Islam and Democracy Contemp SArab Affairs 3.3.July Sept 2010

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

This article was downloaded by: [University Of British Columbia]On: 13 September 2010Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 917249060]Publisher RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Contemporary Arab AffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t780786794

Islam and democracyFahmy Howeidya

a Al-Ahram Journal, Cairo, Egypt

Online publication date: 05 July 2010

To cite this Article Howeidy, Fahmy(2010) 'Islam and democracy', Contemporary Arab Affairs, 3: 3, 297 — 333To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2010.494405URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2010.494405

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t780786794

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2010.494405

http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

Contemporary Arab AffairsVol. 3, No. 3, July–September 2010, 297–333

ISSN 1755-0912 print/ISSN 1755-0920 online© 2010 The Centre for Arab Unity StudiesDOI: 10.1080/17550912.2010.494405http://www.informaworld.com

Islam and democracy*

Fahmy Howeidy

Al-Ahram Journal, Cairo, EgyptTaylor and FrancisRCAA_A_494405.sgm10.1080/17550912.2010.494405Contemporary Arab Affairs1755-0912 (print)/1755-0920 (online)Original Article2010Taylor & [email protected]

This paper reviews how the civilizational discourse of Islam differs from that ofdemocracy but doesn’t necessarily mean that it contradicts it. Knowing that thisjuxtaposition promotes diversity and distinction, this paper elucidates the factorsof ambiguity that surround this religion and system in order to uncover the realdimension of their distinction. The paper is organized as follows: first, it presentsseven characteristics of the Islamic state. Next, it discusses the importance ofconsultation (al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] ) and the necessity of questioning the rulers in Islam. Third,the article answers the question “Where does democracy correspond to Islam andwhere does it differ?”. Several prominent opinions are examined in the fourth part,before displaying the main positions from the 1980s, vis-à-vis democracy, in partfive. Part six exhibits the fatwas of al-Qaradawi. At the end of the article, the paperemphasizes the approaches that can be taken towards Islamic ruling (shar[imacr ] ah).

Keywords: political system; Islamic governance; democracy; ummah; shari ah(Islamic legal rulings); doctrinal schools

Islam is wronged twice: once when it compared with democracy, and once when it issaid that it is against democracy. Comparison between the two is erroneous, but so areclaims of incompatibility; and this is the matter which is in need of an extrication inthe first instance and clarification in the second.

Comparison is excusable from the methodological angle between Islam which is areligion and a message containing principles for organizing the acts of worship ofpeople and their ethics and dealings with one another and between democracy, whichis a system of rule and a device for participation as well as a theme borne by a numberof positive values. It is true that there is much which might be said in the context ofthis juxtaposition, but the civilizational dimension of the issue ought to be clear on theconsideration that Islam has its particular civilizational initiative, whereas democracyis a part of an alternative civilizational initiative. This difference should not be takenin the sense of contradiction or rivalry where the realm of correspondence remainspersisting on the basis of some basic values and the ultimate ideal, but rather it shouldbe comprehended in the scope of diversity and distinction.

In other regard, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the subject, in its total-ity, is akin to surveying a vast sea of ambiguities – some simple, others compound. Itis the matter which impels the researcher to transcend the bounds of simply laying outthe ideas and investigating them to engage in an attempt to uncover the subjects ofambiguity and interference and to extricate and liberate the elements of the case in

Email: [email protected]*This paper was first published in Arabic in Al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabi, vol. 15, no. 166,pp. 4–37. The original referencing system has been retained.

u a

ı

˘

˘

Downloaded By: [University Of British Columbia] At: 00:10 13 September 2010

298 F. Howeidy

order for them to be appreciated in their actual dimensions or within their true frame-work.

The position of the Muslims – and not Islam – towards democracy resembles animportant focal point mired in ambiguities when it is burdened to a large degree bythe heavy weight of history; and memory plays a decisive role in instilling doubts andbarriers and possibly even rejection and aspersions of blame as well.

Democracy is for some, in our time, not viewed only as a system of governmentpredicated on freedom, political participation, multiplicity (of political parties) and soforth, but rather as a symbol of a Western initiative to exercise domination and heaphumiliation upon the Arabs and the Muslims; and its media discourse, at least, reflectsa manifest hostility towards Islam. From this standpoint, the refusal of democracyfrom the vantage point of these persons should not be considered as a rejection of itin its essence, but rather, in truth, as a rejection of the initiative which it represents.

This is the fine line which many do not notice in their apprehensive assessmentsof some Islamists vis-à-vis democracy with the possible exception of two Westernresearchers – John Esposito and James Pescatori – who paid attention to this point intheir important study published under the title of ‘Democracy and Islam’. The studymentions that some Islamist groups condemned the Western styles of democracy andthe form of government which was forcibly entered into their countries by Britain; andtheir negative reaction was, in fact, an expression of their general rejection of Europeancolonial authority and a defence of Islam against greater dependency on the West morethan it was a total rejection of democracy.1 This is what explains, to a large extent, theposition of wide sectors of mainstream Muslims, especially those which manifested instrength during the Algerian parliamentary elections, when some raised the bannersrejecting democracy and criticizing the Constitution and the (National) Charter, whenthey were demanding sh[umacr ] r (consultation) and resort to the Qur [amacr ] n for judgement.

When I was availed of the opportunity for discussions with some of them, I discov-ered that they considered democracy to be part of the merchandise of the Western planwhich they viewed as being embodied in the ignominy and humiliation of the Frenchoccupation, whereas their rejection of the Constitution and the (National) Charter wasbecause they were worded in terms of socialism and they did not refer to Islam.

In addition to the fact that the West remains connected to domination and colonial-ism in the Arab-Islamic memory, it is also – for many in the past – an analogue formoral corruption at times and for unbelief at others. It is historically confirmed thatthe fathers of the Western Church were the first to attribute unbelief to the Muslimswhen they did not acknowledge their religion or their Prophet; whereas Muslimsconsidered the acknowledgement of their prophets to be a part of the Islamic faith, andthe Qur [amacr ] n categorized them as ‘people of the Book’ (ahl al-kit[amacr ] b).

Many among Muslims have long-harboured latent suspicions about the West andits attempts to realize particular political goals. They were facilitated in that by thecircumstances of the conceptual and cultural backwardness that enveloped the Arab-Islamic world. We may notice, for instance, that the Ottoman Sultan Selim III steppeddown at the beginning of the 19th century (1807 CE) as a result of the fatw accusinghim of imposing upon the Muslims systems of ‘the unbelievers’ (al-kuf[amacr ] r) where theOttoman mufti A [amacr ] All[amacr ] h al-Effendi decreed: ‘Every sultan who introduces thesystems of the Franks and their customs and imposes upon his subjects to follow themis not fit to rule’.2

In modern Iranian history, there are events which resemble this. When ShahMuhammad Al[imacr ] Mu affir al-D[imacr ] n al-Q[amacr ] j[amacr ] r[imacr ] (1907 CE) wanted to confront the national

u a ˘a

˘a a

aa˘

t· a a

˘

ı z· ı a a ı


Contemporary Arab Affairs 299

movement, he made it public that the law which the movement was seeking wasagainst the shar[imacr ] ah (i.e., Islamic law) because it was positivist and Western, and inthis he utilized a fatw[amacr ] of one of the fuqah[amacr ] – Fa l All[amacr ] h N[umacr ] r[imacr ] – claiming that theconstitutional system was against Islam, for that reason.

When the Islamic caliphate (i.e., the Ottoman) was abolished in 1924, KamalAttaturk appointed himself President of a secular state in Turkey, and Shah Reza Khantook the opportunity to reaffirm his monarchy, claiming that the republican systemwas in contravention of Islam on the consideration that those who advocated it wereimporting ideas of the ‘unbelieving’ West and that they abolished the office of thecaliph of the Muslims and put in its place a republican system.3

Perhaps one of the most curious exploitations the resulting ambiguities in thecollective Islamic memory is what Ahmad al-Sh[amacr ] m[imacr ] , the Yemeni politico, confirmedin his memoirs about the 1948 Revolution against Imam Yahya al-Mutawakkil, inwhich he participated, which did not succeed and which announced in its first commu-niqués the call for the establishment of ‘constitutional government’.4

In the first days of resistance to the revolution, Imam Ahmad dispatched a call toaction and an advisory to the sheikhs and notables of the tribes in Yemen, and in itwas the text:

Would you be pleased with the killing of the renowned Imam Yahya and his sons andwith replacing the shar[imacr ] ah of Allah with rule by (positive) law, and exchanging theQur [amacr ] n, the book of Allah, for the constitution and having Yemen follow the Christians?

This was because at that time the term ‘constitution’ (dust[umacr ] r) was considered to beopposed to the Qur [amacr ] n, and its reputation had been besmirched to the degree that if onewere to ask what the meaning of ‘constitution’ was, the reply – relying on al-Sh[amacr ] m[imacr ] –would be: ‘That your house is not yours, your wife is not yours and your religion isnot yours!’

There is a famous story from Egypt in the same context where it is related that(Pasha) Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid entered himself as a candidate in the elections of the(Representative) Founding Association for principles of democracy in the protectorateof al-Daqhaliyah before the First World War. When his opponent wanted to demolishhis support, he made it public that the democracy for which the Pasha was calling wasa Western concept which permitted women to marry four (husbands) in parity with thehusband in his marriage to four women. This assertion was sufficient to bring downLutfi al-Sayyid in the elections!

Ahmad al-Sh[amacr ] m[imacr ] says that the attribution of constitutionalist or ‘haddastur’‘became one of the most vile of aspersions that a person might cast on his opponentor enemy at that time and for a number of years thereafter’. He adds further that peoplein an [amacr ] , after the arrest of the revolutionaries, were shouting ‘Long live ImamAhmad’ and ‘Death to the republicans’. And after they spent a period in the prison ofthe Imam, the head of the jailers came, one time, and informed them: ‘Be informed ofgood news, the Imam will release you all after the arrest of the constitution and hiswife in the house of the faq[imacr ] h’.

Such was the well-established impression in the collective Islamic memory aboutthe various terminologies of the Western initiative, and these were entirely negativeas may be seen, for some of the reasons we have mentioned. And it is impossible toexpunge these impressions in any attempt to extirpate the widespread roots of tensionin the Islamic reality in regard to the sum total elements of Western experience, withdemocracy being at the forefront of these.

ı

˘

a a ˘ d· a u ı

a ı

ı

˘

˘a

u

˘aa ı

a ı

S·

˘

a ˘

ı


300 F. Howeidy

If it is our purpose to orient towards the other side, then we will find that there arematters that we ought to clarify, the most crucial of which can be encapsulated in thefollowing four observations:

● The first observation pertains to the point of departure of rule of law for theWestern authoritative point of reference and its considering it to be the sourceby which standards of public welfare and rectitude are measured for citizens andthe particular orientation towards the issuance and dependence on the certifi-cates of good conduct for the countries of the Third World. It is a principlewhich is deemed to warrant preservation, merit caution and demand recourse –not exclusively in regard to the experience of the West, but out of respect forsubjectivity, and appealing to civilizational/cultural specificity, where a personcannot hope to assess the measure of success of his nation (ummah) except onthe basis of its taking from or correspondence – say its contrition – to the West-ern model. It is a position which diverges of a necessity from the affirmation ofrespect for shared human values and, similarly, for the supreme ideal that is theproduct of human experience and about which the majority of people concur, onthe consideration that they are equals in terms of creation, and not on the basisof it being lessons in etiquette or perquisites of civilization imposed from aboveon the weak or by the dominator on the dominated.

● The second observation can be summed up in the question: Is it possible for usto criticize Western democracy – as its own sons criticize it now in loud voices– or is it for us merely to submit to it as it was ‘sent down’ and to preserve itand recite it as an anthem morning, noon and night? That is the vast develop-ment in the means of communication and its tremendous capability to influ-ence have stirred up ongoing debate – in Europe especially – about the utilityof political parties and the role of television in cultivating awareness and possi-bly in distorting it – the matter that has become capable of shaping publicopinion, which might express particular vested interests and might not reflectthe desires of the people and their preferences. It is a development which castsdoubt on discourse about the sovereignty of the people, for instance, and whichcalls for a re-evaluation of a number of instrumental presuppositions ofdemocracy.

● The third observation is inherently connected to the previous two and is repre-sented in the question: Are we appointed to implement the Western model ofdemocracy in the form that it is followed in those countries despite the possibledifferences between the nature of the societies and their composition? Thequestion supposes that there is a difference between democratic values (shared,questioned and other) and between the model or the form that corresponds tohow these values are being implemented in reality (parties, the House of Repre-sentatives or the senate or the caliphate). We are not discussing abiding by thevalue, as that is a subject of agreement without debate, but rather the discussionrests on the approach which must be followed in effecting that abidance, wheresuch supposes – in this case – that there will be a natural change in the socialfabric. If the circumstances of Egypt, for example, permit the establishment ofpolitical parties, the establishing of the like of these parties in another countrywhere tribal, ethnic or sectarian circumstances are rooted, might be a path totearing apart the unity of the nation and fragmenting it (Lebanon being anexample of that and Yemen possibly another).



● The fourth observation is that we are confronting a crossroads worthy of note indealing with the question of democracy from the standpoint that we live in apotent state of schizoid paradox where there is acceptance of democracy at thenational or regional level yet there are coups against democracy in the interna-tional arena, which are governed in the main according to the criterion of bruteforce and nothing else. So the decision rests with the strong and woe to theweak, and if the majority of countries, or the majority of people and their inhab-itants and senior democrats in their countries are themselves arrogant oppressorsin the international arena, raising the banners of multiplicity and tolerancewithin but posting the declarations of ‘pax romana’ on the outside. This is thematter which clearly implies that dealing and cooperating with democracytranspires exclusively on the basis of self-interest and not on ethical bases.

What is intended by these observations is not to detract from the matter of democracyor to renounce it or to bypass it. We assert that what it represents of values and whatit offers of guarantees remains the most preferable way of effecting the realization ofpolitical participation and protecting freedoms in the present circumstances. Despiteany negative factors or shortcomings which it may exhibit, it is with its defects, incal-culably superior to its alternatives among systems of government or methods of politics.

The desired aim of what we have asserted is the liberation of the question and thedelineation of the framework which governs our point of view in dealing with democ-racy – its costs and values – and thus this is nothing more than an attempt to constrainthe course of dialog, and guide the comprehension of the aspects of the subject andnot to expropriate these in any way. This is an introduction which I deemed necessarybefore delving into the heart of the matter, in order to remove some of the basic obscu-rity that leads to the supposed battle between Islam and democracy. It is a skirmishwhich I suspect has its primary origins in a greater ambiguity in understanding theview of Islam of the political system and legitimate bases for establishing society andconstructing the world.

First: Seven focal points of the Islamic state

If understanding any problem is half way to solving it, then if that understanding isnot proffered in the question of the battle between Islam and democracy, then I willbe as a guarantor clearing the path before the solution. If it is the case that we arefaced, in the truth of the matter, with an example of a misunderstanding between thetwo sides, then it is the case that Islam has the greater share of ambiguity.

For that reason, we will not answer now the question of how we can resolve thebattle, nor the question of the source of the ambiguity, but rather we will try to liberatethe subject first through confirming the conception of Islam for building the politicalstate, in order that we may be entirely explicit about the realities of the subject we areresearching as it is impractical to discuss any issue, where each can understand it in away alternative to the other.

This conception can be read from three angles: one which pertains to basic featuresand characteristics; a second which pertains to means; and a third which is predicatedon goals and intents. We will not be able to improve upon this reading unless weconsider each angle individually. We will begin with the first point and inquire: Whatare the characteristics of state as Islam conceives of them? We are able to delineateseven characteristics and they are as follows.


