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The IRD:

Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Office Information

Research Department (1946 - 48)

HISTORY NOTJES

IRD Origins and Establishment

of the Foreign Office Information Research Department

1946-48

Hi&toriau. LRD No .. 9

IRD

Origins and Establislunent of the Foreign Office Infonnation Research Department, 1946-48

Historians, LRD

ISBN 0 903359 60 X

FOREWORD

As part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's commitment to Open

Government, the then Secretary of State, Mr Douglas Hurd, agreed in 1993 to the

review of the records of Information Research Departtnent (IRD). The publication of

this History Note on the origins and establishment of the department marks the

opening at the Public Record Office of the first papers to be released following this

review.

These papers (in class FO Ill 0, piece numbers 1-165) cover 1948, the first year of

IRD's operation. Further releases will follow at regular intervals.

August 1995

Ian Soutar

Library and Records Department

CONTENTS

Page

I Origins 1

Early initiatives 2

II Establishment 7

Administrative arrangements 7

Spreading the word 8

Methods and media 9

Liaison with other departments, organisations and governments 13

III IRD's First Year 20

I ORIGINS

The origins of the Foreign Office Information Research Department (IRD), established early

in 1948, lie in the onset of the Cold War. Its creation was prompted by the desire ofMinisters

in Mr Attlee's Labour Government to devise means to combat Communist propaganda, then

engaged in a global and damaging campaign to undermine Western power and influence.

British concern for an effective counter-offensive against Communism was sharpened by the

need to rebut a relentless Soviet-inspired campaign to undermine British institutions, a

campaign which included direct personal attacks on the Prime Minister and members of the

Cabinet and divisive criticism of government policies. On the international stage, and at the

United Nations in particular, Ministers increasingly felt the lack of ready ammunition to

counter attacks on them by Soviet and satellite delegates.

Within the Foreign Office, where responsibility for overseas publicity and information work

lay, strategies to combat Soviet propaganda had long been discussed, and IRD evolved from

plans drawn up in 1946. It took some time, however, for officials to convince Ministers,

including Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, of the need for a formalised programme of action.

Bevin's initial reluctance sprang in part from a feeling that 'the putting over of positive results

of British attitude will be a better corrective' than an aggressive denunciation of communism. 1

Furthermore, public opinion in Britain was still on the whole sympathetic to Russia, partly

because of her sufferings as a loyal ally during the second world war, and partly because of the

persuasiveness to many people of Communism's claim to be the repository of 'progressive'

thought and action and to be the means by which the oppressed of the world would be

relieved of their burdens. Communism was also identified in many minds with peace and

disarmament. Stalin still retained for some the avuncular status of Uncle Joe, and many

people simply refused to believe reports of the scale and horror of the forced labour camps.

Within the Labour Party, differences in attitude towards the Soviet Union emerged publicly

both in Parliament and in the Trades Union Congress. Writing to the Prime Minister on 29

October 1946, a group of Labour MPs argued that British Socialist policies could bridge

antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union and encourage Soviet extension

1 Comment on a minute by Sir lvone Kirkpatrick, Assistant Under Secretary superintending information departments, 22 May 1946: FO 930/488.

1

of political and personal liberties. They deplored the 'anti-red' virus, opposed allying Britain

with 'American imperialism' and foresaw the United Nations as the principal future

instrument of international security. By the middle of 194 7 the risk of a split in the Labour

Party and its implications for foreign policy were being seriously discussed. 2 The need to keep

the left wing of the Party on side became a factor in the conduct of government policy towards

the Soviet Union. Combined with inhibitions over possible allegations of int r£ r nc in the

internal affairs of other countries, this was to contribute to th shift in in£ rmation tactics

towards the cloak of secrecy.

Nevertheless, by the end of 194 7 the need to take defensiv action against Soviet propaganda

was accepted at the highest level. A decision had to be taken to expos ommunism and to

offer something better. The earlier plans and programmes drawn up within th For i n Office

were now brought into play.

Early Initiatives

In the course of a briefing m tina on 18 March 1946 with th Amba ad r d i to

Moscow, Sir Maurice Peterson th Permanent Und r cr tary f tat 1r ar nt

suggested a paper on how t unter oviet propaganda. A m

Christopher Warner, Assistant Und r S cretary of tat d alin with

'The Soviet campaign again t thi ountry and ur r

Warner argued in favour fa d fensive-offensiv ', xp 1ng mmuni m

totalitarianism and providing n1oral and material upport t th fightin it

short of a direct attack on th p lici of the Sovi t Gov rnm nt.

