Isaiah Berlin: Liberalism and pluralism in theory and … · Isaiah Berlin: Liberalism and pluralism in theory ... appeared simultaneously with Crowder’s initial critique)

Feature Article: Political Theory Revisited

Isaiah Berlin: Liberalism and pluralism in theory

and practice

Jason FerrellDepartment of Political Science, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal QC

H3A 2T7, Canada.

E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract One of the most pressing dilemmas of the moment concerns pluralismand the issue of justification: how does one defend a commitment to any particularposition? The fear is that pluralism undercuts our ability to justify our moraland political views, and thereby leads to relativism. As I argue here, Isaiah Berlinprovides an exemplary argument concerning the ties between pluralism andliberalism. Although Berlin admits there is no logical link between pluralism andliberalism, he nevertheless highlights plausible ties between pluralism and the fieldsof philosophy, history and politics, all of which provide good reasons for him toendorse liberalism. Moreover, these arguments indicate how pluralism differs fromrelativism, so that pluralists such as Berlin are not guilty of the charge of moralsubjectivism. A reconsideration of Berlin’s position thus provides insight into theproblem of justification in a pluralist condition, one that illuminates certainfeatures of pluralism, as well as exemplifies its compatibility with liberalism.Contemporary Political Theory (2009) 8, 295–316. doi:10.1057/cpt.2009.2

Keywords: Isaiah Berlin; liberalism; pluralism; relativism; philosophy; history

Introduction

One of the most pressing dilemmas of the contemporary moment revolvesaround the idea of value pluralism. The issue, in its simplest form, concerns theproblem of justification: given the condition of value pluralism, how can onedefend a commitment to any particular moral or political position? Although theproblem of justification has been a perennial one in the history of politicalthought, it has become especially troublesome today, as there has been wide-spread acknowledgment that there are no uncontestable universal standards bywhich we may evaluate competing moral views (Nagel, 1979, p. 134f.; Walzer,1983, p. 4f.; Taylor, 1993, p. 17f.; Habermas, 2001, p. xxxix; Williams, 2002,p. 1f.; Rawls, 2005, p. 63f.). As Alasdair MacIntyre asks: ‘How ought we to

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decide among the claims of rival and incompatible accounts of justice competingfor our moral, social, and political allegiance?’ (Macintyre, 1988, p. 2). Theconcern is that given a variety of values and multiplicity of moral beliefs, everyone is as valid as the other. In such a situation it is feared that our choices arenecessarily subjective, as our justifications reflect our own personal preferences,viewpoints or circumstances (Williams, 1985, p. 156f.). Thus it is claimed thatmoral pluralism highlights the necessity of choice, but does not provide anyguidance as to how those choices should be made (Crowder, 1994, p. 295).

Of the many theorists who have written about the problems of moralpluralism none has been more influential than Isaiah Berlin. Berlin’s writingson pluralism are among the earliest contemporary treatments of this idea, andhis views have been used as a jumping off point by others for their ownarguments.1 Two notable disputes have arisen as a result of Berlin’s work, thefirst concerning the success of his own attempt to reconcile liberalism andpluralism, the second concerning the more general question of whether or notliberalism and pluralism can be reconciled. The two disputes can be linked, asBerlin’s arguments can be taken to exemplify the more general problemssurrounding the relations between liberalism and pluralism. So far as the firstspecific dispute goes, the common belief is that Berlin actually fails to reconcilehis commitment to both liberalism and pluralism. Berlin’s writings, whichrange over a variety of subjects, are held to be too disparate to render a concise,defensible account of his commitment to liberalism. Consequently, it is thoughtthat further arguments are necessary if his defence of liberalism is to be credible(Galipeau, 1994, p. 176f.; Riley, 2000, p. 120f., 2001, p. 283f.; Lukes, 2003a,pp. 100–105; Crowder, 2004, p. 11, 2007, p. 207f.).

So far as the second dispute goes, the idea here is that Berlin’s discussionexemplifies the subversive nature of moral pluralism (Beiner, 1992, pp. 59–60;Lukes, 2003b, p. 93f.). Because pluralism encompasses all values it supposedlycannot privilege any given constellation of values, and this is an especiallynotable problem given Berlin’s inability to defend his own liberal beliefs.For some, such as John Gray and Richard Rorty, Berlin’s views and thecomplications they invite are liberating (Rorty, 1989, pp. 45–47 and Gray, 1996,p. 142f.). For others, such as Michael Sandel and Leo Strauss, the shortcomingsof Berlin’s arguments are indicative of broader problems contemporary liberalsface (Sandel, 1984, p. 8 and Strauss, 1989, p. 17). Consequently, according to thesecond set of disputes, Berlin is, at best, someone who highlights the contingentand tenuous nature of our moral and political commitments, at worst, a relativist(Hausheer, 1980, p. xlix; Kocis, 1980, p. 51; Sandel, 1984, p. 8; Strauss, 1989,p. 17f.; Tamir, 1991, p. 158; McKinney, 1992, p. 405; Ignatieff, 1998, p. 286;Kateb, 1999; and Baghramian and Ingram, 2000, p. 3f.).

In this essay, I wish to reconsider the question of Berlin’s pluralist defence ofliberalism. As I shall argue, Berlin’s views about pluralism provide an

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insightful defense of liberalism, but not along the lines others have suggested.Where others have fastened upon specific claims Berlin makes concerning thelinks between liberalism and pluralism, I would like to highlight the congruencebetween different arguments he marshals, arguments concerning the nature ofphilosophy, history and politics. As will be seen, Berlin says different things indifferent places about the direct relationship between liberalism and pluralism,and the incongruity between these claims appears to render his positionproblematic, if not inconsistent. Despite this, however, a plausible defence ofBerlin’s position can be constructed – one that encourages a reconsideration ofhis basic views, as well as the broader consequences of moral pluralism. As I willshow, the strongest defence of Berlin does not relate liberalism to pluralismdirectly so much as joins them together by way of other concepts. More, areconstruction of Berlin’s beliefs provides novel insights into various connectionsbetween liberalism and pluralism, especially as concerns the role of philosophy.