302 F. Howeidy

(1) The trusteeship (wil[amacr ] yah) of the ummah (over itself) as it is the decision-makerand its acquiescence/good pleasure is the condition upon which the perpetuity of itschoice rests:

The vast majority of the masses of our compatriots (i.e., the Sunnis) and among theMu tazilah and the Kh[amacr ] rijites and the Naj[amacr ] r[imacr ] yah assert that the means to its confirmation(that is, the imamate or the leadership) is the choice (ikhtiy[amacr ] r) of the ummah.5

The matter is indeed like this as the ummah possesses the general leadership, and italone has the right to choose the imam or to remove him – that is, to end his term andimpeach him as it installs him and supervises him and possesses the primary right/dutyin regard to him.6

This connotation is precisely that which is affirmed by the most prominentcontemporary ulam[amacr ] of the u [umacr ] l (fundamental source principles of religion), just asour teacher Muhammad Y[umacr ] suf M[umacr ] s[amacr ] wrote in this context: the source of sovereigntyis the ummah alone and not the caliph, because he is a trustee over it in matters ofreligion and in directing their affairs according to the shar[imacr ] ah of Allah and hisMessenger. Thus, he derives his authority from them, and they have the duty to advisehim as well as to orient him and to rectify (his actions) if he errs. Rather, they havethe duty to remove him from the office to which he has been entrusted by their choiceif they find what necessitates his removal. It is logical that the source of sovereigntyis the original grantor of trust not the deputized trustee (al-n ib al-wakeel).7

Among that which Uthm[amacr ] n Khal[imacr ] l, Professor of Constitutional Law, mentions inthis regard is that Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) does not consider the trustee (al-w[amacr ] l[imacr ] )as possessing a right to sovereignty, rather he sees that sovereignty is the right of theummah alone which the w[amacr ] l[imacr ] exercises as an employee or a trustee of it, so it is ableto remove him if it finds what justifies that.8

As the matter is such, sheikh Abd al-Wah[amacr ] b Khil[amacr ] f, took the position that:

The place of supreme leadership in Islamic government is tantamount to the place ofsupreme leadership in any constitutional government because it derives its authorityfrom the ummah as represented by the people accorded authority (ul[imacr ] al- all wa al-iqad); and it is for this sultan to remain in their trust and looking out for their interests;thus the ulam[amacr ] of the Muslims have decreed that the ummah can depose the caliph fora reason that necessitates it.9

We, then, are talking about elected civil authority from the representatives of theummah and its abiding by the shar[imacr ] ah of Islam does not transform it into a religiousauthority according to the prevailing conception in the experience of the West, whichis linked to claims of divine mandate and perpetual monopoly of authority where reli-gion in it remains the source of law and values and not a source of authority in anycase. The imam Muhammad Abduh was one who vociferously rebutted this dubiouscontention from the beginning of the twentieth century, when he mentioned that oneof the fundamental sources (u [umacr ] l) specified by Islam is: ‘the overturning of religiousauthority and eradication of its bases’ And, he added in regard to another subject ofhis contentions that Islam:

demolished constructing this authority and erased its traces, so that there did not remainamong the masses anything of its name or contour. Islam did not confer authority uponany after Allah and His Messenger over the creed ( aq[imacr ] dah) of anyone, nor control overhis faith. Furthermore, the Messenger – upon him be peace and blessings – was a

a

˘

a a ıa

˘

a ˘ s· uu u a

ı

˘

a ˘˘

a ıa ı

a ı

˘

a a

ı h·˘

˘

a ˘

ı

˘

s· u

˘

ı



conveyor [of the message] and a warner, not one who dominated or who had control asAllah the Most Exalted said: ‘So remind [them], verily, you are one who reminds, andyou do not have control over them.’10 And he did not grant anyone of his line the rightto dissolve [pacts] or conclude [them], not on earth nor in heaven; rather the faith liber-ates the believer from every overseer in what is between him and Allah, other than AllahHimself … the Muslim whatever his status in Islam, whether high or low, is not chargedwith anything except with the duty to give advice and guidance.

The Imam summarizes his view in a single sentence:

There is no religious authority in Islam aside from the authority of righteous preachingand calls for the good and condemnation of evil, and it is an authority which Allahconferred upon the lowliest of Muslims and whereby He clips the wings of its highest,and just as it is granted to the highest, it is partaken of by the lowest.11

(2) Society is culpable (mukallaf) and responsible (mas [umacr ] l). Establishing the reli-gion and building in the life of the world as well as supervision of the general welfareare among the responsibilities of the ummah and not the authority alone.12 An indica-tion of this is that the Qur’anic discourse is directed towards the culpability of theummah in a number of subjects: ‘O you who believe, be steadfast in justice’ (s[umacr ] ratal-nis a Q 4: 135); ‘O you who believe honor your pacts and cooperate in goodnessand piety and do not conspire in sin and animosity’ (s[umacr ] rat al-m [amacr ] idah Q 5: 1-2); ‘letthere be among you an ummah which calls to the good and commands what is rightand forbids what is wrong’ (s[umacr ] rat [Amacr ] l- Imr[amacr ] n Q 3: 104).

From the standpoint of this discourse a society can be classified as a guarantor ofits interests, mobilizing all its vital sectors for rectification and reform through itsobservance of commanding the right and forbidding the wrong. And this is a culpabil-ity which covers all of the activities and actions of the society from wrongdoings ofthe street and the marketplace to the injustices of the rulers and the appointees, evento the extent that Imam al-Ghazali considered it:

the greatest axis in the religion … if its carpet has been rolled up and its knowledge andwork have been neglected then its prophethood been disabled and religiosity dwindled,and chaos has become general and deviation [from what is right] has become widespreadand ignorance has become commonplace and corruption has spread dangerously andlawlessness has increased, and the lands have been ruined and the slaves [i.e., people]have perished.13

It is an obligation of the ummah, and an analogue of faith that: ‘the believing menand the believing women are trustees over one another, they command what is rightand they forbid what is wrong and they perform the prayers …’ (s rat al-tawbah Q 9:71) This is even to the extent that Imam al-Ghazali mentions that: ‘whoever abandonscommanding the right and forbidding the wrong has gone out from among these believ-ers specified in the verse’.14 Such is also the case when the Qur [amacr ] n indicates that thecurse which fell upon those of bani Israel who disbelieved is attributable to thembecause: ‘they did not prohibit the wrong they were doing …’ (s[umacr ] rat al-m[amacr ] idah Q 5: 79).

According to this clearly specified culpability, every individual or group in Islamicsociety has its share of responsibility for rectifying the course and defending the well-being of the ummah. In another regard, al-zak[amacr ] t (alms) which is one of the pillars ofIslam and faith, is considered the like of another culpability which calls the society toself-sufficiency where it becomes obligatory on everyone capable to contribute a shareof his wealth, which will contribute towards the provision of this security. In this

˘u

ua ˘

u a ˘

u A

˘

a

u

˘a

u a ˘

a


304 F. Howeidy

giving of his, he does not proffer a contribution nor a ‘good deed’ – in commonparlance – but rather he performs a duty towards others out of his wealth, termedaccording to the expression of ‘duty unto Allah’ the Most Exalted.

We are, then, in the context of a society, present in the matter of law (al-shar ) andits rulings, which is not waiting for solicitation from an authority nor permission froma government where its presence is dictated according to divine culpability. As for thepossible form by which this presence can be effected, the people can formulate itaccording to the circumstances of their time. As such, what is important is that societymaintains the mechanisms of its self-propulsion and does not become a victim ofpower or resigned before it.

History bears witness that Islamic society was burgeoning with multiple entitiesand institutions which assumed this function from among groups of ulam[amacr ] , judgesand muftis to guilds of crafts and artisans, to the sheikhs of the tribes and clans and theskeikhs of Sufi orders and heads of sects.15 Along with this, the mosque was a centrefor cultural dissemination. And the waqf (charitable endowment) was a major inde-pendent institution established by people through their giving, and it performed itsweighty role in meeting the needs of the ‘social defence’ of the ummah. And whoeverperuses what Mu af[amacr ] al-Sib[amacr ] [imacr ] wrote in his book Min Raw[amacr ] i Ha [amacr ] ratina (From theWonders of Our Civilization) and what Muhammad Am[imacr ] n affirmed in his doctoralthesis on ‘Al-Awq[amacr ] f wa al- ay[amacr ] t al-Ijtim[amacr ] [imacr ] yah fi Misr’ (‘Charitable endowments andsocial life in Egypt’), perceives the extent to which the charitable endowments of waqfprovided for the various social and cultural needs of society in terms of schools,institutes, libraries and mosques to places of refuge, hospitals and hotels; that is notinclusive of other aspects of life which reached the extent of the expropriation ofcharitable endowments for the benefit of those seeking marriage, matrons, and toentertain the sick, even to the degree that it extended to care for sick animals, crippledhorses and stray dogs.16

Thus Islamic society was running itself – by itself – many centuries before theappearance of the concept of ‘civil society’ for which some yearn in our time.

(3) Freedom is the right of society, where the human being exercising his freedomis the obverse side of al-taw [imacr ] d (the divine unicity of Allah) and the enunciation ofthe shah[amacr ] datayn (two testaments of faith) in confirmation of the profession of his servi-tude to Allah alone, and his liberation from any authority of anyone among people.

Verily Allah reveals to us His desire only, but he does not compel us to abide by thisdesire. He grants us the freedom of choice, and we, by virtue of that, are capable if weso will to submit and choose His shar[imacr ] ah, just as we are able, if we so will to go againstHis commands and bring down his shar[imacr ] ah from our consideration and therefore bearthe consequences because whatever the choice is, the result falls on us.17

The most significant practices of freedom are those which obtain in choice andopinion as ‘there is no compulsion in religion: righteousness has been made clearfrom error …’ (s[umacr ] rat al-baqarah Q 2: 256); and he said: ‘the truth is from your Lord,so whoever so wills let him believe and whoever so wills, let him disbelieve …’ (s[umacr

] rat al-kahf, Q 18: 29); ‘Say: Believe or do not believe …’ (s rat al-isr[amacr ] Q 17: 107);‘And if your Lord had so willed, He could have caused everyone who is on the earthto believe, all of them altogether; so would you coerce people until they believed?’(s rat Y nus Q 13: 99).

Thus, the ruling of Islam in regard to freedom of belief is:

˘

˘

a ˘

s·t· a a

˘

ı a ˘˘

d· aı

a H· a a

˘

ı

h· ıa

ı

˘

ı

˘

u

u u a ˘

u u



prohibition of any person encroaching upon or harassing another for the reason of hisbelief in a particular creed and attempting to impose his creed and convictions upon him.Imposition of the creed is impossible, and reprimanding others for their creeds iscompletely rejected.18

If freedom in Islamic law represents an established general source principle in thescope of the creed, over and beyond other human life areas, is it possible – after that– to assert that the teachings of this religion restrain the view of people in otherspheres of their social and political life?

Political freedom in our contemporary terminology is not anything but a derivativeof an Islamic fundamental general principle which is the freedom of the human beingfrom the standpoint of his being a human, specified in decisive texts in the Qur [amacr ] n andthe sunnah. Sufficient indication is for us to mention the ad[imacr ] th of the Messenger ofAllah where he said to his Companions: ‘None of you is a sycophant: one who says“I am with the people, if people are good, then I will be good, if people are bad thenI am bad”.’19

Freedom of belief is subsumed under freedom of speech which is unfettered inIslamic thinking, except in one regard and that is that opinion not be derisive ofreligion or attacking it where such is a violation the general order of the state.20

The matter is not strictly the ‘permissibility’ of expression of opinion as it iselevated to the status of existence when it pertains to the expression of truth and whatis right given that the texts of Islamic shar[imacr ] ah specify that it is a sin for which thereis punishment in the afterlife to remain silent about wrongdoing, which should berenounced according to law.

(4) Equality between people is among the source principles (u [umacr ] l) of Islam as allare created from ‘a single soul’ and all of them possess inviolable dignity specified bythe Qur [amacr ] n for the human being, according to these characteristics without regard tohis denomination or race. The Prophet indicted the meaning of the single origin ofhumanity in his farewell khutbah (sermon): ‘Verily your Lord is One, and yourprogenitor is one’, i.e., Adam; and in the Qur [amacr ] n we find:

O you people, We created you from a male and a female and made you peoples and tribesthat you might know one another. Verily, the most dignified of you with Allah are themost pious among you. Indeed, Allah is knowing and aware. (s[umacr ] rat al-hujar[amacr ] t, Q 49: 13)

The apparent meaning of the address in the verse is in reference to all people, andMuhammad ‘Izzah Darwazah comments on this in his book Al-Dust[umacr ] r al-Qur [amacr ] n[imacr ]

(The Qur’anic Constitution) saying: ‘What is intended by it [i.e., this verse] is the lackof any specification of discrimination between human beings for whatever reason.’21

As for piety (al-taqw[amacr ] ), the verse indicates that it is what distinguishes people, sothere is no effect on the principle of equality in the life of people, given that the sphereof distinction according to piety is the afterlife and not the life of the world – that is,before Allah and not among people. Distinction in this regard should not be conceivedof as having an effect in implementation of the laws of the shar[imacr ] ah upon all people;or, in other words, there will not be any effect on the principle of equality before thelaw specified by the texts of Islamic shar[imacr ] ah.22

If this equality is among that which people have come to know in this age, then itshould not be forgotten that Islam first proclaimed it fourteen centuries ago, the lawof Rome was prevalent in the Levant and Arabia Felix in the southern tip of theArabian Peninsula. According to Roman law, people were categorized as either free

˘ah· ı

ı

˘

s· u

˘a

˘a

u a

u ˘a ı

a

ı

˘

ı

˘


306 F. Howeidy

or not free. The free were of two classes, the free whose ancestry was Roman andthose who were not natives and these were Latin. As for those who were not free, therewere four types: slave, manumitted, semi-liberated, and landed peasants. Only theoriginal native free Romans enjoyed political rights during most of the periods ofRoman history; as for others, they were deprived of these.23

Also, Aristotle says in his book Politics that fi rah (inborn nature) is that whichmade the barbarians slaves for the Greeks (and these are the teachings of the Peripa-tetic school) that the gods created two types of human being: a superior type endowedwith reason and will, and they are the Greeks according to the nature of the situation;and a second type which the gods did not endow with anything other than bodilystrength and what pertains to it and they are the barbarians (the non-Greeks) … thegods willed that there be division along these lines for the barbarians to shore upthe deficiency among the Greeks (bodily strength), the matter which necessitated thatthe others remain slaves subjugated to the service of the superior kind – thosepossessed of rightly guided reason.24

It is imperative that we realize in this context that the Muslims when they observedthe Greek cultural heritage in the ‘Abbasid era, drew the impression that all whichthey found was sound; however, they did not elect to choose the political theses –some of which had been translated by al-Far bi, for example, because they sawthemselves as not in need of them, but rather as their being at a more advancedstage.25

(5) The different other has his law. From the moment that the unitary origin ofhumanity and the dignity of every group of human beings were decreed in theQur’anic discourse, ‘the other’ attained his rights to dignity and law, simply by virtueof being a human. The Prophet of the Muslims once stood up in observance of a pass-ing funeral procession when it was said to him: ‘The deceased is Jewish.’ He replied:‘Isn’t he a [human] soul?’ When Imam Ali bin Abi Talib dispatched his deputy andcommander Malik al-Ashtar to Egypt he said to him: ‘Let you feel in your heart mercyfor the subjects and affection and kindness towards them … [any given] one of themis either a brother to you in religion or an equal to you in creation.’

Over and above this, the Qur [amacr ] n decrees in regard to a number of subjects thatdifferences between people are signs from Allah and one of his normative sunnah(normative modes/laws) in the universe. The Most Glorious and Exalted createddifferent people for a wise reason that he willed:26 ‘O you people, we crated you froma male and a female and we made of you peoples and tribes that you might know oneanother …’ (s[umacr ] rat al-hujar[amacr ] t, Q 49: 13); and ‘He created the heavens and the earthand the differences in your tongues and your colors; verily in that are signs for theworlds.’ (s[umacr ] rat al-r[umacr ] m, Q 30: 22); and ‘If your Lord had willed He could have madeall people into a single ummah (community/nation), but they have not ceased to differ,except those to whom Allah has shown mercy and it is for that [purpose] that Hecreated them.’ (s[umacr ] rat H[umacr ] d Q 11: 118-119).