These proposals were ndor d by th Foreign Offic ommitt n Ru ·an P li y

Committee), established in April 1946 t study Sovi t activiti and rdinat aunt r-

action, and a working party wa t up under Sir I von Kirkpatri k. With th appr v 1 f th

Prime Minister, an action programme was prepared involving a Ion -t rm propaganda

campaign against Communism with the assistanc of th Minist rial and Publicity

Committee, British Missions oversea the Central Offic of Inform ti n ( ) and th BB .

The tone was uncompromising:

2 N 9549, FO 371/66371 . 3 Sargent-Peterson interview, N 5572/605/38G FO 371 56832; Warn r m m . 56786. The memorandum is printed in Documents on British Policy Over: eas

2

/ 38 . 88.

371 /

This programme is not easy to execute since the essence of

communism is a less attractive subject for publicity than the acts of the

Soviet Government .. .its efficacy will depend largely on our policy,

since propaganda cannot operate successfully in isolation. We have a

good analogy in our very successful propaganda campaign during the

war directed towards stimulating resistance movements in Europe.

The V sign was blazoned all over the world. But at the same time we

acted ... We were not inhibited by the fear that the Germans would find

out what we were doing, or that they might react or that we might be

criticised. Propaganda on the largest possible scale was coordinated

with our policy. The result was a success.

Mr Bevin however considered the proposed measures too negative: 'This programme lacks

the positive side of the new Britain.' 4 Similarly, although he was willing later in 1946 to agree

to the launch of a propaganda offensive in Persia, where the Tudeh party was inciting

violence against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, he was still unwilling to give blanket

approval for a wholesale campaign against communism: 'I am not going to commit myself to

the whole of Kirkpatrick's schem in order to tackle Persia ... The more I study it the less I like

it.' 5

Throughout 194 7 the Soviet propaganda barrage continued against a background of

Communist expansion. While the Soviet press accused the Labour Party of 'stimulating an

anti-Soviet propaganda campaign and urging Social Democrats to ally with the forces of

imperialism' (Pravda, 10 June), Soviet authorities were consolidating their hold on Central

Europe and the Balkans. Many informed observers believed another war imminent, and were

not sanguine of America's commitment to the defence of Europe. Powerful Communist

parties in France and Italy vvere capable of sharing, and possibly taking, power. Britain's

colonial possessions were vulnerable to Communist influence.

4 P449, FO 930/488. 5 Minuting on Tehran telegram No. 749 of26 May 1946, FO 930/488. For the directive 'Russia in the Middle East', finally approved in October recommending a two-pronged reply to Soviet propaganda, whereby_ the Middle East should be persuaded to look to Britain for guidance and support, and Soviet misrepresentatiOns should be dealt with factually while publicity was given to the real state of affairs in Russia, see N 15609/G of 11 October 1946 FO 3 71/56887.

3

Kirkpatrick's proposals were reconsidered by the Russia Committee in July, but it was

concluded that no action should be taken before the Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting

due to take place at the end of the year. 6 Meanwhile a new phase in Soviet strategy was

heralded by the establishment of the Cominform in October 194 7, combined with the strident

tone of Soviet speeches at the United Nations and pessimism about the outcome of the CFM

meeting. 7 The question of how to react to escalating Soviet attacks was raised once more in

the Russia Committee. In line with Mr Bevin's opinion that factual propaganda was best, the

Committee inclined towards strengthening the presentation of British policy by the inclusion

of more positive material. The need for a more aggressive propaganda offensive was

recognised, however and Mr Bevin asked for a scheme to be worked out. a

On 6 December 194 7 the Parliamentary Under Secretary, Christopher aat r Lord) Mayhew

submitted to Mr Bevin a paper en titled 'Third Force Propaganda', which drew h avily on th

concept of a Third Force 'comprising all democratic elements which ar anti-Communist and

at the same time genuinely proaressiv and reformist', although not nee s arily belonging to

social democra6c parties. Third Fore principles should b adv rtised a offering th best and

most efficient way of life, whil th principles and practic of Communi m and al

unrestrained capitalism, should be attacked; the foreign policy of Communist untri hould

be exposed as a hindrance to int rnational cooperation and world p ac · ivil lib rti 1 u

stressed and a positive appeal 1nad Christian principl . 9

Many of th e basic workina practic · lat r dev loped by IRD w r for had w d in

Kirkpatrick's 1946 cheme and Mayhew' paper. In order to implem nt th n w poli y

overseas Posts would be directed to u e th resources not only of the information fV1C but of

the whole Mission. At home a sn1all Communist Information Department would b t up

possibly headed by an experienced specialist from outside the Diplomatic Servic . Under th

instructions of the Russia Committee and with Ministerial approval, it would bri f Minister

and delegates to international conferences. The new unit's output would includ periodical

issues of 'Speaker's Notes' on fundamental issues, from which extracts could be taken for us

6 Meetingof31July 1947, N 9345 FO 37 1166371. 7 Cabinet meeting of25 November CM90(47), CAB 129/10. 8 Meetingof23 October 1947, N 13701/271/38G FO 371/66374. 9 PG 138/138/950G, FO 9531128.

