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encounter with Christ as judge and source of eternal life (notes 63-6,76above). As a share in Christs death, iLL was a participation in the defeat of thepowers of evil and so in the redemption (note 22); and as the acquisition ofthe grace of final perseverance, it healed from sin (notes 68-71 ). Like theother sacraments, it was a gift from God designed to help man in hisinfralapsarian condition (notes 51,54-7) and a means to deeper lasting life(notes 25,62). As an ecclesial activity it gave a new relationship to themilitant and triumphant Church (notes 74-5,77). This is why human deathcould not be put on the same level as biological death: man could never die asif he were merely animal,&dquo; and mans death was not an anticlimax but theculmination of his lifes work (notes 24,25,67-9,73).

To some extent the attempt to extract a system from or impose oraer onsix hundred years of theological endeavour is bound to be artificial and theconclusions reached brittle and provisional. Further, our enquiry has led us toextrapolate from what is predominantly moral and spiritual theology todogmatic theology, and some distortion is inevitable. With these remarks inmind, the reader will, I hope, agree that the conclusions, as far as they go, arejustified.

JEREMY MOISER

83. Alcuin, Epistola 11, PL 101,158: nullatenus homo perire poterit sicut animalquodlibet. Cf. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo 1,18, PL 158,384.

ROBERT GROSSETESTES UNDERSTANDING OF TRUTH

At the outset it should be pointed out that the conclusions set forth in thispaperl are based on an extensive and substantial body of material andsupporting evidence. Not all of this supporting evidence can be incorporatedinto this brief paper. Robert Grossetestes understanding of truth is for memore than the object of sheer inquiry, for it is my belief that his doctrine oftruth contains emphases and motifs that ought to be recovered and retrieved,especially in view of certain problematical developments in more recentcoherence and correspondence notions of truth.

1. This paper was read at the Seventh Conference on Medieval Studies (1972) atWestern Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan.

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Through offering a brief exposition of certain basic features of Grossetestesdoctrine of truth, it is maintained that the latter occupies a crucial position inthe understanding of truth within the Augustinian tradition. It is not thatGrosseteste introduced new notions or a new terminology, for the latter wasderived largely from St Augustine and St Anselm. However, there are a numberof factors operative in the thought of Grosseteste which along with his owntemperament and interests give his work its own unique character, as well assetting him somewhat apart from St Augustine and St Anselm. These factorsinclude the logica 110m in addition to other major works of Aristotle, thePseudo-Dionysian treatises, the legacy of Chartres, and Greek and Arabicscientific treatises. Grosseteste was especially innovative in the area. ofscientific methodology and experimental science where he appeals toexperimentum along with ratio and auctoritas, but he also has something tooffer us in his understanding of the nature of truth. Because of the ratherdiffuse, fragmentary, and encyclopaedic activity and writing uf Grossetestea considerable number of his treatises and opuscula have to be examined inuncovering his doctrine of truth. He does give us, as did St Anselm, a littletreatise with the title De Yeritate. But other statements concerning truthmust be culled from a number of texts including De Scientia Dei, De VeritatePropositionis, De Unica Forma Omnium, De Libero Arbitrio, and QuaestionesTlzeologicae. In evaluating his doctrine of truth certain consequentialdeficiencies should also be cited.

Grosseteste speaks of truth as being and truth as right or correct relation-ships. These two notions or basic categories persist throughout his wholedoctrine of truth. For truth as being he uses such expressions as id quod est ; ,which he takes from Augustines Soliloquia (IL5.8), rei entitas ;2 idem veritaset entitas,3 and the rationes aeternae rerum J4 or rationes rerum increatae :5 SId quod est covers, of course, the whole spectrum of being and signifies morethan a Wittgensteinian state of affairs or what Heidegger terms Vorhanden-heft : Grosseteste also draws from Augustine the notion that truth is that quaeostendit id quod est.6 Here veritassignifies a being in terms of its disclosing

2. De Veritate, BW 130. BW is abbreviated form of the following: L. Baur, Diephilosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste Bischofs von Lincoln, Band IX ofBeitraege zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, hg. C. Baeumker (Muenster i.W.: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1912). In the above volume L. Baur offersus a critical edition of a number of Grossetestes treatises. The number following BW isthe page number in Band IX cited above. 3. De Libero Arbitrio, 8, BW 188.4. Ibid., BW 191.5. Comm. Post. 1.7 (Venetiis 1552), f. 8. Reference is here made to book and chapter

of Grossetestes commentary on Aristotles Posterior Analytics. As indicated, the 1552Venice edition, an early printed edition, is being used. The above and subsequent folionumbers refer to this edition. At the beginning of Liber Primus of Grossetestescommentary we find the following: Divi Roberti Linconiensis Archiepiscopi Parisiensis,in Aristotelis Posteriorum Analiticoru Libros, Elegantissima commentaria Feliciterincipiunt. The text that I have read and examined is in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.6. De Vere Religione 36.66, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 32:230. The

abbreviation CCSL is used hereafter.

