anada’s defence space programme is at acrossroads for the first time since 1986

when the question of the Strategic DefenceInitiative (SDI) connection to the NorthAmerican Aerospace Defence (NORAD)

Command brought forward the need for a re-establish-ment of a Canadian military space policy.1 Fifteen yearslater, Canada has once more been faced with the chal-lenge of deciding which direction its future defencespace programme will follow, and again the matter istied to Canadian-American (CANUS) cooperation andthe issues surrounding missile defence. With often over4000 soldiers deployed in twenty-plus missions acrossthe globe, Canada has a fundamental requirement for thespace assets needed to support its soldiers on active

service. Yet Canada simply lacks the resources todevelop a large-scale defence space programme; there-fore, it must depend heavily on a high level of coopera-tion between the Department of National Defense(DND) and the United States Department of Defence(DoD). Recently, that relationship has been challengedas a result of the costs involved in continuing coopera-tive ventures and the debate over Canadian support forthe American National Missile Defense (NMD) pro-gramme. The issue will undoubtedly be a focal point inthe next NORAD renewal agreement. If CANUSdefence space cooperation shrinks, will Canada increase

Summer 2000 ● Canadian Military Journal 51

IS THE SKY FALLING?CANADA’S DEFENCE SPACE PROGRAMME AT THE CROSSROADS

by Captain Andrew B. Godefroy

Captain Andrew Godefroy is with the Directorate of SpaceDevelopment in NDHQ.

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its indigenous space capability to compensate for the lackof allied support? What are Canada’s choices? Should itpursue a cooperative relationship or would Canada bene-fit from a more autonomous defence space programme?

GHOSTS OF THE PAST

he present status of Canada’s defence space pro-gramme is clearly reflective of its sporadic and

politically complicated past. Geographically, the ColdWar placed Canada directly between the Soviet Unionand the United States of America, a position that led toa central role for the country in North American securi-ty and deterrence against Soviet attack. As Cold War

technology evolved, deterrence came to include missileand space technology. Under the direction of theDefence Research Board (DRB), the Defence ResearchTelecommunications Establishment (DRTE), theCanadian Armament Research and DevelopmentEstablishment (CARDE), and other military and civilianorganizations, Canada directly participated in a numberof defence space projects.2 These projects includedupper atmosphere studies, satellite design and construc-tion, communications, rocketry design and testing, andballistic missile development.3

Between 1957 and 1967, Canada significantlyexpanded its national space programme to the pointwhere the next step would have been to create a formalcivil-military space organization similar to the AmericanNational Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)to direct the country’s national space strategy. By 1967,Canada had successfully developed an indigenous spacestructure, designed and launched the Black Brant rocket,built and launched (with American assistance) theAlouette satellite, making it the third country after the USand Soviet Union to put a man-made object in orbit, andcultivated a budding Canadian space industry.Unfortunately, the national space programme never mate-rialized, and within half a decade of Canada’s centennialcelebration was but a mere shadow of its former self.

A number of factors contributed to Canada’s demil-itarization of space. While the dominant military influ-ence in space projects during the 1950s and 1960s nodoubt contributed to the success of Canada’s space pro-gramme, the defence element was perceived as a contra-diction to the evolving Canadian identity of the follow-ing decade. Canada’s endorsement of the UnitedNation’s treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in 1963and the United Nation’s Outer Space Treaty (UNOST) in1967 were interpreted almost verbatim by Ottawa, andled to the removal of DRB control from most ofCanada’s space projects. The first Trudeau governmentsaw no distinction between the militarization of space(placing military space assets in orbit) and the‘weaponization’ of space (placing weapons in orbit),and moved quickly to deprive Canada’s military of anyspace assets or capability. In 1968, the governmentwithdrew financial support from most defence spaceprojects, preferring instead to concentrate its resourceson the development of a domestic satellite communica-tions system. The difficulty with this strategy was that,at the time, Canada simply lacked the industrial capa-bility to support such a project.4 Meanwhile, the transi-tion from a large defence economy to a civil-social-ori-ented economy during the early 1970s meant that DNDalone simply could not afford expensive space technol-ogy, and government policy denied it any significantsupport from the civilian sector. The schism left the

52 Canadian Military Journal ● Summer 2000

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national space programme as nothing more than a strug-gling, commercially-oriented, internationally-dependentcivilian enterprise.5

Between 1970 and 1986, Canada was not making itsown defence space strategy, even though it was morethan capable of doing so. DND had very limited controlover any space assets, and relied heavily on Americanand allied space support for everything from strategicintelligence to tactical communications. No officialDND space policy existed, and Canada’s defence policygave no official direction. Although the 1971 WhitePaper on Defence placed the surveillance of Canada atthe top of its defence policy priorities, little considera-tion was given to fulfilling this role with respect tospace assets even though the country’s air and maritimeassets could not effectively carry out the task.