4

abroad, while the English edition would be made available to people in key positions at home.

In order to influence important overseas trade unionists and other influential leaders, a

programme of visits would be set up, and close and confidential liaison maintained with the

Labour Party and the Cooperative Movement.

The breakdown of the Council ofF oreign Ministers in December 194 7 led to a hardening of

attitudes, and Mayhew was authorised to submit a Cabinet paper embodying his

recommendations. He pointed out that now it was agreed that anti-Communist publicity

could be undertaken, there was no need to regard his scheme as a potentially 'black'

operation.10 The final form of the paper was prepared by Christopher Warner, and drew

more extensively on the political arguments of his own 1946 draft than on the concept of the

'Third Force', about which he had in any case expressed doubts,11 and which proved

inappropriate to some areas, either on cultural grounds, such as in the Middle East and Asia,

or, as in France where 'Third Force' had come to mean the coalition of Socialists and

Christian Democrats holding the middle ground between Gaullism and Communism. 12

On 8 January 1948 Mr Bevin presented to the Cabinet a memorandum on 'Future Foreign

Publicity Policy' together with two interconnected papers, 'The First Aim of British Foreign

Policy' and a 'Review of Soviet Policy'. 13 In 'The First Aim of British Foreign Policy', Mr

Bevin described the threat to the 'fabric of Western Civilisation' posed by Russia and her

Communist allies and argued that it was for the British Government as European social

democrats, and not for the An1ericans to give the lead in the spiritual, moral and political

sphere to all the democratic elen1ents in Western Europe which were anti-Communist and, at

the same time genuinely progressive and reformist.

The machinery to lead this anti-Communist campaign, as devised by Warner and Mayhew,

was set out in 'Future Foreign Publicity Policy'. The practical arrangements for the new

offensive, frrst proposed in the Third Force paper and refined in discussion with officials, were

retained: the two main elements were the establishment of a dedicated unit to prepare briefing

material on Communist policy, tactics and propaganda, and the extension of an information

10 Minute of30 December 1947 N 134/31/38G of 1948, FO 371/71648. 11 Minutes of Russia Corrunittee 18 December 194 7, N 14892/ G, FO 3 71 I 663 7 5. 12 Minute from Warner to Frank Roberts, Minister at Moscow, 2January 1948, P 138/138/G, FO 953/128. 13 CP(48)8, 6 and 7 respectively CAB 129/23.

5

capability to political sections in overseas Posts, although it was anticipated that existing

information machinery would continue to be largely responsible for executing the campaign. 14

The unit was to base its operations on factual reporting and in-depth research. Mr Bevin

ruled out anti-Communist propaganda in Iron Curtain countries, taking the view that HM

Government should not incite people to subversive activities if they were not in a po ition to

lend active assistance in overthrowing their regimes: as he later explained to his Ministerial

colleagues, in peacetime he considered overt propaganda more important than ov rt, whil

agreeing that there might be some exceptions. The main channels of communication w r to

be the publication of Ministerial statements in the foreign press; the BBC and th official

London Press Service; and overseas Posts_l5

The Cabinet endorsed the Foreign Secretary's proposals: in fact, the Prime Minister who had

seen a draft of CP(48)8, had already started the ball rolling by attacking th ovi t nion's

new imperialism in a broadcast pe ch on 4 January. Sir Ian Jacob form rly Military

Assistant Secretary to th Cabin t and now Dir ctor of Overseas Broadcasting a th BBC

and a member of the Russia C nunitte , stressed th n d for further Ministerial p on

which the BBC could ba:e th O> ir r porting. Th Lord Pr sid nt of th oun il H rb rt

Morrison, obliged on 1 I January and Mr A ttl al suggest d that Mr B vin includ a

passage in his speech for the foreion affairs debate in th Hous of Common t th ffi t tha

while Britain wa · endeavourin()' t co perat with countri with diffi rent id 1 th

activities of the Cominform lik those of its predec sor, th Comint rn afford d th r at t

hindrance to mutual confid nc and understandinO''. 16

Meanwhile th Russia Comtnitt e lo t no tim in instigating a preparatory ircular to tho

Posts which could b expected to implement th new policy, inviting th m t ontribut

appropriate raw material. 17 Th Cotnmonwealth Relations Offic and olonial po ts

for which the Foreign Offic had no direct responsibility, w re similarly put in th pictur .

