in other parts of the world, but
particularly those in the Middle East. It placed its own struggle
in the same category as Arab nationalist leaders such as Jamal
Abdul Naser of Egypt 29 and nationalists of Syria, Morocco,
28 For a study of nationalism as a reaction to Europeandomination see Kedourie, E. (ed.) Nationalism in Asia and Africa (World Publishing Company, N.Y. 1970). For a review of the Iraniancase see Seton-Watson, H. Nations and States (Methuen, London,1977). For a radical critique of the subjection of the idea ofAsian Nationalism to European post-enlightenment rationalistdiscourse see Chatterjee, P. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Zed, London, 1986).
29 Support for Naser was strengthened by the fact that Naserconsidered the Shah an enemy for his recognition of Israel as wellas closeness to the West and conservative forces in the Arabworld. Stephens, R. Naser A Political Biography (Allen Lase,London, 1971) p.42. For a sketch of Jamal Abdul Naser's politicalportrait, including his concept of Nationalism and the context ofits application see Vatikiotis, P.T. Naser and His Generation (Croom Helm, London, 1978).
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Algeria and Iraq. 30 In this identification it viewed the 1958
unity between Egypt and Syria 31 as a great step towards the
ideals of the peoples of Asia and Africa. 32
While in Iran the freedom movement was temporarily forced
to retreat, it emerged horrendously [stronger] in Arab
countries ... The colonialist were [now] worried that the
flame of freedom and independence should engulf these
countries. 33
Even when Arab nationalists, particularly Naser in his
polemics with the Shah, began calling the historically known
Persian Gulf, the Arabian Gulf, the NRM went as far as denying
this fact as a rumour by colonialists and its agents to saw seeds
of conflict between the Persians and the Arabs in the old school
of divide and rule. 34
It is of significance to have in mind that in the eyes of
NRM, and within the context of the anti-colonial struggle, the
Iranian government was seen a powerless puppet in the hands of
foreigners. The position of the Iranian government was viewed as
almost insignificant since it was supposed to reflect the direct
wishes of the foreign powers. Even changes in Iranian cabinets
30 NRM Documents, V.5, p.157.31 United Arab Republic (1958-61) an experiment in political
union between the two Arab states which failed due to differencesin economies and culture, not to mention the ambitions of theirpolitical leaders. Nyrop, R.F. Egypt: A Country Study (TheAmerican University, Washington, 1983). See section of UAR.
32 NRM Documents, V.5, p.181.33 NRM Documents, V.5, p.247.34 NRM Documents, V.5, p.202, 249.
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were believed to be brought about by the colonialists as it suited
their designs. 35 Government members were seen as traitors who had
fled to the camp of the enemy and through whom the enemy
implemented its designs and wishes. This put the anti-colonial
struggle on a strategic footing while the fight against the regime
itself became almost a tactical matter within that strategy.
The extraordinarily powerful force [of government] that we
face today, has imposed itself on our political, social
and economic life through reliance on the great powers of
Britain and the United States ... In these circumstances
the power of these [two] governments is reflected in the
political influence of the domestic traitors. 36
It was within these conditions that the NRM called for the
upholding of the national honor as the first aim of its programme.
In its interpretation of national honor it referred to the need to
destroy the shame of protege status and called for the acquisition
of political independence, the right to exercise national
sovereignty and political freedoms. 37
Freedom and Constitutionalism
The second theme in the ideology of NRM was that of
political freedom and this was an element alongside, though
secondary to nationalism. The theme was closely followed by the
idea of constitutionalism, although a great distinction was not
35 NRM Documents, V.5, p.154.36 NRM Documents, V.5, p.134.37 The Charter of National Unity, NRM Documents, V. 5, p.3.
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made between the two and at times the meaning of the two ideas:
freedom and constitutionalism were indistinguishable.
The purpose of the national movement was to end the
colonial influence and to help the establishment of
national sovereignty . . When Dr. Mosaddeq reached the
seat of power his government pursued two aims Only: the
implementation of the law of nationalization of the oil
industry and the reform of electoral laws. Had he been
successful in the pursuit of his aims the colonial
influence would have been uprooted and there would have
been an initiation towards the establishment of a lasting
government of people for the people. 38
The NRM saw the articulation of this political inspiration
in the proper conduct of parliamentary elections and the right of
political organizations to unhindered activity. The argument that
the members of parliament should be freely elected appears
constantly in the NRM literature. 39 Indeed despite all odds NRM
put up 12 candidates for the post-coup 18th Majlis, although the
following Majlis was boycotted (1956).
The NRM emphasis on political freedoms had its immediate
background again in the pre-coup National Front experience and in
this respect NRM was the continuation of the National Front,
although within a new political environment. Both the NF and NRM
38 NRM Documents, V.2, p.89.39 NRM Documents, V.2, pp.255-294 and NRM Documents, V.5,
p.165, 596.150
Historic and Social Law
saw themselves as inheritors of the Constitutional Revolution of
1905 which had stood up against the tyrannical governments of the
time and had established the country's first house of
representatives. The identification with the Constitutional
Revolution and inspirations from its ideas and events comes out
repeatedly in the NRM propaganda. In this context the NRM saw
itself as the manifestation of the effort towards furthering and
completing the ideas and achievements of the Constitutional
Revolution.
Dr. Mosaddeq's greatest service was that 50 years after
the Constitutional [Revolution] he put the following
dilemma to the nation: Does constitutionalism mean that
the head of the executive ... should be appointed by the
desires, will and even whims of a single person or the
majority of the people? 40
It should be pointed out that the NRM activists as well as
some commentators 41 believe that the aim of acquiring political
freedoms was as significant as the anti-colonial struggle. In the
own words of NRM:
Those who believe that the National Movement under the
leadership of Dr. Mosaddeq ... is simply an anti-colonial
40 NRM Documents, V.2, p.17.41 On the role of the idea of democracy and anti-colonialism
within the ideology of the National Front see Katouzian, H.Musaddig and the Struggle for Power in Iran, (I.B.Tauris, London,1990) and Political Economy, and reactions to it includingHomayoun, D. Negahi as Birun Looking within (Iran va Jahan, U.S.1984) p.48, and F. Azimi, Fasl-e Ketab, 7 & 8, 1991.
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Historic and Social Law
campaign ... are no doubt gravely mistaken. Not only Dr.
Mosaddeq's government was a great development in the
history of Iranian constitutionalism ... it was a vital
[element] for the completion of the newly founded
democracy. 42
However a review of the existing NRM publications
including their official organ and particularly their internal
documents indicate that the emphasis on anti-colonial nationalism
and political democracy were not equal at all. While in every page
of every issue, the attacks on colonialists are repeated,
references to the issue of political freedoms and the necessity of
democracy are less readily available. 43 Of course this could be
due to tactical consideration and the fact that anti-colonial
appeals might have had greater response amongst the population,
particularly after the 1953 coup. Nevertheless the difference of
emphasis is one that can not be overlooked.
Charismatic leadership
The necessity of the charismatic leadership of Mosaddeq
played a prominent role in the ideological makeup of NRM. Although
after the 1953 coup Mosaddeq lost all executive positions and was
unable to exercise even indirect leadership, his name and image
remained. Suffice it to say that all NRM publications titles use
his name in one way or another: the Path of Mosaddeq, the
Mosaddeq's Movement, the Mosaddeq's Doctrine. At a time when party
42 NRM Documents, V. 2, p.43.43 Refer to NRM Documents, V.2. & V.5.
152
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organization was not only weak but also under police pressure and
in decline, it was natural that the role of charismatic
personality should be further exploited. Mosaddeq was the symbol
of the earlier achievements of the National Front and NRM did well
politically by attaching itself to him, despite the lack of
functional organizational contact. Commenting on the significance
of Mosaddeq, one NRM commentator wrote:
It was not Dr. Mosaddeq who created the National Movement,
but undoubtedly and in all truth he suitably held the
responsibility of leadership, without the slightest
deviation or mistake ... No capable commander is separable
from his forces. It is the judgment of the Iranian nation
to worship the great Mosaddeq like an idol. 44
Efforts by the Iran Party wing to reduce the emphasis on
Mosaddeq was apparently one of the reasons of internal dispute
that ultimately lead to the withdrawal of the party from NRM. 45
The prominent role of Mosaddeq in the ideological makeup and
propaganda of the Nationalists was to continue, although it seems
to have declined with the passing of time. Such reliance on the
charismatic personality of a leader might seem contradictory to
the ideals of constitutionalism, democracy and rational process of
government that members of NRM (as a constitutional and democratic
party) aspired to, but the functional realities of an
underdeveloped political society forced and imposed, to say the
44 NRM Documents, V.2, p.44.45 Bazargan, Interview, 1989.
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Historic and Social Law
least, such twists to the ideal. If the charismatic appeal is
distinguished, in the Weberian sense, from the traditional and
legal-rational kind of authority 46 then the efforts of NRM
towards creating social change can be better understood.
Furthermore the emphasis on Mosaddeq was reinforced by government
efforts at portraying itself as upholders of Positive Nationalism
as opposed to what it claimed to be Mosaddeq's negative
nationalism. 47
Non-alignment
Anti-colonialism constituted the main theme in the
ideology of NRM but as with many third world ideologies of the
post World-War-Two period, non-alignment had also an important
role to play. NRM not only took Britain and the United States as
its main enemies but it placed the Soviet Union within the ranks
of foreign powers with evil designs on Iran. The main catalyst for
attacks on the "Red Colonialists" was usually the pro-Soviet Tudeh
party. 48 Refuting cooperation with the Tudeh party towards the
establishment of an anti-colonial front, even after the coup had
extensively paralyzed all political activity was coupled with the
accusation that the party was an instrument of Moscow and the
Comintern. Reasons for non-cooperation with the Soviet Union were
never systematically spelled out but included the Soviet policy on
Iran during the 1940-53 period and in particular its, and the
46 Scruton, R. A Dictionary of Political Thought (Pan Books,1982, p.58).
47 Pahlavi, M.R.S. Mission For My Country, See Chapter on MyPositive Nationalism. The term Negative Nationalism (Nasiyunalism-e Manfi) was coined from the Nationalist cliche of PassiveEquilibrium (Movazeneh-e Manfi).
48 NRM Documents, V.5, p.291.154
Hiotoric and Social Law
Tudeh's position on Mosaddeq government. In this context even old
skeletons such as the pre-communist Russo-British agreement on
extending their spheres of influence in Iran were brought out of
the closet. 49
However it is significant to note that the attacks on the
Soviet Union were relatively limited. While throughout NRM
publications there were constant references to and analysis of the
causes for opposition to the British and the Americans, there was
much less discussion of opposition to the Soviets. In fact the
condemnation of the two sides, ie. the Eastern "Red" and Western
"Black" colonialists, was not comparable at all. Although there is
no doubt that the NRM was opposed to communism and the Soviet
Union, this theme was not overtly developed. One reason might have
been tactical considerations which saw the logic of fighting in
one front. This argument is clearly apparent in one analysis where
a NRM commentator goes as far as to say that the victory of
national liberation movements in the colonized world, including
Iran, would be to the benefit of the USSR and therefore they
should enjoy Soviet support. 50
The immediate background to this NRM policy went back,
once again, to the National Front where Mosaddeq's Passive
49 Anglo-Russian Treaty of 31 August 1907 settleddifferences between the two countries over Iran, Afghanistan andTibet. It divided Iran into three spheres, with northern andcentral Iran in Russian sphere, Southeast in British sphere and aneutral zone in between. The Iranians were not consulted orinformed about the focus of the agreement. Avery, P. (Ed.) TheCambridge History of Iran, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1991) p.205.
50 On policy towards the USSR see for example NRM document, V.2. p.187, 209.
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Historic and Social Law
Equilibrium was the guiding principle of foreign policy and which
rejected the influence of the traditional colonial powers, Britain
and Russia. This policy was popularly believed to have had its
roots in the Constitutional Revolution where the newly founded
parliament had initiated a "Third Option" in rejecting British and
Russian influence in the hope of obtaining a nationalist policy.51
Mosaddeq's Passive Equilibrium principle has been studied
elsewhere. 52 Here it is sufficient to point out that this
neutralism was similar to the reaction of a number of third world
countries to the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United
States in the 1950's. Since then the word neutralism has been
replaced by non-alignment and even that has become obsolete with
the ending of the cold war (1990). But in the 1950's and the
subsequent three decades neutralism meant the rejection of the
positions symbolized by the United States and the USSR and the
assertion that there was a better, even if not entirely
identified, third way. 53
Organization
51 For an example see Kai Ostuvan, H. Siyasat-e Muvazeneh-eManfi The Policy of Passive Equilibrium (Taban, Tehran, 1948)pp.1-20.
52 See the standard texts on the 1950-60 period.53 Nonalignment in international politics, ie. peace time
policy of avoiding political or ideological affiliations withmajor power blocs took shape in the post-WWII cold war period. Themovement took formal initiation in the Bandung Conference (1955)where the Nonaligned Movement was conceived. In the 1950s themovement was more concerned by its political independence andanti-colonialism while in the latter decades it showed moreconcern with economic issues. For an analysis of the movement seeBurton, J.W. (ed.) Nonalignment (Andre, Deutsch, London, 1966).
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Historic and Social Law
The most important tactical consideration which was to
reach strategic proportions was organizing the opposition forces.
Faced with what they saw as alternatives of either attracting the
trust and support of foreign powers and the ruling establishment
or indirect infiltration of major political institutions including
the Majlis and the press, the NRM leaders opted for a third way.
54 This option called for the independent organization of
opposition elements into a formidable fighting machine. This
tactic was reinforced by NRM analysis of the causes of the 1953
coup. In what amounts to one of the most thorough political works
of NRM, three areas were identified as the causes of the
Nationalist defeat: the domestic political arena, the foreign
factor and the internal dynamics of the National Movement. Within
these three the last one (ie. the internal dynamics of the
National movement) was said to be the most readily available and
suitable for change and the most significant in guaranteeing the
strategic independence of the movement. The problems of the
internal dynamics of National Movement included weak leadership,
non-existence of organized operations, poor planning, poor
intelligence, poor propaganda and personal rivalries between
activists. 55 To deal with the problem the NRM published several
pamphlets, giving directions to its members for discussions and
operational matters. It also called on other political
54 NRM Documents, V.5. p.195.55 The Qualitative Evolution of the National Movement, NRM
Documents, V.5, p.239-274.157
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associations and independent activists to close ranks within an
organized association. 58
The National Movement invites all [political]
personalities, parties, and groups and associations ... to
accept and believe in the principle that the victory of
the National Movement lies in obtaining organizational
power and the correct continuation of the struggle. Only
in this respect is it possible to create useful conditions
without the fear of deviation into other [political]
currents. This is the only logical alternative. 57 Without
exaggeration the contemporary age is the age of
organization. In all the spheres of activity, be it
finance, bureaucracy, politics, economy or the military,
victory is for those who have the use of correct and
appropriate organizations. Without organization nothing is
possible 58
However as indicated the organizational and actual
activities of NRM were to remain meagre and insignificant in
comparison to the abilities of the regime. The issue of the
existence of a formidable opposition organization was one of the
reasons that in 1961 the Freedom Movement of Iran and in 1965 the
People's Mojahedin Organization were formed. One factor in their
56 The issue of organization was to become increasinglysignificant in the following decade and of prime reasons in theformation of guerrilla organizations; Mojahedin Khalq, andFadaiyan Khalq. On Mojahedin see Abrahamian, Radical Islam, p.85.
57 NRM Documents, V.5, p.274.58 NRM Documents, V.5, p.264.
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organization was the belief that a highly organized apparatus was
needed in the ranks of the opposition. 59
Religion
While on the subject of ideology it is necessary to look
at religion. Generally speaking religion was not an important
element in the intellectual structure of NRM. Throughout their
literature there is little attention given to religion or
religious issues and that which exists is of little significance
in comparison to the anti-colonial or constitutional arguments and
it constitutes possibly less than one percent of the total
rhetoric. It should be pointed out at the same time that the
religious community was not in a position to cooperate with NRM
and therefore there was no need to appeal to the religious
community. Almost all the senior clerics were considered
sympathetic to the establishment and even within the ranks of the
junior clerics the majority were closer to the regime than the
opposition. The state-cleric relation had actually improved
following the 1953 coup and relations between the two did not
start to sour until the issue of the White Revolution (of which
more later) was raised in the early 1960's. 60
Despite these facts the study of religion in the NRM
ideology is of significance for the simple reason that religion
was to become a crucial issue in the years to come. Indeed some
59 On Mojahedin see Abrahamian, Radical Islam, p.85.60 Akhavi, S. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran
Chaps. 3 & 4.159
Historic and Social Law
seeds of the later religious movement were sown in the NRM and it
was here that they started to grow.
No definitive reason has been given for why the religious
elements began to stretch their muscle in the NRM. One analyst
believes that the arrest of senior nationalist politicians, who
were almost all proponents of secular politics, allowed the
emergence of the junior but the more religiously oriented
individuals to the leadership. 61 According to another observer it
was the steadfastness and simple stubbornness of the religious
elements, in comparison to the more secular minded activists,
which became attractive among the ranks of the opposition,
particularly the young, thus allowing religion to take deeper
political roots. 62 The attraction lay possibly in the non-
compromising and puritanical image of the stubborn religious
element. It could have also been the fact that the Iran party
which was led by the more secular leaders took a more conciliatory
approach to the regime and thus lost the initiative in the
opposition camp which was to become increasingly radical.
The radicalization of the religious element in the ranks
of NRM is evident from a single document left by the religious
groups of the movement. The letter signed by the 'Movement of God-
Worshipping Socialists", the "Islamic Society of Students" and the
61 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, Chap.3, see section on National Resistance Movement. passim.
62 Jazani, B. Tarh-e Jame'eh shenasi Va Mabani-yeEsteratezhi-ye Jonbesh-e Engelabi-ye Khalgh-e Iran, Sociological Sketch and Strategic Principles of the Revolutionary Movement ofThe Iranian Masses (Maziar Publications, Tehran, 1978) p.85.
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"Cooperative Society of God-Worshippers" indicates the existing
tensions between the secular and the religious orientations being
viewed to correspond to the class strains within the ranks of the
opposition. The document, an open letter, accuses the secular
intellectuals of moral corruption, class exploitation and
political compromise with the enemy. The signatories state, in no
uncertain terms, that they are not prepared to make sacrifices for
the "idle gigolos and the slipshod ladies" who as members of the
affluent families are in fact a part of the ruling classes.
However the signatories declare their preparation as the toiling
class to struggle, fight and make sacrifices for a movement that
would be religious in nature. 63
It should be re-emphasized that religious arguments in the
ideological structure of NRM were marginal. On several occasions
appeals were made to the religious consciousness of the people. In
one case the Algerian anti-colonial campaign was compared to the
war that Hosain, the third Shiite Imam, waged against the ruling
house of Mo'avyeh, at the desert of Karbala. Taking into account
the depth of passion which Hosain's death traditionally evoked in
the hearts of the ordinary Iranian, the association of his
martyrdom with the Algerian national struggle meant an immediate
popular identification against the might and power of the French
rule.
On one other occasion the NRM warned the highest cleric of
the day, Ayatollah Borujerdi, of the consequences of state
63 NRM Documents, V.2, pp.369-374.161
Historic and Social Law
authoritarianism and played on xenophobic fears. But generally
speaking then the religious element was of little significance in
the actual ideological make up of NRM, but with the rise of
uncompromising Muslim activists it was to become an issue of
unprecedented proportions.
Internal Conflicts
One of the reasons that NRM failed to emerge as a
formidable political organization was its internal ideological
conflicts. 64 Political issues which were to become centres of
conflict were mainly over matters of organization and tactic. For
one thing conflicts from the pre-coup years were dragged into the
movement. In one case the leadership crisis in the Toilers Party
(Third Force) 65 which had not only the best organization but also
the best cadres paralyzed party functions and led to a three way
split within its ranks. Other political and personal rivalries
surfaced within as well as in between political organization.
The NRM leadership also lacked the necessary experience
and the expertise in dealing with the situation. The admission to
this shortcoming was declared openly in the movement's plenium.
We have to confirm the point that the action of NRM
could not have been without errors and criticism ... right
from the beginning [rather than initiating policy] NRM was
64 For a review of conflicts within the ranks of themovement see NRM Documents, V.5, pp.263-266, & 311-332.
65 For details of the Tailors Party crisis see Katouzian,Musaddiq & the Struggle for Power in Iran, Chaps. 15 & 16. passim.
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reacting to daily events . NRM has well learnt its
weaknesses ... and has experienced many defeats. 66
No details were given and it is not clear what other
options, rather than the policies that they had already chosen
could have been pursued. It seems NRM interest in organizational
issues stemmed from this general failure.
One other conflict which apparently led to the withdrawal
of the Iran party from the Movement and thus caused the NRM's
total dismemberment was the tactical option of approaching the
regime and its foreign supporters. 67 The Iran party believed it
could utilize the existing contradictions between the supporters
of the regime, ie. the Americans and the British to the advantage
of the opposition. While President Dwight Eisenhower was shifting
US policy from Soviet containment to reinforcement of regional
defence arrangement, there was a belief among the leadership of
the Iran party that the US was willing to pull away from Iran's
authoritarian establishment and make closer contacts with the
opposition. To this end the Iran Party wished to project a more
reasonable portrait of itself by reducing attacks on the US as
well as the Shah and putting less emphasis on the person of
Mosaddeq. On the other hand the radical faction in the NRM, to
which Bazargan belonged, wished to maintain the anti-colonial,
anti-establishment and pro-Mosaddeq posture. In this context they
accused the Iran party of inflaming hopes of reconciliation with
66 NRM Documents, V.5. p.312.67 Bazargan, interview, 1989.
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the US and thus losing valuable time and opportunity for building
a functional and active organization. While the more conciliatory
approach found a base in the older and more senior members of the
rank and file, the radicals option was more popular within the
younger students and less senior supporters. 68
Law and Social Evolution
From the 1953 coup and its subsequent political
restrictions to the opening of the climate at the end of decade
Bazargan wrote a relatively small number of books and pamphlets:
1955 The War of Yesterday and Tomorrow 69
1957 Love and Worship or the Human Thermodynamics 70
The Current Needs 71
1958 The Worship of God and Current Ideas 72
The book Love and Worship or the Human Thermodynamics was
written in prison and is a juxtaposition of scientific ideas and
concepts of social relations. The Current Needs pamphlet
emphasized and called for the need for social organization,
apparently in the face of mounting state suppression and disunity
among the ranks of the opposition. The second pamphlet was a
repeat of an earlier argument from the 1940's on the critique of
68 NRM Documents, V.5, p.263-265.69 Jang-e Diruz va Farda. (Monthly publication of Mashhad
Industrial College, 1955). No other details available.70 'Eshq va Parastesh ya Termudinamic Ensan (Enteshar
Publications, Tehran, nd.) First published in 1957, according toprivate documents in possession of the author.
71 Ihtiyaj-e Ruz (Book Distribution centre, Houston, 1976).First published in 1957.
72 Khuda Parasti va Afkar-e Ruz (Book Distribution centre,Houston, 1977). First published in 1958.
164
Himtoric and Social Law
the Modernists' supposedly unjust perception of religion. 73 The
fall in Bazargan's work was a direct result of censorship and
political restrictions. As soon as the political climate opened at
the end of the decade Bazargan produced some 13 books and
pamphlets in a space of three years.
To portray the ideas of Bazargan in the 1953-60 period two
arguments on the Evolutionary Course of Religion and Social Laws
have been chosen. The first argument comes in a book The Trodden
Path that Bazargan published originally in 1947, based on a
speech one year earlier. However the book was extensively revised
at a later stage. Bazargan indicates that he wrote one hundred
pages of the 240 page book during his first spell in prison. Other
sections were also revised but unfortunately neither Bazargan nor
the publisher have recollections of the exact date of the later
revisions. However it is clear that the main revisions belong to
the 1953-60 period when Bazargan seems to have been engaged in
elaborating themes on the nature of evolutionary and social laws.
Therefore it is reasonable to discuss the arguments presented in
the book in the post 1953 period. The second argument comes in the
book Love and Worship which was also written in prison, and later
elaborated and published. 74
The choice of the two arguments is made to reflect the
fact that the two not only complement each other in Bazargan's
73 The fact that Bazargan's continues his emphasis onreligious issues while the NRM paid little attention to thereligion, even on a rhetorical level, indicates his marginalideological position at this point even though he had a leadingorganizational position in the movement.
74 Bazargan, Defence, p.16.165
Historic and Social Law
vision of things, but they are representative of developments in
Bazargan's intellectual position. Following the 1953 coup Bazargan
draws away from addressing the currents of ideas in society and
begins to address the particular currents which reflect the ideas
of those in power. The prelude to this development is Bazargan's
efforts to prove that social developments and social relations are
governed by laws. In other words history and society are said to
be governed by processes which are rational and logical. If this
premise is accepted it then becomes necessary to discover these
Laws. Should there be a failure in acting according to these laws,
Bazargan states, social decadence will set in. Initially we follow
Bazargan's discourse on historical evolution, or as he puts it,
the Evolutionary Course of Religion. Then the argument of social
laws or in his own words the Thermodynamics of Society is studied.
Evolutionary Course of Religion
Here Bazargan's argument is that the worship of God (ie.
religion) has developed through evolution. However this process
has two sides. On the one hand is the lineage of divine truths
revealed to the prophets and on the other hand the truths
discovered by ordinary human beings through various, and evolving,
levels of rational faculty interacting with nature. While the
lineage of the prophets has reached its final climax and obtained
the highest truths, the human has yet to reach its peak.
Bazargan states that the mission of the prophets evolved
with regard to the peculiarities of time and place that they had
lived in and advanced in parallel to the growth of human
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Historic and Social Law
civilization. The evolutionary process of the prophets lineage
started with Noah, 75 passed through Lot, 76 Jaycob, 77 Joseph, 78
Moses 79 and Jesus to reach its height with Mohammad. Other
prophets who are not mentioned in the Koran including Buddha and
Zoroastera and even the prophets of the ancient Egyptian religions
are also said to have a place in the process. Thus all religion is
a continuity aimed at teaching Monotheism, human responsibility
and to reveal the truth of the hereafter. 80
Human beings advance, and along their side the prophets
are given their mission: At one stage their role is that
of a nurse keeping the child from falling, at another
time, it is to harness the frenzied youth ... and finally
. to show the long, dangerous but productive road of
life to the young man. 81
75 The story of Noah and the flood is repeated a number oftimes in The Koran, see VII, 59-64, 142, and XI, 25-49.
76 Lut (Lot of the Bible) and his story are Biblical. He issent as a warner to people of Sodom and Gomorrah. See Gen. XIX,24-26 & 30-36, and The Koran VII 80-84.
77 Jaycob, the son of Isaac, the son of Abraham. For hisstory see The Koran, II, 132 and VI, 84.
78 Joseph, the son of Jaycob. Chapter (Sura) XII of TheKoran is dedicated to his story.
79 The Koran portrays Moses as the prophet of God and theleader of the Jewish exodus from Egypt. The Koran, II, 29.
80 The three ideas are a version of the three principles ofMuslim faith: Tawhid (belief in the one God) Nabuvvat (Mohammad isthe prophet of God) and Ma'ad (there is no escape from the finalday of judgment). Goldschmidt, A. A Concise History of the Middle East (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1979) p.39.
81 Bazargan, The Trodden Path, p.30.167
Historic and Social Law
The mission of the prophets was to reform a generation of
human beings. But not all of their audience accepted the true and
divine guidance. Thus they were seized by blasphemy and
consequently destroyed by natural disasters. He gives an example:
The nobles of the tribe thought of a great deceit [against
Noah] ... but the storm came and destroyed the generation
of infidels who were un-reformable and who would not bare
but infidels and adulterers. 82
The prophets' periodic missions were then aimed at the
guidance of the populace followed by the destruction of the
infidels. The process therefore included a selection of an elite
and the purpose of advancing the progress of mankind.
Selection (as in the term used by the masters of natural
sciences) is carried out in the garden of humanity. The
experienced gardener uproots the inferior plants and
leaves the pious to reproduce. However in accordance with
the law of heredity and under the influence of the
environment, the later generations are attracted towards
diverse ends. In the later cultivations, various types of
people including the pious but also the corrupt begin to
re-appear. It again becomes necessary to designate a new
prophet to reform the race. 83
82 Bazargan, The Trodden Path p.22.83 Bazargan, The Trodden Path, p.22.
168
Historic and Social Law
This evolutionary process had its own peculiar
characteristics: it began at a primitive stage of idol-worship and
advanced to conditions where man assumed responsibility for his
behaviour, followed by the organization of his social life.
Furthermore the process had geographical and social aspects:
initially the audience of the prophets were limited to the circles
of friends and the immediate tribe. But with the evolution of
religion the audience enlarged to reach the whole humanity.
There was also an apparent development in method. While at
the early stages of human growth the emphasis of the prophets was
on human conditions, at the later stages the learned and acquired
dispositions were appealed to and finally the intellectual and
logical methods were utilized. 84
Now a similar form of evolution was taking place among
mankind in general for the evolutionary path which had already
been passed by the prophets was the very way that man was passing
through. But while prophets had reached the climax of the teaching
the evolution of the path of man continued. While the prophets
were guided by divine inspiration (with its mechanism unknown to
us) in order that they could comprehend the truth of the worship,
man was to reach the same conclusion through experience and
logic. 85 Based on this assumption Bazargan points out that the
Western secular civilization is closer to the path of truths
84 Bazargan, The Trodden Path, pp.20-42.85 Bazargan, The trodden Path, p.19.
169
Himitoric and Social Law
revealed to the prophets than the traditional eastern culture of
Iran which is yet to reach that stage. 86
From the very first day man has not passed through any
path except that of the prophets. Interestingly the
extremists, groups who are the vanguard of scientific
materialism, are on the way which will inevitably lead to
God, the here after and religion. Indeed they maybe closer
to the understanding of the truth of origins and
resurrection of man than many of the superstitious
faithful. 87
What Bazargan sketches in the above argument is reducible
to two basic cluster of ideas: on the one hand the story of the
prophets and their teachings and on the other hand the fact that
their message has evolved. Bazargan brings the stories from the
Koran and then expands on what the prophets were supposed to have
done. These ideas are then put in an evolutionary framework.88
Bazargan's emphasis is on two issues: Firstly that communities are
86 The impact of this ideas on the - yet to be formed -Mojahedin Khalq Organization was immense. In the first three yearsof its activity the MKO produced a number of books including oneentitled Rah-e Anbiya Rah-e Bashar, The Way of the Prophets, TheWay of Humanity. The title of the book seems to have come from theheading of a chapter by Bazargan in the Trodden Path. Another MKObook was Evolution. Given the fact that the authors of the bookshad been members of the FMI before forming their own organizationin the early 1960s, it would be safe to assume that they picked upthe idea of evolution, of society and religion, from Bazargan'sTrodden Path. For the Mojahedin's story see Abrahamian, Radical Islam p.92 & 100.
87 Bazargan, The Trodden Path, Introduction, p.3.88 It seems that Bazargan was the first to articulate, in a
consistent form, the theme in Iran. The idea was a standard byChristian apologists once the historicity of the sacred events wastruly established.
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either believing or denying the existence of the divine and
secondly that this process is an evolutionary and historic one.
The evolution of man is the divine will. However some
traditionalists and pessimists might want to deny this
reality and this truth. 89
For Bazargan this evolutionary progress has its own
measures of progress: it starts from individualism and localism to
develop into universalism, and it tends from emotions towards the
realism of logic. These are said to be the measures of evolution.
Bazargan's sources are more or less easily identifiable.
The stories of the prophets except those of the ancient religions
(ie.Buddha, Zoroastra and Mazdak) all come from the Koran. But the
ideas of evolution, or at least part of it, have their roots in
Darwin's Origin of Species and the Theory of Natural Selection.
Bazargan himself points to the issue of selection which is said to
have come in Darwin's discussions on the history of evolution.
In this sense a selection, as used by the natural
scientists, 90 has been made in the human farm. 91
Partial and distorted use of the ideas of Charles Darwin
(1809-82) on the theories of evolution and natural selection was
89 Bazargan, The trodden Path, p.31.90 Here Bazargan goes as far as using the Romance word
Selection, in the Persian text as to emphasis the point.91 Bazargan, The Trodden Path, p.22.
171
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not unique to Bazargan. Similar usage of Darwin's ideas, though
with different arguments have European precedents. From the late
19th century Social Darwinists drew on the concept of the survival
of the fittest to support racist ideas, which was in turn used by
the Nazis as evidence for their arguments. Also the European
imperialist expansion was at times explained in pseudo-Darwinian
language where it was the burden of the powerful white man to rule
over the animal like communities of the world. 92 Obviously
Bazargan's usage of Darwin is to portray not the superiority of a
race but that of religious belief in an evolutionary process.
At the same time the Muslim belief that the mission of
Mohammad was the last in the course of prophets reinforced the
evolutionary concept. The Koran verse that "Mohammad is the
apostle of God, and the seal of the prophets' 93 could be
foundation of the view that since Mohammad has completed the
lineages of prophets there must have been an "evolutionary' course
which had culminated with him. It is possible that this idea too
contributed to strengthening Bazargan's view on historical
evolution.
The third root of Bazargan's idea on evolution concerns
the criteria of progress and change. But this is not something
that he had adapted from the Koran or Darwin. Of course his
measurements of evolution, ie. rationalism and collectivism have
similarities in Islamic Shiite texts, however not in the direct
92 Eccleshall R. Political Ideologies (Hutchinson, London,1984) See sections on Social Darwinism.
93 The Koran, XXXIII, 40.172
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manner that Bazargan has adapted from the holy book. In the Shiite
tradition the source of Muslim laws are said to be intellect
(Ag1), consensus (ijma'), tradition and the Koran. And of course
not in that order. 94 The use of reason and consensus in Shiism is
to support other sources of jurisprudence.
Here Bazargan's emphasis on rationalism and collectivity
seem to have parallels with the ideas of French philosopher Aguste
Comte (d.1857). known as the founder of sociology and Positfvfsm,
Comte introduced the idea of historical development of human
thought which took place in three states of the theological, the
metaphysical and the positivist. 95 Comte's elaboration on the
issue of the relation between the hierarchy of exact social
sciences and the organization of social order was influenced by
Saint-Simon, social reformer and a founder of Socialism. 96 Both
ideas seem to be in harmony with Bazargan's idea on the evolution
of human mind and the corresponding social organization. However
the researcher has not identified routes of Comte's influence on
Bazargan. Comte however did influence French conservatism, and its
twentieth century manifestation, the Action Francaise, with which
Bazargan was in contact during his studies in France. 97 It is
possible to speculate that Bazargan was influenced through this
route.
94 Enayat, H. Modern Islamic Political Thought, (MacmillanPress, London, 1982) p.48 & 167.
95 Merz, J.T. A History of European Thought, V.III (WilliamBlackwood & Sons, Edinburgh, MCMXIV) p.88.
96 Merz, A History of European Thought, V.IV, p.470.97 Soltaw, R. French Political Thought in the Nineteenth
Century (Ernest Ben Ltd. London, 1931) p.204.173
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Now it is possible to enquire about the logical coherence
and compatibility of Koran stories of the prophets, the concept of
evolution and the criteria for evolution. Bazargan is interpreting
the Koran in his own terms and obviously the configuration of the
three concepts are peculiar to his own understanding. But the
issue of the compatibility of a religious perception with that of
natural selection and evolution has a precedent in the West. Here
an active and lively debate between the Evolutionists and the
Creationists has been going on since Darwin's On the Origins of
Species (1859) came to challenge traditional understanding,
particularly traditional Christianity, on the role and nature of
man. The challenges to Biblical literalism were seen to be the
impersonal process of variation and natural selection (as opposed
to the existence of an intelligent designer over and above the
universe) and the arbitrary nature of man (as opposed to the
immortality of the human soul and the distinctiveness of his
rationality). The Christian theological reaction to the idea of
evolution has been categorized into three basic arguments; that
God controls events that appear random, that God has designed a
system of law and chance, or that God influences events without
controlling them. At the same time an effort has been made to move
from a position of conflict to that of open dialogue and
systematic synthesis (ie. developing a theology of nature as
opposed to a natural theology).98
It seems appropriate to enquire about the aim of Bazargan
in presenting the story of the prophets in an evolutionary format.
98 Barbour, I.G. Religion in an Age of Science (SCM Press,London, 1990) Chap. 6, passim.
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In other words what does he wish to do through this argument? From
a political point of view it is Bazargan's position vis-a-vis
political power, sovereign or subjected, that is of interest. The
meaning, logic, language, aims and motives of Bazargan must be
analyzed in themselves and in the context of political events and
ideas of the day to appreciate their significance. It should be
remembered that Bazargan was earlier critical of the Modernists
for their failure to acknowledge the social significance of
religion and their superficial imitation of the Europeans. Here
again Bazargan is trying to defend the same position with a
different argument and in order to attract the social and
political attention to the issue of religion. We have also
discussed Bazargan's critique of traditionalists for their lack of
social and political activity. Here again the same meaning is
repeated in a different manner by emphasizing collectivism and
rationalism. Similar efforts were detected earlier in discussing
Bazargan's views on Labour where he tried to interlock religious
ideas of good deeds with those of historic evolution.
From one point of view the undeclared assumption of
Bazargan in the composition of the two ideas (ie. evolution of
religion and rationalism/collectivism) in the argument that the
way of man is the path already passed through by the prophets is
to allow himself to make the achievements of modern civilization
available to the traditional society. In other words with the
argument that the achievements of contemporary civilization will
only take man closer to the path and the aim of the prophets (ie.
the path which the traditional society believes itself to follow)
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Historic and Social Law
Bazargan allows himself and the traditional society to come closer
and use modern philosophical or scientific achievements.
However the significance of the present argument about
evolution is that it acts as a prelude to Bazargan's discussion of
the significance of social law. Following the 1953 coup Bazargan
adds this new theme to the argument on evolution. He switches the
argument which until then addressed the traditionalist and
Modernist currents to a discourse against the tyranny of the state
and in defence of political and civil liberties. Thus the study of
the argument on evolution must be seen as the efforts of a man
facing political repression and violations of social laws, which
in his mind, of course, inhibited social evolution. He therefore
intends to use the argument to motivate the various social strata
into political action. (As with Marxism, for example, which also
uses a theory of history as the basis for political action and a
means of political mobilization).
The argument is especially designed to address traditional
elements. While in the earlier stages Bazargan was criticizing the
traditionalists for their conservative approach and apathy towards
social progress, he is now emphasizing his points so as to
radicalize the society vis-a-vis the rule of tyranny. In fact
Bazargan wishes to bring the religious community into the
political sphere and to this end he tries to arm them with a
rational, social and historic ideology. The theme was significant
enough that from the over 20 articles, pamphlets and books that he
wrote in the 1953-63 period in at least six the argument on
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evolution has been repeated with different emphasis and different
arguments and different languages. In other words in almost a
third of Bazargan's work of the period there is concern for the
issue of historical evolution.
Natural Laws of Society
Based on the idea that history has an evolutionary and
detectable pattern Bazargan sets his eyes on defining the laws of
this process and thus condemning those whose practices are against
the direction of the laws of social evolution and who are
therefore, in Bazargan's mind, are condemned to destruction. These
people, Bazargan believes, are those in power, those who have
subjected him and is associates to arbitrary practice of power and
injustice.
Bazargan's argument builds on the premise that in the same
manner that the elements of a physical, chemical or mechanical
phenomenon follow certain particular patterns in their relations
with each other, the social elements, ie. the individual persons,
too pursue basic laws in their relations with each other. Bazargan
thus elaborates a mechanical set of social relations.
Society is a system which could be subject to
regulations similar to laws of physics, chemistry or
thermodynamics ... of course it would be very complicated
and extraordinarily more complex than a simple system of
gas or a combination of water and steam. 99
99 Bazargan, Love and Worship or The Human Thermodynamics, p.96.
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Law in a society relatively determines the responsibility
of individuals in their profession, the social scale and
regulation of their relations with each other as well as
[social] processes. It is exactly as the map drawn for the
operations of the pieces of a machinery. 100
Should the natural laws of society be observed, society
will prosper constantly improving itself and even finally
achieving eternal life. The characteristics of the natural laws of
society, according to Bazargan, are on the one hand
specialization, correct division of labour, proper appointment of
individuals to social responsibilities and on the other hand
justice and fair treatment in social relations.
Social justice is itself evident from the natural laws
inherent in social relations. If, Bazargan states, laws are not
made according to customs and aspirations of society and if
"parameters and particularities" of society are not taken into
account they will have adverse effects. 101 Bazargan thus puts
forward the logic of the necessity of observing the rights of
individuals within a mechanized interpretation of social
relations:
Members of society have particular characteristics and
there must be a balance between these characteristics and
100 Bazargan, Love and Worship or the Human Thermodynamics,
p.94. 101 Bazargan, Love and Worship or the Human Thermodynamics,
pp.96-103.178
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the responsibilities required of them. Much like when
parts of gas turbines are being designed according to the
desired strength and power. In the design the particular
characteristics of each part must be taken into account.102
Earlier we followed Bazargan's efforts at interpreting
some form of evolution in the historical process. In comparison
the argument on law is an effort to define the relations between
individual members of society. The main emphasis of Bazargan in
this argument is on law as it rules over society in much the same
way as natural laws govern the mechanical actions of a natural
body. According to Bazargan desired [legal] laws are which take
into account the social particularities and then guide social
relations towards a desired evolutionary ideal. Bad [legal] laws
are those which fail to take into account these particularities.
Here Bazargan seems to be introducing an ambiguity between
law meaning a judicial and legal rule and law as an underlying
determination of phenomena independent of human will. His
conception of law, the fact that he does not distinguish between
social/legal law and the laws of the physical world resembles the
conception of law as held during the middle ages in Europe where
law was popularly conceived as a circumambient atmosphere which
extended from the sky to earth and penetrated every aspect of
human relations. Everyone believed in the reality of natural law,
but also felt all law to be eternally valid and in some degree
102 Bazargan, Love and Worship or the Human Thermodynamics,
p.96.179
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sacred as the providence of God was concerned to be a universally
present force which touched man's lives in most trifling details.
The custom which was rooted in the ways of the people was in no
sense set off from natural law but rather was felt to be a twig of
the great tree of the law, which grew from earth to heaven and in
whose shade all human life was lived. 1" Bazargan looked at law
in similar fashion, for it was conceived to be an all embracing
phenomenon, root, trunk and branches, which included not only
natural law but also legal as well as scientific law.
It is quite evident that the argument on social laws has
been brought forward with inspiration from thermodynamics.
Bazargan study's of the subject in Paris and the subsequent
teaching of the subject in Tehran's technical college has been
already discussed. From there on the use of thermodynamic, both as
analogy and source of inspiration was common in his political
reflections. The most clear of examples already cited is the
physiological analysis of human thermodynamics, as discussed
earlier.
It has already been discussed how Bazargan had generalized
and extended the concept of thermodynamics to that of social
labour. Now he is extending it to that of social relations. Taking
this point into the background it should be stated that the
juxtapositioning the laws of thermodynamics with those of social
relations are an example of functional use of natural sciences.
103 Sabine, A History of Political Theory, p.195.180
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Bazargan's purpose in bringing up the issue of law is to
confront the political tyranny that had been imposed after the
1953 coup. Taking into account the conditions of the time and the
imposed political restrictions, Bazargan was not able to openly
express his views. The restrictions are particularly clear with
regard to the argument on law, for it was written while he was in
prison. In his own words the work was "a souvenir from the early
months of imprisonment at the Martial Law ... where fortunately
reading and writing was not yet banned". 104
Setting forth the issue of law is in fact his protest at
what he believes to be lawlessness or at least the practice of bad
law. The fact that he feels the existing judiciary can not give
him protection in the face of the arrest and political suppression
of himself and his collaborators, and he seeks to somehow explain
the situation. It is thus that he comes to believe that the laws
governing the establishment and the country are designed to
protect and represent the interests of a few.
The most ideal [legal] laws are those which manage the
society according to the average condition of the majority
. Reformist laws are those in which the majority of
people express their views, norms and acceptable social
traditions and which harness the degenerate social
minorities. 105
104 Bazargan, Love and Worship or The Human Thermodynamics
p.l.
p.94.
105 Bazargan, Love and Worship or the Human Thermodynamics,
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Bazargan's change of theme is significant. While in the
1940-53 period he addressed the topics brought up by the social
currents of Modernists, traditionalists and communists, in the
post 1953 period he addresses the topic of the lawlessness of
government. His problem is more than anything else that of the
arbitrary power of the sovereign and its relationship to the
people. In the new argument the earlier language and terms have
been maintained and the same form of logic and methods of argument
repeated, however the topic and the problem have changed.
However Bazargan's belief in the existence or the
necessity of observance of social laws did not arise because he
suddenly discovered that since natural bodies have laws governing
them the social body should have particular laws which must be
observed. Of course this logic exists within Bazargan's argument
and it is not possible to deny his efforts at discovering laws
that govern social behavior. However the conclusion is arrived at
through encounter with what he believes to be social injustice and
lawlessness and the necessity of the existence of laws in society.
Arbitrary rule and lawlessness pressure him to seek regulations of
social affairs and persuade him to use the logic of
thermodynamics.
Using models from the natural sciences is on the one hand
due to the effect of the scientific logic on Bazargan's social
perception and on the other hand due to their functionality in
advancing social aims. However it is the latter which seems to
182
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have the edge. In the history of political ideas in the West
scientific interpretations of social developments and the
attribution of scientific laws to social relations has a chapter
of its own.
Finally there is a need to point out the contradictions
which exist in the last sections of the argument. Here Bazargan
states the view that since each part of the social system has a
peculiarity of its own, and that for a smooth running of the whole
system there is a need to observe and respect the peculiarities,
therefore those laws which take into account the characteristics
of the majority of the people are good. Taking into account the
particular political and personal conditions facing Bazargan, the
aim of this argument seems to be an effort in curtailing the
political power of state. However it seems that the logic of the
argument could be used to defend an authoritarian rule. The belief
that the value of the members of society lies not in their
inherent existence as individuals but in their use and function,
could possibly cause a deviation from Bazargan's purpose. In other
words if Bazargan intends to use the argument towards limiting the
power of the state and thus transfering greater power to the
individual his argument might prove defective in the final
analysis.