CANUS defence space cooperation became increas-ingly limited as the foreign policies of the two countriesmoved in opposite directions. The majority of Canada’sspace projects were not designedwith the intention of contributingto collective security and deter-rence, but rather to meet morepressing national priorities.While the US planned new spaceprogrammes within the contextof threat, economic constraints,and national security, Canadaplanned its space programmeswithin the context of industry,economic parity, and nationalinterest. The distinct nature ofeach approach highlighted thedifference of priorities for spacedevelopment between the twocountries.6 Unfortunately,Canada simply lacked the indige-nous assets to fully develop itsspace programme, and relegatedspace industries to niche sectors,economic parity to short-termgains, and national interest toimmediate benefits over longterm evolution.

In 1981 NORAD was renamedfrom ‘air’ to ‘aerospace’ to reflect the organization’sincreased roles in detection, tracking, and monitoring ofspace activities. However, these and other aspects ofthe new NORAD clearly demonstrated the evolvingdichotomy between Canadian and American space capa-bility in the 1980s. While the US forged ahead in itsapplication of space technology to defence programmes,Canada’s limited capabilities were increasingly margin-

alized. When the American government announced itsSDI programme in 1983, Canadian-American defencespace relations were all but completely severed. WhileSDI was vehemently opposed in Canada, it had a posi-tive effect on the country’s defence space policy.Essentially, SDI initiated a strong policy debate thateventually led to the re-establishment of a defence spaceprogramme in Canada in 1986. Though very modest,the DND space policy issued in 1987 was the first plugin a very large hole that had existed in Canadian defencepolicy for almost two decades.

The destruction of the American space shuttleChallenger in January 1986 also had serious implica-tions for Canada’s space programme. After the maidenflight of the Space Transportation System (STS) in1981, shuttles increasingly became the staple means ofUnited States access to space. In 1982, PresidentRonald Reagan officially designated the STS as the pri-mary launch vehicle for the American national securityprogramme.7 In the hopes that the shuttle would fly

twenty-five missions a year, the United States halted theproduction of Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELV) andphased out its remaining stock. When the Challengerwas destroyed, the US was unable to redirect its pay-loads to other launch systems. The American militarywas literally denied access to space for over two years.In turn, Canada, completely dependent on Americansystems, was also denied the same access to space.

Summer 2000 ● Canadian Military Journal 53

Testing the Communications Technology Satellite prior to launch at the David Florida Labs.

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Despite the rapid alteration of the global strategicenvironment in the late 1980s, and a succession of exter-nal conflicts and internal DND strife in the early 1990s,Canada successfully formulated both a DND space poli-cy and an organization with which to implement it. InJuly 1989, the Chief of Review Services (CRS) tabled acomprehensive report on Canada’s defence space pro-gramme that initiated a series of policy recommenda-tions over the next several years.8 A Space DefenceWorking Group (SDWG) was formed, and in 1992 ittabled its first comprehensive space policy. During thenext four years, the SDWG developed plans and plan-ning guidance documents, which among other itemshighlighted the requirement for an indigenous militaryspace-based capability.9 In 1996, the management struc-ture was then reviewed which resulted in the creation ofthe Directorate of Space Development (D Space D) in1997 under the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff(DCDS). Since its institution, the Directorate has devel-oped a number of initiatives ranging from CANUS spacecooperation to the Joint Space Project (JSP), an omnibusprogramme including several different space capabili-ties. Its mandate included the facilitation of space activ-ities in DND and the Canadian Forces, and strategicplanning for future development. Though seeminglystraightforward, the Directorate has been faced with anumber of military and politically sensitive challenges.

CURRENT POLICY FRAMEWORK ATTHE CROSSROADS

hile the 1994 White Paper on Defence clearlyidentified the necessity for a multi-purpose com-

bat-capable force, it was reluctant to identify that such aforce would depend heavily on an active military spacepolicy and force development. While mentioning spaceas an important factor in the future security environ-ment, the White Paper provided little direction on thedevelopment of Canada’s defence space programme andmade no specific commitments towards space-relatedmilitary projects. The myopic blurring of the milita-rization and weaponization of space was still evident inCanada’s defence policy of the mid-1990s, and it con-tinued to hinder the advancement of, among otherthings, the very multi-purpose force that it wanted toprovide. Only recently has the attitude within the gov-ernment changed.