The scope and variety of the replies received, from places as far r moved as Marseill and

Macao, testify to the interest stimulated as well as to current fears of Soviet int ntions.

14 Minute of30 December 1947, 134/3 1/38 of 1948, FO 371171648. 15 Memorandum by Mr Bevin of30 April1948 on Anti-Communist Publicity, PR 360 361/ 1/G, FO Ill I . 16 Minute of21January 1948, SU/48/2 FO 800/502; N 878 N 1141 , FO 371/71629. 17 Circular telegram No.6 of23 January 1948 PRl/ 1 /913G, FO 1110/ l.

6

n ESTABLISHMENT

A_.. • • • amJnJstrative arrangements

Sir Orme Sargent informed departments at home of the formation of IRD in Office Circular

No. 21 of 25 February 1948. By that time its first head, Mr (later Sir) Ralph Murray, an

Assistant, and one expert had been appointed, and a starting budget of£ 150,000 agreed with

the Treasury. Salaries accounted for a relatively small proportion of this, the larger portion

earmarked for common services (accommodation, paper, telegraphic facilities etc), and for

unquantifiable contingencies. Originally to be called Northern Information Department

(NID), it was named Information Research Department at Murray's suggestion, to avoid

confusion with an Admiralty department. Murray himself, and other early IRD staff, were

drawn from the ranks of regional information units which proliferated during the war years

but were now being slimmed down. IS

Although the intention as stated in CP(48)8, was that the new department should be a 'small

section in the Foreign Offic to collect information about Communist policy, tactics and

propaganda and to provid mat rial for our anti-Communist publicity through our Missions

and information ervice · abroad' it soon became clear that greater resources would be

required to perform the e task on a global scale. By August 1948, although the unit had

expanded to 16 Murray found it impossible to increase 'this slow, laboured trickle of output'

without an enlarged tabli hm nt. He needed competent editorial staff, reference section

assistants and reader for the Iron Curtain press. The specialised requirements of the unit

made it difficult to find suitable candidates among existing diplomatic service staff, and

presented recruitment probletn , as the qualifications stipulated were in many cases not

acceptable to the Civil Service Con1mission.

The need to recruit specialist staff, free from the limitations of civil service pay and conditions,

was one of the considerations which led Murray to suggest, in September 1948, that part of

the costs of the unit should be transferred to the secret vote. 19 In addition, the move to the

secret vote would enable a more flexible use of money, and avoid the unwelcome scrutiny of

18 XS03/95H (5/48G) FO 366/2759· PXS 03/27 FO 953/El739). 19 Minute of21 September 1948, XS0395HI0/48G FO 366/2759.

7

operations which might require covert or semi-covert means of execution. By the end of 1948

it had been agreed that £100,000 would be allotted from the 1949-50 secret vote to cover the

operational costs of the unit, including salaries, printing, films etc but not the office and

administrative expenses, which would be met by the Foreign Office.

Spreading the word

The new department began day to day work without delay, preparing background papers to

be used by Posts and individuals, and for reproduction in the media. Some oversea Po ts

considered neither the proposed themes nor the suggested readers appropriat to their

circumstances: attacks on capitalism, as well as potentially offensive to th nit d tat s

caused problems in a number of countries. In the Middle East, 'capitalists' implied the for ign

oil companies and the ruling classes neither intended as targets. Cairo al o found upport for

democratic Christian principle highly problematic, and consider d th mi- du at d a

better target readership than workers and peasants, as mor likely to prov k eli nt. 20 her

were also difficulties in attacking Communism in countri s wh r th xistin r · ·m thou h

right-wing was authoritarian s 1 'h as in Portugal , pain and Ar ntina. In pr d min ntl

Catholic Latin An1 rica Britain did not app ar an appropriat hampi n

principles 2I and in Japan under rnilitary ccupation th auth riti tr a · u lik

any other ally. On the whol e h w v r, th r a tion fr m P t w p nd

accommodate particular con erns a s n of dir tiv was pr par d indi tin m tn

objective and th m s adapt d to I al conditi n .

France and Italy were i1nn1 diat ly identifi d as pri rity targ t parti ularly in vi

possible Communist success in th Italian election of April 1948. By mid- bruary Warn r

who had on 1 January 1948 a sumed re ponsibility for all information w rk (Information

Policy Deparunent and six existing regional information departments), was abl to t 11 Rom

that material on the realitie of life under Communist regimes would oon b availabl for

handing over to party organisers writers in anti-Communist papers, anti-Communist political

candidates and any influential figures who could make use of it. He pointed out that ther

would be no need for recipients to acknowledge their source, although th Ambassador might

20 Letter fromJM Troutbeck, Head of the British Middle East Office in Cairo, to Warner, 19 March 1948 PR 136/1/913G, FO 1110/4. 21 Despatch from Caracas 19l\1arch 1948 PR 167/1/913G FO 1110/5.

