Ireland Cold War Marshall Plan

Ireland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. Cold War Concerns

Whelan, Bernadette.

Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 8, Number 1, Winter 2006,pp. 68-94 (Article)

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WhelanIreland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. Cold War Concerns

Ireland, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. ColdWar Concerns

✣ Bernadette Whelan

The broad proposal for what became the Marshall Plan was laidout by U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall in his June 1947 com-mencement address at Harvard University. Marshall highlighted the grimconditions in Europe and offered U.S. economic assistance to speed the conti-nent’s recovery. He spoke of the physical destruction of “cities, factories,mines, and railroads” and the economic dislocation that resulted in shortagesof food, fuel, and raw materials affecting both urban and rural populations.He said that governments were being “forced to use their foreign money andcredits to procure . . . necessities abroad” and therefore were “unable to re-cover by dint of their own efforts, the living standards which their peoples en-joyed prior to the war.”1 The initiative he proposed would seek to break the“vicious circle” and restore the conªdence of the Europeans in their own eco-nomic future and the future of Europe as a whole.2

Marshall’s speech focused on three main points: ªrst, the threat to the“free world” resulting from the imminent economic, social, and political col-lapse of Europe; second, the offer of aid to interested European states actingtogether rather than individually; and third, the urgent need to establish con-ditions within which “free institutions” could be restored. From April 1948to January 1952, the United States provided loans and grants worth nearly$13 billion to ªfteen European countries.

The historiography of the Marshall Plan is immense. Thousands of booksand articles provide traditional, revisionist, and post-revisionist interpreta-tions of the plan’s origins, implementation, and impact. In the 1960s and

1. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Ofªce, serial publication), 1947, Vol. III, p. 225 (hereinafter referred to as FRUS, withappropriate year and volume numbers); and Henry S. Commager, ed., Documents of American History(New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1973), pp. 532–534.

2. Commager, ed., Documents of American History, pp. 532–534.

Journal of Cold War StudiesVol. 8, No. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 68–94© 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology

Angelia Fell

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1970s, revisionist historians argued that the European Recovery Program(ERP) was a key instrument in U.S. foreign policy. They looked at the ERPlargely in the context of the origins and impact of the Cold War. The in-creased availability of formerly secret documents in the late 1970s and 1980sled to a post-revisionist view, along with a reªning of the revisionist interpre-tation. This latter strand is particularly evident in Sallie Pisani’s 1991 study ofthe relationship between the Marshall Plan administration and the Ofªce ofPolicy Co-ordination, the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA). Pisani convincingly argues that the Marshall Plan was used in part forcovert interventionist purposes to combat Communism in selected ERPstates. Subsequently, David Ellwood and Anthony Carew traced the methodsused by the Marshall planners to oppose Communism in ERP countries andstrengthen the democratic capitalist systems there. They argue that the plan-ners launched extensive productivity, publicity, and propaganda campaigns inEurope “to remake the old world in the likeness of the new one.”3

Nevertheless, the ERP at its core was designed to use economic, ªnancial,and propaganda methods and structures to promote reconstruction, recovery,and prosperity in Western Europe, thereby thwarting the expansionist tacticsof domestic Communist parties and Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. This ar-ticle examines how America’s anti-Communist and strategic concerns werepromoted in Ireland through the Marshall Plan. The article begins by consid-ering why the United States invited Ireland to participate in the MarshallPlan, particularly when the Communist threat there appeared slight and U.S.strategic needs were being met through access to Northern Ireland’s territory.The article then determines whether U.S. concerns about the emerging Cold

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3. Because of the increasing availability of national archives, the vast historiography on America’s rolein postwar Europe now includes countless items relating to the Marshall Plan. Alan S. Milward, TheReconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51 (London: Methuen, 1984), minimizes U.S. inºuence inthe process of European recovery and evolution toward greater integration. On the other hand, Mi-chael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), argues that the United States was some-what successful in reshaping Western Europe in America’s image. For a solid historiographical essay onthe Marshall Plan generally and from national perspectives, see John Killick, The United States and Eu-ropean Reconstruction, 1945–60 (Edinburgh, UK: Keele University Press, 1997). See also Sallie Pisani,The CIA and the Marshall Plan (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991); David Ellwood, Re-building Europe: Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction (London: Longman, 1992); An-thony Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Manage-ment Science (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987). Regarding the Cold War dimensions ofthe Marshall Plan, see Scott Parrish, “The Marshall Plan, Soviet-American Relations and the Divisionof Europe,” in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii, eds. The Establishment of Communist Regimesin Eastern Europe, 1944–1949 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 55–73; and Geoffrey Rob-erts, “Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of the Cold War, 1947,” Eu-rope-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 8 (1994), pp. 1371–1386. Hogan (in The Marshall Plan, p. 19) uses thephrase “to remake the old world in the image of the new.”

War were fulªlled by two successive Irish governments during the country’sparticipation in the ERP from 1947 to 1952.4

A number of factors account for Ireland’s inclusion in the ERP. When Mar-shall delivered his speech in June 1947, the unrestricted nature of the invita-tion to participate in a recovery program attracted attention throughout Eu-rope. In the State Department, George F. Kennan hoped that the new policywould place a severe strain on relations between Moscow and the satellitecountries. He insisted that the plan be open to allies, former allies, enemies,former enemies, and neutrals.5 Accordingly, the Soviet Union and the EastEuropean countries were invited to take part, as were Italy and Germany (for-mer enemies) and Ireland and Portugal (both neutral). Kennan’s Rooseveltianinternationalism, however, was not shared by other U.S. policymakers.Charles Bohlen, William Clayton, and Dean Acheson supported an open-ended invitation for a different reason: They believed that once the SovietUnion refused to participate, the blame for dividing Europe would restsquarely on Moscow’s shoulders. The inclusive nature of the U.S. proposalmay therefore be viewed as an attempt to create a bloc of countries centeredaround the United States. The identity of those countries was partly shapedby the Soviet Union’s response.

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov attended the Paris confer-ence that had been convened by Britain and France in June 1947 to respondto Marshall’s invitation, but he promptly indicated that the Soviet Unionwanted aid without strings attached and certainly did not want any U.S. in-volvement or interference in the USSR’s domestic economy. Within six weeksof Marshall’s speech, Soviet leaders dismissed the Marshall Plan as another ex-ample of “dollar diplomacy” and forced the East European states not to par-

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4. In 1947 the Irish political landscape appeared stable. Two center-right parties, Fianna Fáil and FineGael, dominated the government. Both parties had emerged out of the divided loyalties caused by theAnglo-Irish treaty of 1921, which consolidated the partition of the island, leaving six counties underthe control of Northern Ireland and the rest under the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State, which re-mained a dominion of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The left wing of the political spectrumwas ªlled by a small labor party that was divided in 1947 and by the emergence of Clann na Poblachta,led by Seán MacBride, whose mother was republican activist Maud Gonne. Although Eamon deValera’s government lost three by-elections in 1947, it did not expect to leave ofªce after the generalelection in February 1948. However, the inter-party government comprising ªve parties and inde-pendent politicians formed a government that had many constituencies to please.

5. John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan andDean G. Acheson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 200.

ticipate either. The ERP thus consisted solely of Western European capitalistdemocracies. Although Ireland could not be singled out and excluded withoutcontroversy and recriminations, Irish participation was not readily approvedin either Washington or London.

Indeed, in many ways the inclusion of Ireland was surprising. Wartime is-sues still inºuenced the U.S.-Irish relationship in the postwar period. Irishneutrality, U.S. opposition to it and Allied efforts to offer a 32-county Irelandin return for Irish involvement have all been well documented.6 After 1945,Ireland’s neutrality still rankled with Washington. In January 1945, John D.Hickerson, the director of the European affairs division in the State Depart-ment, wrote to David Gray, the U.S. minister in Dublin, that “the people ofthe United States, I believe, will not soon forget that the one time in historywhen Ireland had an opportunity to assist this country the Irish governmentturned a deaf ear.”7 Hickerson was not the only State Department ofªcial whowas annoyed by Ireland’s neutrality and by the resurgence of anti-partition ac-tivity in the United States in late 1947. Although these sentiments did notprevent Ireland from being invited to participate in the ERP, they did affectthe form of aid allocated during the early stages of the program.8

Nonetheless, Ireland’s strategic location was a crucial concern for U.S. de-fense and security experts. The intelligence review put out by the U.S. WarDepartment in May 1946 noted that in the current world situation, the polit-ical disposition of West European countries had never been more signiªcantto U.S. interests.9 Three years later, a CIA report stated that

Ireland is potentially a valuable ally because of its strategic location athwart thechief seaways and airways to and from Western Europe. Its terrain and topogra-phy lend themselves to rapid construction of airªelds which would be invaluableas bases for strategic bomber attacks as far east as the Ural mountains. . . . Irishneutrality would probably again be tolerable under conditions of global warfare.However, and assuming these conditions, because hostile forces in Ireland wouldoutºank the main defenses of Great Britain, and because it could be used as a

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6. See Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939–45 (Dublin, Ire-land: Gill and MacMillan, 1983).