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its own being or the being of other entities. In truth as being there are, ofcourse, different degrees and levels of being. We cannot elaborate on all ofthese here.

In speaking of truth as correct or right relationships Grosseteste uses suchterms as adaequatio . Icoequatio . Icollformitas, similitudo, rectitlldo,reettis, and similis. Here we note that he derives terms from Augustine,Anselm, and the traditional definition of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus.He operates with all these expressions and the meaning may shift dependingon a particular usage or application.

Grossetestes understanding of truth is made up of four basic categories oftruth: viz., the summa veritas which may be termed ontological truth, theveritas rerum which I term ontic truth, intellectual or cognitive truth, andlogical or propositional truth. In having these four basic categories Grossetesteis certainly not offering a striking innovation within the Augustinian tradition,but what is noteworthy is his persistent concern that these categories bestrictly and carefully ordered in accordance with ontological priority.Although he. initiates his inquiry into the nature of truth by focusing onlogical or propositional truth, his reason for beginning here is stated asfollows: Consuevimus autem usitatius dicere veritatem orationis enuntiativae. 7However, according to Grosseteste neither human- speech, nor the humanintellect is the primary locus of truth. The summa vritas is ultimate andfoundational for all other truth, and the former includes the Verbum Dei orSenno Patris as ground and norm of created truth. Grosseteste begins histreatise on truth by citing John 14:b: &dquo;Ego sum via veritas et vita&dquo;. Hic ipsaVeritas dicit se esse veritatem.3 He shares Anselms concern to distinguishsharply and clearly between the truth which is foundational and measures andthat truth which is relative and measured. This is very explicit where he states:Et complectitur haec definitio etiam summam veritatem, quae est rectitudorectificans simul cum veritatibus rerum, quae sunt rectitudines rectificatae.9 9Elsewhere he states that the human intellect is not determinative of theprinciples of being: Non est enim intellectus effectivus principiorum ....10Grosseteste is very insistent that subordinate truth be kept subordinate. Thisconcern is expressed repeatedly in a number of different ways and places.

Another facet of Grossetestes doctrine of truth, which could be predicatedof his thought in general, may be considered a corollary of the feature just

cited. This facet concerns the matter of coherence and the attempt to achievea grand synthesis or coherent system. As far as I know, Grosseteste has givenus no grand and coherent synthesis or system in the form of a magnum opusor theological-philosophical summa. Father Daniel Callus argued that heplanned to compose a Summa Tlzeologiae or Summa Sententiarum.l1 One

7. De Veritate, BW 34.8. De Veritate, BW 130.9. De Veritate, BW 135.

10. Comm. Post. II. 6, f.43.

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could argue that he didnt achieve such because of his wide range of interestsand inquiry, his temperament, and the need to assimilate a vast amount of .new sources at his disposal. In view of his doctrinal stance, I do not believethat such assimilation would have been a prerequisite to composing such asystem or synthesis. Over against the above, I would propose that he neitherfelt compelled nor was he especially concerned to construct a grand coherentintellectual or doctrinal system. Furthermore, I believe that he sensed acertain inadequacy in the face of the ineffable grandeur of the truth. I dontdoubt that he had the ontological foundation required for such a system. Hespeaks of an ultimate visio of the truth. However, because of his stress onontological and ontic truth, and his firm belief in a radical coherence andsymmetry in the very being of the st~rnrrta veritas, the eternal ratioliesexpressed by the Verbum Dei, and the consequent coherence within thecreated order, it could be expected that he felt less of a need to achievecoherence and synthesis in terms of an intellectual or doctrinal system. Thisdoes not mean_ that the latter is of no importance to him nor that it cannotbe realized in some measure. hlans intellectual effort should mirror somethingof the ratio and coherence within the truth of being. In passing, I would alsopoint out that Grosseteste does not make extensive use of what I term strictcoherence, viz., necessary logical truth. Augustine uses the latter more thanGrosseteste. This difference in appeal to strict coherence brings us to anotherfacet of Grossetestes doctrine of truth which may be contrasted with anotheremphasis found in Augustines understanding of truth.