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Social Developments 1960-63
By 1960 things were becoming awkward. The Americans had
started pressing the Shah for reforms as the liberal wing of
policy makers in Washington became increasingly concerned about
unconditional support for corrupt and authoritarian regimes in the
third world. This perception was particularly reinforced in the
administration of President J.F.Kennedy after the communist take
over in Cuba. Within Iran the economic difficulties of the late
50's had brought about general discontent. The political
opposition had picked up momentum and the Majlis had become vocal.
Under these pressures the Shah decided to liberalize. The 20th
Majlis elections were cancelled (Agust 1960) on the grounds that
they were rigged and PM Manuchehr Iqbal was asked to resign. The
Shah appointed Ja'far Sharif-Imami to form a cabinet. However the
new PM failed to either attract the trust of the Americans or Co
restrain the domestic economic crisis. His cabinet fell after one
person was killed in violent demonstrations protesting against
wage freezes. 1
The Shah was forced further back and subsequently Ali
Amini was appointed the Prime Minister. Earlier Amini and those
around him had begun to flex their muscles in the newly opened
political climate. However as a former Iranian ambassador to
Washington Amini was disliked by the Shah who saw him as a US
favourite. The Shah was also weary of Amini's political ambitions
but he needed Amini to bring about the necessary changes. The two
1 The analysis here has been based on data and arguments in:Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.420-426, Avery,Modern Iran, Chap. 29, passim. Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran pp.213-224, Katouzian, Musaddiq & the Struggle forPower in Iran Chaps. 15 & 16. Keddie, Roots of the Revolution, pp.150-153.
185
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men compromised: Shah retained control of the armed forces and
Amini strengthened the executive at the cost of the legislature by
closing down the Majlis. This move alienated the landed classes
who held the majority of seats in the parliament and who were to
become even further disillusioned with Amini, himself of land-
owning aristocratic stock, when he introduced a land reform
programme.
At the same time Amini could have become acceptable to the
National Front. 2 On the one hand he had been the minister of
economy in Musaddiq's government and on the other hand he
initiated discussions with the Front and chose several reformers
for his cabinet. Furthermore he reduced political pressure
allowing political associations to operate openly after seven
years. However the National Front refused to support Amini's
reform programme on the grounds that he failed to meet their
demand for free elections. The Front agitated against his
government. Amini's main argument was that to carry out his main
programme of land reform in order to create an independent class
of farmers he needed strong government. Pressure built up against
Amini and the climate changed. The traditional conservatives
opposed his land reform. The Nationalists were unhappy with his
refusal to hold free elections. The Shah saw him as a personal
challenge. Finally Amini made a tactical mistake of resigning over
2 The National Front activists had begun meeting andorganizing at the time of Sharif-Imami. Earlier, the SecondNational Front was born. On the Second National Front seeKatouzian, H. Musaddiq & the Struggle For Power in Iran (I.B.Tauris, London, 1990) chap. 16, passim.
186
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a secondary issue. The Shah accepted and moved to prepare his own
men to take control of power.
At this point the Shah relied on the armed forces, the
bureaucracy and conservative forces outside the government,
including the landlords and the clergy, to advance his position. A
faithful collaborator, Asadullah 'Alam was appointed as the prime
minister, giving the Shah personal control over daily running of
government. 'Alam had in mind to carry out a three point strategy:
Majlis elections, land reform and political suppression. While the
conservatives were pacified with the danger of an all-out reform
receding, the police moved against political activists including
former PM Amini and National Front leaders. Elections for the 21th
Majlis were carried out with even greater government control.
The Shah hijacked for his own ends the land reform
programme first implemented by the Amini cabinet. The purpose of
the reform programme which soon went beyond the distribution of
land while maintaining the land issue as its central feature were
multiple. Socially it was designed to destroy the social and
economic base of the traditional patterns of rural relations. It
was also intended to reorganize social relations on a more modern
basis in rural areas. Politically it was designed to create a
progressive image for the state so as to meet American demands for
reform and, on the domestic front, to paralyze internal
opposition. It also helped the movement of land based capital into
urban industry and made the state the unrivalled centre of capital
accumulation. The economic effects of the White Revolution were
The Islamic Mass Appeal
not immediate, however their long term reverberations were
immense.
Obviously the move by the state to destroy an old rival
was to meet with resistance particularly from those of the
conservative classes. The landlord had indeed realized the
political implications of the White Revolution. However reaction
from the urban based and democratic National Front opposition was
minimal and confused. For a long time they kept silent and then
reacted only by criticizing the lack of political freedoms in the
country. Their behaviour possibly indicates the degree to which
they had lost political initiative in terms of social manipulation
and the fact that they accepted the modernizing and progressive
nature of the reforms.
The most violent reaction came from the religious
leadership. Possibly more than any thing else an instinctive fear
of the extension of the powers of the state into all levels of
life was their driving force. Provocative sermons and political
agitations directed towards the religious community and led by the
yet little known Ayatullah Khomeini soon brought large crowds to
the streets. The disturbances led to massive popular uprising on
6th June 1963. The government took a tough stand and ordered a
shoot to kill policy. After three days of rioting and scores of
deaths the regime triumphed. At one stroke the conservative as
well as the religious radical rivals of the regime were dealt
with. The ground was laid for the rise of the almost undisputed
rule of the state for the next decade and a half.
The Islamic Mail Appeal
On the economic front the improvements which had started
in 1953 came to a standstill in 1960. On its way the boom had
caused inflation and a balance of payment deficit. The inflation
was triggered largely by too much credit, little control on
foreign currency, the purchase of too many non-essential imported
goods and too little productive investment. The greater part of
the state revenue, which had increased significantly because of
growth in oil income, failed to be used for investment purposes
because it was being swallowed up in current expenditure. Finally
the economy became depressed though not stagnant. Poor economic
prospects as well as political uncertainty reduced domestic
investment, and urban land prices (the main speculative sector)
bore the brunt of the fall.
As general counter measures the state began to tighten
credit, reduce imports, lower public expenditure and borrow
abroad. Initially PM Sharif-Imami introduced a stabilization
programme intended to increase import duties, to discourage non-
essential imports, limit domestic credit, and restrict foreign
exchange buying. Later Amini instituted stringent measures
requested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the
meantime the increasing value of the oil exports as well as US
financial aid provided helpful short term relief. 3
3 The analysis has relied on data and arguments in:Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.420-426, Avery,Modern Iran, chapter 29, passim. Katouzian, The Political Economyof Modern Iran, pp.213-224, Katouzian, Musaddiq & the Struggle forPower in Iran Chaps. 15 & 16, Keddie, Roots of the Revolution, pp. 150-153
189
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Freedom Movement of Iran
With the 1960 liberalization allowing a degree of
political activity, a group of Nationalists, including Bazargan,
formed the Second National Front. However differences were to
develop within the Front and to have strategic impact on the
course of events. The more conservative tendency rested with the
leadership cadre while the former NRM activists formed the nucleus
of a younger and more radical wing. 4 It was from the ranks of
latter tendency and upon the experience of the NRM years that
Bazargan and a group of his associates decided to form a new
political group. Again here Bazargan took the initiative and with
the support of his close collaborators formed the Freedom Movement
of Iran. 5
The formation of FMI seems to have had two
characteristics: the desire to create a political organization
with an Islamic identity (added to the nationalist,
constitutionalist and democratic credentials) and a more radical
position in Iranian Nationalist opposition. To quote Bazargan;
For us and a large number of our associates . . there
could not have been any other motive than that of
religious principles and beliefs ... For others Islam was
4 On the politics of the Second National Front seeKatouzian, Musaddig and the Struggle for Power in Iran, chap. 16passim, and Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, pp. 143-155.
5 For a review of the circumstantial events leading to theformation of FM1 see Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, pp.156-169.
190
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not an active social and political ideology. There was no
party or group functioning within such a context. 6
The ideology of the FMI will be discussed in greater
detail. Here it is sufficient to point out the fundamentals of the
manifesto of the organization which was published and distributed
at the inaugural ceremony (May 17, 1961). The constitution claimed
to be based on Islam, the Iranian constitution, the U.N. Charter
and the universal declaration of human rights. In domestic affairs
it called for respect for the constitution, Islamic social ethics,
democracy, economic independence and bureaucratic, specially
judicial reforms. In the domain of foreign policy it called for
Iranian neutrality in world affairs, support for the U.N., good
neighbourly relations, cooperation with Islamic countries and
search for non-violent solutions to world affairs. It is
interesting to note here that a number of these principles
particularly those concerning bureaucratic reform, neutral foreign
policy and constitutionalism were put to test when FMI came to
power in the post 1979 revolution. But of this more later.
There was only a nineteen month period of free, albeit
limited activity, from the official declaration of the intent of
activity to the first arrest of the leadership cadre (January
1963). Within this period the party opened a club, applied for
membership in the SNF, drew closer to the religious community and
produced a number of publications and pamphlets. Showing political
6 Bazargan, Defence, p.207.191
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consistency, radicalism and religiosity the group soon found a
degree of popularity among the ranks of the opposition. 7
The role of Bazargan in the formation and activities of
the FMI was paramount. He was the main force behind the initial
proposal for the formation of the party, the first leader of the
group, and its ideologue. Most of the main theoretical tracts were
written by him. In early 1963 following the publication of a
pamphlet Iran on the Verge of a Great Revolution, FMI's leadership
cadre were arrested. In court Bazargan presented the group's main
defence. Thus the influence of Bazargan's political thought on the
group is evident at various levels and domains.
Here the study of FMI ideology in the 1960-63 period rests
upon the hundreds of pages of internal documents, letters,
declarations and pamphlets which the organization published in
this brief period of political openness. A detailed analysis of
the contents of the available material indicates that FMI
ideologues emphasized several issues:
1. Islamic identity as the ideology of appeal to the
masses,
2. Constitutional and democratic government as opposed to
the state's ideology of authoritarian modernism,
3. Tactical issues of cooperation with the National Front,
role of Mosaddeq and matters of policy.
Islamic Identity as the Ideology of Appeal to the Masses
7 Nazih, H. Interview, London, 1991.192
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Among the FMI documents which have survived from the
period three pamphlets best present the ideas of the group:
Religious and Political Struggles, 8 An Open Letter to the Shah, 9
and Iran on the Verge of a Great Revolution. 10 The first pamphlet
which has no signature but is known to have been written by
Bazargan is the best presentation of FMI's concept of religion and
religious activism. The study of the pamphlet as well as several
other smaller communiques (which address relevant topics) gives a
more or less complete picture of the religious idea in the
structure of the FMI's political ideas. Put briefly the
FMI/Bazargan argued that:
1. While the 'National Iranian" identity of the people was
a relatively modern concept the "Islamic Religious" identity was
historical and all embracing.
2. Aiming at the political mobilization of the people the
element of consciousness was of more significance than their
material conditions and therefore greater attention should be paid
to it.
3. Since the clerical community had become increasingly
political and opposed to the regime, they should be supported.
8 A 1962 pamphlet reprinted twice later; at the trial of theFMI leaders (late 1963) and by the Islamic Association of Studentsin Europe and North America (1967). In the latter edition somefootnotes were added by the publisher. In 1981 FMI reproduced thepiece in an effort to highlight its religious credentials in theface of attacks by the ruling Islamic Republic. No author's nameis given in the document but it was written by Bazargan.Mobarezeh-e Mazhabi, Mobarezeh-e Siyasi Religious and Political Struggle (n.p. n.p. 1981).
9 The pamphlet was written by a FMI founder, Hasan Nazih,while hiding in a villa on the outskirts of the capital and bypublished in August 1962. Nazih, H. Interview, London, December1991. For the text see FMI Documents, V.2. p.133.
10 February (Bahman) 1963. See FMI Documents, V.2. p.222.193
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Bazargan then concluded that to advance the political
struggle towards the establishment of political democracy it was
vital to utilize the religious element as the foundation of its
ideological structure. This section seeks to re-construct and
analyze the above arguments in order to clarify their logic,
evidence, sources, background, audience and function. The study
further shows that articulation of this position, ie. Islamic
identity as the ideology of mass appeal constitutes the most
significant characteristic of the post 1960 opposition as compared
to the previous period.
In distinguishing the psychology of the identity of the
people who live in Iran, Bazargan believed that the "religious
self" consciousness was superior to the national identity both
vertically (historically) and horizontally (socially all-
embracive) •11 According to Bazargan the national identity only
emerged around the time of the Constitutional Revolution (late
19th and early 20th century) and as the result of contacts with
European culture. Otherwise Iranians had no "deep understanding of
the meaning of nationalism and Iranianism nor any particular
attraction towards it*. This modern national identity, FMI
believed, was a superficial imitation of Western concepts of
nationalism, and it had failed to penetrate the culture of the
Iranians further than the cheap literature. FMI went as far as to
say that the historical notions of Iranian nationalism as
11 Religious and Political Struggle, pp.13-16.194
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indicated in the literature of Ferdowsi 12 was nothing more than
"old tales". Even if there had been a sense of geographical
identity it was limited to local boundaries of villages and towns.
For the FMI ideologue the cause of such conditions lay in
the manner of historical development in the East, which to his
understanding, has been the cradle of prophets, religions and
spiritual expressions. In comparison, it was said, since the time
of the Greeks the West had been the source of inspiration for
notions of nation and nationalism. Obviously Bazargan did not take
into account that the national identity in the West came only
later and that as far as research shows Medieval and even early
modern identity was local or personal - to the king, but not
national.
It is nevertheless quite clear that in the eyes of
Bazargan there was a difference if not a degree of conflict
between the religious and the national identities. In other words
Bazargan believed that people tended to know themselves as Muslims
first and Iranians later. Referring to the inevitability of modern
development and the fact that it would be impossible to deny the
emergence of the national idea, FMI stated that the transition
12 Ferdowsi (d. 1020, or 1025) wrote the Shah-nameh (Book ofKings) of some 50,000 couplets, on the history of ancient Iran.This was in keeping with the traditions of prose (usually under asimilar title) in which a national identity of Iranian people wascreated by either revitalizing symbolic legends or transfiguring,by means of poetry, the true historical facts. The same patternwas applied in the first two decades of twentieth century whenworks on ancient Iran were published and Ferdowsi became acultural hero. Frye, R.N. (ed.) The Cambridge History of IranV.4. (Cambridge University Press, 1975) pp.625-628.
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from the religious to the national was by no means complete and
that the religious continued to be present. Even then, FMI argued,
it should be taken into account that religion in general, never
died and it would exist in one form or another.
To support the argument references were given to the
historical periods of Umayyad (661-750 AD) Abbasid (750-945 AD)
Safavid (1501-1722 AD) and Qajar (1779-1924 AD) where both the
ruling powers and opposition to them appealed to religious beliefs
and principles. The 1906 Constitutional Revolution was also given
as an example:
At the time of Constitutional Revolution, had it not been
for the initiative and leadership of the great spiritual
leaders and the sentiments of religious duty and rewards,
no [social] movement and sacrifice would have taken place.
In the camp of the tyranny as well as opposition,
propaganda and agitation was also [exercised] through
religious sentiments. 13
Therefore Bazargan concluded that since people see
themselves as more Muslim than Iranian the "grounds for political-
religious agitation was more available than the national or
humanist" approach. 14
There is no doubt that in Iranian history the religious
identity has played an important part in the structure of Iranian
13 Reli ious and Political Stru..le p.15.14 Religious and Political Struggle, p.16.
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social thought. Even Marxists, such as Tabari, characterize Iran's
historical ideologies, both before and after Islamic/Arab
invasion, as a blend of religion, mysticism, superstition, and
idealistic philosophy. 15 However this is only partly true, for
the process of secularization had already taken root by the turn
of the 20th century and a leading element in the leadership of the
1906 Revolution was secular and European influenced. 16 To
challenge Bazargan's reference on the constitutional revolution it
is sufficient to say that the 1905 revolutionary process was never
established by the clergy nor did it exclusively appeal to
religious arguments and symbols. Although the clerics did play a
part in the general uprising and the foundation of the
Constitutional Assembly, their role was not as extensive as they
would like to portray. Indeed it was under the leadership of
secular liberals holding modern secular ideas, that the clergy
participated in the revolution. 17
There has already been discussions of Bazargan's
understanding of the religious element in social and political
thought. What is striking is the change of meaning and change of
emphasis on what is said to be Islamic. Initially in the 1940-53
period Islam for Bazargan meant a critique of Modernists for their
reluctance to acknowledge the social importance of religious
15 Tabari, E. Barkhi Barresi-ha Darbarih-e Jahan bini-ha VaJonbesh-ha-ye Ijtema'ye, See chap. 4, passim.
16 For a digest of modern history of relations between stateand religion, in particular of this period see Lapidus, I. AHistory of Islamic Societies (Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1988) Chap. 22, passim.
17 See Adamiyyat, F. The Idea of Social Democracy in theConstitutional Movement in Iran (Payam, Tehran, 1984) chap. 1,passim.
197
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morals and institutions. It also meant criticism of the
traditional community for their social and political conservatism.
Instead he favoured a socio-religious work ethic in helping the
process of social and economic modernization. After the 1953 coup
the religious element was juxtaposed with ideas of historical
evolution and social law as to emphasize the necessity of
respecting the law and the position of the individual and thus
condemning arbitrary rule of government. Throughout the various
juxtapositionings of the religious elements the change of the
interpretations is of most interest.
With the formation of FMI Bazargan's interpretation of the
religious element in social consciousness is that of social
identity. While maintaining his former understandings Bazargan now
wished to use Islam as the foundation of national identity upon
which a political protest could be built. One could well ask what
is the reason for the change of interpretation? Why has Bazargan
appealed to the religious element rather than a secular one? Why
has the traditional element become so forceful at the cost to the
secular one? It seems one of the reasons for this turn of events
was the defeat of both the secular liberal and Marxist positions
in confrontation with the ruling political tyranny. The political
developments of 1940-53, 1953-60 and 1960-63 manifested the
inability of these two ideas to deal with the political problems
of the era. These two ideas which sought to achieve either/or
political liberalism, social justice and anti-colonial neutrality
had accepted defeat in the face of the dominant Modernist/royalist
ideology which sought state expansion, social modernization,
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secularization, authoritarian government and state controlled
economic growth. Bazargan and his collaborators sought to stand
against the ruling trend and to this end they thought of religion
as an indispensable foundation of social identity and as a factor
that could differentiate their social identity and interpretation
of constitutionalism from that of the Shah. It was the problem of
facing an audience, addressing an audience and attracting an
audience which concerned the FMI activists more than anything
else. Mobilization of the people against the government is a
primary objective of any political group. FMI wished to come
closer to the people and in this context believed that it had to
operate within the language, culture and logic of the people. It
is from such a platform that FMI identified with the Indian social
movement led by Mahatma Gandhi whom FMI portrays as having a
religious identity before a national or political one and whose
philosophy is based on India's indigenous culture. 18
Consciousness
Aiming at the political mobilization of people, Bazargan
argued that the element of consciousness was one of greater
significance than the material conditions of the people. It seems
this position was in reply to Marxist conceptions of political
activity which viewed the material/economic conditions as the
necessary prelude to class struggle and revolution. In contrast
Bazargan believed that the material difficulties were merely
circumstantial and only a backdrop for political struggle. It is
18 Later Bazargan wrote a book on the Indian nationalistmovement. Bazargan, M. Azadi-ye Hend Liberation of India (Tehran,Omid, 1977).
199
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not sufficient for a people to be in poor material conditions, he
argued, before they initiate political movements. Instead there
was a need for a °feeling of discontentment, rebelliousness and
protest." This realm of instincts, emotions and ideas is the
source of political movement. Furthermore this realm is synonymous
with that of religion and religious consciousness. Hence Bazargan
concludes the necessity to mobilize religion alongside, if not as
a substitute, for nationalism. 19
Under all conditions the sources of the movement of a
[social] unit are the spiritual sufferings and passions,
not material elements. The agents for political struggle
are the emotions, instincts and ideas. Altogether things
spiritual rather than material. 20
The problem that Bazargan had put in terms of
contradiction between consciousness and materialism has been an
issue of debate since the time of Greeks in various traditions of
political thinking, including epistemology as an area of
philosophy. For instance in Marxism the initial notion was that
ideology is an element in the superstructure and thus determined
by the economic base. This position was gradually criticized as
being too reductionist. Later Marxist theorists including Gramsci
and Althusser tried to give the ideological factor or the realm of
consciousness its own relative autonomy. 21 The aim of Bazargan's
19 NRM Documents, V.2, pp.236-237.20 NRM Documents, V.2, p.237.21 Curtis, M. Marxism (Atherton Press, New York, 1970) Part
One, passim. Donald, J. & Hall S. Politics and Ideology (OpenUniversity Press, Milton Keynes, 1986) p. 148.
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argument, it seems, is to reject popular leftist notions of the
day that until the material conditions have developed to such a
level as to create class antagonism then social struggle and
political movements would not emerge. The argument was thus
addressed to the left and those influenced by it. Unfortunately
Bazargan does not give historical or actual evidence for his view.
Taking into account the political climate of the period, if we
accept Bazargan's argument that consciousness is the main element
in initiating social protest and that this consciousness is a
religious one, then the socio-political consequence of this
position could only be the strengthening of the religious
discourse, identity and community .
The Religious Establishment
The third element that went into the construction of the
religious theme in the FMI ideological structure was on the social
role of the clerics. Bazargan initiated contacts with the clerics
from the early days of its formation. Two clerics were involved in
its foundation: Ayatollah Abolfaz1 Zanjani and Ayatollah Taliqani.
Though not a senior cleric at the time Taliqani was to play an
important leadership role not only in the Freedom Movement but
later in the 1979 revolution. Zanjani's role was more of a patron.
He gave his blessing to the newly founded movement and prayed that
it would succeed in its social activities including close
relations with the National Front.
The use of what might be coined Islamic symbolism is
evident from party documents. In order to draw closer to public
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opinion FMI pamphlets were peppered with popular and familiar
religious quotes and phrases. For instance almost all of their
important communiques and publications started with an Islamic
axiom. These included the opening verses of Koranic Suras: In the
name of God, the compassionate and the merciful, or Imam Hosain's
famous quote: Life is but a belief and struggle in its defence, or
another famous Koran verse: Verily never will God change the
condition of a people until they change it themselves. 22 It is
significant to note that nationalist symbols gradually changed to
religious as FMI's perception of its audience changed. For example
communiques were addressed to Muslims as well as countrymen. 23
Furthermore FMI started using holy days for political
gatherings. This practice was of course nothing new within the
traditional community, as well as the National groups. However to
put this at the centre piece of political action of a group of
modern educated intellectual, it indicated an important turn of
events. FMI put the emphasis on Ashura, the day when Imam Hosain
died in the battle of Karbala. The Hosain paradigm runs deep in
the popular Shiite psyche for he is taken as the high symbol of
martyrdom and sacrifice. 24
22 The Koran, XIII, 11.23 FMI Documents, V.1 p.196.24 Martyrdom, particularly that of Imam Hosain, but also of
other Shiite Imams plays a central role in Shiite thought. Bygiving his life for his religion, Hosain provided successivegenerations of Shiites with the major paradigm of their sufferingand persecution. His martyrdom on the day of Ashura, is marked bypassion plays and telling of stories which reenact his martyrdom.The theme adds highly emotional content to the rituals of Shiism.Kramer, M. Shiism Resistance and Revolution, (Westview Press,Boulder) p.55.
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However what might be called the strategic linkage
between FMI and the clerics did not come until the Shah's White
Revolution programme and the June uprising. With the approach of
the proposed referendum for the reform programme the clerics
instigated acts of provocation. 25 At this point FMI moved in
defence of the clerics and published several pamphlets addressed
to the educated modern middle classes explaining and justifying
the position adopted by the religious establishment. 26 Indeed the
radical and active entrance of the senior clerics into political
life was a dream that the FMI ideologue had nurtured for many
years. It was his thesis that the religious community should
become socially and politically active and with the emergence of
clerical opposition to the reform programme the dream was becoming
true. FMI congratulated the clerics and thanked them for their
bravery, enlightenment and coordination:
After 56 years since the clerics were the flag holders,
natural leaders and creators of law in the Constitutional
Movement, the Muslim people of Iran [now] look with wonder
and hope at their collective return [to the political
scene]. 27
25 Akhavi identifies four factions among the Ulama at thisstage; one sympathetic to the government, the other neutral whilethe third and fourth were in the opposition but with variousdegrees of militancy. The bulk of the clerics fell within the lasttwo groups. Akhavi, S. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p.103.
26 For FMI position on the clerical establishment see FillDocuments, V.1, pp.174-178, 196-202, and 250-252.
27 FMI Documents, V.1, p.176.203
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The defence of the clerics was in reaction to state
propaganda against them on several issues: constitutionalism,
women, and social reforms. 28 FMI expressed no doubt that the
clerics supported free elections and democratic social progress.
The general principles of Islam, FMI said, were in no way in
contradiction to democratic change. Referring again to the
Constitutional Revolution, Ayatollah Naini was mentioned as a case
of clerical defence of constitutionalism. In a later section 29
there will be a detailed discussion of Naini's influence on
Bazargan, however it is significant to point out here that a
leading Ayatollah, Naini did write an important tract in defence
of the country's first constitution and against tyranny.
FMI believed in what turned out, in the following decade,
to be a great blunder in thinking that there were internal safe
guards in Islam against the tyrannical practice in government and
that the clerics would honour democratic obligations. These
guarantees (FMI as articulated by its ideologue, Bazargan,
believed) included the belief that the practice of choosing the
religious Marja'-e Taqlid or the source of imitation in religious
28 Khomeini and his followers were not agitating against theland reforms. The spearhead of their attack was against theproposal concerning election bill and women's rights. The localelection bill not only gave the vote women, it replaced the Koranin the induction ceremonies with "my holy book'. In other words itrecognized the holy book of other religions. The message thatKhomeini and his entourage emphasized was the danger of the billfor Islam. Emphasis on this point rather than land reform, mighthave been due to tactical considerations and in fact that theirappeal found greater response from the population. But it was inthe context of increasing secularism, undermining of traditionalsociety, and the loss of power by the clergy, that the clericalobjections rose.
29 See Bazargan's defence at the military court.204
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rituals, practices and duties was democratic in the sense that it
allowed the individual to change his religious master should he
think it necessary. FMI believed this model would carry over into
politics and that the practice of government according to Islamic
laws would follow the same principle and would be democratic.
Furthermore, FMI believed Ejtehad, or the principle of independent
juristic reasoning (which allows senior clerics to review all
existing jurisprudence and pass new judgment) meant that the
religious establishment would be able to up-date its position from
ritualistic practices of the bygone ages into contemporary modern
social setting. 30
The other issue on which FMI defended the clerics was the
land reform. The government claimed that the clerics were in
opposition to the land reform for they were themselves benefactors
of the feudal system. 31 FMI, however, believed the clerics had
never benefited from the wealth of the feudal classes, that
financial support for them came from the lower social strata and
that all Waqf or endowment lands were in fact controlled by the
government. Furthermore it believed that the clerics would support
government repossession of lands which had been usurped, against
Islamic land laws, by the big landlords. It was perceptive of FMI
leadership to realize that the political aim of the reforms was to
undermine the conservative political rivals of the state and make
30 For a discussion on Ejtehad and Taqlid as codes of Muslimlaw see Kaman, M.H. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (IslamicText Society, Cambridge, 1991) Chap. 19, passim.
31 Information about the political movement of the radicalclerics in this period is scarce but for brief summaries seeAkhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p.103-105, and/Caddie, Roots of Revolution, p.158.
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the state bourgeoisie not only the ruling but the only elite.
Addressing the regime one FMI communique said:
Your [state's] extended feudal government would be
relatively more dangerous than the government of the
feudals. 32
The other issue was that of women. The government reforms
had proposed the extension of electoral rights to women. The
clerics had opposed the move on the grounds that "since the
meddling of women in social affairs would require prohibited acts
as well as continuous and multiple corruption, it is forbidden and
must be prevented". 33 Needless to say the clerics demanded the
social limitation of women to the traditional sphere of life. FMI
appeared to defend the clerics by claiming that what the clerics
wanted was by no means reactionary and was not intended at
limiting the freedom and rights of the women. The clerics, FMI
ingenuously claimed, wished for the establishment for
parliamentary democracy where all including women would have the
right to vote. Indeed in Islam women were allowed to directly
appoint attorneys to deal with their property and interests. But
the intention of extending the voting right to women, FMI believed
was to "politicize women, prevent them from their natural duties
and create quarrels in families". The clerics had never been known
as champions of women's causes and FMI's stand on the issue was
supportive of clerics.
32 FMI Documents, V.1, p.201.33 Quote from a tract distributed by the clerical
establishment at the time of proposed electoral reforms. FMIDocuments, V.1, p.175.
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The Islamic Mass Appoal
With the arrest of the FMI leadership there is a marked
shift towards closing of ranks with the clergy. 34 This
cooperation turned into a strategic linkage once the June uprising
had broken out and shaken the regime to its foundation. For
instance while in a year of activity up to the uprising there are
only 10 cases of reference in FMI publications to individual
clerics (8 cases to Taligani and 2 cases to Zanjani) 35
immediately after the disturbances and in a space of several
months the number goes over the 35 mark (Ayatollah Khomeini 20
times, Ayatollah Milani 8 and Ayatollah Shari'atmadari 7). All the
post-uprising publications deal with the uprising in one way or
another. The clerical leadership of the "sacred" uprising is
praised for its bravery as well as for upholding the symbols of
religion and freedom. The uprising is further said to indicate the
wide social base of the clergy and social support for the "Great
Idol Breaker - Ayatollah Khomeini".36
The historic [June] battle ... is the brilliant embodiment
of the ideals that we have longed for while struggling for
many years under the sacred flag of the National Movement
... The absolute unity of the Freedom Movement of Iran
(the vanguard of the revolutionary forces of the National
Front) with the noble clerics who lead the struggles of
34 It is not known who was running FMI after the arrest ofthe leadership cadre.
35 FMI Documents, V.1. index.36 The term refers to the story of Abraham breaking the
idols of his forefather's to reveal their weakness and undermineidol-worship. See The Koran, XXI 51-77.
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the nation, has shaken the foundation of the oppressive
ruling establishment. 37
Constitutional and democratic government
Besides Islamic identity the second element which went to
construct the political perception of the FMI was the necessity of
constitutional and democratic government. FMI opposition to the
person of the Shah and the government of All Amini fell within
this context. Each of these issues will be dealt with in sequence.
FMI's emphasis on law stemmed from the fact that the
practice of government was arbitrary. There has already been a
discussion on Bazargan's ideas on law in the 1953-60 period. Now
that political pressure had been reduced, he (as the FMI
ideologue) saw fit to use the opportunity to make his views
explicit. Furthermore not only had the regime suffered a set back
but it was also endorsing democracy so as to portray a non-
authoritarian image. The ball was in the court of the opposition
and they had the initiative, at least for the time being.
The audience which such arguments would have appealed to
would have been those who had fallen victim to the arbitrary
practices of power, both within the modern educated intellectuals
as well as the traditional community. The language, its quality,
articulation and sophistication did consciously or otherwise,
appeal to an educated class. The FMI must have believed that
37 FMI Documents, V.1, p.332.208
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expression of these ideas would attract sufficient number of
people to their cause and that this would make a difference in the
political balance. FMI's argument on law consistently referred to
the Iranian constitution. Various articles in the constitution
were used as points of reference to condemn the regime and the
person of the Shah in their arbitrary practice of government.
The lineage of such social perception went back to the
National Resistance Movement (1953-56) and the National Movement
(1949-53) which in turn have their source of inspiration in the
Constitutional Movement (1905). They all shared an effort towards
regulating government practices and ending the arbitrary rule of
government. It should be pointed out that there was no logical
contradiction in FMI's constitutional perception and that of
Islamic identity. The simple fact is that FMI's and Bazargan's
political interpretation of Islam was basically a constitutional
and democratic one and they even went as far as believing that the
clerics too were in search of constitutional and democratic
government.
FMI's diagnosis of Iranian social problems lay in the
arbitrary lawlessness of the government. The gist of all socio-
political difficulties, it was said, lay in the fact that the
boundaries of law, particularly the constitution were not kept. To
remedy the problem the FMI placed as the first article of its
manifesto the necessity of respect for the law:
[FMI intends to] revive the constitution and to establish
the rule of law in order to determine the limits and the209
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responsibilities of the various [government] powers so as
to safeguard the true government of the people for the
people. 38
A number of constitutional articles, from the main text as
well as the supplement, were repeatedly appealed to. The articles
included those allowing the parliament and not the monarch to
interfere in socio-political affairs (articles 1, 2, 15, 27),
those limiting the power of the regent (44, 48, 64), calling for
the separation of powers (11, 27, 28, 71, 79, 81) freedom of the
press (20) and freedom of association (21). Furthermore it was
said that the legality of government practices was dependent on
public opinion, public interests, and public satisfaction. Such
proper practice of government, the FMI hoped would put a peaceful
and just end to social conflicts and safeguard the rights of the
nation.
People wish for the establishment of a legal government
according to the constitution. Today it must be confessed
that only a parliament dependent on the people and a
government dependent on the parliament are able to
liberate the country from the current dangerous crisis. It
must be accepted that the philosophy of establishing the
constitution and the National Consultative Assembly
[parliament] was to prevent the creation of such crisis.39
38 NRM Documents, V.1 p. 2539 FMI Documents, V.1, p.154.
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It was for violation of the constitution that FMI
criticized the Shah and said that he should reign rather than
govern. 40 The FMI interpreted the constitution as having excluded
the monarch from government responsibility and having demanded
accountability from the cabinet of ministers. Obviously FMI was
unhappy with the Shah's direct control over Iranian politics,
including the appointment of the prime minister and the monarch's
political manipulations. However the FMI did not go so far as to
call for the change or disbandment of the institution of monarchy.
Rather it hoped that the institution would continue indefintely
with the Shah leaving political and executive matters to the
government. Of course this was an impossible thing to ask, for the
monarch was deeply involved in politics and the slightest
withdrawal from it would have had disastrous political
consequences for him. However it seems FMI was not insincere in
its calls for a constitutional monarchy. Although as we shall see
FMI attacks on the Shah increased after the June 1963 uprising.
In this regard FMI's tactic was to attack not the person
of the king, for that could provoke harsh consequences, but to
blame all ills on those around him. It was also common to quote
others in contradiction to what the king had said. These included
the use of speeches made by prime minister Amini or journalistic
articles from the foreign press which had a free hand in reporting
Iranian affairs. In several instances the fate of the Shah's
father and his death in exile, was mentioned as a warning to the
monarch's authoritarian rule.
40 For details of FMI opinion on the Shah see FMI Documents, V.1, p.133-156, and 95-103.
211
The Islamic Mass Appoal
However with the bloody suppression of the June uprising
the tone of the FMI towards the Shah changed. Giving him a
collection of titles including the "bloodthirsty mad howler
criminal", it called for the overthrow of the hated regime. There
was no longer any reference to the constitution for FMI saw the
regime on the verge of definite collapse and destruction. It
should be kept in mind however that all the FMI's publications
after the uprising were written and prepared by the new
leadership. The senior members, including Bazargan, were in
prison. It is not known how much they would have approved of the
radical new shift.
In the second place, following the issue of
constitutionalism was democracy. It should be taken into account
that the "democratic" idea of FMI although significant in its own
right received less attention than that of constitutionalism. FMI
believed the right and power of the Iranian nation to determine
its own fate was a divine providence and people had a right of
social activity to articulate their natural potentials. 41 Towards
this end it was vital that the freedoms of association, political
organization (including that of labour unions) and expression
should be respected. There should be an end to the practice of
arrests, imprisonments, exiles, tortures and executions. In the
eyes of the FMI the nation had sufficient political education and
was prepared to take up the challenge of living in a democratic
41 On FMI's concept of Freedom see FMI Documents, V.1, p.24-43, 65, 280-210.
212
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society. Whether this assessment of Iranian society was realistic
remained to be seen but the FMI was clearly acknowledging the
concept of popular democracy.
Today in the Iranian society issues such as . the
revival of the constitution or the expansion of
democratic [practices] . have left the domain of
intellectual circles to become a powerful popular demand.
Every man on the street can today express clear opinions
on the generalities of these issues. 42
For the FMI the most significant element of democracy was
the freedom and necessity to hold free elections. This idea was
reinforced by the 1940-53 experience where the National Movement
grew out of parliamentary democracy and was later paralyzed as the
result of restrictions imposed on the democratic practices. The
function and the aim of elections was to be to force the state
back from public life and the political sphere. FMI believed that
now there was an element of political openness it was necessary to
expand the democratic practice and guarantee a healthy ongoing
process through the holding of elections and sending popular
figures into the parliament. The emphasis on free elections was a
form of insurance policy in the face of an uncertain future.
It was the issue of free elections which also, initially,
determined the FMI policy towards the Amini government. 43 As
42 FMI Documents, V.1, p.24.43 For FMI's position on Amini see FMI Documents, V.1,
pp.77-78, 141, 208.213
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pointed out earlier, Amini wished to carry out the land reform
programme single handed and towards this end, as well as with
Shah's approval, he had closed down the parliament where the
conservative landed elements were most powerful. The FMI and along
side it the various parties participating in the Second National
Front, were critical of the closure of the parliament for they saw
their only hope of maintaining some form of control over
government through presence in the parliament. Amini was prepared
to and did relax restrictions on the National Front forces
including the FMI, in the hope that they would ease their attacks
on him and even join him against the traditional establishment.
However the FMI and the National Front saw Amini in a different
light and refused to accept the offer. FMI refused to acknowledge
that there were differences between Amini's position and that of
the ruling establishment. Furthermore it disliked Amini for his
earlier post-coup cabinet posts with Prime Minister Zahedi.
Amini's government is a safety valve . . designed for
limited bestowing of freedom and fight against corruption
... However Amini has started a revolution to save his own
class [and that's why] he refuses to hold elections. 44
But a few months into the Amini administration the FMI's
criticism of his government came to end. It seems the FMI realized
that weakening of Amini could only strengthen the Shah and the
conservative establishment. All attacks in FMI publications on
Amini were dropped. Although there was no expression of support
44 FMI Documents, V.1, p.208.214
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for him in any way, neither were there any attacks. Other forces
of the Second National Front however continued their attacks on
the prime minister. From the FMI's point of view, that support
should have been extended to Amini seems wise enough, for once he
had gone the Shah returned only to establish his absolute practice
of government.
Tactical issues
There were several tactical issues which were of
importance to the FMI. These included relations with the Second
National Front, the role of Mosaddeq, pin pointing an audience and
organizing supporters. There is no doubt that relations with the
National Front were of great importance and that the FMI tried to
develop a thorough policy with regards to it. 45 Before the
establishment of the FMI, Bazargan and associates had represented
the NRM in the Second National Front 46 while after the
establishment of FMI, there were working relations between the two
organizations and the FMI members, including Bazargan participated
in the SNF as individuals rather than party representatives. The
FMI only joined the Front until the formation of the Third
National Front (1965). In over 300 pages of FMI documents left
from the early 1960's there are over 50 references and discussions
with regards to the issue of relations with the National Front.
Fill approach to the Second National Front was both supportive and
45 For relations with the NF see Fill Documents, V.1, p.16,51, 73, 78.
46 For organizational and political details of the NRM rolein the Second National Front see Chehabi, Iranian Politics andReligious Modernism, on the Second National Front, and Katouzian,Musaddig and the Struggle for Power in Iran, chap. 16, passim.
215
Th. Islamic Mass Appoal
critical. On the one hand it called for and emphasized cooperation
with and strengthening of the NF, and on the other hand it
criticized the Front for lack of a clear programme and its
conservatism.
Cooperation with the NF was on the cards from the very
early days. Concerned that the establishment of FMI might give an
impression that an alternative organization was being founded,
Bazargan addressed the issue in the FMI inauguration speech. He
emphasized that there was no possibility of FMI standing in
opposition to the NF and that the FMI saw itself as a
complementary element within the Front. Furthermore the FMI was
determined to follow the path and utilize the experience of the
Front. FMI went as far as to say that not only it was important
that the Front should be strengthened but that the leadership of
the opposition forces should rest with the Front. Weakening of the
Front's leadership, FMI believed, would lead to dispersion of the
activists and strengthening of the regime and the leftists. In one
communique it expressed its view as such:
The National Front is the symbol of our national unity for
its existence represents the common purpose of the
majority of patriots. 47
FMI's criticism of the Front was for its lack of a clear
programme. It believed that the member parties could not follow
their own independent policies until the Front's general strategy
47 FMI Documents, V.1, p.73.216
The Imlamic Mars Appeal
was clear. The Front's demands for free elections was not seen as
a sufficient challenge to the government's position on several
issues including bureaucratic reforms, economic development and
foreign relations. Criticism of efforts to turn the Front into a
single party was directed at the dominating elements in the
Front. 48 Accusations of conservatism of the Front went back to
when Bazargan and his associates were representing the NRM in the
Front and constituted it's radical wing along side the student
body. There were also differences over mass mobilization as
opposed to elite formation and party vs. individual membership.
Attacks on the Shah rather than Amini's government as the spear
head of the Front's political offensive was the other
controversial issue between the two organizations. 49
The image and the role of Mosaddeq was of importance in
the FMI. The foundation of the movement had had the blessing of
Mosaddeq who at the time was in exile in his private estate but
was able to communicate with activists. In the 300 pages of
documents sampled, there are more than one hundred references to
him. Once in every three pages the political activities, ideas,
relations, and policies of the old prime minister are referred to.
Most significantly Mosaddeq was praised for being a democrat and a
defender of democracy, for standing against colonialism, and for
proposing an economic policy free of oil revenues. He was also,
and clearly enough, mourned as the victim and the martyr of the
1953 coup.
49 On efforts to turn the second National Front into asingle party see Katouziaa, Mosaddeq and the Struggle for Power in Iran p.228.
49 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, p.147.217
Th. Imlamic Mass Appoal
However FMI's attachment to Mosaddeq, as in the case of
NRM, was ideological as well as pragmatic. It is significant to
note that in comparison with the NRM period, there was now a less
analytical approach to Mosaddeq. It seems as the years passed, a
greater sense of formalism took over. The passionate personal
attachment and policy modelling gradually gave way to his
recruitment for mere propaganda purposes. However the respect that
FMI held for Mosaddeq and his ideas should not be underestimated.
In Bazargan's description of his own associates they were Muslims,
patriots, constitutionalists and Mosaddeqists:
We are Mosaddeqist [for] we know him to be one of the
great servants of Iranian honor ... He was the only head
of government in Iranian history who was truly elected by
the people and who walked in the path that the nation
desired. He united the people to the government and
managed to defeat colonialism. 50
An important idea that emerged in the structure of FMI's
political thinking was that of struggle and its organization. In
the ten years after the coup the regime had increased its
political hold over the country. There was little public
participation in political affairs. To offset this stalemate FMI
insisted on the necessity of political struggle. One of the main
party pamphlets "Religion and Political Struggle" devotes a large
section to the study of the nature of struggle. Although not
50 FMI Documents, V.1, p.18.218
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indicated on the published pamphlet the work was by Bazargan. Here
three themes can be detected in FMI's concept of struggle: Social
responsibility/consciousness, effort and sacrifice.
Social consciousness was said to be important for it
enlightened the individual to the fact that he had to take
responsibility for his social fate. Effort was the main element
for without action there would be no movement. And finally
sacrifice of wealth and life was said to be the final ingredient
which if not invested would bring no returns. To support these
arguments, and typical by Bazargan, a scientific hue was given to
the theme. Quoting Conte due Nouy's work in L'homme et sa
destinee, it was said that struggle was necessary for evolution in
all spheres of life not only political but also the scientific and
ideological. Life was said to be cycles of discontent, struggle
and progress.
Struggle is carried out by an individual, association or
nation against the existing conditions with the hope of
changing it to a desired condition ... Whatever exists in
terms of civil and moral beliefs owe their existence to
these struggles and revolutions. Struggle on the path of
history is the very same as mutation in the process of
evolution of species. If it was not for these mutations,
struggles and revolutions, humans would have not
advanced.51
51 Religious and Political Struggle, p.2-3.219
The Islamic Na.. Appilal
Addressing the religious audience it was further added
that social and political struggle was divine providence. In
highlighting sacrifice examples were given from the Algerian war
against the French and the case of the female activist Jamyleh
Bupasha. The story of a Muslim anti-colonialist woman activist was
certain to attract attention.
There has already been a discussion of the significance of
labour in Bazargan's ideas in the 1940's and also of the NRM's
emphasis on the importance of organization in the 1950's. One of
the reasons for the establishment of the FMI was in criticism of
other organizations, including the NF, for their lack of
organizational discipline, programme and political vigour. This
perception was to stay with FMI for sometime to come. It was also
to be adopted by others and take an increasingly important role in
the formation of the FMI offshoot, the Peoples' Mojahedin
Organization.
Furthermore there was an emphasis on organizing mass
struggle, for spontaneous social movements were said to be not
sufficient in achieving the desired social goals. The problem lay
in the fact that while the government was thought to be well
organized and acting according to plans, the opposition lacked
both organization and a programme. The solution lay in creating an
organization capable of, on the one hand ideological work
including intellectual training and propaganda, and on the other
hand of coordinating the activities of members.
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The Islamic Na.. Appeal
In the process of political education and organization the
FMI had to establish a social base. The main battleground from
which it recruited was the universities. University students had
become increasingly political in the 1940's and had maintained the
political atmosphere despite government efforts to the contrary.
With the opening up of the political climate in the early 1960's
the students had returned to activism with a vengeance. The
students constituted an important element in the Second National
Front and were the vanguard of its radical wing. A noticeable
portion of the FMI i s communiques were either addressed to
university students or were written by the student section of the
group. The issues which these communiques addressed were on the
social responsibility of students, the vanguard position of the
student element, provocations against government interference in
universities and organization of student protest against the
regime.
As long as a single student remains in the county, there
will be struggle towards thwarting the sinister designs of
the ruling elite, towards the liberation of the nation and
towards the establishment of national and constitutional
government. 52
The White Revolution
FMI viewed the proposed White Revolution as a ploy on
behalf of the Shah, the Americans and a consequence of
misunderstanding by Iranian intellectuals. FMI's views on the
52 FMI Documents, V.1 p.131. Also see pp.104, 111, 129, 259.221
The Islamic Mass Appeal
White Revolution were spelled out in the pamphlet "Iran on the
Verge of a Great Revolution. Within 24 hours of the distribution
of the pamphlet all leading members of the group were arrested.