8

let the Italian Government know about the campaign. 22

Non-attributability was a central and distinguishing feature of IRD material. It made it

possible to reconcile two essentially contradictory requirements: to achieve the widest possible

circulation for the information contained in its papers; and the need, laid down at Ministerial

level, to protect the existence of an officially-inspired anti-Communist propaganda campaign

and ensure it did not become known to the public. It was also believed that the information

would have greater impact if it were not seen to emanate from official sources. This

arrangement, under which those who received IRD material were aware of its origin but were

expected not to divulge its source, generated some confusion in the uninitiated but was

understood and respected by recipients. Remarkably, a minimal number of breaches of trust

occurred during IRD's lifetime. A number of attempts were made at drawing up an

explanatory caveat the 1948 version (by no means fmal) read

The attached material on .. .is for the use of His Majesty's Missions

and Information Officers in particular.

The information contained in this paper is, as far as it is possible to

ascertain factual and objective. The paper, may, therefore, be used

freely as a reference paper, but neither copies of it nor the material

contained in it should be distributed officially without the sanction of

the Head of Mission. It and/ or the material in the paper, however,

may be distributed unofficially in whatever quarters seem useful so

long as it can be assured that there will be no public attribution of

material or of the paper to an official British source. 23

Methods and Media

Some early distribution methods continued the wartime saturation tactics, when pamphlets,

leaflets and posters were used, and other suggestions (such as the surfacing of rumours) were

considered, but as Mr Bevin had foreseen, peacetime conditions required a different, more

direct approach based on research and the published word. In France, for example, the

22 Letter from Warner to Sir VAL Mallet, HM Ambassador at Rome, 24 February 1948, PR 111 /913G, FO 1110/1. 23 A similar formula accompanied the first paper produced by the US Department of State's Office of Intelligence Research (PR 943/865/913G, FO 1110/128).

9

emphasis was on placing articles in the widest possible range of publications, rather than on

providing material to individual contacts. Proposals were put foiWard for a specialised weekly

publication, and for a joint distribution venture with an existing feature agency, neither of

which materialised, partly because of the financial outlay. 24 In Norway, some 900 [sic] copies

of British newspapers were distributed weekly - a quantity which, if the figur is accurate

would be beyond contemplation in more recent times. In other parts of the world local

shortages of newsprint led information officers to suggest that the only way to ensure

publication ofiRD material was to supply the paper to print it on.

To supplement its own output, IRD constantly sought out publications from other ources

though the bureaucratic difficulties of ordering through other departtnents, and in som case

currency restrictions , caused some problems. IRD also played a part in arranging th

publication of the frrst book by a Soviet defector to Britain, Lt-Col GA Toka v though this

proved a less than happy experience. Early reports suggested that 'Notes on Bolsh vism -

Communism' would constitute an unemotional and interesting account of Soviet li£ and th

Foreign Secretary agreed Toka v hould be helped to publish it. But both th text and th

author proved difficult to handle Tokaev causing considerabl confusion by di do in hi

existence to newspap rs in Britain befor th extracts from his book w r r ady for

serialisation. 25

In an attempt to reach a wider trade union readership Mayh w ugg st d H rb rt

Tracey of the Defence of De1nocracy Trust, that his organi arion sh uld pubH h an

international edition of its publication 'Freedom First' although IRD w r not happy with

its unsophisticated approach and the lack of authenticated fact and d tail. A thr -way flo

of information was envisaged: basic material from th trad union sid , knowl dg of

overseas conditions from Labour Attaches, and advice from IRD, who contracted to buy

copies for direct distribution overseas and to obtain mailing lists from Labour Attaches. 26

The plan had, however, to be abandoned in the wake of the Lynskey Tribunal's

investigations into allegations that bribes had been paid to certain government ministers and

officials as 'Freedom First' became incidentally the subject of unwelcome publicity when it

emerged that the central figure in the Tribunal's investigations had paid for a subscription

24 PRI11/l/913Gof22March FO 1110/3, PR999/999/913of21 October, FO 1110/148. 25 PR 523/523/913G,July 1948, FO 1110/80. 26 PR517, 617/1/913G, FO 1110/11 · PR 783, 852/638/913G, FO 1110/99.

10

with a dud cheque.