Grosseteste does not share Augustines urge and need to turn from withoutoneself and to turn within oneself in the quest for truth and certitude. GordonLeff states that Grossetestes position was founded upon St Augustinesconception of truth as in the mind.12 D.E. Sharp asserts that Grossetestestheory of knowledge becomes, like that of Augustine, a metaphysics of innerexperience .... , 13 I do not believe that such statements can be acceptedwithout some important qualifications. It is true that Augustine attachesconsiderable importance to the human mind as a locus of truth and to thereflection of the mind upon itself in seeking knowledge of the truth. Hestresses that the interior truth and teacher must be listened to. 14 Truth is theinterior light&dquo; with which the mind has immediate contact. Truth andcertainty is to be sought within ones own mind. Ratio says: Avertere abumbra tua, revertere in te ....16 Elsewhere he says: Noli foras ire, in te ipsum

11. D.A. Callus, The Summa Theologiae of Robert Grosseteste, Studies in MedievalHistory, ed. R.W. Hunt, W.A. Pantin, and R.W. Southern (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1948) 180-94.12. G. Leff, Medieval Thought (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962) 187.13. D.E. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century (London:Oxford University Press, 1930) 34-5.14. De Magistro 11.38-12.40. 15. De Vera Religione 55.113, CCSL 32:259-60. 16. Soliloquia II.19.33, Migne, PL 32:901.

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redi. In interiore homine habitat veritas. 17 Grosseteste certainly does notemphasize this turning within to the degree that Augustine does. He does notexperience doubt and the need for certitude experienced by Augustine. Heputs greater emphasis on turning to the world of ontic truth, physical entities,phenomena, and their causes. I do not find Grosseteste making frequentappeals to the truth within. Grosseteste does not seem to have been radicallyshaken by doubt. Anselm and Grosseteste both seem to devote more attentionto the truth of created res than does Augustine. Grossetestes interest inphysics and causes immanent in the created order attests to this.

Another facet related to the one just discussed is Grossetestes belief in theindestructible character of truth. Although there is nothing to indicate that heever radically doubted whether there was any truth, in attempting to refutethe sceptic he does use an argument much like theorem 17 found in Stoiclogic and an argument akin to that of Augustine in his Soliloquies: If notT,then t; if t, then T; therefore, if not T, then T. In other words, even thenegation or denial of truth is considered to be an affirmation of truth. How.ever, for Grosseteste himself, certitude concerning truth is rooted in his wholeunderstanding of truth and in his explication of the nature of truth. Veritas isbound up with esse and through the method of division the affirmation oftruth follows upon the affirmation of being. It is not through an elaborateargument that he arrives at certainty concerning the being of truth. Hisassurance concerning the imperishable character of truth arises from a visionof the truth itself. The being of truth is hardly jeopardized by statements thatdeny its being. He concludes: Quomodocunque sit, manifeste inextinguibilisest lux veritatis, quae etiam sui illustrat extinctionem, nec aliquo modocorrumpi potest.8

Although several other features of Grossetestes doctrine of truth areworthy of consideration, only a couple of additional facets can be discussedhere. Like Anselm, Grossetests wrestles with the question whether truth issingle or multiplex, a question tied up with the whole matter of thepluralitatem et distributionem of the name of truth, the application ofconcepts, universals, etc. One would miss what is at stake here if one weresimply to dismiss the issue as arising from linguistic confusion and a lack ofcritical acumen regarding language and meaning. For Anselm and Grossetestesomething very important is at stake here. Both Anselm and Grosseteste arevery concerned to point out that the summa veritas has its own unique statuswhich is radically different from that of created and contingent entities.Grosseteste wants it clearly understood that when we speak of a true createdentity, we do not thereby intend to attribute to it divinity.9 He states: Item:in nullo communicant creator et creatura. Univoca autem in aliquo com-municant. Ergo creator et creatura in nullo univocantur.20 While Grosseteste17. De Vera Religione 39.72, CCSL 32:234.18. De Veritate, BW 139.19. De Veritate, BW 130.