Basically FMI believed that the land reforms were of no
significance because Iran had never been a feudal society. The
reforms were designed, it said, to increase state political
control and would only bring economic disaster. Surprisingly, the
FMI added that it would welcome application of Islamic standards
to landownership as interpreted by Sayyed Mahmud Taliqani which
called for public ownership of land. 53
Primarily the FMI said the reforms were an effort to
reinforce the rule of tyranny. In other words the socio-political
position of the landlords and the clergy were to be sacrificed (as
was already the case with the intellectuals, political elite and
the military) towards consolidating the position of the Shah. This
was carried out under a pseudo-revolutionary programme created on
the models which had emerged in radical regimes such as that of
Egypt's Naser, India's Nehru and Cuba's Castro. At the cost of
losing the support of the traditional elite the regime aimed at
attracting the support of the farmers and the workers. However
this was a temporary affair as it would fail to solve any social
problems. The Americans were said to be also interested in the
reform programme on the grounds that it would create a barrier
against communist influence and would guarantee that their
financial assistance would not be wasted in a corrupt bureaucracy.
At the same time many Iranian intellectual, specially those on the
53 FMI Documents, V.1, pp.202-221.222
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left were under the illusion that Iran had a feudal social system
and that it was the feudal class which controlled the political
power and opposed social progress. On the contrary, the FMI said,
Iran was controlled by a centralized government operating through
a modern military force. The institution which had benefited most
from the control of land was not the landowning class but the
state and the Royal Court in particular.
When faced with a dopy gendarme, a skinny state clerk or
an addicted tax collecter, a landowner despite all his
wealth . is but a helpless toy. Regardless of his
control over peasants, the landlord has no power in
comparison to the state. The very fact that re-
possessioning of land has taken place with such ease and
speed, is the best indication that feudalism has not
existed in Iran as it did in medieval Europe. 54
The FMI was also critical of the manner in which the
reforms were planned. Too little time and attention were paid to
the details and the whole programme which included at least six
major issues of controversy were put to public referendum. The
fact that there had been no public debate, that the press was
controlled by the government and that the regime could not be
trusted to carry out an unbiased voting were further evidence of
the illegality of the whole affair.
54 FMI Documents, V.1, p.206.223
The Islamic Mame Appeal
The consequence of the reforms, the FMI said, would be
economic disaster. The destruction of the traditional patterns of
ownership in agriculture, and the requirement of the worker's
partial ownership of industrial units would create in-stability
and depression in all economic and productive organs. 55
Furthermore pseudo-reforms, the FMI warned, would sacrifice human
ideals in terms of social trust. Once desired social values, such
as social reforms, were used by governments as instruments of
misguiding the population, such ideals would lose their value,
leaving the people hopeless and in despair. In other words FMI was
complaining that the regime had ideologically disarmed the
opposition on their own terms. The FMI believed that the existing
patterns of landownership despite it's short comings were more
desirable than the prospect of chaos that would take over as the
result of the land reforms. The landlord, FMI argued, was an agent
of order, management, innovation and even occasional charity for
the simple reason that increase in production meant increase in
his own income. However the distribution of land would break up
the estates into units unable to pursue modern methods of
production. The government-proposed Producers and Consumers
55 A number of researches on the consequences of the landreforms confirm the worst of FMI's fears. Hoogland believes thatthe programme was a major contributing factor to Iran'sagricultural stagnation after 1970. Amid's research points to asocial polarization between the rich and the poor farmers. He alsodiscovers patterns of food production lagging behind populationgrowth, forcing the country to import. A yet grimmer picture ispainted by Maclachlan whose research indicates that thecombination of land reforms, general government economic policyand the boom in oil revenues led to severe and possiblyirreparable damage in large agricultural areas. See Hoogland, E.J.Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980 (University of Texas Press,Austin, 1982), Amid, M.J. Agriculture, Poverty and Reform in Iran (Routledge, London, 1990), Maclachlan, K. The Neglected Garden (Tauris, London, 1988).
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Cooperatives were also criticized for being far fetched and
impractical for Iranian society.
Negation of Tyranny
In comparison to the quiet post-coup years, in the 1960-63
liberalization period Bazargan returned with a vengeance to write
23 articles and pamphlets culminating, following his arrest, in a
350-page defence statement at the military tribunal. And it is
this defence statement which is of interest to us and which will
be discussed here. The list of Bazargan's writing in this period
(and the subsequent years in prison) reveals the spectrum of his
interests:
1959 The Social and Global Muslim 56
▪ God in Society 57
▪ The House of People 58
▪ Man and God 59
▪ The Teaching of Religion 60
1960 Revelation 61
▪ Ali and Islam 62
56 Mosalman-e Ijtema'ye va Jahani The Social and Global Muslim (Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977). The pamphlet isbased on a 1959 lecture and was first published in Iran in 1965.
57 Khuda dar Ijtema' (Book Distribution Centre, Houston,1979). First published in 1959.
58 Khaneh-e Mardom The House of People (Book DistributionCentre, Houston, 1978). First published in 1959.
59 Insan va Khuda, in Chahar Maqaleh (Enteshar Co. Ltd.Tehran, nd) First publication 1959.
60 Amuzesh-e Ta'limat-e Dini. Lectures at the ReligiousTeachers Training College.
61 Details not available.62 Ali va Islam, 2nd edition (Book Distribution Centre,
Houston, 1978). First published in the religious monthly Peykar-e Andisheh (1960).
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The Islamic Mass Appeal
▪ The Inevitable Victory 63
1961 Notes from the Hajj Pilgrimage 64
Automation 65
Islam: The Doctrine of Struggle and Productivity 66
The Lesson of Religiosity 67
68
▪ The Advantages and Disadvantages of Religion 69
1962 The Single Global Government 70
• Freedom of Choice 71
• The Boundary Between Religion and Social Issues 72
• The Young Islam 73
▪ The Advantages and Disadvantages of Religion 74
• Liberation of India 75
• Religious and Political Struggles 76
People's Expectation from Religious Leaders 77
63 Piruzi-ye Hatmi. Details not available.64 Yaddashti az Safar-e Hajj (Maktab-e Tashaiu'. Qom, 1961).65 Khud Jushi, in Chahar Magaleh (Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran,
nd.) The article was first read in a 1961 meeting of the IslamicAssociation of Engineers.
66 Islam: Maktabi Mobarez va Muvaled (Entesharat Alfath,Tehran, nd) The piece was written in 1961.
67 Dars-e Din Dan i (Tehran, 1961) (Book Distribution Centre,Houston, Texas, 1977).
68
69 Mazaya va Mazar-e Din, in The Good Need.70 Hokumat Jahani-ye Vahed (Book Distribution Centre,
Houston, 1978). Originally published in 1962.71 Ikhtiyar, 1962. No other detail available.72 Marz-e Miyan-e Din va Omur-e Ijtema'ye (Book Distribution
Centre, Houston, 1976). The piece was originally read to thesecond congress of Islamic Associations and printed in 1962.
73 Islam-e Javan, in Chahar Macialeh (Enteshar Co. Ltd.Tehran, nd). First published in 1962.
74 Mazaya va Mazar-e Din, in Nikniazi (Book DistributionCentre, Houston, 1976). The piece was written in 1962.
75 Azadi-e Hind (Omid, Tehran, 1977). Written in 1962.76 Mobarezeh Mazhabi Mobarezeh Siyasi, 1981.77 Entezar-e Mardom az Maraje', in Bahthi Darbareh-ye
Marja'iyat va Ruhaniyat.226
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1963 Defence Statement in the Non-jurisdicto Military Court of
Appeal 78
▪ Prayer 79
▪ The Prophet's Propagation 80
▪ The Sugar Wars in Cuba 81
1964 Wind and Rain in the Koran 82
1965 Atmospheric Phenomena 83
▪ The Endless Particle 84
1966 The Process of Evolution of the Koran 85
Bazargan's Defence statement in the Non-jurisdicto
Military Court of Appeal is of interest to us. The defence is in
two parts; the first section deals with the circumstances leading
to the establishment of the Freedom Movement of Iran and his own
involvement in politics. The second section is an ideological
construct in defence of democracy and constitutional government. A
number of sympathizers attending the trial taped Bazargan's speech
and published the first section in Tehran in 1964. However the
court did not allow the reading of the second section in which
Bazargan attacked the monarchy and accused it of tyranny and
78 Modafe'at Dar Dadgah-e Ghir-e Saleh-e Tajdid NadharNezami Defence Statement in the Non-jurisdicto Military Court ofAppeal (Modarres Publications, Bellville, 1977).
79 Du'a (Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1970). Written in prison(1963).
80 Tabligh-e Paighambar. Written in Prison (1963).81 Jang-e Shekar dar Kuba. Translated from French in prison
(1963).82 Bad va Baran dar Koran. Written in prison (1964)83 Padideh ha-ye Javi. Written in prison (1965).84 Zarreh-ye Bi Enteha, Second edition, Book Distribution
Centre.85 Sair-e Tahavul-e Koran. Written in prison (1966),
published in 1976. The second volume came out in 1981. Asupplement to the fist volume was published in 1983.
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despotism. The full and edited version of the defence was
published in the United States by Modarres Publications in 1971.
Six years later the 3rd edition was published by the Freedom
Movement of Iran's Foreign Division, but with no further editing.
The 350-page defence covers a number of points, including
the Movement's activities and ideas. But in terms of political
ideas it is the second section of the piece titled Why we oppose
tyranny but support the constitution and popular democratic
government that is of interest. 86 This argument is possibly
Bazargan's most comprehensive, articulate and typical polemic in
negating tyranny and defending democratic and constitutional
government. 87 The expression of these ideas is significant within
the then political context which witnessed transition to the
almost absolute consolidation of power by the monarch. In negation
of tyranny and approval of democracy and constitutional government
four core themes are presented by Bazargan: tyranny as the source
of social instability and historical discontinuity, tyranny as the
source of underdevelopment, tyranny as the cause of the corruption
of the individual and tyranny as the rejection of the religious
faith. The following section is an effort to analyze the various
aspects of his ideas.
Tyranny as the cause of social instability and historic
discontinuity
To indicate that tyranny is one, if not the only, cause of
social and historical discontinuity Bazargan puts forward ten
86 Bazargan, Defence pp.214-305.87
228
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different arguments. 88 In this section some of these arguments
are scrutinized. The overall argument is quite simple: tyranny is
not desirable because it creates a gulf between the rulers and the
ruled and thus brings about the weakening of the state and its
inevitable destruction. Here Bazargan is presenting a simple
cyclical concept of history with despotism being the root of the
downward trend. The social context of the discourse is easily
detectable: Bazargan was speaking at a period when the Shah had
consolidated his political position and the prime minister, 'Alam,
was a loyal Royalist. The democratic opposition had been
suppressed through arrests and the popular radical opposition had
been defeated through a massive violent crack down in which
hundreds and possibly thousands had been killed. The Shah had
gained the confidence of his American supporters and had
successfully embarked on a social programme that had undermined
his conservative rivals. The state led by the Royal Court was in
gear to consolidate its absolute authority.
With regard to the roots of the conception, Bazargan's
ideas seem to be genuinely his own in the sense that they are not
copies of ideas from an already existing body of discourse. The
condemnation of tyranny and call for democracy is the man's
genuine response to his own arrest and that of his political
collaborators as well as the massive political restrictions that
the establishment was imposing on society. Viewing a regime which
88 These arguments include the contradictory nature oftyranny to that of modern (Western) political experience,experience of the recently independent nations, functional anduncorrupt delegation of power, individual and public security,public morality and popular government.
229
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had taken, with a high degree of active unpopularity (as clearly
indicated by the bloody June disturbances) a turn towards greater
political suppression, Bazargan reacted by developing an argument
where on the one hand tyranny is condemned and on the other hand
tyranny is said to be unstable.
However it is of importance to have in mind that this very
idea was the argument put forward by the liberal wing of the
American establishment in the early 1960s. They argued that
regimes in the third world should liberalize politically in order
to obtain greater social base and therefore greater stability and
continuity in the face of the domestic or foreign inspired
communist threat. Indeed it was on the basis of this theory, which
developed after the popular communist revolution in Cuba, that the
Americans encouraged the Iranians into some form of reform in the
early 1960's. The argument in favour of democracy as a source of
stability was promoted mainly by American political scientists
from the 1950's onward. Is it possible that Bazargan might have
developed his argument on the instability of tyrannies under the
general influence of the ideas that were being expressed at the
time?
With regard to the coherence of Bazargan's argument it is
useful to point out that the argument for instability can be used
to defend tyrannies rather than condemning them. It is more common
to argue that since the desires and passions of the people are
unstable they are a cause for the unstable rule of government.
Authoritarian and absolute rule is therefore required so as to
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ensure the stability and consistency of civil life. But of course,
for many, this is not the same as tyranny. 89
As far as the function of Bazargan's argument is concerned
it is again possible to detect his efforts in condemning the
rationale that the regime was using for its survival. Bazargan was
calling for support in his objections to the increasing
authoritarian exercise of power by the regime. An exercise which
was limiting the political influence of the citizens. In this way
he was challenging the authority of the state in the name of the
citizen.
In his argument Bazargan first identifies the nature of
tyranny and goes on to explain its destructive consequences:
In this debate by tyranny we shall mean any form of
government irrespective of appearance or title,
irrespective of name and practice, which is based on the
judgment and decision of an individual or a group of
individuals who then rule without consulting or consent of
the subjects. It is irrelevant whether this despotism is
maintained in the name of benevolence and claims of good
service in the direction of reform and progress or it is
maintained by the interests and designs of individuals
immersed in injustice and corruption. 90
89 Monk. I.H. Conversations with, October 1990, Universityof Exeter.
90 Bazargan, Defence p.215.231
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Here the most central of Bazargan's arguments are with
references to Iran's own history, the experience of the post-
colonial independent countries, and modern (Western) civilization.
As regards Iran the argument is introduced by stating that the
whole course of Iran's history has witnessed tyrannical forms of
government of one sort or another, of one degree or another, and
that this tyranny is synonymous with the institute of monarchy.
It is correct [to say] that Iran has been managed
historically through tyranny ... [and that is why] the
secret of the country's survival is attributed to the
monarch, 91 ... Iran's tyrannical monarchy, with 2500-years
of history ... [has had] total hegemony over the commoners
and the elite, and [has ruled] over all aspects of social
life. 92
Bazargan goes on to accuse monarchies of having ruled
through arbitrary despotism.
This is a country where human beings are of no value where
no law or regulation exists, where there is no shelter for
the masses, where the interests and the will of the tyrant
are the words of law, where only through the approval of
the tyrant security is possible, and where violation of
peoples rights and destruction of their wealth and life by
the state functionaries is a common phenomenon.
91 Bazargan, Defence p. 222.92 Bazargan, Defence p. 232.
232
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Appointment and removals, orders and regulations, justice
and injustice are all made towards benefiting the rule of
tyranny. 93
Bazargan's claim that Iran has been ruled by tyranny in
its 2500 year history relies on references to various cases of
monarchs who are commonly known for their brutal treatment of
their subjects. However there is no philosophical articulation and
elaboration to the argument. It seems that the piece is intended
to be an extensive polemical work rather than an undertaking in
political philosophy.
The exercise of tyranny through the institution of
monarchy is then said to have destructive social and political
consequences. For one thing the exercise of power is given to
individuals who are necessarily corrupt. Subordination and blind
loyalty to the more powerful become the only methods of social
loyalty and the only practice expected of those in lower ranks. As
a result, the wishes and actions of the individual are directed
towards pulling closer towards the centre of power. The tendency
to seek favours with those in power in turn leads to mistrust and
insecurity, for it is no longer individual or social morality
which determines a person's social position and advance but the
desires of men in places of authority. In such a system people
realize that success lies in gaining access to the source of power
through whatever means. Abandoning all morals and righteousness
93 Bazargan, Defence, p.234.233
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they follow suite. Tyranny will then spread its tentacles
throughout society.
There is no need for encroachment and mistreatment to come
from the person of the tyrant or as the consequence of his
personal interests ... the rule of despotism causes the
method of tyrannical management to spread in all domains
be they that of government, security, agriculture, trade,
or even family. Every head of a section will be tyrannical
ruler unto himself. As to have an open hand with his
subordinates, it is [only] necessary to settle one's
account with the arch tyrant in one way or another. 94
A most destructive consequence of such circumstances is
the setting in of social apathy: people becoming distanced from
things politic. With the prevailing mistrust that follows there
will be no social base to support the regime.
The tyrant and his agents are left to themselves, the
establishment becomes rootless and support-less in the
face of constant and enormous fluctuations. No matter how
long the institution of the state is sustained, it will
remain rootless and highly underdeveloped [only] to be
destroyed with the change of its masters. 95
Since tyranny is dependent on an individual it can never
reach a state of stability, continuity, and constancy, either in
94 Bazargan, Defence p.235.95 Bazargan, Defence p.242
234
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part or in the whole. Popular discontent, natural depreciations,
domestic fluctuations and external pressures will constantly beat
it until it falls and is destroyed. 96 Bazargan refers to several
historical cases including that of the Islamic/Arab invasions of
Iran, the Mongul invasion and the fall of the Safavid, Afshar and
Zand dynasties to support his argument.
Tyranny as the Cause of the Corruption of the Individual
Bazargan however believes the greatest damage caused by
tyranny is spiritual in that despotism destroys the individual.
Here two core themes are put forward: tyrannies are inherently
corrupt and that man is inherently good and that he is aware of
this goodness. Here again Bazargan's analysis of the corruption of
tyranny is a functional one in the sense that deceit is seen as a
necessary element for the functioning of despotism.
We have already reviwed Bazargan's functionalist approach
to social studies, as indicated from his earlier views on the
natural laws of evolution. The roots of Bazargan's functional
critique of tyranny can then be detected in Bazargan's
"scientific" vision of the world. In other words Bazargan is
trying to prove that deceit is a "function" of tyranny or a
"malfunction" of the natural society. The deceit that Bazargan is
referring to could possibly be the political maneuvering of the
Royal Court in liberalizing the political and economic system or
the propaganda of the regime in portraying the rule of the Shah as
divinely inspired. The °inherent goodness of man" which is said to
96 Bazargan, Defence, p.244.235
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be destroyed by the deceit of tyranny is a natural concept in that
it views man as being good in himself. This goodness is viewed as
being moral in the sense that man has the inherent capacity to
distinguish between truth and falsehood.
The roots of the concept are naturally religious in that
we know Bazargan's personal moralism to be religious rather than
humanist. The coherence of the general argument depends on
acceptance of the two basic concepts, ie. that despotism is by
nature deceitful and that man is by nature good as well as able to
detect the difference between falsehood and truth.
Bazargan believes that tyranny is based on deceit, the
source of all immorality. This is due to the fact that the tyrant
has to project qualities that are not of his own to protect his
un-divine and un-elected rule. Qualities attributed to the
individual ruler are either exaggerated or are outright
fabrications. Here the individual person will have to either
accept the deceit or stand against it. Opposing the deceit would
certainly mean inviting the wrath of the state and losing one's
source of security and subsistence.
Once the victim of the state, the individual will suffer
humiliation and loss of self respect. To live and lead a normal
social life would demand the appeasing of the rulers and the
accepting of deceit. But this would mean participation, even
though unwilling, in the act of falsehood. Once the individual has
become a partner in the deception he begins to lose his self
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respect and self dignity. Finally he sinks to the level of the
animal. To facilitate the process of corruption, the state
actively encourages the de-politicisation of the individual
through providing trivial engagements. 97
In a despotic society for those who do not wish to
surrender completely and thus lose their individual
personality but are neither ready to sacrifice, resist and
confront the establishment, there is only one way out: to
use deceit, fraud and dishonestly through flattery towards
the benefactor and the master. Deceit, hypocrisy and
swindling become defensive measures to protect one's
property and life or to appease the powerful. Needless to
say that fraud and hypocrisy require the disappearance, or
at least fading away of the human character ... [Man will]
then be even inferior to the animal since he has been
denied his natural instincts and intelligence.
Tyranny must be seen as the source of all corruption,
because it is founded on deceit. This is because to
portray the un-natural, un-divine and un-elected rule of
an individual ruler, there has to be an exaggeration of
his qualities in the eyes of the people. In attracting
97 The Shah's regime actively encouraged non-politicalsocial entertainment, such as popular music, cinema, and fashionas an alternative to politicisation, specially that of the youth.The state sponsored cultural engagements were seen by theopposition as a de-politicising process. In latter years andwithin this context several terrorist attempts were made byunderground organizations to bomb cultural festivals. Bazargan'sreferences to the "process of corruption" seems to be a responseto this situation.
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qualities to him which are not his, honesty is lost as a
social practice and the individual becomes a participant,
even though unwillingly, in this process of fabrication.98
Tyranny as the Rejection of Religion
Bazargan also rejected the rule of tyranny by appealing to
religious and Islamic arguments. The arguments put forward by
Bazargan on the one hand appeal to traditional Islamic themes, in
this case the Koran and the Sunna (ie. the traditions of the
prophet) and on the other hand refer to the position and history
of the religious institutions in Iran.
(References to Islamic Institutions) Bazargan's argument
tries to utilize traditional Islamic themes to state that tyranny
is contrary to both the logic of the Koran and the way in which
the Prophet Mohammad conducted social affairs. This argument draws
on an existing book "Admonition to the Community and Exposition to
the Nation by Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad Hosain Naini (1860-1936).
Naini's political carrier centred around the 1906 Constitutional
Revolution when the clerics were divided in support of the
Constitutional Movement and against the absolute rule of the
monarchy. There had been several efforts in trying to legitimize
constitutionalism in a country where only Islamic and Royalist
interpretations had any precedent. Notable among these works was
98 Bazargan, Defence p.260238
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the one by Naini who is said to have presented the most coherent
and typical of views held by the senior clergy. 99
Naini's basic argument is to first state the undisputed
necessity of authority and government and then to condemn the
tyrannical form of government and to defend the constitutional
one. Naini describes tyranny as the arbitrary action of a ruler
without consideration for others. The ruler treats the country as
his private property and in spite of his defects, he ascribes to
himself the attributes of God. Furthermore people are treated like
slaves and thus fail to enjoy the benefits of full human life. On
the matter of evidence presented in support of the arguments Naini
appeals to the traditional sources of Islamic theology, Koran and
the Hadith.
The main intellectual influence on Naini 100 is said to
have come from Sayyed Abdul al-Rahman al-kawakibi's work
"Characteristics of Tyranny and Destruction of Enslavement". 101
In turn large parts of Kawakibi's work has been traced to a small
99 Naini's case is discussed in detail in Hairi, A.H. Shiismand Constitutionalism in Iran (Brill Leiden, Netherlands, 1977).Naini's book was republished by Bazargan's close associateAyatollah Taliciani.
100 Hairi, Shiism and Cosntitutionalism in Iran, p.159.101 Kawakibi (d.1903) was a strong opponent to the despotism
of the Ottoman rulers. One of his two books, The Characteristics of Tyranny, Taba'i al-Istebdad wa Musari al-Istibdad was writtenunder the influence of Vittorio Alfieri who had written on thesame subject. It is not clear when the book was written. Houranireports it to have been translated into Turkish in 1897 andpublished in Geneva. Chehabi says that the book was firstpublished in Cairo in 1905 and translated into Persian andpublished the following year. Hourani, A. Arabic Thought in theLiberal Age (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1962) p.271-273. Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, p.
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work 'Della Tirannide .. by Vittorio Alfieri, a forerunner of
Italian nationalism 102 whon is said to have delighted in the works
of Montesquieu.
Bazargan adapted the main logic of Naini's argument yet
the main examples that he draws from Koranic verses and the Hadith
are not those used by Naini. Bazargan also dropped substantial
parts of Naini's argument in condemnation of ignorance as the
underlying force of tyranny, relations between tyranny and
religion as well as detailed defence of constitutionalism. 103
Bazargan makes direct although limited reference to Naini
in condemning tyranny and uses his argument denouncing the
accreditation of the attributes of God to the ruler. The function
of the argument is obviously to challenge the personal position of
the monarch. His particular argument seems to have been designed
to refute the propaganda of the regime which gave increasingly
dazzling attributes to the Shah. Bazargan himself refers to some
of the titles: Centre of Worship, One with Divine Qualities, the
One to be Obeyed, etc. 104
102 Conte Vittorio Alfieri (d. 1803) Italian tragic poetwhose prominent theme was the overthrow of tyranny, and revival ofItalian nationalism. Nearly all of his nineteen tragedies presentthe struggle between a champion of liberty and a tyrant. Hisautobiography, The Life of Vittorio Alfieri Written by Himself, ishis chief work in prose.
103 For these arguments see Hairi, Shiism andConstitutionalism, Chap. 5, passim.
104 Bazargan, Defence p.299240
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Here Bazargan's argument is based on the assumption that
man is free by "nature" and therefore the exercise of power over
his faith is against the natural order of things. 105
The practice of rulers and monarchs (who see themselves as
the owner of the people) ... in violating the rights, the
wealth and the honour of people is in fact a claim to
absolute ownership and choice ... and we know that this is
the exclusive right of the sublime God. 106 The Maxim of
tyranny is that All things are of the Shah. 107 Not only in
titles and address but also in written and spoken words
the royal being is glorified and promoted . . Since
commands, rewards, dismissals, appointments and orders of
death and honour are issued from his person, it is then
natural that in the eyes of people he becomes the sole
source of good and bad, life and death. Here [is] the
claim to divinity ... [which] goes to take the place of
God in the minds of the people, believer or not. 108
Bazargan makes his own direct references to the Koran.
Here clearly it is the particular interpretation of the verses by
the person of Bazargan which gives them anti-authoritarian content
in defence of modern democratic practices. Here again as before
Bazargan approaches the Koran as the absolute and divine source.
105 Using the qualities of God to downgrade the claimsavailable to secular rulers has abundant parallels in reformation
and scholas tic Christian thought.106 Bazargan, Defence p.296.107 A slogan used by the regime.108 Bazargan, Defence, p.298.
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Although he is of course interpreting the text, yet he does not
consciously acknowledge this fact.
In the references to the Koran the stories of Moses
fighting the Pharaoh, Abraham against Nemrud, Jesus against Jewish
priests/Roman emperor and Mohammad against the tribes of Qurayish
are said to be struggles against "thrones of tyrannical' rule. The
stories are taken to indicate that religion is by nature opposed
to tyranny for the simple fact that God does not allow the
subordination of the people to the rule of tyrants.
Religion and tyranny are never compatible in source or
manner. Contradiction and conflict exists and will
continue to exist between them. Neither can God allow the
subordination of the people to the rule of monarchs nor
can tyrants ... accept obedience and submission of the
people to any thing except their own orders and
interests 10
Man's inclination towards individual independence and
social freedom are said to be inherently natural or in the natural
order of things as God intended them to be. Here the authority of
the Koran is called for, where in the story of creation God grants
man the freedom to disobey him. Bazargan makes no direct quotation
from the Muslim holy book but he is possibly pointing to the
following verses:
109 Bazargan, Defence, p.259.242
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Behold thy lord said to the angels: I will create a vice-
regent on earth. They said wilt thou place therein one who
will make mischief therein and shed blood, whilst we do
celebrate thy praises and glorify thy holy name? He said:
I know what you not know. 110
The idea that man is the vice-regent of God and therefore
not subordinate to any other authority is a common and popular
theme with many Muslim activists, be they fundamentalists
challenging the state or liberals seeking a change of regime.
However the traditional Koran commentators had a different view on
this point. The great commentator in the tradition 111 of
jurisprudence, Al-Tabari believed the vice regency was referring
to Adam or his sons while Ibn Taimiya thought it would be
blasphemous to even suggest that man could be the vice regent of
God (for it would indicate the absence of the creator). From the
philosophical tradition Ibn-Arabi saw the vice-regent as the
perfect man who in his microcosm represented God in his macrocosm.
However many modern commentators have interpreted the vice regency
within the context of the "right" of man exercising social
112 Bazargan of course comes within the camp of the"authority".
110 The Koran, II, 30.111 Some analysts have categorized four different traditions
of discourse in Islamic history. The philosophical (which reliedon logic) the jurisprudence (which relied on the traditions of theprophet and the early leaders) the Sufi (which trusted intuitionand inner illumination) and the pragmatists (which built theirdiscourse on the practical implications). Needless to say alltraditions make plentiful use of the holy book in support of theirdiscourse while their relationship has at times been horrendouslyviolent. For a catagorization of the tradition to realist andidealist movements see Tabatabai, S.J. A PhilosophicalIntroduction to the History of Political Thought in Iran.
112 Idris, J.S. Is man the Vice regent of God? in Journalof Islamic Studies, V.1 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990).
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modern commentators when he views man as being free by nature and
not subject to the rule of social tyranny.
Are those who support the rule of despotism "wiser and
more compassionate than the creator of man? God granted
freedom to man and empowered him to even disobey the
divine and pursue his ego or the temptations of the
devil". 113
Bazargan's inclination towards the religious argument is
clear. The fact that the state had taken a massive step in putting
down the bloody June uprising which was led by a religious figure,
that the contents of the uprising were significantly religious,
that the secular opposition politicians were in disarray and that
the regime was definitely moving towards a greater secular
practice, all contributed to Bazargan turning towards the
religious discourse.
Bazargan's purpose is to bring to the attention of the
religious audience that the propaganda of the regime is against
their beliefs and against their faith. The function of these
arguments then is to appeal to the Muslim community against
tyranny. Bazargan tries to pursuade the Muslim faithful that their
religion is by nature against the rule of tyranny. We have already
seen Bazargan's critique of Modernists for their failure to
acknowledge the significance of religion and faith in modern
society. Now Bazargan is using religion as a means of persuasion
113 Bazargan, Defence, p.261.244
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against the rule of tyranny. However things must not be seen out
of proportion. It is clear that Bazargan's appeal to religious
texts was not the only appeal that he was making. His other
arguments were clearly secular by nature.
In his references to Islamic historical institutions
Bazargan follows two themes: one that religious institutions are
independent from the state and second that religion constitutes
the Iranian collective spirit or national identity. Obviously the
function of both themes is to counter the arguments by which the
state was expanding in social domination. In other words Bazargan
was refuting allegations by the regime against the religious
institutions that Islam was imposed on Iran through the Arab
invasion and that it was and remained alien to the country's
historical heritage and national identity.
He was also trying to weaken the arguments in favour of
the ruling authority by stating that the true national spirit was
not the one created by the ruling establishment but by the society
itself. The primary function of all these arguments, as it has
been pointed out was to oppose the tyrannical practices of the
regime, however this particular theme is significant with regard
to the June 1953 crack down against the clergy and religious
institutions.
Bazargan's argument pursues the following logic: The
numerous foreign invaders who stormed Iran in the past two and a
half thousand years were almost all nomads with cultural heritages
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of a less civil nature than the defeated Iranians. Nevertheless
once in power they tended to adopt the existing Iranian culture,
in particular the art of state and population management. However
the Islamic Arab invasion was distinct for it delivered Islam, a
superior religious persuasion to Iran's own and to which Iranians
remained faithful despite the subsequent throwing of the Arab
domination. In Iran Islam became an independent social sphere
within which people took refuge from the tyranny of the state and
within which a source of spiritual inspiration was instituted for
all categories of cultural and social undertakings. Literature,
fine arts, handicrafts, architecture and social rituals reflect
this independent popular religious sentiment. Furthermore it was
this collective spirit which allowed the recreation of the civil
life after each period of chaos following the fall of a dynasty or
a foreign invasion. Today the religious sphere remains independent
of the state and in many ways opposed to it. The secret of
religious independence lies in Shiite thought.
The reason for such a state of affairs is clear: they
arise from the nature of Islam and particularly that of
Shiism ... the distinction of Shiism ... lies in the fact
that the followers of Ali did not accept the rule of those
who lacked representation from the divine or the prophet
and who obtained leadership [Imamate] through deceit
[Thus] Shiism not only maintained its vitality and
constant ability to conform to social developments and
events, it also secured its general independence and
popular democratic quality. People financially supported
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the clerics and the religious activities. Despite its
limited political and military capabilities, Shiism has
been able to extend its domain in the hearts and minds of
the believers particularly the Iranians and to maintain
its independence as a haven and a refuge. 114
Bazargan's evidence refers to the rise and fall of various
dynasties in ancient and more recent Iranian history, and mention
is made of other ancient civilizations (Roman, Egyptian, Greek,
etc.). However these references are scant. The more impressive
knowledge of the subject is shown in the field of literature, the
foremost artistic expression of Iranian culture. Here distinction
is made between schools in the service of the Royal Court and
those writing as independent thinkers.
In critique of Bazargan's argument on the independence of
the religious organizations from the state it is possible to
detect an over emphasis. Although it is true that the clergy
maintained a distance from the state and was not at the service of
the state Bazargan's view that the clergy were the only social
group that did not accept the patronage, the pay and the orders of
the ruling monarchies seems something of an exaggeration. It is
clear that this argument builds on the earlier Bazargan pamphlet
"Religious and Political Struggle" where he had defended Iran's
Islamic identity.
Tyranny as the Cause of Underdevelopment
114 Bazargan, Defence, p.255.247
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In his effort to condemn the tyrannical form of government
Bazargan points to what he believes to be the inevitable effects
of tyranny in the maintenance and perpetuation of
underdevelopment. Here four themes are elaborated upon: the
effects of tyranny:
i. on management of the factors of large scale production
ii. on social voluntary cooperation
iii. on the fall in the rate of productivity
iv. on encouragement of colonial influence
The first three are standard arguments in liberal
capitalist ideologies where it is said the state, let alone a
tyrannical one conflicts with the individual initiative.
Proponents of this idea believe the less intervention from the
state the better. The last theme, on tyranny and colonialism, is
an elaboration of Bazargan's earlier position on colonialism. 115
The first argument basically alleges that tyranny
constitutes the centralization of power and does not allow the
separation of powers and thus the existence of an independent
judiciary. As a result the judicial body becomes a tool in
implementing the interests of those in power. Bribery and
corruption develop as a common order of things bringing about a
situation where there is no guarantee that an appeal to the
judiciary will lead to fair judgment. Once social trust is lost,
no individual will be willing to cooperate with others towards the
establishment of large scale units of production. As a result no
115 See section on colonialism.248
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accumulation of capital, no long term planning, and no large scale
voluntary organizations 116 takes place. This is said to be in
stark contrast with the modern experience of developed countries
where large scale assembly of resources and large scale
productivity are the foundations of development. 117 More
specifically the security of property rights is endangered by
arbitrary rule, and it is on this basis that economic progress
depends since no one will improve what he can not be sure of
enjoying.
It would be correct to believe that in a tyrannical or
even authoritarian state there is a great probability of the
judiciary being under the direct control of the executive and
becoming corrupt in giving preferential treatment to those in
power. However Bazargan fails to give any concrete evidence that
the case holds true for each and every case.
The vulnerability of property rights (ie. the allocation,
use and transfer of the objects of wealth) to the arbitrary rule
of government, which Bazargan is referring to, has a varied
history in the West. Ownership was acknowledged in classical Roman
law while in the medieval legal system, a notion of property in
land emerged from customary and feudal rights and obligations,
limiting the rights of the feudal lords. In modern legal systems,
116 State-run large scale organizations are said to sufferfrom apathy of the work force.
117 Bazargan, Defence, pp.237-240.249
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property has come to represent one of the rights of the individual
against the state. 118
It should be pointed out that Bazargan and his political
collaborators in FMI did have strong connections with the Bazaar,
the traditional and independent bastion of Iranian enterprise.
Chehabi who has studied Bazargan's relations to the Bazaar
concluded Bazargan to be a leader in the emancipator movement of
the traditional middle class, with a Bazaar background, who had
lost much of their social and political influence; but never made
specific reference to the decline of the Bazaar, on the grounds
that as an engineer he was not personally affected. 119 The point
must be emphasized that although Bazargan might have had
connections to the Bazaar in terms of family background, his
defence of the private sector, was never directly concerned with
traditional Iranian entrepreneurship. As the above argument shows
he was more concerned with modern forms of large scale
productivity which surpassed Bazargan's interest in trade.
Bazargan was active as a businessman in the 1940's and 1950's and
witnessed the relative decline of the private sector in comparison
to the growth of the state owned industries. It could be argued
that given the connection that Bazargan had to the private sector
his experience inclined him to conclude or at least to reinforce
the belief that there should be greater legal guarantees for the
private sector and therefore the right of property.
118 For a review of the history of the idea of the right ofownership within the context of the obligations of the state seeSchlatter, R. Private Property (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London,1951).
119 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, seeChap. 4. See social Base of LMI, the Bazaar.
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Bazargan also argued that tyranny effectively encourages
the expansion of colonial interest. The argument is an
improvisation of the anti-colonial theme which he had elaborated
some two decades earlier. 120 As in the initial form, Bazargan
explains independence in terms of the ability of a country to
maintain its freedom from foreign nations through its ability to
produce sufficient amount of goods to trade in the international
market. For this level of production to be achieved however, there
is a need for individual initiative. Initiative allows the nation
to seek solutions to its problems, face challenges, pursue the
necessary initiatives and thus refrain from dependency and
imitation of others. Bazargan believes that since in pre-
industrial age nations were able to sustain a form of independence
without trade with their neighbours, the phenomenon of dependence
and independence is a product of the industrial age.
The above theme has already been discussed in detail. Here
it is sufficient to point out that there are three themes in the
argument: individual initiative, productivity and colonialism.
Individual initiative is a slightly changed version of the
"individual independence" which Bazargan was demanding in the
earlier stage. Addressing the dominant social trends of
Westernism, it shunned imitation of the western world in favour of
indigenous independence and creativity. The second theme, ie. that
of productivity has its roots in Bazargan's earlier theme on
labour, which he put down as the underlying element of progress.
120 See section on colonialism.251
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121 The third theme was detected to be close to a basic Leninist
interpretation (ie. foreign trade as the imperialist linkage). To
this argument, which is more or less a replica of Bazargan's
earlier anti-colonial position, Bazargan now adds an analysis of
tyranny. He suggests that tyranny destroys the character of the
individual through accustoming him to flattery rather than honest
effort towards social mobility. Once the individual becomes aware
that the various aspects of his life are not determined by
himself, he loses interest in any form of creative initiative. He
will always wait for others to initiate change. Furthermore even
if any form of creativity is expressed on behalf of the
individual, the tyrannical system will be the first to oppose it
for the simple fact that tyranny is by nature opposed to social
movement and change. 122
121 see section on labour.122 Bazargan, Defence p.72-74.
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ConstitutionalIslamic Ideology
Political Developments 1963-77
The fifteen year period between 1963 and 1979 witnessed
the absolute consolidation of the personal power of the monarch.
The consolidation took place at a vicious cost to all social
classes for it meant their increasing loss of political influence
and ability to regulate the social environment. However by the end
of period cracks started to appear in the Shah's power structure.1
At the centre of the Iranian state reigned supreme the
person of the Shah; a man who wished to consolidate his personal
authority and change Iranian society by the measures of his own
understanding alone. To this end he regulated the state structure.
All senior appointments, particularly those in the military, were
his personal choices. The government and the cabinet were active
only as an administrative body carrying out his policies. The Shah
was said to be not only the executive leader and the ideologue of
the people, but an entity over and above the nation. This is well
reflected in the motto of the regime: God-Shah-Motherland. The
monarch surrounded himself by a circle of closer subordinates in
the body of the Royal Court which then relied on the military
machine and the bureaucratic structure to exercise government. It
seems the increasing ability to exercise power (specially with the
massive increase in the oil rent-revenue) caused the Shah to
suffer from delusion of grandeur. Celebrating 2,500 years of
monarchy and subsequently changing the historical religious-
1 For this analysis the data and arguments from thefollowing have been used: Abrahamian, Iran Between TwoRevolutions, Chap. 9, Avery, Modern Iran, Chaps. 28-29, Farmayan,H. Politics during the sixties Ghodes, Iran in the 20th century, Chap. 10, Kamrava, Revolution in Iran Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran, Chaps. 12-16, Keddie, Roots of Revolution, Chaps. 7-8, Nyrop, Iran: A Country Study, Chap. 7, Sanjabi, Hopes and Despairs, Chaps. 7-8.
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national calendar to a monarchical one seem to have been symptoms
of such ideas. 2
For his direct rule the Shah relied on the military and
the para-military apparatus. The military were indeed close to
him. His father, an officer in the Persian Cossack Division had
come to power through a coup and sustained his rule by creating a
modern national army. The Shah himself was educated in military
schools and had made his return to the centre of Iranian politics
by relying on loyal military units to stage the 1953 coup. To
reward this loyalty and reinforce the function of obedience to the
monarchy some 20% of the national budget was spent on the
military. The ranks of the armed forces swelled with those who
swore loyalty to his rule. The military enjoyed the best
privileges and the prestige that the state could provide. In his
endless effort to maintain all sections of society distant from
the realm of politics, the monarch encouraged divisionary
rivalries among military officers.
The second pillar of the Shah's rule was the bureaucratic
machinery. The functions of the machinery were two-fold. On the
one hand to implement the Shah's policies and on the other hand to
function as the channel of purchasing political loyalty. For its
expenditure and expansion the bureaucracy depended on the oil
2 On the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of thePahlavi Dynasty, the Shah changed Iran's Islamic calendar to animperial one. One analyst called the decision "breath taking inits grandiosity" and the "outstanding manifestation of the Shah'sgradiosity". Zonis, M. Majestic Failure; The Fall of the Shah(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991) pp.81-82.
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rent-revenue for the production of which only a marginal labour
force was responsible. This fact meant that there was no need to
create or maintain functional and efficient government
organizations. Thus the inefficiency and irrelevancy of the state
machinery which developed massively in the 1963-79 period. Yet if
nothing else the bureaucracy brought to the regime an increasing
ability to influence and determine the nature of life in urban and
rural society.
The story of parliamentary and party politics in this
period is farcical. The regime tried several times to organize and
maintain political organizations (Mardom and Melliyun in the 50's,
Iran-Novin in the 60's and Rastakhiz in the 70's). The function of
the parties was mobilizational rather than participatory. Indeed
the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) was said to have been created in the
Leninist/Arab Nationalist tradition of party politics.
Malfunctional in the sense that the party apparatus failed to
create a social base upon people's participation in the process of
choice making, they did however assist a degree of state control
over society. The parliaments told a similarly miserable story.
The MPs were hand picked by the government for their loyalty and
their behaviour was designed to legitimize the actions of the
regime.
While decision making lay in the hands of the Shah with
the military and the bureaucracy acting as his instruments of
rule, the various social classes became increasingly powerless in
regulating the social environment and determining their own
Constitutional Islamic Idoology
destiny. The landed classes were the first political targets with
the peasantry as the second victims of social malfunctions. In the
towns the middle classes were kept apolitical while the massive
community of emigre unskilled labourers became increasingly
confused in cultural terms and economically pressurized. The
politically articulate sections of the intelligentsia suffered
restrictions at the hands of the government. Thus in terms of
political measures, the whole society was reduced to a client of
the state and was only rewarded for its loyalty.
The land owning classes were one of the oldest categories
in Iran's social structure. Always dependent on a more powerful
autonomous state the land owners constituted about 45,000 families
owning 80% of the arable land. Though traditionally opposed to the
Pahlavi rule, the land owners collabourated with the institution
of monarchy during the 1940s and 1950s against the Nationalist,
democratic and radical social movements. However seen as possible
contenders for power they were destroyed by the Shah in the
following two decades. In the 60s and 70s they never managed to
stage a come back to the political arena.
As regards the peasant community it is possible to detect
an unprecedented shift in their social orientation. While with the
White Revolution the number of independent farm owners increased
there was also an increase in the number of wage earners and those
who could no longer maintain a productive agricultural unit.
Furthermore state interference on the level of the village and the
attraction of employment in the city stimulated a mass migration.
Constitutional Ielamic Ideology
In the 63-79 period between 20 and 25 percent of the rural
population moved to the cities.
In the urban setting the emigration of unskilled labour on
the one hand and the massive jump in the oil rent-revenue on the
other brought about a cancerous urban expansion which had the
seeds of the subsequent collapse of the state. The community of
the working classes, particularly unskilled and semi skilled
labourers engaged in services, construction, semi manufacturing
and the industrial sector constituted the largest urban bloc.
Making up some 2.5 million families this newly transit community
found itself and its high expectations facing a crisis of identity
in the new socio-cultural environment.
The urban middle classes could be divided into two
identifiable sections. First the propertied middle class which
lived and worked outside the oil rent-revenue distribution
network, but was an indirect benefactor of the system. For this
reason it could be spared the indoctrination required of other
more dependent sections of urban community. This section (some one
million families) included the Bazaar, the independent
entrepreneurs and the clergy. Secondly there was the salaried
middle classes (some 0.6 million families) who were the direct
beneficiaries of the state although constituting the lower rank
and file. They included the civil servants, teachers and white
collar workers. Their political function, as required by the state
and rewarded by permanent employment was to remain non-political.
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The articulate political opposition constituted a small
urban community. The White Revolution and the subsequent bloody
suppression had put an end to the experimentation in political
openness which the country had enjoyed in the 40s and early 50s.
The political behaviour and political institutions which were
beginning to take shape through the process of trial and error
were suppressed. The National Front, the Tudeh, the conservative
clergy and the landed classes were unable to communicate to the
society, had become isolated, had lost popular base, and were no
longer attractive. Instead grew a new generation of political
activists who in the 60s and 70s became increasingly attracted to
a lethal concoction of Leninist radical underground organization,
use of violence as political strategy and religion as popular
reference of appeal. This new generation came from the ranks of
the National Front, the Tudeh and the clergy.
As the above mentioned tendencies consolidated and left
deeper impressions, political pressures began to build up. By the
second half of the 70s the state was showing signs of incapability
to deal with its problems. The highly centralized, autonomous,
over expanded state and the chronic political under development as
well as the under-represented social classes constituted the
context within which a massive spontaneous social protest was to
take shape.
Politico-economic developments
Whatever way the economic developments between 1963 and
1979 are studied there is no escape from the fact that two issues
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determined the form and content of this process: the land reform
and the oil boom. 3 In both cases the result was the increasing
political role of the state. Of course there are different and
opposing interpretations of this economic process. One perspective
refers to the land reform, the oil boom, the increase in GDP, the
expansion of industrial plants, the investment in infrastructure
and the growth of the welfare system as magnificent economic
progress. 4 Others view this development as the growth of state
capitalism where the state functions as the autonomous body in
owning and managing the economic sector. 5 The third perspective
belongs to those who view the economic function as the outgrowth
of a rentier state. Here the economy is viewed as pseudo-modernist
because it is not functional in terms of real growth but as the
means of distribution and consumption of the oil wealth. 6 In
other words the finger is pointed at an assymetry between the
growth of the economy and the social/political mobilization of the
people (civil society) resulting in an overblown state.
