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IS CORRUPTION EVER A GOOD THING?Farhan Hyder Sahito
Institute for Software Technology
Graz University of Technology
Graz, Austria
Corruption as one of the oldest phenomenon in human society exists in every country,
and probably no country is free of corruption. Though, the amount certainly differs by
a large margin in different places or institutions (Tanzi, 1998). Corrupt peoples are
considered to be parasites and evils who misuse their position for personal benefits in
an ill-famed fashion. And yet, despite the stigma that it carries, it is a widespread
phenomenon. The World Bank estimates that corruption amounts to 5 percent of the
world GDP or around 200 billion dollars per year worldwide. However, Africa loses
25% of its GDP (Boris et al., 2008).
Common wisdom sights corruption as an obstacle to development and growth. Mauro
(1995) also observed a negative relationship between corruption and investment.
Various other scholars claim that it sands the wheel of economic growth and collapses
political regimes (Gupta et al, 2002; Tanzi, 2002 & Wei, 2000). Corruption is also
considered to be the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development
around the world that links to underdevelopment (Gupta et al., 2002). Others believe
that corruption hinders political development, instability and possible national
disintegration (Hodess, 2004; and Schlesinger & Kenneth, 2002). Various
international organizations: for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank, the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), different (Non Governmental Organizations) NGOs and
Transparency International (TI) are also active in fighting against this barrier on many
fronts (El-Sharkawy, 2006).
Is corruption ever a good thing? According to Gupta and others, at first sight the
question seems ironic and even provocative, because this is a question in which the
opinion and interests of the economist and scholars are likely to conflict (Gupta et al.,
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2002). So, given corruption's complex nature, this question is still controversial
among scholars and economists (Gupta et al., 2002). But needless to say, corruption
and its effects can be seen from a large number of viewpoints and it can be argued
that corruption certainly does have two sides to it (Hislope, 2005).
This article will attempt to answer above question and will advance reverse thesis of
propaganda of international community about corruption. It will argue that corruption
is a good thing and it has many advantages. These arguments will be supported by
various evidences and examples. It will further discuss that corruption is a good thing
because some form of corruption may allow us to achieve required objectives within
ineffective and inefficient environments with better outputs; these outputs are
unachievable, if we are strictly honest and ethical (Lui, 1996). It is also good in a
sense that, it compensates the consequences of a defective bureaucracy and bad
policies and may helpful in economic growth, political development and national
integration.
The main thrust of the article will be centred on the above arguments. However, the
paper will be divided into three parts with an analysis and a discussion. The analysis
will deal with the definition of the concept corruption. An attempt will be made to
look at positive relation of corruption with economic growth, political development
and national integration with underdeveloped countries. That will provide us better
perspective as to why corruption is beneficial. The first part will look at the positive
relation of corruption with economic development. It will be argued that corruption
greases the wheel of the economy that speeds up the process of investment and boost
economic growth. Furthermore, Lui’s (1996) queuing model will be discussed, that
may decrease administrative delay, improves the quality of bureaucracy and made the
wheels of administration turn more efficiently. The second part will discuss that,
corruption is a form of political machine. This machine can increase the political
development by supporting and strengthens political parties. This notion also used to
hold a country together, stabilizing democracy and creates unity that may further
flourish development of the country.
The third part will argue that corruption may play its effective roles in maintaining
legitimacy by integration among minorities and elites of the country. In this part, the
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concept of corrupt exchange will also be explored. It will be argued that this exchange
reduces the possibility of interethnic violence and creates multiethnic coalition that
may foster interethnic peace and nationalism. Finally, a discussion will be made that
will identify that corruption brings many advantages and benefits, especially for the
developing countries. However, these benefits have some limitations. Furthermore, it
will be discussed that, international community has to understand the complexity of
this issue rather than only promoting propaganda against this survival strategy
(corruption) of developing countries.
ANALYSISThere is usually the difficulty to explain the definition of corruption. Because of it’s
complexity it is hard to put forward a dogmatic definition of this concept. According
to the Transparency International, corruption is “the use of public office for personal
gain or “misuse of entrusted power for private benefits.” However, these definitions
of corruption are not agreeable and satisfactory, because there are also evidences of
corruption in private sectors (Thomas & Meagher, 2004). Therefore, the most
influential definition of corruption can be defined as “behaviour that deviates from
formal duties because of private gains” (Mishra, 2006). Yet, some scholars also raise
the question about that particular behaviour. In sum up, we defined corruption in
many different ways, but each definition lacking in some aspect. So, it can be argued
that, this complex concept manifests itself in various ways. As Tanzi (1998) argues
that, “like an elephant, while it may be difficult to describe, corruption is generally
not difficult to recognize when observed.”