The many improvements that were made toCanada’s defence space programme between 1987 and1997 were the result of necessity, not vision. With moredeployments to zones of conflict throughout the globe inthe last decade than during the entire period from 1954to 1989, it would have been impossible for Canada tocarry out most of those missions without space support

of one kind oranother. The mas-sive troop deploy-ments of the1990s highlightedthe immediaterequirement foradequate indigenousMilitary SatelliteCommunicat ions( M I L S AT C O M ) .The inc reasedemploymen t ofprecision guidedmunitions demon-strated a growingdependence onaccurate strategici n t e l l i g e n c e ,satellite imagery,and satellite navi-gation and posi-tioning. Also, thegeneral increasein littoral opera-tions by navalforces placed agreater depend-ence on accurate

54 Canadian Military Journal ● Summer 2000

Canada’s RADARSAT has been a critical asset for gathering strategic intelligence in support of DND operations.

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meteorological and geo-detic capabilities. As thegovernment continued tocommit Canadian Forcesacross the world, moreand more space supportwas necessary. Reluctantlyperhaps, the Liberal gov-ernment accepted that themilitarization of spacewas a long-existing factthat had to be publiclysupported if it was to meetother foreign policy goals.The creation of D Space Dwas a sign of that acceptance.

Only in the last fiveyears, after the solidifi-cation of Canada’sdefence space infrastruc-ture, has DND been ableto look ahead to space2020 and beyond. Anumber of challengeshave been readily identi-fied, all of which have aserious impact on futurepolicy development.First and foremost,Canada’s current defencespace policy still requiresa great deal of definitionand elaboration. Therapidity of evolution andchange in space technology requires a policy thatreflects this continual change. Canada’s defence spacepolicy has been updated only every five or six years,which has often left it outdated and unable to effec-tively direct defence planning guidance and forcedevelopment. This has not only affected indigenousspace development but also cooperative defence spaceactivities, particularly with the United States. By con-trast, American defence space policy has received con-tinual attention and yearly modification to reflect newtechnology developments.

Second, the constant fiscal pressure placed on thedefence space programme has made it necessary topick and choose carefully in the course of its devel-opment, ensuring certain core capabilities while yettrying to meet several objectives. This modest efforthas placed Canada in the precarious position of rely-ing heavily on foreign space assistance to meet itsdefence needs. The majority of that assistance hascome from the US, but Canada’s limited budget for

defence space has put considerable strain on thatrelationship. The relationship has been furtherstrained from time to time when related defenceissues have driven a wedge between the policies ofthe two countries.

Third, the differences between Canada and the USin defence policy has created many challenges in build-ing the space cooperation on which DND has come torely. The political divergence has influenced manyareas of cooperation; the SDI of the 1980s and its fol-low-on programmes were but one example. Canadawould, of course, never have unfettered access to allAmerican space programmes no matter how aligned itspolicy were to become. The US has in general pareddown Canadian access to American data over the lasttwo decades, and US security interests will undoubtedlycontinue to deny Canada access to some of its lead sys-tems and certain intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance data. Such restrictions may provide the impe-tus for Canada to develop its own indigenous capabili-

Summer 2000 ● Canadian Military Journal 55

Canada currently has highly developed ground segments at home for recieving satellite data.

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ties in certain fields, and offer niche capabilities lackingin American programmes as leverage towards obtainingotherwise restricted data.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE

recent headline published on the cover of Jane’sDefence Weekly read, “Forget test failure – it’s

Canada threatening NMD success”.10 Though thequote was later discredited as having been taken out ofcontext, it was indicative of the perception thatCanada’s defence space programme has suffered impo-tency and the inability to participate actively in thespace-related defence of North America and Canada-US defence interests. When NMD has been added toNORAD, Canada should be all but useless in NorthAmerican defence. Such attitudes are not recent phe-nomena, and often stem from the fact that those mak-ing policy decisions often have little or no knowledgeof the facts. A recent Senate Committee on Defenceand Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) hearing held on 29February 2000 clearly demonstrated this point.11