7. Hickerson to Gray, 1 January 1945, in National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Re-cord Group (RG) 59, Box 20, File UKD-5(b).

8. Ireland received loans rather than grant aid until 1949. See Bernadette Whelan, Ireland and theMarshall Plan 1947–1957 (Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 2000), pp. 286–298; and RonanFanning, “The Anglo-American Alliance and the Irish Question in the Twentieth Century,” in JudithDevlin and Howard B. Clarke, eds., European Encounters: Essays in Memory of Albert Lovett (Dublin,Ireland: University College Press, 2003), pp. 199–202.

9. “Intelligence Review No. 12,” May 1946, in Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), Harry S. TrumanPapers (HSTP), Box 16, Naval Aide File, War Department.

base for bombing North America, the denial of Ireland to an enemy is an un-avoidable principle of United States security.10

Amid increasing tensions between the superpowers, the strategic importanceof Ireland’s geographical location affected U.S., British, and West Europeandefense planning. Any desire to isolate Ireland in retaliation for its wartimeneutrality was counterbalanced by the need to incorporate the country intosome kind of U.S.-sponsored security organization. The Marshall Plan pro-vided just such an opportunity. Of equal importance to the United States,however, was the British view of Ireland’s importance.

The United States received British support on this matter for three rea-sons: ªrst, the strategic location of Ireland; second, a fear that exclusion mightrefuel the anti-partition movement, particularly in the United States; third,the interlocking nature of the Irish and British economic and ªnancial sys-tems. This last factor meant that by the summer of 1947 both countries re-quired signiªcant external aid in the form of dollars and raw materials.11 A1946 U.S. War Department analysis of UK security concerns noted that“Britain’s strategy for defense of the home islands has been based on . . . [the]strategic unity of the British isles. Britain cannot permit any part of the Brit-ish isles, including Éire, to be controlled by another power.”12 Britain had tra-ditionally depended on having either direct control of or a friendly ally on itswestern and southern ºanks to protect the sea and air approaches and ensurethe continued ºow of badly needed supplies.

During World War II, these security concerns were tempered by the be-nevolence of Irish neutrality toward the Allies and Britain’s possession of basesin Northern Ireland.13 Although the latter arrangement continued into thepostwar period, Ireland’s permanent inclusion in a collective security arrange-ment was a key aim of London’s defense strategy. Lord Addison, the British

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10. “Central Intelligence Agency Report, Ireland,” 1 April 1949, in HSTL, HSTP, Segregated Records(SR)-48, Box 256, President’s Secretary’s File (PSF).

11. On the economic relationship between the two countries, see Whelan, Ireland and the MarshallPlan, pp. 31–41. The U.S. State Department regarded Ireland as an economic satellite of Britain andtherefore believed that assistance to Ireland would relieve the pressure on the British economy.

12. “Intelligence Review No. 16,” 29 May 1946, pp. 36–37, in HSTL, HSTP, Box 16, Naval AideFile, War Department.

13. By 1944, 120,000 Americans were stationed in Northern Ireland. The benevolence of Irish neu-trality toward the Allied side was evident from frequent contact between Irish and Allied military andintelligence authorities, the exchange of information about the movement of Axis planes, ships, andsubmarines, and the joint monitoring of weather conditions. In addition, Ireland permitted Allied air-craft to ºy over Irish territory to the Atlantic and treated captured Allied servicemen more lenientlythan it did their Axis counterparts. See Dermot Keogh, Twentieth-Century Ireland: Nation and State(Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1994), p. 120. In 1946 the Pentagon recommended that high-rankingofªcers in the Irish army should be awarded the American Legion of Merit for “exceptional meritori-ous and outstanding services to the United States” from 1943 to 1945. Ronan Fanning, “Irish Neu-trality—An Historical Review,” Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1980), p. 35.

dominions secretary, argued for Irish membership in the United Nations(UN) on the grounds that “we should expect to ªnd her generally sympa-thetic to the western European attitudes on international problems.”14 Ire-land’s participation in the UN was blocked by the Soviet Union, but the prin-ciple of assent was maintained by Clement Atlee’s government in London.15

Such a course, the British government hoped, would have the furtherbeneªt of normalizing Anglo-Irish relations. This bilateral relationship hadmany layers, but diplomatic discourse by war’s end was characterized by newlevels of cooperation and mutual understanding. Sir John Maffey, the Britishminister in Dublin, noted in his 1945–1946 annual review that for “the ªrsttime in history the British cabinet has been able to conduct a long war with-out any anxiety about Ireland.”16 Some difªculties lingered, especially regard-ing de Valera’s visit to the German legation in Dublin to express his condo-lences upon Adolf Hitler’s death, but the relationship overall was moreamicable than it had been in many years.

Both London and Washington feared that the exclusion of Ireland wouldrefuel anti-partition activities in Britain and the United States. For the timebeing, however, the Irish patriotic slogan “England’s difªculty is Ireland’s op-portunity” had been moderated to “England’s difªculty is none of Ireland’sbusiness.” Maffey believed this was “something new.”17 Consequently, at adiplomatic level at least, moderation prevailed. British support of Irish mem-bership in the UN aimed also to extend Irish foreign policy horizons beyondthe conªnes of partition and provide Britain with an ally on the internationalstage.18 Irish participation in the ERP was favored for the same reason.

Regarding Ireland’s anti-Communist credentials, at ªrst glance Washing-ton had little to worry about. Anti-Communism had long been a central fea-ture of Irish life. Pope Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (“On Re-construction of the Social Order”) which condemned Communism, atheism,and materialism, had heavily inºuenced the Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy’spublic statements and parish sermons and found a ready audience among amajority Roman Catholic population. A 1946 U.S. War Department intelli-gence report on Ireland noted that “the fervent Catholicism of the Irish is abulwark against Communist inºuence.” Similarly, a 1949 CIA report

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14. “Addison memorandum,” 9 February 1946, in The National Archives of the United Kingdom(UKNA), Prime Minister’s Ofªce (PREM), 8/258, 0969.

15. “Record of government meeting,” 21 March 1946, in UKNA, PREM, 8/258, 0969.

16. “Annual Report, 1945–6,” in UKNA, Foreign Ofªce (FO), 54722, W8767.

17. Ibid.

18. “Addison memorandum,” 9 February 1946.

afªrmed that “Communism has little appeal to the Irish whose views on polit-ical, social and economic matters are conditioned by religious beliefs.”19

Political parties on both the right and the left used “Red scare” tactics tosmear the opposition and win voters to their side. The Communist Party ofIreland had never made an impact in either local or national elections. More-over, after the founding of the Irish state in 1922, nationalism had been at theheart of Irish politics and society, leaving little room for other political ideolo-gies. Public dissatisfaction with the performance of a political party, in or outof government, was expressed through the ballot box during local and na-tional elections. Yet, even if it seemed unlikely that Catholic Ireland wouldturn to Communism, the U.S. government’s concerns about Communist ac-tivity and about the seeming deterioration of Irish economic conditionsstrengthened the case for including Ireland in the ERP.

Given the political, diplomatic, security, and economic reasons for in-cluding Ireland in the Marshall Plan, the only remaining question, at least inthe short term, was whether the Irish government would accept the invita-tion.

The Irish Response

The Fianna Fáil government led by de Valera received a formal communica-tion on 4 July 1947 from Norman Archer, the acting British representative inIreland, and Stanislas Ostroróg, the minister at the French embassy, invitingde Valera to attend a meeting in Paris on 12 July and “take part in the drawingup of a program covering both the resources and needs of Europe” for the fol-lowing four years.20 At an ofªcial level, Ireland’s department of external af-fairs, under the guidance of its new secretary, Frederick Boland, was predis-posed to new international initiatives. Boland welcomed the opportunity torepair Ireland’s international reputation after the damage inºicted by a seriesof events: Ireland’s neutrality during the war, de Valera’s visit to the Germanlegation, the burning of British and American ºags in Ireland on the day thewar ended, and the exclusion of Ireland from the UN in 1946. Moreover, thedepartment had ªnally achieved a strong standing within the Irish adminis-tration and, with de Valera’s support, was ready to extend its contacts and ho-rizons. Consequently, the ERP invitation, which also included membershipin the Committee for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) and later

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19. “Central Intelligence Agency Report, Ireland,” 1 April 1949.

