Is There Reason for Skepticism? Joe Cruz Williams College Philosophy and Cognitive Science Thanks to Jonathan Vogel, Melissa Barry, Alan White, Will Dudley,

Is There Reason

for Skepticism?Joe Cruz

Williams College Philosophy and Cognitive Science

Thanks to Jonathan Vogel, Melissa Barry, Alan White, Will Dudley, Tom Kelly, Joe Sheiber, Brad Armour-Garb, and Jonathan Greco for conversation on these issues.

Skepticism• Skeptical arguments aim to be

rationally persuasive.


rationally persuasive.• And therefore must appeal to

epistemic principles.


rationally persuasive.• And therefore must appeal to

epistemic principles; this has often been taken to show that skepticism must be limited.

Skepticism• Seems to retain a potent

repertoire of arguments even if a commitment to reason must be preserved.

My Project• Show that skepticism is a result

of tensions between individual epistemic principles.


of tensions between individual epistemic principles; this might lead to a kind of pragmatic resignation.


of tensions between individual epistemic principles; this might lead to a kind of pragmatic resignation.

• Explore a more confident response to skepticism by arguing that the way the skeptic uses epistemic principles undermines skepticism itself.

Epistemic principles• Rules that state the conditions

under which a set of inputs yields (epistemically) high-quality output.

Epistemic principles• Rules that state the conditions

under which a set of inputs yields (epistemically) high-quality output.

• Prescriptive (though they may retain significant debts to descriptive theories of cognition).

Epistemic principles Examples:

“If a person has a clear sensory impression that x is F (or of x's being F) and on that basis believes that x is F, then this belief is prima facie justified” (Audi, 2001, p. 43).

“If S believes that he perceives something to have a certain property F, then the proposition that he does perceive something to be F, as well as the proposition that there is something that is F, is one that is reasonable for S” (Chisholm, 1966, p. 45).

Epistemic principles Examples:

“Having a percept at time t with the content P is a defeasible reason for the cognizer to believe P-at-t” (Pollock and Cruz, 1999, p. 201).

Epistemic principles• Perception

Epistemic principles• Perception• Memory• Induction• Temporal Reasoning

etc.

Epistemic principles Generic Schema:

Being in mental states 1,...(n-l) is a good (but defeasible) basis for an inference to mental state n in the cognizer.

Epistemic principles• Are content-neutral.

Epistemic principles• Are content-neutral.

But faculty-specific

Epistemic principles• Are content-neutral.• Are not consciously explicit.

Epistemic principles• Are content-neutral.• Are not consciously explicit.

But can be made conscious

Epistemic principles• Are content-neutral.• Are not consciously explicit.• Supervene on agent’s

psychology.

Skepticism Reconsidered Skeptical arguments

Offer the mere possibility of an alternate incompatible but equally explanatory hypothesis.

Skepticism Reconsidered Skeptical arguments

Offer the mere possibility of an alternate incompatible but equally explanatory hypothesis.

Are all such possibilities cogent?

Skepticism Reconsidered• Conclusions can’t be rationally

distinguished on the basis of collateral evidence.

Skepticism Reconsidered• Conclusions can’t be rationally

distinguished on the basis of collateral evidence.

Cartesian (or external world)

skepticism

Skepticism about memory

Humean skepticism

Skepticism Reconsidered What principle?

Skepticism Reconsidered What principle?

If S possesses some evidence e, and if e does not discriminate between two or more conflicting conclusions, then it is not rational for S to believe one of those conclusions.

Call this the discriminating evidence principle.

Skepticism Reconsidered Discriminating Evidence Principle

Is it content-neutral?



If it is*, then DE can be applied to arguments that use other principles, and this is precisely what skepticism does.

* Reflection, Generality of cognition

Skepticism Reconsidered An argument for Commonsense Realism

(1) I appear to have two hands.

(2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to

believe that I have two hands.

Skepticism Reconsidered An argument for Commonsense Realism




Perceptual Principle

e.g., “If a person has a clear sensory impression that x is F …and on that basis believes that x is F, then this belief is prima facie justified” (Audi).

Skepticism Reconsidered Against Commonsense Realism




(3) I may be deceived by an evil demon, therefore

it is not reasonable for me to believe that I

have two hands.


Skepticism Reconsidered Against Commonsense Realism






have two hands.


Discriminating Evidence Principle

Skepticism Reconsidered Pragmatic Resignation


• Perceptual principle and DE are both constitutive of cognition.


• Perceptual principle and DE are both constitutive of cognition.• In mundane contexts, they tend to conflict only locally.


• Perceptual principle and DE are both constitutive of cognition.• In mundane contexts, they tend to conflict only locally, but once made conscious can conflict globally.


• So we must weigh our susceptibility to skeptical arguments against the value of our cognition.





If it is not*, then skepticism itself may be in danger.

* Domains of reason, evolution

Skepticism Imploded? Suppose DE is content-neutral

Skepticism Imploded? Suppose DE is content-neutral

• DE could then apply to itself.

Skepticism Imploded? Some cases

(1) I remember clearly and vividly that my

capacity for applying DE is defective.


believe that my capacity for applying DE is

defective.


(1) I remember clearly and vividly that my




defective.

Memory Principle


(1) I have accumulated a lot of evidence that my




defective.


(1) I have accumulated a lot of evidence that my




defective.

Inductive Principle

Skepticism Imploded?• These cases show that it is possible for someone reasonably to believe that her capacity for deploying DE is defective.

Skepticism Imploded?• These cases show that it is possible for someone reasonably to believe that her capacity for deploying DE is defective.• The mere possibility of these cases can be used in a DE-based argument against skepticism.

Skepticism Imploded?(1) I appear to have two hands.





have two hands.








have two hands.

(4) I may be mis-applying DE, therefore it

is not reasonable for me to retract my

earlier argument.








have two hands.

(4) I may be mis-applying DE, therefore it

is not reasonable for me to retract my

earlier argument.




Skepticism Imploded?• But skepticism does not seem incoherent. What is going on?

Skepticism Imploded?• But skepticism does not seem incoherent. What is going on?• We can have a pragmatic resignation toward the apparent implosion of skepticism.

(But) Is There Reason

for Skepticism?

(But) Is There Reason

for Skepticism?

No.

Documents

Is There Reason for Skepticism? Joe Cruz Williams College Philosophy and Cognitive Science Thanks to Jonathan Vogel, Melissa Barry, Alan White, Will Dudley,