My argument shall proceed in three parts. First, I will review Berlin’sposition, and begin with his explicit statements about the ties betweenliberalism and pluralism. As noted, these statements are equivocal, as Berlinsays inconsistent things in different places. Such inconsistency has generatedparticular criticisms of his position, which I will also briefly review. Then I willlay out what I think is a better summary of his position, one that relatesarguments he makes concerning the nature of philosophy, history and politics.My intent will be to show how Berlin does, indeed, provide a consistentaccount of liberalism, given his pluralist commitments, despite the discrepan-cies of some of his explicit claims. Finally, I shall consider the strengthof Berlin’s position. As I will argue, although Berlin’s position remainsproblematic, his argument concerning the significance of philosophy providesgood grounds for thinking that there are reasonable links between pluralismand liberalism. As shall be seen, although Berlin cannot directly deriveliberalism from pluralism, indirect links can be determined through a chain ofconceptual connections. These connections can be interpreted so that Berlin’sargument is logically consistent, and does not transgress the ‘fact/value’distinction. I shall also touch on the distinctiveness of Berlin’s liberalism asregards the possibility of evaluating other moral positions, as well as how hissensitivity to history distinguishes his position from a more ‘cosmopolitan’approach. With this in mind, let me begin with a review of Berlin’s explicitstatements about liberalism and its relations to pluralism.

Berlin’s Explicit Claims Concerning Liberalism

Berlin’s statements concerning the ties between liberalism and pluralism aremultiple and varied. In different places he makes different claims, and it is not

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clear how the various things he says are compatible. Berlin’s mostcontroversial, if not earliest, statement about the relationship betweenpluralism and liberalism is found in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty,’ where hewrites: ‘Pluralism, with the measure of ‘‘negative’’ liberty that it entails, seemsto me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek y theideal of ‘‘positive’’ self-mastery y’ (Berlin, 2002c, p. 216). The controversysurrounds the use of the term ‘entails,’ as it is ambiguous whether Berlinintends this to mean that pluralism is logically linked to liberalism (by way ofnegative liberty), or if there is some other relationship. If Berlin is asserting alogical link between the two ideas, then he is wrong to do so. For as GeorgeCrowder has shown, to make such a claim is to commit the ‘naturalisticfallacy,’ which is to say, it is to derive a normative commitment from anempirical proposition. As Crowder puts it: ‘The mere fact of the ultimateplurality of values, supposing it to be a fact, has no tendency to advance thenormative claims of liberalism or y of any other political doctrine’ (Crowder,1994, p. 293; compare Crowder, 2004, p. 144). Whatever Berlin may mean bythe term ‘entails’ he cannot mean that liberalism is logically derived frompluralism, otherwise his position is indefensible. In fact, as Berlin makes clearin other places, he does not mean this.

That Berlin does not believe pluralism logically leads to liberalism is evidentfrom scattered things he says in various essays, correspondence and conver-sation. His most explicit recognition that there is no logical link betweenpluralism and liberalism comes during an interview with Ramin Jahanbegloo.As Berlin tells Jahanbegloo: ‘I believe in both liberalism and pluralism, butthey are not logically connected’ (Jahanbegloo, 1991, p. 44). This claim isrepeated during the course of an exchange of letters and series of interviewsbetween Berlin and Beata Polanowska-Sygulska. When Polanowska-Sygulskaasks Berlin what he thinks about Gray’s views – which hold that pluralismactually undermines liberalism – Berlin responds:

From liberalism you can’t get to pluralism, because you might have avery despotic and completely dogmatic liberalism which says, ‘This is thetruth; what I, a liberal, say is true, and everything else is false. I don’tallow any disagreement. I have discovered the answer, how to live, andthe answer is liberal.’ So you can be a liberal without being a pluralist.(Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, 2006, p. 213)

Obviously Berlin’s argument is awkward, as he inverts the terms of thediscussion. Rather than address how one goes from pluralism to liberalism, heinstead speaks about how to go from liberalism to pluralism. The point,however, remains the same: there is no logical link between the two ideas. Thisis clarified when Polanowska-Sygulska follows up the interview with a letter,

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and again highlights how Gray’s ‘analysis leads him to a conclusion whichforms the main thesis of his book: Liberalism is not supported by value-pluralism y’ (Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, 2006, p. 81). Berlin returns:‘I think that Gray is perfectly right in saying that a pluralist outlook need notnecessarily be liberal y’ (Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, 2006, p. 84).However, Berlin is more circumspect about the differences between the two inthe rejoinder to Crowder he co-authored with Bernard Williams (and whichappeared simultaneously with Crowder’s initial critique). Although Berlin andWilliams do not explicitly say that pluralism and liberalism are logicallyunrelated, they do acknowledge the conceptual differences when they claimthat ‘concrete discussion’ is more useful than ‘debate about logical possibilities’as regards the ‘weaknesses of liberalism’ and the ‘problems of a self-consciouspluralism’ (Berlin and Williams, 1994, p. 309, emphasis added). Clearly, then,Berlin is aware that pluralism and liberalism are logically distinct concepts, andthat one does not imply, or automatically lead to, the other. Consequently, hisstatement that pluralism ‘entails’ negative liberty (and therefore liberalism)should not be understood as suggesting a logical connection. So how else canhe join the two concepts?

One connection concerns a purported relationship between imaginativeinsight and toleration. The basis of the argument is that there is a common‘human horizon’ that allows for the possibility of understanding others.Because individuals share a common human nature, there exists the possibilitythat we can imaginatively grasp the thoughts and beliefs, values andcommitments, of others. As he puts it in ‘My Intellectual Path’:

If I am a man or woman with sufficient imagination (and this I do need),I can enter into a value-system which is not my own, but which isnevertheless something I can conceive of men pursuing while remaininghuman, while remaining creatures with whom I can communicate, withwhom I have some common values – for all human beings must havesome common values or they cease to be human, and also some differentvalues or else they cease to differ, as in fact they do. (Berlin, 2000b, p. 12)

To the extent that this is the case – that we can imaginatively ascertain the viewsof others – Berlin believes that respect and toleration follow. As he explains itto Polanowska-Sygulska: ‘if you are a pluralist, that commits you to thetoleration of diverse views – not only to toleration but to understanding them’(Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, 2006, p. 93). The idea (again, awkwardlyput) seems to be that seeing the world from another’s perspective means we willcome to comprehend their perspective. Once we comprehend their perspective,we have grounds for respecting them, which means that we have grounds fortolerating them. And toleration, Berlin argues, is a suitable foundation for a



liberal order. As he says: ‘Toleration is the centre of the whole thing; andunderstanding must be presupposed in toleration y [t]here is something abouta liberal society that possesses a width of understanding of different views y’(Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, 2006, p. 93). And again: ‘If pluralism is avalid view and respect between systems of values y is possible, then tolerationand liberal consequences follow y’ (Berlin, 2000b, p. 13). So the connectionbetween liberalism and pluralism seems to be that imaginative insight yieldsrespect, and respect promotes (liberal) toleration.