The general characteristics of the period were as follows:
As the result of the increase in the budget, the development plans
3 This study in this section is a synthesis of data andarguments in: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Chap. 9,Avery. Modern Iran, Chap. 20, Bharier, J. Economic Development ofIran 1900-1970, Last four Chaps, Katouzian, The Political Economyof Modern Iran, Chaps. 12-16, Nyrop, Iran: A country Study, Chaps.9-11, Keddie, Roots of Revolution, Chap. 8, Maclachlan, Theneglected Garden, Chaps 5-6, Mofid, Development planning in Iran.
4 For this perspective see Nyrop, Iran: a Country Study. 5 See Keddie, The Roots of the Revolution.6 See Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran and
Mandavy, Hosain, The Patterns and Problems of Economic Developmentin Rentier States: The Case of Iran, in Cook. M.A. (ed.) Studiesin the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islamto the Present Day (Oxford University Press, London,1970).
261
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
whi6h acted as the main instrument of economic control, turned
towards welfare expenditure as a means of distributing the oil
wealth. Consequently services provisions such as housing and
health moved up the scale of government expenditures. Industrial
investments too moved up slightly and maintained a steady second
position. Transport/communication remained high though losing
their lead. Agriculture was discarded altogether out of the
picture and became a disaster area.
The neglect of agriculture and traditional production in
general led to major dislocations in rural areas. Agricultural
output which despite the land reform and increased oil revenues
maintained parity with the oil income till 1970, then lost its
leading position in the economy. With the impact of the land
reform and huge government expenditure in the urban areas
migration began from the country side. From 1963 to 1977 the rural
areas lost some 20% of their population to the cities. Meanwhile
the urban expansion was sustained by government oil rent-revenue
which in concrete terms constituted massive imports of goods,
foods and services and thus an increasing rate of consumption. It
was within this context of major dislocations of population and
over-heating of the rentier economy that later political
disturbances were to take shape.
It is obvious that the most significant element within
this process was oil. The oil rent-revenue increases were
phenomenal. The increase was in two stages. The first stage saw a
steady but strong upward movement from $0.4 billion (1963) to
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$2.3b. (1971). The second stage saw the massive jump to over $20b.
mark (1973) reaching $25b. (1979). Subsequently oil revenues which
till 1970 were still less than the non-oil income, overtook all
other items in GDP/GNP and the state budget, determining the
nature of government revenues and its distribution. The new
situation made the state further autonomous of social classes,
helped the de-stabilization of traditional economic sector, and
made the society increasingly dependent on the state as its source
of income. Supported by the petro-dollars the state expanded its
bureaucratic machinery both as an instrument of social
regulation/control and as the channal for the distribution of the
oil wealth in return for political alliances. The fact that the
oil revenue was independent of the organization of labour force
(since only a marginal number of workers were employed in its
production) helped the state not to be subjected to scrutiny for
efficiency or corruption.
Industrialization was a high item on the government agenda
and it remained high: it held third, first and second places on
the priority list of the 3rd (62-68), 4th (68-72) and 5th (73-77)
development plans respectively. Industrialization, in the minds of
the government, meant capital intensive, urbanized, centralized
production of intermediary and consumer goods directed at import
substitution. Industrialization was mostly of assembly nature but
it also meant the construction of water and electricity plants.
The building of an infrastructure for transport and communications
had an independent budget far higher than all other items. But the
increase in rapid communications was meant to serve military needs
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more than anything else. In fact parts of industrial investment
was camouflaged for military expenditure which on its own
accounted for some 30% of the total annual budget.
In terms of political economy then it is significant to
note that as with all rentier states the common pattern of
modernization as state building rather than state building for
modernization was predominant. In other words industrialization
seemed to act as the channel of the distribution of oil revenues
in return for political loyalty and thus the main channel of
serving the state-clientele relationship. For this very reason
there was never a need for industrialization, ie. the process of
investment, management and production, to be economically
efficient or profitable. This relationship explains the fact that
despite massive investment in new sectors the profitability of the
highly neglected traditional sectors remained higher.
Similarly the increasingly rentier nature of the economy
is evident in the massive growth of the service sector. This
sector (which included finance, health, housing) experienced the
highest rate of growth to the point that in the 5th development
plan (1973-77) it held the highest priority. Much like industry
the services provided a channel for distribution and consumption
of the oil revenue. It should be kept in mind that, rather than
being a merit of its own, it was pure reliance on the increase in
the income from oil which allowed the rapid expansion of the
service sector.
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Meanwhile the 1963-77 period saw the rapidly diminishing
importance of traditional economic sectors particularly
agriculture. Bent on modernizing through high tech, capital
intensive, and urban-based methods of production, the traditional
patterns of agricultural activity which had survived for hundreds
of years in the harsh environment of Iran were abandoned. In the
1960's traditional agriculture was destroyed through negligence
while in the 1970s the large scale cooperation and agro-businesses
emerged only to be destroyed through mis-management. The land
reform's insistence on replacing landlords with cooperatives
proved disastrous for the simple fact that dividing the
traditional socio-economic structure of the isolated Iranian
village and imposing a new set of social relationships drawn up by
ill-educated urban government officials was unrealistic. The
state, strengthened by its increasing oil revenue, and acting
through the development plans, set out on a process of modernizing
socio-economic relations on its own terms and for its own
political intentions without regard for the traditional indigenous
society including the rural sector and its agricultural
production. Miserable support for traditional agriculture caused
severe damage to production.
With increasing unemployment in the rural areas and
massive government expenditure in the cities the peasant migration
gathered momentum. This initiated an urban expansion which was to
turn large sectors of Iranian cities into ghettos in the next two
decades. Despite relative negligence, it is significant to note
that the traditional agricultural production maintained its
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leading position in the export sector, after oil, and domestic
agricultural production remained relatively constant in the
1963/77 period although it was dwarfed by the total GDP moving up
over twelve times.
Makings of an ideology
Very little is known about Bazargan's social and political
activity after his imprisonment (1963). The military tribunal
passed a ten year prison sentence but he was released within three
years. Nothing is known about his years in prison which given that
a number of activists were living in close proximity should have
meant an interesting exchange of ideas. Furthermore the
circumstances regarding the release are not clear but he was set
free following a pardon from the Shah.
Almost immediately after leaving the prison Bazargan
joined his colleagues and started writing. His book, Prophetic
Mission and Ideology, which possibly amounts to his best political
work in the 1963-77 period was prepared within a year or two of
his release. However the fact that he had served a sentence forced
him to keep out of public view and organized activity so as not to
attract the sensitivities of the regime. Indeed the absence of
Bazargan from the activities of the Ershad Association for
Religious Discourse 7 where almost all distinguished Muslim
7 A research and conference centre used by reformist andrevolutionary Islamic intellectuals including Ali Shariati,Morteza Motahhari, Ayatollah Mofatteh. The former howeverdominated the process and his lectures (1969-72) printed anddistributed at an unprecedented circulation of two million, wereto become the ideological basis of the 1979 revolution. Chehabi,Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, pp.204-210.
266
Constitutional Islamic Idaology
reformers and ideologues gathered and which amounted to an
important reform movement within the religious community can not
be explained otherwise. However this lack of public profile was
compensated for with a large body of written works. Some fourteen
books and pamphlets were the product of Bazargan's writing in this
period. Indeed Bazargan consolidated his position within the
opposition movement and the religious tendency to the extent that
with the fall of the Shah's regime he was able to present himself
as a suitable candidate for leading the provisional government. In
this period Bazargan wrote a large number of pamphlets and books.
1966 Prophetic Mission and Ideology 8
1967 The Good Need 9
Prophetic Mission and Evolution 10
Iranian Compatibility 11
1968 Mosque in Society 12
1969 Motive and the Motivater 13
1973 Religion and Civilization 14
8 Be'that va Ideoluzhi (Book Distribution Centre, Houston,1976). Bazargan began writing the book in prison (1964) anddelivered a lecture on the topic when he was released from prison(1967). The date for the first edition is not known.
Nikniazi (Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977).Believed to be a 1967 lecture.
10 Be'that va Takamul (Book Distribution Centre, Houston,1977). Originally a 1967 lecture.
11 Sazgari-ye Irani (Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1967), (2ndedition Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977).
12 Masjed dar Ijtema" (nd. np . rip.).13 Angizeh va Angizandeh. A lecture delivered on behalf of
Bazargan by Hashem Sabbaghian in 1969. Date and publisher of firstedition not known. (Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1978).
14 Din va Tamadon. A 1973 introduction to FakhreddinHejazi's book Naqsh-e Payambaran dar Tamadon-e Ensan The Role ofProphets in Human Civilization. It was later publishedindependently. (Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977).
267
Constitutional Islamic Idaology
1976 A Review of the Ideas of Eric Frumn 15
The Scientificity of Marxism 16
Koran's Process of Evolution, V.1 17
1977 The Pests of Monism 18
Nature, Evolution, and Monism 19
Koran's Sentenceology 20
1978 Imam and Time 21
Here we have chosen the Prophetic Mission and Ideology for
analysis because it best represents the main intellectual themes
that Bazargan was dealing with at the time. Although the book was
written and published in the early parts of the period and was to
a noticeable extent a reaction to the pre-1963 debates within the
Islamic circles, it is nevertheless typical of the polemics and
ideological dialogue of the pre-1979 Islamic revolution era.
The book took the same form as many of Bazargan's other
works as a combination of a lecture edited and substantially
solidified with additional material. The original lecture was
given in 1965 at ceremonies celebrating the missionary appointment
of the prophet Mohammad, it was then revised and published. The
15 Barresi-ye Nazariyeh-e Forum. (Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran,1976) & (Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977).
16 'Ilmi Budan-e Marksism (np. rip. nd.). Co-written withEzzatollah Sahabi.
17 Sair-e Tahavul-e Koran. First published in 1976.18 Afat-e Tawhid. A 1977 pamphlet. (Book Distribution
Centre, Houston, 1978).19 Taby'at Takamul va Tawhid. A 1977 lecture. (Book
Distribution Centre, 1977).20 Jomleh Shenasi-ye Koran (1977). No other detail
available.21 Imam va Zaman. Not details available.
268
Constitutional Islamic Idoology
book is divided into an introduction and three chapters. Under the
title of The Historic Evolution of Ideology the first chapter is a
selective abstract of an American political text book and
discusses fifteen topics, including the political philosophies of
Greece, Rome, the middle ages, and the absolutist states as well
as those of 17th and 18th centuries, Hegel, Liberalism, Marx,
Socialism, Communism and Fascism. It is notable that the greater
part of the chapter is on the issues of socialism and Marx
indicating the significance of the two for Bazargan.
The second chapter distinguishes between The Accepted and
the Inadmissible Political Concepts. According to Bazargan the
ideas which have become ill-favoured in contemporary civilization
include the divine nature of authority, absolute freedom of the
individual, subordination of government to religious institutions
and the absoluteness of pure logic and utility. The acceptable
principles are said to be the necessity of government, leadership,
ideology, democracy, and realism. The third chapter, Islamic
Ideology, discusses the main issues of the earlier sections and
brings in traditional Islamic themes as well as Bazargan's own
innovations and syncretic ideas. The study here is based on the
last chapter.
Bazargan's effort in creating a harmonious body of
political ideas can be best understood within the intellectual
climate of the period. One of the political and intellectual
peculiarities of the 1963-77 period seems to be efforts on behalf
of the opposition to elaborate ideological constructs. By
Constitutional Islamic Icloology
ideological constructs we mean a body of political ideas which
tries to address the fundamental and organic questions of social
organization and behaviour. These included the purpose of social
organization, the role of authority, the rights of the people as
opposed to the power of the state, alternative political
formations, etc. Such efforts are evident in the works of men such
as Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Khomeini, Bizhan
Jazani, Morteza Shi'aiyan, Ali Asghar Haj Sayyed Javadi, and the
body of works presented by the Leftist Mojahedin Khalq and
Fadaiyan Khalq Organizations.
It is possible to speculate that these ideological drives
owe their existence to political repression and the regime's
tactic of maintaining an apolitical society. The fact that various
social classes were not allowed to express their opinions nor
exercise an influence on the regime in the pursuit of what they
saw as their interests meant that their spokesmen initiated the
construction of bodies of political concepts which increasingly
fell outside the language of the ruling establishment. Lack of
dialogue between the civil society and the state as well as
inadequate communications between various classes and sub-
communities caused the development of different political
languages which had little in common and shared no common
experience of debate. As later events, particularly during the
1979 revolution were to show (and which we shall discuss in
detail) efforts by men like Bazargan who wished to integrate
themes from clerical, modernist and liberal languages failed to be
sufficient to have an impact on the main course of events.
Constitutional Islamic Idsology
At the same time the influence of the West was positive in
this regard. From the Iranian perspective, the 1960s and the early
1970s were decades of social rebellion in Europe and the United
States, the defeat of American superpower in Cuba and Vietnam, the
withdrawal of France from Algeria and the violent strengthening of
the Palestinian movement. These events shared the celebration of
unorthodox language as the expression of protest and rebellion
against perceived injustice. The language was that of negation and
conflict with the status quo. Ezzatollah Sahabi, an early
participant in the religious movement has pointed to these events
specially the Cuban Revolution and Iran's June 1963 uprising as
the factors that pushed the Islamic modernists to radicalize. 22
Within this context the 1960s were a decade of fateful
change in Shiism. Organizationally Muslim activists became clearly
distinguished and contrasted to Nationalists and Communists
although ideologically there were areas of overlap. They also
assimilated ideological notions that had general political appeal
- notably revolution and social justice - in order to create a
distinctive Islamic ideology. Efforts were made in the early 1960s
to reform the leadership but these ideas were to be abandoned with
Ayatollah Khomeini demonstrating the power and effectiveness of
the clerical leadership working within the traditional
framework.23
22 Har1r1, N. Mosahebeh ba Tarikhsazan-e Iran, InterviewWith History Makers of Iran (, Tehran, n.d.) pp.185.
23 Arjomand, S.A. Authority and Political Culture inShi'ism, (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1988) p.190.
271
Conatitutional Islamic Ideology
With regard to Bazargan the effort to build a body of
interrelated ideas has two sources. The first is what Akhavi has
called the first clergy reform movement (1960-63). 24 As discussed
further the reform movement came in a period of relative political
openness and was initiated by some fifteen Islamic scholars of
whom Bazargan was the only lay person. The reform comprised
efforts at establishing a collective clerical leadership as well
as revitalizing defunct sections of the constitution which called
for an active role of the clergy in the legislature. Although
Bazargan participated in these debates his main effort to build on
the ideas presented in these discussions was to come a number of
years later, after his prison term and well into the 1960s. Indeed
this and other cases indicate that a tendency seems to have
existed where the intellectual response to social events seems to
have accrued a number of years after the actual experience.
Obviously time was needed to reflect on the events.
The second and lesser influence was that of George H.
Sabine's book A history of Political Theory. 25 The book seems to
have been important in strengthening and further formulating
certain political concepts which Bazargan had previously held.
These included particularly that of natural law and political
freedom. Furthermore Bazargan seems to have adopted, from Sabine's
work, the idea of presenting a cohesive and interdependent body of
ideas where a number of fundamental political concepts exist side
24 Akhavi,25 Sabine, G.H. & Thorson, T.L. A History of Political
Theory (Dryden Press, Hinsdale, Illinois, 1973).272
Constitutional Imlamic Ideology
by side. This is distinguishable from the earlier and even later
works of Bazargan which are more eclectic, polemical and distant
from political philosophy in the sense of an organized and
disciplined investigation of political problems. The introduction
of a number of interrelated but divergent themes, depth of study
and consistency seems to have been a mark of modern professional
influence. 26
Bazargan himself confesses to these sources of influence
when he states that Iranian thinkers need to utilize modern
Western ideas as much as they need to rely on their own heritage.
The former are said to be the final products of man's historic
progress and modern social change while the latter are seen as
inevitable historical traditions within which lays the raw and
undeveloped seeds of modern ideas. 27
On the meaning of ideology Bazargan says that although the
word has Greek roots his understanding of it is modern and refers
to what has developed since the second world war to mean a
collection of fundamental assumptions which determine the
political aims of a party (or individual) and act as its criteria
for social action. 28 Ideology, as a study of Sabine's work might
26 Sabine's work was written in 1937 and subsequentlyrevised for a 1961 edition of which a translation was made intoPersian by Baha'uddin Pazargadi. In the West the book has become astandard text and a recognized classic in the study of politicaltheory. According to Thorson who edited the work for a fourthedition Sabine should be noted for his closeness to David Hume'sforceful argumentation, skepticism and empiricism. See preface tothe fourth edition.
27 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.2-4.28 Bazargan refers to a 1960's Larouse, the French
encyclopedia, as his source of this meaning.273
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have given the impression of, is a collection of different and
varied historical achievements, constantly changing form, colour
and shape. 29 The following section is a study of the main
elements that Bazargan discussed in elaborating his ideological
construct.
Natural Law
The first principle of Bazargan's Islamic Ideology is that
of natural law. 30 The principle assumes that nature follows
particular sets of laws which are established by God and the
acceptance of which is the very meaning of the religion of Islam
(literally "submission"). The political aim of Bazargan in
introducing such an idea is to negate the absolutist claims of the
sovereign to his authoritarian rule while at the same time
countering the Modernist and the Leftist trends in Iran's
political climate.
We have already discussed the emergence of the ideas of
"Social Evolution" and the "Rule of Law in Society" as elaborated
by Bazargan in the decade following the 1953 coup. 31 The first
idea developed the notion that religion has been transformed by
evolution and completed gradually by the prophets of God. Human
beings follow the same evolutionary path but rely on reason to
conform to the laws of religion and society. The second idea
developed the notion that society is a natural phenomenon governed
by laws which determine the nature and relation between its parts.
29 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.8.30 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp. 95-106.31 See chapter three.
274
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
It is then necessary that these laws, embodied in things
themselves, should be translated into social laws and observed. 32
Both of Bazargan's arguments were introduced as methods of
countering the tyrannical exercise of government and defending the
existing laws in protection of the rights of the individual. It is
with such background and prelude that Bazargan counters the
concept of Natural Laws in Sabine's History of Political Theory
and thereupon introduces it as the corner stone in the shaping of
his ideological construct. The function of the argument continues
to be the effort to curtail the despotic exercise of political
power. However more minor functions including propagation of
religious thinking and refutation of Leftist ideas are also
pursued.
In explaining what Bazargan himself calls Natural Laws and
at other times Reality, Bazargan states that the first principle
in his ideological construction is the very one that was
introduced in the 17th century by the Europeans and which
constitutes the basis of all ideological constructs. Indeed all
political thinkers and schools are said to be aiming at either
observance or implementation of these unchangeable laws which
determine human history. 33 It seems then Bazargan has been
overwhelmed by the potential significance of the concept of
natural laws in Sabine's book and uses it to reinforce his earlier
convictions on legal constitutionalist law. His earlier
32 There seems to be some confusion on Bazargan's part onthis point for he fails to distinguish between physical and morallaws That is indicative and prescriptive or descriptive.
33 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.96.275
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understanding of the concept emphasized that history and society
have their own particular laws. Now Sabine's elaborations on
natural laws bolsters this opinion and turns it into the first
principle and foundation of his ideological ensemble. There is
thus a movement from a procedural and positivist conception of
natural law to that of a transcendental and substantiative one.
It is upon the concept of a universe regulated by laws
that Bazargan introduces God and Islam into the argument and
stresses the point that the ultimate rule is not that of nature
but of God. Bazargan maintains that if laws govern the state of
nature then the existence of a first law maker and regulator is
necessary, and if this is accepted then it becomes essential that
the laws revealed by God to man are respected. For the observance
of the divine laws would mean harmony with the creation and
utilization of natural resources. In other words on the basis that
God has created the natural world, including that of men, Bazargan
views religious laws as the very laws of nature. It is here then
that Bazargan finds the true meaning of Islam (submission).
Submission of Islam is surrender to the laws of nature, and the
acceptance of the laws of nature is the very worship of the
divine. Acceptance of the divine laws is realism itself.
To prove the point that Islam has confirmed the absolute
rule, handiwork and command of God in natural law Bazargan turns
to the Koran and introduces several verses as evidence. We shall
deal with his method of treatment of the Koran elsewhere but here
simply reproduce some of the verses:
Constitutional Islamic Iderology
So set thou they face steadily and truly to the faith,
(establish) God's handiwork according to the pattern on
which he has made mankind: no change (let there be) in the
work (wrought) by God: that is the established religion,
but most among mankind understand not. (XXX-30) The
Command is for none but God: he hath commanded that ye
worship none but him: that is the right religion, but most
men understand not. (XII-40) And call not, besides God,
another God, There is no God but he. Everything will
perish except his own face. To him belongs the command.
(XXVIII-88)
Up to here Bazargan's logic is clear: He stipulates that
there are laws governing life, that these laws are God made and
that human beings must observe these laws. Here however a point is
introduced to the argument that is of significance from a
political point of view and could be the basis of certain
inconsistencies. Bazargan states that since God is the first law
maker no other is allowed to establish laws and that all must
follow the divine legislator. In other words human beings are said
to be incapable of establishing social codes of conduct based on
their own rational resources.
In divine ideology the first and eternal legislator is
God. No individual, Sultan, people, or class has the right
of legislation through either the assemblies of the elite,
consultative assemblies [parliaments] or referenda
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
What we mean here by law are the basic principles of
ideology and the fundamentals which determine the general
responsibilities, and not the secondary and executive
regulation that are validated in executive assemblies
[parliaments]. 34
It is interesting to note that from a political
perspective the concept of divine legislator acts as a two-edged
sword. On the one hand it is intended to limit the right of the
sovereign in following his own desires in endorsing laws. But on
the other hand it denies the right of the people in determining
their chosen destiny. However it allows them to make legal codes
within the general specification of God's law. This seems to be
close to the views of Locke's that people must be the only
interpreters of what god's law is. Legislation can't go outside
the limits of natural law, so there is no absolute popular
sovereignty. On the other hand each individual has responsibility
for interpreting God's law so no human authority can overrule what
the people decide.
In later years this tension proved to be of significance
when the clerics laid siege to the right of interpreting the laws
of the divine legislator and thus the right to govern. It is of
course true that the tradition of writing religious laws or
Shari'a was the most orthodox and widely spread of all the
34 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.98.278
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
traditions within Islamic history. 35 But it seems highly
improbable that Bazargan saw Shari'a as the true expression of
religion. In fact he had been highly critical of the extent that
Shari'a and jurisprudence had developed. 36
It is significant to point out that the concept of Natural
Law is the most recurring theme in Sabine's History of Political
Theory where the views of some 25 thinkers on the topic are
discussed. This could possibly explain the emphasis of Bazargan on
his own interpretation of the concept. 37 In the history of
Western political thought natural law (and subsequently natural
rights) are those recognized by natural justice. In other words
natural laws is a system of law binding on men by virtue of their
nature alone and independent of all convention. The usual
attribute of human nature that is chosen as the basis for this law
is reason or rationality. Natural law first emerged with the need
to exert jurisdiction over and above customary Roman law so as to
make it applicable to all people under Roman dominance. There are
35 Islamic law or Shari'a developed out of scholasticjudgments on the Koran and the prophet's traditions, from thesixth to the thirteenth centuries when several schools becameinfluential in Sunni tradition while a single but more dynamicschool continued in the Shiite counterpart. Shari'a has been allencompassing, providing a comprehensive guide line for the societyof believers on all matters of life until the 19th century whenthe introduction of European codes, rapid social change,increasing secular states and clerical conservatism made itincreasingly redundant and irrelevant. Esposito, Islam, theStraight Path, p.142. However it must be kept in mind that Shari'ahad always been in a state of tension vis-a-vis the legal practiceof the rulers in Islamic lands, although this cleavage must not beexaggerated. An -Na'im, A.A. Toward an Islamic Reformation, p.31.
36 See Bazargan, The causes of underdevelopment of Muslims Nations.
37 See the index, Sabine, History of Political Thought, p.864
279
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
a number of theories of natural law but two fundamental kinds of
theory stand out. The Medieval philosophers, Aquinas for instance,
attempted to derive natural law from a higher law, ie. divine law,
which would be the expression of the will of God. The post-
Renaissance philosophers on the other hand, beginning with Grotius
and culminating in Kant, thought the reference to divine law was
unsatisfactory since it reduces natural law to positive law. The
two schools are thus different in theological claims as well as
the basis which they offer for natural law. 38
For Bazargan the doctrine of natural law is intended to
open up two possibilities, even though on a polemical level: the
negation of tyranny and the negation of the absoluteness of
rationalism. These two positions clearly indicate Bazargan's
dialogue with the dominating social trends of thought; Modernism,
and the establishment apologism. In denying the rationalism which
Bazargan sees as the foundation of Iran's secular Modernism
Bazargan refers to Sabine's discussion of Rousseau's attacks on
rationalists and the philosophical dilemmas of later socialists.
Bazargan maintains that rationalism which had "claimed infinite
knowledge fell to suffer from the disease of simplification and
then prey to human emotions". Bazargan points out that "while
logic and science must be employed, contentment with them would
not be sufficient as it would constitute a deviation". 39 The
"deviation" is apparently from some form of natural law
38 For a discussion on the issues of natural law see Tuck,R. Natural Law Theories (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1979) & Binnis, J.M. Natural Law and Natural Rights (ClarendonPress, oxford, 1980).
39 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.63.280
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independent of human rationality. In refuting the authoritarian
apologists Bazargan believes that once realism of natural law and
the principle of God as legislator has been accepted then
"monarchies and despotisms which [claim] partnership in the
authority of the divine" 40 are seen as being opposed to
monotheism (Tawhid) of Islam and espousing polytheism (Sherk). 41
This is a near copy of Naini's argument which has already been
discussed in earlier parts of this study.
Continuing the argument that the world is dominated by God
Bazargan states that this position should not be taken to imply
the illegitimacy of government and consequently the rule of
disorder and absolute individualism. Bazargan initiates this
argument on a traditional Islamic theme on the necessity of
government as a means of thwarting possible chaos and anarchy. He
refers to the case of conflict between the first Shiite Imam and
the Kharijites which culminated in one of the first civil wars in
Islam (658 at Nahrayan). The conflict rose when Kharijites with
puritanical, fundamentalist and radical views challenged Ali's
acceptance of arbitration at a war with Mo'avyeh. Ali as the
Caliph had been challenged by Mo'avyeh, and the Kharijites who
were initially on the side of Ali, believed he had a religious
obligation to wage war against Mo'avyeh. The acceptance of
arbitration came as unacceptable news to Kharijites who started
40 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.100.41 Tawhid, the unity or oneness of God upon which the
monotheism of Islam is based, as opposed to Sherk or theassociation of others with God which is viewed as the worst ofsins. Esposito, Islam the Straight Path, p.6 1 15.
281
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shouting that "only God can decide". 42 Kharijites later turned
into a community which saw itself as having the mandate of
fighting in the path of God and against evil. With such background
they believed that any good Muslim, even a slave, had the right to
become the leader of the religious community and lead it in
battle. According to Bazargan it is in reaction to this position
that Ali accused the Kharijites of being anarchistic, and against
the very existence of government. Bazargan quotes Ali as saying
that "there is a necessity for a commander of people, whether good
or bad. It is he who collects the taxes, who fights with the enemy
and who secures the road." 42
Freedom
The second but the most extensively discussed element in
the Islamic Ideology of Bazargan is that of freedom. 44 The
background to the argument put forward on freedom is in Bazargan's
defence at the military tribunal where he defended the individual
and social right to freedom against the tyrannical exercise of
government. The defence emphasized four major themes:
1. Tyranny causes social disability,
2. Tyranny cause the corruption of the individual,
3. Tyranny contradicts religion (in both theological and
historical terms)
4. Tyranny reinforces underdevelopment and colonialism.
42 Esposito, The Straight Path, p.47.43 Al's argument sounds purely Hobbsian. Bazargan,
Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.108.Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp.107-132,
132-142, 144-163.
282
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
In the post-prison period Bazargan reintroduces his
argument in defence of freedom but there are changes in both form
and content of the thesis. In terms of the form of the language
here he has a tendency towards the greater use of religious
symbols and terminology. Of course in the earlier argument (at the
military tribunal) Bazargan had used religious reasoning in
defence of freedom. Now however, his entire emphasis is on the
religious aspect and he has substituted the religious themes for
secular ones. Prior to this period it was possible to place
Bazargan within the religious wing of the mainly secular
Nationalist current which displayed explicit anti-tyrannical and
anti-colonial dispositions. Now the religious element has over-
shadowed all other aspects and has become the main component of
the ideology. Beside the language and tone of the argument, the
content has also altered, not in the sense that Bazargan is
speaking contrary to his earlier pronouncements, but in the sense
that he has turned even more towards the religious sources to
argue in defence of the freedom of the human being.
The most significant shift however is that the audience is
now the traditional religious community and the arguments are
directed to their ideas. Indeed Bazargan's reasoning with regards
to the issue of freedom in the book, Prophetic Mission and
Ideology, seems to be a polemic with Sayyed Mohammad Hosain
Tabatabai. Tabatabai (1903-1982) represented the enlightened
constituency within the religious orthodoxy. The author of 20
volumes of Al-Mizan (The Balance) commentary on the Koran, five
volumes of The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism,
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seven volumes of philosophical essays, Glosses upon the Afsar
(Hashiyh bar afsar) and tens of commentaries on various points of
Islamic thought, Tabatabai enjoyed the title of "Allameh, the
Learned One'. Tabatabai showed great mastery over his field of
study and no-one came close to criticizing his philosophical
positions. In the words of Nasr, Tabatabai represented the central
and dominating class of clerics who had combined interest in
jurisprudence and Koran commentary with philosophy, theosophy and
Sufism. He possessed the distinction of being a master of both the
Shari'a and esoteric sciences and at the same time an outstanding
traditional philosopher. He managed to exercise a profound
influence in both the traditional and modern intellectual
circles. 45 Most significantly Tabatabai was the master to
Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, professor at the faculty of theology
at Tehran University whose ideas were to gain respect with Islamic
orthodox, fundamentalist and even modernist elements and who was
to become the official, though not the actual, ideologue of the
Islamic revolution in the late 1970s.
Tabatabai and Motahhari participated, along with fifteen
other religious scholars of whom Bazargan was the only lay person
in a series of seminars which were to be known as the Monthly
Religious Society. The society produced a series of magazines and
a book; An Inquiry into the Principle of Marja'iyat and the
45 See introduction to Tabatabai, Shiite Islam. 284
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Religious Institution. 46 Akhavi has described this 1961-63 series
of talks 'the first clergy reform movement which left a profound
impact on the religious community and opened the ground for
vigorous debate among the clerics'. 47 Basically the series called
for the reformation of the clerical establishment, including the
position of religious leadership, which it was suggested, be
organized in a committee, in contrast to the traditional pattern
of the defacto emergence of a leader. Such proposals made both the
traditional and conservative clerical establishment as well as the
regime uneasy, for it challenged the status quo in favour of a
situation where both would have lost influence and prestige.
Although the proposals made no direct attack on the authority of
the government, the powerful infusion of socio-political ideas
into religious thinking gave it a definite polemical quality. The
intellectual adventure which was organized by Ayatollah Motahhari
is said to have been the most important work to have been
published in Iran in the previous fifty years, namely since Naini
wrote his constitutional treatise. 48
It was here that Bazargan and Tabatabai clashed as they
had done so previously. Although details of the arguments are not
known it is possible to suggest that the central issue was on the
46 Marja'-e Taqlid (Source of Imitation); The idea thatbelievers should "imitate" a leading figure in affairs ofreligion. These could include rituals of worship or socio-political judgments. Motahhari distinguishes the Source ofImitation on his specialization and application of logic. SeeBahthi Darbareh-ye Marja'iyat va Ruhaniyat A Discussion onMarja f iyat and the Clergy (Enteshar Publications Co. Tehran,1962).
47 Akhavi, Religion and Politics, chap. 5, passim.48 Akhavi,
285
Conotitutional Imlamic It:biology
nature of government. In the series Tabatabai expressly rejected
the idea of convergence between Islam and democracy and instead
emphasized their fundamental differences. 49 Of course it should
be pointed out that Bazargan, as presented in this study, is not
championing democratic sovereignty but limited constitutional
participatory government based on natural law. However the
difference between the two men in their approach to the issue of
democracy is clear. Later Tabatabai was to express his views in
his other works including Shiite Islam a book written shortly
after (in the second half of the 1960s) at the request of
Professor Kenneth Morgan of Colgate University with the express
aim of presenting the view of an authentic representative of
Shiism to the Western reader. 50 Similarly Bazargan expressed his
views in the Prophetic Mission and Ideology. The dialogue between
the two men is clear.
In Shiite Islam Tabatabai points out that from the
traditional Shiite point of view the political method of selecting
the ruler (Caliph) by vote is not acceptable. Such a procedure
could mean that "people could become rulers' contrary to the
nature of religious government as desired by Islam (the government
being in charge of executing divine order in society, allowing
personal and social freedom to the extent possible and
implementing social justice). Divine government could only be
carried out by a person who was inerrant and protected by God from
fault. Furthermore the only duty of an Islamic government would be
49 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, p.173.50 Tabatabai, Shiite Islam, p.17.
286
Constitutional Imlamic Ideology
to make decisions by consultation within the limits set by the
Shari'a (and then in accordance with the demands of the moment.)
51 Tabatabai's emphasis on the infallibility of the ruler
protected by God is one of the characteristics of Shiite political
thinking, particularly in contrast to the mainstream Sunni
tradition. It is by its claim to a supernatural moral excellence
based on an esoteric knowledge, that the succession of Ali and his
family is justified in the Shiite view of things. This view of
esoteric knowledge subsequently articulated itself, in Shiite
thinking, in a form of idealism in which the feebleness of the
ordinary man kept the tradition aloof from politics. Subsequently
the right of the infallible Imam to rule was transformed, by a
number of scholars, including the Ayatollah Khomeini to mean as
the right of the religious juriconsult to govern. 52
It is in reply to the position of the conservative and
traditional clerics including Ayatollah Tabatabai that Bazargan
introduces his argument in Prophetic Mission and Ideology. 53 In
it he defends his concept of government in Islam as compatible
with democracy. The book was published after Bazargan's arrest and
it is reasonable to suggest that it is in direct response to the
traditionalist polemics as expressed by 'Allameh Tabatabai during
the Monthly Religious Talks (1960-63). Here Bazargan's main effort
is to persuade the conservatives that the two ideas of Islam and
democracy are compatible. In other words he tries to bring
51 Tabatabai, Shiite Islam, pp.43-44.52 Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, chap. 1.
passim.53 Bazargan Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.132-142, and
144-147287
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together the two traditions of discourse and make them compatible,
or at least to show by implication that they are not
contradictory. In the process, and in order not to contradict some
traditional Islamic ideas, he makes some concessions to the
traditionalist camp.
It is important to bear in mind that in the 1940s and
1950s Bazargan was critical of the clerics for their conservative
and quietist approach to social issues and politics. Now in the
1960s he has become critical of their traditional concept of the
nature of government which reserves authority for the spiritual
elite, that is the sinless Imam. It is this concept of government
which Bazargan seeks to refute. Addressing the traditional
community Bazargan states that although he can respect the motives
of the scholar-clerics, their "extremist' position is unacceptable
to him for such severity places them within the camp opposed to
political freedoms. Bazargan believes that the opposition of these
certain religious leaders and writers and their sensitivity to the
'word democracy' has several causes. Most significantly they think
it contrary to the Islamic practice of things. For instance
concerning the position of the leader of the religious community,
Bazargan says, the clerics call for the right of a religious elite
to choose the community leader whose acceptance by the community
is then obligatory on religious grounds.
Here both the position of Bazargan and the leading
clerical elements are non traditional although they both appeal to
traditional practice. The practice has its roots in the
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traditional Islamic and particularly the Shiite position, based on
the method of choosing the leader of the Islamic community after
the death of the Prophet Mohammad (632), but limited to the first
four Caliphs (632-661) before the leadership turned into
hereditary monarchy (661). The first Caliph was selected through
the vote of the majority of the companions of the prophet, the
second by the will and testament of the first, the third by a six-
man council whose members and rules of procedure were organized by
and determined by the second. 54 The succession of the fourth
Caliph Ali who is the first Shiite Imam was approved of by the
majority of the members of the Muslim community.
Bazargan states that the cleric's opposition to democracy
is either because they are badly informed or have misinterpreted
the issue altogether. They have taken democracy to represent the
corruption of Western societies and the injustices of their
governments. Furthermore they have imagined democracy to be
absolute licence of the individual and adherence to the wish of
the majority in all and every case. Bazargan also criticizes the
clerics' sense of righteousness and their view of themselves as
the learned religious elite and throws doubt on their integrity.
On what grounds do they see themselves to be on the straight path
and others to be deviating from it? What guarantees do they have
that once in power they will not choose the course of betrayal and
impose a rule of tyranny, Bazargan with some foresight asks the
clerics.
54 Tabatabai, Shiite Islam, p.48.289
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To support his thesis in defence of the practice of
democracy and to define constitutional freedom Bazargan refers to
four Koran themes. The first is on the creation of man:
Behold thy lord said to the angels: I will create a vice
regent on earth: they said: wilt thou place therein one
who will make mischief therein and shed blood? Whilst we
do celebrate thy praises and glorify thy holy (name)? He
said I know what you know not. And he taught Adam the
nature of all things, then he placed them before the
angels and said tell me the nature of these if you are
right. They said "Glory to thee, of knowledge we have
none, save what thou hast taught us, in truth it is thou
who are perfect in knowledge and wisdom". He said "0, Adam
tell them of their nature". When he had told them God said
"Did I not tell you that I know the secrets of heaven and
earth, and I know what ye reveal and what ye conceal?" And
behold we said to the angels "Bow to Adam" and they bowed
down. Not so Iblis: he refused and was haughty: He was of
those who rejected Faith. We said "0 Adam, dwell thou and
they wife in the garden and eat of the bountiful things
therein as (where and when) ye will, but approach not this
tree or ye turn into harm and transgression". Then did
Satan make them slip from the (Garden) and get them out of
the state (of felicity) in which they had been. We said
"Get ye down, all (ye people) with enmity between
yourselves. On earth will be your dwelling place and your
means of livelihood for a time." (11:30-36)
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In interpreting these verses Bazargan states that despite
the knowledge that man would cause corruption and shed blood on
earth but because he would also learn the names (qualities) of God
and learn of his secrets, God created man and allowed Satan to
tempt him. Bazargan interprets this to mean that God has given man
the freedom of choice (Ekhtiyar). This indicates that man is
naturally free and that his freedom is a divine blessing and a
gift. Freedom constitutes the key to man's progress and the ground
for his evolution. It is this freedom which has made him to be the
conscious, intelligent and creative creature that he is. 55
Bazargan also refers to another Koran verse; Command the
good and forbid the evil. 56 Akhavi cites this verse to be the
centre-piece of the Shiite political theory, for once applied to
social settings it grants the possibility of protest against the
ruling authority (a position which reinforces Shiite's
historically minority position and continuous vicious circle of
persecution.) 57 It is important to note that the verse was taken
up by the clerical reformist movement (cited above) as the
instrument of taking a political position against the authorities.
On the face of it the principle presents itself as a moral axiom
calling for good deeds and avoidance of wrong. However once it is
interpreted that the principle applies to public/political
behaviour of the masses it immediately takes a political hue and
55 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp.130-132.56 Al-Amr bi-alm'ruf wa al-nahi an al-munkar, The Koran III,
110.57 Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p.12.
291
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
could be then interpreted as being the foundation for social
reformation.
Up to this point Bazargan seems to be in agreement with
the reformist clerics aiming at changes within the ruling
establishment and making a political statement vis-a-vis the
authorities. But he departs from the cleric's position where he
pushes the point further and interprets the principle to mean the
necessity of the right of the people to exercise criticism of the
institution of government. By this move Bazargan is further
transferring the right of political decision making from the state
as well as the clergy and into society. To safeguard his defensive
position Bazargan shields himself under classic Islamic rhetoric.
He quotes Ali, the first Shiite Imam as having said that once the
Islamic practice of commanding the good and forbidding the evil is
not practiced there will be corruption in religion. Equating
religion with society at large, but particularly the government,
and extending the need to command good, from moral preaching of
the clerics to the individual's social responsibility, Bazargan
thus interprets the principle as the practice of social criticism
putting it in a modern frame of reference altogether. 58
To further strengthen his argument in defence of the
practice of democracy Bazargan also refers to the manner in which
the prophet and All exercised power. A manner which Bazargan
58 This position parallels the essentially Protestant movein the West making the individual responsible for what is donesocially and so requiring him to be able to exercise politicalrights.
292
Conistitutional Islamic Ideology
interprets as having been "democratic". They are both said to have
allowed members of the community to express their views, to
criticize and to live in security and peace despite their
opposition to the government. Neither of them, are said to have
created any obstacles for their political opponents. Bazargan's
comments on the early history of Islam which is looked upon by all
Muslims as the exemplary golden age is of course open to
interpretation. But Bazargan believes that the practice of
government by Ali indicates that his administration, chosen by the
people, was the best form of "government of the people or
democracy". 59 The examples of "democratic practice" by Ali is
said to be that his "election" to the seat of Caliphate and his
acceptance of arbitration in second Muslim civil war at the battle
of Saf fain (657) with the force of Mo'avyeh, the governor of Syria
challenging the leadership of the Muslim world and finally taking
it after the death of Ali. In Saffain as Mo'avyeh's men faced
defeat they raised the Koran on the tip of their spears and called
for arbitration. 60 Ali agreed but the arbitration fatally
weakened his position. However the fact that he accepted the
demand for arbitration rather than to push at the military
advantage that he had in the battle-field is indicated here by
Bazargan to show Al's regard and respect for the wishes of the
59 Of course allowing opposition is not the same asdemocracy but it does indicate a limited or moderate rule,tolerance.
60 There are various interpretations on why Ali accepted thearbitration. One states the unwillingness of the commanders underAli to pursue the war in order to take tactical advantage of thesituation towards reinforcing their own position vis-a-vis bothAli and Mo'avyeh. See Kennedy, H. The Prophet and the Age of theCaliphates (Longman, London, 1986) p.78, and Esposito, Islam theStraight Path, p.43.
293
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majority. 61
Bazargan applies similar types of argument to prove the
"democratic practices" in the government of the prophet Mohammad.
Of course the choice of prophethood is said to have been that of
God rather than people, in the sense that it was God who decided
to choose Mohammad to carry the message of Islam and lead the
community, but the manner of his rule indicates that it belonged
to the people and was exercised through popular consultation and
vote. As further examples of "democratic practice" Bazargan cites
the prophet's departure from Mecca on his Hejra, the battle of
Uhud and negotiations in the battle of Trench (or Ahzab).
The case of Hejra (the Prophet's emigration from the city
of Mecca to Medina in 633 which became the foundation of the
Muslim calendar) refers to the fact that the Prophet's emigration
took place at the invitation of the Medinans. Being under pressure
in Mecca the Prophet agreed to the invitation to leave for Medina
but only after making sure that the great majority of Medinans who
had been at the civil war accepted his position of leadership and
61 Similar parallel to Bazargan's efforts can be found inthe West. For instance the Protestants in their implementation ofone of their chief items of belief, ie. the universal priesthoodof all believers, pushed forth the idea of self-independence andindividual autonomy. While Calvin's sustained attempts weredirected towards the development of new political institutions,Martin Luther referred large areas of social and political life tothe jurisdiction of the individual conscience. This in turn madethe individual responsible for what is done socially and sorequires him to be able to exercise political rights. For a studyof the connection between individualism and the universalism ofenlightenment see Tawney, R.H. Religion and The Rise ofCapitalism.
294
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arbitration. 62 Bazargan interprets Mohammad's approach to the
issue as one of "democratic" practice for it supposedly relies on
the wishes and consensus of the population, the majority.
The case of Uhud refers to the battle between Mohammad and
the Meccan forces (624) where Mohammad suffered losses but not
strategic defeat. The Battle of the Trench took place three years
later when the Meccan confederate armies laid siege on Medina
lasting a fortnight. In the latter differences appeared within the
Meccan confederacy and with a turn in the weather the troops
dispersed leaving Mohammad able to attack the remaining groups. 63
Bazargan's reference to these two events, is apparently with
regard to Mohammad's willingness to take military council. In the
former battle some parties of the Muslim force were allowed to act
on their own judgment and in the latter a trench was dug up, on
the suggestions of a Persian convert, as the defence strategy.
The other Islamic paradigm used by Bazargan is that of
consultation (Shura). The concept is again borrowed from two
verses of the Koran:
(That which is better and lasting is for] those who
hearken to their lord and establish regular prayer, (and)
who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation (XLII,
38) It is part of the mercy of God that thou deal gently
with them ... ask for (God's) forgiveness for them and
consult them in affairs (of moment). (III, 159)
62 Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, p.33.63 Cambridge History of Islam, V.I, p.48.
295
Constitutional Islamic Idsology
According to Bazargan the two verses indicate the
affiliation of the Islamic community in the sense that the
management of affairs has to be carried out through consultation
of its members. Furthermore it signifies that members of the
community should co-operate in their administration of social
affairs. Referring to the fact that the above verses were direct
divine commands to the person of the Prophet, whom Bazargan
believes to have been a genius, it then becomes imperative for
ordinary members of the community to utilize and implement the
divine rule of consultation. Although the actual appointment of
Mohammad to prophethood was a divine measure independent of the
wishes of the people, Bazargan states, the study of his life and
his government indicates that his rule was carried out through
consultation (Shura) with the people and approved through their
appointment. It was therefore a government of the people and in a
modern sense a democracy, Bazargan concludes.
The expression of compromise towards the position of the
traditional conservatives including that of Tabatabai comes within
the discussion on the limitations of government. To appease the
traditional stand Bazargan makes several references to the limits
set upon his conception of democratic government. The aim of the
exercise is to ease concerns amongst conservatives that the
practice of democratic government will bring havoc to their
traditions and will undermine the religious community. The purpose
of freedom, Bazargan points out, is not to create moral
carelessness or chaos on the social or political levels. On the
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
contrary its purpose is to liberate the human being from the
chains of injustice and violators of human rights. Indeed the rule
of law is established to counter coercion of wealth and power. The
very meaning of freedom is to establish law, social principles and
responsibilities, Bazargan emphasizes, not to become liberated
from them.