This was the background against which ‘the other’ attained his position oflegitimacy in Islamic discourse. There was no problem with regard to the Jews orChristians on the consideration of them being ‘people of the Book’. And theirprophets were the prophets of the Muslims and to believe in their having been sentwas part of the Islamic faith. Also, the Sabaens and Magians were considered‘protected peoples’ (ahl dhimmah) and during the reign of Umar bin Abd al- Az z,he expanded the category to include them among the protected people of Allah andHis Messenger.

t·

a

˘

˘a

u a

u u

u u

˘ ˘ ˘

ı



There were and have not ceased to be differences and variations persisting acrossthe doctrinal schools (madhahib) in matters of religion which are more particular andmore sensitive – the matters which lead the Islamic reason to accept all the differencesof ‘the other’ in matters of the world, which are lesser than matters of religion inparticularity and sensitivity. The dawn of Islam did not impinge upon any otherreligion, it did not occur to it to impinge upon the view of ‘the other’ and from thisstandpoint multiplicity of religions was permissible; which made the acceptance ofmultiplicity/diversity in matters of the world permissible from the standpoint thatvariations in creed were permissible and such facilitated the way, by necessity, fordifferences in the climate of political and social reform.

(6) Injustice is forbidden and resisting it is a legal obligation. Injustice accordingto the Islamic understanding is not only among the major wrongs and sins, and notonly indicative of the corruption of civilization as Ibn Khaldun said, but rather all theseconstitute hostility towards the right of Allah and violation of the principles of justicewhich were the intended goal of the Message and prophethood as we will clarifybelow. In a ad[imacr ] th quds[imacr ] : ‘[Allah says] O my slave (i.e., human being), I have forbid-den injustice for Myself and have made it forbidden among you, so do not be unjust/commit wrong.’ Prevention of injustice is one of the reasons for the orientation of theQu’ranic discourse: ‘in order to warn those who do wrong and to give good tidings tothe doers of good’ (s[umacr ] rat al-a q[amacr ] f, Q 46: 12). In warning of its perpetration againstpeople, the Qur [amacr ] n decrees: ‘verily the path [of retribution] is directed towards thosewho wrong people and who commit excesses in the earth without right; for those thereis a painful punishment’ (s[umacr ] rat al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] Q 42: 42). In point of fact, Islam has permittedfighting for the sake of repelling injustice: ‘those who have been wronged are permit-ted to fight, and Allah is able to grant them victory.’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Hajj, Q 22: 39). And isnot permitted for Muslims to make public displays of what is reprehensible except inone case and that is when they are exposed to injustice where the Qur [amacr ] n specifies:‘Allah does not like the display of what is reprehensible except in the case of one whohas been wronged …’ (s[umacr ] rat al-nis[amacr ] , Q 4: 148). Furthermore, there is inducement toresist injustice and this resistance is legitimate and legally justified: in the accounts ofProphetic had[imacr ] th is: ‘The best word is speaking the truth before a deviant sultan’; andthe sayyid of martyrs Hamzah bin Abi Talib and his men went up against an imam whowas astray and he enjoined him (to do right) and forbade him (to do wrong) and hekilled him for this. And (there is a had[imacr ] th) that if people see a wrong doer, and theydo not take him by the hand (to restrain him from committing injustice), then they areliable to be subjected to a collective punishment with him – joint and several.

This last had[imacr ] th is of considerable import as it implies that Allah threatens thosewho remain silent about injustice with punishment if they acquiesce to it. There arenumber of indications of this meaning in the Prophetic discourse such as when theProphet said: ‘By Allah, verily you shall command what is right and forbid what iswrong and take the wrongdoer by the hand and restore the right of the one who hasbeen wronged, and if not, then Allah will strike the hearts of some of you by others.’In relation to this, the Muslim fuqah[amacr ] concluded that justice was mandatory and injus-tice absolutely rejected in the lands of Islam to the extent that Ibn Taymiyyah said:‘The wrongdoer deserves retribution and reprimand, and this is an agreed upon sourceprinciple (a l) [of Islamic law] … and the fuqah[amacr ] have specified that textually … andI know of no dissent in that regard.’27

This creedal obligation to resist the offender under the aegis of the Islamic statedoes not have a correlate in any other legal system. In addition to that it is tantamount to:

h· ı ı

u h· a

˘a

u u a

u

˘a

u a ˘

ı

ı

ı

a ˘

s· a ˘


308 F. Howeidy

effective guarantee of the affirmation of public oversight/censure, in which the Muslimdoes not consult in his judgment anything other than his Islamic conscience and theconstitution of Islam, that is, its legal system; all of this is removed and independent fromthe institutions of authority of the Islamic state, and in apposition to them.28

(7) The law is above all. The legitimacy of authority in the Islamic state is contin-gent upon its engaging and perseverance in abiding by working according to theIslamic legal system in toto, without differentiating between the rules governing theconduct the conduct of the Muslim whether as a citizen or a ruler or between thesebasic values and the salient events as found in the Qur [amacr ] n and sunnah.29

In other regard, the sovereignty of the shar[imacr ] ah and the submission of all to it –both rulers and ruled – there is what implies a higher law above the law, just as thereis a ceiling which does not permit itself to be exceeded or the manipulation of it. Theindependence of the referential authority of Islamic law far removed from the author-ity of the state and the caprice of rulers provides an important guarantee in confrontingexcesses of executive power, especially in the countries of the Third World where theauthorities control the representative parliaments and employ them in the service oftheir whims.

This does not necessarily constitute a fetter on the duty of specialists in society inpromulgating the laws or deriving what they see fit and for the public good amongrulings. That is a guaranteed right, without doubt, and indeed there is a provision thatexercising of that right and duty remain predicated on a particular authoritative refer-ence that is removed from whim and outside of the sphere of the hegemony of thestate. It is exemplified in the texts of the Qur [amacr ] n and the sunnah and this authoritativereference is supposed to represent the scales of justice and the to preserve the highestprinciples for regulating the movement of society and its wishes.

Islamic fiqh posited a complete and organic separation between the side thatformulates Islamic law and derives it and between the political authority which isentrusted with its execution and rule. This separation is also that which distinguishesthe shar[imacr ] ah from the democratic system entirely, and it preceded its development bymore than a millennium.30

The farthest reaches of constitutional thought in the experience of the human intel-lect are found in the separation of powers, and the consideration that legislativepowers are one of three – legislative, executive and judicial – and, thus, that this sepa-ration provides considerable guarantee against the excess of executive power;however it does not accord a guarantee against excessive powers of the legislativebranch, especially in cases where the ruler promulgates law or creates the authoritywhich does so.

The Islamic conception solves this problematic and provides a form which protectsthe ummah from the tyranny of executive and legislative authorities when it elevatesthe law above caprice and self-interest. These are the most important characteristicsof the Islamic view of the political system, and it remains for us to discuss the meansthat Islam specifies for it and the intents it seeks.

Two: Abiding by sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] (consultation) and seeking council for information

These seven aforementioned characteristics are expressive of a grand aspiration whichcannot be reached without clear mechanisms guided by the specific goals that will befulfilled in the end.

˘aı

˘

˘a

ı

˘

u a



When the researcher flips through the pages of the Islamic discourse searching forthese instruments or means, he realizes that they are on the basis of two basic pointsof focus which are al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] (consultation) and the obligation to question the rulers.As for the case where one is looking for these sought after goals, he will find that theIslamic discourse distils these into a single word: justice (al- adl).

That path drove me to attempt to investigate the nature of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] in the view ofpolitical Islam through a number of sources; and, my attention was caught by thebook Fiqh al-Sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] wa al-Istish[amacr ] rah (The Fiqh of al-Shura and Seeking Advice) byTawf[imacr ] q al-Sh[amacr ] w[imacr ] which transcends by a great deal the picture typically imprinted onpeople’s minds. It is no longer the principle basis of the Islamic system; it has becomethe cornerstone of the various activities of society.

Many have tread in the study of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] on the consideration that it is a principle uponwhich the system of rule rests, which fetters the authority of the rulers. However, westudy it here on the consideration that it is a general and comprehensive theory for theprinciples upon which individual freedom, rights of the people, solidarity of the societyand all the political, social, fiscal, economic and other aspects are based.31

Al-Sh[amacr ] w[imacr ] continues:

The study of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] as a general theory begins, in our view, with the rights of the humanbeing and his freedoms and the authority of the ummah and its sovereignty. It confirmsthat human rights in our shar[imacr ] ah are not restricted to individual rights only – the freedomof opinion and the freedom of ownership and to dispose of one’s property [as deemedfit] – but rather, an individual’s rights are connected to participation in the decisions ofthe group to his right to participate in it in regard to its wealth and resources, as a resultof the social solidarity which necessitates joint responsibility just as does al-h[amacr ] w[imacr ] .32

And, he concludes in regard to another subject that al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] is ‘socialism of opinionand thought alongside socialism of wealth’.33

He defines his goal in his major research by saying:

Settled in my mind is the necessity of adopting the general theory of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] in Islamicshar[imacr ] ah as the perfection of the theory of ‘Abd al-Razaq al-Sanhuri of the ‘khilafah’(caliphate), which was the subject of his doctoral dissertation in political science at theUniversity of Lyon in 1936, and the most important characteristic of the caliphate in theview of al-Sanhuri was the principle of the ‘unity of the ummah’, and unity – in our view– is indivisible from freedom. Al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] is the Islamic expression of freedom because itis freedom of thought and opinion and a guarantor of the rights of individuals, groupsand peoples upon which the Islamic political system ought to be based.34

Al-Shawi is not the first person to assert that al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] represents a general methodin the dynamic movement of Islamic society. Others among the fuqaha , ulam[amacr ] andresearchers echoed the idea – and al-Shawi mentions of them sheikh MahmoudShaltut; and, these relied for support on the saying of the Most Exalted: ‘Those whoanswer their Lord, establish the prayer and their matter is sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] (consultation)between them; and, among that which we have enriched them, they spend.’ (s[umacr ] ratal-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] , Q 42: 28). And the term ‘their matter’ (amrihim) is comprehensive and abso-lute, which means that is comprehensive and sufficient to delineate all matters whichhave a public character, according to the expression of Muhammad Asad.35

Along with this, and despite the tremendous number of studies published in thelast decade dealing with the subject of the Islamic political system or those which are

u a

˘

u a

u a aı a ı

u a

a ı

u a

ı

˘

a ı

u a

u aı

˘

u a

u a

˘˘

a ˘

u au

u a


310 F. Howeidy

dedicated to the question of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] , we find that the important contribution made byal-Shawi in his research (840 pages) is his distinguished ijtih[amacr ] d whereby he desired toextract from al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] a ‘general theory’ fully integrating sources and essential princi-ples. Despite that our discussion of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] in this regard comes in the context of theexhibition of the Islamic conception of the political system, and it casts light on itsbeing chief among means specified by the shar[imacr ] ah as a focal-point for rule. We werenot able to direct the course in that direction without an expose of the ijtih[amacr ] d ofal-Shawi in the question of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] first due to its importance and uniqueness andsecondarily due to the fact that it is the most recently published research on the subject– at least in Egypt.

If we consider the ranks of those asserting that al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] is a genuine value inIslamic society we would find that it covers a much wider area than the limits of thepolitical system; although, we are focusing here on its role within these limits on theconsideration that this is what concerns us here.

It is important to mention that we indicate that depending on democracy as a basisand a system of government was the fruit of a long and costly struggle, especially forreformers and revolutionaries who were pitted against the forces of various authoritiesin Europe, in particular – whether represented by nobles or Church fathers or both.However, al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] , when it took its place in the discourse of Islam and within thebases of its society, was not the result of a battle or the result of a forced outcomenecessity, but was rather a divine imposition of legal culpability which was sent downin the Qur [amacr ] n upon the heart of Muhammad – for those who believe in the message ofthe seal of the prophets; and, as for those who do not believe in it, then they endeavourto evaluate it – according to historical facts as having been a result of prescient andpenetrating reformism aimed at creating a righteous, stable and enduring society andbuilding it up as well as anchoring unshakeable foundations for it.36

The role which al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] plays as a means or an instrument for the expression ofthe Islamic political initiative has features which can be delineated through the follow-ing observations:

● If some of the pious ancestors – al-salaf – knew al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] as ‘soliciting inconsultation (mudh karah) the people of opinion (ahl al-ra y) in the matter, thenfollowing them’, then the contemporary definition for it is: taking decisions inlight of the opinions of specialists in the subject-matter of the decision, in everyaffair among the public affairs of the ummah.37

● As for the Qur’anic text: ‘And their matter is sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] between them’, it clearlyindicates that all the affairs of the Islamic ummah ought to be discussed by allthe representatives of society as the term ‘between them’ indicates society as awhole – men, women, Muslims and non-Muslims and representation of the soci-ety in the majlis al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] – parliament – which may bear any other name as longas the function is fixed; and, there is no way to accomplish this, except throughelections.38

● There is a difference between the people of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] and those of ijtih[amacr ] d whichought to be mentioned: the first are the people of opinion (ahl al-ra y) in theummah, who are supposed to represent society in all its strata, currents anddenominations – and there are those who represent the non-Muslims, if theyexist, and this goes without saying. As for the ahl al-ijtih[amacr ] d, they are the peopleof knowledge – among the fuqah[amacr ] (jurists) of the Muslims who entrust themwith ijtih[amacr ] d in deriving the legal rulings of the shar[imacr ] ah, where it is assumed that

u aa

u au a

ı

˘

au a

u a

u a

˘a

u a

u aa ˘

u a

u a

u a a

˘

aa ˘

a ı

˘



the shar[imacr ] ah is the basis of law and legislation; and thus, the condition of Islamis mandatory for them (i.e., for the fuqah[amacr ] ). It goes without saying that thepeople of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] are those in the representative parliament where as the peopleof ijtih[amacr ] d are the scientific committee (hay ah ilm[imacr ] yah) who are nearer to theconcept of an association or board of senior ulam[amacr ] or group of Islamicresearchers or the Majlis al-Islamy[imacr ] al-A l[amacr ] (the supreme Islamic council).

● Muslim fuqah[amacr ] are accustomed to terming the ahl al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] as the ahl al- al waal- aqd (i.e., the ‘people of authority’ or literally those who were given thepower ‘to conclude and dissolve pacts’) which expresses a historical conceptionthat developed at the dawn of Islam as a result of the circumstances of theProphetic emigration (hijra) (to Medina) and the establishment of the firstIslamic state. It is not obligatory that they be called by this term – whoevercommissions them with functions and specializations which were commis-sioned to the ahl al- al wa al- aqd in the first Islamic state. However, what is‘obligatory’ (al-w[amacr ] jib) is that these functions and specializations are engaged inby a group from among the ummah which has been trained for that – in everysociety or time – in what one of them needs of the required abilities and compe-tence to undertake this obligation.39

● There is another difference of the utmost importance between al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] (consul-tation) and al-istish[amacr ] rah (seeking advice). Al-istish[amacr ] rah is the asking for theopinion or advice from one who is in a position of trust vis-à-vis the personasking for it. Someone asking for al-istish[amacr ] rah alone possesses the right to makea decision in the matter for which he has sought the opinion. As for al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] , itis the legitimate (Islamic-legal) group means whereby the group or the ummahissues a decision in one of its general/public affairs. Al-istish[amacr ] rah is not obliga-tory and the opinion given to the one seeking it is not binding upon him. As foral-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] , it is both obligatory and binding.