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seeks to guard against sheer equivocation, he stresses that words like ens andveritas cannot be applied to particular beings without diversity in intentio .He even believes that the sense of terms applied to the summa veritas must beintuited and perceived in the summa veritas himself. The supreme truth hasits own unique status and is always in view no matter what kind of truth isbeing discussed. Grosseteste makes this point when he says: But perhaps thename of truth is nowhere applied except to signify in some way, at leastadjacently or obliquely, the supreme truth as form of the name. For as thetruth of a thing can not be understood except in the light of the supremetruth, so perhaps it is not to be hypostasized through the name of truthexcept when it bears the significance of the supreme truth 21

Grossetestes epistemology is very much determined by and bound up withhis doctrine of truth. There is a type of realism in his epistemology whichcorresponds to his emphasis on created singulars and the twofold plenitude ofbeing of created things. He holds that the human knower can have directknowledge of things themselves and their truth. The cognitive subject comesto know things themselves, not merely an image, a concept, or a phantasmwhich represents the thing. A phantasma may be required as a means to anend, but it is transcended inasmuch as intdlectus, enim, et scientiaapprehendunt res in puritate essentiae suae, sicut in seipsis sunt 22 By virtueof such factors as divine illumination, the intelligibility of truth, right willing,etc., one can directly perceive the degree of being and truth of the singularthing. In the light ~of the supreme truth one can view the truth of things.

In conclusion, certain consequential deficiencies in Grossetestes doctrinewill be pointed out. By virtue of the fact that only the immutable andintelligible really deserve to be termed truth, although everything that is maybe termed true insofar as it is, it follows that the mutable, the contingent, andthe sensible are relegated to an inferior position. Grosseteste refers tocontingent reality as corruptible truth: Item: in futuris et contingentibusvidetur esse veritas corruptibilis. Veritas autem, quae Deus est, nullo modoest corruptibilis.23 Truth&dquo; is most properly applied to what is whollyabstracted from time, change, and even the possibility of change. Theimmutable-mutable and eternity-time dichotomies affect Grosgetestes viewof the corporeal and the contingent, and the latter is consequently viewedmore as a sacramental and symbolic order which simply reflects that whichreally deserves to be termed truth, viz., eternal immutable truth. Moreover,the inherent value and intrinsic worth and efficacy of mutable entities andhistorical events are brought into question. It also follows that such as Godsredemptive acts in history tend to be eclipsed and taken less seriously thanthey should be.20. De Libero Arbitrio 16, BW 217.21. R. McKeon (ed. and trans.), Selections from Medieval Philosophers Vol. I (TheModern Students Library; New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1957) 275. This isMcKeons translation of Grossetestes statements in De Veritate, BW 139.22. Comm. Post. 1.19, f.27. 23. De Veritate, BW 130.

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The dichotomies in Grossetestes doctrine of truth also left their mark onthe whole of his thought, including his epistemology and methodology. Thisis apparent in his conception of fides, the different grades of knowledge, andintellectual vision. The lowest form of knowledge has to do with contingentiaerratica&dquo;,24 while the highest level of knowledge is the cognition of immutableand eternal truth. The question is whether contingent and singular entities andevents can ever be objects of intellectus and visio. Faith and authority were tobe transcended.

A number of questions may be also raised in connexion with Grossetestesunderstanding of truth as correspondence. Just what is intended in the use ofwords like 4conformitas, 4similitudo, 4adaequatio, and rectitudo? Furtherclarification should be offered concerning intelligible correspondence and themanner in which right relations may differ depending on whether we arespeaking of things, propositions, events or actions. It may also be askedwhether the conception of truth as correspondence can be maintained in theface of the epistemological realism cited earlier. If I am able to perceivethings directly, then what is it that corresponds to the thing? On the otherhand/if my mind in some way corresponds to the intelligible thing, then howcan I at the same time affirm that I directly perceive the thing itself?Furthermore, if there is no factor of correspondence or representationinvolved in my perception of intelligible things, then how can I ever be inerror? In other words, is error possible in the face of Grossetestesepistemological realism? Of course, if one cannot know things themselves,then how can one ever ascertain whether or not one knows that which is thecase? Grosseteste teaches that perception does not terminate in a phantasma.But how can one know this? How can one possibly perceive and know morethan one perceives and knows? These are difficult questions and obviouslyarise not only with regard to Grossetestes doctrine of faith. Grosseteste doesnot really address himself to such questions and this may be due in part to hisbelief in factors such as divine illumination, exemplarism, the intelligibility oftruth, the possibility of intellectual vision, faith, gratia iuvans, auctoritas, etc.

Finally, from a biblical point of view one could wish that Grossetestewould have incorporated more of the biblical notions and content into hisunderstanding of truth. Although his application of terms in his doctrine oftruth is generally in accordance with scriptural usage and application, thecontent or sense of his terms is often determined more by metaphysical andontological notions and categories derived largely from Neoplatonism andother extra or non-biblical sources. Even though he frequently cites thescriptures and offers some commentary on the same, much of the biblicalsense and teaching is blocked out by philosophical and ontological notionswhich he has adopted.

ROBERT J. PALMA24. Comm. Post. 1.2, f.2.

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