Yet these definitions mention above did not justify that corruption is a bad thing.
Transparency international’s definition (“use of public office for private gains”) is
also not clearly mentioned that corruption is bad for overall welfare of the country
(Miranov, 2005). However, number of empirical researches was initiated by various
scholars in different time periods tried to address above concerns. They attempted to
see the relation of corruption with investment, growth and political development.
Mauro (1995) and Shleifer and Wei (2000) in their different researches found
negative relation between corruption and growth. However, Egger and Winnerb (2005)
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in his research for a sample of 73 countries found positive relation between corruption
and economic growth in developing countries.
In relation with Egger and Winnerb’s (2005) research, it can be argued that corruption
may be ethically unsavoury, but, according to many economists and scholars the
spectrum of corruption is very wide and there are indeed some types of corruption that
can benefit the rich and poor alike (Bardhan, 1997). This notion is common in
underdeveloped economies where legitimate transactions take a long time to process
because of bureaucratic inefficiencies (Bardhan, 1997 & Hisolpe, 2005). However,
numbers of scholars are agreeing that corruption is more prominent in developing
countries. There are various grounds that support this argument. Such as: inequality in
distribution of wealth, high taxes, low salaries, strict regulations, less accountability
and the weakness of the legitimacy of governmental institutions that would have a
more immediate impact on the behaviour of civil servants and public (Egger and
Winnerb, 2005 & Gupta et al., 2002) and lead them towards corruption.
In above situation, corruption may seem to work well and a little grease can speed up
the transaction in developing countries rather than obstacle to economic growth.
These circumstances may become suitable for those who don’t want to lose time
waiting in queue for simply getting a passport or licence, or when there is limited
supply of goods and services such as health, education or natural resources (Lui,
1996). Specially, when inefficient bureaucracy makes it hard to start companies,
import or export goods (where every day of delay causes a huge loss to the
businessman). In these situations, corruption can cut through the red tape and
motivate bureaucrats who would otherwise shirk their duties (Tanzi & Davoodi, 2000).
Proponents agree that, bribes make it expensive to start a new business, but if bribes
don't work, it is impossible to start a new business, which is clearly even worse.
Furthermore, the actors involved in this scenario, such as corrupt officials,
businessman and the national economy are better off because of these bribes.
Economists argue that, this behaviour that benefit to different actors is called
functional corruption (Gould, 1999). This corruption may allow achieving different
objectives in highly inefficient bureaucratic environment and both parties receive a
benefit from the transaction. Similarly, the first impulse of the economist is that, such
Page 5 of 20
a mutually beneficial trade cannot be bad and the reason is: in corruption nobody is
forced into anything and both sides make a gain, so it can not be called poor or even
evil? These analyses proved that, the corruption may help defeat the damaging effects
of bad corruption associated with poor institutions and significantly promotes
development and growth in underdeveloping countries (Lui, 1996 & Nye, 1967).
Subsequent paragraphs will also discuss this advancement in relation with economic
growth, political development and national integration.
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) argued that, the corruption has positive relation
with economic growth. Hisolpe (2005) further defined this relation as “ersatz
mechanism.” This mechanism may allocate resource more efficiently when markets
are not perfectly developed or state distorts prices. It may also encourage the rise of
risk-taking corporations, who are otherwise hindered by state regulations (Hisolpe,
2005). Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) also suggest that under rigid regulation and
inefficient bureaucracy, corruption might foster economic growth. Lui (1968) further
calls it as “second best” principle. According to her, in existing policy distortion,
corruption may offer additional twist that may in fact encourage economic efficiency
and welfare. Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) also believe that this corruption
may raise efficiency and growth by this principle. Huntington (1968) further believes
that in these circumstances, corruption “oils the mechanism” and enhance the
efficiency to the South East countries. Evidences also proved that, the growth rates
are very high in India and China due to the corruption. And the reason is: corruption
eliminates the government-imposed rigidities that slow down the investment and
impede with those economic conditions that are favourable to growth (Nye, 1967 &
Huntington, 1968).