Tawfiq al-Sh[amacr ] w[imacr ] emphasized this contrast in his aforementioned book andmentioned that the lack of attention of some to this has plunged them into speculationthat al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] is not binding at a time when if they realized the qualitative distinctionbetween al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] and al-istish[amacr ] rah, they would not have engaged in this argument inthe first place.40

This matter is, in fact, like this, as the view adopted by the majority of our contem-porary fuqah[amacr ] is that al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] is binding in the beginning and the end. Abd al-Q[amacr ] dirAwdah has a new observation in this context and he asserts that al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] will not havemeaning if it does not take the opinion of the majority; that is, if it is not binding.41

● Freedom is the essence of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] . If freedom of opinion is not guaranteed forall, then there is no room for any discussion of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] . It follows that confis-cation of opinion aborts the value of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] and divests it of its content.Among the observations of sheikh Mahmud Shaltut in this regard is his assertionthat: ‘Islam posited the principle of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] , and it had at the dawn of Islam astatus such that it glorified the name of Islam in asserting the right of the humanbeing; further, the basis in it was complete freedom of expression of opinion.’42

The meaning of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] guarantees for society the basis of freedom of consulta-tion and genuine dialogue deriving from equality in the right of thought and defendingopinion. For the sake of this, it is necessary that those who believe in Islamic sh[umacr ] r[amacr ]

ı

˘

a ˘

u aa ˘ ˘

ı˘

a ˘

ı

˘

aa ˘ u a h·˘

h·

˘

a

u aa a

au a

a

u a

a ı

u au a a

a ˘ u a

˘

a˘

u a

u au a

u a

u a

u a

u a


312 F. Howeidy

proclaim that they – when they hold fast to it as a basis for the constitutional systemin society – intend, first and in essence, what al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] imposes of provision ofcomplete freedom for all in dialogue and exchange of opinion – in absolute freedom– before or after any decision is taken.43

is for the ummah to remove a ruler if he deviates

The second focal point of what we have termed the means specified by Islamic polit-ical discourse is the necessity of questioning the rulers (mus[amacr ] alah al- ukk[amacr ] m). And itwill be recalled here that the matter is not merely a duty of the ummah to inform himand then back down from him, but it is a legal obligation of the shar[imacr ] ah where theummah is guilty of sin and is taken to account before Allah if it is negligent in carryingit out. In the noble Qur [amacr ] n is: ‘Do not incline towards those who do wrong as hellfirewill touch you’ (s[umacr ] rat H[umacr ] d, Q 11: 113); and: ‘these villages, We destroyed them whenthey committed wrong and we made their destruction a pledge’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Kahf, Q 18:59). In a Prophetic had[imacr ] th is: ‘Verily, people, if they see the wrongdoer and they donot take him by his hand, then they are on the verge of Allah making punishmentgeneral [joint and several].’

Therefore, first, the ummah constantly oversees the ruler in that which it isobliged in commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong; second, in whatis an obligation for it of the duty of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] ; third, in what it is commanded ingiving advice; fourth, in what it has of duty in its being the primary side in the pactof the imamate, when it – according to the dictates of that contract is granted theright to rule and install him as an imam in authority and where he (i.e., the imam) isnothing but a trustee for it (i.e., the ummah) so it has the right to ask him about hiswork.44

Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the first caliph, realized this fact and proclaimed it to peopleimmediately upon taking charge of the Muslims and he made his famous statement: ‘Ihave been given charge of you, but I am not the best of you. If I do good, then supportme; and if I do evil, then set me straight.’ ‘Umar bin al-Kha ab expressed the samemeaning in his talk with people when he said he had duty to obey what Allah hadcommanded, and that they had the duty to give advice even if it harmed him. One dayhe asked people to indicate to him his crookedness, and one of them replied: ‘ByAllah, if we knew there were any crookedness in you, we would have set it straightwith our swords.’ There was nothing for the Commander of the Faithful to do but togive praise to Allah that He had put among the Muslims one who would resist thecrookedness of ‘Umar with his sword.

The Muslim fuqah[amacr ] have a lot of extremely clear discourse on confirming the dutyof the ummah to rectify its rulers and their responsibility to take them to account ifthey do not remain on the straight path, so they are appointed to set these rulersstraight and to remove them if there is no other alternative.

Diya’ al-Din al-Rayyis collects the views of the fuqah[amacr ] on this precise point andincluded them in his valuable book al-Na ar[imacr ] y[amacr ] t al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] yah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah (IslamicPolitical Views).45 By way of example, among these opinions are the following:

● What Imam al-Shafa [imacr ] reported that the imam is removed on account of corrup-tion and deviance; and the same is true for every judge or emir.

● What ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Baghdadi decreed that the imam when he goes astray(diverges) from that (i.e., the correct path), the imamate was a standard for him

u a

a ˘ h· a

ı

˘

˘au u

uı

u a

t·t·

a ˘

a ˘

z· ı a ı a ı a ı

˘

ı



to turn him from his error to being correct or to turn away from him to another;and their way in it is like his way with his successors and his judges and hisfollowers. If they deviate from his sunnah, he will rectify them or change them.That is the rectification of all is the obligation of the ummah on the ruler andwhoever represents him. Either he is rectified or he steps down and is with-drawn.

● Among that which Abu Hamid al-Ghazali mentioned in this context; that as forthe unjust sultan his wil[amacr ] yah (trusteeship) should be ended; and he should eitherstep down or it is obligatory to remove him; and, he is not in reality a sultan.

● As for Imam al-A[imacr ] ji author of al-Maw[amacr ] qif (Positions), he said: ‘It is for theummah to pull out the imam and remove him for a reason that necessitates this.’The commentator added in the gloss: ‘For example, that which may be foundwhich will bring about the imbalance of the circumstances of the Muslims andthe disintegration of the matters of religion as much as they have a say in histenure to regulate and elevate it.’

The imam Ibn azm set down his opinion along the following lines: what is oblig-atory, if there occurs anything of deviance and if, say, the imam is spoken to aboutthat and forbidden it; then if he is precluded from it and returns the truth and submits,then there is no way to remove him and he becomes the imam as he was, and it is notpermissible to remove him. If he is precluded from carrying one of the obligationsincumbent upon him, and he does not desist, then it is mandatory to remove and toinstall in his place other than him who will engage in the truth.

This is the same who would say in regard to another subject that the imammust be obeyed in what the book of Allah and the sunnah of His Messenger driveus to; so if he goes astray in anything of these, he should be prevented from thatand the add punishment and truth should be applied to him; and if there is nosafety from harm except by removing him, then he is to be removed and anotherwill take his place.

Tawf[imacr ] q al-Sh[amacr ] w[imacr ] reports that the side from which the decision in the matter ofcensure and rectification (of the ruler) should issue is that of the people of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ]

who represent the ummah; where it is supposed that these are the same who selectedthe ruler to represent the ummah. Therefore, they have the duty to set him straight andrevoke his contract. As for individuals it is for them to behave within the limits whichthey are granted by the principle of commanding the right and forbidding the wrong;and, they must abide by what the ummah decrees among proceedings systematizingsupervision and oversight and rectification. And the first of their rights which cannotbe suspended or denied is that they should stand and accuse the ruler of deviation;however, those who make specific charges and who issue the binding decision inregard to him are the people of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] or the side which the ummah elected in freeelections.46

The goal in all of this is the spread of justice which is the goal of the Message andthe basis of dominion. These are the supreme values which all should consider andwhich imbue their struggles. When the banners of Islam are flown and its teachingsexecuted and its hud[umacr ] d (penalties) implemented, and when that does not end in justiceand fairness, then this indicates directly that the Message has been divested of itscontent and that means are incapable of reaching the intended ends.

Qur’anic texts are clear in indicating this, and among these are the sayings of theMost Exalted:

a

ı a

H·

h·

ı a ıu a

u a

u


314 F. Howeidy

We sent aforetime our messengers with clear signs and sent down with them the bookand the balance (of right and wrong), that men may stand forth in justice; And we sentdown Iron, in which is (material for) mighty war, as well as many benefits for mankind…. (s[umacr ] rat al- ad[imacr ] d, Q 57: 25)

In comprehending this matter Ibn Taymiyah said:

The intended meaning of sending the Messengers and sending down the Book andpeople engaging in justice is in the rights of Allah and the rights of His creation … sowhoever turns away from the Book he is set straight by the sword.47

Verily Allah commands you justice and good …. (s[umacr ] rat al-Na l, Q 16: 90)

Verily, Allah commands you to tender things entrusted to their people, and if you judgebetween people to judge in justice …. (s[umacr ] rat al-Nis[amacr ] , Q 4: 58)

Say: ‘I have believed in what Allah sent down of the Book, and I am commanded to setyou straight [in justice]’. (s[umacr ] rat al-Sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] , Q 42: 15)

Notice that the address here is in the language of the divine command and not inthe way of explanation or recommendation.

Do not let the machinations of a people make commit [crimes] or be unjust … be just asthat is closer to piety. (s[umacr ] rat al-M[amacr ] idah, Q 5: 8)

Justice, here, is an absolute not a relative value, meaning that it is obligatory toabide by it or in the confrontation of enemies as it is with ones on people and thecaliphs. In this we cite al-Zamakhshari: ‘In this is a mighty admonition that justice(al- adl) (and to be just) is mandatory with the greatest of the enemies of Allah, thenhow powerful is it in, and what is supposed in regard to its necessity with believerswho are the friends and the beloved?’

The Commander of the Faithful ‘Umar bin al-Khittab wrote to one of his agentssaying:

As for justice, there is no dispensation/license with regard to it – neither from near norfar, and neither in times of tribulations or comfort. If it were shown to us, it would bestronger and more able to extinguish deviance and more able to suppress the false thandeviance.48

Transmitted about al-Mawaridi is his assertion about the principles that restore andrectify the world – so that its affairs become organized and its affairs are appropriatelydisposed is comprehensive justice calling to the thousands and searching for obedi-ence, building the lands and increasing by it wealth, and increasing the lineage of thehouse of the sultan. Some rhetoricians relate his saying that: ‘Justice is the scale ofAllah which he set up for creation and which he installed for truth.’49

Ibn Taymiyah said:

People do not disagree that the recompense of the wrongdoer is evil and that the recom-pense of the just person is noble; and thus, it is reported that Allah aids the just state –even if it is unbelieving; and he does not aid the unjust state – even if it is believing.

And, he says in regard to another subject:

u H· ı

u h·

u a ˘

u u a

u a ˘

˘



Justice is the order of everything, if a matter of the world persists on the basis of justice,then it persists; and even if whoever is responsible for it will have a reward in the after-life; and whatever is not on the basis of justice will not persist, even if the one responsi-ble for it has faith and is not rewarded in the afterlife.50

We are not able to enumerate the texts and remnants which make justice a centralvalue in the Islamic discourse as these are beyond count; even to the extent that anentire book on legal science would not be able to deal with all of them. From themoment that justice – in the text of the Qur [amacr ] n – was considered a goal of all themessengers and the heavenly books, the value of justice progressed – after al-taw d(the unicity of Allah) and became the standard whereby to measure the veracity ofIslamic practice – where every practice either approached the reality of the messageof Islam or distanced from it according to the measure of its respect for the value ofjustice or its violation of it. From this standpoint, tell me where you are in relation tojustice, and I will tell you where you are in relation to Islam!

Third: al-Ray s; a testimony, 40 years old

Where does democracy correspond to Islam and where does it differ?There is no doubt that we must notice the ambiguity and the accompanying debate

in this matter which represents a new phenomenon in Arab-Islamic society, whichcame into prominence during the last two decades in which this Islamic situationdeveloped in this random fashion which we notice; where the schools of rightlyguided education were absent. So, we witness this development in the body, butregression in the intellect, and this is the matter that precipitated these conceptualdistortions, the hidden signs of which have yet to return for any. It is regrettable thatmany read the Islamic phenomenon and judge it on the basis of the latest press releasesand nothing else in recording the phenomenon – and some of these are perverse, andin other instances the product of exceptional conditions.

However, the fair researcher if he is able to follow the current Islamic literature inEgypt and the Arab world and analyse its content from the beginning of the century –at least – he will come away with an entirely different impression wherein there is nomention of the skirmish with democracy and no conflict with the Western Liberalinitiative. And if we are aware of the difference between the democratic experience inthe West and the colonial politics of the Western nations, then we will realize that theconflict has remained confined to the second sphere and not to the first.

What the most prominent of our fuqah[amacr ] wrote – from Muhammad Abduh andRashid Ri a to Mahmoud Shaltut on the subject of the system of rule or the politicalview of Islam agrees in its general framework with the various values of democracy.Furthermore, what the two sheikhs – Abduh and Ri a said about it in the ‘tafs r ofal-Man r’51 and what sheikh Shalt t mentioned in the context of ‘The Basic Princi-ples of Government’52 removes any ambiguity in the subject.

The matter does not differ in the context of the Islamic movement, and what Hasanal-Banna wrote in this context during the 1940s addressing the masses of the MuslimBrotherhood that: ‘There is nothing in the foundation principles of the representative[parliamentary] system which negates the principles that Islam posited for the systemof government’ and as such:

it is not far removed from the Islamic system nor alien to it. Given this consideration wealso say with confidence that the basic principles on which the Egyptian Constitution

˘ah· ı

ı

a ˘

d·

d· ıa u


316 F. Howeidy

rests are not in conflict with the principles of Islam and not far removed from the Islamicsystem or alien to it.53

Because this was the position of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood move-ment, it should not be surprising that he gave a lecture along the same direction at theMuslim Youth Association headquarters in 1948 under the title ‘Islamic Democracy’.

Perhaps the most famous thing written under this rubric at that time was the bookby Abb s Ma m d al- Aqq d entitled Democracy in Islam (1952) where he assertedin its Introduction: ‘The concept of democracy was engendered by Islam for the firsttime in the history of the world.’54

Space does not permit details of the other views which were expressed about thisposition; however, we wished only to call attention to the Islamic dealing with thedemocratic experience that proceeded according to the basis of a rapprochement withit; and that occurred in the framework of the engagement with the imperial West,regardless of whether represented in the French occupation or the British. I mean thatthe Islamic intellect behaved consciously when it distinguished between what wasrelated to civilization in the West and what was political; and, it did not begin from apoint of rejection or opposition to whatever was Western as transpired in the 1950swhere such was ascendant in the shadow of the confrontation between the Egyptiannationalist movement and British colonialism, which resulted in the July 1952Revolution. The situation was factoring in emergence of a distinct critical view of theWestern Liberal experience, and it is the view which crystallized after the Revolutionin the call for an independent Arab initiative; which would fight an engagement withthe Western system, shortly thereafter.

Some months before the July 1952 Revolution, the book Islamic Political Theoriesby Professor of History at Dar al-‘Ulum Muhammad Diya’ al-Din al-Rayyis waspublished in Cairo. We consider him to be the first classifier and discussant of theprofusion of points of correspondence and differences between Islam and democracy,proceeding also in his book from the standpoint of rapprochement and not conflicteven if he remained clear in his delineation of points of distinction and independence.

Given the importance of this early treatment of the issue, we will allow for detailsof it as it is more informative than citing many other sources during the four subse-quent decades which attempted and have not ceased to attempt to delimit the valueswherein Islam correlates with democracy and those in which they differ.

Al-Ray[imacr ] s says: ‘There are many aspects of correspondence between Islam anddemocracy, however the aspects of divergence are more numerous.’55

In delimiting the aspects of correspondence, he directs his reader to the chaptersof his book which deal with the concept of the political contract between the ummahand the ruler and the responsibility of rule. He concludes from this that there are notonly between Islam and the democratic system aspects of resemblance from the polit-ical standpoint: ‘but, rather what democracy contains of elements or the best of thecharacteristics which distinguish it are encompassed by Islam.’

In explaining that he says:

If what is meant by democracy is that it is as Lincoln defined it ‘government of thepeople, by the people and for the people’, then this connotation is represented – withoutdoubt – in the system of the Islamic state – with the exception that ‘the people’ shouldbe understood in Islam in a particular or comprehensive sense.

He continues thereafter:

˘

a h· u

˘

a

ı



If what is meant by democracy is that which has become associated with it usuallyamong the existence of particular political or social principles such as the principles ofequality before the law and the freedom of thought and creed as well as the realizationof social justice and so forth; or the guarantee of certain rights such as the rights to life,freedom and work and what resembles these, then, there is also no doubt that all of theseprinciples are realized and these rights are guaranteed in Islam … except that it is neces-sary to realize that the view of Islam towards these rights, from the standpoint of thenatural origin, might differ. They might be considered rights of Allah, and they might beconsidered rights shared between Allah and the slaves [i.e., humans]; and they might beconsidered blessings and not rights or be ascertained as though they reflect the originalstatus of things or that they constitute the law which Allah posited for existence or al-fi rah (inborn nature). However, despite all that, these differences have no effect on theview of the nature of these characteristics or situations; the result is one, and that is thatthe human being is guaranteed all these matters.

As for the case where what is intended by democracy is that its system is a consequenceof it and it realizes the principle of a separation of powers, then this also is manifest inthe Islamic system. Legislative authority here, which is the most important among powersin any democratic system, is posited with the ummah alone and separate from the authorityof the imam or the head of state. Legislation derives from the Book [i.e., the Qur [amacr ] n] andthe sunnah or the ijm[amacr ] (consensus) of the ummah or ijtih[amacr ] d (independent legal reasoning).In this, it is independent of the imam, and in fact, is above him as the imam is bound andconstrained by it. The imamate, in reality, is nothing more than a leadership/presidencyof executive authority. The judiciary is independent also as it does not adjudicate accord-ing to the opinion of the ruler or the president, but rather does so in accordance with thelegal rulings (a k[amacr ] m) of the shar[imacr ] ah – that is, the command of Allah – and it cannot butjudge this way so long as it is desired for it to remain an Islamic judiciary.