Another important part of the department's work was to counter Soviet behaviour in the

United ations and other international fora, where the Russians indulged in long and

carefully prepared speeches frequently irrelevant to the agenda and clearly aimed at a wider

audience. Once Foreign Office departments had established a line to take and secured the

agreement of the Russia Committee, IRD was given the task of preparing notes for the

British delegations. aterial was specially prepared for meetings such as the United Nations

General Assembly in Paris in October 1948. It took some time for IRD to develop the

technique of producing crisp debating points with well-documented references on such

subjects as human rights (one of their long-term concerns), rather than their longer papers.

IRD also took on the task of briefing delegates on the tactics they were likely to encounter

from Soviet representative and suggesting a strategy to deal with them.27 Early attempts at

warning and briefmg on~ rene participants, though not particularly successful at first, set

the pattern of IRD inter t in Communist conference tactics, an area in which the

department built up con id rabl expertise.

The chief focu of IRD ork however was the preparation of briefs, based on in-house

research which ould b adapted by recipients to local conditions. Posts worldwide

responded to r quests for mat rial on Communist activities, which formed the basis of a

uniqu databas to which th Foreign Office Research Department (FORD) and the Russian

Secretariat in Mo v al o ontributed.28 While FORD expertise was frequently invoked, its

Soviet ection fought off a n1on y-saving proposal to incorporate it with IRD: the academics

did not s e th m el e a propagandists.

IRD staffthemselve took a while to develop a satisfactory 'house style': commenting on the

fourth paper to be produced Murray wrote that it was 'still too much ex cathedra, and needs

lots more illustration and concrete facts to be really effective. But the thesis and basic facts

are sound'. 29 In the frrst three months of the department's existence, briefs were produced

27 PR 760/760/913G FO III0/12.

28 By 194 7 the Russian Secretariat had a staff of 5 responsible for reading all the main Soviet periodicals, translating and preparing press digests, in addition to interpreting duties: N 8781/8781/38, FO 371/66461. One of the first members ofiRD,Jack Brimmell, was recruited from their number. 29 PR 124/57/913 FO 1110/25.

11

on: the real conditions in Soviet Russia (11 March); conditions in the Communist­

dominated states of Eastern Europe (12 March); Poland as an example of how Communism

gains and consolidates control in a state (18 March); equality and class distinction in the

Soviet Union (24 March); labour and trade unions in the Soviet Union (7 April)· the

Communisation of justice in Eastern Europe ( 10 April); Communists and th fr dom of the

press (10 April); facts of Soviet expansionism; and peasant collectivisation (25 May). By June

1948 the frrst paper considered mature enough to warrant printing em rg d Es nc of

Soviet Foreign Policy', quickly followed by 'Christianity in th Soviet Union' (al o Jun ).

Then followed 'Communist Conquest of the Baltic States' Gun ), 'Daily Li~ in a

Communist State' (August), 'Control of Workers in Countries under Communist

Domination' (August), 'Forced Labour in the USSR' (November) and 'Training th Young

for Stalin' (December).

Once IRD began to issue papers, all its output went to th Labour Party' int mational

department, whose Secretary wa Denis (later Lord) Heal y, and which arrang d a r

limited circulation. Talking points (Speaker's Not s) wer pr par d for political p ak r . In

July 1948 Warner minuted that tnor Minist rial effort was n ded, and Mayh w wr to

Ministers askin<Y for help in u ·ina quotable material, but a sug stion that all IR

sent to all Cabinet Mini ter provoked th Minist r f Stat (H tor Ma il) t mm nt:

Ther hould be n gen ral circulation t Mini t r .

Mini ters by all means and let them hav th tuff n a p r nal ba i .

But a general circulation would b highly dang rous. 30

Links with European political partie , such as some Italian Socialists w r an importan

means of securing reliable overseas multipliers, among them th Neth rlands Lab r ar

which printed 30,000 copies of De waarheid over OostEuropa, bas don IRD' first pap r 'Th

Real Conditions in the Soviet Union'. 3l

From mid-1948, the flow of background papers was suppl mented by a weekly Digest of

news items dealing with the Communist countries and their activities in international

30 Minute of 13Ju1y 1948, PR 445/141/913G, FO 1110/41. 31 Letter from The Hague, PR 653/57/913, FO 1110/29.

12

organisations. Each edition also carried a more detailed treatment of one topical event. The

Digest was not intended to compete with day-to-day briefmg, but to provide quotable

material on events which wer not necessarily common knowledge. Where possible stories

were attributed to a named source and presented in a form easily used by sub-editors and

information officers who wer expected to pass selected items to their contacts, rather than

hand over whole · ues of the Digest. 32

Liaison with other departments, organisations and governments

As IRD began or it b came important to clarify its relations with those already working

in the same field. Th · istry of Defence Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices

and Central Offic of Information all had an interest in the new policy, as did the BBC. The

US Government had b n kept informed regarding the establishment of IRD, and the

question of coordinating anti-Communist policies within Western Europe was also

discus ed. E tabli hin a productiv and harmonious relationship with all these was not

always as .