20. “British and French invitation to Irish government,” 4 July 1947, in National Archives of Ireland(hereinafter NAI), Department of the Taoiseach Files (D/T), S14106A.

the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), provided anideal opportunity to expand the country’s diplomatic horizons in a multilat-eral context.

The external affairs department also believed that participation in theERP would mark “the ªrst time that Ireland has had an opportunity of co-operating in an international organization in which the members of the Brit-ish Commonwealth of Nations were not also participating.”21 Ireland in thatsense could exert its sovereign and independent status even though technicallyit was still a dominion within the British Commonwealth. This argument alsoprovided the department with a reason to welcome the European dimensionof the ERP, although European unity per se was not an active matter in Irishgovernment policy in 1947.

The anti-Communist and security implications of the program did notgo unnoticed by external affairs personnel. Following Marshall’s Harvardspeech, Irish ofªcials argued that U.S. motives were economic and political:to achieve economic recovery and social stability in Europe, to forestall aslump in American prices, and to provide support and leadership to the freeworld, as had been done earlier through the Truman Doctrine. On this lastpoint, an external affairs memorandum described the Marshall Plan as being“in line with President Truman’s statements some months ago about the ob-ject of aid to Greece and Turkey.” But the memorandum indicated that it was“difªcult to see how the USA would give large scale assistance to Eastern Eu-ropean countries under governments like that in Hungary.”22

Although Irish ofªcials were aware that American decisions about theERP would be inºuenced by political as much as economic concerns, this didnot affect their support for Irish participation. Nor were they worried aboutthe anti-Communist intent of the program. To be sure, some Irish diplomatshad misgivings about Soviet and U.S. hegemonic aims in Europe and pre-ferred to adopt a neutral and independent path between the two superpow-ers.23 But the views of Joseph Walshe, the Irish ambassador to the Vatican,were far more typical. In one of his frequent missives to Boland from Rome,Walsh said on 16 July 1947 that “it seems to be useless to try and judge Rus-sian reactions by ordinary standards.”24

Ultimately, there was little doubt that the external affairs departmentwould push for acceptance of the invitation. This enthusiasm, however, was

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21. “Memorandum,” June 1947, in NAI, D/T, S14106A.

22. Ibid.

23. Desmond Dinan, “After the ‘Emergency’: Ireland in the Post-War World, 1945–50,” Éire-Ireland,Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 1989), pp. 85–103.

24. Joseph Walshe to Frederick Boland, 16 July 1947, in NAI, Department of External Affairs (D/EA), Conªdential Reports Received from the Holy See Embassy, P12/2A.

not shared by the department of ªnance, headed by J. J. McElligott, who be-lieved that Ireland could not expect “any measure of salvation from the so-called Marshall Plan” and wanted to “avoid the indignity of accepting U.S.aid.”25 McElligott’s minister, Frank Aiken, was hostile to participation in theERP because it would divide Europe and force Ireland to abandon its neutral-ity.26 These two departments dominated the debate on whether to accept ERPfunds. Neither the Irish public nor opposition parties were consulted prior tothe government’s acceptance of the invitation on 4 July 1947.27

Unlike Switzerland and Italy, Ireland did not attach any conditions to itsinvolvement in the ERP. The Swiss provisos related to protecting the country’straditional neutral status, ensuring the CEEC economic agreements wouldnot be binding without prior agreement, and reserving the right to maintaintrade agreements with non-CEEC countries. The Swiss government regardedall three conditions as key issues of national concern.28 Ireland, by virtue of itsneutral status, might have attached similar terms to its membership but de-cided not to do so. Italian acceptance was accompanied by the condition thatthe CEEC would not form an anti-Soviet bloc, which might also have beenexpected to cause concern to neutral Ireland.29 Clearly, de Valera, who wasboth prime minister and minister for external affairs, along with his depart-mental ofªcials, believed that Irish neutrality would not be jeopardized byparticipation in the U.S.-sponsored program. In any case, the country ur-gently needed economic assistance.30

Concern about the impact of the Marshall Plan on Ireland’s neutralitywas conªned mainly to the country’s small Communist Party. In the August1947 edition of the Communist publication The Review, M. P. O’Dwyerasked, “Just where are we going? What is the Fianna Fáil Government leadingus into?” Answering his own questions, O’Dwyer insisted that the ERP was a“Wall Street–inspired imperialist plan” to consolidate American control of theRuhr region in western Germany and to create a “western bloc against the So-viet Union and the new democracies.” Europe, he argued, was not “devas-

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25. “Finance,” 3 February 1948, in NAI, Department of Finance (D/F), F 121/10/48.

26. “Ireland in the European Recovery Programme 1947–53,” in HSTL, Oral History Project 1978,Section 3.

27. The government did not release a public statement on the Marshall Plan until the ofªcial state-ment of acceptance was published on 6 July 1947.

28. De Valera was informed of the Swiss position by Walter de Bourg, the Swiss chargé d’affaires inDublin, and by W. B. Butler, the Irish representative in Berne. “Finance Note 28,” 30 June 1947, inNAI, D/T, F305/57I.

29. Ibid.

30. In June 1947, Ireland shared the prevailing European trend of increasing reliance on the dollararea for imports. The Irish citizen still faced shortages of basic items such as tea, sugar, butter, bacon,clothing, petroleum, oils, and lard.

tated,” not in need of “reconstruction” by the “latest wearer of the imperialistmantle.” He disparaged the recent CEEC meeting in Paris: “of course it was apolitical conference, of course it was directed against the Russians.” He alsocriticized the government for abandoning neutrality and—unlike Switzerlandand the Scandinavian countries—bringing Ireland “into the British bloc withits head up.” O’Dwyer concluded that “unless national Ireland calls a halt, thenation will ªnd itself being walked farther yet. . . . we may as well start sprin-kling a bit of chromium around Spike Island. The Yanks like things nice.”31

Such views held little sway outside the small circle of Communists andsocialists. Ultimately, Irish ofªcials, along with politicians, farmers, factoryowners, traders, and workers, who admittedly knew little about the ERP, sup-ported the government. As George Duncan, a Trinity College economist, putit, the large majority of Irish concluded that they should not look “a gift-horsein the mouth,” particularly an American one.32

In the immediate postwar years, many forces drew Ireland into the Mar-shall Plan. The Irish government, which had been in ofªce for sixteen yearsand needed a boost for its tired appearance, swiftly accepted the invitation.Although de Valera advised the Irish representatives attending the Paris con-ference in the summer of 1947 to avoid involvement in political matters thatmight compromise the country’s neutrality, the fact remained that Ireland hadagreed to take part in a U.S.-sponsored organization consisting exclusively ofWest European states.33 Following the Soviet withdrawal from the Paris con-ference, participation in the Marshall Plan equated—at some level—to anti-Sovietism and alignment with the United States.

Fighting Communism in the ERP

From the start of the ERP, U.S. policymakers believed that success dependedas much on ideological and psychological considerations as on economicachievements. David Ellwood has argued that the plan was more than thesum of its “key operating tools”—the loans, grants, counterpart funds, andtechnical assistance.34 Indeed, when Marshall delivered his speech in June

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31. M. P. O’Dwyer, “Just Where Are We Going? What Is the Fianna Fail Government Leading UsInto?” The Review (Dublin), August 1947, p. 3, in National Library of Ireland (NLI).

32. George A. Duncan, “Marshall Aid,” Journal of Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol.19 (1949–1950), p. 293.