The concept of ijm[amacr ] which is among the particulars of Islamic shar[imacr ] ah and which isunique in its advocacy of it, supports the assertion that it is specific to the ummah and itswill and that it has a position superior to that in which it might enjoy in any other demo-cratic system, however perfect. The Muslims had decreed – before Rousseau appearedand others like him to talk about ‘public will’ and to glorify it – that the will of theummah is infallible and that it is of the will of Allah, and it was made a source of legis-lation (al-tashr[imacr ] ), even if it depends – in the end – on the dual sources of the Book andthe sunnah. From the academic standpoint, this will is represented in the ijm[amacr ] of themujtahidin among the ulam[amacr ] of the ummah ….

Furthermore, he discusses the differences between Islam and democracy and heclarifies them in three matters as follows:

The first matter: the intended meaning of the word ‘people’ or ‘ummah’ (nation) in moderndemocracy as is known in the Western world is a people bounded by geographical bound-aries living in a single region where its individuals are grouped on the basis of connectionsof shared blood, race, language and customs. That is, democracy is directly associatedwith ‘nationalism’ (al-qawmiyah) or racism and it is consistent with fanatical grouptendencies or racism. Islam is not like that as the ummah according to it, in the firstinstance, is not connected to a single place or to blood or language as these are artificialor accidental or secondary connections; the connection, in the original sense, is onenessin the creed (al- aq[imacr ] dah) – that is, in the conception and conscience of everyone who isconvinced of the concept of Islam, from any race or color or nation, and he is a memberin the state of Islam. The view of Islam is humanitarian and its horizons are global. Thisis not prohibitive, but rather this might be necessary in order to realize the public good;it might be obligatory legally that there persist within this public sphere, private spheres– regional or nationalist – for the sake of organization or the realization of national orlocal goals which do not conflict with the general goals. If other connections exist – andthese are oneness of nation and origin, language and other than these – alongside the

t·

˘aa

˘

a

h· a ı

˘

˘

a ı

˘

ı

˘

a

˘

˘

a ˘

˘

ı


318 F. Howeidy

essential connection which is the oneness of creed, this is certainly stronger for the exist-ence of the ummah and the coming into being of the state.

The second matter is that the aims of modern Western democracy, or any democracy infuture times, are temporal or material goals directed towards realizing the happiness ofan ummah or people especially from the standpoint of realizing its demands in this lifeof the world – directed, for example, in the development of resources or the raising ofwages or war gains. However, the goals of the Islamic system or Islamic democracy – ifsuch a term is correct – while it might subsume the like of these goals in this world andmight accord them what they merit of attention while moving away from the conceptnationalist prejudice – combines alongside these, spiritual goals. Rather, the spiritualgoals are first and primary and the highest. Ibn Khaldun says in his definition of theimamate – as we have seen – it is ‘for the realization of the welfare of the people in theafterlife and the temporal follows this when the states of this world all revert – accordingto the Legislator – to their consideration in regard to the good of the afterlife.’ So, theIslamic state ought to consider its works for the afterlife as being the end goal and engagein all good works commanded by the religion, which lead to the good pleasure of Allahand realize the spiritual requirements of the human being. Similarly, it makes the religionor moral law the criterion for measuring its works and its conduct.

The third matter is that the authority of the ummah in Western democracy is absolute.The ummah has the absolute right and possesses sovereignty, and it or the majlis (parlia-ment) which it elects promulgates law or abrogates it. The decisions which this majlishands down become mandatory law which is executed, and these must be followed –even if they come in contradiction to moral law or conflict with general human welfare.Modern democracy, for example, declares war for the sake of sovereignty of a peopleover another or to usurp control of a market or to colonize a place or to attain a monopolyover sources of oil. And, by way of example, it spills blood without end and slaughterscountless human souls, and all of humanity suffers as a result of this.

However, in Islam the authority of the ummah is not absolute like this, but rather it isconstrained by the shar[imacr ] ah: by the religion of Allah, of which every individual isconvinced and obeys. It is not able to behave except within the limits of this law; and,this law is contained in the Book [i.e., the Qur [amacr ] n] and the sunnah. Also, if it is acknowl-edged that the universal will of the ummah is one of the sources of law, then it is under-stood that this will depends on what came in the Book and the sunnah also in some form;and, this right itself might have conferred according to the dictates of the matter by them;and if it is supposed that among the characteristics of the will of this ummah is that it willnot diverge from the truth – that is, it will not deviate from the method delimited by thesetwo sources. The ummah in Islam or, say if you will, in Islamic democracy abides bymoral law and is constrained by its principles; and, the religion has imposed upon itobligations and charged it with responsibilities.

Diy[amacr ] al-D[imacr ] n al-Rayy[imacr ] s concludes from his expose that Islam does not correlatewith other commonly known systems on the political map as the ruler is not thepossessor of sovereignty as Islam is not an ‘autocracy; nor is it the men of religion orthe gods as it is not a ‘theocracy’; nor is it strictly law alone as it is not a ‘nomoc-racy’; nor is it the ummah itself as it is not a ‘democracy’ in this narrow meaning.The correct answer is that sovereignty in it is dualistic, so the ‘sovereign’ is twomatters combined which should remain inseparable. The establishment of the stateand its survival cannot be imagined except with the existence of this correlation.These two matters are one: the ummah; and two: the law or shar[imacr ] ah of Islam. Theummah and the shar[imacr ] ah are the possessors of sovereignty in the Islamic state.

The Islamic state, then, is according to this form, a unique system particular to Islam.The assertion that it correlates to any other known system is not correct; and thus, there

ı

˘

˘a

a ˘ ı ı

ı

˘

ı

˘



ought to be posited for it a special terminology – which describes it according to a termrepresentative of its true nature. And as long as the like of such a term is not clear or hasnot yet been found, it is sufficient now to indicate it according to its comprehensive char-acteristic – that it is an ‘Islamic system’.

He adds lastly that:

If there is no doubt about utilizing the term ‘democracy’ – while minding the previousessential differences, then it is possible to describe this system – in an approximate sense– as a human, global, religious, moral, spiritual and material ‘democracy’ all together.Or, it may be possible – when these connotations are represented in the mind – tocombine all these characteristics in a possible expression and say it is an ‘Islamicdemocracy’.

Fourth: The ceiling remains the problem

In a general sense, most of the subsequent writings which depicted the political systemdid not draw on democracy as a thing attaching to value or function – especially whatis connected to it of shared rights, answerability, and choosing the ruler and theummah exercising its sovereignty in all of that. There is a growing awareness of theindependent element of Islamic discourse, its civilizational initiative. There are anumber of indications which point to the error of comparing between Islam, which hascreedal depth and its broad message which encompasses the dynamic of society in itsentirety in its expressions and practices and moral values, and between democracy asan instrument in the political system. Among that which is said in this context is that‘It is not just nor scientific to term a system which is fourteen centuries old with eithera modern or an ancient term which might correlate to it in some matters yet differ fromit in others.’56

Furthermore, the number of writings has multiplied which focus on clarifying thatal-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] transcends democracy in its role on the consideration of it being a principlewhich transcends the boundaries of politics to administration of other activities ofsociety; and in its original creedal nature and being accounted as an Islamic-legalculpability and not merely a ‘political obligation’. The previously mentioned book byTawf[imacr ] q al-Sh[amacr ] w[imacr ] , Fiqh al-Sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] wa-l Istish[amacr ] rah is the most recent study to treat thispoint at great length.

However, greater caution which preoccupies many researchers and has incited fearamong some of the activists in the Islamic sphere after it was directed towards whatwe have termed the ‘ceiling’ of democratic practice (which al-Ray s touched upon).Is it possible for this practice – if initiated – to infringe upon the shar[imacr ] ah and exceedits bounds? Is it acceptable to submit to the authority of the ummah in democraticdiscourse at the expense of Allah in Islamic discourse?

We find a great faq[imacr ] h such as Ab[umacr ] al-A l[amacr ] al-Mawd[umacr ] d[imacr ] saying of democracy: ‘Ithas nothing to do with Islam, and it is not correct to apply the term democracy to thesystem of the Islamic state.’ He adds that the term ‘divine government’ or theocracyis more applicable in expressing the Islamic system. However, he hastens to cautionthat European theocracy differs entirely from divine government (Islamic theocracy):

It is in Europe a special class of custodians, legislating law for people on their ownaccord, according to their whims and their goals; and, they impose their ‘divinity’ on thegeneral masses of people in the lands while hiding behind the divine law. The like of thisgovernment is more apt to be called Satanic government than it is divine government.57

u a

ı a ı u a a

ıı

˘

ı u

˘

a u ı


320 F. Howeidy

As for the theocracy which Islam brought, our master al-Mawdudi adds:

Its matter is not possessed autocratically by a class of custodians or sheikhs; rather, it isformed by the hands of the Muslims in general, and they are the ones who take chargeof their matter and engaging in their affairs in accordance with what is transmitted in theBook and the sunnah.

Thus, al-Mawd[umacr ] d[imacr ] prefers to apply the terms ‘democratic theocracy’ or ‘divinedemocratic government’ to Islamic government because he grants Muslims in itrestricted popular rule, and executive authority is not composed except according tothe opinion of the Muslims, and by their hands are such removed and such installed.Thus, in all the affairs for which there is not an explicit ruling of the shar[imacr ] ah, thereis nothing decisive except the ijm (consensus) of the Muslims.

Finally, after al-Mawd[umacr ] d[imacr ] affirms the necessity to observe and abide by theshar[imacr ] ah of Allah in the exercise of the ummah of its authority, he says that fromthis standpoint, Islamic rule goes back to being democratic except in the case wherethere exists a decisive text of the shar[imacr ] ah, as it is not for any among Muslims,rulers or ulam[amacr ] to change anything of it. From this standpoint, it is correct toapply the term ‘theocracy’58 to the (type of) rule.

Defence of the democratic value is basic position which is unconstrained amongIslamist researchers whose studies into the Islamic political system and that questionof al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] have increased since the beginning of the 1970s. Rather we notice thatsheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali, known for his traditional defence of democracy since1949 when he published his book Al-Isl[amacr ] m wa al-Istibd[amacr ] d al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] (Islam andPolitical Autocracy) counters Muhammad Qu b who criticized borrowing from otherpolitical schools – and among them democracy – who in his book on Al-Tarb[imacr ] yahal-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah (Islamic Education) opines:

Those who assert in their claims: ‘we take from Islam such and such and we take fromdemocracy and socialism such and such … and we remain Muslims [ought to recall theQur’anic verse] ‘Would you believe in some of the Book and disbelieve in some? Therecompense of whoever does that is none other than disgrace in the life of the world andon the Day of Resurrection, they will be sent to the fiercest torment.’ (s[umacr ] ratal-Baqarah, Q 2: 85)

Sheikh al-Ghazali discusses this view and responds to it in his book The Constitu-tion of Cultural Unity among Muslims saying:

This talk needs to be reigned in as democracy is not a religion to be put in the ranks ofIslam. It is a systemization of the relation between the ruler and the ruled. We considerit to see how it confers individual dignity on the supporter and the opponent equally andhow it sets its legal barriers to prevent the individual from excess and to not encouragethe violator to say with a full mouth – ‘No,’ where he does not fear imprisonment orarrest. … Tyrannical autocracy was the ghoul which consumed our religion and our lifeso is it forbidden to seek good for the Muslims so that they might borrow some of theprocedures undertaken by other nations when they have been subjected to the like of ourtravails? The means which serve our creed and our betterment are a part of generalhuman thought; there is no relation between it and the desired end. We have seen thatadvocates of conflicting philosophies have transferred much in this sphere without anyhardship. The hardship, in its entirety is that we should abandon our religion andrenounce its u [umacr ] l (source principles) and values, out of a predilection for another pointof view, imported from the East or the West.59

u ı

ı

˘

a

˘

u ıı

˘

ı˘

˘

a ˘

u a

a a ı a ıt·

ıa ı

u

s· u



Fifth: two positions from the 1980s: i tiz z (pride) and ikhti m (contention)

While this basic position withdrawn from democratic values remained clear and deci-sive for various contemporary Islamist researchers, the period of the 1980s witnessedtwo additions to it, expressive of an increased caution vis-à-vis democracy. One ofthese came out of differences and exploitation of the civilizational initiative, and theother came out of the rejection of the Western model in all the givens of its experience.

The first position crystallized in what Sa f al-D n Abd al-Fatt , teacher of polit-ical science at the University of Cairo, expressed in his doctoral dissertation that waspublished in the book entitled al-Tajd d al-S y s wa al-W qi al- Arab al-Mu r;Ru yah Isl m yah (Political Renewal and the Contemporary Arab Reality; An IslamicView). His suppositions reflect an orientation of a generation among young Islamistresearchers who were engendered by the ‘[Islamic] Revival’ – al-Sa wah – and whobrought out for us a serious academic endeavour expressing extreme pride in what theIslamic civilizational initiative has to give, decisive emphasis on the affirmation of itsunique and distinctive nature, and continuous warning about slipping into a course ofblind imitation of the Western system.

Among that which Sa f al-D n calls for in his dissertation is the construction of anIslamic political science – independent in its points of departure and terminology; and,he provides a model for that for which he calls. He draws support for his warningagainst the importation of systems of the West – and democracy at the forefront ofthese – on a number of considerations at the forefront of which are the following:

● Whatever is imported from an un-Islamic ummah – with the goal of its benefit– will not yield a good result which will guarantee the utmost effectivenessbecause it does not emanate originally from the conscience of the ummah andthe creed of the Muslims.

● These systems and institutions which are employed to solve the problems of theIslamic ummah will no doubt be entirely or partially contradictory or – in thebest of circumstances – lacking, in what will lead to their distortion.

● Faith in the Islamic creed imposes upon the ummah to endeavour to build itsorganizations and derive its solutions from the Book and the sunnah, in order tocorrect its faith and rectify its life.

● The Islamic creed imposes upon those convinced of it to put to the test anysystem other than its own, regardless of how close the resemblances may bebecause acceptance by the Muslims of that system as it is and without clarifica-tion might lead to submitting to the defeat of their systems and the order of theircreed or to scepticism in regard to them or serve as a means to draw them outfrom their creed.60

Whereas Sayf al-Din proceeds from a point of pride (in Islam) and ends in differ-ences and not a conflict with democracy, there is a segment of the Islamist youth whohave proceeded from a standpoint of anger and confrontation and who have ended inrejection of democracy and opposition to it, fearing it itself and not the civilizationalinitiative it represents.

The literature of the Jama ah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah banned in Egypt represents this latterorientation. In two studies of the Jama‘ah – one on Muh[amacr ] kamat al-Ni [amacr ] m al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ]

(The Trial of the Political System) and the other by the title of Al- arakahal-Isl m yah wal- Amal al- izb (The Islamic Movement and Political Party Work),the group considers democracy to be the antithesis of Islam.61

˘

a s· a

ı ı

˘

ah·

ı ı a ı a˘ ˘

ı

˘

as·˘ a ı

h·

ı ı

˘

a ıa z· a ı a ı

H·a ı

˘

H· ı


322 F. Howeidy

They assert in this that the sovereignty of the people conflicts with the absoluterule ( kim yah) of Allah and that to consider the people to be the source of authorityand legislation is a type of j hil yah (i.e., a ‘period of ignorance’ such as the so-calledpre-Islamic Jahiliyah). This is because the promulgation of law is not granted to anycreation but is strictly relegated to Allah alone. As for freedoms, democracy positsthese without any restraints or conditions, and this conflict with Islamic obedience inaddition to it being a gateway to major corruption. Democracy specifies the principleof multiple (political) parties whereas in Islam there is nothing other than Hizb Allah(the party of God) and Hizb al-Shay [amacr ] n (the party of Satan). Democracy posits equal-ity between people where there is no difference between a believer and an unbeliever(k[amacr ] fir) or a corrupt person (f[amacr ] siq) whereas the Qur [amacr ] n decrees: ‘Should We renderMuslims the like of criminals’? (s[umacr ] rat al-Qalam, Q 68: 35) – Even if the question isposed in a discussion of the afterlife and not the life of this world.