Chiefs of Uiff Within hit hall

Communi t pr pa an

sugge tion that I D "

Warfar Ex

although IRD a

PWE h uld ak 33

I ar that orne machinery was needed for liaison on anti­

n the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff (COS). Any

a ort of peacetime equivalent of the wartime Political

db th Prime Minister early in the department's existence,

nt d nth working party which considered what form a future

h arran ements for liaison with the Services were set out in a

memorandum of 31 ar h 1 48 b th Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Norman Brook (later

Lord ormanbrook) and appro ed by Mr Attlee: there was to be a series of committees

from each ervic oordinated by the Secretary to the COS Committee, who chaired the

Inter-Service Committ e on Propaganda Dissemination (as his counterpart, the Head of

IRD attended the latter's meetings).

A constructive relationship between IRD and the Service representatives proved difficult, as

the latter were unwilling to accept that they should not play a planning role: they recorded

32 Minutes ofjuly 1948 PR 590/590/913 FO 1110/ 11; departmental1etter to Rome, 15 September 1948, PR 704/590/913 FO 1110/87. 33 PR 137/137/G 24 arch 1948 FO 1110/38; FO 1110/104, passim.

13

their conviction that, as experience developed, 'it would be necessary to extend the present

organisation to embrace all forms of activity needed to pursue the cold war against

Communism', and complained that there was no plan, no progress reports and that

something was seriously wrong if no department was dealing with the indoctrination of

opinion within the United Kingdom.34

One of Warner's early objectives was to allay misgivings in Europe about th tr ngth of

Western defence. With this in mind, the Service Chiefs wer authoris d to xchan view

and information through the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of taff in Wa hington to

ascertain what intelligence about US military strength could be us d in anti- ommunist

propaganda. 35 However, the flow of information on a range of military subj cts g on

conditions in the Soviet army, was disappointing, and suggestions for dir ct activity ( uch as

~request from Paris for a retired officer to b given a platform at the Royal Unit d fVlce

Institute to lectur on Britain's position in a futur war so that his t xt ould b mor widel

disseminated to ounter French fear of early defeat at S vi t hand ) prov d difficult to

carry forward. 36

Golonies and Dominions

h d n int Both the Colonial and onunonw alth R lati n Offi

Soviet propaganda, which c n i tently attacked Britain'

both policy and condition within British-controll d t rritori

1n un rin

from Soviet behaviour in th backward ar a of th form r

became bound up with the work of the Cabinet ommjtt n

(ofwhich both Mayhew andjacob wer member ), wh s t rm ofr £ r n

November 1948 ' to stimulat and one rt th dis mination f publi ity d t

ntin

din

unt r

Communist propaganda in countries overseas specially in th lf-gov rnin and Ionia!

countries of the Commonwealth and neighbouring territori s'. 37

The questions of informing Dominions governments, and th m thod of di tributi n of anti-

34 PR 161 290, 313, 419/137/913G FO 1110/38. 35 Cabinet Office telegram DEF 825 of 31 March 1948 to British joint StaffMis ion Wa hin on PR 137/137/913G, FO 1110/38. 36 PR938, 986/137/913G, FO 1110/38; PR175/l/913G, FO 1110/5. 37 Cl(48)13 of26 November 1948, PR 1250/23/913G, FO 1110/22.

14

Communist material r main d to be resolved. IRD proposed that High Commissions

should pass on r earch pap r at government level, as well as communicating material to

selected individual r cipien . Th disparate stages of development in the countries involved,

combined with r e arion on th part of the CRO (which originally intended to leave

India Pakistan and lon out of the distribution38 ), resulted in an uneven beginning to

IRD work but timulat d an appraisal of colonial information facilities.

As well as d lopin th m dia in the colonies where the local press was often hostile to the

polici of th m trop titan power IRD and the Colonial Information Policy Committee

du mat rial illu trating the virtues of British colonial administration,

u h a labour relations where Soviet attack was most likely. At the

same time it to ounter what some saw as 'the one undoubted and signal

success ofRu ian propa anda ... th almost universal acceptance of the idea that there is no

colonial r ra ial ppr i n under oviet rule' by exposing Soviet exploitation of weaker

countri · u h · th Balti te and the need for information on civil rights, regional