33. Whelan, Ireland and the Marshall Plan, p. 66.

34. Ellwood, “‘You Too Can Be Like Us’: Selling the Marshall Plan,” History Today, Vol. 48, No. 10(October 1998), p. 34. Each ERP government was obliged to set aside in local currency equivalentamounts to the loans and grants received. Loan set-asides could be used by individual governments fora wide range of purposes. However, using grant set-asides required the agreement of the Economic

1947, there was no plan, no program, no blueprint in place.35 In late July,Ivan White, a counselor in the U.S. embassy in Paris, told Frederick Boland,the secretary of the Irish department of external affairs, that they “had noth-ing in the nature of a plan in mind. . . . [T]he Europeans would have to pro-duce it themselves.”36 Yet the State Department, which was in control of es-tablishing the ERP framework from July 1947 until the EconomicCooperation Administration (ECA) took over in April 1948, wanted the six-teen participant states to increase production, expand foreign trade, lower orremove all barriers to the free movement of trade and labor, achieve ªnancialstability, and realize European unity—in short, to create a united states of Eu-rope and remake the old world in the likeness of the new.37 The idea was en-capsulated in one ERP slogan used in publicity campaigns—“You too can belike us”—while Paul Hoffman, the former car salesman and president of theStudebaker car company who became the ªrst administrator of the ERP, sawthe primary aim of the ERP as being to “crystallize a free-world doctrinewhich reºects the ideals and strivings of free men.”38

Underpinning the “American way” was a belief in and dedication to theconcepts of growth, modernization, and prosperity as the recipe for greatnessand a barrier against Communism. Hoffman believed that the United Stateshad immense responsibilities for propaganda beyond its borders: “[A]s theleader of the free world, it must by deeds and words make clear to all peoplesour devotion to the idea of a free, peaceful and more ample life for all men.”39

Thus, propaganda described as “information” was central to the operation ofthe ERP.

Authority for these activities came from Article II of the bilateral cooper-ation agreement signed by each participating country with the U.S. govern-ment. Under the agreement, the ECA was permitted to engage in the “dissem-ination of information” about the ERP, European-American cooperation,and European cooperation. Funds for publicity and propaganda came from a5 percent cut in each country’s counterpart fund and from the ECA’s ownbudget for the purpose, yielding an almost unlimited supply of money. In ad-dition, each ECA mission in the sixteen European capital cities had the ser-vices of an information division, or an ofªcer at the very least.

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Cooperation Administration (ECA) and, therefore, accorded the local mission some inºuence in thedirection of participants’ economies.

35. See Hogan, The Marshall Plan, ch. 1.

36. “Boland to External Affairs, Dublin,” 28 July 1947, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/1.

37. On the creation of the ECA and initial objectives, see Hogan, The Marshall Plan, pp. 101–108.

38. Quoted in Ellwood, “‘You Too Can Be Like Us,’” p. 33; and Paul Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won(London: Michael Joseph, 1951), p. 123.

39. Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won, p. 125.

The countries considered by the Americans to be most in need of ERPpropaganda measures were France, the German Bizone, and Italy. A secondgroup comprised Austria, the French zone in Germany, Greece, Trieste, andTurkey. In the third group were Britain and Sweden, and a fourth group con-sisted of Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,Norway, and Portugal.40

The ECA Information Division in Paris used its own radio and ªlm unitsand independent companies, in cooperation with the local missions, to pro-duce thousands of press releases, publications, posters, photographs, exhibi-tions, radio programs, newsreel stories, and documentary ªlms.41 No idea wastoo large or too daring for the Paris ofªce.42 The absence of a separate infor-mation division in the Dublin mission reºected the ECA’s ranking of coun-tries according to the urgency and threat posed by Communism, and in thisregard Ireland was not a priority. From the beginning of the ERP in Ireland,Communist activities were meager and posed little threat to the country’sdemocratic capitalist system. Although ECA and U.S. State Departmentofªcials kept abreast of the activities of the few Communists in Ireland, theyconcurred with the CIA view that Irish Catholicism was a bulwark againstCommunist inºuences.43

Nonetheless, from December 1947 to September 1948, when the StateDepartment and its network were still responsible for the ERP, the depart-ment circulated a telegram to its diplomats in ERP countries requesting thatthe United States be credited through publicity as the source of ERP assis-tance. In this way, the dependence of the participating countries on theUnited States was to be stressed. Irish ofªcials had no difªculty implementingthe request. Frederick Boland, the secretary of the Irish Department of Exter-nal Affairs, agreed that publicity measures for the ERP were “entirely naturaland legitimate.” He even went so far as to tell Vinton Chapin, a counselor inthe U.S. legation in Dublin, that “it is in the interests, not only of the UnitedStates, but of the receiving countries themselves that the people . . . shouldhave clearly before their minds, throughout the period of the [ERP], the ex-tent of their dependence from time to time on aid furnished by the United

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40. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe, p. 162.

41. One of the more bizarre publicity methods was a balloon used as part of the Marshall Plan MobileExhibit. The exhibit carried out a 6,000-mile tour. The balloon, 50 feet in diameter and emblazonedwith the letters “ERP,” was moored over the ERP exhibit. But it broke away when ºying over the WestGerman border town of Hof in April 1950 and was blown over Czechoslovakia, where it was shotdown by ªghter planes and ground guns. Millions of smaller balloons were also released, each with acord inside carrying a message, part of which read “The Marshall Plan—a plan for democratic peace.”

42. Ellwood, “‘You Too Can Be Like Us,’” p. 35.

43. “Central Intelligence Agency Report, Ireland,,” 1 April 1949, p. 13; and Whelan, Ireland and theMarshall Plan, pp. 362–363.

States.”44 Boland agreed that the Irish government information bureau, press,radio, and parliament would all give full publicity to the ERP in accordancewith the “government’s declared policy with regard to the Marshall Plan, butalso the traditional feeling of the people of this country towards the UnitedStates.”45 Furthermore, Boland was amenable to the branding and labelingwith the ERP logo of all U.S. goods and services supplied to Ireland. JamesDillon, the minister for agriculture, agreed with Boland and noted that “wehere in Ireland were so fond of ‘Old glory’ we make no objection, as we areglad to see this symbol anywhere.”46 Irish acquiescence contrasted with thereaction in Italy. For Andrew Berding and his ECA publicity team in Rome,the labeling issue added to accusations of U.S. interference in Italian domesticaffairs.47

The arrival in Dublin of ECA personnel, particularly William H. Taft inSeptember 1948 and Clement Hoopes in May 1950, altered this haphazardapproach to publicity. Two months after Taft arrived, he came under pressurefrom the ECA ofªces in Washington and Paris to investigate Ireland’s plans topublicize ECA and OEEC operations. The ECA needed to reassure the U.S.Congress that the Europeans were meeting all their ERP obligations, includ-ing publicity. Taft stressed to Irish ofªcials that the ECA’s aim was “not one ofglossing over difªculties or one of disguising American self-interest. It israther one of emphasizing Europe’s self-interest in co-operation with othercountries and as it is being worked out in the OEEC.” Taft offered to meetwith the Irish ERP committee to discuss the matter, and ECA ofªcials inWashington solicited the assistance of Hugh McCann, a counselor in the Irishlegation, to assist “with the big ‘Public Relations job’ in hand.”48 Thus, a fur-ther aim of the ERP publicity machine throughout the period was to ensurethat full acknowledgment and recognition was accorded to all U.S. exports toERP countries. The principle of dependency was enshrined in the publicitycampaign.

The Irish ERP committee also recognized in December 1948 that Irelandcould “not avoid” taking some publicity steps and that explanations of thegeneral situation might help “to dispel misunderstandings” about the ERP.

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44. “Garrett to State Department,” 13 January 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 14, File 700.

45. “Boland to Chapin,” 8 February 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 14, File 700.

46. “Dillon to John Muir, European Correspondent, Whaley-Eaton News Service,” 27 October 1948,in NARA, RG 84, Box 16, File 800–872.

47. David Ellwood, “The Marshall Plan and the Politics of Growth,” in Peter M. R. Stirk and DavidWillis, eds., Shaping Post-War Europe: European Unity and Disunity 1945–57 (New York: St. Martin’sPress, 1991), p. 19.

48. “Minutes of Meeting, Commins and Taft,” probably late November 1948, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/122; “McCann to Boland,” 24 December 1948, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/122; and “Taft toCommins,” 1 December 1948, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/122.

The proposed methods of publicity were a monthly ministerial public addressand the publication of suitable OEEC documents.49 However, Con Creminin external affairs was not convinced that the ERP committee’s proposalswould satisfy ECA ofªcials who “have a feeling that we are not doing quiteenough in this direction.” He doubted the value of public lectures because theaudiences were usually too small. Instead he favored the publication andbroadcasting of specialized publicity matter geared at the ordinary person,along with ministerial press conferences.50

The nature and intended targets of the messages that would be transmit-ted to the public drew little attention from the Irish committee in 1948. Forthe time being, the committee had little difªculty acknowledging U.S. gener-osity and emphasizing Ireland’s need for assistance. However, this soonchanged. Cremin’s proposals found a receptive audience in the minister forexternal affairs, Seán MacBride.