This talk represents an anomaly in the general Islamic discourse; and, despite thefact that those close to the Islamic situation are aware of its limited scope and influ-ence, a person is not able to hold back his astonishment in regard to the extent of itsecho as reflected in the discourse of the media – almost to the extent that the pictureis turned upside down so that one might assume that what is the anomaly is actuallythe norm and the norm is actually the unique exception in this. We would not be ableto indicate this position if it were not for the emphasis on presenting an exhaustivepicture of the methods of Islamist thought vis-à-vis the issue of democracy, even whatmight be limited and anomalous among the trends of this thought.

It seems that this anomaly has exerted pressure on some of our fuqah[amacr ] and hasimpelled them to issue ‘fatwas’ in the matter of democracy to dispel the doubts whichhave been stirred up about it and to put the matter in its correct context.

Sixth: Thus gave sheikh al-Qaradawi a fatwa

The well-known faq[imacr ] h and scholar of u [umacr ] l, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, was asked in Algeria:‘Is it correct that democracy is of unbelief (kufr)?’ And this question was repeated anumber of times to him, so he wrote an opinion on the subject in this context in thenewest printing of his book Fat[amacr ] w[amacr ] Mu [amacr ] irah (Contemporary Fatwas) writing:

What is strange is that some people judge democracy to be a blatant evil, and yet theydo not know it well, do not dive into its essence or aspire to its rationale, with the excep-tion of the consideration of form and themes.

Among the principles asserted by our predecessors among our ulam[amacr ] is that judging athing derives from the conception of it, so whoever judges something of which he isignorant, he is judged to be mistaken even if he by chance happens to hit the markrandomly as this is a shot in the dark. Thus it is confirmed in the had[imacr ] th that the judgewho judges in ignorance is in hellfire just as the one who knows the truth but judgesaccording to other than it.

Is democracy for which the peoples of the world call, and for which the great number ofmasses fight in the East and the West, which some peoples attained after bitter struggleswith the forces of excess, for which blood was spilled and thousands sacrificed – evenmillions – as in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and in which many Islamists see accept-able means to reign in the capriciousness and recalcitrance of individual rule as well asto de-claw political authority from which our Muslim peoples have suffered … is thisdemocracy evil or tantamount to unbelief as some hasty and shallow people assert?

h· a ıa ı

t·a

a a ˘au

a ˘ı s· u

a a

˘

as·

˘

a ˘

ı



The essence of democracy – far removed from academic definitions and terminology –is that people choose who rule them and who administers their affairs and that neither aruler nor a system which they despise should be imposed upon them and that they shouldhave the right to censure the ruler if he errs and to remove him if he deviates. Further, itimplies that the people cannot be driven in directions or towards economic, social,cultural or political modes which they do not acknowledge and with which they are notpleased where if some of them oppose such they are exiled and punished in exemplaryfashion, or even tortured and killed.

This is the essence of true democracy in which humanity finds a direction and practicalapproaches such as elections and public referenda as well as the preponderance of themajority, the multiplicity of political parties, the right of the minority to opposition, free-dom of the press and the independence of the judiciary, etc. So, is democracy in itsessence as we have mentioned it incompatible with Islam? Where does this incompati-bility come from? What is the indication from the operative injunctions of the Book andthe sunnah which supports this claim?

The reality is that the person who considers the essence of democracy finds that it is ofthe heart of Islam, and he disavows that people should be led in prayer by an imam whomthey detest and with whom they are not pleased it. In a ad[imacr ] th (it is reported): ‘For three,their prayer does not rise above their heads so much as a finger-width …’ and hementions the first of these: ‘A man who acts as imam for a people in prayer when theydetest him …’ (transmitted in Ibn Majah). And when this is in regard to prayer, how isit in matters of life and politics? In a sound ad[imacr ] th (it is transmitted): ‘the best of yourimams’ – that is your rulers – ‘are those whom you love and who love you, and for whomyou make supplications and who make supplications for you; and, the worst of yourimams are those whom you anger and who anger you and those whom you curse andwho curse you’ (transmitted by Muslim on the authority of Awn bin Malik).

The Qur [amacr ] n has launched an attack of utmost harshness against rulers who intimate divin-ity on earth – those who take the slaves of Allah as slaves for themselves, such as Nimrudwhose position vis-à-vis Abraham is mentioned along with that of Abraham towardshim: ‘Have you not considered the one who argued with Abraham about his Lord(merely) because Allah had given him kingship? When Abraham said, “My Lord is theone who gives life and causes death,” he said, “I give life and cause death.” Abrahamsaid, “Indeed, Allah brings up the sun from the east, so bring it up from the west.” So thedisbeliever was overwhelmed (by astonishment), and Allah does not guide the wrongdo-ing people.’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Baqarah, Q 2: 258).

This excessive ruler supposed that he gave life and death, just as the Lord of Abraham –who is the Lord of the worlds – gives life and death, and therefore that people ought toworship him just as they worshipped the Lord of Abraham! To demonstrate his claim togiving life and death, he brought two men who were passing down the road and hepronounced a death sentence on both of them without any crime. He executed one ofthem immediately and said, ‘Look here. I’ve given death.’ Then he spared the other andsaid, ‘I’ve given life. Am I not, in this, giving life and death?’

And the like of him is Pharaoh who called out to his people: ‘I am your Lord the MostHigh’ (s[umacr ] rat al-N[amacr ] zi [amacr ] t, Q 79: 24) and who said in jest: ‘O you notables, I have notinformed you of a god other than me.’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Qa a , Q 28: 38).

The Qur [amacr ] n exposes an unholy alliance between three despicable sides: first, theoppressive ruler with intimations of divinity in the lands of Allah who usurps controlover the slaves of Allah and who is represented by Pharaoh; second, the politicalopportunist functionary who subjugates his intelligence and experience to the serviceof the excessive ruler (al- gh yah) and who shores up his rule and tames his people

h· ı

h· ı

˘

˘a

u

u a

˘

au s· s·

˘a

t· a ı


324 F. Howeidy

into submission to him, and such is represented by Hamon; and third, the capitalist orfeudalist who benefits from the rule of the excessive ruler and who supports him andspends some of his wealth in order to gain more wealth from the sweat of the browsof the people and their blood, and such is represented by Qarun.

The Qur [amacr ] n mentions this triumvirate allied in sin and animosity and its standingin opposition to the message of Moses until Allah took them to task. ‘And, We sentMoses with our signs and clear authority to Pharaoh, Hamon and Qarun and theycalled him a magician and a liar.’ (s[umacr ] rat Gh[amacr ] fr, Q 40: 23–24). ‘And [as for] Qarun,Pharaoh and Hamon, Moses had come to them with clear demonstrations butthey were arrogant in the earth, but they could not defeat [him].’ (s[umacr ] rat al- Ankab[umacr ] t,Q 29: 39).

What is incredible is that Qarun was of the people of Moses and not of the peopleof Pharaoh; however, he oppressed his own people and took sides with their enemyPharaoh. This along with Pharaoh’s acceptance of him with him is indicative of thematerial benefit that brought them together despite their ethnic origins and lineage.

Among the great aspects of the Qur [amacr ] n is that it connects between idolatrous excess(al- ughy[amacr ] n) and the spread of corruption which is the cause of the destruction ofnations and their ruin as when Allah the Most Exalted says: ‘Have you not seen howAllah dealt with the:

Ad [people], the people of Aram possessors of high buildings the like of which were notcreated in the lands, and the Thamud who carved out their homes in cliffs. And Pharaohpossessed of [ropes and] posts of those who were excessive in the lands and so corrup-tion was increased in them. Thus, Allah cast down upon them the voice of punishment,verily your Lord is waiting [for you]. (s[umacr ] rat al-Fajr, Q 89: 6–12)

The Qur [amacr ] n expresses ‘excess’ (al- ughy[amacr ] n) with the utterance ‘highness/aloof-ness’ (al- ul[umacr ] ) meaning arrogance (al-istikb[amacr ] r) and attempting to take control of thecreation of Allah through humiliation and draconian coercion as Allah says ofPharaoh: ‘He was high among the excessive …’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Dukh[amacr ] n, Q 44: 31); ‘Verily,Pharaoh was high [and mighty] in the earth and he made its people into factions –weakening one group among them – slaughtering their sons and sparing their women.Verily, he was among those spreading corruption.’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Qasas, Q 28: 4).

Thus, we see that being ‘high (and mighty)’ and ‘spreading corruption’ are corre-lates. The Qur [amacr ] n does not restrict its attack against excessive rulers intimating divin-ity alone, but rather it groups with them their peoples and populations who follow theirorders, who travel in their orbits and who submit to them; and, it charges them (i.e.,the people) with responsibility along with them. Allah the Most Exalted says of thepeople of Noah: ‘Noah said: ‘Lord, they rebel against me and follow him who doesnot increase his wealth or his offspring except in loss.’ (s[umacr ] rat N[umacr ] , Q 71: 21). ‘AndAllah, glory be to Him, says of the Ad, the people of (the prophet) H[umacr ] d: ‘And thoseAd [people] rejected the signs of their Lord and rebelled against His messengers andthey obeyed the command of every draconian and obstinate [ruler].’ (s[umacr ] rat al-H[umacr ] d,Q 11: 59).

Allah the Most Magnificent says of the people of Pharaoh: ‘He frightened hispeople so they obeyed him; indeed they were a corrupt people.’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Zukhruf,Q 43: 54); and

they followed the command of Pharaoh and the command of Pharaoh was not rightlyguided. And his people will be brought forward on the Day of Resurrection and thrown

˘a

u a

u

˘

u

˘at· a

˘

u

˘a t· a˘u a

u a

u

˘a

u uh·˘

u˘

u u

u



into the fire and painful is that into which they are thrown and in agony are those thrown[in]. (s[umacr ] rat H[umacr ] d, Q 11: 97–98)

People are held responsible, or at least in part because they are the ones who makePharaohs and excessive rulers and he is an expression of the masses and the like ofthem when they ask before Pharaoh: ‘What made you Pharaoh?’ and, he will respond:‘I did not find anyone to stand up against me!’

And among those who are most responsible along with the excessive rulers are the‘instruments of power’ – those whom the Qur [amacr ] n terms ‘soldiers (al-jun[umacr ] d)’ and bywhich it intends the ‘military forces’ which are the fangs and claws of political powerand the scourges by which to terrorized the masses if they rebel or think aboutrebelling. The Qur [amacr ] n says: ‘Verily Pharaoh and Hamon and their soldiers were inerror’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Qa a , Q 28: 8); ‘So we took him and his soldiers to task and cast theminto the sea. So see how was the punishment of the wrongdoers.’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Qa a , Q28: 40).

Like that, the Prophetic sunnah attacks the unjust and draconian princes whowould drive people with a harsh stick; and if they speak out, nobody will answer them;and they are those who will disintegrate in fire like a grass mat.

Similarly, it attacked those who march in their orbits and who carry burning incensebetween their hands – among the helpers of injustice. And the sunnah finds fault withthe ummah in which fear is spread so that it is not able to address the wrongdoer. Onthe authority of Abu Musa, it is reported that Messenger of Allah said: ‘Verily in hellfire,there is a valley, and in the valley there is a well called “habhab” and it is incumbenton Allah to make very obstinate oppressor reside there’ (transmitted by al- abar nwith a good isn[amacr ] d).

And, on the authority of Mu [amacr ] w[imacr ] yah it is related that the Prophet said: ‘There willbe imams after me making assertions and none will respond to them for what they say;and they will plunge into the fire like monkeys’ (transmitted by Ab[umacr ] Ya l[amacr ] al- abar[amacr ] n[imacr ] ).

On the authority of Jabir, the Prophet said to Ka b bin Ujrah:

‘Seek refuge with Allah from the principality of fools.’ So, Ka’b asked, ‘What is theprincipality of fools?’ The Prophet replied: ‘There will be princes after me who are notguided by my guidance and who do not follow my sunnah, so whoever believes them intheir lies and supports them in their injustice, such are not of me and I am not of them,and they will not be subject to my defense. As for those who do not believe them in theirlies and who do not support them in their injustice, such are of me and I am of them, andthey will be party to my defense.’ (transmitted by A mad bin anbal and al-Baz r)

On the authority of Mu‘awiyah (through an ascending chain of transmitters): ‘Anummah will not be sanctified if judgments in it are not according to truth, and the weakdoes not take his share from the strong without being spurred’ (related by al- abar[amacr ] n[imacr ] ).

On the authority of ‘Abdullah bin ‘Umar (through an ascending chain of transmit-ters): ‘If you see my ummah afraid of saying to the unjust, “O you wrongdoer”, thenbid farewell to them’ (reported by A mad bin anbal in al-Masnad).

Islam specified al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] as a basis among bases of Islamic life and made it incum-bent upon the ruler to seek council and incumbent upon the ummah to advise, even tothe extent that it made advice (al-na [imacr ] hah) tantamount to religion in its entirety.Among it is advice for the ummah of the Muslims, that is their princes and rulers.

Similarly it made the commanding of what is right and the forbidding of what iswrong a mandatory obligation; rather it rendered the best jihad a word of truth spoken

u u

˘a u˘a

u s· s·u s· s·

T· a ıa ˘

a ı

u

˘

a T· a ı˘ ˘

h· H· a

T· a ı

h· H·u a

s· ı


326 F. Howeidy

to the deviant sultan; and the meaning of this is that it made resisting internal excessand corruption weightier with Allah than resistance against external invasion becausethe first is often times a cause of the second. Indeed, the ruler in the view of Islam isa trustee of the ummah and an employee of it; and it is an original right/duty to takehim to account or to remove him from the trusteeship and especially if he breaks itsobligations.

The ruler in Islam is not an infallible authority but rather a mortal who is correctas well as mistaken, who is just as well as deviant; and, it is the duty of the commonMuslims to block him if he errs and to set him straight if he swerves.

This is what the greatest rulers after the Messenger of Allah proclaimed, the Rash-idun caliphs for whom we are commanded to follower their sunnah and to hold onwith our teeth on the consideration that it constitutes an extension of the first teacherMuhammad.

The first caliph Abu Bakr says in his first khu bah:

O people, I have been given trust over you and I am not the best of you. If you see thatI am right, then support me; and, if you see that I am wrong then block me. … Followme in what I obey Allah, and if I rebel against Him, then you are not obliged to followme.

‘Umar, the second caliph, says: ‘It is a mercy from Allah, anyone that guides me tomy own faults.’ And he said, ‘O you people, any of you who sees in me crooked-ness, then let him set me straight.’ One from among the masses responded: ‘O sonof Khi [amacr ] b, if we see crookedness in you, we will rectify it with the edge of ourswords!’

A woman replied to him while he was standing on the minbar, and he did not findany fault in that, but instead he said: ‘The woman is correct and ‘Umar is mistaken.’

‘Ali bin Abi Talib said to a man who was opposing him in a matter: ‘I have beencorrect and I have erred. Above every one possessed of knowledge is one who knowsbetter.’ (s[umacr ] rat Y[umacr ] suf, Q 12: 76).

Seventh: It is our right to borrow from the particular advantages of democracy

Islam preceded democracy in decreeing the principles upon which its essence persists;however, it left the details to the ijtih[amacr ] d of the Muslims in conformity with the u [umacr ] l(source principles) of their religion and the welfare of their world as well as the devel-opment of their life according to time and place and the renewal of the circumstancesof the human being.

The distinguishing characteristic of democracy is that, during its protracted strug-gle against injustice and tyrants among patriarchs, kings and princes – it was able toarrive at forms and means which are considered, up until today, to be the ideal guar-antees for the protection of people from the domination of draconian rulers.

There is no harm for humanity or its thinkers and leaders to contemplate otherforms and approaches in order that it might arrive at what is better and more ideal.However, to facilitate that and for it to be achieved in the reality of people, we see itnecessary for us to draw on the approaches of democracy in order to realize justiceand al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] as well as respect for human rights and to be able to stand in the face ofthe excess of high and mighty sultans of the earth.