Among the possible economic benefits of corruption, the important benefit is an
equilibrium queuing model. Lui (1996) defines this model as a cooperative game OR
an illegal mutual agreement where both parties involved will benefit. According to
her, bribes can minimize the waiting cost that spent in queues. This model can be
considered a good relief for whom the time has the greatest value. They get decisions
Page 6 of 20
quickly because bribe reduces administrative delays. This reduction further speeds up
the process of investment when agents use speed money to get around bad laws and
institutions (Lui, 1985). In sum up, some kinds of government corruption can not be
considered as bad, because corruption promote efficiency in a sense that it inform us
how regulations are administered, and how to counterbalance the poor investment
decisions made by bureaucracies (Lui, 1985, 1996).
Joel Waldfogel (2006) further defined the usefulness of queue model by summarizing
a recent study in Delhi, India. This study was done with 800 people who needed
driver’s licenses. He discussed the benefits of corruption by saying that, if you need a
license than by offering bribes you can save your time if you are in a big hurry. This
corruption is beneficial in a sense that, one has to spend about few minutes in waiting
line, as opposed to five hours for those who did not hire an agent. This example shows
that, in some countries, the offer of a bribe in exchange for quicker processing—
reducing the social cost of waiting in line. Sometime, offering bribes also ease the
pressure on public, if supply and access provided by the government is limited.
Similarly, those who need to access within limited supply and would be willing to pay
the bribes, they can get higher access in what government is providing.
Beck & Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) further define above phenomenon by arguing
that, this queue model also promotes efficiency in corporations. However, efficient
firms are often those who can afford the highest bribe. Though, those firms that adopt
an honest approach are more likely to fail in its attempt to procure contracts and terms
as inefficient (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). For instance, in bidding competitions or in
limited supply the most efficient corporations, those who are well organised can offer
the highest bribes to win that competition. The grounds are: secret information about
evaluation criteria or competitors’ bids reduces economic risks, and improved
economic framework (Kaufmann & Wei, 1999). According to Tanzi (1998)
corruption may also improve the allocation of resources in these circumstances. These
arguments illustrate that, the limited supply is reachable and the massive amount of
time spent by the citizens or business firm in a queue can be reduced through the
payments of bribes. However, these bribes could also give bureaucrats an incentive to
speed up the process, in an otherwise lethargic administration (Leys, 1964).
Page 7 of 20
Moreover, above benefits can also promote efficiency and growth or in other words it
greases the wheels of development. Bardhan (1997) reminds history of US and
Europe, where entrepreneur get favoured to grow out of bribes-so called “grease the
wheels” hypothesis. Huntington (1968) further states that, in 1870’s and 1880’s in the
United States, utility, railroad and industrial corporations grew faster because of
corruption. This hypothesis suggests that this corruption may be advantageous in a
“second best” principle. This happens especially when distortions emerge by ill-
functioning institutions (Leff, 1964 & Huntington, 1968). Different scholars and
economist also consider “grease the wheels” hypothesis as a trouble-saving device.
According to them, this device raises efficiency, investment and ultimately growth.
However, these scholars also suggest that, this hypothesis may be only beneficial in
those developing countries where governance is ineffective, and remains harmful (Lui,
1996; Mirnov, 2005; & Egger and Winnerb, 2005).
In less developed countries, from the point of view of public, corruption appears as an
elegant and comparatively cheap solution for an individual. From the point of view of
the corrupt bureaucrat, the bribe just appears as an additional opportunity to make
some income (Tanzi & Davoodi, 2000). Tanzi (1998) also supports these arguments.
He says that, those countries, where public sector wages are low, such as India; it is
not practical or realistic to increase the wages without reducing the size of the
employees. This reduction is politically difficult and creates more problems in poor
countries. However, corruption plays a vital role in this situation and may
counterbalance the needs of both government and the public employees, and could
beneficial in the short run for both directly involved (Tanzi, 1998).
Moreover, Bailey (1966) argues that, this corruption is not only beneficial but it can
also improve bureaucracy by expanding the quality of its civil servants, especially in
developing countries. As Lui (1996) and Beck & Maher (1986) believe that, in nearly
all Asian countries, officials are not well paid to meet the ends. In those circumstances,
when wages in government service are insufficient, then bribe is almost a
conventional fee that “made the wheels of administration turn more efficiently” (Wint,
1955). This may also attract able civil servants who would have otherwise opted for
another line of business. Nye (1967) goes further and argues that, the bureaucratic
corruption is also an important source of capital formation, especially when state
Page 8 of 20
lacks a capacity to tax a surplus out of workers openly or when private capital is
limited. However, this notion raises a question here that whether this capital uses to
grow economy or winds up in Swiss bank?