As leader of Clann na Poblachta, MacBride had overseen the operation ofa highly effective and innovative campaign during the 1948 elections and,once in ofªce, carried his interest in publicity further. MacBride agreed withCremin’s view that a more sophisticated, specialized, and targeted ERP infor-mation campaign was needed. MacBride also viewed the campaign as an op-portunity to highlight the injustice of the partition of the national territorywith the existence of Northern Ireland, a message that—ironically—accordedwith Berding’s operating principle of tying the ERP into domestic issues.However, MacBride’s intention was certainly not what the ECA or, indeed,U.S. State Department ofªcials had in mind. Nor was it what OEEC ofªcialsexpected.51

Despite criticism from the ECA and State Department, MacBride tookthe opportunity to demand that the ERP publicity campaign highlight theunanswered national question. He involved himself in the minutiae of thepublicity and offered guidelines about slogans for posters. One such poster,dealing with economic cooperation, featured a map of Ireland. The map in-cluded the Northern Ireland border, but it also clearly indicated the economicdifªculties caused by partition. Possible accompanying slogans suggested byMacBride included “Our economic problem is increased by the Partition ofthe industrial portion of the country from the rest,” along with those pro-moted by the ECA: “Produce more,” “Let us work for peace and prosperity,

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49. “ERP Committee,” 3 December 1948, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/15 pt. 1.

50. “Cremin to MacBride,” 29 December 1948, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/122.

51. The OEEC also came under pressure from the ECA in late 1948 to publicize the ERP, to popular-ize the OEEC, to extend popular understanding of the need for economic cooperation, and to encour-age participant countries to become more active on the matter. “Donald Mallett, OEEC InformationDivision to Biggar,” 24 February 1949, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/15 pt. 1.

international co-operation, full employment, full production and a better andpeaceful world.”52 The combination of messages reºected the concerns ofIrish domestic and foreign policymakers, in addition to those of ECAofªcials.

A pamphlet entitled “Working with Europe,” produced by the externalaffairs department in May 1949, discussed Ireland’s problems, the importanceof European cooperation, and the dimensions of ERP aid needed.53 Althoughthe pamphlet elicited praise from the ECA information division in Paris andlocal ECA ofªcials as well as congratulatory notes from Harriman, Hoffman,and Bissell to MacBride, the partitionist dimension of the posters used at the1949 Paris exhibition in the OEEC headquarters drew criticism. MacBridemade no excuses, commenting that “it is difªcult to see how Ireland could beexpected to show an economic map of her territory without, in some way,raising the sore question of partition.”54 The predominance of this domesticissue in the minister’s foreign policy agenda affected the realization of otherAmerican aims for Ireland through the ERP.

Not surprisingly, these political issues were omitted from the publicitycampaign organized by the ECA mission in Dublin. Following the arrival ofClement Hoopes in May 1950 to oversee the publicity effort, the full range ofcommunication media was adopted.55 Under Hoopes’s direction, the ECAmission ªrst targeted the farming community, then industrial and businessemployees, then executives and managers, and ªnally trade unions, women,and children. The ECA staff took up almost every invitation to speak andadopted special measures. The messages stressed American generosity, howimprovements in agricultural research and education could increase food pro-duction, and the value of efªcient industries using high-quality raw materialsand craftsmanship. The bottom line, as one ofªcer told his audience, was that“whatever happens by . . . June 1952, the Irish will be able to look back on

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52. “ERP Committee,” 21 February 1949, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/138/2; and “MacBride Note,” Feb-ruary 1949, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/138/2.

53. “Working with Europe,” May 1949, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/138/2.

54. “Ireland Draws Criticism in Paris,” Irish Independent (Dublin), 5 July 1949, p. 1.

55. Prior to Hoopes’s arrival, the ECA mission and the government had clashed once over a publicity-related issue. In January 1950 ªnance ofªcials objected to criticism from William H. Taft, who im-plied that “Ireland [was] not using dollars as fast as allocated.” Taft apologized and explained that theunfortunate emphasis on spending rates was “not of our doing.” He said that any future public state-ment about this matter would be checked with external affairs prior to release, but Carrigan also be-lieved they should keep the public informed about the operation and progress of the ERP as stipulatedunder the Bilateral Agreement. “Ireland Not Using Dollars as Fast as Allocated,” The Irish Times(Dublin), 18 January 1950, p. 5; “Finance,” 18 January 1950, in NLI, D/EA, 305/57/209; “Creminto Hogan,” 20 January 1950, in NLI, D/EA, 305/57/209; and “Carrigan to Hogan,” 21 January1950, in NLI, D/EA, 305/57/209.

real progress where, for them, it counts most—in the rehabilitation of theirgreen and pleasant land.”56

Altered Visions: June 1950

The focus of the ECA-initiated publicity programs in all ERP countries wasaltered from 1950 onward by the outbreak of war in Korea. In August 1950the ECA Information Division in Paris drafted a report that recognized thechanged circumstances. To strengthen European “stability, self-conªdenceand, therefore, self-respect,” the ECA proposed to alter the three main themesof the publicity drive. As the report explained:

(1) Marshall aid and military assistance are good for you because they giveyou—as Europeans—a ªghting chance to make Europe strong enough to dis-courage any aggression.(2) But—this strength can only be achieved through unity. As separate, rivalpowers, the nations of Free Europe are weak, are dangerously exposed.(3) Productivity must increase because more food, more machines, more ofnearly everything is needed to make Europe so strong it will be unassailable.57

Accordingly, the original Marshall Plan slogan, “You too can be like us,” be-came “Prosperity makes you free.”58 Europeans were now to learn, as PaulHoffman, the ªrst ERP administrator, noted, “that this is the land of fullshelves and bulging ships, made possible by high productivity and goodwages, and that its prosperity may be emulated elsewhere by those who willwork towards it.”59 In mid-1950 the ECA launched a productivity drive andemphasized it at information campaigns while acknowledging that such mea-sures had to be adapted to local conditions.60

ECA ofªcials by this point argued that European self-defense was “an ob-jective which over-rides in immediate importance any of the economic goalswe and European leaders have established in [the] past two years.” In the con-text of Ireland, the chief goals became, as Paul Miller, the ECA chief, told thePublicity Club of Ireland in September 1950, “peace, unity and prosperity.”

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56. “Frank Gervasi, ERP Information Division, Paris, Speech, Radio Éireann Order of Program,” 14April 1950, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/148.

57. Ellwood, “The Marshall Plan and the Politics of Growth,” p. 25; emphasis, in original.

58. Ibid.

59. Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won, p. 91.

60. The Anglo-American Council on Productivity, the ERP Technical Assistance Program, and theERP Productivity Program were all directed at increasing European productivity levels. Under the aus-pices of the second and third of these programs, an Irish trade union group visited the United States in1951.

ECA ofªcials in Ireland stressed how much the ERP had done for Ireland andhow little Ireland had been required to do in return, particularly in terms ofits continued non-aligned status.61

Protecting Irish Neutrality within the ERP

The initial plan was that Ireland would receive ERP ªnancial aid until 30June 1952. However, the needs of American and Western European rearma-ment necessitated a reorientation of U.S. foreign aid programs, shifting fromeconomic aid to military assistance. From late 1950 on, the continuation ofeconomic and military aid was dependent on each ERP country’s willingnessto accept an amendment to the EC Act requiring the participating states “tostrengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of thefree world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and inde-pendence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the ef-fective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for col-lective security.”62

The ECA mission in Dublin informed Seán MacBride on 23 December1950 that aid to Ireland and Portugal might be halted within a week.63 Thisdisclosure did not come as a surprise to Irish ofªcials, who were aware thatdiscussions about the suspension of aid had been under way for some time be-tween Washington and London. Furthermore, on 19 October 1950 ECA per-sonnel in Dublin told the Irish government that further allotments for 1951–1952 would be reconsidered at the end of 1951 “for reasons connected withthe present defense effort.”64 Ireland was given the opportunity to align itselfformally with the United States in a defense arrangement in return for contin-ued economic aid. In practical terms, however, the Irish government had tiedits own hands on the matter through its refusal to participate in the North At-lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in February 1949.