During his presentation, the senior Canadian officerserving at NORAD, Lieutenant-General GeorgeMacdonald, had to explain repeatedly to the commit-tee panel exactly what NMD was capable of doing.General Macdonald received subtle expressions of

surprise when heclarified the factthat NMD wasonly a limitedresponse to attack,and that a hundredintercept missilesmay successfullyengage only up totwenty targets.The expressionsof surprise werenot so subtle whenhe pointed out thatunder the currentcommand struc-ture, as DeputyC o m m a n d e r - i n -Chief NORAD,he would be respon-sible for firingmissiles if theC o m m a n d e r - i n -Chief was awayfrom NORAD orincapacitated inany way during amissile attack. Hewent on to empha-

size that NMD was simply an extension of ballisticmissile warning (in which Canada actively partici-pates), and that the segregation of Canadian Forcesfrom NMD activities while remaining a member ofNORAD was not feasible. If Canada was to choosenot to participate, the functionality of NORAD head-quarters would have to be fundamentally reconsidered.

CHOOSING THE RIGHT FORK

espite any contingency planning, the fate ofCanada’s defence space programme rests heavi-

ly in the hands of the politicians, so it is there that thefirst match must be won. It is unlikely that the USwill make any concession towards Canada concerningthe integrat ion of NMD into NORAD. Therefore,Canadian participation, even if symbolic in nature,may be a wise step towards ensuring the longevity ofthe agreement. At the very least it may assuageAmerican concerns that Canada is simply a deadweight in North American defence that should be leftto sink on its own. As future space technologies allbut eliminate Canada’s traditional geographic situa-tional importance, Ottawa will have to rely on pro-viding a share of the security burden rather than rely-ing on the outdated American involuntary guaranteeof protection.

56 Canadian Military Journal ● Summer 2000

RCD troop making use of the INMARSAT Communications System during recent operations in Bosnia. The portable uplinksits atop the rear vehicle.

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Canada must learn from its space past and respondeffectively to its space future. Experience has demon-strated that although unable and unwilling to create acompletely autonomous space programme, Canada cer-tainly has the potential for providing certain key spaceassets in return for status as a junior partner to the US.While the reality of the present situation demands thatCanada continue to pursue a cooperative strategy, theCANUS relationship should not subvert our own nation-al efforts to improve various space capabilities. Simplyfor the sake of sovereignty protection (the number onepriority in the Defence White Paper), Canada mustendeavour to develop some indigenous strategic spaceassets that will provide unfiltered intelligence productsto the decision-makers in Ottawa.

Present and future decisions regarding Canada’sdefence space programme must keep in mind the aimsoutlined in the 1994 White Paper and the currentCanadian foreign policyagenda that has beencommonly referred to asthe “Axworthy Doctrine”.As ‘human security’becomes increasinglycentral to Canada’s for-eign policy, the CanadianForces will undoubtedlybe tasked to provideever-increasing numbersof forces around theworld. Space supportwill constitute an adjunctrole in these missions,linking forces to theirCommander, and theCommander back tod e c i s i o n - m a k e r si n Ottawa. Other spaceassets will be essentialto ensure that Canadiantroops can continue tolive, move and fight inany theatre of conflict.

The civil-militaryduality of Canada’s spaceprogramme must also betaken into consideration.Canada currently has nosatellites deployed whichcarry out solely militaryfunctions. Rather, Canada uses all of its space assets as asingle strategic resource, which, when necessary, mayprovide support to military operations. For example, boththe Search and Rescue Satellite (SARSAT) and Canada’s

own Radar Satellite (RADARSAT) have provided crucialspace support to the military. However, despite this obvi-ous overlap of purpose, Canada has no national spacevision or policy, and the existing civilian and defencespace policies are anything but complimentary or compre-hensive.12 Most recently, gaps and divisiveness betweenthe defence and civilian policy sectors led to serious dif-ficulties over the development and deployment ofRADARSAT-2, and ultimately led to Canada awardingcontracts originally intended for Orbital SciencesCorporation in the US to Alenia Aerospazio of Italy.Though the choice was reasonably defended by theCanadian Space Agency, the US saw it as a sleight and, inturn, other space cooperation issues suffered. Defencewould do well to remind the civilian sector that suchactions have a strategic impact on both programmes, andwhat effects one will almost always affect the other.With a unified, overarching space policy architecture,decisions should be better coordinated in the best

interests of both civil and defence programmes. Inreturn, improvements to defence capabilities will like-ly result from an equal advance made in Canada’scivilian space sector. The two must work together.