Furthermore the principles of the constitution will be
specifically determined by divine law. No-one has the right to
regulate such fundamental laws. Here Bazargan's reference is to
the 1906 constitution which gives concessions to Islam on several
grounds. The 1906 constitution was drawn up by European minded
reformers from the Belgian model and called for the establishment
of an elected legislature and constitutional government. This was
initially approved by the clerics who enthusiastically
participated in the first parliament. However once they had
realized the practical consequences of a secular and elected body,
including the ascendancy of secular courts at a cost to the
religious ones, a section of the clerical community initiated an
offensive. The supplementary law which was passed the following
year gave the clerics an extralegal position. The second clause of
the law states that the parliament may at no time legislate laws
that are contradictory to the sacred laws of Islam". Furthermore
it calls for the creation of a board of no less that five
juriconsults and devout specialists in Islamic law, nominated by
clerics and accepted by the parliament as full members, who would
then have the power to supervise the process of legislation and
ConAtitutional Islamic Idoology
veto bills should they be contrary to the Islamic Shari'a. 64
However within the next five decades the clerical establishment
increasingly lost its social and political influence and the
clause became redundant.
It is in this spirit that Bazargan points out that the act
of government, from his Islamic perspective, is the act of
guardianship or custodianship (as in the case of trusteeship of
religious foundations traditionally exercised by the clerics).
Furthermore this custodianship regarding people's wealth and
affairs is extended by the people as in an act of trust. 65 But
governments have no right to determine the destiny of the
individual, the nature of human responsibility, individual rights,
or fundamental social laws, for all these are within the dominance
of the divine. The only responsibility of government is to work
according to the design of God and in accordance to the divine
conscious of man.
It is interesting to note that it was on the very basis of
the concept of guardianship that Ayatollah Khomeini later built
his idea of Islamic government and the absolute rule of the
Juriconsult. In his book Islamic government (1971) Khomeini argues
that Islamic government differs from representative and/or
constitutional monarchies on the ground that there is no need for
new legislation because all necessary laws have already been
promulgated and revealed by the prophet and the infallible Imams.
64 Mottahedeh, R. The Mantle of the Prophet (Chatto &Windus, London, 1986) pp.219-222.
65 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.116.298
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Thus the function of any assembly (presumably consultative or
representative) would be to engage not in the enactment of laws
but in agenda setting, that is the clarification of the means of
administration. 66
Within the greater context of the debate however it
appears that Bazargan's concept and understanding of freedom is a
positive one -rather than negative- in the sense that freedom is
not seen as the freedom of unrestrained movement of the individual
(Thomas Hobbes) and the absence of opposition restraints against
it. But the positive creation of a social environment where, under
the protection of law the individual is capable of fulfilling his
true and good nature. 67
But Bazargan is also aware that both the individual and
the society possess limited forms of freedom to choose between
alternatives and create their own life/social programme. Were it
not for freedom and the possibility to choose, there would be no
responsibility demanded of human beings and the concepts of
education, and ideology would have no meaning. 68
Bazargan distinguishes between freedom enjoyed by man in
relationship to God and freedom as between members of the society.
The former has no restraints, for God has set no limits on the
66 Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iranp.165.
67 For a comparison on the different approaches, ie.positive versus negative liberty, see Berlin, I. The Two Conceptsof Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press)pp.118-172.
68 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.95.299
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freedom of man. God only seeks to guide the individual thought and
action. However relationships between human beings are limited to
general responsibilities and laws based on the principle that
there should not be infringement on the rights and freedoms of
others. 69 This position reflects Bazargan's break from the
traditional position where God, via Shari'a, is claimed to have
legislated for many aspects of life, leaving little freedom for
the individual.
Comparing Bazargan's understanding of the issue of freedom
and democracy to the earlier stages (that is the post 1963 to the
pre-1963 period) there is no marked change in the content of the
concept. However the audience of the discourse has changed. With
regard to the issue of freedom the book Prophetic Mission and
Ideology is almost exclusively written in response to the
traditional Islamic position and its concept of elite government
while in the pre-1963 period Bazargan had addressed the regime and
criticized it for unrestrained practice of government. While the
objective of both exercises was to further the cause of democracy,
the method of the approaches differ. Initially Bazargan criticized
the state as the cause of tyranny, in the Prophetic Mission and
Ideology, he criticizes those who are basically his allies in the
fight against the Pahlavi state. Bazargan is now thinking on long
term issues and the effort is meant to change his allies from what
he sees as a non-democratic position to a democratic one. In the
process he utilizes the traditional Islamic sources of
inspiration: the Koran, Hadith and early Muslim history. He
69 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp.133-140.300
Constitutional Islamic Idoology
interprets the verses, the practices of the prophet and historical
events in favour of the democratic practice of government.
We had pointed out earlier that during the 1941-53 period
(and particularly in the first half) Bazargan was concerned with
the advance of the communist ideology in general and that of the
Tudeh party in particular. As he became more concerned with the
authoritarian nature of government during the 1950s and 1960s,
Bazargan was to reduce his concentration on the issue of Marxist-
Leninist ideology, although it is possible to detect the existence
of the issue in the fringes of his works. Many of the revised
versions of the writings which were published in the early 1960s
testify to this fact. But the issue became particularly acute in
the early 1970s when an inside coup in the Mojahedin Khalq
Organization, which had till then claimed Revolutionary Islamic
ideology, "shed its petite bourgeoisie skin° and turned Marxist
Leninist. 70 In response to the situation and within a year
Bazargan produced two books: The Scientificity of Marxism and A
Review of the Ideas of Eric Fromm. (The first book was written in
partnership with Ezatollah Sahabi and both writers, for reasons
unknown to this author used pseudonyms). The two books were
clearly intended to refute the ideological constructs of Marxism
and Neo-Marxism and to limit their influence among Iranian
intellectuals particularly the younger generation. In both books,
after extensive critical review of Marxism, Bazargan reaches the
conclusion that inherent contradictions of the ideology will bring
70 For an account of the great schism see Abrahamian,Radical Islam, chap. 6, passim.
301
Constitutional Islamic Idoology
about a self-refutation and the acknowledgement of the religious
truth of the freedom of man.
Social obedience and rebellion
The third element within the Divine Ideology of Bazargan
is the issue of social obedience and rebellion. 71 The concept
developed within the context of the religious reform movement in
the 1960-63 period which called for the establishment of a supreme
religious council. As already discussed, the movement concerned
the issue of leadership of the religious community. Several
factors had helped the situation: on the one hand Ayatollah
Borujerdi who ranked highest among the Shia clerics in Iran had
died, precipitating the acceleration of a reform movement. Facing
a vacuum at the leadership level of the religious community the
more reformed minded elements (within the leading ranks of the
religious community) moved to propose the concept of collective
leadership. On the other hand the political liberalization of the
period allowed the clerics to take a more active role and a
somewhat reformist position. Had it not been for the open
political climate of the period it is possible that the leadership
would have gone to the more radical elements much sooner. This
indeed happened after the 1963 crackdown and the emergence of the
less compromising stewardship of Ayatollah Khomeini. Had the open
climate continued it is again possible to think that the supreme
leadership council concept might have been successful with the
more moderate traditional and conservative elements maintaining a
firmer grip on the leadership positions.
71 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp.163-178.302
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
It is within such a context that Bazargan supported the
idea of the supreme council. The idea has in a way its precedent
in the 1906 constitution where it was stipulated that a five
member committee of clerics would have veto power over parliament
any legislation. The proposal of the clerical reform movement, and
particularly that of Bazargan, much resembles what was originally
stipulated in the 1906 constitution but never implemented. It
seems logical for the clerical community to have re-emphasized
those elements of the constitution which it thought to be of
significance for its own social position.
Bazargan's argument for the establishment of the supreme
council comes within the issue of social obedience and rebellion.
Bazargan himself calls it the principle of obedience and safe
guard of the community. It argues that conflict of ideas and
interests is a natural, though not desirable state of affairs and
that conflicting ideas should be reconciled through the
application of Islamic principles which in the last stage finds
its manifestation in an elected body of learned and pious men of
religion who act as arbitrators in issues of social concern,
particularly those concerning relations between the state and the
people. The idea constitutes an innovation on the five-man
constitutional committee.
Bazargan begins his argument 72 by accepting that the
emergence of differences and conflicts of interests is the
72 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp.163-178.303
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ordinary state of affairs in society, Islamic or otherwise. How
then is one to go about settling the differences and ending the
conflicts? Does any side to the conflict, specially those in
minority, have the right to rebel against the opposing view and
try to put an end to the existing order? Furthermore what is the
procedure for reconciliation?
To start with Bazargan states the inherent unity of the
Islamic community (Umma) based on the idea of one God (Tawhid). In
the same manner that God and his religion are one, it is in the
interest of the people to create one single community. Indeed with
the truth of revelation there should not be any differences
between the believers. However the natural state of affairs is
that of conflict between human beings, but the ideal towards which
they should strive is that of unity and reconciliation. Bazargan
refers to two Koranic verses:
The religion before God is Islam (submission to God), nor
did the people of the book dissent there from except
through the envy of each other after knowledge has come to
them. (III, 19) Nor would thy lord be the one to destroy
communities for a single wrong-doing if its members were
likely to mend. If thy lord had so willed, he could have
made mankind one people. (XI, 117 & 118)
It is upon this basis that Muslims should discipline
themselves in social harmony and realize that separation,
isolation and conflict is contrary to the desired goals of Islam.
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Bazargan clearly states that the rule applies both to Islamic
countries and societies as well as smaller social units and
communities. The reference is obviously to the issues within the
Muslim community of Iran (where the question of leadership had
become of paramount importance) and within the Iranian society at
large where segments of the Muslim community were laying political
challenge to the ruling establishment. To support his views
Bazargan refers to several Koranic verses:
Dispute ye not with the people of the book, except with
means better (than mere disputation) (XXIX, 46) As far as
those who divide their religion and break up into sects,
thou hast not part in them in the least. (VI, 159) And
hold fast all together, by the rope which God (stretches
out for you) and be not divided among yourselves, and
remember with gratitude God's favour on you, for you were
enemies and he joined your hearts in love. (III, 103) Obey
God and his apostle and fall into no dispute lest ye lose
heart and your power. (XIII, 46)
Now that the necessity for the establishment of unity has
been argued for it is necessary for the community to accept a
single recognized leader who will then guard the unity and order
of community and who will come to symbolize the community. Indeed
obedience to the leader (Imam) is a religious obligation and
rebellion against him forbidden. It is clear that Bazargan is
trying to establish the necessity of a strong, undisputed
leadership for the Islamic community. It is towards this end that
Constitutional Islamic Idsology
he is arguing. Here Bazargan's main reference is Koran's (IV, 59)
verse; "0 ye who believe! Obey God and obey the apostle and those
charged with authority among you."
To emphasise that his interpretation of the verse (IV, 59)
and particularly that of "those charged with authority among you"
is different from the traditionalist and fundamentalist
interpretation Bazargan immediately points out the fact that the
authority in question is chosen by the people.
Going back to the main argument, Bazargan brings up
several historical events to support his concept that even the
Shiite Imams supported the idea of obedience to the will of the
community, in that while they were opposed to the ruling powers
they did not challenge authority as such. Indeed they submitted to
the ruling authority in the hope that the strength of the
community will be maintained. Bazargan gives four historical
examples; of Imams Ali, Hosain, Hasan and Sajad. Ali, the first of
the Shiite Imams, according to Bazargan, accepted the rule of the
three earlier Caliphs and even cooperated with them and only
agreed to become the fourth Caliph on the people's request. This
Bazargan apparently believes indicates that Ali was prepared to
put up with rulers who, according to Shiite belief, had usurped
the seat that rightly belonged to him, only in order to strengthen
the Muslim community rather than ravage it by dogs of conflict and
civil war.
The second case refers to the second Shiite Imam, Hasan
Mojtaba, the elder son of Ali, who made peace with Mo'avyeh and
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Constitutional Islamic Ideology
accepted his Caliphate. The Shiite interpretation of this peace
which was one of the first formal Shiite submissions to a usurping
ruler (in the Shiite eye) is a pragmatic one. It is said that the
peace rather than war was chosen not because Hasan was unable to
stand up to the challenges of Mo'avyeh but because this was the
best, shrewdest, way of protecting his partisans. 73 This Bazargan
insists indicates Imam Hasan's respect for the welfare of the
larger Muslim community. Imam Hasan could have put a claim for
leadership and could have gone about establishing his own
authority. But he did not do so in order to guarantee the unity
and order of the larger Muslim community.
The two other examples follow similar arguments. Bazargan
also says that from the fourth Imam onwards, during the rule of
the Umayyid and Abbasid rules, none of the Shiite leaders
separated their ways from the existing Islamic community in order
to establish their own rule and independent government. This was
done in order to guarantee the unity of the community and the
fundamentals of religions.
However as stated earlier Bazargan views social conflict
as the natural state, in contrast to complete harmony as the ideal
state. He refers to two Koranic verses which ask the believers to
call upon the Prophet, as the interpreter of the divine text to
deal with differences among the community.
73 Tabatabai, Shiite Islam, pp.194-195.307
Constitutional Islamic Idoology
If ye differ in anything among yourself, refer it to God
and his apostle (IV, 59) When there comes to them some
matter touching (public) safety or fear, they divulge it.
If they had only referred it to the apostle, or to those
charged with authority among them, the proper
investigation would have tested it (IV, 83).
These verses, according to Bazargan signify the state of
conflict in nature as well as the rule of the Prophet of God as
the final arbiter. However since the prophet is no longer
accessible, his traditions as well as the Koran should be
utilized. It is now up to those who are learned in the Koran and
familiar with the Hadith of the Prophet to interpret the
situation. But the issue becomes more complicated if the matters
of conflict have no precedent in the Koran and the Hadith.
This point is of significance since the modernization of
social relations in twentieth century Iranian society has brought
about unprecedented situations to which there are no references in
traditional Shiite body of literature. To deal with this situation
Bazargan again returns to Islam, in this case methodology, where
traditionally, besides the two sources of the Koran and Hadith,
reason and consensus have been applied. In traditional
jurisprudence the use of reason has taken a number of forms
including that of personal opinion (ra'y) jurist preference
(istihsan) or analogical reasoning (qiyas). 74 The last source,
74 Karnali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Chaps. 9,12, passim, & Esposito, The Straight Path, p.83.
308
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
that of consensus (ijma) calls on the majority opinion of the
community as a check on individual opinion. However in time the
idea of community, cited above, became restricted to that of the
community of jurists acting on behalf of the larger Muslim
community. 75 To make his point Bazargan relies on a Hadith.
"We said 0 Prophet of God what if an issue rises to which
a [Koranic] verse has not been revealed and to which you
have not established a tradition? He said: gather the
learned amongst the believers and consult among yourselves
without judging on a single opinion." 76
Bazargan's approach to the issue is to try to retain one
element and change the other. In other words he accepts that the
interpreters and final arbitrators have to be learned men of
religion but he insists that in the last analysis these men must
be chosen by the people. It is upon this basis that Bazargan
declares his final intention and asks why should there not be, in
the effort to deal with highly sensitive social issues, a "supreme
clerical body"? 77
The body would have just men learned in the affairs of the
world and the hereafter. Most significantly it would be chosen,
directly or indirectly by the people. It would operate on a
permanent basis, to solve issues within the religious community
proper. And it would deal with matters of difference rising
7576
Esposito,Bazargan,
Islam the Straight Path, p.84.p.172.Prophetic Mission and Ideology,
77 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.172.309
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between the people and the government, as well as differences
between various governmental branches, for instance the executive
and the judiciary. The clerical body would be of such supreme
nature that it would have veto power over the parliament.
Bazargan's proposal, to say the least, is extraordinary. It not
only suggests the involvement of the religious community and
establishment in politics, it calls for their active participation
in the legislature. It places the clerics at the highest level of
decision making and gives them extra ordinary powers with little
process of check over their actions. Of course Bazargan has
emphasized the elected nature of the body. But given the fact that
this very point has been a matter of dispute with the traditional
segments of the clerical community the idea could have posed, and
indeed it did in the following decade, serious political
consequences once articulated into realpolitik.
It was on the basis of the idea of the duty of the learned
men of Islamic law that the radical wing of the clerical body
built their argument, and later led the 1979 Islamic revolution.
In due course the revolution brought about albeit a limited
period, the domination of the concept of the absolute rule of the
jurisconsult as articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini. 78
78 Khomeini proposed the concept of the "absolute rule ofthe juriconsult" in reaction to factional fighting within theIranian regime and in order to support the government in carryingout its programme against the existing opposition (winter 1987).Khomeini argued that the government of the Prophet Mohammad wasabsolute and its requirements took procedure over all other issuesincluding the very act of worship of God. Velayat-e Motlaqeh-eFaqih The Absolute Rule of the Jurisprudent" (FMI, Tehran, 1988).Also see Enayat, H. Iran: Khumayni's Concept of the Guardianshipof the Juriconsult in Piscatori, J. (ed.) Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983).
310
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Having established the argument in favour of creating a
Supreme Clerical Body, which most significantly challenged the
then current consensus of the nature of leadership, Bazargan turns
his attention towards the state. The question which he poses is
this: What is the responsibility of the individual if an elected
government transgresses the bounds of justice, or fails to accept
the rule of God and his Prophet or worse still is un-elected or
non-representative? For his answer Bazargan falls back on the rich
Shiite tradition of polemics which rationalize and legitimize the
minority position Shiism had suffered for all of its history vis-
a-vis the Sunni majority and which constitutes the very
theoretical foundation of the existence of the Shiite school.
With regard to the duties of the individual to obey or to
rebel against the state, Bazargan argues that the first response
of the Muslim should be that of "Enjoining the good and forbidding
the evil." 79 It has been said that this concept is the most
important collective duty of believers, the accomplishment of
which is the simple reason for Muslim concern with politics in the
first place. 80 Or that this verse is the centre-piece of Shiite
political thought for it grants, when directed to a social
setting, the possibility of resistance against authority as a
means of forbidding the evil and enjoining the good. 81 There has
already been a discussion on how Bazargan intended the concept to
79 Al-amr bil-ma'ruf wa'n-nahy an al-munkar, The Koran III,110.
80 Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, p.2.8]. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p.12.
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mean the right of the individual to criticize the government and
therefore a pillar of the democratic exercise of power. Now
Bazargan interprets the principle to justify advice, consultation,
reasoning and criticism. In other words rational and non-violent
approaches to settling social and political matters. However
should those in authority contradict the divine laws and
transgress the obligation of obtaining allegiance (Bayat) 82 then
the individual can, and indeed must, disobey and ultimately rebel.
On the duty and obligation to resist unjust rule Bazargan
states that individuals, particularly those in the service of
government have no right or responsibility to implement rulings
which are ill intended. But in contrast to mere violence, Bazargan
states, resistance and if necessary rebellion and revolution can
be authorized only after certain conditions are met. These
conditions include the failure of consultation, reason, and
criticism on the one hand and use of provocation and violence by
authorities on the other hand, as well as an increasing general
social degeneration, and demand and support by the people for
action. Quoting Koranic verses in support of his argument, ie. the
right of rebellion, Bazargan refers to the following:
And follow not the bidding of those who are extravagant
and who make mischief in the land and mend not (their
ways) (XXVI, 151 & 152). And pursue not that of which thou
82 Bayat is the allegiance that the four rightly guidedCaliphs demanded from the Islamic community upon taking office.With the fourth Caliph Ali, according to Bazargan, Bayat was ofgreater significance.
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Constitutional Islamic Ideology
hast no knowledge for every act of hearing or of seeing or
of (feeling in) the heart will be inquired into (on the
day of judgment) (XVII, 6) Their real wish is to resort
together for judgment (in their disputes) to the evil one,
though they were ordered to reject it. (IV-60)
Bazargan thus moves in his argument (by relying on the
concepts of obedience and rebellion) from calling for strong
collective leadership in the religious community, to the need to
check the exercise of state power by a religious body and finally
to the right of the individual to rebel against authority should
that authority fail to act within divine justice.
War and Peace
War was an important issue in the early days of Islam.
Mohammad led the Muslim army in three main battles and many mor
smaller campaigns, skirmishes and raids in his 23 year mission. 83
After him the first four Caliphs commanded many more battles
within their 29 years of rule. The earliest wars of Islamic
history had seriously threatened the existence of the young
community and had demanded full dedication by the believers.
Through later military campaigns territories controlled by Muslim
armies expanded from a small area in the west Arabian peninsula as
far as India in the East and North Africa in the West. As holy
war, Jihad, later came to be interpreted as the defence of the
realm of peace/Islam (dar-al-Islam) from the dar-al-harb, the
83 The three main battles were Badr (624) Uhud (625) andKhandaq (627). Others included Khaybar and Hunayan.
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Constitutional Islamic Ideology
realm of war. There are 35 direct references (out of the 6,000
verses) in the Koran to holy war. 84
Fight in the cause of God those who fight you but do not
transgress limits for God loveth not transgressors, and
slay them whenever ye catch them and turn them out from
where they have turned you out, for tumult and oppression
are worse than slaughter. But fight them not at the sacred
Mosque unless they (first) fight you there. But if they
fight you slay them, such is the reward of those who
suppress faith. But if they cease, God is oft-forgiving,
most merciful. And fight them on until there is no more
tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith
in God, but if they cease let there be no hostility except
to those who practice oppression. (Koran, II, 193-194)
Those who behave and suffer exile and strive with might,
[fight] and main in the God's cause, with their goods and
persons, have the highest rank in the sight of God (IX,
20) Fighting is prescribed for you, and you dislike it.
But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good
for you and that ye love a thing which is bad for you.
(II, 216)
However according to orthodox interpretations the concept
of holy war or Jihad in the Koran means exertion in the path of
God rather than purely military conflict, as the concept has come
84 Kassis, H.S. A Concordance of the Koran (University ofCalifornia Press, Berkeley, 1983).
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Coamtitutioaal Islamic Idoology
to be understood in recent years with the rise of militant Islamic
tendencies. In the orthodox mind the exertion becomes external
war, only as when the borders of Islam are threatened. In fact
during most of Islamic history and specially that of Shiism (which
distanced itself from political engagement during most of its
history) Jihad has been understood as exertion in inner moral
struggle and in the field of religious sciences. 85 The concept is
found both in Sunni and Shiite traditions. Jihad also includes the
socio-economic domain where it has meant the reassertion of
justice in the external environment of human existence starting
with man himself. To defend one's rights and reputation, to defend
the honour of oneself and one's family is said to be a Jihad and a
religious duty. With regard to the spiritual, Jihad refers to the
struggle for perfection in the inner life. Indeed this inner Jihad
is known as the major in contrast to the minor station of warfare.
In the Muslim eye major/inner Jihad is required to make one
detached from the impurities of the world. 86
Bazargan's study of the concept of war comes in reference
to what he sees as an inevitable clash with the ruling
establishment as well as what he believes to be over-enthusiasm on
behalf of the segments of the Muslim community who celebrate war
as a means of divine expression. 87 With regard to the
establishment Bazargan seeks to argue that war is a natural and
85 Naar, S.H. (ed.) Shiism Doctrines, Thought andSpirituality (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1988)p.5.
86 Naar, Shiism, Doctrines, Thought and Spirituality, pp.275-278.
87 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp.178-198.315
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inevitable event for which Muslims should be always prepared.
Addressing the zealots in the Muslim community he argues that war
can only be employed as a last resort and only in a defensive
posture. To establish his arguments Bazargan first identifies the
place of war in human society and goes on to emphasize Islam's
insistence on peace as an ideal but also Islam's realism in its
permanent preparation for defensive combat. He then identifies the
characteristic of the enemies of Islam and the conditions for
fighting them.
War and peace are both part of real life and impossible to
negate, their denial being a fancy, Bazargan argues. The Koran
views war as the very law of nature and tradition of the upholders
of the banner of truth in history. It calls for the responsibility
of defence as a divine test and tribulation to purify the believer
in his path of evolution. The fact that human beings have not yet
reached a state of perfection makes struggle and war for survival
in their society inevitable: indeed the world is the house of
confrontation. Bazargan points to a number of Koranic verses which
clarify the Islamic position on the issue:
[Had] not God checked one set of people by measures of
another, the earth would indeed be full of mischief (II,
251) Do you think that they will be left alone on saying
"we believe" and that they will not be tested? (XXIX, 1)
Or do you think that ye shall enter the garden (of bliss)
without such (trials) as come to those who passed away
before you? They encountered suffering and adversity. (II,
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214) Be sure we shall test you with something of fear and
hunger, some loss in goods or lives or the fruits (of your
toil). (11,154)
To support his argument Bazargan refers to the more
immediate historical cases which he terms struggles for truth,
freedom and independence. The destiny of all righteous struggles,
he says, are determined in the field of battle. Until the day that
people are willing to fight, kill and be killed there will be no
possibility of victory. Bazargan refers to several modern
historical cases: the American War of Independence, (1770s) the
French Revolution (1789) the Irish Independence (1921) and
decolonization of India (1947) Cuba (1959) Congo (1964) Algeria
(1962) as well as the "miraculous" war of Vietnam (1960s).
Bazargan believes it naive to think that the enemy could
be defeated through mere perseverance and reasoning. Rights are
acquired not given. In the last analysis war is indeed a conflict
between the divine will and the entity of evil manifesting itself
in nature.
But who are the Muslims to fight? Who are their enemies?
Bazargan makes it clear that war will be fought against those in
power. The enemy is the one who insists in retaining the present
corrupt order because it suits its interests. The enemy is the one
who shows prejudice in the maintenance of the practice of
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traditions despite their harmful effect. 88 The enemy is the one
who enslaves the people and exploits them. It is the one who
monopolizes the seat of authority. Clearly the references are to
those in power in the country. Bazargan believes that war with the
ruling power is inevitable and he is preparing his camp for
battle. Bazargan's purpose is preparation for war with the
government.
It would be wrong however to think of Bazargan as a zealot
rubbing hands at the prospect of the coming conflict. Indeed once
having argued that war is natural and having identified the enemy,
he immediately falls back and opens a front against those within
his own ranks in order to check what he sees as their
overzealousness in preparation for war. He is aware of the
inevitability of conflict but he hopes to check its excesses.
Bazargan says that expansionism, vengeance, exploitation,
seeking of hegemony and creation of colonies can not be in
accordance with the Koran's teaching. The case of undue violence,
aggression and massacres are forbidden. Raping of women, killing
of children and the elderly, destruction of the fruits of labour,
destruction of homes and places of worship contradict the
teachings of the Koran. It is forbidden to initiate war against
people of different religions, even the infidels, if there has not
been a provoking attack, a breach of covenant or a conspiracy.
88 In over one hundred cases the Koran refers to "the way offathers" (ie. tradition) in either condoning or condemning anissue, in particular serving the God of the fathers. For examplesee The Koran XXXI, 21.
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Constitutional Imlanic Ideology
Bazargan criticizes those clerics who 'imagine that for
the purpose of the propagation of religion holy war is permissible
or necessary". 89 Such persons have failed to understand Islam's
refusal to use coercion for the purpose of gaining political power
or acquiring wealth and riches. More significantly Bazargan
believes the imposition of religious beliefs through compulsion
finds no support in the Koran. Faith is a matter of rational and
emotional nature. The holy book has never demanded of Muslims to
fight in order to establish justice, destroy an unjust ruler, or
free human beings from social bondage. Faith can not be imposed
through violence. Even the prophet was not responsible for
people's beliefs. His duty was to simply convey the message of God
through words of wisdom, advice and argumentation. Bazargan refers
to several Koranic verses:
Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands clear
from error (II, 256) If it had been thy Lords will they
would all have believed, all who are on earth. Wilt thou
then compel mankind against their will to believe (X, 99)
If it has been God's plan, they would not have taken false
gods, but we made thee not one to watch over their doings.
(VI, 107)
89 In a book written latter by two of the clerics who hadparticipated in the 1960-63 debate it is clearly stated that Jihadis "endeavour and sacrifice for the cause of God, that is,deliverance of the people from injustice, restoration of belief inGod, and establishment of just social system. The aims of Jihadare: expansion of belief in God and ending persecution". SeeBeheahti, M.H. & Bahonar, J. Philosophy of Islam (IslamicPublications, Salt Lake City, UT, n.d.) p.567.
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Bazargan's criticism of the position of the orthodox
clergy is clear when he states that the concept of holy war
(Jihad) in the existing jurisprudence is neither necessary nor
practical. 90 For one thing the shortcomings of the concept is in
the fact that the Islamic countries are incapable of offensive
action even if they wanted. Here Bazargan makes assertions that
are remarkable and unprecedented. He challenges the actions of the
first four righteous Caliphs in their initiation of war and says
their attacks on the Byzantine and Persian empires which led to
the creation of the Muslim empire can not be taken as rules of
action. 91 Bazargan accuses the Caliphs of having failed to
understand the deep meaning of the concept of peace in Islam.
Playing on the Shiite belief that their own Imams, in contrast to
the Sunni Caliphs, were infallible Bazargan says the Caliphs could
have made mistakes in their conduct of affairs.
Bazargan also brings up the idea expressed by some Shiite
thinkers that holy war can not be pursued except in the 'presence
of the Imam". Although purposefully unclear the Imam is a
90 The concept apparently refers to the idea of war withunbelievers and non-Muslims. For a study of the laws of war inIslam see Peters, R. Jihad in Medieval And Modern Islam(E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1977) where ideas of twelfth century lawyerAbu al-Walid Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Rushd are studied. In booksof Hadith long chapters can be found on the subject of Jihad, seeHughes, T.P. A Dictionary of Islam (W.H.Allen, London, 1855).
91 The first military defeat of the Sassanian (Persian)empire came in 606 with the final and decisive battle at Qadesiyehin 637. However it took till 654 for the total invasion,absorption and occupation of the more distant areas. Thesubjection of Byzantium mainly took place between 634 and 643 whenthe city of Tripoli fell. See Lapidus, I.M. A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988) pp.37-41.
320
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reference to the Imam of the Time who in the Shiite tradition is
said to return from occultation to lead the believers into battle
against infidels to establish justice and the government of God on
earth. In Bazargan's treatment of the subject it is also
noticeable that he refrains from the use of the word Jihad and
instead opts for the standard Persian word for war (Jang).
Now that Bazargan has established the inevitability of
war, has identified the enemy and has checked the excesses of the
zealots in the friendly camp he goes on to establish the order
through which conflict and war emerge and through which
conciliation and peace are established.
Most primary of all, Bazargan states, is the fact that
Islam is a religion of peace. It seeks to establish friendship and
peace in all human communities, be it the family, the more
immediate environment around the individual, the society or the
community of the human race. Compassion, as evident in all the
opening verses of the chapters of the Koran "In the name of God
most gracious, merciful" are qualities of the divine which have to
be acquired by man. Affection to humans and humanism in general
constitute one of the foundations of religion. Bazargan quotes the
necessary Koranic verses in his own defence:
If two parties among the believers fall into a quarrel,
make ye peace between them, but if one of them
transgresses beyond bounds against the other then fight ye
(all) against the one that transgresses until he complies
Conetitutional Islamic Ideology
with the command of God, but if he complies, then make
peace between them with justice and be fair. The believers
are but a single brotherhood, so make peace and
reconciliation between your two (contending) brothers.
(XLIX, 9-10) But if one exhorts to a deed of charity or
justice or conciliation between men, to him who does this
seeking the good pleasure of God, we shall soon give a
reward of the highest (value) (IV, 114) So fear God and
keep straight the relations between yourselves. (VIII, 1)
The qualities of compassion and forgiveness in Islam are
so great that even at a time of confrontation, Islam tends towards
peace. It suggests goodness in face of evil, friendship in place
of spite and compassion for the enemy. All these qualities are
envisioned to extinguish flames of conflict and war. Islam advises
restraint and suggests forgiveness to be of greater value than
revenge. It tells its followers that in case of conflict should
the enemy suggest peace, it should be welcomed with optimism.
Bazargan again refers to the Koran.
Those who spend (freely) whether in prosperity or in
adversity, who restrain anger and pardon (all) men, for
God loves those who do good. (III, 134) Let them forgive
and overlook, do you not wish that God should forgive you?
(XXIV, 22) Nor wilt thou cease to find them, barring a
few, ever bent on (new) deceits, but forgive them and
overlook (their misdeeds). (V, 14) These are a people who
will not believe. But turn away from them and say "Peace".
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But soon shall they know. (XLIII, 89) The recompense for
an injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree) but if a
person forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is
due from God; for God loveth not those who do wrong (XLII,
40) But if the enemy inclines towards peace do thou (also)
incline towards peace, and trust in God, for he is the one
that hearth and knoweth (all things). (VIII, 61) Therefore
if they withdraw from you but fight you not, and (instead)
send you (guarantees of) peace, then God hath opened no
way for you (to war against them) (IV, 90)
Bazargan refers to the demand of the Koran that Muslims
should refrain from war in certain periods of the year and certain
areas.
They ask thee concerning fighting in the prohibited month
Say: fighting therein is a grave (offenCe) but graver is
it in the sight of God to prevent access to ... the sacred
Mosque. (II, 217)
The practice of restraint refers to an Arab custom which
prohibited warfare in the month of pilgrimage. The month
proceeding and the month following it were also included in the
prohibition. In fact the following month was called by the name
Prohibited. Similarly the territory of Mecca was sacred ground in
which war was prohibited. But according to the Koran (II, 194)
Muslims were free to wage war in these periods and areas should
their enemy break the custom. Bazargan says the tradition of
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restraint is a tradition from the time of Abraham, the ancient
messenger of God. The practice of maintaining a security zone and
a period of peace is designed to establish general coexistence
among the believers and help them to move towards a global
government of justice.
The Koran's call for friendship and peace is so great that
it even calls for coexistence with those who it considers to be
unbelievers. It suggests friendship with them;
God forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you
not for (your) faith nor drive you out for your homes,
from dealing kindly and justly with them. (LXE, 8) And let
not the hatred of some people in (once) shutting you out
of the sacred Mosque lead you to transgression (and
hostility on your part). (V, 2) 0 ye who believe, stand
firmly for God, as witnesses to fair dealing and let not
the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and
depart from justice. (V, 9)
However conditions of peace could change into
prerequisites for conflict and ultimately war should certain
dangers impose themselves upon the Muslim community. On the one
hand if the enemy decides to destroy their wealth, kill them or
uproot their faith and customs, then they are obliged to fight.
Conspiracy and/or breaking the covenant could also be foundations
for conflict. War must be pursued and the enemy killed until the
"webs of conspiracy are cleared and the law of God is
established".
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Constitutional Islamic Ideology
If they withdraw not from you nor give you (guarantees) of
peace besides restraining their hands, seize them and slay
them wherever you get them. (IV, 91) Fight them on until
there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail
justice and faith in God, but if they cease let there be
no hostility except to those who practice oppression. (II,
193)
War is thus inevitable and one has to be prepared for it.
But the acceptance of dangers and casualties must be seen as a
means of acquiring divine forgiveness and blessing.
Think not of those who are slain in God's way as dead.Nay,
they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of
their Lord. (III, 169) Against them make ready your
strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of
war, to strike terror into the enemies. (VIII, 60)
Islamic Economics
It must be recalled that with the emergence of the
communist Tudeh party in the 1940's Marxism entered Iran's
intellectual life with force. Consequently throughout the 1950's
and the 1960's a great section of Iranian youth were attracted to
it. The Marxist presence was strong enough that the establishment
as well as the secular Nationalist and religious opposition
movements saw it as an important, if not the main, rival and a
threat. During this period Islamic activists oriented themselves
Constitutional Islamic Iclmology
so as to counter this challenge. The main thrust of the religious
movement against the communists was educational, ideological and
was pursued by men such as Tabatabai, Morteza Motahhari, Mahmud
Taliqani and Ali Shariati. There has already been a discussion of
Bazargan's critique of the Marxist position in the 1940's.
Although not organized in the sense that these men planned all
their ideological offensive collectively, there was an
intellectual harmony of a sort in the way they approached the
subject. 92
One of the works written with the express intention to
check the communist threat was Islam and Ownership by Bazargan's
close collaborator Taliqani. 93 The infusion of economic
interpretations of social history, historical materialism,
concepts of class conflict and dialectics was seen as the door
through which the youth were attracted to materialism. Taliqani,
among others, wanted to address these issues and put forward his
Islamic point of view. It is ironic that through his efforts to
counter Marxism, he came to understand its ideas and background to
the extent that he developed a degree of sympathy for Marxists and
was to become known as the Red Ayatollah himself. Furthermore his
own son Mojtaba who was involved with the Islamic guerrilla
underground later turned communist and in a sensational 'Letter of
a Son to his Father" spelled out why he had "evolved* from his
petty bourgeois Islamic ideology to embrace proletarian Marxist-
92 Rafsanjani, H. Etela'at (Tehran, 6 May 1991) p. 3.93 Taleqani, M. Islam va Malekiyat Islam and Ownership,
Jabbari, A. & Rajaee, F. (trans.) (Mazda Publishers, Lexington,Kentucky, 1983).
326
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
Leninism. Ayatollah Taliqani became a leading charismatic figure
in the early post-revolutionary period possibly second, if not
equal, to Ayatollah Khomeini. But his post revolutionary
activities were not to last long. He died in September 1979.
Taliqani's Islam and Ownership is an effort to refute
communist as well as capitalist economics and to present a theory
of Islamic economics. The book, first written in 1951 was revised
and expanded in 1954 and 1965, the latter being the copy in use.
The book discusses a concept of evolution of ownership, and the
emergence of the power of labour and goes on to discuss Marx's
general ideas. It furthermore attacks capitalism for its creation
of economic problems and class differences. In contrast Taliqani
offers his audience the characteristics and foundations of Islamic
economics, and studies economics in the light of faith.
With regard to economic ideas 94 Bazargan draws heavily on
Taligani's book, a fact which he points out in the early parts of
his argument. Other sources including are also mentioned. 95 But
the use of these latter books are secondary and all of Bazargan's
major themes seem to have been extracted from Taligani's work.
Bazargan identifies his audience and the function of his
writing when he points out that the "effect of economics is so
great that some thinkers have viewed economics as the expression
of all life and have known man to be an economic being". 96 The
94 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp.198-228.95 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.200.96 For all the material regarding economy see Bazargan,
Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp.198-228.327
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
references are supposedly to the Leftists and Communists who are
said to view all things from the point of view of economics. The
structure of Bazargan's argument is to first identify the
subordination of economics to morality in Islamic view of things.
He then discusses the significance of economic activity where he
sets the limits within which Muslims should approach economic
activity. He then elaborates on four other principles of his
economic system, which draws heavily from Taligani's book and
relies on traditional sources of Islamic scholarship. These are
the criteria for ownership of land, the principle of non-
damage/compulsion, issue of earning and usury, and the role of
government in economic affairs. 97
Bazargan believes economics should be subordinated to
faith and morals. 99 In other words the economic practice,
production, accumulation, distribution and consumption, should be
seen as a form and a means of worship where moral criteria and
constraints determine the form and content of activity. Through
this reiteration of morals into economic life it is hoped to
create a new social order. This system will be then able to on the
one hand surpass the justice that socialism and communism wish to
establish and on the other hand refrain from the restraints of
state-controlled organization. The Islamic system is supposedly
the best of both worlds. It seeks egalitarian measures of
97 Bazargan elaborates on a number of other principles andissues. This study has digested them to the Six Principles citedabove.
98 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, Morality, pp.200-203.
328
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
socialism while acknowledging the practical and pragmatic aspects
of capitalism.
The issue of ownership is the foundation of the argument
since in Islam, it is said, there is no idea of absolute
ownership. Man is considered to be the temporary owner of things,
a trustee in a manner of speaking. Wealth should be therefore
utilized to the satisfaction of God. However God is needless of
all things including man's charity. It is important then to
attract God's satisfaction through adherence to his providence.
Two basic qualities of God are his creativity and his grace. In
the human realm God's creation can be expressed in terms of
productivity, the fruit of which is for the consumption of the
individual, his immediate family. God's quality of grace is best
identified in man's expenditure of wealth in service to the
people, ie. charity. Such a moral approach to economic activity
would guarantee that all men, as servants of God and members of
the human brotherhood, would enjoy equally the good things of life
and would guarantee that there would be no class differences. Here
Bazargan's concern is identifiable. Faced with the issue of social
justice and unfair distribution of wealth, he introduces a moral
element as the guarantor of fair distribution. The moral element
is based on God's qualities of grace and compassion. 99
It is then in address to the traditional community that
Bazargan calls for greater productivity. 100 There has already
99 The reference here is to opening verses of the Koranchapters; In the Name of God Most Graceful and Compassionate.
100 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, Necessity ofWealth, pp. 203-207.
329
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
been a discussion on Bazargan's call, in the 1940's, on the
traditional segments of society to become involved in greater
productivity. Here the argument is put forward under the title of
the Necessity of Wealth. In it Bazargan tries to introduce the
modern themes of labour, production, and economic independence
through the language of Islam. Bazargan uses several Koranic
verses and a number of Hadith to fight off mystical and Yogic
interpretations of religion which call for a turning away from
active and productive life. The sayings of the prophet and the
verses ' of the Koran which Bazargan refers to are:
1- Close is the turn from poverty to blasphemy,
2- A man without subsistence is a man without a
[rewarding] hereafter,
3- 0 God through this bread give us your blessing. Let it
not be separated from us, for if there is no bread, there
is no fasting, nor prayer, nor any of the divine
obligations. (The Bread Prayer)
It is he who has spread out the earth for (his) creatures,
therein is fruit and date palms, producing spathes
(enclosing dates), also corn with its leaves and stalk for
fodder and sweet smelling plants. Then which of the
favours of your lord will ye deny. (LV. 10-13) [God] will
send rain to you in abundance, give you increase in wealth
and sons, and bestow on you gardens and bestow on you
rivers. (LXXI, 11) Eat and drink of the substance provided
by God, and do no evil nor mischief on the earth. (II, 60)
Eat and drink but waste not by excess, . Who bath
forbidden the beautiful (gifts) of God, which he bath
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produced for his servants, and the things clean and pure
for sustenance? (VII, 31-32)
Bazargan's interpretation of the above is that Islam gives
great importance to its address of economic problems including the
fight against poverty. This effort is closely identified with that
of worship and prayer. The Koran identifies the fruits of the
earth, and the goods disposable to man as God's blessing to his
servants. It is therefore significant, and obligatory, for the
Muslim to produce and provide for himself, his family and his
community .
Having argued for the necessity of work, productivity and
creation of wealth in the Muslim community Bazargan then addresses
the issue of the accumulation of wealth, the manner of its
expenditure and the problems that these two are said to incur for
the individual Muslim. 101 Contrary to the earlier argument,
Bazargan now warns of the dangers of wealth diverting the
individual from the path of truth and engaging him in a world of
fancy. His topic has direct sources in the Koran and it is a
traditional religious theme. Bazargan borrows it completely from
Taliciani's Islam and Ownership. 102
101 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, Dangers ofWealth, pp.207-209.
102 For Taliqani's treatment see Taligani, Islam andOwnership, Chap. 6, The Economic Problems Caused by Moneyspecially p.108.
331
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
Bazargan argues that according to the Koran unrestrained
wealth is detrimental to man's religious practice and education
and must therefore be bound by morals and social constraints.
See thou one who denies the judgment (to come)? Then such
is the (man) who repulses the orphan (with harshness), and
encourages not the feeding of the indigent. (CVII, 1-3)
Woe to every kind of scandal-monger and backbiter, who
pileth up wealth and layeth it by, thinking that his
wealth would make him last for ever (CIV, 1-3) The mutual
rivalry for piling up (the good things of this world)
diverts you (from the more serious things) (CII, 1) He who
is a greedy miser and thinks himself self-sufficient ...
we will indeed make smooth for him the path to misery.
(XCII, 8-10) He may say (boastfully) wealth have I
squandered in abundance! Thinketh he that none beholdeth
him? (XC, 6-7) Ye honor not the orphans, nor do you
encourage one another to feed the poor, and ye devour
inheritance, all with greed and ye love wealth with
inordinate love (LXXXIX, 17-20) Collect (wealth) and hide
it (from use), truly man was created very impatient,
fearful when evil touches him and niggardly when good
reaches him (LXX, 18-21) Hindering (all) good,
transgressing beyond bounds, deep in sin, violent (and
cruel) with all that, base-borne, because he possesses
wealth and (numerous) sons. When to him are rehearsed our
signs "Tales of ancients" he cries! Soon shall we brand
(the beast) on the snout!
Constitutional Imlamic Ideology
The ability to dispense with large amounts of wealth leads
to man's unjust treatment of other members of the community.
Bazargan refers to Koranic stories where the wealthy are said to
have always fought against prophets.
Never did we send a warner to a population, but the
wealthy ones among them said "We believe not in the
(message) with which ye have been sent". (XXXIV, 34)
In Bazargan's view wealth must not become an ultimate aim
for the Muslim, but a means through which the individual can come
closer to God. Wealth then presents a divine test. Those who
accumulate gold and silver but fail to consume it in the service
of the good of the community will enter hell fire. The example of
Koranic stories are repeated where tribes and nations which
respected the people of wealth degenerated and were destroyed.
Your riches and your children may be but a trial. (LXIV,
15) It is not your wealth nor your sons that will bring
you nearer to us in degree (XXXIV, 37)
The issue of wealth in the life of Mohammad is an
interesting one. Mohammad's father was a trader, as were a large
number of Mecca's population, and involved in the city's thriving
caravan trade between the Indian ocean and the Mediterranean.
Mohammad, an orphan from birth, became a steward for a wealthy
widow whom he subsequently married. Mecca at the time was a
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society in transition from a semi Bedouin to a commercial urban
society and this process was accompanied by serious economic and
social cleavages. Mohammad became a successful member of Meccan
society and after starting his missionary office he challenged the
powerful and prosperous Meccan oligarchy, condemning the socio-
economic inequalities of Meccan life. He defended the rights of
the orphans, the poor and asserted the obligation of the rich in
supporting the dispossessed. 1" The Koran's comments on the topic
of wealth is evident in Mohammad's life. While acknowledging the
goodness of wealth, it condemns it in another form, ie. when not
disposed of for the welfare of the community.
Some Western scholars have understood Islam to be
compatible with modern capitalism. On the one hand the Koran
expresses no opposition to private property, since it lays down
rules for inheritance, for example. Wage labour is also viewed as
a natural institution to which there can be no objection. Contrary
to some religions whose sacred text discourages economic activity
in general, the Koran looks with favour upon commercial activity.