Although the argument concerning imaginative insight and toleration isclear, it remains encumbered by a notable difficulty. This difficulty primarilyconcerns Berlin’s conception of a universal human nature. Berlin sometimesrefers to a universal conception of human nature when he speaks about thepossibility of understanding others, portraying this concept as a quasi-empirical one that endures over time (Berlin, 1996c, pp. 18–9; Berlin, 2002a,p. 45; and Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, 2006, pp. 39–42). But, as GeorgeCrowder and Henry Hardy note, Berlin’s concept of human nature ischaracterized in two different ways. Sometimes he refers to a ‘human horizon’that serves as the boundary of human experience – the limit beyond whichactions are no longer intelligible as human. At other times he speaks about a‘core’ of human values which are shared by all societies (Crowder and Hardy,2007). Either way, a particular problem arises, which is how Berlin’sconception of human nature is to yield the type of insight necessary for aspecifically liberal order. Berlin’s stated concern is for the differences thatdefine us – for the variety of moral commitments that are the hallmark ofpluralism. But both the ‘horizon’ and ‘core values’ refer to what defines us ashumans; that is, they refer to those universal qualities we have in common.Unless such things are, in some mysterious way, liberal then Berlin’s relianceupon these ideas cannot push us in the direction of liberalism. AlthoughJonathan Riley believes that the human horizon does, indeed, carry a liberalslant, I do not see evidence for such an interpretation within Berlin’s writings(Riley, 2001). Although Berlin argues that a shared human nature provides theopportunity for imaginative insight he does not indicate that either the humanhorizon or our core values are constituted by primarily liberal values. Ifanything, his use of the human horizon, in particular, allows him to clarify howpluralism differs from relativism, not show how pluralism leads to liberalism(Ferrell, 2008, pp. 46–52). Ultimately, because his conception of human natureis defined in terms of what broadly defines us as human, I do not think it canserve as a jumping off point for a defence of pluralism and liberalism, whichindicates that toleration as the result of imaginative insight into ‘core’ values ora shared ‘horizon’ is ineffective as it stands.

Clearly Berlin’s explicit claims regarding the links between liberalism andpluralism are problematic. The direct ties he mentions in his early writings are

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vaguely phrased and contestable, whereas his arguments concerning imagina-tive insight, toleration and the human horizon do not yield the consequenceshe indicates. Nevertheless, Berlin does provide other arguments that highlightthe compatibility of liberalism and pluralism. A plausible defence of hiscommitment to liberalism can be constructed from what he says about thenature of philosophy, the study of history and political practice. It is to thesediscussions that I now turn.

Berlin on Philosophy, History and Politics

The discussion concerning philosophy

For Berlin the pursuit of knowledge is unavoidable as human beings cannothelp but inhabit an intelligible world. ‘Men,’ he says, ‘cannot live withoutseeking to describe and explain the universe to themselves’ (Berlin, 1978c,p. 10). The need to clarify and comprehend the world is, according to Berlin, anecessity, something that arises regardless of other concerns as the humancondition demands elucidation. Philosophy, whose purpose is ‘to assist men tounderstand themselves,’ is an attempt to meet this need, that is, it is an attemptto render the human condition explicable (Berlin, 1978c, p. 11). Philosophy, asBerlin depicts it, is an endeavor which explores and exhibits those ‘hiddencategories and models in terms of which human beings think y .’ It thereforeprovides guidance or illumination so that men ‘operate in the open, and notwildly, in the dark’ (Berlin, 1978c, p. 10). That said, philosophy is but onemanner, one mode, of exploring and explaining the human condition; thereremain other, equally valid, ways of comprehending life. History and science,for example, also provide men with the means for understanding the world andtheir place in it. Nevertheless, although these fields may often overlapphilosophy, they are yet different engagements.

According to Berlin, what distinguishes philosophy from other pursuits isthat philosophy has no clearly defined boundaries, no agreed uponmethodology or manner of settling disputes. ‘Philosophical problems arisebecause concepts and words and thoughts and ways of formulating andarguing about the world and about oneself come into special sorts of collision’(Berlin, 1996a, p. 61). Berlin repeatedly emphasizes that there are two generalways of answering questions: by empirical observation, and by a process offormal reasoning. As he puts it

The history of systematic human thought is largely a sustained effort toformulate all the questions that occur to mankind in such a way thatthe answers to them will fall into one or other of two great baskets:



the empirical, i.e., questions whose answers depend ... on the data ofobservation; and the formal, i.e., questions whose answers dependupon pure calculation, untrammeled by factual knowledge. (Berlin,1978c, p. 2)

Yet the problems of philosophy are not so readily classifiable, as they do notlend themselves to such easy categorization. Instead, philosophy addressesthose questions whose answers appear hazy, questions that are confusing andlead to disagreements about their resolution. As they do not yield either toempirical verification or to formal deduction, philosophical questions areessentially indeterminate; they are ambiguous, puzzling and frustrating. Hence,individuals frequently answer them by trying to force them into one of the twogiven ‘baskets,’ that is, individuals try to regard such questions as either strictlyempirical or completely formal. Sometimes, such efforts succeed in resolving aparticular problem; they recast the question and open new intellectual vistas.Other times, such efforts fail; the problem remains unresolved, our confusionremains just as acute, our perplexity just as profound, as before (Berlin, 1996a,p. 58). When this is the case, when, that is, individuals continue to struggle tounderstand a given issue or question, a question which defies categorization, itmay be considered philosophical (Berlin, 1996a, p. 9).2 Philosophical questions,then, constitute a third category, another ‘basket’ into which problems that falloutside the boundaries of the other two categories are thrown.