Among the principles specified in the shar[imacr ] ah is that any thing which is necessaryto fulfil an obligation is, itself, obligatory; and, in the case of the demands of the legal

t·

t·a

u u

a s· u

u a

ı

˘



intents of the shar[imacr ] ah, if there is a means specified to achieve these, then such ameans takes the legal force of that intent.

There is no legal basis in the shar[imacr ] ah which prohibits borrowing a theoretical orpractical concept from non-Muslims. The Prophet, in the Battle of the Trench(al-khandaq) adopted the idea of digging a ditch, which was a method of the Persians.

He also benefited from polytheist prisoners at the battle of Badr from ‘amongthose who knew how to read and write’ in teaching the children of the Muslims writ-ing, despite their polytheism; as wisdom is what the believer ought to seek, and whenhe finds it, he has a right to it.

I have indicated in some of my books that it is among our rights to borrow fromothers ideas, approaches and systems that which benefits us so long as these does notconflict with the text of an operative legal injunction or a fixed legal principle. It isincumbent for us to transform and modify what we borrow and to augment it as wellas to give to it abundantly of our spirit in order to make it a part of us and so that itwill lose its original typology.

If we consider a system such as the system of elections or voting, it is – in the viewof Islam – ‘bearing witness’ (shah[amacr ] dah) to the suitability of the candidate. It is neces-sary that the ‘voter’ meet the necessary conditions that a witness must meet – that hebe just and willing as Allah said: ‘And let the just among you bear witness …’ (s[umacr ] ratal- al[amacr ] q, Q 65: 2); ‘and among those who are willing among the witnesses …’ (s[umacr ] ratal-Baqarah, Q 2: 282).

And anyone who bears testimony that someone is unrighteous is righteous hascommitted the major sin of false testimony (shah[amacr ] dat al-z[umacr ] r), and the Qur [amacr ] n hascompared this to taking partners (shirk) with Allah when it has said: ‘So avoid the filthof idols and avoid uttering falsehood (al-z[umacr ] r).’ (s[umacr ] rat al- aj, Q 22: 30). Furthermore,whoever bears witness that a candidate is fit simply because he is a relative or fromone’s town or for some personal benefit which will accrue from him, such a personhas disobeyed the command of Allah the Most High: ‘and engage in bearing witnessfor Allah …’ (s[umacr ] rat al- al[amacr ] q, Q 65: 2).

As for whoever fails to meet his voter obligation, so whoever was competent andtrustworthy failed (to be elected) and someone unworthy wins by a majority whocannot be described as ‘strong and trustworthy’, then such a person has withheld testi-mony (katama shah[amacr ] dah) of the sort which the ummah is most in need. The MostExalted has said: ‘and the witnesses must not decline if they are called’ (s[umacr ] ratal-Baqarah, Q 2: 282); ‘Do not withhold testimony, and whoever withholds it, it is thesin of his heart …’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Baqarah, Q 2: 283).

The like of this can be said, from the outset, in regard to the candidate running forelection and his necessary qualifications. In addition to these constraints and orienta-tions of the electoral system, we will render it – in the end – an Islamic system, evenif it was originally borrowed from others. What we would like to focus on here is whatwe emphasized at the beginning and that is that the essence of democracy is decisivelyin agreement with the essence of Islam if we return to it in its authentic sources anddraw from its pure springs – from the Qur [amacr ] n and the sunnah and the works of theRashidun caliphs, not from the history of deviant princes and kings of evil or from thefatwas among the deviant destroyers among the ulam[amacr ] of the sultans, and not fromthe devoted but hasty who are not well-informed.

Some might say that democracy means the rule of the people by the people andthis is necessarily a rejection of one who asserts that absolute rule (al- [amacr ] kim[imacr ] yah)belongs to Allah; however, this is not a sound assertion. It is not necessary that calling

ı

˘

ı

˘a

uT· a u

a u ˘a

u u H·

u T· a

au

u

˘a

˘

a ˘

h· a ı


328 F. Howeidy

for democracy is suggesting that the rule of Allah belongs to the human being as formost of those calling for democracy, this has never crossed their minds. What theymean and are stressing is the rejection of coercive dictatorship; the rejection of the ruleof the affairs of the people by tyrannical autocrats of deviant and draconian sultans.

True, all that these people intend from democracy is that the people should choosetheir rulers as they wish and take them to account for their actions; to reject theirorders if they contravene the constitution of the ummah – or in Islamic terms: if theycommand rebellion (i.e., against Allah); and to have the right to remove them if theydeviate and sin and do not heed advice or warning.

I would like to note here that the principle ‘absolute rule belongs to Allah’ –‘al- kim[imacr ] yah li-ll[amacr ] h’ is an authentic Islamic principle upheld by all scholars of u [umacr ] lin their researches into Islamic-legal ‘rule’ and ‘the ruler’. They concur that ‘the ruler’is Allah the Most Exalted and that the Prophet conveyed for and about Him – as Allahis the one who commands and prohibits, who makes (things) lawful or forbidden andwho rules and legislates.

The assertion of the Kharijites ‘There is no rule except Allah’s’ is an assertionwhich is true in its essence; however, what is denied to them is their taking the wordout of its context and their interpretation of it to mean the rejection of arbitration(al-ta k[imacr ] m) by a human being in the struggle. This contravenes the text of the Qur [amacr ] nwhich specifies arbitration in more than one subject, among the most famous of thesebeing the arbitration between spouses if dissension occurs between them.

For this reason, the Commander of the Faithful Ali responded to the Kharijites bysaying: ‘a word of truth where what is intended is false’, and he described their assertionas ‘a word of truth’ but chastized them for intending by it what is false. How could itnot be true when it is taken explicitly from the Qur [amacr ] n itself: ‘verily rule is not exceptunto Allah …’ (s[umacr ] rat Y[umacr ] suf, Q 12: 40). The rule of Allah for creation is incontrovertibleand absolutely certain, and it is of two types:

● The universal rule of ordination – kim yah kawn yah qadar yah – meaningthat Allah acts in the universe and implements His command through which hisordinations proceed; and he rules creation according to his sunnan (i.e., norma-tive practices) which do not change – what He has made known of them andwhat not. In regard to this is the saying of the Most Exalted: ‘and Allah rulesand there is no obstacle to His rule, and he is swift of taking to account’ (s[umacr ] ratal-Ra d, Q 13: 41). What is meant here is the rule ( ukm) of Allah in regard todivine ordination not in regard to legislation and command.

● The rule of legislation and command – [amacr ] kim[imacr ] yah tashr[imacr ] [imacr ] yah amr[imacr ] yah – andthis is the rule of culpability (al-takl[imacr ] f); command and prohibition; and to abideby what is best; and this is what was exemplified in that with which Allahdispatched the messengers and in sending down the books; and, in these Hepromulgated the laws, laid down the obligations, made lawful the lawful andforbade the forbidden. This is what no Muslim who is content with Allah as hisLord, Islam as his religion and Muhammad as Prophet and Messenger would reject.

The Muslim who calls for democracy does so on the basis that it constitutes a formof rule embodying the political principles of Islam in the choice of ruler, the specifi-cation of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] and advice, commanding what is right and forbidding what iswrong, resisting deviance and rejecting rebellion (against Allah) – especially if it getsto the degree of ‘blatant unbelief’.

h· a ı a s· u

h· ı ˘a

˘

˘au u

h· a ı ı ı

u˘

h·

h· a ı ı

˘

ı ıı

u a



What confirms this is that the (Egyptian) Constitution textually specifies – alongwith upholding democracy – that the religion of the state is Islam and that Islamicshar[imacr ] ah is the source of law; and this is confirmation of the supreme rule of Allah –that is the supremacy of His shar[imacr ] ah and that it has the supreme word.

An explicit and clear article might be added to the Constitution that every law orsystem which contravenes the decisive principles of the shar[imacr ] ah is void and in realitythis is a confirmation not an establishing (of something new).

Thus, it is not the case that calling for democracy on the consideration that itconstitutes the rule of the people is a substitute for the rule of Allah if there is nocontradiction between the two. If that were a necessary precondition of democracy,then the correct assertion among the rightful among the ulam[amacr ] of Islam is that theobligatory of the madhab is not to the madhab and that it is not permissible to accusepeople of unbelief or being corrupt or taking them to account according to theconstraints of their madhab; as it is possible that they might not abide by thesestrictures – or even, that they might never think about them at all.

Among the evidences according to this group among Islamists that democracy isan imported principle which has no connection to Islam is that it is based on the adju-dication of the majority and its consideration of it to be the possessor of the right toinstall the rulers and to facilitate matters and to accord preponderance to one of thevarious matters. So, voting in democracy is the rule and authoritative reference andwhatever view passes by absolute majority – or by limited majority in certain circum-stances – is the view which is executed, and maybe this (view) is a mistake or false.

Islam, however, does not account this means and does not preference one opinionover another on the basis of majority agreement to it, but rather it considers it in itsessence: is it correct or incorrect? If it is correct, then it is implemented and even ifthere is only one vote in favour of it or none at all. If it is incorrect, then, it is rejected– even if there are 99 out of 100 votes in favour of it.

The texts of the Qur [amacr ] n indicate that the majority is always in the ranks of thefalse and erroneous and on the side of idolatrous excess (al- [amacr ] gh[umacr ] t) as is exemplifiedin the saying of the Most Exalted: ‘And if you obey most of whoever is on the earth,they will lead you astray from the path of Allah’ (s[umacr ] rat al-an [amacr ] m, Q 6: 116); ‘Andmost people not believers, even if you are vigilant’ (s[umacr ] rat Y[umacr ] suf, Q 12: 103). TheQur [amacr ] n reiterates the like of following Qur anic refrains: ‘and most people do notknow’ (s[umacr ] rat al-a r[amacr ] f, Q 7: 187); ‘rather most of them do not reason’ (s[umacr ] ratal- ankab[umacr ] t, Q 29: 63); ‘but most people do not believe’ (s[umacr ] rat H[umacr ] d, Q 11: 17); and‘however most people are not grateful’ (s[umacr ] rat al-Baqarah, Q 2: 243). Similarly, it isindicated that the people of good and righteousness are the minority as in the sayingof Allah: ‘few of My slaves are grateful’ (s[umacr ] rat Saba , Q 34: 13); and ‘except thosewho believe and work righteous deeds, and few are they’ (s[umacr ] rat [amacr ] , Q 38: 24).And, thus is the assertion turned back on the one who asserts it when he is in erroror mistaken.

In a Muslim society, we ought to be talking about democracy more than those whowork and use their reason and who believe and are thankful. We are not talking abouta society of rejecters or people astray from the path of Allah. Furthermore, there arematters which do not enter into the sphere of voting and which are not subject totaking votes because they are among the fixed principles which do not accept change,except in the case where the society changes itself and is no longer Muslim.

There is no place for voting in the decisive matters of al-shar[imacr ] ah and the basicpremises of the religion and what is known of it of a necessity. Voting is in matters of

ı

˘

ı

˘

ı

˘

˘a ˘

˘at· a u

u

˘

au u

˘a ˘

u

˘

a u˘

u u uu

u ˘

u S· ad·

ı

˘


330 F. Howeidy

ijtih[amacr ] d (independent legal reasoning) which will bear more than one opinion as wellas an affair of the people wherein they may differ – such as in the choice of a candidatefor a particular office – even for the office of the head of state; or for example in thepromulgation of traffic laws or building codes or zoning laws for commercial estab-lishments, factories or hospitals and so forth among that which enters into what thefuqah[amacr ] term ‘deferred welfare’ (al-ma [amacr ] li al-mursalah) such as making the decisionto declare war or not or to impose particular taxes or not; to declare a state of emer-gency; to determine the term of the head of state and the possibility of his re-electionand for how long, etc.

If opinions differ in these issues, would they be left unresolved or would they beresolved? Is there preponderance without a numerical majority, or must there bepreponderance?

The logic of reason and law and reality dictate that there is no doubt about prepon-derance; and, preponderance in a situation of dissent is numerical superiority (i.e., themajority). So the opinion of two is closer to being correct than that of one. In a ad[imacr ] this that: ‘Satan is with the person alone (al-w[amacr ] id), but he is more distant from two’(reported by al-Tirmidhi).

It has been confirmed that the Prophet said to Abu Bakr and Umar: ‘If the two ofyou are in consensus about some matter of consultation, I will not go against you’ (trans-mitted by Ahmad). The meaning of that is that two voices (or votes) take precedenceover one – even if it is the voice of the Prophet, so long as this remains far removedfrom the sphere of promulgation of law and the conveying of that which is from Allahthe Most Exalted.

As we know, the Prophet followed the majority view in the Battle of U ud and hewent outside the city of Medina to meet the armies of the (Meccan) mushrikun whenhis view and that of the senior Companions had been to remain within and to fightfrom within the city – from its streets and alleys.

More clear than this is the position of Umar in case of the six members of the sh[umacr

] r[amacr ] who were appointed for the caliphate, and that the majority should choose one amongthem, and subsequently that it would be for the rest to listen and obey. In the case ofa stalemate of three against three, they would choose a candidate from outside themand that would be ‘Abdullah bin Umar; and if he did not accept, then it would be fromthe three among whom was Abd al-Ra m n bin Awf.

A Prophetic had[imacr ] th affirms the principle of ‘al-saw[amacr ] d al-a a am’ and thecommand to follow it and the term refers to the masses of the common people and thegreatest number of them. It is a had[imacr ] th which is reported a number of ways some arestrong and supported by numbers of ulam[amacr ] according to view of the masses inmatters of the caliphate, on the consideration of that being among the causes of itspreponderance, if there is not a significant number which opposes it.

The imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali took the position in some of his writings infavour of preponderance when two views were equivalent.

There are those who may say that preponderance is what is correct even if no oneis with it; as for what is incorrect, it is rejected even if 99 out of 100 are for it. Whatis decisive and correct in the matters is that which is confirmed and explicitly textuallyspecified in the shar[imacr ] ah and this determines the contention; it does not broker dissen-sion or accept opposition, and this is very rare and that about which is said: ‘the groupdoes not agree with the truth, so even if you are alone [you must].’

As for the cases of ijtih[amacr ] d among those for which there is no text or for which atext will permit more than one exegesis or for which there is an opposing view or

a

a ˘ s· a h·

h· ıah·

˘

h·

˘

u a

˘

˘

h· a

˘

ı a

˘

z·

ı ˘

a ˘

ı

˘

a



one stronger than it, then there is no harm in recourse to preponderance to settle thedispute and voting is one way to do that known to humans and a preferred methodamong intellectuals – and Muslims among them. There is nothing in Islamic lawwhich prohibits it; rather, there exists in the texts and the precedents that whichsupports it.

The first and foremost thing which afflicted the Islamic ummah in its history is theneglect of the principle of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] . The caliphate of the ‘R shid n’ was transformedinto ‘mordacious monarchy’ termed by some of the Companions as ‘Cesarian’ – thatit was infected by tyranny and imperialism – transferred to the Muslims from the king-doms which Allah caused them to inherit; and they should have drawn from these alesson to avoid their rebelliousness and the depraved vices which were a cause of thedownfall of their states.

Furthermore, nothing has afflicted Islam and its ummah and da wah (call) in theModern era except the crimes of tyrannical rule taking control over people by thesword of the arrogant and their gold. Nothing has disabled the shar[imacr ] ah or imposedsecularism and necessitated the alienation of people except hegemony and draconianrule and the use of iron and fire. Nothing has struck the Islamic movement and da wahor punished those engaged in these and its sons and exiled them and turned them intorefugees except the tremendous burden of tyrannical rule – conspicuous at times andveiled at others and in the guise of spurious calls for democracy that the forces hostileto Islam issue publicly and which they confront from behind a curtain.

Islam did not persist and its da wah did not spread nor did its revival come intoprominence nor was its cry raised except through what it was granted of limited free-dom wherein it found the opportunity to respond to the inborn nature of people withwhich it conforms and so that the [amacr ] dh[amacr ] n (call to prayer) for which it yearns may beheard and so that the intellects to which it calls may be convinced.

The first battle of the Islamic da wah, the Islamic revival and the Islamic move-ment in our age is the battle of freedom. It is necessary for all those who covet Islamto stand in a single row in order to call for it, defend it as it cannot be done withoutand there is no substitute for it.