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The less political resources are a big problem in less developed countries, such as
India, because politicians rely on material incentives to get enough power to govern
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). However, Hislope (2005) suggests that, in deeply divided
societies, where political consensus is weak and the state is fragile, corruption can
offer a much-needed adhesive policy for political stability. Susan Rose-Ackerman
(1997, p. 40) also believes that, the “Democracy gives citizens a role in choosing their
political leaders.” In this sense, corrupt material can make democracy possible by
strengthening parties. This can be a profitable political glue by allowing political
parties to get funds, that can be used to hold a country together and under certain
condition corruption actually benefits society (Tanzi, 1998).
Nye (1970) believes that, this corruption may further increase government capacity by
financing the political parties. And can also be beneficial to the continuation of the
political system in the same way that reforms are (Huntington, 1970: 3). Theobold
advanced further and said that, many political parties in the western experience were
also initially relied on corruption to unite their disparate groups, once established they
endorsed a “vision of the public interest that opposed the private exploitation of the
state” (1990: 122). However, it is also evident that, state actors adopt this strategic
approach in those conditions when the tools of approval and force are not politically
viable (Theobold, 1990). On the other side, Huntington (1968:196) suggests that,
utilizing of government and public funds to illegally develop stronger political party is
“only a mild form of corruption” if it all. Because the later outcomes of these public
and state funds will be beneficial for growth and development of the country
(Graziano, 1980). For instance, the Nineteenth century experience of England and
USA is a positive example in the use of state and public funds. Both countries used
these funds properly to assemble the strengths of their political parties (Perkins, 2000).
Page 9 of 20
Robert Hislope (2005) further defines the benefits of the political corruption by saying
that corruption is a form of political machine. It works, when political and
administrative system unable to address certain social necessities. Political machine
may play a vital role in managing disparate and conflict interests of civil society. This
machine not only gives access to the urban poor, new immigrants and ethnic
minorities to state resources, but, it also facilitates business elites for different
privileges (Hislope, 2005). Perkins (2000) suggests that, regimes in less developed
societies should encourage this political machine as they support hatchling business
organizations, because “development and consolidation benefit from them.”
According to him this machine may also build up the strong political staff. This staff
will have capability to defend, stabilize and unite the democratic rule. Moreover,
society will receive the benefit of this unity that may promote assistance in stabilizing
democracy and thriving economy (Perkins, 2000). Besides these arguments, Tanzi
(1998) feels that, this party financing may allow the state to maintain a lower tax
burden, which can also favour growth in a country. However, Tullock (1996) raises a
question here and asks that, whether this lower burden is more profitable to growth
than a lower degree of corruption?
Many scholars, including Voskanyan (2000) and Junichi Kwata (2006) also criticize
the relation of corruption and political development. According to them corruption
undermines the legitimacy of government and has harmful effects on political
development. They also demand for strict regulation and zero tolerance policy for
eroding corruption. However, in response, Hisolpe (2005) condemns this policy of
reducing corruption. He argues that, in this policy, the international community and
the developed countries undermines the only political mechanism of developing
countries that lies between “politics-as-bargaining and politics-as-war.” In short,
“corruption is capable of fostering social forces that undermine its own existence”
(Hisolpe, 2005).
NATIONAL INTEGRATION
Page 10 of 20
Society grows better if the political structure of the country maintains its legitimacy
and the members of the society share their sense of community (Hislope, 2005). In the
1960s and 1970s, different revisionists, such as Joseph Nye (1967) Samuel
Huntington (1968) and others argued that, under certain circumstances, corruption
could have positive and beneficial effects in maintaining legitimacy and development
in a society. It is basically a survival strategy for ethnic minorities, dispossessed and
subaltern in a society (Hislope, 2005). On the other side, it also facilitates elites into
their networks of self-interests. These both benefits make the bridge between the
minorities and the elite class that create unity and integration (Nye, 1967 & Hislope,
2005).
Different proponents of corruption also advanced the view that, corruption may
helpful in reducing discrimination among minority groups. This factor is also helpful
in economic growth of that country by utilising their skills (Lipset & Lenz, 2000).