Yet this says little about the specific nature of philosophical questions.Which issues, exactly, does philosophy address? Which problems does it try toresolve? Which answers does it seek? According to Berlin, philosophy concernsitself with our basic cognitive categories, that is, ‘[i]ts subject-matter is to alarge degree not the items of experience, but the way in which they are viewed,the permanent or semi-permanent categories in terms of which experience isconceived and classified’ (Berlin, 1978c, p. 9). Such an engagement encompassesa broad range of ideas:

Purpose versus mechanical causality; organism versus mere amalgams;systems versus mere togetherness; spatio-temporal order versus timelessbeing; duty versus appetite; value versus fact – these are categories,models, spectacles. (Berlin, 1978c, p. 9)

Obviously these ‘spectacles’ comprise some of the individual’s most funda-mental traits, as they are the conditions by which he perceives and judgesthe world. Philosophy, as the excavation of these conditions, regards themanner in which they overlap or come into conflict, the ways in which theyconverge or intersect, their similarities and their differences; it unearths theindividual’s most deeply held values, the standards by which he judges himself

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and others, the beliefs which guide his actions. In short, philosophy lays barethe ways in which individuals ‘think the world.’

At this point it is important to note that Berlin’s discussion seems to considerconflict and confrontation to be conditions of philosophy, that is, disputationseems to be a prerequisite to philosophy. As noted, particular questions orproblems arise which make men reconsider the way they view the world. Suchreconsiderations, however, do not lend themselves to any one particularanswer, but, instead, reveal a variety of responses, many of which are mutuallyexclusive or incommensurable. Because none of these explications candecisively answer or lay to rest the issues at hand, philosophy remains an open-ended endeavor, an engagement that depends upon a variety of perspectives.Philosophy thus assumes a form of pluralism, in that a multiplicity of‘spectacles’ is a requisite to philosophical inquiry. If philosophy were to excludeall approaches to a given question but one, it would become monistic orreductive – it would be little more than dogmatism (Berlin, 1996a, p. 63). Itcertainly would not be the pursuit of truth, which cannot forbid men to askquestions.3 Consequently, for Berlin, pluralism and philosophy are closelyrelated – an important point to which I will return. For now it is enough tonote that philosophy has a conceptual tie to pluralism, as philosophy,according to Berlin, involves multiple perspectives.

But philosophy is not related only to pluralism. As Berlin makes clear, thereare also ties between philosophy and history. Each generation, Berlin argues,has its own particular problem to face, its own peculiar dilemmas to resolve. Ifindividuals are to redress their concerns or solve their problems, they mustlearn to recast their questions – to imagine how received problems relate tocontemporary concerns (Berlin, 1996a, pp. 59, 65–69). Here, then, lies thenexus between philosophy and history, for Berlin believes that the categories bywhich we engage the world are empirically discernible, or manifest inexperience. History provides a record of the values, thoughts, beliefs andmores which underlie a given individual or community, and thereby determinethe way we view the world. Hence our philosophical categories are open tohistorical excavation, indeed, demand historical investigation if we are toresolve the problems arising around them. Philosophy and history, accordingto Berlin, although not necessarily the same engagements, are yet related.

The discussion concerning history

As with philosophy, Berlin distinguishes history from the more formal sciences.Although history utilizes many of the techniques of science, while, that is,it attempts to be rigorous, logical and precise, history itself is not to beregarded as a scientific endeavor. Although historians exhibit capacities similar



to those of scientists, notably a ‘capacity for thinking in general terms,’ they alsoexhibit the ability to regard events as unique occurrences ‘and not primarily asinstances of types or laws’ (Berlin, 1978a, p. 140). Indeed, according to Berlinhistory is concerned with the exhibition of patterns of discontinuity as well ascontinuity, which means that history does not aim at the articulation of generalpropositions or scientific laws. Instead, history is an attempt to relate particularperiods or ages, and the individuals and communities thereof, in such a way thatwe today ‘are conscious of having brought before us not merely attested facts,but a revelation of a form of lifey’ (Berlin, 1996c, p. 25). Unlike science, historydoes not attempt to examine men or communities solely in terms of ‘idealmodels’ or abstract generalizations. Rather, it seeks to explicate those facets ofhuman experience that are particular and fleeting. History therefore differs fromscience in that historical explanation depends upon an intellectual capacity whichis more aesthetic than discursive, a so-called ‘sense of reality’ which is sensitive tothe transitory aspects of human experience which escape scientific articulation(Hanley, 2007, p. 159f.).

The task of science, Berlin reminds us, is to provide laws which relate the‘particular’ to the ‘general,’ that is, the aim of science is to provide an ‘idealmodel’ whose usefulness lies in its ability to describe the behavior of ‘objects inthe natural world’ (Berlin, 1978a, p. 115). Although Berlin notes that it ispossible both to regard men as natural objects and to explain their behaviorscientifically, he thinks that such explanations are partial. The problem is thatscientific explanations often disregard or ignore the most important facets ofhuman experience, for scientists only address that which is observable andexplicable in terms of ‘regularities’ which ‘can be described and locked in labour-saving formulas y’ (Berlin, 1978a, p. 133). As scientists regard men from thestand-point of external observers, that is, as detached and uninvolved spectators,their explanations tend to be staid and circumscribed; they overlook the fact thatmen are ‘active beings, pursuing ends, shaping their own and others’ lives,feeling, reflecting, imagining, creating, [and] in constant interaction and inter-communication with other human beings’ (Berlin, 1978a, p. 133). As a result,scientific explanations slight those aspects of human experience which indicatethat men are not merely ‘organisms in space,’ but actors as well. Science, then,when it turns its gaze upon man, presents a picture which is partially inaccurate,insofar as it foregrounds only those aspects of the human condition which areamenable to its particular approach. To the extent that man is a being who hasconstituent features that escape it, whose behavior defies explication in terms ofgeneral propositions, science proves to be incapable of depicting the complexityof human experience. It is this deficiency, this lack of sensitivity regarding thedepths of the human condition, which Berlin thinks history remedies.

As an actor, man is subject to further investigation, investigation thatdemands a fuller account of human experience than that given by science.