It is important for me to affirm that I am not among those who are enamoured withusing words of foreign origin such as ‘democracy’ and so forth in order to expressIslamic concepts. However, if the term and its use have become widespread amongpeople, then our ears will not be deaf to it; rather it is incumbent that we know itsconnotation when it is spoken so that we do not understand something other than itsreality or confer upon it what it does not connote or what is not intended by thoseuttering it and talking about it. Here, we will have judged it in sound and balancedfashion. It will not prejudice or harm us that the term has come from others as judge-ment does not turn on names and titles, but rather on what is named and content.

In any case, many among writers and those engaged in the da wah use the term‘democracy’ and find no harm in doing so. Abb s Ma m d al- Aqq d authored a bookentitled Islamic Democracy and Khalid Muhammad Khaild went so far as to considerdemocracy to be Islam itself. (This was pursued in our book The Islamic Revival andthe Concerns of the Arab-Islamic Nation.)

Many Islamists seek democracy as a form of rule, a guarantee of freedoms and ameasure of security against the excess of the ruler and for the reason that true democ-racy represents the will of the ummah not the will of the individual ruler and his groupof beneficiaries. It is not sufficient to raise the banner of democracy at a time when itsspirit is being battered in prisons opened wide and whipped with scourges and when

u a a u˘

ı

˘

˘

˘

a a

˘

˘

˘

a h· u

˘

a


332 F. Howeidy

through state of emergency rulings every person possessed of a free opinion is pursuedas well as whoever asks of the ruler ‘Why?’ to say nothing of saying: ‘No.’

I am among those seeking democracy in its being a practical means and as ameasure to realize our goal in a dignified life wherein we will be able to call to Allahand to Islam as we believe in it without us being thrown into the darkness of the gaolsor the gallows and nooses being readied for us.

It remains for me to recall that some ulam[amacr ] have not ceased to assert until todaythat al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] is for the purpose of information and not binding; and that the rulercan seek advice but it is not incumbent upon him to abide by the view of the peopleof al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] – the ahl al- al wa al- aqd. As has been mentioned elsewhere it is clearthat al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] has no meaning if the ruler can seek council and then do whatever hewishes to do – throwing the opinion of the people of al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] against the wall. If suchis the case, then how can these people be termed the ahl al-hal wa al- aqd as they areknown from our cultural heritage, when they neither dissolve nor conclude (any pacts)?

Ibn Kathir mentioned in his tafs[imacr ] r on the authority of Ibn Mardawayh that ‘Ali binAbi Talib was asked about al- azm (i.e., making a decision) in the saying of the MostExalted: ‘And consult them in the matter and when you have come to a decision, thenput your trust in Allah’ (s[umacr ] rat [Amacr ] l- Umr[amacr ] n Q 3: 159); and, he responded: ‘[It means]consult the people of opinion and follow them.’

If, in the matter there are two opinions, then what has afflicted our ummah and hasnot ceased to do so up until today, as a result of tyranny is backing up the assertedopinion with mandatory and binding sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] .

Whatever the differences, if the ummah or the group sees fit to abide by the viewthat al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] is binding, then differences will be alleviated and what is agreed uponwill become mandatory and a legal obligation. The Muslims have their conditions andif a leader or emir is chosen on this basis and this condition, then it is not permissiblehim for to back down from this contract and to abide by another opinion as theMuslims have their conditions and to abide by a contract is an obligatory duty.

When it was suggested to Ali bin Abi Talib that he be sworn the bay ah (i.e., thepledge of allegiance) on the basis of the Qur [amacr ] n, the sunnah and the deeds of the twosheikhs – that is, Abu Bakr and Umar – before him, he rejected this – that is, abidingby the work of the two sheikhs – because if he accepted that it would have been bindingupon him. And in this, Islamic al-sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] . approaches the spirit of democracy, or if youwill: the essence of democracy approaches the spirit of Islamic sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] . And, all praiseto the Lord of the Worlds.

Notes1. John L. Esposito and James Piscatory, ‘Democratization and Islam’, Middle East Journal,

45 (1991), art. 3, p. 434.2. Fahm[imacr ] Huwayd[imacr ] , The Qur [amacr ] n and the Sul [amacr ] n, p. 65.3. Ibrahim Disouq[imacr ] Shatt[amacr ] , Al-Thawrah al-Iran[imacr ] yah, pp. 49–60.4. Ahmad al-Sh[amacr ] m[imacr ] , Riy[amacr ] al-Taghy[imacr ] r fi al-Yaman, p. 90.5. Ab[umacr ] Man [umacr ] r Abd al-Q[amacr ] hir bin [amacr ] hir al-Baghd[amacr ] d[imacr ] , U [umacr ] l al-D[imacr ] n, p. 279.6. Muhammad iy[amacr ] al-D[imacr ] n al-Rayy[imacr ] s, al-Na ar[imacr ] y[amacr ] t al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] yah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah, p. 217.7. Muhammad Y[umacr ] suf M[umacr ] s[amacr ] , Ni [amacr ] m al- ukm f[imacr ] al-Isl[amacr ] m, p. 124.8. Ibid., p. 126.9. Al-Shaykh Abd al-Wah[amacr ] b Khil[amacr ] f, al-Siy[amacr ] sah al-Shar [imacr ] yah, p. 58.

10. Surat al-gh[amacr ] shiyah, Qur [amacr ] n 88: 21–22.11. Muhammad Abdu, al-A m[amacr ] l al-K[amacr ] milah, Jama aha wa aqaqaha wa Qadama lah[amacr ]

Muhammad Am[amacr ] rah, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Al-Mu assasah al- Arab[imacr ] ya l-al-Dir[amacr ] s[amacr ] t wa al-Nashr).12. Mussa, Ni [amacr ] m al- ukm Fi al-Isl[amacr ] m, p. 116.

˘

a ˘

u a

u a h·

˘

u au a ˘

ı˘

u A˘

a

u a

u a

˘ ˘

˘a˘

u au a

ı ı ˘a t· aı a ı

a ı ah· ıu s· u

˘

a T· a a ı s· u ıD· a ˘ ı ı z· ı a ı a ı a ı

u u a z· a H· ı a

˘

a a a

˘

ıa ˘a˘

a a

˘

H· a˘

a ˘ ˘

ı a az· a H· a



13. Ab[umacr ] [amacr ] mid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghaz[amacr ] l[imacr ] , I y[amacr ] Ul[umacr ] m al-D[imacr ] n, Vol. 2, p. 306.14. Ibid., p. 307.15. Hussein M[umacr ] nis, Alam al-Isl[amacr ] m, p. 239.16. Mu af[amacr ] al-Sib[amacr ] [imacr ] , Min Raw[amacr ] i Ha [amacr ] ratina, p. 115.17. Muhammad Asad, Minh[amacr ] j al-Isl[amacr ] m f[imacr ] al- ukm, Tarjamat Man [umacr ] r Muhammad M[amacr ]

(Beirut: D[amacr ] r al- ilm li-l-Mal[amacr ] y[imacr ] n, 1964), p. 19.18. Al-Say[imacr ] d Jaw[amacr ] d Mu afaw[imacr ] , uq[umacr ] q al-Ins[amacr ] n fi al-Isl[amacr ] m (Teheran), p. 24.19. Muhammad Sal[imacr ] m al- Aw[amacr ] , f[imacr ] al-Ni [amacr ] m al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] l-il-Dawlah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ]yah, p. 215.20. Ibid., p. 190.21. [amacr ] fir al-Q[amacr ] sim[imacr ] , Ni [amacr ] m al- ukm fi al-Shar[imacr ] ah wa al-T[amacr ] r[imacr ] kh al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] , Vol. 1, p. 85.22. Al- Aw[amacr ] , Fi al-Ni [amacr ] m al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] li-l-Dawlah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah, p. 229.23. Mar [umacr ]f al-Daw[amacr ] l[imacr ] b[imacr ] , al- uq[umacr ] q al-R[umacr ] m[amacr ] n[imacr ] yah, p. 464.24. Fahm[imacr ] Huwayd[imacr ] , Muw[amacr ] in[umacr ] n L[amacr ] Dham[imacr ] y[umacr ] n, p. 86.25. Ibrah[imacr ] m Ds[umacr ] q[imacr ] Shit[amacr ] , ‘Hadh[amacr ] al-Ta l[imacr ] l al-Dimuqr[amacr ] [imacr ] an al-Isl[amacr ] m wa Nadhar[imacr ] yatihi fi

al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] sah[imacr ] ’, Al- ay[amacr ] t (20 July 1992).26. Y[umacr ] suf al-Qar [amacr ] w[imacr ] , al-Sa wah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah bayn al-Ikhtil[amacr ] q al-Mashr[umacr ] wa-l-Tafarruq al-

Madhm[umacr ] m, p. 59.27. Abu Muhammad Al[imacr ] bin Ahmad bin azm al-Andalus[imacr ] , al- uriq al- ikm[imacr ] yah, p. 14.28. Muhammad Taha Badaw[imacr ] , ‘Ba th fi al-Ni [amacr ] m al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] ’, in Man[amacr ] hij al-

Mustashriq[imacr ] n al- [amacr ] dir an Maktab al-Tarb[imacr ] ah al- Arab[imacr ] l-Duwal al-Khal[imacr ] j bi-l-Ta [amacr ] wunma al-Muna amah al- Arab[imacr ] yah li-l-Tarb[imacr ] yah wa-l-Thaq[amacr ] fah wa-l- Ul[umacr ] m, Vol. 2, p. 127.

29. Ibid., p. 125.30. Tawf[imacr ] q al-Sh[amacr ] w[imacr ] , Fiqh al-Sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] wa-l Istish[amacr ] rah, p. 459.31. Ibid., p. 20.32. Ibid., p. 29.33. Ibid., p. 30.34. Ibid., p. 46.35. Asad, Minh[amacr ] j al-Isl[amacr ] m fi al-Hukm, p. 89.36. Al-Q[amacr ] sim[imacr ] , Ni [amacr ] m al-Hukm fi al-Shar[imacr ] ah wa al-T[amacr ] r[imacr ] kh al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] , Vol. 1, p. 66.37. Al- Aw[amacr ] , Fi al-Ni [amacr ] m al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] li-l-Dawlah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah, p. 179.38. Asad, Minh[amacr ] j al-Isl[amacr ] m fi al-Hukm, p. 89.39. Al- Aw[amacr ] , Fi al-Ni [amacr ] m al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] li-l-Dawlah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah, p. 203.40. Al-Sh[amacr ] w[imacr ] , Fiqh al-Sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] w-al-Istish[amacr ] rah, p. 120.41. Abd al-Q[amacr ] dir Awdah, al-Isl[amacr ] m wa Aw [amacr ] un[amacr ] al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] yah, p. 126.42. Muhammad Shalt[umacr ] t, al-Isl[amacr ] m Aq[imacr ] dah wa Shar[imacr ] ah, p. 440.43. Al-Sh[amacr ] w[imacr ] , Fiqh al-Sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] w-al-Istish[amacr ] rah, p. 293.44. Al-Rayyis, al-Na ar[imacr ] y[amacr ] t al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] yah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah, p. 339.45. Ibid., p. 340.46. Al-Sh[amacr ] w[imacr ] , Fiqh al-Sh[umacr ] r[amacr ] w-al-Istish[amacr ] rah, p. 331.47. Taq[imacr ] al-D[imacr ] n Ahmad bin Abd al- al[imacr ] m bin Taym[imacr ] ya al- ar[amacr ] n[imacr ] , al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] sah al-Shar [imacr ] yah fi

I l[amacr ] h al-R[amacr ] [imacr ] w-al-Ra [imacr ] yah, p. 26.48. Ab[umacr ] Ja far Muhammad bin Jar[imacr ] r al- abar[imacr ] y, T[amacr ] r[imacr ] kh al- abar[imacr ] y: T[amacr ] r[imacr ] kh al-Umam w-al-

Mul[umacr ] k, Vol. 3, p. 585.49. Ab[umacr ] al- asan Al[imacr ] bin Muhammad al-M[amacr ] ward[imacr ] , Adab al-D[imacr ] n w-al-Duny[amacr ] , p. 119.50. Taq[imacr ] al-D[imacr ] n Ahmad bin Abd al- al[imacr ] m bin Taym[imacr ] ya al- ar[amacr ] n[imacr ] , al- asb, pp. 6, 94.51. Muhammad Abduh and Rash[imacr ] d Ri [amacr ] , Tafs[imacr ] r al-Man[amacr ] r, Vol. 4, pp. 162–163.52. Mahmoud Shalt[umacr ] t, Min Tawj[imacr ] h[amacr ] t al-Isl[amacr ] m, p. 567.53. asan al-Bann[amacr ] , Majm[umacr ] at al-Ras[amacr ] il (Mushkil[amacr ] tun[amacr ] fi aw al-Ni [amacr ] m al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] ), p. 398.54. Abb[amacr ] s Ma m[umacr ] d al- Aqq[amacr ] d, Maws[umacr ] at al- Aqq[amacr ] d: al-Qur n w-al-Ins[amacr ] n, Vol. 4, p. 687.55. Al-Ray[imacr ] s, al-Na ar[imacr ] y[amacr ] t al-Siy[amacr ] s[imacr ] yah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah, pp. 378–386.56. Al-Q[amacr ] sim[imacr ] , Ni [amacr ] m al-Hukm fi al-Shar[imacr ] ah wa al-T[amacr ] r[imacr ] kh al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] , Vol. 1, p. 388.57. Ab[umacr ] al-A l[amacr ] al-Mawd[umacr ] d[imacr ] , Na ar[imacr ] yat al-Isl[amacr ] m wa-Hady[imacr ] hi fi al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] sah w-al-Q[amacr ] n[umacr ] n w-al-

Dast[umacr ] r, p. 33.58. Ibid., p. 35.59. Ab[umacr ] [amacr ] mid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghaz[amacr ] l[imacr ] , Dust[umacr ] r al-Wi dah al-Thaq[amacr ] f[imacr ] yah

bayn al-Muslim[imacr ] n, p. 211.60. Sa[imacr ] f al-D[imacr ] n Abd al-Fatt[amacr ] Ism[amacr ] [imacr ] l, al-Tajd[imacr ] d al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] wa al-W[amacr ] qi al- Arab[imacr ] al-Mu r:

Ru y h Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah, p. 90.61. Jama ah al-Isl[amacr ] m[imacr ] yah, research titled Muh[amacr ] kamat al-Ni [amacr ] m al-S[imacr ] y[amacr ] s[imacr ] included in a secret

bulletin ìKalimat al- aqî.

u H· a a ı h· a ˘

˘

u ı

u ˘ ˘

as· t· a a

˘

ı a ˘

˘

d· aa a ı H· s·u ad·

a

˘

a ıı a s· t· ı H· u a a

ı

˘

a ı z· a ı a ı a ı

Z· a a ı z· a H· ı

˘

a ı a ı˘

a z· a ı a ı a ıu

˘

a ı ı H· u u a ıı ı at· u a ı uı u ı a a d· ı at·ı

˘a ı

ı a ı H· au d· a ı h· a ı a u

˘

u ˘

ı H· ı T· H· ıı h· z· a ı a ı a ı a

ı S· a

˘

ı

˘

ı ı

˘

a˘

z·

˘

ı ı a

˘

u

ı a ı u a a

a aa ı z· a ı

˘

a ı a ı˘

a z· a ı a ı a ıa a˘

a z· a ı a ı a ıa ı u a a˘

a

˘

a d· a

˘

a ı a ıu a

˘

ı ıa ı u a a

z· ı a ı a ı a ı

a ı u a aı ı

˘

H· ı ı H· a ı ı a

˘

ıs· a a

˘

ı

˘

ıu

˘

ı T· ı a ı T· ı a ıu

u H·

˘

ı a ı ı aı ı

˘

H· ı ı H· a ı H·ı d· a ı au ı a a

H· a u

˘

a ˘ a a D·

˘ z· a a ı˘

a h· u

˘

a u

˘ ˘

a ˘a aı z· ı a a ı a ı

a ı z· a ı

˘

a ı a ıu

˘

a u ı z· ı a ı ı a a uu

u H· a a ı u h· a ıı

ı ı

˘

ah· a

˘

ı ı ı a ı a

˘ ˘

ı

˘

as·˘a a ı˘

a ı a z· a ı a ıH·


Documents

Islam and Democracy Contemp SArab Affairs 3.3.July Sept 2010