This corruption may make a bridge among different groups that might otherwise end
in clash and conflict (Hislope, 2005). Similarly, Nye (1967) argues that, it is possible,
if there is more corruption in developing country. In this sense, entrepreneurs from
minorities ultimately get access to political decision making process that leads to less
discrimination and integration among different actors of the society. Corruption may
further allow these groups to assimilate each other and integrate their leaders into the
“existing upper class” (Nye, 1967).
Nye (1967) further states that, in early nationalist period, in the West Africa and the
Central America, corruption played vital role in the integration of their elite leaders.
Integration of millions of immigrants in the 19th century was also based on corruption.
Moreover, this integration may comfort the transition from traditional life to modern,
because integration maintains soft relation between literate official and illiterate
country person (Lipset & Lenz, 2000). The traditional life of country man will
improve, if he approaches the corrupt official with some money or gift (Nye, 1967).
As Shils' argues that, corruption “humanizes government and makes it less awesome"
(Dike, 2003).
Above arguments shows that, the corruption works as inclusion for the dispossessed, a
furnishing additional instruments for the promotion of elite unity and national
Page 11 of 20
integration (Holmes, 2005). However, some scholars criticize on the philosophy of
this theme and argue that, integration for one group may be disintegrative for another
(Voskanyan, 2000). In response, Holmes (2005) replies that the corrupt exchange
might be the remedy of this issue, because it may tame nationalism and foster
multiethnic coalitions.
CORRUPT EXCHANGE
According to Lipset & Lenz (2000), states are unable to resolve the contradictory
interests that occur in ethnically divided societies. This incapability produces
disintegrative violence and numerous external challenges. In this way, the corruption
exchange is a mechanism that may reduce the possibility of interethnic violence and
creates multiethnic coalition in rapidly changing societies (Holmes, 2005).
Furthermore, corruption tames nationalism that strengthens the regime stability and
moves towards disunity to consensual unity. Corruption may also provide a political
system to cope with the above issues with a rate of social change, which blocks the
political influence and coalitions among members (Holmes 2005). According to Scott
(1967: 508) this political system further leads to “politics-as-war” to “politics-as-
bargaining.”
According to Gagnon (2004), in the concept of corrupt exchange, the coalitions
among members are based on reciprocity. On these grounds, corrupt multiethnic
coalitions will likely create de-mobilizing regimes (Gagnon, 2004). This regime is
feasible, as no participant has concern in troubling and mobilizing its group against
the other. Such regimes may avoid interethnic disputes and violence and move
towards peace and unity (Horowitz, 1985). This unity can purchase peace by giving
each side a stake and a personal interest in the system. However, due to the elements
of reciprocity this coalition can move towards disintegration with in a year (Gagnon,
2004). Though, Holmes (2005) states that, long term coalition is possible, if these
ethnic party elites regularly interacts each other. This interaction may develop an
overarching network of influence and communication among elites. Furthermore, this
relation will dispel the hostile stereotypes and may discover the common norms.
These rules may further foster the mutual friendship and unity that tames the sense of
nationalism (Holmes 2005).
Page 12 of 20
Holmes (2005) further notifies the case study of Macedonia. In 2001, the state of
Macedonia successfully maintained interethnic peace with corrupt exchange. After
independence this state had numerous internal ethnic cleavages and challenges by
neighbouring countries. However, corrupt exchange facilitated effective elite unity
and made Macedonia enabled to survive its regional and domestic crises. Finally, the
Macedonian and Albanian party elites created robust coalition government. As in the
words of Holmes (2005) “corrupt exchange served as both glue and dissolvent in
Macedonia’s post-communist trajectory.” Servet Avziu, a state minister, once argued
in public that, people are in peace today, because we handled the situation and
maintained the peace in the state of Macedonia. However, Hugh Pope1 argued in his
response that “The people in power know what peace means and the price of peace.”
DISCUSSION:
In the current era, many scholars and international community frame corruption as
cancerous, and consider its impacts as `negative on economic, social and political
development (Larsson, 2006). However, this article elaborates that this complex issue
can be seen as positive and beneficial for many. Argument and evidences in the article
also illustrates that corruption is a good thing. For instance, it was argued that
corruption greases-the-wheels of commerce, strengthens political development and
brings integration in the society. It was also argued that corrupt exchange reduces the
possibility of interethnic violence and creates multiethnic coalition in ethnically
divided societies. In this sense, corruption can not be considered as negative, because
all forms of corruptions are not similar, and that some corruption might actually be
good (see, for example, Leff, Huntigton, and Lui).