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Because his vantage is not that of an external observer, but of an individualsimilarly situated in the human condition the historian is able to grasp thoseconnections between individuals and their context – ‘the interplay of men withone another, of their feelings, thoughts, choices, ideas about the world or eachother or themselves’ – which elude science (Berlin, 1978a, p. 125). In otherwords, because he too is an actor, the historian is capable of excavating thecategories and experiences, which the scientist ignores. Indeed, such excavation isa difficult process, for the categories with which it deals are not readilyaccessible, being so engrained in our conceptions of ourselves, our language andour customs, as to be almost indistinguishable from them. As Berlin puts it:‘these generalisations lie too close to us and are too self-evident to be brought upinto the light by any save those bold and original and independent men ofgenius’ (Berlin, 1996c, p. 18). When they are brought to light, the effect is usuallyquite disturbing, as these categories provide the texture of our experiences.‘Nothing,’ Berlin says, ‘can compare with the experience of being made aware ofthe characteristics of the most intimate instruments with which one thinks andfeelsy’ (Berlin, 1996c, p. 17). In such instances we are made aware of the depthsof life, of the complexity of our existence, of what it means to be human, forthese categories provide the means by which we orient ourselves in this world.Touching them is like touching a nerve or providing an electric shock. It issimply upsetting (Berlin, 1996c, p. 16).

But this is not all, as the excavation of these basic categories also signifiesthe relationship between history and philosophy. By indicating the fabric ofour thought, or of the particular thought of a given individual, group orage, history intimates certain philosophical concerns, that is, history indicatesthose ‘constant characteristics’ which are the subject of philosophy. History,in attempting to provide an account of the particular, necessarily providesan account of the general as well; of the very frameworks which buttressour thoughts and views of the world, of the categories that determine ouractions. The study of history, although not specifically addressing philoso-phical questions, nonetheless provides answers which prove beneficial tophilosophy, as it indicates the fundamental categories by which men live. Ittherefore appears that history and philosophy are complementary engage-ments, insofar as they both address questions which lie beyond the scope ofscience, questions which are opaque, ambiguous and strike men to the core oftheir being. That the answers history and philosophy provide frequentlyprove revolutionary, frequently result in a tremendous re-orientation of ourbasic categories, means that they are not without political import. Indeed,according to Berlin, the political significance of our ideas is not somethingthat should be underestimated. Consequently, a full account of Berlin’s viewsabout philosophy and history requires an examination of political practiceas well.



The discussion concerning political practice

According to Berlin the spheres of history and politics strongly overlap. As ourpolitical experiences are always situated in a particular historical context,history and politics are two comparable endeavors; that is, history and politicsare related engagements. As Berlin says, ‘History is the account of the relationsof humans to each other and to their environment; consequently, what is trueof history is likely to be true of political thought and action as well’ (Berlin,1996c, p. 28). It is not surprising, then, when he asserts that politics provesresistant to scientific investigation; for if the political realm is akin to that ofhistory, and history cannot be scientifically explained, then the same wouldpresumably hold for politics. Indeed, it is upon this ground that Berlinpropounds the idea that politics is less a scientific enterprise than an aestheticone, an engagement that depends as much upon an imaginative grasp ofparticular situations as it does knowledge of abstract principles. As withhistory, the realm of politics demands capacities which lend themselves to anintuitive grasp of context and situation, particularity and differentiation; thatis, the art of politics also demands a ‘sense of reality’ which revolves around anability to note and comprehend what is novel and unique, individual anddistinct. In short, politics requires a grasp of historical context.

According to Berlin, the practice of politics is more of a skill than a body ofknowledge. Although it is true that statesmen often exhibit a form ofknowledge commonly referred to as political wisdom, or ‘common sense,’ thisknowledge is categorically different than that of the sciences. The difference,Berlin believes, is comparable to that between botany and gardening: one is theknowledge of plants, the other an expertize. Although one may learn muchfrom the study of botany, this does not guarantee that one will be able to growplants, or even grow them well (Berlin, 1996c, pp. 32–33). Berlin does not meanto suggest, however, as it may appear, that the study of botany is never usefulto the gardener, but that botany and gardening should not be equivocated. Onemay be an excellent gardener, and know little about the science of plants, orone may know much about plants, and be unable to grow a single blade ofgrass. Similarly, in the realm of politics, one may know much about a givencommunity, the facts of its history, institutions and customs, yet be unable toredress the dilemmas it faces. Again, Berlin is not suggesting that science has novalue for the statesman or politician, or that the sciences are without practicalor political import. Rather he is suggesting that science is not the only, or eventhe best, manner of addressing political issues. As he says:

I repeat: to deny that laboratories or scientific models offer something ...of value for social organisation or political action is sheer obscurantism;but to maintain that they have more to teach us than any other form of

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experience is an equally blind form of doctrinaire fanaticism ... . (Berlin,1996b, p. 50)

The point, then, is to distinguish that mode of understanding humanexperience, which is specifically political from those which are not. In thecase of politics and science, the distinction is fairly obvious, in that the politicalrealm, as the historical, addresses the contingent, fleeting moments which areslighted by scientific generalizations. The realm of the political is the realm ofthe particular. In this, again, history and politics strongly correspond, for bothtake as their starting point the transitory aspects of the human condition.History and politics both address the individual, the unique and the passing.

Still, there must be a means of organizing, or making sense of, the contingentissues which are the subject of the political realm. To be faced with a politicalquestion is to be faced with a problem that not only needs resolution, butalso needs an intelligible resolution – it is to be faced with a dilemma whichrequires a reasonable response. For despite his criticisms of science – hisinsistence that science is a mode of experience with notable boundaries andlimitations – Berlin is not an obscurantist. He claims to be a ‘liberal rationalist,’and indeed, repeatedly insists that ours is a condition which demandsthoughtful consideration, that is, that the dilemmas we face require judiciousand prudential answers (Jahanbegloo, 1991, p. 70). These answers, he indicates,are to be found in the space where politics and philosophy overlap.