Similarly in the Traditions of the Prophet there are no challenges
to the concept of private property. There are of course the
conditions that usury is forbidden and there is an obligation to
give alms. However economic activity, the search for profit, trade
and consequent production for the market are looked upon with
favour. The Koran does not merely say that one must not forget
one's portion of this world, it also says that it is proper to
combine the practice of religion and material life carrying on
103 Esposito, Islam the Straight Path, pp. 8-11.334
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trade even during pilgrimage, and goes as far as to mention
commercial profit under the name of God's bounty. 104
The political implications of Bazargan's argument (in that
it encourages the creation of wealth through productivity and
greater economic activity, and also criticizes the practice of the
accumulation of wealth) is dualistic. This position corresponds
well with that of the smaller and the more traditional private
sector of the economy which had less contact with and support from
the government. The fact that the regime favoured large scale,
high tech and urban industries under its own supervision at a cost
to the smaller, more traditional, labour intensive sector,
including the Bazaar, meant that there was less lending to the
latter and more despise opposition by them towards the state. The
tension is further strengthened by the fact that there have been
close ties between the Bazaar and the clerical community as two of
the non-state institutions in contemporary Iranian history. The
clerics, at least until the 1979 revolution, had always given
voice to the grievances of the Bazaar classes. In turn the Bazaar
gave financial and political support to the clerics. Furthermore
these ties were maintained and encouraged through family and
business affiliations. 105
On the issue of the ownership of land which constituted
the main form of ownership throughout the ages in the Muslim
104 Rodinson, M. Islam & Capitalism, (Allen Lane, London,1974) p.13.
105 For a study on the growing Ulama-Bazaar alliance seeReddie, Religion and Politics in Iran, pp.7-8.
335
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
empires, Bazargan builds his argument 106 on the assumption,
discussed earlier that God is the absolute owner and that man can
only act as his vicegerent. 107 Therefore land (and natural
resources, for which no labour has been exerted) are public
properties and not of private nature. Bazargan states land is a
deposit on behalf of God to man and its ownership is conditional
on the factor of trustworthiness and its restoration to life (ie.
cultivation or other productive use). The ownership is thus
temporary, and ceases should the conditions fail to apply. The
arbiter and custodian of all land is the Just Ruler who represents
God. Land therefore is neither private property nor public
property (belonging to the community) but that of God who disposes
of it through the management of his steward, the Imam. The type of
ownership of Muslim land falls into three categories. First the
land which becomes that of the cultivator on the condition of
cultivation. Second the land under the direct use of the just
ruler and used for the welfare of the community. Third the land
which on the discretion of the just ruler is divided among the
members of the community.
The exact replica of this argument can be found in
Taligani's work under the title of the Roots and Foundation of
Islamic Economics which in turn relies on traditional Islamic
106 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, Land, pp. 209-
212.107 The idea that "to God belongs the kingdom of heaven and
earth' is cited eleven times in the Koran (for example see II, 107and III, 189). The vicegerency of man of earth is repeated anumber of times, for example "I am setting in the earth a viceroy"(II, 30).
336
Constitutional Islamic Icloology
80jurisprudence. 1 It is clear that Bazargan has taken the ideas
from Taliqani. However there has been no study of the economic
ideas of Taliqani with regard to their sources and his innovation.
But the general impression given is that Taliqani had emphasized
the collective nature of property rights in Islamic jurisprudence
(as well as the role of labour in determining profit) in a
pragmatic move to challenge the leftist collectivism's claim to
justice.
Taliqani's work has been said to be less comprehensive
although, on the issue of property rights to be in keeping with
works of other Muslim ideologues written after the Second World
War. 1" These include the works of Sayyed Mohammad Bacier Sadr 110
111and Hasan Bani Sadr. Similar views on property rights are
12expressed by Ayatollah Beheshti 1 and Ayatollah Bahonar. 113 They
108 Taliqani, Islam and Ownership, Chap. 5, specially pp.88-89.
1" H. Katouzian, Shiism and Islamic Economics, in Keddie'sReligion and Politics in Iran (Yale University Press, London,1983) p.148.
110 An Iraqi Shiite cleric, Sadr (1930-80) exercisedimportant influence as writer on social, economic and politicalaffairs. He was executed by Iraqi Ba'ath government. Eqtesad-e Ma(Our Economics) is his main contribution to the economic debatewithin the Shiite activists.
111 Bani Sadr (1933- ) studied sociology and economics inTehran and Paris universities and subsequently became an Islamicideologue on economic affairs. He was elected Iran's firstRepublican president but fled the country after falling out withAyatollah Khomeini. His main book on economics is Eqtesad-eTawhidi (Monotheistic Economics.)
112 Mohammad Hosaini Beheshti (1928-81) studied at Islamictheological schools of Isfehan and Qom, later received his Phd.from the University of Tehran. Worked as a secondary schoolheadmaster for a time before being going to Germany as the managerof an Islamic centre. His political views pushed him towardsAyatollah Khomeini. Following the 1979 revolution he became thechief justice of the supreme court and the chairman of the IslamicRepublican Party. He died in a terrorist bomb blast. See Beheshti,Islamic Philosophy, see introduction.
113 Javad Bahonar (1933-81) Studied at Kerman and Qomtheological schools and the University of Tehran. Became
337
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
all agree that there are three types of ownership in Islam: namely
that which is of God's and trusted to his representatives on
earth, that which is public and the private. 114
In actuality the first and second types of property go to
give the state significant powers in determining the form and
content of the type of ownership. This is evident in the history
of Muslim societies, particularly with regard to land which until
the modern age constituted the main object of ownership. The fact
of the state's significant share of the ownership of the soil,
without the individual having the right to more than a precarious
appropriation (and even then a mere possession of a part of the
community's land where the possession might or might not be
hereditary) has led some scholars to see Marx's Asiatic mode of
production in traditional Muslim society. 115
The fourth of the Six Principles is that of La Zarar Va
La Zerar, that there should be "neither damage or compulsion" in
economic activity. 116 The principle which is accepted in both
Sunni and Shiite traditions seeks to prevent possible damage that
might arise from certain types of ownership or economic
politically active in the 50s and 60s as a pamphleteer and drewclose to Ayatollah Khomeini. After the revolution he was a memberof the ruling Revolutionary Council, minister of education andlater the prime minsiter. He died in a terrorist bomb attack.
114 For a treatment of Bager Sadr's and Ban! Sadr's viewssee H. Katouzian, Shiism and Islamic Economics. For views of thelatter two see Beheshti, H.H. & Bahonar, J. Philosophy of Islam(Islamic Publications, Salt Lake City, UT, n.d.) specially pp.417-420.
115 Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, pp.61-66.116 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, No damage,
compulsion, p.221.338
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
transaction. Here Bazargan has clearly drawn on the traditional
theme as expressed by Taliqani.
The principle is based on a Hadith reported through a
known lineage. It is reported in Usul-e Kafi, 117 as well as
Tahzid, who report from Ibn Bakir, who reports from Zorara who
reports from Imam Mohammad Bager [the fifth Shiite Imam] that:
"Samara Ibn Jandab had a date palm in the courtyard of an Ansar's
home. Without prior permission, he occasionally would enter the
courtyard to check his tree. The Ansar asked Samara to seek
permission before entering the yard, but he ignored the request.
The Ansar appealed to the Prophet. He summoned Samara and told him
about the appeal. Samara said "Why should I ask permission to
check on my own tree?" Samara did not consent. The Prophet then
said "You are a harmful person". Then he turned to the Ansar and
said "Cut his tree and give it to him". Then added "Islam does not
permit harming one-self nor does it permit inflicting harm on
others". 118
Bazargan's interpretation of this study is that should the
ownership of a particular trade or industry prove detrimental to
the welfare of the community of Muslims, materially or
spiritually, then the Just Ruler of the Islamic government would
have the right to reclaim the property for the good of the
117 The earliest Shiite collection of traditions (Hadith) byMohammad Ibn Yaqub al-Kulayni (d.939). The author collectedwhatever came to him on the authority of those who were known asthe adherents of Shiite Imams. Jafri, S.H.M. Origins and Early Development of Shiite Islam (Longman, London, 1979) p.303.
118 See Taliqani, Islam and Ownership, p.129.339
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community. In modern terms Bazargan sees the repossessing of the
property as an act of nationalization. Such an endeavor could be
applied if those entitled to judgment, apparently the Just Ruler,
deems it necessary. It is of significance to note that it was upon
the basis of these conceptions that Bazargan, once in the position
of power in 1979, decided on sweeping nationalization of banks and
heavy industry. The nationalization process will be discussed in
detail later but it is necessary to determine what is meant by
"damaging" economic activity which is seen as detrimental to the
welfare of the Muslim community. This is most evident in the
discussions on his fifth of the Six Principles of economics.
The fifth of the Six principles of Bazargan's Islamic
economics comes under the heading of the Principle of Productivity
and Earning. 119 The argument basically states that earning and
the acquisition of wealth should be subject to one's capacity and
willingness to produce. The backdrop to the argument is Bazargan's
effort to condemn the dominant concept of economic modernization
as propagated by the state while, and possibly more importantly,
to refute Marxist notions regarding surplus value upon which
accumulation of capital is condemned as an act of exploitation.
The whole argument should be seen within the larger framework of a
fast changing Iranian political economy.
Bazargan builds his argument 120 upon the basis from which
to refute Marxist ideas that capital accumulation can take place
119 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, Earning,pp.212-221.
120 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp.212-221.340
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
only through exploitation based on usurping the surplus or added
value created by labour. Bazargan tries to prove that the added
value is rightly owned by the owner of capital and thus capitalism
is not necessarily an act of exploitation of the labour force. He
then sets conditions for accumulation which shall be discussed in
his Islamic version of capitalism.
Bazargan believes there is an inherent contradiction in
Marxist ideas about surplus value. To prove his point he argues
through an example: A labourer receives 100 money units for his
daily work, a skilled labourer receives 500 units for the same
period. This is based on the fact that the skilled labourer has
accumulated either physical strength or technical experience
through years of practice. This constitutes an added value to
which, Bazargan points out, the Marxist does not object. Capital
should be seen in the same light, for if it is right for the
skilled labourer to accumulate an added value within himself (in
the form of muscle strength or intellectual ability) it must be
correct for this added value to be kept in the form of currency.
Why is it that the Marxist is willing to reward the skilled
labourer (as the practice shows in the 1960s East European
countries) but not willing to accept that which they have been
rewarded, ie. the accumulated added value within the individual
once it is translated into currency and capital? This earned
capital, Bazargan believes, is the most natural and general right
which man is able to use.
At the same time Bazargan launches an attack on the
banking system as the den of refuge for capitalists from which
341
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
they exploit the labour of the nation. It is through the operation
of banks that capitalists have managed to control the economic and
political spheres. In condemnation of the banking system Bazargan
goes on as far as expressing criticism of Marxists who have
supposedly forgotten the role of the bank in guaranteeing the
survival and perpetuation of capitalism. Bazargan's objection to
the banking system is on the use of usury, which the Koran has
prohibited.
On usury the Koran says • 0 ye who believe, devour not
usury, doubled and multiplied (the sum lent). 121 Those who
swallow usury will not stand except ... driven by madness. This is
because they say trade is like usury, whereas God hath permitted
trade and forbidden usury. 122 The prophet Mohammad had started
condemning usury, besides false contracts, and upholding the right
of the poor in the first ten years of his mission in the city of
Mecca. This was the means through which he had challenged the
Meccan oligarchy and the existing socio-economic inequalities. 123
However the ban on usury in concrete practice did not mean
that in the 13 centuries of Muslim culture the practice had not
existed. What in fact emerged was a collection of tricks invented
to dodge the issue. To quote a standard practice: Trader A sells a
book to trader B for 120 Dinars to be paid in a year's time, but
then he buys the book back immediately for one hundred Dinars
payable on the spot. In this way the book is retained by trader A,
121 The Koran, III, 130-131.122 The Koran, II, 275-276.123 Esposito, Islam the Straight Path, p.10.
342
Constitutional Islamic Idoology
100 Dinars are given to trader B, and 120 Dinars are to be paid
back in a years time. There has been no lending of money, no
interest claimed but simply a matter of exchange taken place. In
this way many Muslims practised money lending under disguise. At
the same time the cultural pressure in the Muslim community
encouraged the religious minorities to openly and publicly
function as money lenders. 124 With the lessening of religious
influence, particularly in contemporary periods, Islam's usury
principle became increasingly defunct and not taken any notice of
in banking practices.
With regard to the modern banking system Bazargan suggests
a boycott and instead lending of money between people based on
religious morality where pure trust would be sufficient in giving
financial support to those in need. Banking then would be a form
of collective investment, without usury and charging only the cost
of running the operations.
Bazargan's attack on banking, while he had earlier
supported capitalism, albeit Islamic capitalism, indicates a
contradiction. A contradiction which rises from Bazargan's socio-
economic position. It seems that here Bazargan's connections to
the traditional segments of Iranian private enterprise, ie. the
Bazaar, is most relevant. The Bazaar as the traditional segment of
Iran's economic system came under increasing pressure during the
1960s. The government's concept of modernization favoured large
scale, capital intensive, import substituting, urban industrial
124 Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, p.36-37.343
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
units to the labour intensive, agricultural based traditional
economy in which the Bazaar was more deeply integrated. In
concrete terms this meant a heavy credit squeeze on the Bazaar
which had to rely on private sources of lending with a higher
interest rate in comparison to the modern industrial sector which
enjoyed government support. The situation left the traditional
segments of Iran's trading community in deep resentment of the
practices of the regime. Although this was not the only
controversial issue between the two social institutions, it is
this point which Bazargan seems to be exploiting.
It is in contrast to such a background which Bazargan
introduces his Islamic version of capitalism. Bazargan first
argues for the necessity of capitalism. If it were not for the
existence of capital there would be no progress in trade,
agricultural productivity, industrial output. Science and
civilization would not progress and a large number of workers
would be left in poverty and hunger. Furthermore it is wrong to
think of capitalism, as it is with all other things, as being
inherently good or evil. Many things can be sources of evil but
this does not mean there are innately bad. Air and water are the
very sources of life, but in the shape of hurricane and floods
they destroy human life. The distinguishing factor is how elements
and things are used for the benefit of human beings. They must be
looked upon as means rather than ends in themselves. Such is the
case with capitalism.
While Islam condemns un-earned capital based on usury, it
does not condemn all forms of the use of capital. Islam proposes a
344
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
capitalist system based on justice, such that wealth is earned
through labour. The system would not allow monopoly in any domain,
and it would prohibit forms of productivity which would be
considered harmful to social welfare. Bazargan appeals to several
Koranic verses to prove that Islam's perception of economics
confirms the right of earning on the condition that labour is
exerted. To man is allocated what they earn, and to women what
they earn. 125 To all are (assigned) degrees according to what
they (have done) 126 Man can have nothing but what he strives for.
127 Bazargan interprets these verses to mean that each man's
right, in terms of economic earning and acquisition, results from
the labour he exerts in a productive process.
The authority of Islamic government is the next principle
to which Bazargan turns his attention. 128 Although there is
little elaboration on what the Islamic nature of authority
entails, the issue is of significance because it constitutes a
direct challenge to the authority of the state. Bazargan is
speaking of Islamic government run by a just Imam at a time when
the regime of the Shah was accelerating its secularization at an
unprecedented rate, and when the regime has crushed an uprising
led by religious elements and exiled a leading religious figure
abroad. So although what Bazargan is saying might not amount to an
elaborate theory of the state it is certainly significant in the
125 The Koran, IV, 32.126 The Koran, XLVI, 19.127 The Koran, LIII, 39.128 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, Authority of
Islamic Government, pp.225-228•345
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
sense that with great force a new element, ie. that of Islamic
government, has been introduced into the political language.
Furthermore what is striking about Bazargan's concept of
the authority of Islamic government is the sweeping power which he
allows it. Although Bazargan insists that the just and learned
Islamic ruler (Imam) is one chosen by the people, the power that
he allows the Islamic government is significant. The ruler is in
charge of organizing the three branches of government and the
legislative has been reduced to a "Fatwa" body.
Fatwa, a written legal opinion traditionally on issues of
jurisprudence, is a matter completely in the domain of the
clerics. A Fatwa is based on the cleric's personal interpretation
of law. Many of the more important opinions become part of
collections of Fatwas, which become authoritative in their own
time. 129 In modern times, and particularly with the proliferation
of Islamic social movements there has been a greater number of
Fatwas regarding socio-political matters rather than purely legal
ones. But the fact that Bazargan views the legislature in the
Islamic government as a domain of the clerics signifies a
contradiction in his concept of government. This contradiction has
been already studied elsewhere and it is significant to point out
here that the dichotomy lies between a tendency for giving
authority to the people as a source of legitimacy and giving the
right of legislation to the clerics as the competent body
responsible for interpreting laws.
129 Esposito, Islam the Straight Path, p.86.346
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
Finally Bazargan states that although there are no
particular formulae for Islamic government or economics given that
history is ever changing, the Koran and Hadiths are clear enough
sources of inspiration. In other words Bazargan acknowledges the
fact that the Islamic political trend is a new and unprecedented
phenomenon. Despite claims by many of the then theorists including
Bazargan which invoke history and particularly the early Islamic
period, as if Islam had an already elaborate system of ideas
regarding government and matters related to it, Bazargan's
statement shows, that the ideals of a radical Islamic state is a
total novelty and it requires great effort to be able to represent
something suitable on the issue.
However Bazargan does not hesitate to point out that the
just Islamic ruler has extensive powers. The ruler is allowed to
confiscate property, set taxes and determine the rights and social
limitations on the individual member of society. The powerful
authority which Bazargan is allowing the Islamic ruler, purely on
the basis that he is just, is only a taste of things to come.
Indeed when the Islamic government was established after the 1979
revolution, the authority rationalized and given to it was bound
by almost no-one, not even God himself.
Means and Ends
The last principle in the Divine Ideology is the concept
of piety, through which Bazargan tries to deal with the problem of
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
political means and instruments. 130 Bazargan states that in a
divine interpretation of things the means can not justify the ends
even though political achievements might be delayed. Islam's
ultimate objective is not purely political but the well being of
the human race and therefore it can not give priority to political
ends at a cost to the human factor.
Here two distinct ideas have been used; that of piety and
that of means. Piety has its immediate root in the Koran and there
has already been a discussion on how Bazargan interpreted it, in
the 1940's, as to mean prudence in social thinking. The idea of
instrumentality is seems to have been introduced to the Iranian
society by Marxists, or at least they are the ones from whom
Bazargan obtains the concept, but it is in reaction to them that
he discusses the issue.
In ideological regimes ... there is a famous practice that
ends justify the means. Lenin and many other socialist or
communist leaders had no hesitation to speak bluntly in
terms of closing down parliaments and imposing the will of
the minority on the majority. 131
As in many other instances Bazargan's political aim in
introducing his argument is to face the ruling establishment on
the one hand (which he interprets to be pseudo-modernist,
tyrannical and corrupt) and to fight with the Leftists (whom he
130 gazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, pp.123-132.131 Bazargan, Prophetic mission and Ideology, p.124.
348
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
sees as his main rivals in claim to power. This is the typical
stance that Bazargan adopted in the 1940-53 period and continued
to take despite changes in the 1953-63 stretch and now pursues
with vigour once again.
If Bazargan's point of view is looked at through critical
eyes it is possible to detect its contradictions and weaknesses.
Bazargan believes that it is not possible for the end to justify
the means if there is a belief in an absolute truth. This is not
necessarily the case. A belief in an absolute being which would
not be accompanied with an acceptance of the rights of the
individual could indeed be the grounds for the suppression of the
individual and society. Therefore what is needed is not
necessarily a belief in a divine power or an absolute truth but
the idea that respects the rights of the individual and demands
respect for them. Of course it is possible for the foundation of
such an understanding to be that of divine ideology in the sense
that since God created humans in reverence they must be the object
of respect.
It is not clear why Bazargan has chosen to discuss the
particular problem of means in his ideology. Although it is
reasonable to accept that the idea is introduced in opposition to
the Leftists as well the dominant socio-intellectual trends, the
specific reasons for the introduction of the idea is not clear. It
is possible that the idea is a refutation of the government
authoritarianism as a means for reform and social welfare. In
other words Bazargan's argument is to undermine the idea of
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
benevolent tyranny. In one part of the debate Bazargan questions
the soundness of the idea that in order to achieve social reform
tyranny is not only desirable but necessary.
In bringing down the existing obstacles, including the
evil minded enemies, and in trying to create a just social
order, are we allowed, temporarily and out of necessity,
to adopt ways that are contrary to our own claims and
beliefs? 132
Bazargan cites Lenin as an example of a political leader
who has unduly rationalized this political method. Lenin, among
other communist figures, claimed that the closing down of
parliaments, imposing the will of a minority on the majority and
erecting the dictatorship of the proletariat was only in order to
establish true democracy and the ideal society. This
rationalization, Bazargan continues, is the source of inspiration
for many liberation movements in the underdeveloped countries,
from which a similar logic for establishing dictatorial rule is
drawn. Bazargan says this approach to power is Machiavellian in
the sense that it allows any illegal and immoral action as long as
it helps the maintenance of power.
It is usually argued that in order to curtail the horders
of illegitimate interests, it is necessary to use their own
weapons, lies and coercion. [It is argued] that since the majority
of the people are not aware of their own wretchedness ... or lack
132 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.123.350
Constitutional Islamic Ideology
power, the informed and the well intentioned minority has the
right, and indeed the duty to use any means even unjust and
deceitful acts both against the enemy and the friend to achieve
and maintain power. And all in order to liberate the subordinated
classes. [It is argued] that justice and fairness are relative
matters and not valid when applied to the opposition. 133
It is in contrast to this justification of this
methodological relativism that Bazargan introduces his conception
of Islamic piety and claims that if there was a belief in an
absolute truth and if the aim of the social struggle was to allow
the people to determine their own destiny then the act of
achieving power and establishing a government becomes secondary
issues relative to the fundamentality of truth. It is clear here
that Bazargan is elaborating on several assumptions including that
belief in an absolute truth would somehow help people in taking
their destiny into their own hands and that these two would spell
the secondary nature of political method. However it seems that
such assumptions are not necessarily true. There is no reason to
believe that a person who believes in an absolute entity should
necessarily refrain from an undesirable method in order to realize
that absolute desired result. Indeed the possibility exists that
since an absolute truth becomes an issue of contest, the political
method will become irrelevant and the motto - the ends justifying
the means - will take greater hold. History seems to confirm this
observation as in the case of ideological states on both the right
and the left of the political spectrum. Ideological governments
133 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.124.351
Constitutional Imlamic Ideology
which base their rule on an absolute truth utilize all methods in
order to maintain that absolute truth.
It is ironic that Bazargan claims that a belief in an
absolute will not be practical in the sense that it will limit
realpolitik. 134 Islam could be then accused of being unrealistic
and impractical. But Bazargan puts forward the idea that Islam
does not aim at the urgent and immediate establishment of a
political government. Instead Islam seeks to liberate humanity and
establish justice in the first place. Whatever action is taken
towards this end, however small, is necessarily correct .
134 Bazargan, Prophetic Mission and Ideology, p.127.352
The Liberal Defeat
Iranian Society 1977/79
At the turn of events that were to lead to the 1979
revolution in Iran the country's population stood at around 34
million with an annual population growth rate of 2.9 per cent. The
population was young: the median age was only 16/17 and those over
the age of 65 were only 3% of the total. 1 The population was
equally divided between rural and urban areas with the nomads and
semi-nomads being less than 5%. The rural population was dispersed
in over 71,000 villages and 22,000 hamlets. Literacy was estimated
to be about 40%. 2
The Gross National Product in 1976 was $57 billion with a
GNP per capita of about $2,200. Iran was the fourth biggest oil
producer and second largest oil exporter in the world. Oil
revenues stood at $20 b. constituting 96% of foreign earnings. The
share of industry and agriculture in GNP were meagre: 10% and 9%
respectively. The fact that the standard of living was
significantly higher in the cities had encouraged extensive
emigration from the rural areas. However agriculture continued to
employ the largest segment of the work force.
A study of the class structure of society based on the
same year's census indicates that the lower rural class, with 45%
of the population constituted the largest social segment. 3 These
included the landed and near landless peasants as well as landless
labourers. The second largest class was that of the lower urban
class, with 32% of the total population and composed of wage
1 The figures are based on the country's third census in1976. Nyrop, Iran: A Country Study, see profile.
2 Bazargan and the society for defence.3 See Abrahamian, Radical Islam, p.16.
353
The Liberal Defeat
earning workers in small workshops and the Bazaar, the industrial
labourers, construction workers and the unemployed. The modern
middle and the traditional (propertied) middle classes were more
or less of the same size, constituting 10% and 13% of the total
population. The former included the modern educated professionals,
civil servants, office employees, clerics, and commercial farmers.
The upper classes which included members of the Pahlavi family,
court connected entrepreneurs, senior civil servants and military
officers were no more than 0.01% of the total population. As
discussed in earlier chapters the socio-economic structure was
under a number of major tensions including rapid population
growth, explosive urbanization, high expectations due to expansion
of education, rapid industrialization, significant increases in
national wealth due to sale of oil, rapid secularization and
adaptation of western culture and last but not least chronic
underdevelopment of political process and institutions. 4
In the last two years of the Shah's rule the economic
conditions of the country generally worsened mainly due to
political factors aggravated by unfavourable economic conditions.
Initially the Amuzegar cabinet (of which more below) had intended
to bring down rampant inflation which had reached the 35% mark
following the uncontrolled boom of 1974/76. Amuzegar was
successful but only at the cost of slowing down economic growth.
The fall in international demand for oil, price rises for western-
produced goods and a turn for worse in the climate resulting in
4 Menashri, D. Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution (Holmesand Meier, New York, 1990) See overview.
354
The Liberal Defeat
decreases in agricultural yield aggravated the general economic
conditions. 5 Furthermore the socio-political unrests were soon to
play havoc, with the economy. As the result of many months of
anti-government strikes which were to come the urban economy was
to go into severe difficulties.
As the result of unrest industrial output was to decline
by some 24% with a large number of industrial units working at 58%
of capacity. The Gross National Product dropped by 6%. 6 Due to
stoppages and breakdowns in the system a shortage of raw material
and intermediate industrial goods developed. Furthermore political
instability, disturbances and low morale caused massive withdrawal
of capital 7 with a large number of owners and top managers of
enterprises leaving the country. Many of those enterprises had
heavy debts to banks and the flight of the managerial echelons
transformed the financial burden to the banks. The situation was
aggravated by demands by industrial as well as white collar
workers for higher wages and greater managerial control at the
place of work. As economic activity slowed down, leaving huge
industrial projects standing idle, a black market began to grow
for all commodities. Unemployment rose to an unprecedented figure
of 3 million, constituting some 30% of the work force. 8
5 Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War Chap. 1. passim.6 GNP dropped 3.5 the following year (1979/80) and 10% on
the one after. Razavi, H. & Vakil, F. Political Environment ofEconomic Planning in Iran 1971-83 (Westview Press, Boulder, 1984),p.108.
7 Some $6.7 b. in 1977/78.8 Rahnema, A. & Nomani, F. Secular Miracle (Zed, London,
1990) Chap. 6. passim.355
The Liberal Defeat
The Revolutionary Offensive and the Royal Defence
The Period between January 1977 (inauguration of US human
rights foreign policy) and February 1979 (end of Iranian monarchy)
witnessed the emergence of a mass social urban revolutionary
movement which challenged the state and successfully brought it
down to its knees. The events of the period have been the subject
of numerous studies and it is not intended to recount them here. 9
However it is instructive to study briefly the revolutionary
movement's political offensive in terms of leadership,
organization, and tactic. In contrast the defence put up by the
state and its gradual but definitive collapse shall be also
studied in similar terms. 10 It is in understanding the political
positioning of the institutions of the state in relation to civil
society and the emerging revolutionary institutions that it is
possible to sketch and understand the position of Bazargan and his
liberal associates.
The events of this revolutionary period were initiated by
the Shah himself. On the one hand US President Jimmy Carter's
foreign policy of human rights and on the other hand the Shah's
9 For instance see: Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, Iran and the Islamic Revolution Bernard, The Government of GodBill, The Eagle and the Lion Green, Revolution in Iran Biro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs Kazemi, Iranian Revolution in Perspective Ramezani, Revolutionary Iran Rosen, Iran Since the Revolution orRubin, Paved With Good Intentions. For a fuller list refer to thebibliography.
10 The study in this section has relied on information andarguments from the following: Rahnema, A. & Nomani, F. The Secular Miracle, see people's revolution. Parsa, M. The Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (Rutgers University Press) part II,Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War, see overview & Chaps. 1 & 2,Abrahamian, Radical Islam, Chap. 1, Keddie, Roots of Revolution,pp.258-276, Biro, D. Iran Under the Ayatollahs, Chap. 4.
356
The Liberal Defeat
own stable domestic position encouraged him to liberalize. The
initial liberalizations were in terms of freedom for a number of
political prisoners, greater openness in the press, judicial
reforms and tolerance of mild open criticism. Intellectuals and
political activists immediately recognized the opportunity for
political action, and particularly after the appointment of
Jamshid Amuzegar as the prime minister, initiated a series of
movements that was to be the beginning of the end for the
11monarchy.
The revolutionary offensive started in early 1977 and
continued throughout the year with soft but unprecedented and
spontaneous acts of protest where professionals and intellectuals,
including lawyers, judges and writers sent open letters to senior
government officials criticizing the regime's policies and
demanding adherence to the constitution. At the same time clerics
initiated and maintained a wave of critical sermons in mosques
across the country. The clerical protests came after the secular
professionals had made their move and Khomeini was positively
encouraging them to initiate it. 12 How ever there was no central
command to the movement and it was more based on the initiative of
individuals or small groups. The second stage of the offensive
(January 1978) came when protests became popular and people took
11 Amuzegar took over from Amir Abbas Hovieda who had beenin the office for 13 years. The 1977-79 revolutionary period sawthe emergence and collapse of four governments. Amuzegar(appointed 7 July 1977), Ja'far Sharif-Imami (27 August 1978),General Azhari (6 November 1978), and Shapur Bakhtiyar (6 January1979).
12 See Khomeini's letter to the clerics, Bazargan, M.Engelab-e Islami dar do harekat The Iranian Revolution in TwoMovements (FMI, Tehran, 1983) p.26.
357
The Liberal Defeat
to the streets. The publication of an article in a semi-official
newspaper attacking Khomeini in derogatory terms provoked an
element of violence. 13 From then on and throughout 1978 the
protests were self perpetuating since they were held as mourning
for "martyrs" killed in the previous demonstrations. Furthermore
they were increasingly massive in the scale that they managed to
attract people on to the streets. The self-disciplined and
organized marches were then coupled with continuous violent
skirmishes with the military. The third stage (1979) and the final
victory to the revolutionary movement came in a bloody three day
battle with the army, the last bastion of the Pahlavi regime. 14
It is useful to have an understanding of the class
configuration of the revolutionary movement. At the time Iran had
a population of around 35 million, half of whom lived in the rural
areas and who were totally out of the political picture. The
smaller towns held around 15 per cent of the population while the
big towns and cities had some 35 percent of the population, with
Tehran alone accommodating some 4.5 million people. It was within
this 8 million people living in the larger towns that the
revolution took shape and therefore understanding the urban class
composition is crucial. According to Abrahamian the lower classes
constituted 58%, the traditional middle class 20% and the salaried
modern middle class 18% of the urban population. 15 If we exclude
those segments which were close to the state, including the
13 Ettele'at evening paper, 7 January 1978. The violencestarted in a Qom seminary.
14 Rahnema, A. & Romani, F. Secular Miracle, See section onprovisional government.
15 Abrahamian, Radical Islam, p.16.358
The Liberal Defeat
military (400,00 personnel and their families), parts of the
bureaucratic middle classes and those who were not mobilized in
the massive street demonstrations, as well as the very young and
the old, it is possible to estimate roughly that some 30% of the
population of the larger urban centres or around 2.4 million could
have participated in the movement. This constitutes 7.4% of the
total population. As has already been pointed out in the earlier
chapters massive migrations had taken place from rural to urban
areas and it was this social segment which constituted the most
solid section of the revolutionary movement. Their ranks however
were consolidated by sections of the traditional as well as modern
urban middle classes seeking a political role in the Iranian
society. On the level of elite, the leadership cadre were almost
totally from classes who had little or no representation in the
state. In other words they were from the Bazaar, clerical, small
landowning, or small entrepreneurial rather than bureaucratic,
military or industrialist classes. 16 In terms of their political
orientation they were liberal or radical of secular and religious
persuasions in contrast to the authoritarian, modernist and
secular orientation of the ruling elite.
The defence put up by the regime in this period had three
characteristics. Initially the political leadership of the regime
became confused with regards to the nature of events, its own
capabilities, the capacity of the opposition and was thus unable
to pursue a definitive course of action. Secondly the bureaucracy
16 See for example Abrahamian, Radical Islam, p.43, Chehabi,Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, p.87, or Arjomand,Turban for the Crown, p.219-220.
359
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which acted as the political institution of the regime, as well as
its executive arm, collapsed -in political terms- when the main
body of the white collar workers joined the opposition movement.
Thirdly and most fatal of all was the psychological and
organizational withering away of the military apparatus which with
400,000 members and staunch loyalty to the person of the Shah
represented the system's last trench.
Systematic comparison between the revolutionary offensive
and the state's defence are instructive. In terms of leadership
Khomeini increasingly consolidated his position as the undisputed
leader of the revolution with all the tendencies including the
orthodox clergy, the secular liberals, and the moderate as well as
the radical left giving him almost total support in the belief
that only a united front could bring down the Shah and that
differences would be settled later. At the same time people at
large immediately identified and actively accepted the position of
Khomeini who projected an image of a saintly figure uncompromising
in his struggle for social justice.
In contrast the leadership of the state apparatus became
increasingly confused and divided, not only losing contact and
communication with the people but also becoming divided among its
own ranks. Here two initial factors were the Shah's discomfort
with the presence of a Democratic, rather than a Republican,
administration in Washington and the possibility that he was
The Liberal Defeat
suffering from terminal cancer. 17 As the protest movement of 1977
turned radical and violent in the following year, the Shah proved
incapable of making firm decisions in terms of either early
capitulation to the demands of the opposition or their total
suppression. Instead he initiated a process of appeasement by
making sacrifices from his own senior ranks. The arrests of Amir
Abbas Hovieda, his prime minister of 13 years and Ne'matollah
Nasiri, the former head of the secret police are but cases in
point. Confusion among senior officials can be detected as early
as January 1978 when the Rastakhiz Party held an extraordinary
session to reorganize and when dissent became vocal in the Majlis
and members began questioning policies of the previous 25 years.
In terms of organization the regime increasingly lost
control of the institutions on which its power rested while the
self-motivated and spontaneous revolutionary offensive initiated a
two pronged strategy where on the one hand it created its own
organizations and on the other hand crept to take over leadership
positions within the state apparatus. The Shah's regime had
traditionally relied on three pillars of power: the Royal Court,
as its elite power centre, the bureaucracy as its political as
well as executive arm and the military as its ultimate instrument
of coercion. Within the early stages of the crisis chaos set in
the political centres of the regime including the Royal Court, the
Majlis and the Rastakhiz Party. The Shah's own policy of purges
17 For a psychoanalytical study of the Shah's withdrawing ofsupport for the system see Zonis, M. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991).
361
The Liberal Defeat
within these ranks 18 seems to have deteriorated morale and
weakened trust. Members of the Majlis and Rastakhiz were the first
segments of the establishment to break away and start severe
critical campaigns against the regime. With dissent being voiced
at the higher ranks of government officials, the lower ranking
members of bureaucracy began to show an increasing tendency
towards political defection. Indeed within a year and by the end
of 1978 the main body of the Iranian bureaucracy, which for many
years the Shah had relied on as a pillar of strength, had
practically joined the revolution and brought life to a standstill
through their strikes. It was only the military which showed a
degree of resistance against the tide that was to spell its doom.
Deterioration in the army which led to its total surrender to the
new regime with only token resistance started with desertion of
conscripts, leading to mutiny among some lower ranking officers
and collapse of morale among senior officers as the Shah abandoned
the political fight and finally capitulated to the maximum demands
of the revolutionaries. The functional collapse of the Royal
Court, the bureaucracy and the military highlights the structural
weakness of the regime which by its own insistence on the non-
political orientation of its instruments of power had made them
inflexible and vulnerable to change.
In contrast the revolutionary movement began to
institutionalize itself on two levels: on the mass as well as the
elite. The former started in 1977 with the organization of mass
18 Including demands on the Royal family to abstain fromfinancial and political activity, arrests of former seniorofficials, anti-corruption campaign, etc.
362
The Liberal Defeat
demonstrations. The latter started to take shape in late 1978 when
the revolutionaries initiated a policy of cooperation with higher
officials of the regime as well as creating a shadow government.19
The mass demonstrations and daily violent clashes with the troops
brought together activist elements organized around neighbourhood
Committees which soon mushroomed around the country. The
Committees functioned and further developed in three ways: First
as cooperatives which were intended to ease distribution of goods
where the crippling effects of strikes had taken consumer goods
out of the reach of some segments of society. Second; as military-
political courts arresting and judging senior government
officials, members of the secret police and "corrupt" social
elements such as prostitutes and pimps. Third; as organized bands
of armed fighters who began to function as the military wing of
the revolution. The different types of Committees were centred
around neighbourhood mosques which constituted a rare non-state
social network with a history of political independence and a
degree of centralized organization. In turn the activists in the
mosques were controlled by the clerics who soon began to
monopolize managerial posts in the neighbourhood organizations.
Later Khomeini and other political figures who were to
capture leadership positions initiated a process of creating high
level leadership bodies. These bodies, including the Revolutionary
Council and the Provisional Government, functioned as the shadow
legislative-executive and gradually monopolized the process of
19 In a letter to Khomeini Bazargan asked him to encouragethis trend. Bazargan, The Revolutionary Council, p. 19.
363
The Liberal Defeat
decision making. Furthermore, through the skillful manipulation of
social symbols, Khomeini began to portray an image of an active
and powerful leader. In effect while the traditional organizations
of the regime were suffering from loss of morale, defections,
malfunctions and confusion, the revolutionary offensive was
beginning to create its own institutions and setting up of
parallel bodies to that of the state.
On the tactical level both the leaders of the regime and
the opposition movement pursued a policy of appeasement and
threat; that is on the one hand they offered social and material
benefits and on the other hand threatened violence and coercion
against their opponents. The "stick" of the regime took different
forms and ranged between pure polemics, physical attacks, bombing
houses, imposition of martial law and a shoot to kill policy. The
"carrot° came in terms of reform policies, promised or set in
motion, against government corruption, economic hardship and
political repression. Respect for the constitution, people's
religion and expansion of social welfare were said to be the prime
criteria for government policy making. The twin policy of
repression and accommodation was designed to bring segments of the
opposition under control and to sew divisions amongst the other
sectors. But the failure of the policy of divide and rule was best
evident in the inability of Bakhtiyar, as a long time National
Front activist, to form a "constitutional coalition" government
under the Shah's rule. Thus the process of appeasement and
concessions that the Shah set in motion ended with his own exile.
A close study of the policies pursued by the regime in this period
The Liberal Defeat
indicates that despite a switch from technocratic to political
orientation of the cabinets, their tactics suffered from a lack of
initiative -as opposed to reactive measures- thus an acceptance
and resignation to failure.
The tactics of the revolutionary opposition was pursued in
order to create an image of an increasingly powerful movement with
a benevolent and accommodating nature while maintaining threats of
violence and reprisals. In concrete terms the opposition tactics
meant mass mobilization of the public, violent sporadic skirmishes
with the army and strikes in offices and factories. These steps
were meant and were effectively able to bring ordinary daily life
to a standstill and undermine the authority, legitimacy and
capabilities of the establishment. The steps were accompanied by
psychological warfare where members of the regime were made to
believe that the revolutionary leadership was non-violent in terms
of social control and that a compromise between various social
segments would be reached.
A study of the qualities and characteristics of tactics
used by the revolutionaries indicates their increasing
manipulation of religious symbols, a tendency to move from soft
civil methods of protest 20 to an increasing use of violence and
coercion. Furthermore the revolutionary leadership established and
maintained unity among its ranks 21 while rejecting all forms of
20 Including letter writing, publication of pamphlets, andsmall public meetings.
21 Despite possibly an occasional attack by the clerics onthe communists which was designed to ease western apprehensionwith regards to pro-Soviet leanings within the revolutionarymovement.
365
The Liberal Defeat
compromise towards the policies of the regime. 22 In contrast the
policy of appeasement or threat by the regime failed to undermine
the opposition's determination in pursuit of its strategic goal of
destroying the centre of power.
The Appointment of The Provisional Government
Until the revolutionary period relations between Khomeini
and Bazargan were cordial. Bazargan was known to Khomeini not only
from his writings but also through involvement with senior
clerical figures and reformist as well as revolutionary religious
movements. Khomeini had come to express indirect support for
Bazargan in 1963 after the latter's arrest for opposition to the
White Revolution. 23 In turn Bazargan and the Freedom Movement had
spoken extensively in defence of Khomeini over a number of
years. 24 Furthermore Bazargan was close to Khomeini's confidant,
Ayatollah Motahhari who was to become the head of the
Revolutionary Council. The two men were well aware of each other's
positions. Bazargan understood Khomeini's attachment to his
concept of the Guardianship of the Jurisconsult. Khomeini knew of
Bazargan's liberal, constitutional and nationalist orientations.
But as the revolutionary movement picked up momentum they needed
each other to further their own causes and differences between
them were overshadowed by their opposition to the Shah. However as
it shall be argued it was Khomeini who was to win from the
22 This was of course not a conscious progression, rather apart of the developmental properties of the revolution.
23 Bazargan, M. Shura-ye engelab va Dulat-e movaqqat TheRevolutionary Council and the Provisional Government (FMI, Tehran,1982) p.19.
24 FMI Documents, V.I. For example p.282 and 359.366
The Liberal Defeat
partnership. While Bazargan failed to pursue his strategic goals,
Khomeini used Bazargan for a transitory period that allowed his
more radical followers to organize and mount an offensive against
the liberal tendency, inflaming radicalism in domestic and foreign
policy and finally defeating them. A defeat which Khomeini in his
euphoria called the Second Revolution.
Bazargan had first met Khomeini for an exchange of views
in the winter of 1962, prior to the implementation of the Shah's
White Revolution and the subsequent disturbances. Following the
Shah's offensive against Khomeini and the religious community,
Bazargan wrote a tract, from prison, in defence of Khomeini which
was read and enthusiastically approved of by the latter. From then
till 1978 Bazargan had no direct contact with the exiled Ayatollah
but received his occasional communiques. However both men had high
profiles within the Islamic movement, one operating within the
country, the other from Exile. When the revolutionary movement
picked up momentum, Bazargan sent a message to Khomeini (August
1978) calling on him to accept the existing constitution, to
attack the idea of tyranny rather than colonialism, to set his
strategy in the context of free elections, and to accept defectors
from the regime. He further asked him to follow a strategy of
gradual transition and to keep aloof from trying to monopolize
power for the clerics. As revolutionary crisis engulfed the
country Bazargan went to Paris, as did other political figures, to
meet Khomeini (October 1978) where he again called on him to use a
gradualist strategy through free elections. Khomeini was not
forthcoming. However he did ask Bazargan to suggest a list for an
367
The Liberal Defeat
advisory council. Bazargan drew up a list and it was on the basis
of this suggestion that the Revolutionary Council was formed in
the following month in order to deal with the management of the
revolution. 25 What is surprising in this episode of events is the
gulf between the two men who had nevertheless decided to cooperate
with each other. Bazargan was to tell his associates back in
Tehran that Khomeini was a "Shah in the clothes of a Molla" and
was to later write that Khomeini seemed indifferent and unaware of
the complexities of political affairs.
I found it extraordinary that he [Khomeini] took
everything so simply ... his indifference and heedlessness
towards elementary issues of politics and [social]
management astounded me. 26
When Bazargan returned to Iran, Khomeini sent him an open
letter asking for his supervision of the strike-stricken oil
industry in order to provide enough fuel for domestic needs. The
appointment was publicly taken as the likelihood of Bazargan being
appointed as the prime minister in the near future. 27 However the
actual suggestion for Bazargan's appointment to lead the
provisional government came from Ayatollah Motahhari in a
Revolutionary Council meeting with Khomeini after the latter's
return to Iran. Also present in the meeting was Ayatollah Taleciani
who advised Bazargan against the suggestion but Bazargan accepted
25 Bazargan, The Revolutionary Council, pp.18-21.26 Bazargan, The Revolutionary Council, p.21.27 On Bazargan's Mission to activate the oil industry see
FMI Documents: V.4/3, Revitalizing the Oil Industry and Organizingthe Demonstrations (FMI. Tehran, 1983).
368
The Liberal Defeat
pointing out his "national and religious duties." 28 However prior
to the formal appointment, Bazargan made his positi on and the
existing differences between himself and the clerics clear.
Detecting the threat he would face from the radical clerics he
warned Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council that he intended to
follow a gradualist and moderate policy. Nobody objected. 29
The programme which Khomeini had asked Bazargan to
implement, although significant in that it constituted the
necessary legal transition from Monarchy to the Islamic Republic
based on popular consent, fails to fully reflect the political
realities and events of the period. Despite the fact that Bazargan
did indeed carry out the instructions that Khomeini had given him,
he was not allowed to stay in office and was forced to abandon his
position. Khomeini's instructions to Bazargan in February 1979
were to bring order to social life, carry out a referendum on the
establishment of an Islamic Republic and hold elections for
constitutional and national assemblies. 30
The fact that Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan as his
prime minister is significant. Why did he choose Bazargan and why
did Bazargan accept the appointment? From Khomeini's point of view
there were several reasons. For one thing Bazargan had the
necessary political credentials. He was respected for his
opposition to the regime and for his activities with the National
Front as well as the government of Mosaddeq. He had spent several
28 Bazargan, The Revolutionary Council, p.25.29 Bazargan, The Revolutionary Council, p.27.30 Bazargan, The Revolutionary Council, p.53.
369
The Liberal Defeat
years in prison for his political ideas. He had written
extensively for four decades on political issues. He had a large
network of contacts within the active political circles. He also
was known for his managerial capacities in the private sector.
Bazargan also had colourful religious credentials. He had
participated in or had been in contact with almost all major
religious-political movements that had taken place in the previous
three decades. The bulk of his writings were on religious topics.
He had been a pioneer in politicizing Islam and calling for
clerical involvement in politics.