Ireland potentially could have beneªted from taking part in a U.S.-ledmilitary alliance. Geographically, it was part of the Atlantic community. Ideo-logically, it fully supported anti-Communist movements and was likely tojoin with others in resisting the “godless East.”65 Soon after coming to ofªce,

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61. “Minutes of Staff Meeting,” 14 March 1951, in NARA, RG 286, Agency for International Devel-opment, Mission to Ireland, Box 1, File 10; and “Team of U.S. Experts to Appraise Country’s Indus-trial Potential,” The Irish Times (Dublin), 15 September 1950, p. 1.

62. “Mutual Security Act 1951,” sect. 2, in NAI, D/T, S14106H.

63. “External Affairs to the Government,” 28 December 1950, in NAI, D/T, S14106G/1.

64. “Gullick to Miller,” 8 January 1951, in NARA, RG 286, Box 1, File 8463.

65. Conor Cruise O’Brien, “Ireland in International Affairs,” in Owen Dudley Edwards, ed., Conor

MacBride had received dire communications from the Irish ambassador tothe Holy See, Joseph Walshe, that the Communists were gaining ground inthe Italian elections. MacBride responded by using diplomatic channels tosend £60,000 collected by the Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy to the Irishambassador in order to support the anti-Communist political parties ªghtingthe elections. Although MacBride had acted against the advice of his depart-mental secretary, Frederick Boland, he was motivated by a desire to make hismark on his new ofªce and to illustrate his anti-Communist and Catholic cre-dentials.66

Later in 1949, MacBride told Walsh that he would do everything hecould to promote the interests of Irish Catholicism.67 Furthermore, when-ever MacBride met U.S. politicians and ofªcials, he emphasized his anti-Communist credentials. State and church found common cause in the Irishgovernment’s ªght against Communism. Moreover, Archbishop CharlesMcQuaid of Dublin openly assured George Garrett, the U.S. minister toDublin, “that the Roman Catholic Church was in favor of Ireland’s acceptingthe invitation to join the North Atlantic group.”68

Other signs from within the leadership strata of the Irish polity suggestedthat Ireland would participate in an international military arrangement. Thecoalition government that took ofªce in February 1948 included senior mem-bers of the Fine Gael party who hoped that the party would commit itself tothe military alliance. T. F. O’Higgins, the defense minister, believed that Ire-land’s defense policy was interlinked with Britain’s: “[T]he likelihood of inva-sion from that quarter is most unlikely and . . . anybody else that attempts toinvade us would have to be strong enough to burst its way through the Britishnavy.”69 Moreover, as O’Higgins was well aware, membership in a U.S.-ledmilitary alliance would have brought increased resources and status for his de-partment. Another senior ªgure who supported entry into an alliance wasPatrick McGilligan, the ªnance minister, who feared that Ireland otherwisewould be strategically vulnerable in a future war with the Soviet Union andthat neutrality would damage Ireland’s international interests. His “plan of

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Cruise O’Brien Introduces Ireland (London: Deutsch, 1969), p. 124. O’Brien worked in external affairsduring this period.

66. “Joseph Walshe to John Charles McQuaid,” 19, 22 May 1948, in Dublin Diocesan Archives(DDA), John Charles McQuaid Papers (McQP), AB8/B, Government Box 2; Dermot Keogh, Irelandand the Vatican: The Politics and Diplomacy of Church-State Relations 1922–60 (Cork, Ireland: CorkUniversity Press, 1995); and Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919–1989 (Cork, Ireland:Hibernian Press, 1990), pp. 212, 313 n. 1.

67. “Walshe to Archbishop John D’Alton,” 23 November 1949, in DDA, McQP, AB8/B, Govern-ment Box 2.

68. Ronan Fanning, “The United States and Irish Participation in NATO: The Debate of 1950,” IrishStudies in International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1979), p. 39.

69. Parliamentary Debates, Dáil Éireann (PDDE), Vol. 99 (1945), col. 2150.

campaign” recommended that Ireland adhere to the Brussels Treaty and,along with Britain and the rest of the commonwealth, initiate discussionsabout mutual defense arrangements.70

Even more signiªcant was the prominence of James Dillon, the agricul-ture minister, in the new government. He was the sole parliamentarian whoopposed neutrality during World War II, a stance that led to his expulsionfrom Fine Gael. Although he was soon admitted back into the party, he didnot alter his views. Dillon wanted to ªght against Communism around theworld and drafted a plan for the establishment of a global federal structure. Inthe parliament in June 1946, he explained that treaties of friendship, under-standing, and cooperation would create “a new Federal Union” encompassingEurope, the commonwealth, and the United States.71

Although Dillon did not receive parliamentary support for his proposal,he did not abandon it. He met with George Garrett, the U.S. minister inDublin, and Vinton Chapin, the chargé d’affaires at the U.S. legation. In De-cember 1947 and January 1948, Garrett circulated Dillon’s plan to well-placed individuals in the United States and Britain, including Arthur Krock, aNew York Times journalist; Leopold S. Amery, the former British state secre-tary for India; and Charles Hambro, governor of the Central Bank in Lon-don. Hambro, in his reply to Garrett, noted the similarities between Dillon’splan, Winston Churchill’s proposal for a United States of Europe, and ErnestBevin’s Western European Union—all of which he supported. Hambropromised to send the Dillon memorandum to Harold Macmillan, the futureTory prime minister of Britain.72

Both Dillon and Hambro were worried that the Communist threat wasintensifying with events in Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Dillonfeared that even if the comprehensive nature of the Marshall Plan could shoreup the threatened democracies, the delay in getting congressional support forit would weaken the conªdence of European states living under the shadow ofCommunism. Because Dillon’s primary motivation was anti-Communism,his proposal would have entailed the abandonment of Irish neutrality and adiminution of Irish sovereignty. Consequently, he was sympathetic not just tothe concept of European integration but also to Irish membership in a collec-tive security arrangement.

However, Fine Gael did not have complete freedom of action to decideon military arrangements. The party was only one of ªve in the government,

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70. Raymond J. Raymond, “Ireland’s 1949 NATO Decision: A Reassessment,” Éire-Ireland, Vol. 22,No.3 (1985), p. 28.

71. PDDE, Vol. 101 (19 June 1946, col. 2188–2191.

72. “Dillon to Garrett,” 6 February 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 21, File 700.

and the main opposition to Fine Gael’s position was expected to come fromClann na Poblachta, led by MacBride. Although the Clann was known for itsstrong anti-Communism, it also espoused radical republicanism, which wasits main electoral appeal. The Clann had fought the election on the issues ofpartition, breaking the commonwealth link, and establishing a republic.Thus, Irish membership in a military alliance that might lead to the presenceof British troops was anathema to MacBride and his party. Moreover, deValera’s decision after his electoral defeat to set off on a worldwide anti-parti-tion tour made it all the more imperative for the Clann leadership to empha-size the partition issue. MacBride could not be seen as less insistent than deValera on the urgency of tackling partition, despite any allegiances he mighthave to the anti-Communist camp. It therefore seemed that the new govern-ment might break apart on the question of international military alignments.

An early indication that Ireland might be asked to join a military alliancecame in April 1948. The signing of the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948had accelerated efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to develop a multilateraldefense arrangement. On 22 April 1948, MacBride circulated a memoran-dum from J. J. Hearne, the Irish high commissioner in Ottawa, to the govern-ment reporting that “an Atlantic nations agreement would be coming to ahead quite soon and that we might expect to be approached at some stage.”Hearne implied that the proposal to Ireland would be similar to that put toSwitzerland: “There is the proposal. You are free to come in if you desire.”73

Signiªcantly, Hearne had forwarded newspaper clippings, including one fromThe Montreal Gazette about a recent speech in which de Valera “defendedÉire’s neutrality during the war” and advocated “neutrality in future.”74

On 7 January 1949 the Irish government received an invitation to joinNATO, and on 8 February the government discussed the invitation. By thistime, however, partition had come to be a central issue in Irish foreign policy.Both MacBride and Prime Minister John A. Costello had earned sharp re-bukes from the U.S. State Department for seeking an amendment to the ECAlegislation that would end assistance to Britain as long as partition remained.75

More signiªcant, the government had announced in September 1948 its deci-sion to repeal the 1936 External Relations Act, to remove Ireland from theBritish Commonwealth, and to declare a republic. After the discussion on

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73. “External Affairs Memorandum,” 22 April 1948, in NAI, D/T, S14291A/1.

74. The clipping of de Valera’s speech, “De Valera Defends Neutrality,” The Montreal Gazette, 13 April1948, is in NAI, D/T, S14291A/1.