As noted, philosophy assumes pluralism, that is, philosophy assumes amultiplicity of responses to the human condition, or a multiplicity of whatBerlin terms ‘spectacles.’ Human experience is such that there are a variety ofways in which men interpret and understand the human condition, or, in otherwords, there are a variety of ways in which men make themselves at home inthe world. Philosophy investigates those categories which do not readily fit intothe empirical or formal ‘baskets’ of science, which means that it investigatesthose categories which deal with questions of moral value (Berlin, 1978b,p. 147f.). Value pluralism, as a constituitive part of philosophy, serves as thenexus between philosophy and politics, as the question of value pluralismdemands a political response. Indeed, Berlin thinks that the most pressingpolitical issues have resulted from the condition of value pluralism, whichfrequently pits one individual, one community, against another. As he pointsout, most political problems do not yield easy solutions; in fact, they oftenrequire painful decisions, insofar as values must be ‘traded off.’ Absoluteliberty, for example, is incapable of being realized with absolute equality,whereas the establishment of full equality requires the curtailment of freedom(Berlin, 2000b, p. 22, 2002c, p. 215f.). The dilemma is that there is simply noway to maximize both values simultaneously. It is easy to see, then, howphilosophy and politics overlap, in that both address, and attempt to remedy,



problems stemming from pluralism, specifically value pluralism. According toBerlin, philosophy brings to light the tensions of pluralism with which politicsdeals. What is less obvious, however is why Berlin thinks liberalism is theappropriate political response to this particular problem.

The Case for Liberalism

As previously pointed out, Berlin acknowledges that value pluralism does notnecessarily entail liberalism, and that given a choice between the security andstability of despotism, and the tumultuous politics of liberalism, individualsmight opt for the former. Yet he thinks such a decision is wrongly made, foralthough there may be no logical inconsistency in choosing a despotic regime inresponse to the condition of pluralism, such a choice carries a high price.The question, then, is to determine upon what grounds one can claim thatliberalism is the best regime.

Berlin indicates his preference for liberalism is partially tied to theconsequences associated with a liberal regime. As he characterizes it, liberalismis a humane ideology that has helped societies throw off the shackles ofsuperstition and false belief; hence his appreciation of liberals such asCondorcet (Jahanbegloo, 1991, p. 70). A similar benefit is attributed toliberalism’s concern for ‘education and rational morality,’ as these provide thegrounds for autonomy, or enable individuals to develop their own beliefs(Belrin, 2002b, p. 59f.). Moreover, liberalism’s emphasis upon negative libertyestablishes boundaries of privacy that allow for the cultivation of self-directedaction (Jahanbegloo, 1991, p. 42; Berlin, 2002a, p. 52, 2002c, p. 173). The lineof argument should be clear: by protecting individuals from the interference ofothers liberalism promotes the conditions of moral agency. As the conditionsof moral agency also require that individuals be free from false beliefs, moralagency requires educated, as opposed to superstitious, individuals. Thus thereis a connection between political liberty, autonomy and education, whichBerlin indicates is a constituent part of the liberal agenda. Liberalism, then, isvaluable because of the benefits it provides individuals as regards liberatingthem from error and providing the grounds for self-directed action.

That liberalism dispels illusion and error indicates a potential tie between itand philosophy. As I have shown, Berlin regards philosophy as presiding overthe ‘general field of undifferentiated human enquiry,’ or as addressing the ‘wholegamut of questions where method of solution is not clear, not given as a part ofthe formulation of the question itself (Berlin, 1996a, p. 57). Philosophy, Berlinargues, is known for demanding ‘wider freedom y upsetting existing values andhabits y destroying boundaries, [and] transforming familiar contours y’(Berlin, 1996a, p. 70; compare Jahanbegloo, 1991, p. 139). Consequently,

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philosophy both liberates and is revolutionary, for it frees the individual fromossified concepts by upsetting the intellectual status quo (Berlin, 1996a, pp.62–67, 70–72, 74–75). This is significant, for Berlin argues that philosophy as aliberating activity entails an explicit tie to liberty in a political sense, specifically,negative liberty. In his opinion, philosophy requires ‘freedom from repression’ –or freedom from external interference – the absence of which would be ‘literallyfatal’ to philosophy (Berlin, 1996a, p. 73). To prevent individuals from askingphilosophical questions ‘is a genuine suppression of a basic interest and need andcraving of human beings’ (Berlin, 1996a, p. 74). This is why, he concludes,‘philosophical activityy is so closely bound up with the existence of a minimumarea of civil liberty within which an individual may think and do what he pleasesbecause he pleases it’ (Berlin, 1996a, p. 75). The tie, then, is that philosophy is anactivity that involves an act of liberation – an act that promotes freedom ofthought. Philosophy therefore requires political guarantees. Liberalism, with itsreliance upon the concept of ‘negative liberty,’ can provide such guarantees.

Given these ties between liberalism and philosophy, it is now easier to seehow Berlin goes from pluralism to liberalism. Simply put: philosophyintervenes between pluralism and liberalism. Because Berlin believes thatphilosophy, conceptually, involves pluralism – and because philosophy can bepractically related to liberalism – philosophy stands as a bridge between thetwo. As Berlin argues, philosophy investigates opaque and difficult questions,and does so by bringing to light unexamined categories of thought. To theextent that these categories of thought are diverse and incompatible,philosophy assumes pluralism. According to Berlin, this necessitates somedegree of liberty, as freedom of thought is a requisite for the full flowering ofphilosophy. Again, as he explains it: ‘there is a peculiar connection betweenphilosophy and liberty, philosophy and non-conformity, philosophy and theneed for freedom from repression y’ (Berlin, 1996a, p. 72). If ‘freedom fromrepression’ is understood in terms of negative liberty (the assumption beingthat repression is the result of external interference), then it is clear thatphilosophy is most secure under a liberal regime, given the central significanceof negative liberty for liberalism. The link is straightforward: pluralismunderlies philosophy, and philosophy flourishes under liberalism. Liberalism,then, is justified as a response to pluralism, given the significance of pluralismfor philosophy, and given the need philosophy has for a liberal order.

Yet the question remains as to whether or not this is a valid defence ofliberalism. Even if pluralism can be linked to liberalism by way of philosophy,it seems that Berlin still violates the ‘fact/value’ distinction. For his statementsabout philosophy and pluralism continue to be descriptive, whereas his claimsabout liberalism appear prescriptive. If so, then he seems to derive, once again,an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ Is there no way, then, for Berlin to justify hiscommitment to liberalism validly, given his affirmation of pluralism?