Recent economic literature presents a good and a “romantic view of corruption”
(Tanzi & Davoodi, 2000). However, this concept may also contain some limitations.
For instances, these benefits may hold negative effects on progress and growth in the
developed countries. In another point of view, Lui (1996: 28) found that, corruption
1 Hugh Pope, “A Nation Clinging to Peace,” Los Angeles Times, (March 29, 1994): 2.
Page 13 of 20
has two effects: short term and long term. In short term, corruption produces
“allocative efficiency” and works as second best solution to market distortions, these
distortions may be created by government strict policies and regulations. On the other
hand, in long term, corruption itself produces market distortions and decreases its
efficiency. In sum up, even if corruption can be a useful means of bypassing
inefficiencies in the short term, in the long term it tends to create inefficiencies of its
own (Lui, 1996).
Moreover, Nye (1967) further defines the limitations of the corruption. He argues that,
corruption is only beneficial in favourable conditions, because in un-favourable
conditions, neither type of corruption is useful and may create various problems
detrimental to one another. Unfavourable conditions are defined by Nye as: Economic
development, national integration, more accountability, intolerant culture and secure
elites. On the other side, he described favourable conditions as: tolerant culture,
corrupted elites, dominance of more tolerant groups, less resources and less
accountability. Nye further argues that, corruption will be beneficial, if the
government will have some intervening problems or obstacles to development. For
instance, if the country is unable to make capitals by legal means, or ethnic hatred
issues threaten the legal activities in society. In this way, despite the high risk and cost,
corruption will be useful for the development. However, Hirschman (1965) indicates
the dangers in measuring the “obstacle to development”. He says that, corruption in
this situation may be beneficial to some one but might be harmful for others. So, there
is a need to understand different types of corruption in relation with different types of
problem.
On the other side of the mirror, some authors argue that, developed countries do not
recognize corruption as a useful concept. The reason is: with high resources and strict
regulation, they can “afford the luxury of wasting some of its wealth” (Frisch, 1996).
On the other side, corruption in developing countries plays an efficient role in low
resources, rigid regulations, inefficient bureaucracy and bad laws. This role further
provides the solutions that how to utilize financial resources in the best way possible
(Frisch, 1996). Andreas (2004) further argues that, such “clandestine commerce is
also an essential survival strategy for many people in the face of dire economic
conditions.” He believes that, rather than only condemning and promoting agenda
Page 14 of 20
against this act by the international community and developed countries, there is a
need for the deeper understanding of this issue. As Cirtautas (1999) believes that,
“This global anti-corruption agenda has been promoted with such a missionary zeal
that some call it the new “ethical infrastructure” of capitalism.” According to her,
corruption reflects the changing balance of power between the government and
capitalism in current international scenario.
As discussed in the article that, corruption brings lot of benefits and advantages. On
the other hand, this is also true that, if there are some people who can benefit by
paying bribes, this means that many other people will bear the costs. However, if
governments and international community want to win the fight against corruption,
they should know that: this fight can not be won with only creating an anticorruption
office and increasing penalties and then to expect quick and positive results from it.
Practically speaking, corruption without changing the policy of the state and without
improving the institutions would have a negative effect on economic and political
development of transition countries (Mauro, 1998 & Klitgaard, 1988).
CONCLUSION
Corruption is a complex phenomenon. Some consider it, as an obstacle to economic
and political development and believe that it creates disintegration. However, this
article advanced reverse thesis of this concept. It was argued by various evidences and
instances that corruption has a positive relation with economic growth, political
development and national integration in underdeveloped countries. It was further
argued that corruption is a political machine, that may strengthens the political parties
and stabilize democracy. This notion can also reduce interethnic violence and may
tame nationalism. It was also discussed that, these benefits have some limitations.
However, it was argued that whatever the limitations are, international community has
to understand that, corruption is basically a survival strategy for many countries. So
rather than promoting agenda against it they should understand the complexity of this
issue. Furthermore, if they really want to curb corruption they must improve the
institutions of the state. Without progressing these institutions this propaganda would
have a negative effect on economic and political development of the developing
Page 15 of 20
countries. “They also should know that corruption is not an existential evil, it is the
desire for justice distorted by fear” (Bond, 2000, p.8).
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