75. “John Hickerson to Garrett,” 4 May 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 15, File 710; and “Garrett toLewis Douglas, U.S. Ambassador in London,” 25 March 1948, in NARA, RG 84, Box 15, File 710.Irish-American politicians lobbied in the U.S. Congress to introduce the amendment. They realizedthat it had little chance of passage, but they believed it would embarrass both Washington and Lon-don.

8 February, the Irish government declined the NATO invitation with the fol-lowing explanation:

Ireland is essentially a democratic and freedom-loving nation. . . . Mindful ofher Christian and democratic tradition, Ireland is earnestly desirous of playingher full part in protecting Christian civilisation and the democratic way of life.Therefore, with the general aim of the proposed treaty, the Irish government isin agreement. In the matter of military measures, however, Ireland is faced withgrave difªculties, from the strategic and political points of view, by reason of thefact that six of her north-eastern counties are occupied by British forces againstthe will of the overwhelming majority of the Irish people.76

In these circumstances, the government noted, NATO membership would be“repugnant and unacceptable to the Irish people.”77

Thus, involvement in NATO was rejected far more because of partitionthan because of neutrality.78 The government argued that North Atlantic se-curity depended on “ending a situation which threatens the peace of these is-lands and which may, at any moment, prove a source of grave embarrassmentto both Britain and Ireland.”79 However, the strategy of attempting to barteran end to neutrality in return for U.S. action on partition failed. MacBridehad overestimated the value of Irish neutrality to the U.S. government, whichalready had access to Northern Ireland, and America’s interest in resolving thepartition question. MacBride did not abandon his strategy, and in 1949 and1950 he continued to lobby the Truman administration directly and indi-rectly through Irish diplomats and Irish-American politicians for action onpartition and for arms through a bilateral treaty. Neither goal was forthcom-ing.80

On the last of MacBride’s three visits to the United States as minister forexternal affairs, he met with President Harry Truman on 23 March 1951. Sec-

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76. “MacBride Draft Memorandum,” 8 February 1949, in NAI, D/T, S14291A/1. At this time Ire-land was also asked to take part in a “league of neutral nations” with Spain, Portugal, and Argentinawhich it declined. “External Affairs Memorandum,” 22 April 1948, S14291A, in NARA, Box 15,RG84 and NAI, D/T, File 710.

77. Texts Concerning Ireland’s Position in Relation to the North Atlantic Treaty (Dublin: Irish StationeryOfªce, 1950), No. 99934, presented to both houses of the Irish Parliament by the Minister for Exter-nal Affairs on 26 April 1950. See also”Irish Government Aide-Mémoire to the United States Govern-ment,” 9 February 1949, in PDDE, Vol. 120 (1950), p. 117.

78. The State Department had already been warned by British authorities that Ireland would rejectthe invitation. “W. Stratton Anderson, U.S. embassy, London, to Acheson,” 19 October 1948, inNARA, RG 84, Box 15, File 707.

79. “MacBride Draft Memorandum,” 8 February 1949.

80. The U.S. government had no intention of moving from its traditional policy. Partition was an in-ternal Irish issue. Regarding the arms issue, not until 1953 did U.S. diplomats and army intelligenceofªcials in the Dublin embassy endorse a request by the Irish government to purchase arms and equip-ment from the U.S. government without reference to a bilateral defense arrangement. “Huston toState Department,” 4 February 1953, in FRUS, Vol. VI, pt. 2, pp. 1559–1560.

retary of State Dean Acheson had advised the president to avoid discussingthe partition question because it would embarrass the British government.Truman believed that partition was a domestic Irish issue, which had no placeon the international stage. Acheson also advised against giving arms to theIrish government until Ireland joined NATO, a view endorsed by the Britishgovernment.81 Thus, in February 1949, the Irish government had set a coursefor itself that ensured both non-adherence to the Mutual Security Act (whichreplaced the Economic Cooperation Act in 1951) and an end to U.S. eco-nomic aid to Ireland.

The growing tensions between East and West led to changes in the Mar-shall Plan legislation. Assistance to Ireland had been furnished under the pro-visions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. Section 115(b) stipulatedthat a country, as a condition of assistance, must adhere to the purposes andpolicies of that act. These conditions were summarized in January 1952 byTheobald Tannenwald, the assistant director of the Mutual Security Agency(MSA), for his director, Averell Harriman, as the promotion of industrial andagricultural production, ªnancial stability, increased interchange of goods andservices between participating countries, the creation of counterpart funds ineach participant country, and the provision of detailed information to theUnited States in order to operate the ERP program.82

These requirements were amended by section two of the Mutual SecurityAct in 1951 obliging states “to strengthen the mutual security and individualand collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the in-terest of their security and independence and the national interest of theUnited States and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries inthe United Nations system for collective security.”83 Each ERP country wasasked to make appropriate amendments in the bilateral agreement underwhich it received economic aid. Complying with the new conditions wouldmean that a country could use any remaining funds in the ERP pipeline andgain access to further economic and military aid from the United States. Thedeadline for an exchange of notes between the United States and each of theMarshall Plan countries was set for 8 January 1952.84

The Irish coalition government and, from June 1951, its successor led byÉamon de Valera of Fianna Fáil indicated that the additional requirements

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81. “Acheson to Truman,” 22 March 1951, in HSTL, HSTP, PSF; and “State Department Brief,” 11September 1951, in HSTL, HSTP, Naval Aide File, Box 23.

82. “Tannenwald to Harriman,” 15 January 1952, in HSTL, Papers of Theodore Tannenwald Jr.,(TTP), Box 3.

83. “Tannenwald to Hon. John W. McCormack, House of Representatives,” 28 February 1952, inHSTL, TTP, Box 3.

84. “Tannenwald to Charles Murphy,” 25 February 1952, in HSTL, TTP, Box 3.

would prevent Ireland from receiving any new aid under the ERP. However,de Valera and his new minister for external affairs, Frank Aiken, hoped to ob-tain all the aid that was still outstanding, particularly $18 million of grantcounterpart, without adhering to the new conditions. As the negotiations be-tween Irish and U.S. ofªcials on this matter reached the ªnal stages in late1951 and early 1952, Cloyce K. Huston, the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Dublin,noted that the Irish government was “desirous of securing a completion of theaid program . . . if that could be completed without prejudice to its policy ofneutrality.”85

Throughout the negotiations, the Irish government made clear that itwould not adhere in any form to the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The talksreached a deadlock because of Ireland’s refusal to include in its note the fol-lowing sentence: “Whenever reference is made in any of the articles of suchEconomic Co-operation Agreement to the Economic Co-operation Act of1948, such reference shall be construed as meaning the Economic Co-opera-tion Act of 1948, as heretofore amended.” Although the Irish government ac-knowledged its “duty” to promote “international understanding and goodwill,” maintain “world peace,” and eliminate the causes of “international ten-sion,” the wording of the sentence was deemed unacceptable.86 External Af-fairs Minister Aiken set out the reasons in a letter dated 24 December 1951 toFrancis Matthews, the new U.S. ambassador in Ireland:

[T]he Irish government wish to obtain a peaceful and early ending of the unjustpartition of Ireland. . . . Ireland cannot, except in the case of an unprovoked at-tack . . . consider entering into any further military commitment with othercountries for joint defense so long as she is denied the national unity and free-dom which they already enjoy.87

Aiken did, however, ask the U.S. government to sell “modern arms and equip-ment” to Ireland to help it cope with the “present dangerous world situa-tion.”88

This general approach was maintained by De Valera, who indicated thatthe continued partition of Ireland compelled it to remain neutral despite itssupport for wider U.S. strategic concerns. De Valera realized that he could notbe seen to associate the country with a military alliance. This stand-off posi-tion annoyed Huston, who argued that the deadlock arose from the “dogged

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85. “Huston to Acheson,” 10 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E.

86. “Aiken to Huston,” 24 December 1951, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E; and “Memorandum ofConversation, Irish and American Ofªcials,” 8 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E.

87. “Aiken to Huston,” 24 December 1951.