It might be suggested that Khomeini was genuinely willing
to share power with the Muslim liberals and even the secular
Nationalists such as the National Front. This indeed seems to have
been the impression formed by a number of liberals at the time (of
which more below). The fact that he had refered to the National
(Melli) cause on several occasions in his public declarations
might be put forward as evidence in this respect. But Khomeini had
developed his concept of "The Guardianship of Jurisconsult" much
earlier on and it is unlikely that he had not contemplated and
rejected the possibility of sharing power with other political
tendencies, including the liberals. 31
What is more likely is that he saw the liberals, under the
leadership of its religious faction and headed by Bazargan as a
useful tactical ally against his foes, particularly the
establishment and the army. Khomeini's tactical alliances, even
31 Benard & Khalilzad, The Government of God, p.110.370
The Liberal Defeat
though undeclared and tacit, with most unlikely partners including
the pro-Soviet Tudeh party, were to become famous in years to
come. Therefore it should come as no surprise that he intended to
use the liberals for the time being and abandon them once they
were of no use. Khomeini needed the liberals, at that stage, for
several reasons. On the one hand he was not sure of a political
association, closer to his own vision of politics that was capable
or prepared to take over power. His clerical allies had little
managerial experience. Ayatollah Beheshti was to point out later
that Khomeini had asked him on several occasion whether he was
prepared to form a government and he had to reply that he was not.
So Khomeini had to put up with Bazargan for the time being as the
only realistic alternative.
Furthermore Bazargan and the liberal tendency were the
most acceptable leadership alternative to the nation-wide movement
which Khomeini was now leading. The appointment of clerics into
positions of government (something which Khomeini had fought for
and is well indicated in his earlier writings) would have been
unacceptable to the politically articulated sections of society
particularly the middle classes. In contrast Bazargan had the
necessary credentials which were acceptable to the modern urban
classes in Iran.
At the same time Bazargan could not have mounted a serious
challenge against Khomeini, and would in any case not do so. As
will be discussed later, even during his hardest days in office
Bazargan emphasized his allegiance to Khomeini's political
371
The Liberal Defeat
leadership. Furthermore Bazargan lacked the forceful personality
and ambition or the intellectual inclination to become a violent
challenger to power. His liberal political orientation expressed
itself in the tactical flexibility that he was willing to use in
order to obtain his political objectives. Bazargan also lacked a
mass and popular base. He was not as well known to the public as
Khomeini and even when given the chance he failed to display a
forceful and attractive charisma that could have become
politically instrumental at a later stage.
From Bazargan's point of view the position of prime
minister of the Islamic Revolution was of course attractive. Most
significantly Bazargan saw the victorious revolution as something
for which he had struggled and suffered over many years. He had
fought for an anti-dictatorial movement with Islamic and National
credentials and in 1979 it must have seemed to him that he had
achieved his finest hour. For years he had spoken of a national
movement led by religious elements and now that the movement was
giving him the opportunity to lead it he could not have refused.
In his first speech after his appointment he expressed his
sentiments:
I have now realized my old dream - towards which I had
worked for forty years - in bringing together these two
old and basic positions, that of religion and [modern]
learning. In this I see tidings for, and liberation of
Iran. 32
32 The University of Tehran, the first message to thenation. Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p. 70.
372
The Liberal Defeat
However Bazargan was well aware that the undisputed
leadership of the revolution lay with Khomeini. He was also aware
of Khomeini's concept of government and political leadership. He
knew that Khomeini wanted to bring the clerics into the political
domain. This was acceptable, on certain conditions, to Bazargan.
Indeed he had emphasized the necessity of clerical involvement in
politics for a number of years. But what Bazargan had apparently
misread was the clerical ambition to monopolize government, and
the extent to which Khomeini was intending to rule by
authoritarian measures. Bazargan believed that Khomeini would be
more accommodating to people like himself who would then have the
opportunity to implement their strategic goals of liberalizing
social relations (of which more below). Bazargan apparently
believed that Khomeini, as he had promised on the last leg of his
exile in Paris, would return to his Islamic seminary and from
there he, along with other religious figures, would act as a
supervisory body checking against the accesses of government.
The Events
February 1979 witnessed the final and official surrender
of the monarchical regime and the establishment of the first post-
revolutionary cabinet headed by Bazargan. 33 The Shah's military
machine declared itself neutral and his last appointed prime
minister, Bakhtiyar, went into hiding. It was during the same
month that revolutionary executions began and soon hundreds were
33 Bazargan was appointed on February 4th and resigned onNovember 5th, 1979.
373
The Liberal Defeat
to face the firing squads across the country. The collapse of the
old order encouraged new political trends, specially in the
periphery and the Kurds were the first to rise. Their spiritual
leader, Ezzeddin-Hosaini sent a set of demands to the central
government calling for Kurdish autonomy. 34
The following month Khomeini moved to Qom, as he had
promised, apparently to return to his life of teaching but as
events were to show he and his clerical establishment did not keep
aloof from politics. In the meantime the pre-revolutionary unity
that brought down the Shah was giving way to divisions. By the end
of the month fighting had begun in the Kurdistan Province as well
as in north western areas settled by Torkmans. However the show of
strength for the emerging system was evident in the referendum
that called for an end to the monarchy and the establishment of an
Islamic Republic. It was at this time that Iraq tested Iranian
defences by bombing several border villages but the foreign
ministry was able to patch up differences and secure compensation.
By April things were becoming more violent. Following the
official establishment of the Islamic Republic at the beginning of
the month, the execution of former government officials continued.
34 In writing this section the following material has beenused: Abrahamian, Radical Islam, Chap. 8, Afkhami, Thanatos, Chap.6, Amjad, From Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy, Chap. 8. Benard,The Government of God, Chap. 5, Chehabi, Iranian Politics andReligious Modernism, Chap. 7, Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs,Chaps. 3 & 4, Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War, pp.77-111, Sanjabi,Hopes & Despairs, Chap. 11, Taheri, The Spirit of Allah, Chaps. 14& 15.
374
The Liberal Defeat
Differences also began to emerge at the top of the leadership
hierarchy, best evident in the arrest of Ayatollah Taleqani's
son. 35 Meanwhile the radical clerics and other fundamentalist
tendencies announced the establishment of the Islamic Republican
Party. It was later in April and early May that a number of
prominent political figures including Major General Qarani 36 and
Ayatollah Motahhari were assassinated by a small fringe group.
Ethnic unrest reached a new peak when Arabs of Khuzistan led by
their religious leader and possibly under Iraqi agitation began
violent anti-government protests.
The following two months witnessed increasing tensions
between the Provisional Government headed by Bazargan and the
Revolutionary Council. While the Council called for increasingly
radical measures the cabinet insisted on moderate policy making.
The transfer of four clerical members of the Council to the
cabinet best illustrates efforts at harmonizing activities of the
two bodies. However Khomeini sided with the radical elements and
criticized the cabinet for being weak. 37
In August fighting in Kurdistan began to take on greater
dimensions and was to last for an initial period of three months.
35 Two of Taleqani's sons were arrested and jailed for anumber of days by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. The two weremembers of left wing organizations. In protest Talegani closed hisoffice and left Tehran for a number of days.
36 Mohammad Vali Qarani was the head of the former regime'smilitary intelligence but was dismissed for an alleged anti-Shahplot in 1958 and sentenced to three years imprisonment. Halliday,F. Dictatorship and Development, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth)p.68.
37 For an example see the evening paper Kayhan (Tehran,March 8, 1979).
375
The Liberal Defeat
The towns in the area changed hands several times and the central
government sent in the army to put down the rebellion. However the
control of the countryside and the mountainous region proved
impossible. Meanwhile in the big cities the radical left began a
campaign of disobedience through demonstrations that usually led
to clashes with pro-Khomeini activists. In reaction to the unrest
the Provisional Government introduced press restrictions while the
revolutionary prosecutor closed down a number of publications.
Despite the tensions the government managed to hold elections for
the Assembly of Experts (a constitutional assembly) which met
later with an overwhelming clerical faction, to discuss the draft
constitution.
Polarization between the more moderate position of the
Provisional Government and the more radical orientation of the
Revolutionary Council became even more apparent in September. The
former's position was weakened by the death of Ayatollah Taleciani
who had refused to give total support to the radical tendency.
Meanwhile the subjection of the media to the control of the
radical Islamic tendency continued with the confiscation of a
number of newspapers.
In October fighting in Kurdistan intensified and towns
again changed hands several times. Meanwhile US-Iranian relations
deteriorated with the admission of the Shah into USA for medical
treatment. In early November radical students proclaiming
adherence to the person of Khomeini seized the US embassy compound
in Tehran. Within 48 hours and after Khomeini's support for the
376
The Liberal Defeat
take-over Mehdi Bazargan resigned as prime minister. A number of
cabinet members however stayed on as a care-taker government until
a new cabinet was installed.
The Liberal Strategy
While in office Bazargan's strategy was a portrait of
classic liberal thinking. 38 On the one hand he tried to limit the
interference of government in civil society, on the other hand he
hoped to regulate government activity through administrative
reforms. To achieve these goals he had to confront the legacy of
the former regime left in the shape of its extensive bureaucratic-
military machine. But he was also forced to face the extremist
elements, of both right and left. The two sides of the political
spectrum claimed the right to monopolize power and showed the
political will in pursuit of their aims. However the most
significant challenge that Bazargan confronted in his effort to
reconstruct the Iranian state was revolutionary acts committed by
sections of society who believed that revolutionary destruction
would still have to continue.
Bazargan's tenure in office can be termed the strategic
defeat of the liberal alternative in the face of social and
political challenges. The liberals may have well understood the
structural problems of Iranian society but they went wrong in
articulating a realistic strategy and in hoping to maintain it in
the face of political challenges and social demands. Limiting the
38 For a comparative discussion on the liberal notions ofthe role of the state and individual in society see Manning, D.J.Liberalism (London, Dent & Son, 1976) pp.73-81.
377
The Liberal Defeat
powers of the state, reforming the bureaucracy and regulating
social relations might have been remedies to Iran's chronic
history of tyranny and authoritarian rule but they failed to meet
the immediate expectations of a population intoxicated with the
taste of triumph, bent on uprooting their immediate past for an
unknown future, naive in the art of political action, expecting
that goodness will come only if evil would be purged and
annihilated by revolutionary violence.
Bazargan and his co-liberals failed to harness popular
expectations, failed to gain a hold on popular imagination, and
failed to make a significant section of the urban population
actiVated through the revolutionary process to identify with their
cause. Subsequently other social forces pushed Bazargan and his
associates to the fringe of the political spectrum and it was up
to Khomeini and his radical clerics to capture the mood and the
imagination of the masses. They in turn rode on the tide of
popular expectations, took up the banner of populism and fuelled
mass hysteria. Consequently they held the reigns of power with
little concern about the effects of their rule, in social or
economic terms. They desperately wanted to exercise power as the
agents of the Divine and to hold on to power at all costs, as the
events of the 1980s were to prove. The story of Bazargan's
government then is the defeat of the liberal alternative at the
hands of the newly politicalised and revolutionary urban classes.
The liberals fell victim to those whom they sought to liberate.
Limiting the Structure and Power of the State
378
The Liberal Defeat
The fundamental elements in the strategy of Bazargan while
he led the Provisional Government was to limit the structure of
government and to regulate it so as to make its actions in
accordance with the existing or the emerging constitutional laws.
This goal was based on the perception that tyranny was
fundamentally the mal-function of natural society. In the eyes of
Bazargan society in its natural form, left on its own with the
state acting only as a regulator and arbitrator between different
components, presented the best form of human life. But in
contemporary Iran, Bazargan believed, the state had come to
dominate social life and to impose itself on all social domains.
During the rule of the late Shah, the Iranian state and
bureaucratic machinery had expanded extensively. The reasons for
the overexpansion of the contemporary Middle Eastern state to the
point where it dominates all others institutions in absolute terms
has been the subject of a number of studies and it is not intended
to open the debate here. 39 When Bazargan came to power the
Iranian state was a massive complex. It directly employed 1.6
million people and further provided indirect employment for a
similar number of people through contractual works. Thus about 30%
of the labour force was in direct or indirect employment of the
state. The income of the state from oil alone was $20 b. some 35%
of the GNP. 40 Furthermore the state had the monopoly of political
39 To name but a few factors the following are mostdiscussed: A history of state absolutism, weakness of privateproperty, extended historic periods of social chaos, imperialistencouragement of bureaucratic centralization and military rule,popular idea of state as vanguard of social progress, availabilityof vast revenues from the sale of oil, etc.
40 Nyrop, Iran: A Country Study, p.XIV.379
Th. Liboral Defoat
activity. No other institution was allowed to engage in any form
of activity which could be interpreted as political. Throughout
his speeches in his nine months in office 41 Bazargan repeatedly
tried to convey this fact and emphasise the necessity of limiting
the size and the power of the state.
Since the time of Ahmad Shah 42 and the constitutional
period, all the governments which had come to power
competed with each other to enlarge this balloon of state
[apparatus]. The minimum responsibility and intention of
the existing government is not to move in a similar
direction. In terms of expenses and number of civil
servants, the state apparatus is three or four times
larger than what is needed. We should not expand and
enlarge it. To employ new people for the government
apparatus is a sin against the revolution, Islam, the
nation and the people. 43
We must avoid statism. I have said it several times and
must constantly emphasize it again. With the kind of state
that we have and the large number of civil servants that
we employ, we should not enlarge this balloon. It will
simply burst. 44
41 Bazargan spoke on the television and radio once everyweek or two.
42 The last monarch of the Qajar dynasty who was forced toabdicate (1925) by Reza Khan the founder of the modern Iranianstate.
43 Indirect quotation from a televised speech. Bazargan, A.Problems and Issues, p.124.
44 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.200.380
The Liberal Defeat
One of the programmes in transforming the former order
into the future Islamic Republic would be to try to leave
people's work to themselves, so they would be able to
carry out [their own work] with greater efficiency and so
the governments burden would be lighter. The government
would then have only the responsibility of guidance,
initiatives, rescue and emergency help. 45
The root of the problem? The root of the problem is that
the state apparatus in Iran which is a product of the
ancient order, has been the instrument of injustice,
corruption and theft of the Pahlavis. People are disgusted
with and hate the state apparatus. 46
In the language of classical liberalism, where the
activities of the free market and private sector are seen as
necessary conditions for guaranteeing the rights of the
individual, 47 Bazargan defended the private sector and condemned
state intervention in economic affairs as a "conspiracy" by the
state to impose itself on civil society.
The Pahlavi regime tried to paralyze the private sector
. it tried to take away all economic activity from the
45 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.24.46 Bazargan, A. Problem and Issues, p.186.47 For a review of the arguments presented by Western
liberals on matters of state and emergence of capitalism seeHolden, B. Understanding Liberal Democracy (Philip Allan, HelmelHempstead, 1988) p.161.
381
The Liberal Defeat
people and to monopolize it. People would have then become
weak, dependent and unable to protest. The policies and
responsibilities of the Islamic revolution and government
should be contrary to this trend ... The government should
act [only] as a coordinator, supervisor and guide as to
allow the people to take up the responsibilities
themselves. 48
Bazargan saw minimum government and minimum state
interference as good government and the natural conditions for
human life and interaction. The role of good government was to
interfere as little as possible in the social domain so as to
allow events to take their "natural" course.
Government should be like a midwife who tries to leave the
mother to give birth naturally. [She] interferes as little
as possible so nature will do its work. Government should
be like the doctor who fights against the disease by
trying to impose the natural state of balance to the
organs of the body. The nature of government should be the
same. It should make the environment safe. It should try
to barricade the entry of microbes so that the people and
the nation will be able to rule themselves, so that things
will take shape naturally. In other words economic growth,
military power, intellectual advance, practical initiative
and financial capital should all come automatically from
the people . It is sufficient that the environment
48 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.306.382
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should be made agreeable as to allow the establishment of
justice. Then everything will be in its [natural]
position. Justice will be done. Progress, blessings,
greatness and power will automatically come from the
people. 49
Bazargan's intentions in limiting the structure and power
of the state apparatus are clear but as shall be shown he was to
fail in realizing this aim. Indeed the outcome of his government
was to the contrary. By the time he left office the state
apparatus had expanded significantly. The expansion of the state
came primarily in the form of large scale nationalization. All
private banks and major insurance companies and hundreds of
industrial units, were nationalized. The reasons that Bazargan
agreed to the nationalizations, an act which stands contrary to
his initial emphasis on limiting state apparatus were fivefold.
1. A large number of owners of large scale industries had fled the
country during the revolutionary upheavals. With their departure
their organizations were left without supervision and in many
instances the production lines shut down. These units included
those owned by the royal family which employed tens of thousands
of workers. All the units turned to government for help. 50
Bazargan had no choice but to extend a helping hand. The cabinet
soon became involved in appointing hundreds of new managers to the
49 Indirect quotation, Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues,p.247.
50 Bazargan A. Problems and Issues, p.102.383
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abandoned organizations, thus effectively bringing all of them
under government responsibility.
2. There were several large scale economic projects, government
owned and managed, but not yet at production stage. In some
instances it was thought that these projects were uneconomical and
a result of showmanship rather than sound financial thinking.
Billions of dollars had been spent towards their completion and
they would have employed hundreds of thousands of people. The best
known among these were the atomic reactor and a large scale petro-
chemical plant on the shores of the Persian Gulf. Bazargan felt he
had no choice but to maintain the state management of these
projects, rather than abandoning them at the particular stage of
completion. 51
3. The nationalization of all banks (as well as insurance
companies) was the biggest economic initiative taken by Bazargan's
cabinet. Although the causes and reasons identified above
contributed to these nationalizations the main reason seems to
have been ideological. There has already been a discussion on
Bazargan's view on banking. 52 It is sufficient to recall here
that Bazargan opposed the modern banking system for its use of
usury. The conviction that banks "give ten drops of blood only to
take back thirty" 53 was the main drive towards the
nationalization of the banks. However there were also social and
political factors involved.
51 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.171.52 See Bazargan arguments in the post-1963 debates.53 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.199.
384
Th. Liboral Dobbat
Banks were disliked by small entrepreneurs for favouring
(in line with the policies of the former regime) large-scale
urban, machine-intensive production units. During the Shah's
period while financial banking was readily available for these
types of activities, the smaller businessman, in industry, trade
and agricultUre suffered from the non-availability of funds. Banks
were thus despised by small investors, particularly in the Bazaar.
The nationalization of Banks played on this attitude. Bringing
them under government control gave an impression that the banks
were being punished and an opportunity was opening up for the
small investor. Bazargan said the nationalization were to give the
industries the necessary assurances that they would be supported
financially. 54
4. A proportion of industrial units which were taken over by
government appointed managers had large amounts of debts to banks
and were unable or unwilling to meet their obligations. The
government felt it had no choice but to take over the
responsibility of running the units till a further occasion. 55
Although the decision might have been to maintain control
temporarily, their take over and transfer to state bureaucracy was
to prove difficult to reverse. 56
5. Another reason for nationalization or temporary take over was
purely political. A number of industrialists were disliked by the
54 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.199.55 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.102.56 The government was not start the privatization of these
unites until some ten years later.385
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revolutionaries for their "gangster image". The ideological
pressrures from the Islamic radicals and the Marxist left were
significant in this respect. In the circumstances the government
had no choice but to meet, at least partially, some of these
ideological demands. 57
The above arguments should clarify the failure of Bazargan
in implementing his most important strategic aim in reducing state
involvement in social and economic affairs. On the one hand he
called for limiting the state while on the other hand he
nationalized or took into government care a large number of
industrial, financial and agricultural units. In some cases he
might have been forced to accept the nationalizations, for
instance in the case of the fleeing of owners or the bankruptcy of
the units. But he went further than this, in encouraging the
nationalization of banks on ideological grounds. At least there is
no evidence of his active resistance against the trend. Indeed
while presenting these policies to the public he was positively
proud of the achievements:
This [nationalization of banks, insurance companies and
industrial units] is the product and the child of the
57 One other group lost their property because they were ofthe Baha'i faith. The government felt obliged to take control ofthese units and interpreted this act as re-confiscation of publicproperty. Baha'ism: A mid-19th century offshoot of Shiism wherethe founder, Bab claimed to be the expected Hidden Imam (Messiah).Baha'ism is now an independent religion separate from Islamhowever Shiite clerics consider them as heretics and have tried touproot their community. For an introduction see Amanat, A. AResurrection and Renewal (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989)or Copper, R. The of Iran (Minority Rights Group, London, 1985).
386
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government. It was also revolutionary. A child is
conceived in nine months, and the government had this one
in five. Now some people might say why is it a girl? We
wanted a boy. Or why is it a boy? We wanted a girl ...
Whatever the case the child has been born, and we have
delivered it to you, the people. God willing it will fair
well and be a pride for the government and the people. 58
The Reform of the State
The second element in the strategic policy of Bazargan and
his liberal entourage seems to have been the administrative reform
of the bureaucratic machinery. This idea was subordinated to that
of limiting the size and growth of the state machinery but in the
same manner that the first liberal alternative failed to achieve
its aim, he failed in implementing the second. Initially Bazargan
believed that the bureaucratic machinery was unproductive and that
it should be reformed so as to make it appropriate to the needs of
Iranian society. The criticism of the state machinery came from
the vision that the machinery was primarily an instrument of
"terror and coercion" by those who had been in power. 59 It had
failed to serve the people and the society. Furthermore it was
unproductive and the civil servants working in it were engaged in
useless activity not only that they did not do what they should do
properly, they weren't doing work that would be beneficial even if
they had done it. 60
58 Bazargan, A. Problem and Issues, p.201.59 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.186.60 Bazargan said the civil servants did little work, chatted
too much and were cheeky. Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.186.387
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It was this perception of affairs that prompted Bazargan
to call on the civil servants to implement 'a revolutionary
process of change from within' the state institutions. From the
third month into office, and through speeches on the radio and
television, Bazargan started to challenge his civil service to
revolutionize the method and procedure of their management and
implementation of regulations. The tactic that Bazargan chose in
the articulation of his aim was to change the senior officials on
a large scale and to bring pressure on the lower ranks to reform.
It should be taken into account that there were political
reasons for changing the top government officials. With the
memories of the 1953 coup lingering on and prompting fears that a
similar counter measure could be repeated, the leaders of the
revolution with the overt approval of all hues of the political
spectrum set a vigorous process of purges in motion. This point
will be discussed in greater detail, here it is sufficient to
point out that the process which started in the senior ranks of
the bureaucracy, and was soon to reach its lowest levels and
produce increasingly sinister social paranoia, was instituted as
the result of fears of a coup rather than from intentions of
bureaucratic reform. But Bazargan seems to have firmly believed
that changes in at least the senior positions were necessary for
any form of reform. Reporting proudly on his own record he
declared that within a four month period his government had
changed 70% of the deputy ministers, 100% of the ambassadors, 100%
of provincial governors, and appointed new directors for 200 giant
388
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state controlled institutions including such diverse organizations
as the oil company and petro-chemical industries, universities and
welfare associations. 61
However, at the same time Bazargan had to challenge calls
to extend the purges to the lower ranks of civil service. The
demands were made by the radical wing of the revolutionary
movement and the tactic of confronting the state machinery,
particularly its military structure, became a debate of intense
dimensions in the early years of 1980 between the liberal,
pragmatic and radical factions. Here it is sufficient to point out
that Bazargan believed there was no choice but to put up with the
existing establishment and officials in order to implement gradual
reforms. He argued that billions had been spent in training and
organizing the civil service and that it would be a waste of
resources to destroy outright the existing establishment. The
change in the bureaucratic machinery should come in stages so as
to limit the possible damage and side effects. 62
Bazargan's attempts to reform the bureaucracy failed. The
political challenges to his authority, as the head of the
government, paralyzed his ability to take control of the state
machinery let alone reform its functions. Furthermore the ranks of
the civil service, which as the executive arm of the late regime
had been a vanguard in joining the revolutionary movement was now
radicalizing itself. Within a period of several months into the
61 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.189.62 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.190-193.
389
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life of the Provisional Government hundreds of Revolutionary
Committees and Councils were established in government
organizations. In many cases the self appointed associations took
over the management of the offices. Physically barring senior
officials from entrance and threatening violent revenge, the
Revolutionary Committees and Councils paralyzed bureaucratic life.
The political challenge for the liberals at the top of the state
machinery was too much. Soon Bazargan abandoned his hopes of
reforming the institution of state which he saw as a main obstacle
to social progress. A study of his speeches from the months of
February to November clearly indicates that as time progressed he
spoke less about the policy of reforming of the state machinery
and spent more time meeting and beating off the challenges from
the radical tendencies, both religious and secular and within as
well as outside the state.
With both his strategic aims of limiting the size of the
state and reforming its machinery becoming increasingly impossible
to implement what remained for Bazargan to do was to maintain the
function of the government machinery at the face of upheavals.
Thus the revolutionary who had enthusiastically supported the
radicalism of the opposition against the establishment was now
trying to save the government from disintegration. The
revolutionary had become a conservative. The purpose of organizing
and maintaining the function of government agencies was the
initial requirement made by Khomeini when he had appointed
Bazargan. 63 What Bazargan understood by arranging the social
63 Bazargan, The Revolutionary Council, p.53.390
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affairs was to restore law and order and to bring back a business
like atmosphere. Initially he was optimistic and his speeches were
affirmative of this mood. A few days after his appointment he told
a large crowd at the university of Tehran:
As soon as the provisional government has been settled
down and as soon as it has commanded [civil servants]
should return to their jobs, be not Holier than the Pope
and set the wheels of administration in motion. 64
Bazargan appealed to various arguments to defend this
position. He said that without regulation, discipline and
administrative hierarchy, the system will not remain intact. He
also appealed to the Koran and religious symbols, stating that
adhering to the instructions of "those in charge" was a moral
duty. 65 But his main emphasis was to warn that until order was
restored and production units in both the private and industrial
sector had been returned to normality there would be no chance of
paying the wages on time or improving the economic lot of the wage
earners. 66
However the challenge to Bazargan was too great. Sitting
at the top of the vast Iranian bureaucracy he watched with horror
as parts of the structure mal-functioned and collapsed. Here it is
sufficient to point out that the armed forces, not only the army
but also police and the gendarmerie were almost totally disbanded
64 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.74.65 Bazargan, A. Problem and Issues, p.136.66 For an example see Bazargan, A. Problem and Issues, p.37.
391
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and none of their members were reporting to their posts. There was
no legislature. The top echelon of the socio-political elite had
fled the country. Workers had taken over places of work and were
refusing to recognize either the existing senior officials or the
new ones appointed by the Provisional Government. 67
Furthermore Bazargan and his liberal ranks were in
disarray. Years of suppression and political inactivity had left
them in small numbers, disorganized and without a proper plan of
action. Bazargan complained that he was unable to draw on men who
were politically acceptable as well as technically able. He blamed
the speedy collapse of the former regime for not having allowed
the opposition movement to train its necessary cadres. Desperate
for people he could trust he brought in close members of his
family to fill in posts, an act that did not go down well in some
quarters. 68
As time passed Bazargan's tone and his appeals became more
desperate. While at the beginning he spoke from a position of
power and demanded correct behaviour, by the time he resigned he
was appealing to deaf ears. 69 Not only his strategic aims of
limiting the size of the state and reforming its machinery had
failed, he was failing to maintain and control the everyday
running of the bureaucracy. The challenge against re-organizing
the old establishment came from the public at large which was
67 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.88-90.68 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, pp.90-91.68 Compare the tone and frequency of appeals for calm in
February speeches to those in September and October. Bazargan, A.Problems and Issues, Chaps. 1, 2 & 3.
392
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becoming increasingly dominated by religious radicals led by
Khomeini.
Democracy and Political Freedoms
From the 1940s to the late 1970s a prominent aspect of
Bazargan's political thinking was the emphasis on democracy and
political freedoms. There has already been discussions on how he
tried to defend and rationalize democratic as well as
constitutional government in the face of the authoritarian rule of
the Pahlavis. Throughout his political career he had spoken
distinctly and on numerous occasions against the rule of tyranny.
In fact his best polemical pieces had been defending democratic
and constitutional rule of authority. With such a background it
might be natural to expect a staunch defence of these values and
ideals now that he had some control over the power of government.
However what in fact emerged constituted a move and a turn in a
different direction, if not in contradiction, to these ideals. It
seems that Bazargan was taken over to such an extent by the
immediate concerns regarding the restoration of order to the state
machinery and possibly its reform, that the earlier concerns for
the establishment and maintenance of democratic and constitutional
practices were pushed into the background. Of course it could be
argued in his favour, as already indicated, that the establishment
of an efficient and limited bureaucracy might be interpreted as
the initial, necessary and practical step towards these values.
However it has to be pointed out that Bazargan's defence and
propagation of democratic practices at this stage seems to have
been quite limited.
393
The Liberal Defeat
The issue that brought out Bazargan in defence of
democracy was the referendum on changing the political system of
the country. Public debate centred around the wording of the
question to be placed before the voters and the exact title of the
republic. 70 Khomeini rejected all titles except that of Islamic
Republic. Keeping in mind the debates Bazargan had had with the
clerics over the issues of democracy and political freedom in
early 1960s it was not surprising that Bazargan suggested a
Democratic Islamic Republic. In fact as early as his appointment
as prime minister he tried to interpret the yet to be established
Islamic Republic as a democratic goal. He even went as far as
insisting that Khomeini's interpretation was the same.
Mr. Khomeini has always believed that he is the voice of
the people, is inspired by the people, works for the
people and lives amongst the people. If we place Islam and
democracy next to each other, they would have a similar
meaning. They are expressions of God's and people's
command. The will of God is the will of the people and the
will of the pious people is the will of God. Therefore our
Islamic Republic is a democratic republic and a true
democratic republic is Islamic. When we speak of people,
as it does throughout the Koran, there is no reference to
a particular class ... it includes all ... the majority as
well as the minority. 71
70 Hiro, Reign of the Ayatollahs, p.108.71 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.72.
394
The Liberal Defeat
If foreign democratic governments and liberal doctrines
have or claim to have reached such maturity as to say
there must be freedom of speech and criticism, Islam not
only allows, but demands free speech and criticism as a
duty. 72
In one speech Bazargan compared the idea of parliamentary
government in Europe with Islamic political ideas and expressed
the view that the Islamic system had similar meaning and content.
He said that the emerging government in Iran would enjoy the
supremacy of the council of parliament which would involve the
whole public in its election. 73
However Bazargan's defence of political freedoms became
controversial over the right of the press and the right of
minority groups to free activity. At the time the majority of the
publications were controlled by the secularists, Leftists and
those who had worked for the former regime. Lacking the ability to
criticize Khomeini as the figurehead of the revolution, they began
to unleash their fury on Bazargan and his government. With the
Islamic groups irritated with their own lack of press organs to
publicize their views, they began attacks on newspaper offices and
newsstands of the opposition. Bazargan joined the fundamentalists
in criticizing newspapers and although he did not go as far as
condoning the attacks, he did not condemn them either. 74 In June
72 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.74.73 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, pp.268-274.74 Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, p.267.
395
The Liberal Defeat
following disturbances and violent clashes in the provinces, the
government expelled foreign reporters in an effort to curtail
reporting of the unease. 75 In early August the revolutionary
prosecutor of Tehran, closed down a leading opposition newspaper
Ayandegan. The following day the government announced a new law
severely curtailing press activity. Within a week the government
declared the closing down of more than twenty newspapers and
magazines. 76
The closing down of newspapers was followed by attacks on
opposition groups including the smaller National Democratic Front,
forcing their leaders to go underground. On August 14 the
International Commission of Jurists denounced the events as severe
setbacks for Iranian political life. Bazargan and his liberal
circles however kept silent, tacitly acquiescing in the attacks on
the opposition. In one speech Bazargan ridiculed the minority
radical left as 2% opposition.
The Challenge of the Popular Revolutionary Movement
In terms of social change the period when Bazargan was in
office represents one of the most turbulent and unsettled times in
contemporary Iranian history. This was a time of great social and
political change, a time of transition from the old order into
something which was not yet certain. The massive revolutionary
protest of the people had cut across class divisions, religious
differences and ethnic dissimilarities to put them face to face
75 See New York Times, June-August 1979.76 For Bazargan's attacks on the press see Bazargan, A.
Problems and Issues, p.221 & 226.396
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with the dominating state machinery. But once the state had
succumbed to pressure and its ability to impose its own law and
order had evaporated there was social anarchy. 77
The most distinguished characteristic of this social
anarchy was the politicalization of all social types. After
decades of political passivity and immobility which had resulted
in chronic political underdevelopment, there was a massive
explosion of political fury. For instance the printed media which
had functioned mainly as a means of propaganda and entertainment
during the Shah's regime suddenly became an arena of political
debate. Average newspaper circulations went up twenty-thirty times
to reach the one million mark, unprecedented in Iranian history.
Paths in the city centres became places for rendezvous for
political discussions. Polemics, social commentary and general
social critique became dominant themes in a country where until
two years before politics was taboo, only spoken in hushed voices
and distant corners.
Furthermore and as the result of general political
naivete, people entertained great expectations. It was believed
that the revolution would provide welfare for all and that the age
of suffering, hardship and inequalities would soon come to an end.
77 For the arguments in this section the following materialhave been used: Afkhami, The Iranian Revolution: Thanatos on aNational Scale, Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, Iran and the Islamic Revolution, Bernard, The Government of God, Bill, TheEagle and the Lion, Green, Revolution in Iran, Biro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, Kazemi, Iranian Revolution in Perspective,Ramezania, Revolutionary Iran, Rosen, Iran Since the Revolution,or Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions. For a fuller list refer tothe bibliography.
397
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A popular rumour had it that the government would be sending every
citizen's share of the oil revenue, in dollars, on a weekly basis
through the post. 78 The old order had collapsed and popular
expectations found themselves translated into a violent take-over
of the wealth of those who had represented the former regime. In
the cities luxury mansions, cars and furniture were confiscated by
gangs of the poor. In rural areas land confiscations by those
wielding enough power were carried out indiscriminately. The
government itself perpetuated this trend by its continuous
confiscation and "nationalization" of property and companies. It
seems that in the eyes of the revolutionaries the concept of
justice meant an immediate free-for-all looting of what there was.
These acts of anarchy became more formal and organized through the
activities of thousands of Revolutionary Councils and Committees
which mushroomed across the country. These ad-hoc associations
immediately made demands for the removal of property rights from
original owners, total control of the places of work and massive
increases in wages. To enforce these demands strikes, sit-ins,
marches and meetings were organized. In a country of little or no
experience in social association, political organization or labour
activity these acts brought havoc to social order.
The situation had an even more dangerous dimension in the
fact that some 300,000 automatic weapons had fallen into the hands
of the public when military garrisons were ransacked in clashes
78 Later Khomeini had to succumb to such expectations and inturn inflame them by announcing that public services includingtransport, water, and electricity would be free and that the poorwill have to pay no taxes.
398
The Liberal Defeat
with the Shah's troops. Constant calls for the return of the
weapons were in vain. Posing with instruments of violence became
fashionable. Teenagers kept automatic weapons at home and a black
market flourished around their trade. In smaller and more isolated
towns it became common to stroll with a rifle.
The revolutionaries were thirsty for revenge; and it was
on their expectations that Revolutionary Courts went into action.
As the fate of former senior officials were sealed by firing
squads the revolutionaries celebrated. 79 The first executions
took place over the roof top of a public school for girls which
had become Khomeini's temporary place of residence. Executions
were popular, and were carried out possibly more to satisfy calls
for revenge than to thwart real political danger. Lynching of
senior officers, military commanders and members of the secret
police were reported. In the first few months of the revolutionary
government the number of executions reached 600. In the next few
years it was to reach tens of thousands.
To indicate the degree of lawlessness and disorder it is
useful to point out that when Bazargan took office the public
prosecutor had sent directions to whatever remained of the police
force not to arrest common criminals for there were no prisons
operating and there was no one to deal with them. 80
79 An example of this hysteria was the unprecedented sale ofnewspapers which printed pictures of the half naked body of theformer prime minister Hovieda with several young men holding G3assault rifles over him.
80 Speech in the month of May, Bazargan, A. Problems andIssues, p.228.
399
The Liberal Defeat
It was this confusion of mass hysteria which in many ways
determined the political development of the coming years. The
popular revolutionary zeal set the form and pattern in which the
political leaders were to behave. In order to be popular the
leaders of political movements, including Khomeini, called for
even greater acts of radicalism. The new hero in the eyes of the
revolutionaries was the man who acted ruthlessly, violently and in
a "revolutionary manner" in breaking down what had been created in
the hated past. The obsession was so strong that soon it became
the dominant social theme; to be revolutionary for the sake of
being revolutionary.
While the driving force behind the great social changes
was people's popular revolutionary movement and their desire to
transform the ancient regime to a new order, it was this very
enthusiasm which Bazargan saw as the main cause of Lhe
difficulties that he and his reformist programme were facing.
Throughout his nine months in office his public speeches reflect
the theme of concern over the direction and content of the social
movement. Increasingly Bazargan began to see the revolutionary
movement as destructive and called - in an increasingly
belligerent language - for revision and calm. He saw the events as
the descent of anarchy and chaos and warned against this
increasingly dominating trend. However his repeated calls for
social responsibility of the individual were not heeded. In one
speech he expressed his fears of total collapse:
400
The Liberal Defeat
Let us not allow the country to [slip] back to the time of
Ahmad Shah and Mozaffaredin Shah 81 where in every village,
gorge, town, neighbourhood and pass a different sheriff
and gang leader pushed their own line. Don't let this
happen. 82
Bazargan referred to a verity of ways in which the social
chaos was hampering his efforts in establishing order. The most
frequent cases of disorder mentioned in his speeches were:
i- Demands by Strikes Councils to take over the management of
government offices, industrial units and educational
establishments.
ii- Refusal of the revolutionaries to recognize the appointment of
new managers by the provisional government.
iii- Plans and cases of action by revolutionaries against the
directions set by the Provisional Government.
iv- Continuing arrests of former prominent social figures.
v- Continuous demands on the government for increases in budget
allocation.
81 Mozaffaredin Shah (reigned 1896-1909) a weak andincompetent monarch whose rule coincided with the ConstitutionalRevolution and the curtailing of the powers of the monarchy. AhmadShah (reigned 1909-25) succeeded to the throne at the age of 11but proved incapable of coping with his responsibilities. Theoccupation of Iran by foreign troops during WWI undermined hisposition and he was finally ousted by Reza Khan. The time of thesetwo monarchs were of general social chaos and disintegration ofthe state. The collapse of the old tyranny further encouragedcentrifugal forces to undermine Iran's already fragile socialfabric. For details, for instance, see Arjomand, The Turban forthe Crown, Chap. 2.
82 Speech in month of February, Bazargan, A. Problems andIssues, p.109.
401
The Liberal Defeat
vi- Attacks on foreign nationals and embassies. 83
The cause for such a state of affairs, Bazargan believed
was the general public persuasion that it had been treated badly
in the former regime and to set the score it had to destroy what
remained of the past and to build a desired future in the shortest
and most radical way possible. The story in Bazargan's view, was
of frustrated expectations turning into violence and revenge.
There was a desire to create overnight an order that would
compensate for the short-comings of the past one hundred years,
and the easiest way to destroy the old was to use violence against
it. In other words to destroy as quickly and as much as possible
of the old regime and thus establish the foundation for the new
order. 84 Bazargan saw that in the name of revolutionary anti-
imperialism and anti-colonialism the revolutionaries were
dangerously negating what had been created in the previous thirty
years.
In practice we see that in place of revolution, there is
an extensive spread of intense vengeance. For many people
the main issue is of setting old scores. Revenge and
vengeance against those who in the previous era had some
how acted against this revolution. 85
Bazargan felt these attacks extended to all social domains
including education, the work ethic, social organization and even
83 For an example see Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues,p.85
84 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.75.85 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.107.
402
The Liberal Defeat
social respect. Increasingly he expressed opposition against these
turns of events. 86 He tried to distance his own as well as
Khomeini's authority from this turn of events in the hope that the
revolutionary zeal would be then some how checked. He said such
public sentiments were opposed to the authority of the government
and the person of Khomeini. Little did he realize that Khomeini
and the radical wing of the movement were to soon use this zeal as
their ticket to absolute control of government.
In reaction to the popular revolutionary zeal Bazargan
stressed the idea of individual responsibility in the hope that it
would curtail the extremist flame. It had little effect. In fact
it provoked popular images of Bazargan as a wishy-washy soft
centreed liberal. 87 Bazargan presented an argument regarding
individual responsibility and based it on the natural
contradiction of tyranny to individual duty. Iran has been ruled
by tyranny for hundreds of years, he said. The tyrant made all
decisions and dictated them to all members of society. The
individual had no choice but to carry out the decisions. But now
things had changed. There was no longer tyranny but freedom. With
it freedom brought the necessity of decision making by and
accountability of the individual. To make decisions, the
individual had to recognize his social responsibilities and thus
behave in a reliable manner. 88
86 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.314.87 For this image see the Ahangar satirical magazine, spring
and summer 1979 issues.88 On this point see Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, pp.
30, 130, & 343.403
The Liberal Defeat
[To enjoy] authority, control and freedom it is vital to
be mature, to accept hardship, to accept discipline and
work ... If a man wants to be free, if he wants to control
[his destiny], then he must be disciplined. 89
Thus Bazargan tried to control and redirect the
revolutionary spirit, but he had neither the time nor the
resources to achieve his aim. As he opposed it, he became
unpopular. A segment of the population began to see him and his
entourage of moderate liberals as weak men, counter
revolutionaries, and even agents of international imperialism.
When Bazargan tired to take steps to normalize social affairs, his
actions were offered as proof of his unreliability." The radical
press, both on the side of the secular as well as religious
groups, reinforced these images. The word liberal became
derogatatory.
The Challenge of the Radical Islamic Tendency
We have already stated that the political fate of Bazargan
was determined in the first instance by the movement of the
revolutionary classes. While Bazargan increasingly lost contact
with various sections of the population, it was Khomeini and his
aids who identified with the popular spirit, portrayed a populist
image and challenged Bazargan's programme. They presented a
platform far more in common with the people's patterns of thought
89 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.301." Rubin, B. Paved With Good Intentions: The American
Experience and Iran (Oxford University Press, New York, 1980).p.288.
404
Thei Liberal Defeat
and language, while actively and consciously using the public mood
towards their own ends. Khomeini was a populist. He kept with the
public mood and once he realized that people wished for a powerful
and radical leader he portrayed the image. His rhetoric and
demands became increasingly radical and this strengthened his
position particularly within sections of the working and lower
middle classes, the clerics, the intelligentsia, and the students.
It was within such a context that differences emerged
within the ranks of the leadership. While the liberals had the
majority in the cabinet, the radicals dominated the Revolutionary
Council. Despite some joint membership between the two bodies dual
sovereignty emerged. While Bazargan's cabinet tried to re-organize
and revitalize the state machinery, the Revolutionary Council came
to capitalize on the revolutionary mood of the people. While
Bazargan tried to control and tame the new revolutionary
organizations, the Revolutionary Council insisted on their
expansion and proliferation.
The split between the liberal and radical tendencies in
the highest echelons of bureaucracy went parallel to political
developments in society at large. The unity of the anti-Shah
movement which had consolidated Khomeini in power was now gone.
With the Shah in exile and soon to die, the unity was turning into
divisions. Political tensions arose over a range of affairs. They
included ethnic clashes, class conflicts, secular as opposed to
religious orientations, reformist in contrast to radical
tendencies and preferences over matters of domestic and foreign
405
The Liberal Defeat
policy. As political groups organized their ranks conflict erupted
on a more general social level.
The development of popular radicalism and of the radical
Islamic tendency have been documented and it is not intended to
recount the process here. 91 However here it is necessary to study
the particular approach of the radical tendency towards the
Bazargan government. Strangely enough the genesis of the
leadership of the radical Islamic tendency, which was soon to
become known world wide as Shiite fundamentalism, had its origins
in the group of men whom Bazargan had chosen as his collaborators.
Prior to the collapse of the former regime, when Bazargan went to
Paris to meet Khomeini, the latter had asked him to draw up a list
of names for the purpose of establishing an advisory council. On
the suggestion of Bazargan an eighteen member council was formed
in November 1978 in order to deal with the management of the
revolution. 92 The body which soon became known as the
Revolutionary Council was composed of members of the Freedom
Movement, Muslim Nationalists, clerics, a number of Bazaar
dignitaries and a couple of military officers. The composition of
the council changed four times but the clerics went on to dominate
the body and to set the tone, content and directions of its
policies. The clerics of the Revolutionary Council included
Ayatollah Taleqani, Ayatollah Motahhari, Hashemi Rafsanjani,
Mohammad Beheshti, Mandavi Kani, Musavi Ardebili, Javad Bahonar.
With the exception of Talegani who was an old collaborator of
91 cf. ff. 7 above.92 Bazargan, The Revolutionary Council, p.23.
406
The Liberal Defeat
Bazargan, and Motahhari who was assassinated later, the rest of
the group were to hold leadership positions in the emerging anti-
liberal tendency.
These leading figures of the radical Islamic tendency were
more or less the very people who had collaborated with Bazargan
throughout the 1950s, 60s and 70s. We have already discussed
Bazargan's polemics within their group where he tried to maintain
a democratic interpretation of government in the face of the
clerical insistence on an elitist form of authority. 93 Now the
radicals who dominated the Revolutionary Council became
increasingly weary of Bazargan's strategy. They did not see the
need for the reform of the state as a prelude to advancement of
Iranian society. Furthermore they were sceptical about Bazargan's
gradualist approach.
At best Khomeini and his radical entourage saw the
liberals as administrators whose expertise was needed for the
tranfere of power. But no more. They were instruments whose
function was to benefit those in power. At worst the radicals
denied the need for administrative/technological expertise and saw
political conviction 94 as the only criteria for social
organization. As Bazargan's term in office extended and the
radical clerics and their lay coalitionists organized themselves
93 See chapter four.94 The term used by the radicals to identity their
supporters was Maktabi, from the word Maktab, meaning school,religious seminary or doctrine. However the term identifiedloyalists to the revolutionary doctrine.
407
The Liberal Defeat
in a number of new institutions, they increased their pressure on
the liberals in an effort to destablise them.
Immediately after the collapse of the old regime the
leading members of the clerical community, including those in the
Revolutionary Council established the Islamic Republican Party.
The Manifesto of the party spells out the political aims of the
radical clerics at that stage. It called for a mixture of
political ideals that could be categorized as Islamic, anti-
colonial and liberal. The Islamic principles included infusion of
religious principles into all social spheres and the suppression
of counter-revolutionary (anti-Islamic) activity. The anti-
colonial ideals called for purging society of foreign influence
and ending economic dependence on foreigners. The liberal
principles called for respect for basic human freedoms and the
transformation of the state machinery. 95 Needless to say, as
later events were to prove, the liberal ideals were abandoned in
favour of the former two. Although other extremist religious
trends were to emerge and/or consolidate themselves 96 the
mainstream remained in the hands of the Revolutionary Council and
the Islamic Republican Party.