Summer 2000 ● Canadian Military Journal 57

RADARSAT imagery capturing up-to-date information on refugee movements during Operation Assurance, 1996.

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LOOKING AHEAD

espite many challenges and hard choices ahead,Canada still has the opportunity to regain much of

the space lost in the last three decades. Decisions must,however, be based on a vision looking ahead twentyyears, not just two or three. Second, goals must be clear-ly defined. The current defence space policy is not suf-ficiently detailed to provide the necessary guidance, andshould be developed more fully to meet selected aims.Third, once a strategy is chosen (and one assumes thatstrategy will coincide with the aims of the White Paper)it must be followed. Too often Canada has chosen adefence policy and force development plan only to haveit flounder when it fails to respond flexibly to Canada’s

evolving foreign and security policy. Space is literallytoo expensive to make such errors, so projects mustreflect the long-term vision of D Space D and DND.Finally, international cooperation is essential to success.Canada simply cannot afford to drive any wedgesbetween itself and its American ally; therefore, futureCANUS cooperation must demonstrate Canada’s will-ingness and ability to act with its partner. Canada’sdefence space programme may be standing at a cross-roads, but this time it has a map, GPS, and an Americanliaison officer to show it the way. There has been nobetter time to act.

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N O T E S

1. Canada completely demilitarized its space pro-gramme between 1967 and 1971 as a result of thedramatic changes in Canadian foreign and defencepolicy brought about by the Trudeau government.When SDI became an issue of concern forCanada, the realization was made that theDepartment of National Defence had no militaryspace expertise or otherwise to even passivelymonitor the issue, let alone act on it. The resultwas the rebirth of a military space policy and theinclusion of space as a factor in the 1987 WhitePaper on Defence.

2. For a comprehensive overview of Canada’sspace programme to 1967, see Chapman, J.H.Upper Atmosphere and Space ResearchProgrammes in Canada. (Ottawa: ScienceSecretariat and Privy Council Office, 1967); forgeneral defence science projects see alsoGoodspeed, D.J. A History of the DefenceResearch Board (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1958).

3. Historically, Canada has been very involved inballistic missile research. For more on Canada’sballistic missile projects, see Godefroy, A.B. TheNorthern Spear: Ballistic Missile Development inCanada 1945-67 (forthcoming); also seeChapman, J.H. Upper Atmosphere and Space

Research Programmes in Canada (as above);anon. “DRB Pioneers Missile Study”, CanadianArmy Journal. Vol.15.3 (Summer 1961), p. 54;DRB. “Rockets Feature 1958 Experiments”,Canadian Army Journal. Vol.13.1 (January 1959),pp. 17-21; and DRB. “Defence ResearchSuccessful in Rocket Nose Cone Firing”,Canadian Army Journal. Vol.13.1 (January 1959),pp. 22-24.

4. The publication of a White Paper on domesticsatellite communications in 1968 by the CanadianTreasury Board President, C. M. “Bud” Drury,simply did not cover the question of constructioncapability and industry support. The move led toserious operation and maintenance costs duringfollow-on communication satellite projects. SeeDrury, C.M. A White Paper on a DomesticSatellite Communications System for Canada(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer 28 March, 1968).

5. Kirton, J. “A Renewed Opportunity: The Roleof Space in Canadian Security Policy”, Canada’sInternational Security Policy (Scarborough:Prentice Hall Canada, 1995), pp. 113-114.

6. Godefroy, A. B. From Alliance to Dependence:Canadian-American Defence Cooperation

Through Space, 1945-1999. (Kingston: RoyalMilitary College MA Thesis, n.p., 1999), p. 64.

7. USA. Government NSDD-42 dated 4 July 1982.

8. Canada. DND. A Canadian Military SpaceStrategy (Ottawa: DND CRS, 1989).

9. Canada. DND. Space Policy (Ottawa, DND1992), pp. 1-3.

10. Seigle, G. “US NMD Lacks Approval FromCanada, NORAD Deputy Says,” JANEs DefenceWeekly, Vol.33, No.4 (26 January 2000), cover andp. 5.

11. Canada. SCONDVA hearing on NationalMissile Defence, Hon. Pat O’Brien M.P., Chair ofCommittee Hearing (Ottawa, 29 Feb 2000).

12. See Canada. DND. Department of NationalDefence Space Policy (Ottawa: DND, 14September 1998), and Canada. Canadian SpaceAgency (CSA). National Paper: The CanadianSpace Programme (Ottawa: CSA, 19 July 1999).

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