I believe it is more fruitful to consider the chain of conceptual connectionswhich link liberalism to pluralism than to worry about whether one can belogically derived from the other. As seen, there is conceptual overlap betweenphilosophy and liberalism, and this overlap allows Berlin to clarify the movefrom pluralism (which underlies philosophical activity) to liberalism (whichprotects philosophical activity). To the extent that philosophy is groundedupon pluralism and requires ‘a minimum area of civil liberty’ philosophy standsbetween pluralism and liberalism. However, I believe the important thing tonote is the way Berlin characterizes philosophy and liberalism. Although Berlinhimself does not specifically make this argument, his statements indicate thatthere is a movement from an activity, which is grounded upon pluralism, to apractice, which is specifically liberal. If philosophy is regarded as an intellectualpursuit (as Berlin suggests) – and if liberalism is regarded as a particular formof political practice (which Berlin also suggests) – then the movement fromphilosophy to liberalism is a movement between two types of activities. Inother words, the movement from philosophy to liberalism involves a sequenceof factual claims, which refer to philosophy and liberalism as empirical, ratherthan normative, pursuits. To the extent that philosophy as an activity assumespluralism, whereas liberalism as a practice guarantees the conditions forphilosophy, then philosophy’s relation to liberalism can conceivably joinliberalism and pluralism without error. Nothing in the connection necessarilytransgresses the ‘fact/value’ distinction, as it is philosophy as an intellectualactivity that is tied to liberalism as a political practice. Consequently, the tiesbetween pluralism and liberalism can be understood to refer to the relation-ship philosophy and liberalism share practically. Berlin’s position, then, ispotentially defensible, if one allows for the connections noted and emphasizesthe nature of philosophy and liberalism as activities. Although such a defencegoes slightly beyond Berlin’s explicit statements, it nevertheless stays true to thetemper of his general commitments. For Berlin does describe philosophy,liberalism and pluralism as noted, even if he does not specifically characterizethem together in this exact fashion.

Two further things need to be noted. First, Berlin believes it is possible toevaluate or judge the content of others’ beliefs. In this he differs from otherliberals, such as John Rawls, who also writes about pluralism.4 Rawls, forinstance, is primarily concerned about the way pluralism affects the ability toachieve consensus on constitutional matters (or what he terms the ‘politicalframework’). His discussion revolves around what he calls the ‘burdens ofjudgment,’ or those obstacles to consensus which reflect limitations ofknowledge (Rawls, 2005, pp. 56–58). Because of the burdens of judgment,individuals cannot agree upon a single comprehensive doctrine, which meansthat consensus has to be ‘political, not metaphysical.’ This has implications forpolitical discourse, as Rawls argues it is illegitimate to urge the truth of one’s

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own beliefs for political purposes, or to justify political claims in reference toone’s comprehensive beliefs. The reason why is simple: such justifications areexclusive rather than inclusive, and tempt individuals to use the power of theState to impose their beliefs on others (Rawls, 2005, pp. 60–62). As Rawlsindicates, the evaluation of another’s beliefs has to proceed in reference topolitical matters, which means it is only legitimate to evaluate others’ beliefsinsofar as those beliefs refer to political concerns. When it comes to politicaldeliberation, evaluations do not extend to the beliefs themselves, as given thespecifically ‘political aims’ of liberalism there is no need to ‘criticize y

religious, philosophical, or metaphysical accounts of the truth of moraljudgments and of their validity’ (Rawls, 2005, p. 127f.). Evaluation only refersto the beliefs as they relate to politics, never back to the validity of the beliefsthemselves. As he characterizes his vision of liberal pluralism, it ‘does withoutthe concept of truth,’ which is to say, it does not judge or evaluate thetruthfulness of the beliefs individuals hold (Rawls, 2005, p. 94).

Berlin’s position is different. Berlin would agree it is wrong to use the power ofthe State to persecute others, but disagree about the possibility of evaluatingcomprehensive beliefs. This is seen, for instance, when Berlin discusses Nazism.As he characterizes it, Nazism is not an impenetrable dogma or form ofmadness; it is, instead, a fully intelligible position. ‘I find Nazi values detestable,’he writes, ‘but I can understand how, given enough misinformation, enough falsebelief about reality, one could come to believe that they are the only salvation’(Berlin, 2000b, p. 12). Berlin does not stop here, however, for he also insists thatNazism is falsifiable. As he tells Jahanbegloo: ‘The proposition that there areUntermenschen is quite simply false, empirically false, demonstrable nonsense’(Jahanbegloo, 1991, p. 38). Here Berlin distinguishes himself from Rawls, asBerlin indicates there are grounds for contesting a position beyond theexclusivity of its claims or intolerance of others. That is, Berlin indicatesNazism can be rejected for more than merely political reasons. Nazism can alsobe rejected because it depends upon ideas and assumptions which are refutableor, as he puts it, ‘demonstrably false’ (Jahanbegloo, 1991, p. 38). As Berlinargues, race does not determine moral superiority, and there is no way tovalidate the Nazi claim that the ‘Nordic races alone are truly creative, and soforth’ (Berlin, 2000b, pp. 12–13). Berlin distinguishes himself from Rawls, then,by arguing that it is possible to judge the content of comprehensive beliefs.Ultimately, the difference between Berlin and Rawls is that Berlin providesleverage for debate about the foundations of a given position; that is, Berlin doesnot confine political judgment to consensus building, or evoke evaluation only asa reaction to intolerance. Evaluation and judgment also extend to an appraisalof the truthfulness of beliefs. Are comprehensive beliefs true? Or are they‘demonstrably false’? In this, Berlin’s conception of liberal political practicedeparts quite dramatically from other liberals.5