88. Ibid.

consecration of the Prime Minister to his policy of neutrality” and that theobstacles to an agreement between the United States and Ireland were “politi-cal and psychological rather than technical.”89

Huston informed the State Department on 31 December 1951 that theIrish response failed to meet the new legislative requirements and that Irelandnow faced the possibility of losing the remainder of its ERP aid. Furthermore,Huston believed that the introduction of the “question of partition or otherpolitical matter into the proposed exchange of Notes” would be an “unaccept-able and unnecessary qualiªcation of the assurances required” under the Mu-tual Security Act. He also believed that the sale of arms to Ireland should havebeen dealt with in a separate communication.90

With three days to go to the deadline of 8 January 1952, an ofªcial in theState Department’s ofªce of British Commonwealth and northern Europeanaffairs, William Hamilton, telephoned Huston in Dublin to discuss the mat-ter. Huston told him that the two sides were still “a long way apart,” and thetwo men agreed that they must emphasize to the Irish government that theERP aid could not be continued unless Ireland embraced the Mutual SecurityAct principles.91 Huston developed these arguments in preparation forMatthews’s meeting with Aiken on 7 January, but he stressed that “the pro-posed agreement can be so worded as to avoid any clash with Ireland’s presentforeign policy.”92 This display of greater ºexibility by the State Department atsuch a late stage arose out of what Hamilton described as the “potentially ex-tremely embarrassing implications” that might arise if ERP aid committed toIreland were cut off.93

However, following a day of meetings in Dublin and Washington on8 January, Huston called Hamilton in Washington to inform him that theIrish government fully understood that $18 million of grant aid and $3 mil-lion of loan aid and technical assistance would be “frozen” if Ireland did notsubscribe to the Mutual Security Act. Huston indicated that he would be incontact with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, but no further communicationoccurred that night, and the deadline for the exchange of notes passed.94 J. J.Hearne, the Irish ambassador in the United States, summarized the situationfor State Department ofªcials at a meeting on 11 January 1952: “The govern-

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89. “Huston to Acheson,” 10 January 1952.

90. “Huston to Acheson,” 31 December 1951, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E.

91. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation,” 8 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E.

92. “Huston to Matthews,” 7 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E.

93. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation,” 5 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E.

94. “Huston to State Department, Correspondence on Termination Period 22 December 1951 to 10January 1952,” in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E.

ment had refused to enter NATO openly and was unwilling to enter throughthe back door.”95

Under these circumstances, suspension of U.S. economic aid to Ire-land, including $150,000 of commodities already ordered under the ERP,$900,000 of technical assistance, and $18 million of grant counterpart funds,was required by law.96 The MSA, headed by Averell Harriman, was initiallyinclined to adopt an inºexible attitude on the disbursement of this aid, de-spite a degree of ºexibility afforded by section 511 of the Mutual SecurityAct.97 Harriman agreed with many others in the U.S. administration that Ire-land, having been neutral during the war, should not have been included inthe ERP in the ªrst place. He opposed giving any assistance to Ireland outsidethe NATO and Mutual Security Act frameworks. However, neither the Mu-tual Security Agency nor the State Department wished, as Matthews in Dub-lin put it, “to stir up” the partition question or to bring trouble on themselvesfrom “the friends of Ireland on the Hill.” Matthews urged George Perkins andHarry Raynor in the State Department to persuade the MSA “to loosen up”and be as liberal as possible on the Irish case.98 Although Perkins and Raynoragreed with the ambassador, Raynor held out little hope that the agencywould agree.

It appears, however, that the MSA in these early days of its existence didnot wish to embroil itself in unnecessary clashes with Congress. Agencyofªcials also recognized that they had a moral duty to fulªll commitmentsmade to Ireland prior to the suspension and eventual termination of ERP aid.Thus, the agency moved from its “unduly rigid” stance, as Tannenwald put it,and permitted existing commodity and technical assistance arrangements tobe funded. With regard to grant counterpart projects, however, the agency or-dered the renegotiation of all commitments undertaken before January1952.99 By 31 July 1953, Ireland and the United States had initialed a draftbilateral agreement. All that remained was for the Foreign Operations Admin-istration, the successor to the Mutual Security Agency, to submit the propos-als to Congress for approval. Six agreements were concluded between theUnited States and Ireland in 1955, 1956, and 1957.

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95. “Department of State Memorandum,” 11 January 1952, in NARA, RG 469, Box 2, File E.

96. “Tannenwald to Charles Murphy,” 25 February 1952, in HSTL, TTP, Box 3.

97. “Tannenwald to McCormack,” 28 February 1952, in HSTL, TTP, Box 3. Under this provision,the U.S. president could decide to continue economic and military aid to any country. Matthews alsoappealed to Truman to provide the remaining aid to Ireland, although he was disappointed with themundane work of his Dublin posting. “Matthews to Truman,” 8 February 1952, HSTL, HSTP,Ofªcial Files.

98. “Garner Ranney to Garrett,” 9 June 1950, in NARA, RG 59, Box 20, File D-5(a); and “HarryRaynor to George Perkins,” 22 January 1952, in NARA, RG 59, Box 20, File D-5(c).

99. “Tannenwald to Charles Murphy,” 25 February 1952.

The consolidation of democratic capitalist systems in Europe and the rebuffof Communist encroachments were central aims of the ERP. In some ways,however, the ECA propaganda campaign was less problematic in Ireland thanin other ERP countries. Despite Ireland’s wartime neutrality, ECA ofªcials re-alized that Irish sympathies lay with the capitalist democratic countries led bythe United States. Moreover, as Boland and Dillon indicated, the Irish gov-ernment had little difªculty participating in and supporting the ECA public-ity campaign. The aims of the Dublin ECA mission personnel and the mes-sages of the attendant publicity campaign, which focused on encouragingeconomic growth, improving productivity, developing greater cooperationwith other ERP countries, counteracting opposition to the ERP, and empha-sizing the reliance of Ireland on the United States, met with general approvalamong elite groups.100

Because of the minimal Communist presence in Irish trade unions, theIrish press, and Irish politics, the chief political goal of the ECA’s publicityprogram—the undermining of Communism—never featured directly inECA-related publicity measures in Ireland. The Irish workforce was as unin-terested in Communism at the end of the ERP as it had been at the begin-ning. Nevertheless, opposition to Communism was an operating principle forECA personnel in Ireland. In 1949, the CIA concluded that “there is no orga-nized opposition or obstruction to the work of the ECA in Ireland and nolikelihood of any.”101 Although this general assessment of the situation was ac-curate, the CIA failed to mention that the handful of Communists and indi-viduals who questioned American motives were critical of the ERP.When anti-Americanism surfaced in early 1951, Paul Miller, the ECA chief,defended the ERP.102 These were isolated incidents, however, because as TomCommins, the head of the ERP section in the External Affairs Department,noted in October 1951, “our people generally have an unqualiªed belief inthe existence of the American democratic way of life and when they think ofAmerica in this context they are more likely to hold an exaggerated idea of thewell-being of the average American than to question it.” 103 His colleague Wil-liam Fay likewise concluded that “there is no need to convince young Irish

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100. The disagreements between Irish and ECA ofªcials mostly concerned the pace of implementa-tion of the ERP in Ireland.

101. CIA, “Opposition to ECA in Participant Countries,” 10 February 1949, in HSTL, HSTP, PSF.

102. “Dr. Miller Defends Marshall Plan,” The Cork Examiner, 26 January 1951, p. 1.

103. “Fay,” memorandum of conversation, 30 October 1951, in NAI, D/EA, 305/57/273.

men” that capitalism would bring “greatly higher” standards of living thanthose available under “Socialist administrations.”104

In the military sphere, the outcome was different. The establishment ofthe Marshall Plan coincided with a change of government in Ireland in Febru-ary 1948. This development brought to ofªce representatives of ªve parties,few of whom had been in ofªce previously and all of whom were eager to im-plement their respective political agendas. The combination, therefore, ofhigh expectations, the coalition nature of the government in 1948–1951, thepresence of dominant personalities such as MacBride, and the anti-partitionworld tour undertaken by de Valera ensured that partition would be a priorityfor the government. The overriding salience of partition in Irish domestic andforeign policy guaranteed that negotiations on defense matters would betainted by partition issues and never fully examined for their own worth.

A year after the end of the ERP, Huston wrote to the State Department:“Partition continues to constitute the avowed basis for Ireland’s policy of ªrmneutrality and of non-participation in any program of collective defense suchas is represented by NATO or MSA.”105 Irish sympathies, he realized, mightlie with the capitalist democracies of the West rather than with the Commu-nist states. But from 1947 to 1952, atavistic issues dominated the approachesof two Irish governments to the new foreign policy challenges that emerged.Ireland was neutral and partitioned when the Marshall Plan began, and it re-mained so when the plan ended.

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104. Ibid.

105. “Huston to the Department of State,” 6 January 1953, FRUS, Vol. VI, pt. 2, p. 1558.