We have already detected the two prongs in the social
structure of the revolutionary offensive which led to the collapse
95 Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, p.109.96 For example the ultra conservative and anti-Baha'i,
Hojjatiyeh. Founded after the coup of 1953 by Sheikh MahmoodHalabi and devoted to a purist interpretation of the return of thetwelfth Shiite Imam, the group expanded until 1984 when it fellvictim to government crack-down for its criticism of Khomeini'sideas.
408
The Liberal Defeat
of the monarchy. It involved the creation of new organizations and
institutions outside the state, and the takeover of the senior
positions within the old state bureaucracy. With the Provisional
Government in power the government posts had gone to the moderate
faction while the leadership posts in the new revolutionary
organizations remained in the hands of the radical clerics and
their lay collaborators. However the main clash between liberals
and radicals came because of and through the newly-formed
revolutionary organizations. These included the Revolutionary
Committees, the Revolutionary Guards and the Revolutionary Courts.
Bazargan's reaction to the radical religious tendency was
to attack them on what he thought to be a vulnerable point and
that was to provoke public fears that the great changes would mean
the end of social order. He warned of the chaos that lay ahead and
in the place of rapid change proposed gradual and limited
modification. He saw the cause of the radical movement in the
popular hatred of the state institutions as the instruments of
oppression. With this he agreed, but as to the means of bringing
the changes he collided with the radicals.
Bazargan accused the radicals of wanting to bring chaos to
the country on several accounts. He was most disturbed by demands
by the radicals for extensive purges and changes in the army,
severing diplomatic relation with countries which had supported
the Shah, elimination of senior government officials and the
effort to impose change on social culture. 97 He saw the radicals
97 Bazargan. A. Problems and Issues, p.252.409
Th. Liberal Defeat
wanting to change everything in the belief and the hope that a new
and better society would emerge on its ruins. The change should
have enveloped everything, but particularly social behaviour and
cultural persuasions. 98
Such measures, Bazargan warned the radicals, were the
results of a spirit of vengeance which sought to suppress and
remove those who might have committed wrong in the past. He
thought accusing the radicals of being reactionary (for the
radicals' search for the guilty made them look to the past) would
be effective. Their policy, he said, was also impractical for it
contradicted the forward looking efforts to reconstruct the
country and its economy. 99 Bazargan said he could not accept such
measures. "Of course I could sit and butcher heedlessly, be a
revolutionary, arrest and imprison, beat up and kill, confiscate
[property]" but such measure would not allow a normalization of
economic, political and bureaucratic conditions.'" Now that the
Shah was gone there was a belief that the revolution which had
brought him down, as the head of the establishment, should extend
into bureaucracy and purge the undesirable elements. 101
In contrast to this revolutionary and radical spirit
Bazargan developed his concept of the two stages of revolution. He
acknowledged that revolution could not have come about without its
destructive power. Such is the nature of revolution. It destroys
98 pazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.91 & 253.
99 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.190 & 137.100 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.182.101 pazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p. 133.
410
The Liberal Defeat
the existing power to replace it by something else. But he
insisted that the "destructive, aggressive, negative and
revengeful" stage of the revolution was over and it was time for
"positive and constructive" action. The two stage theory which was
to become the basis of his main analysis of the Iranian Revolution
(written a few years later and of which more below) was discussed
over 35 times in his speeches to the nation. 102
Here lay Bazargan's difference with the radicals. It was
not that he opposed the concept of change. Indeed he clearly
announced on a number of occasions his opposition to the
conditions created by the former regime. 103 He was committed to
changing the social and political conditions. However there were
differences in the method, extent, speed and direction of the
desired changes. While the radicals wanted extensive and rapid
change, Bazargan insisted on gradual and limited measures.
The differences between the two sides were therefore on
the meaning of revolution itself. Indeed, at the time, an
extensive debate had begun to interpret the meaning of the changes
that were taking place. The people wanted to know and understand
"the revolution" and it was up to the political and intellectual
leaders to provide answers and standards. Bazargan compared his
desired and the actual developments to rain and flood.
102 For example see Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.17,
136, 322.103 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p. 24, 30, 345.
411
The Liberal Defeat
[Imagine] the drought and famine stricken land and
[imagine] the blessed rain that turns into flood and
washes away everything with it. This flood is the fever of
revolution. It has now unfortunately become entangled with
vengeance, spite, and quarrel. The judgment of reason and
God is to divert the flood into practical channels, to
halt its destruction. 104
It was on this ground that Bazargan was accused of "not
being revolutionary". The accusation came in the media and on
several occasions Khomeini expressed similar ideas. 105 To defend
his position, Bazargan insisted that he was a revolutionary but
went on to interpret the revolution in his own terms as
construction. He insisted that revolution constituted extensive
planning, ordered and principled change, implementation of laws
and considerable work, all in order to achieve fundamental
changes. Thus he emphasized that he "was and has always been, very
much a revolutionary". 106
Bazargan's reaction to the revolutionary organizations was
severe and desperate. In over seventy speeches and interviews
which he gave while in office the issue of these organizations was
the most prominent. The emergence and challenge of the
revolutionary organizations occupied him and diverted him from his
strategic plans. Although the difficulty with the organizations
reached a crisis point in the capital Bazargan reported that the
104 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.90.105 Biro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, p.107.106 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.239.
412
The Liberal Defeat
situation in the provinces was even worse. He warned that the
country would plunge into an unprecedented crisis if the
difficulty continued. 107 Bazargan was furthermore concerned with
the fact that a general state of fear was being created in public
life, undermining social trust.
A state of unease and concern has been created for all.
Arrests, imprisonments, beatings, killings have undermined
security and trust ... The executions, murders, severe
treatments have caused insecurity, fear restlessness and
anxiety. Every one asks and everybody is fearful [of the
fact] that the Committees, the Guards or some people in
their name ... are acting with such sheer impudence. 108
Initially Bazargan hoped that it would be possible to
bring the Committees under control and to put an end to them by
re-vitalizing the security organs of the state. When this proved
impossible he tried to control the stages of their formation by
appointing Ebrahim Yazdi 109 and Mostafa Chamran 110 to head the
units but both failed to bring them under the control of the
Provisional Government. Bazargan then tried to contain their
107 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.94, 131, & 136.108 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.131.109 Ebrahim Yazdi, Muslim activist and member of NRM and
later FMI. Is known to have been the driving force behind FMI'sAmerican branch and the network of Muslim Students Association.Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, p.190.
110 Mostafa Chamran, active member of FMI in the UnitedStates. An early organizer of Amal Movement in Lebanon. Killed inthe Iran-Iraq war (1981). See Zendeginameh-ye sardar-e rashid-eislam shahid Doktur Mostafa Chamran, Biography of Dr. Mostafa Chamran: the Brave Commander of Islam (FMI Publications, Tehran,1982).
413
The Liberal Defeat
development by controlling their finance but did not succeed. 111
The Guards developed independently of the government and in
political terms soon turned against it. 112 A month and a half
into his office and Bazargan was calling the Committees the
"troublesome cockroaches whose hand and feet must be tied up". 113
However things were to change and as social tension particularly
those provoked by leftist forces in the periphery increased, and
since the traditional military forces were no longer operational
the Provisional Government was forced to accept and encourage the
new security organizations as its main line of military defence.
Clashes in the peripheries made Bazargan acknowledge their
necessity as a means of maintaining law and order. 114 From then
on Bazargan simply insisted on giving the bodies an organized form
rather than putting an end to their activities. Despite the fact
of their interference with government activities, the need to face
the military rebellion in the provinces, forced the Provisional
Government to act positively in consolidating the new
revolutionary organizations.
Bazargan's efforts to deal with these organizations
display a logical contradiction. On the one hand he approves of
111 Al-Safir Daily, interview with the Commander of theIslamic Revolutionary Guards, Abu-Sharif (Beirut, December 1st,1991), Quoted by Biro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, p.131.
112 For more details on the Committees see any standard texton Iranian revolution, including Benard, & Khalilzad, TheGovernment of God, pp.106-120, Biro, Iran Under Ayatollahs, pp.100-112, and Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War, p.67 & 132. On theCourts see Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War, p.131, & 168, and
Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, pp.105-107. On RevolutionaryGuards guards see standard texts on Iranian Revolution including
Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, p.109-120, Taheri, The Spirit of Allah, p.256-269, Wright, In the Name of God, p.69.
113 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.302.114 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.239.
414
Th. Liboral Dofeat
the positive nature of revolution which ended the regime of
monarchy. On the other hand he disapproves of the natural
consequences of revolution including the formation of
revolutionary security apparatus. To solve this seeming
contradiction Bazargan elaborated his theory of the "two stages of
revolution" to which we have referred earlier. However the theory
fails to deal with and explain the situation clearly. Its short-
coming lies in the fact that it fails to acknowledge that the
natural consequence of revolutionary movement is the destruction
of an existing state and creation of new ones. Bazargan should not
have expected the first without the second.
With regard to the Revolutionary Courts Bazargan expressed
similar sentiments and ideas. In the activities of the Courts he
saw not the destruction of the Shah's apparatus of oppression but
the creation of a social climate of fear, vengeance and
instability. From the early days of the establishment of the
courts well into the third month of his government, Bazargan
expressed discomfort with the activities of the courts. 115
Apart from the domestic consequences of the revolutionary
Islamic justice he was concerned with the image of the revolution
abroad. Or at least this was the concern that he expressed in
order to try to curtail the Courts. International organizations
monitoring human rights had started to express concern over the
nature of the judicial procedure in Iran. Bazargan could not but
have been concerned with their disapproval for they were the very
115 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.33.415
The Liberal Defeat
organizations to which he had appealed during the Shah's rule to
bring pressure on the government so as to ease pressure on
political prisoners. 116 However it has to be pointed out that
Bazargan's concern for summary executions seems to have had its
limits. Particularly after Leftist disturbances in the peripheral
provinces, Bazargan expressed no remorse for the judgments ruled
by the Courts. He simply protested against the judicial procedure.
Despite the fact that they [Leftists] were executed, and
most of them were justly so, and it could not have been
otherwise, and these foreigners are uselessly making a lot
of noise, the courts should have been held properly so as
to prove that the judgments were correct. 117
However concern with the negative consequences of the new
judicial procedure seems to have had the upper hand, for in May he
publicly put forward a five point programme to Khomeini to curtail
the activities of the Courts. The programme called for a general
amnesty, limiting the activity of the Courts, convening the Courts
only on the request of the central government, ending the
interference of the self appointed judges in the procedure of
government and strengthening and centralizing the executive,
judiciary and the legislator. 118 Although Khomeini gave
conditional approval to the plan his position has to be understood
within his general approach to the moderate tendency.
116 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.98.117 speech after the referendum and disturbances in
Kurdistan. Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.112.118 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.33.
416
The Liberal Defeat
The challenge from the Left
The third most significant challenge to the liberal rule -
after popular discontent and the radical Islamic tendency - came
from the Left. During the revolutionary period and subsequently
with the Provisional Government in power two platforms emerged in
the Left camp. The first saw parallels between the Islamic
Revolution and the Russian Revolution of 1917. On this basis two
options were available: either to accept Bazargan's "liberal
democratic" rule leading to a final bourgeois authority or adopt a
"revolutionary democratic" path towards the liberation of the
working class. 119 Two major organizations, The Mojahedin-e Khalq
and the Fadaiyan-e Khalq voted for the latter option. The
Mojahedin saw the liberal bourgeois government as incapable of
dealing with Iran's social problems and would not come too close
to it in the fear that it would taint their revolutionary
credentials. 120 The Mojahedin pursued a double-line policy. On
the one hand it accepted to move into the political arena, rather
than initiate armed rebellion against the "bourgeois' rule. On the
other hand it established a para-military organization, the
Militia. Although here the fear of the Royalist-Imperialist
military threat was a concern, the long term prospects of
revolution for the establishment of class-less society could not
have been without weight. 121 However the Mojahedin-e Khalq did
not stand against Bazargan's government. Even it could be said
119 Abrahamian, Radical Islam, p.136.120 Abrahamian, Radical Islam, p.136.121 For an extensive discussion on Iran's Left see A.H.H.
Abedi, Iran at the Crossroads (Patriot Publications, New Delhi,1989) Chap. 5. passim.
417
The Liboral Iftfeat
that in the total context of the situation and possibly due to the
influence of Ayatollah Taleciani on them, gave tacit support to the
government.
Much like the Mojahedin, the mainstream Fadaiyan abandoned
the armed conflict and moved into the political arena. This move
must have taken into account the overwhelming power of Khomeini
and the availability of a more open political climate. With regard
to Bazargan, the Fadaiyan saw the Provisional Government as a
"conservative body which had allowed the infiltration of political
and religious reactionaries into its ranks and thus from the
beginning oppossed it with all their power. The National
Democratic Front also supported the Fadaiyan on this stance. 122
The Fadaiyan's relation with the Provisional Government turned
particularly soure with conflict in Kurdistan when they accused
Bazargan as being lukewarm and unable to defeat imperialist-
capitalist designs.
The second platform on the Left was that of the Tudeh
party and at a later stage a faction of the Fadaiyan. These groups
saw a revolutionary anti-imperialist potential within the ranks of
Iran's "petite bourgeoisie", in which the cleric, and particularly
Khomeini had a vanguard position. On this basis the Tudeh party
supported Khomeini's radical line, aggravated his differences with
the liberal tendency and sought to establish a united front with
the radical petit bourgeoisie. The intention was to direct Iran on
a path of non-capitalist socio-economic development with the
122 Abedi, Iran at the Crossroads, p.153.418
The Liberal Defeat
support of the international socialist camp. 123 The policy had
therefore the Soviet interests, in the context of the
international balance of power, in mind. This position brought the
Tudeh party into direct clash with the "liberal bourgeois
dominated Provisional Government" which lacked anti-imperialist or
class credentials. 124 The strategy fitted well with the radical
Islamic onslaught on the liberal tendency and was welcome by them,
although somewhat discreetly.
A most serious challenge to the central authority came
from Kurdistan disturbances where an infusion of leftist activism
and Kurdish ethnic sentiments created an explosive national issue.
The military clashes in Kurdistan not only brought the former
Imperial army back into the mainstream but also established the
position of the Revolutionary Guards and Committees while
strengthening the view on the extreme wing of the clerical rule
which looked towards the challenges posed by the opposition as a
catalyst for stabilizing its own power.
Bazargan's view of the left changed rapidly, though
predictably, during his term in office. Initially he acknowledged
123 The terms Noncapitalist Path and RevolutionaryDemocracies were born by Soviet ideologists at the time ofKhrushchev (early 1960s) in an effort to explain the turn of ArabNationalists towards socialism without the help of communistparties as well as a theoretical frame work to justify Sovietsupport for nationalist governments in the third world. Freedman,Moscow and the Middle East (Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1991) p.20.
124 For a view of Soviet policy vis-a-vis Iran and the Tudehfactor within it see Golan, G. Soviet Politics in the Middle East (Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.187 and Freedman, R.O. Moscowand the Middle East, p.66.
419
The Liberal Defeat
their contribution to the revolutionary cause and approved of
their good will. 125 However demands by the Left to dismantle the
Imperial army and to establish a popular-revolutionary force drew
the line between the two sides. Bazargan defended the army and
said its weakening would only encourage foreign interference. 126
Relations with the left, but particularly the Fadaiyan became
increasingly difficult with the erruption of military conflict in
the peripheral provinces. Bazargan accused the "anti-Islamic,
anti-National communist provocateurs" for the incidents and drew
parallel to the policies of the Tudeh party in the time of
Mosaddeq. 127
According to detailed plans these Trotskyists,
8Maoists, and Marxists 12 have moved from various cities
with arms and provisions received internally or from
abroad into [peripheral] areas and have conducted armed
action against the military centres. 129
Acts of terrorism, in which a number of senior members of
the Islamic regime, including Ayatollah Motahhari and first Chief
of Staff Qarani, were assassinated consolidated Bazargan's fearful
125 Bazargan, Problems and Issues, p.89.126 An observation that was to prove its accuracy with the
Iraqi offensive on Iranian soil in the following year. Bazargan,A. Problems and Issues, p.92.
127 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.14.128 For a discussion on these groups see Zabih, S. The Left
in Contemporary Iran (Croom Helm, London, 1986).129 Indirect quotation, Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues,
p.110.420
The Liberal Defeat
vision of the radical Left. 130 After the referendum on the
establishment of an Islamic Republic where an overwhelming
majority of people participated and where a number of Leftist
groups, most distinctly the Fadaiyan boycotted the event, Bazargan
began to ridicule these Leftists as a "two-percent" minority. 131
A statement that the Left was not to forget for a long time. By
the end of his tenure in office Bazargan was criticizing the Left
for an alleged "continuous treachery". 132
Bazargan and Khomeini
In one sense Khomeini was the very spirit of the Iranian
revolution. Bazargan represented the defeated Islamic reformist
trend. Relations between the two men, on the practical as well as
tactical level, are then symbolic of the confrontation between the
radical and reformist Islamists. The theoretical implication of
the two men's positions shall be discussed later, but their
practical relations went through several distinct stages while the
former was in office. The process was determined by a number of
factors but most significantly the emergence of and pressure by
the radical Islamic tendency. Initially Bazargan expressed full
support for Khomeini bolstering his position. Immediately after
his appointment, addressing the crowd at Tehran university
Bazargan portrayed Khomeini as "the great leader, Grand Ayatollah,
the guide of the revolution and the dearest and the greatest
120 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.36. The two men wereassassinated by Forcian, an Islamic fringe group under theinfluence of the most radical ideas of Ali Shariati, particularlyhis anti-clericalism. The group had much in common with the Left,in terms of armed tactic and underground organization.
131 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.10.122 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.260.
421
The Liberal Defeat
father of the nation". 133 This was abandonment to public
sentiments despite the fact that differences existed between the
two men right from the start and Bazargan was well aware that his
style of government might fail to attract Khomeini's support. 134
The first important public signs of tension between the
two men became apparent over the referendum for the change of the
regime and the new constitution. A draft resembling the
constitution of the French Fifth Republic had been prepared with
Islam having been added as the criteria for determining civic
liberties. But the contents were not precise and furthermore it
did not reserve any special place for the clerics. Khomeini wanted
a public vote on the draft. Bazargan insisted on an election which
consequently took a large number of clerics into the
constitutional assembly and resulted with Khomeini's Rule of the
Jurisconsult as the major theme of the constitution. Despite
initial differences, Bazargan's Freedom Movement gave a yes vote
at the referendum. 135 Bazargan's foreign minister Sanjabi quotes
him as saying that one of his greatest mistakes in office was not
to put the original draft to referendum but insist on an elected
assembly which consolidated the clerical position in the political
structure. 136
133 Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.71.134 For the initial differences see the discussion on
appointment.135 On this point see Chehabi, Iranian Politics and
Religious Modernism, p.264, Menashri, Iran: a Decade of War, p.85,
Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, p.115.136 Sanjabi, K. Hopes and Despairs p.334.
422
The Liberal Defeat
However things became worse, and by May Bazargan was
asking Khomeini to leave his residence in Qom and come to Tehran
where he could engage in the daily affairs of government. 137
Bazargan realized that Khomeini, despite his earlier promise that
he would take a supervisory rule wished to fully engage in
political affairs. Bazargan then intended to engage him in the
daily affairs of the country with the intention that such
involvement would influence his vision of things and make him
appreciate Bazargan's own more practical and pragmatic position.
This could have reduced tension between the liberal Provisional
Government and the more radical Revolutionary Council.
As Bazargan faced the failure of his policies he
privately offered his resignation to Khomeini on a number of
occasions. This seems to have made little impact, for by October
he was publicly threatening that if the pressure of the radicals
continued he would resign. 138 He did not have to wait for long.
With the fiasco created over his meeting in Algeria with the U.S.
national security adviser Zbigniew Brezezinski, 139 followed by
the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran Bazargan felt
unable to continue. Khomeini's support for the students who had
taken over the embassy was the straw that broke the camel's back.
Bazargan resigned among jubilation by the radicals at the defeat
of the liberal alternative.
137 See Bazargan's letter to Khomeini, Bazargan, TheRevolutionary Council, p.28-35.
138 A public speech, Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.61-
69.139 The Algerian trip was to celebrate the country's
independence. Foe greater detail of the meeting see Chehabi,Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism, p.272.
423
The Liberal Defeat
In his resignation speech Bazargan was mildly critical of
"Mr. Khomeini" and expressed concern about radical measures that
his entourage were taking. He further warned the nation about the
course of events. The country and the revolution, he said, were
deviating from their proper course. 140 At the same time the
general respectful and loyal pose that Bazargan had adopted with
regard to Khomeini meant that his resignation was in turn taken
cordially and with due diplomatic respect. This fact was to help
Bazargan maintain a posture in the political mainstream and to
continue his activities as loyal opposition. This was no little
achievement, for as violence became the main theme of politics in
the early 1980s, to be able to maintain an open door posture of
dialogue with various social fores was a rare political feat.
Bazargan's relation with Khomeini was determined by a
number of factors. As already discussed one of the reasons that
Bazargan accepted the post of prime minister was his
acknowledgement of Khomeini as the undisputed leader of the
revolution. Bazargan was aware that he could not succeed except
under the patronage of Khomeini. Khomeini had by now consolidated
his position even more. With a word or two he could seal the fate
of his rivals. Neither Bazargan nor any body else, as events were
to prove, had a chance to survive, let alone hold the reigns of
government and lead the cabinet without Khomeini's approval.
140 The proper course must have referred to his own versionof things, particularly his strategy of bureaucratic reform. Seethe last T.V. interview, Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.27')-
283.424
The Liberal Defeat
Bazargan's primary political instinct must have been his
own survival. Bazargan must have hoped that siding with Khomeini,
and being in power would allow him to carry out his reformist
policies and strategic aims. As far as Bazargan was concerned this
must have been a calculated risk in the context of the balance of
forces. Bazargan took his chances. Had he succeeded he could have
made changes in Iran's political life, but his failure would and
did put the liberals significantly out of the political balance.
But it is not clear that had not the liberal tendency, under the
leadership of Bazargan, bid for power at that stage, they would
have been able or more successful at a later stage.
Another factor which determined Bazargan's relation to
Khomeini was religion. Although it is striking that Bazargan's
rhetoric during his period in office was markedly moderate in
terms of religious content, Bazargan must have nevertheless been
attracted to see things in terms of religious vs. secular
categories. Indeed at the elections, for both the constitutional
assembly and the parliament, Bazargan and his Freedom Movement
tried to form a united religious platform. Not only was Bazargan
religious in personal convictions, as discussed in earlier
chapters, he believed in the pragmatic involvement of the
religious community and the use of religious language in Iranian
politics. 141 In this regard and despite differences with
141 These were on the basis of Bazargan's assessment ofIranian social identity as Islamic, and the independence of theclerical body from the state. Both positions come out clearly inhis trial. See the earlier chapters.
425
The Liberal Defeat
Khomeini, Bazargan could not but have reinforced Khomeini's
religious position (both personal and political approach.)
One other element which shaped Bazargan's relation to
Khomeini was the general balance of political forces. Right from
the beginning Bazargan was aware that the main challenge within
the government to the implementation of his goals came from the
radical clerics. However in the larger frame-work he felt
threatened by both the remaining political establishment of the
former regime and the emerging leftist challenge. The tendency in
support of the former regime remained strong in the military and
the bureaucracy. Indeed at a later stage there were attempts to
stage a coup. 142 The left's show of strength came in the
periphery, where guerrilla activities in Kurdistan and
Torkmanistan sapped government political resources. At this stage
the leadership of Khomeini was a determining element in uniting
various tendencies in support of the new emerging political and
social order.
With regard to the struggle between the liberal and
radical tendencies of his movement, Khomeini developed his own
role as the supreme arbitrator. This role was indeed to become one
of his main functions in the following decade when opposing
tendencies within the establishment were to engage in bitter power
struggles. Initially Khomeini realized that differences were
inevitable and thus he was unwilling or unable to create a
142 For details of the coup see Hiro, Iran Under theAyatollahs, p.156.
426
The Liberal Defeat
homogeneous political following. Apparently he thought a degree of
difference was constructive. In their turn tendencies and factions
which operated within the new regime encouraged this development.
They viewed Khomeini as the supreme leader, undisputed in his
populist image. They all needed him and were incapable of
challenging his position. However they learned not to expect
Khomeini to give them full support against competing tendencies,
as long as the competitors functioned under his general guide-
lines. Instead they encouraged his role as the arbitrator and
accepted his decisions as final.
Khomeini clashed with Bazargan over the implementation of
the latter's strategic goals. We have already discussed Bazargan's
the wish for reform of the state bureaucracy as the foundation of
political constitution and democratic government. However Khomeini
wished for an Islamisation of government in his own vision of the
Rule of the Juriconsult. This vision entailed the monopolistic
position of the clerical class in the political elite. An act
which Bazargan could not have agreed with. 143 Furthermore
Khomeini was a committed revolutionary. Bazargan was a reformist
4through and through. 14 To Khomeini the use of violence, measures
outside the legal system and authoritarian decisions were of no
consequence. For Bazargan these were difficult to accept.
143 For an example of Bazargan's opposition to this point
see Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.282.144 On one occasion Bazargan portrayed Khomeini as a
bulldozer which relentlessly destroyed things on its path to makeway while he (Bazargan) was a "sissy automobile" in need of flatasphalt roads. Bazargan, A. Problems and Issues, p.75.
427
Conclusion
Conclusion
Bazargan has been active in Iranian politics, at both the intellectual
and organizational levels for over five decades. While his liberal
notions of Islamic constitutionalism were initially comparatively
marginal, they have become increasingly central in more recent years.
A study of his writings and activities show a degree of consistency in
both form and content and reveals his ability to maintain himself in
the forefront of Iranian politics. Bazargan has been outspoken in
pursuit of his ideas and has paid the price for this. After several
decades of activity he came to the seat of power at a turbulent time
in Iran's contemporary history and his tenure in office was to spell a
strategic defeat for the liberal and democratic movement. This defeat
was caused partially by Bazargan's political miscalculations and
possibly by his lack of full comprehension of liberal politics.
Bazargan is certainly a forerunner in the Islamic tradition of
activist-interpreters who have emerged since WWII in Iran and whose
discourse is of significance in its polemical vanguard position,
religious language of presentation, selective use of source material,
modern urban audience, social nature of debate as well as radical
function of rhetoric. Within this context Bazargan's fundamental
concern has been with socio-political issues, although the demise of
religious thought in modern Iran has also been a source of distress to
him. His lack of training in traditional Islamic teachings (including
jurisprudence and philosophy) as well as access to modern European
discourse has produced a significant degree of syncreticism in his
writings.
Bazargan has written over 79 articles, pamphlets and books but his
style of writing and presentation is difficult and the reader is often
429
forced to abstract the material before a degree of cohesion is
reached. However Bazargan has learned to use language as a political
tool and through his numerous works, has attracted sections of the
public. His language not only exploits the sense of safety apparent in
traditional culture, it appeals to a sense of progressiveness in the
use of modern perspectives. The marks of his writings, in particular
the ideas of activism and evolution, and in more recent periods,
notions of liberal politics has certainly left a mark on other Islamic
thinkers.
The development of Bazargan's political thought corresponds, more or
less, with the ebb and flow of Iran's political events, in particular
with the role of the state and the imposition of its arbitrary will on
civil society. Bazargan's early intellectual roots are naturally in
the traditional Islamic culture of the early 20th century Iran which
had come (in the more educated classes) into contact with European
thought. But the first significant European impact on Bazargan was in
France, where he spent seven years studying thermodynamics and was
close to Catholic and Republican circles of pre-WWII France and as a
consequence of which he embarked on a critique of traditional Iranian
religious culture. In returning to Iran Bazargan came to face, and
accept with certain reservations, the modernist views as represented
in the ruling state. From the fall of Reza Shah to the coup that
established his son firmly in power, Bazargan initiated his polemical
and ideological writing dealing critically with issues of secularism,
Marxism and traditional modes of thought and instead proposed the
concept of Islamic work ethic. However the 1953 coup turned him away
from addressing currents of thought in society to deal with the issue
of law, or rather the lack of it, in the state's arbitrary treatment
of citizens. In the 1960-63 liberalization Bazargan returned, with a
430
vengeance, to write on National Islamic Identity as the foundation of
an appeal to the masses and as a means of socio-political
mobilization. With his arrest prior to the 1963 unrests, Bazargan's
defence in court was a condemnation of tyranny, as the cause of
individual and social corruption. During the Shah's autocratic rule
(1963-77) Bazargan switched back to addressing debates amongst
opposition activists rather than arguments presented by the ruling
authoritative establishment. Throughout this period he maintained a
dialogue (in defence of democratic government) with sections of the
clerical community. He also put forward a critique of Marxism
following a coup in the Mujahedin Khalq Organization. With the 1977
liberalization, Bazargan became active in emphasizing themes on human
rights. During his nine-months of government his distinct emphasis was
on the reformed (efficient) and limited state as the foundation of
°natural° society. During the 1980s his main efforts were to
legitimize a liberal paradigm of political intercourse in contrast to
authoritarian conceptions of power.
Bazargan was one of the founders, and has been the leader and
ideologue of the Freedom Movement of Iran for over three decades.
However it would be wrong to say that FMI has been a one man band.
Indeed there is a distinct difference between the ideas of FMI (as
well as other political organisations that Bazargan was involved in)
with those of his own. This possibly indicates Bazargan's open-
mindedness in accepting other ideological and political themes and an
ability to work with others. Nevertheless Bazargan's influence on FMI
is distinct. The activities of FMI must be seen within the Iranian
frame of reference and within this context they have shown a degree of
success. For one thing they have survived three decades of Iranian
politics, sometimes as a loose association, at times as a more
431
organised entity. Moreover they have been consistent in presenting a
platform throughout the period. Their ability to articulate a liberal
Islamic orientation in emphasizing the religious national identity and
seeking limitations to the power of the state has been the hallmark of
their success. Furthermore, since the 1979 revolution, they have been
the most successful group in legitimizing a liberal, democratic and
constitutional paradigm.
To fully understand the meaning of the political language that
Bazargan has used in his struggle for social influence and political
power, the context of their discourse has to be identified. Basically
the Islamic Liberal discourse was, and has been, interacting with five
currents of thought, each with distinct structures of social
perception and political ideas. The first current belonged to the
modernists who have had for the greater part of the twentieth century,
the dominant position in dictating the form and content of social
perceptions and who articulated their ideas through the Pahlavi state.
The second cluster of ideas was those of the traditional society in
general and the clerical community in particular. The third current
was that of Marxism which entered the domain of the intellectual
consciousness in Iran after WWII and went to significantly influence
the form and content of the political thought at various levels. The
fourth current was the authoritarian notions of government which the
ruling establishment used in defence and justification of its rule.
(This current appealed to various traditional -eg. notions of the
historic Iranian kingship- and modern concepts -eg. the subjection of
political development to economic progress-). The last cluster of
ideas which the Islamic Liberals had to address was those belonging to
their audience or the public at large. Indeed the identification of
the public social awareness, which the Islamists, including Bazargan,
432
assumed to be religious rather than not, was an important element in
the formation of the structure of their political vision. Bazargan's
discourse is distinguished in that it address the above themes and
reaches towards a common understanding and a common language with
them.
It was in response to the challenges of the traditional culture (in
its conservative and reactionary pose) and secularism (in its
aggressive revisionism) that Bazargan formed his own ideas on
religion. Possibly the most significant element here is his
development of the idea of the evolution of religion. The theory
maintains that religious thought has gone and will continue to go
through an evolutionary process. The idea allows Bazargan a platform
for reformation of traditional thought as well as accumulation of
modern ideas towards the creation of a synthesis between elements of
the traditional and the modern discourses. This platform allows a
significant flexibility to the interpreter of the faith, widening his
scope in the use of sources, methodology, interpretation and
presentation. It further gives him a stand in contrast to both the
secularists and the traditional platforms. Bazargan's religious vision
was basically that of man, the viceregent of God, armed with weapons
of rationality and science, interacting with his material environment
so as to actualize his divine qualities. This vision was created in
contrast to a fatalistic conservative traditional world view as well
as in competition to what Bazargan saw as a secular, self centred
(thus amoral) concept of man.
In elaborating his Islamic ideological construct Bazargan also
discussed the topic of natural law. The principle assumes that nature
follows particular sets of laws which are established by God and the
433
acceptance of which is the very meaning of the religion of Islam.
Bazargan maintains that if laws govern the state of nature then the
existence of a first law maker and regulator is necessary and if this
is accepted then it becomes essential that the laws revealed by God to
man are respected. The observance of the divine laws would indeed mean
harmony with the creation and utilization of natural resources. In
other words on the basis that God has created the natural world,
including that of men, Bazargan views religious laws as the very laws
of nature. It is here then that Bazargan finds the true meaning of
Islam (submission). Islam means surrender to the laws of nature and
the acceptance of the laws of nature is the very worship of the
divine. Acceptance of divine laws is realism itself.
Here the main function of the idea is to negate the absolutist claims
of the sovereign to authoritarian rule. However the concept of divine
legislator acts as a two-edged sword. On the one hand it limits the
right of the sovereign in following his own desires in endorsing laws.
On the other hand it denies the absolute right of the people in
determining their chosen destiny. This tension is apparant at various
stages of Bazargan's writing.
It was also in dialogue with traditionalism and modernism but in
addressing the issue of social underdevelopment, that Bazargan
elaborated the idea of Islamic Labour Ethics. The idea points to an
absence of "modern work ethic" in the national character as a cause,
if not the cause of underdevelopment and seeks to alter the situation.
Bazargan linked modern work ethics to Islamic beliefs in the hope that
it would help the mobilization of the productive forces. The argument
here is significant in that it contains a basic juxtapositioning of
the Marxist influenced concept of history with the Islamic concept of
434
deeds ('Amal). Bazargan pursued this argument through a terminological
ambiguity in that there are constant switches from the Marxian notion
of labour to the Islamic notion of deed. Bazargan had obviously hoped
to establish the concept of labour as the factor determining the
individual's spiritual destiny as well as his social progress.
The idea of the freedom of man is a main element in Bazargan's Islamic
political vision. The argument (and its subsequent notion of the
necessity of democratic government) basically addresses two different
audiences: secular modernist authoritarian royalists against whom
Bazargan struggled while Mohammad Reza Shah was in power, and senior
religious elements with authoritarian interpretations of government.
Here Bazargan's arguments are fundamentally religious. He interprets
the Koran's story of the creation of man to mean that man is
distinguished from other forms of creation by his knowledge of things
and that he is given the freedom of choice (ekhtiyar). Bazargan thus
concludes, freedom constitutes the key and the foundation to man's
life (and progress.) It is through his freedom that man is made to be
the conscious, intelligent and creative being that he is. Bazargan
pushes the point further (and here he departs from orthodoxy) in that
he interprets the principle to mean the necessity of the right of the
people to exercise the power of choice over the institution of
government.
Government then, in the eyes of Bazargan, is the guardianship of
people's wealth and affairs, extended by the people to the rulers in
an act of trust. However government can not be an absolute expression
of popular will for it has to function within the bounds of natural
law. Bazargan's concept and understanding of freedom is therefore
positive - rather than negative - in the sense that freedom is not the
435
absence of restraint but the positive creation of a social environment
where, under the protection of divine law, the individual is capable
of fulfilling his true and good nature.
The issue of social/national identity has been at the centre of a
great deal of polemics in contemporary Iran and Bazargan's ideas on
social identity forms a cornerstone in his theories of political
activism. Here Bazargan basically argues that while the "national
Iranian" identity of the people is a relatively modern concept, the
"Islamic religious" identity is historical and all embracing.
Furthermore aiming at the political mobilization of the people, it is
vital to utilize this religious element as a foundation of ideological
constructs. Bazargan argues that the national secular identity emerged
around the time of the constitutional revolution and as the result of
contacts with Europeans. This modern identity, Bazargan believes, is a
superficial imitation of Western concepts of nationalism and it has
failed to penetrate popular culture. In contrast people tend to see
themselves as Muslim first and "Iranian" later. This religious
identity is vertically (historically) and horizontally (socially)
comprehensive.
Throughout his writings one of the general concerns of Bazargan was
the threat of the advance of the communist ideology. His polemics with
the Marxists were highlighted in two periods; in the 1940s when the
Tudeh party was fast expanding and in the mid 1970s when an internal
schism in the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation led to the overthrow of the
Islamic leadership and the emergence of a Marxist central cadre.
Bazargan's response to the communist advance was unique in that he did
not directly criticise the Marxist groups, nor did he involve himself
in the daily political issues. Rather he exerted his efforts towards
436
the creation of a rational critique as well an alternative
intellectual framework to the communist idea. The aim was to put into
the political and intellectual arena a competitor that would diminish
the attraction of the leftist ideology. In his critiques Bazargan
reached the conclusion that the inherent contradictions of the
communist ideology would bring about a self-refutation.
The perception of modernism in Iran is complex and often confusing. In
general it has been taken to refer to the process in the last few
centuries where by societies all over the world have been transformed
by technological innovation, commercialized economic life,
urbanization, and centralisation of government. In this process
unquestioned commitment to long-established social practices,
including religious faith has been abandoned and new national
identities adopted. While Bazargan showed great interest in the idea
of progress/evolution and referred to the religious notions of
social/national identity, his reaction to the mainstream of Iranian
modernism was to its secular element. Here his arguments are varied
and their thrusts differ with time, but the most repeated theme is on
the necessity of morality for social cohesion and progress. In other
words Bazargan argued that religion was the foundation of individual
and social ethics and that without religion there would be a moral
collapse. It is then significant, and possibly ironic, that Bazargan's
arguments in defence of what he called moralism (as opposed to
secularism) had a distinct modernist element in that it functioned in
support of and aimed at social progress.
437
Bibliography
Bibliography
Bazargan's works
Date of composition English namePersian name(details of the edition used for this study)[details of the first edition]
1942 Religion in EuropeMadhab Dar Urupa(Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1965, A5, 44 pp.)[First published in Danesh Amuz, nos. 9-11, 1942.]
Complimentary and Abusive Language in IranFohsh va Ta'arof Dar Iran(No publication details available)
1943 Purities in IslamMuttaharat Dar Islam(No publication details available)
1944 Pragmatism in IslamPragmatism dar Islam,(in Religion in Europe, Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1964,A5, 7 pp.)
1945 Coefficient of Conversion Between the Material and the spiritualZarib-e Tabadol Mian-e Madiyat va Ma'naviyat(in Religion in Europe, Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1945,A5, 13 pp.)
The infinitely SmallBi nahayat Kuchek-ha(in Religion in Europe, Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1965,A5, 57 pp.)[First published in daily Kayhan.]
Industrial Thermodynamics, V. 1-2Termodinamic-e San'ati(No publication details available)
1946 Labour in IslamKar Dar Islam(Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1978, A4, 95 pp.)
1947 The Trodden PathRah-e Tey Shodeh(Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977, A4, 250 pp.)
1948 The Source of IndependenceSarcheshmeh-e Isteqlal,(in The Secret of the Backwardness of the Muslim Nations,A4, 51 pp.)
1950 Heart and MindDel va Damagh(Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1965, A5, 24 pp.)
438
[First published in Forugh 'Ilm 1950.]
The Great Consequences of AssociationAthar-e 'Azim Ijtema' in Heart and Mind(Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1965, A5, 11 pp.)[First published in Forugh 'Jim 1950.]
The Secret of the Backwardness of the Muslim NationsSir-e Aqab Uftadegi Melal-e Mosalman.(Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1976, A4, 51 pp.)
Causes of the Decline and Decadence of Islamic Nations(Islamic Review 23 London, June 1951).[English version of the above, original Persian article]
Islam or Communism, Worship of God to the Worship of the SelfIslam ya Komunism, Az Khuda Parasti ta Khud Parasti(Nashriyeh-e Anjoman-e Islami Daneshjuyan, np. nd. 63 pp.)
1951 Youthful Games With PoliticsBazi-e Javanan Ba Siyasat(Aftab, Tehran, 1952, A4, 23 pp.)
1955 The War of Yesterday and TomorrowJang-e Diruz va Farda.[Monthly publication of Mashhad Industrial College, 1955.]
1957 Love and Worship or the Human Thermodynamics'Eshq va Parastesh ya Termudinamic-e Ensan(Enteshar Publications, Tehran, nd. A5, 222 pp.)
The Current NeedsIhtiyaj-e Ruz(Book Distribution Center, Houston, 1976, A5, 18 pp.)
1958 The Worship of God and Current IdeasKhuda Parasti va Afkar-e Ruz(Book Distribution Center, Houston, 1977, A4, 74 pp.)
1959 The Social and Global MuslimMosalman-e Ijtema'ye va Jahani(Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977, A4, 69 pp.)
[First published in 1965.]
God in SocietyKhuda dar Ijtema'(in Chahar Magaleh, Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, nd., A5,98 pp.)
The House of PeopleKhaneh-e Mardom(Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1978, A4, 66 pp.)
Man and GodInsan va Khuda,(in Chahar Macialeh, Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, nd., A5,54 pp.)
The Teaching of ReligionAmuzesh-e Ta'limat-e Dini
439
(No publication details available.)
1960 RevelationVahi(No publication details available).
All and IslamAli va Islam,(2nd edition, Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1978, A5,13 pp.)[First published in Peykar-e Andisheh, 1960.]
The Inevitable VictoryPiruzi-ye Hatmi(No publication details available).
1961 A Note from the Hajj PilgrimageYaddashti az Safar-e Hajj(in The House of People, A4, 8 pp.)[Maktab-e Tashaiu' Qom, 1961].
SpontanietyKhud Jushi,(in Chahar Macialeh, Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, nd. A5,43 pp.)
The Advantages and Disadvantages of ReligionMazaya va Mazar-e Din(in The Good Need, A4, 39 pp.)
Islam: The Doctrine of Struggle and ProductivityIslam: Maktabi Mobarez va Muvaled(Entesharat Alfath, Tehran, nd. AS, 57 pp.)
The Lesson of ReligiosityDars-e Din Dani(Second edition Book Distribution Centre, Houston, Texas,1977, A4, 163 pp.)[First published in 1961.]
1962 The Single Global GovernmentHokumat Jahani-ye Vahed(Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1978, AS, 42 pp.)
Freedom of ChoiceEkhtiyar.(No details available).
Religious and Political StrugglesMobarezeh-ye Mazhabi, Mobarezeh-ye Siayasi(np. np. 1981, A4, 37 pp.)
The Boundary Between Religion and Social IssuesMarz-e Miyan-e Din va Omur-e Ijtema'y(Second edition, Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1976,A5, 34 pp.)
The Young IslamIslam-e Javan,(in Chahar Magaleh Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, nd. A5,
440
57 PP-)
Liberation of IndiaAzadi-e HindTranslation from French,(Omid, Tehran, 1977).
People's Expectation from Religious LeadersEntezar-e Mardom az Maraje'(in Bahthi Darbareh-ye Marja'iyat va Ruhaniyat, A5,26 pp.)
1963 Defence Statement in the Non-jurisdicto Military Court of AppealModafe'at Dar Dadgah-e Ghir-e Saleh-e Tajdid Nadhar-e
Nezami_ (Modarres Publications, Bellville, 1977, A4, 388
PP-)
PrayerDu 'a(Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1970, A4, 70 pp.)[Written in prison, 1963.]
The Prophet's PropagationTabligh-e Paighambar(in Heart and Mind, A5, 31 pp.)
The Sugar Wars in CubaJang-e Shekar dar KubaTranslation from French, J.P. Sartre,(No publication details available)[Qasr prison, 1963.]
1964 Wind and Rain in the KoranBad va Baran dar Koran.(Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1974, A4, 164 pp.)
1965 Atmospheric PhenomenaPadideh ha-ye Jay!.(No details available).
The Endless ParticleZareh-e Bi Enteha(Second edition, Book Distribution Centre, A4, 166 pp.)
1966 Prophetic Mission and IdeologyBe'that va Ideoluzhi(Second edition, Book Distribution Centre, A4, 240 pp.)
1967 Prophetic Mission and EvolutionBe'that va Takamul(Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977, A4, 62 pp.)
Iranian AdaptibilitySazgari-ye Irani(Second edition, Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977,A4, 72 pp.)
The Good NeedNikneyazi
441
(Second edition, Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977,A4, 55 pp.)
1968 Mosque in SocietyMasjid dar Ejtima'(nd. np . np.)
1969 Motive and MotivatorAngizeh va Angizandeh(Second edition, Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1977,A4, 59 pp.)
1973 Religion and CivilizationDin va Tamadon(Second Edition, Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1979,A4, 77 pp.)
1976 Koran's Process of Evolution, V.1Sair-e Tahavul-e Koran[First published in 1976.]
A Review of the Ideas of Eric FrumnBarresi-ye Nazariyeh-e Forum.(Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1976, A4, 222 pp.)
The Scientificity of Marxism'Ilmi Budan-e MarksismCo-authered with Sahabi, E.(np. np. nd. A4, 222 pp.)
1977 Nature, Evolution, and MonismTaby'at Takamul va Tawhid(First edition, Book Distribution Centre, 1977, A4,46 pp.)
The Pests of MonismAfat-e Tawhid(Second edition, Book Distribution Centre, Houston, 1978,A4, 80 pp.)
Koran's Sentence-ologyJomleh Shenasi-ye Koran(No publication details available.)
1978 Imam and TimeEmam va Zaman.(No information available.)
1980 Prophetic Mission and GovernmentBe'that va Dulat,(Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1980, A5, 44 pp.)
Service and Charity in the Islamic Republic of IranKhadamat va Kheirat dar Jomhuri-e Islami-e Iran(in Prophetic Mission and Government, A5, 39 pp.)
Prophetic Mission in SocietyBe'that dar Ijtesma(in Prophetic Mission and Government, A5, 53 pp.)
442
1981 Koran's Process of Evolution, V.2Sair-e Tahavul-e Koran.(Enteshar Co. Ltd. Tehran, 1981, A3, 205 pp.)
Rediscovery of Values V.1-IllBazyabi-ye Arzeshha(Second edition, FMI, Tehran, 1985, A4, 449 pp.)
1982 Problems and Issues of the First Year of the Revolution,Moshkelat va masa'el-e Avalin Sal-e EngelabEdited by Bazargan, Abdolali(Second edition, FMI, Tehran 1983, A4, 166 pp.)
The Iranian Revolution in Two MovesEngelab-e Islami dar do harekat(Third edition, FMI, Tehran, 1983, A4, 256 pp.)
Prophetic Mission and PietyBe'that va Tazkiyeh(Not yet published.)
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