The second thing to note is that Berlin’s vision of liberalism is notcosmopolitan, if this means that liberalism is a universal ideology guaranteedto stand ‘the test of time.’ Unlike someone such as Kant, whose defence ofliberalism is predicated upon an assumption of its a priori universality andeternal validity, Berlin’s commitment to liberalism is tempered by hisrealization that institutions reflect contemporary concerns and historicalcontext. This leads Berlin to qualify his arguments on behalf of liberalism. Forexample, he says: ‘It may be that the ideal of freedom to choose ends withoutclaiming eternal validity for them, and the pluralism of values connected withthis, is only the late fruit of our declining capitalist civilisation y’ (Berlin,2002c, p. 217). Obviously such a statement complicates his position, as it raisesthe issue of whether or not Berlin is a relativist. It appears that the contingentcharacter of liberalism implies moral subjectivism, which is to say, it appearsthat Berlin’s preference for liberalism is arbitrary. However, as I have arguedelsewhere, given the conceptual differences between pluralism and relativism itis clear that Berlin is not a relativist. For Berlin logically distinguishes pluralismfrom epistemological and moral relativism, and relies upon arguments about acommon human nature and ‘sense of reality’ that allow him to avoidsubjectivism. This allows Berlin to specify what is shared by individuals in lightof their common humanity, while also remaining sensitive to the particularitiesof context that differentiate societies, cultures, and peoples (Ferrell, 2008,p. 44f.). Thus the historical dimension to Berlin’s thought does notautomatically lead to relativism as sometimes thought (for example, Strauss,1989, and Kateb, 1999). Rather, Berlin’s historicism redirects attention to theties between philosophy and history, and, by extension, liberalism. For asnoted previously, history provides evidence of the categories that philosophyinvestigates. Consequently, whatever conclusions philosophy draws from thisevidence will need to be tentatively put, for as Berlin makes clear, althoughphilosophy can clarify correctly (or incorrectly) held ideas, it cannot guaranteea particular set of ideas for eternity. As he puts it: ‘no solution can beguaranteed against error, no disposition is final’ (Berlin, 2002b, p. 92). Thisholds even for liberalism, which is a modern response to a variety ofcontroversies involving the advent of the secular State, capitalism and evolvingnotions of individual identity (Berlin, 2000a, pp. 111–112). Berlin’s defence ofliberalism, then, is not one that assumes he has final say.

Conclusion

As I have argued, Berlin’s commitment to liberalism stems from his viewsabout the roles philosophy, history and politics play in our lives, and how theseactivities – especially philosophy – encompass certain aspects of pluralism.

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Philosophy draws upon pluralism in that a multiplicity of ‘spectacles,’ orapproaches, is a prerequisite of philosophical inquiry. History, which helpsexcavate and clarify the categories of thought that are often the subject ofphilosophy, as well as provides the empirical content for philosophicalreflection, provides further reasons to think that philosophy and pluralism arelinked. More, the sort of judgment historians utilize is similar to the type ofpractical reasoning exhibited by statesmen, as both engage in activities dealingwith the particular, discrete and unique. Together, these endeavors helpilluminate why liberalism is the appropriate response to pluralism, and helpclarify how someone who is a pluralist can still justify their commitment to aparticular moral or political position. Berlin’s argument indicates that there areactivities which are ultimately constituted by the condition of pluralism –would not exist otherwise – and can only be fully pursued under a regime thatreflects this. For this reason, liberalism, according to Berlin, is the institutionalarrangement which best matches pluralism, as liberalism is the politicalideology that is most responsive to man’s intellectual, historical and practicalcapacities. That philosophy, in particular, plays a special role in the move frompluralism to liberalism is especially significant, for it clarifies the uniqueness ofBerlin’s position. Unlike some liberals, Berlin allows for the possibility ofevaluating others’ beliefs. And contrary to what many critics claim, he is not arelativist as his commitment to liberalism is not subjective. It is, instead, onethat reflects a deep appreciation of the contributions made by various pursuitsto our lives, even as these pursuits themselves exhibit the condition ofpluralism. Berlin’s arguments, then, are instructive, insofar as they indicatehow one can acknowledge the significance of diversity, without being forced toconclude that one’s own views are arbitrary. Pluralism may not logically entailliberalism, but as Berlin shows the two are not conceptually incompatibleeither. Such a lesson – as simple as it sounds – nevertheless remains pertinentwhile there are those who argue that pluralism precludes the ability to justifyour political and moral commitments.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Raia Prokhovnik and the anonymous reviewers for theircomments on early versions of this paper.

Notes

1 For a sample of the various ways Berlin’s thought inspired other thinkers see: Crowder (2002);

Galston (2002, p. 4f.); Gray (2000, p. 85f., 2006, pp. 20–22); Kekes (1993, pp. 12, 60, 93–98);

Rorty (1989, p. 45f.); and Shklar (1989, pp. 28–29).



2 ‘ y the nature of philosophical problems y is that they are precisely those problems which are

not soluble by the application of ready-made techniques, precisely those questions which puzzle

and oppress because they cannot be dealt with by the techniques so successful in the sciences or

elsewhere y’ (Berlin, 1996a, p. 9).

3 The advent of a particular approach to philosophy, which tries to abolish questions rather than

answer them is addressed by Berlin in ‘Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century’. See: Berlin,

2002b, 75f.

4 Other liberals express concerns similar to Rawls about what is basically the idea of neutrality;

that is, the idea that the state should not impinge upon individual’s beliefs. Although the details

of their discussion may differ, the basic idea is the same: a liberal state should not evaluate

competing moral positions. Rawls, however, provides an especially good instance of such

arguments; hence I have fastened upon his for purposes of comparison with Berlin. Still, similar

comparisons could be made with Bruce Ackerman; Ronald Dworkin; Will Kymlicka; Charles

Larmore; and Robert Nozick – although doing so would go well beyond the confines of the

present discussion. See: Nozick (1974); Ackerman (1980); Dworkin (1985); Larmore (1987); and

Kymlicka (1989).

5 This is not to suggest that Berlin’s position is without complications. It is one thing to assert the

falsity of Nazism, another to evaluate the truthfulness of Conservatism, Socialism and similar

positions. It is not clear, for example, how one could demonstrably verify Republicanism, or

falsify Conservatism. There is clearly a form of empiricism underlying Berlin’s argument,

although it is unclear how he would develop this. As it stands, his claims exhibit a rudimentary

‘correspondence theory’ of epistemology (that truth is predicated upon beliefs corresponding to

an objective reality), a position that has historically proven difficult to defend. Still, Berlin

prompts a type of foundational reflection about politics that is contrary to many trends in

political theory today.

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Isaiah Berlin: Liberalism and pluralism in theory and … · Isaiah Berlin: Liberalism and pluralism in theory ... appeared simultaneously with Crowder’s initial critique)