- un n f national minorities (for example the Chechen-Ingush). 39

territ ri

implication

r al nsult don the extent of Communist penetration. Britain

an xi ring information organisation in Mrica, although in some

r r ervants of the local government, which had

n of brief . In outh East Asia, the Communist uprising in

th ituation in Burma and Indonesia led in December 1948

to a d < r ional information office in Singapore, within the

omm1 ffic in order to prepare and distribute suitable material in local

languag and o provid up-to-dat information about the region. Under the direction of

alcolm acDonaJd th Commissioner General this office produced some effective and

widely circulated output. 40

Central Ojfice of lnforrno.tWn

Relation between IRD and the COl set up in April 1946 to take over the government

38 PR ll3/23/913G FO 1110/22. 39 Paper on Imp rial Propaganda PR 284/ 23/913G; Directive for propaganda countering Soviet attacks on colonialism and colonial administration 17 August 1948, PR 580/ 23/913G; FO 1110/20. 40 FO telegram to in pore lO December 1948, PR 1203/953/913G, FO 1110/143.

15

publicity services previously the responsibility of the wartime Ministry of Information wer

discussed on the basis of a memorandum on 'Publicity Policy in regard to Communism in

relation to COl standard services'.41 While the COl's main task was to publicis asp cts of

British life, the memorandum suggested that suitable opportunities should b tak n to draw

comparisons with the disadvantages of Communism:

This will of course have to be done with due consideration for th

susceptibilities of the countries in which our publicity is being carri d

on ... Nevertheless provided that tact and address are used w should b

able to be forthright and effective in our comparisons, and on occasion

our denunciation of Communist methods.

In addition to items for inclusion in the London Press Servic , IRD provided th I with a

long list of topics for con1n1issioned articles, including: contribution from English ian

French and Italian ex-Comtnunists on their reason for l aving th Party· n

impressions of the USSR~ th Russian economic grip on Iron urtain untri and

conditions in them· experience. in for ed labour camp ; ovi t p n tration in th Middl

East· and expo:ur f Ru · ian administration in th publi . d an

publication wa t b ar rano- d in s rial form for uitabl

The COl were not entir I happy about this n w poli y. h y ~ It th th p ti nal

methods of thouaht required [for polemical and ontr v rsial mat rial diffi r n

from our normal lifc that we would probably fail to on ntrat hind th

activity'. Recoiling fr n1 th pro pect of ' cr t r semi- cr t op rational w rk th

proposed a completely separate production unit working dir ctly to IRD. Warn r how r

replied that the COl wer not required to produc pamphl ts r oth r mat rial: th y w r

already carrying out the new policy within the content of th London Pr s rvi . IRD

could, he added commission their own special anti-Communist articl s (a barb d r £ r nc to

the COl's failure to find suitable authors on Communist subjects, with on or n tabl

exceptions such as Edward Crankshaw and Malcolm Muggeridg ). 43 h id a that th

41 OP(48)19, 8Aprill948 PR 173/l/913G, FO 1110/5 . 42 Letter from Murray to COl 11 May 1948, PR 375/375/913, FO 1110/60. 43 Internal minute by Director General ofCOI, 30 November 1948 and 1 tt r from Warn r 1 D c mb r: PR 1226/l/913G, FO 111 0/15 .

16

departm n

formalised proatucrJo

the departm n

asswnp ·on

unit al o conflicted with the COl's more

with the COl led to the development of

nfin d to pro essing existing material was

graduall n rk I .

British Broadcastin r rahon

F.figh I ~

some arl

ofth juJ

I int r

fa climini h th infiu n

br d 5

He a u

44 Minute from Ra t H nke • 45 emorandum 23 1/1 o

.... .., ... , ........ n IRD and th BBC the main channel for

ditorial direction 44 but the provisions

oac1casnrur P li pr ail d:

m in ind p nd nt in the preparation of

n thou h it hould obtain from the

rn d u h information about

nd th p lici of Hi Majesty's

th " ·11 p rmi itt plan i programmes in

r

m n pril:

m that th ituation will not be

n t r I tionship with the BBC so far

n rn d and insist that they accept

th tr nt nts. But I should not be in

ry riou i sues here and might well

nd r putation in foreign countries of the BBC's

f BB output to determine whether it was in line with the

371/7l632A-B. prill 48 PR 361/11913G FO 1110/9.

17

new publicity policy. Accordingly, in April 1948 Embassies in Communist and satellite

countries were commissioned to monitor BBC broadcasts in locallanguag . Repli (and

estimates of the cost of the exercise) varied greatly, although it was agreed that mor att ntion

should be paid to the selection of news items than to non-political mat rial. On of th main

conclusions of the exercise was that news emanating from Communist sourc s often found to

be inaccurate, should not be broadcast without explanatory or correctiv comment unless

there was no danger of misunderstanding.

The results of the survey were discussed with Sir Ian Jacob by Mayh w and Warn r and

Posts informed. Agreement was reached on a number of improv ments uch a that

programmes including press summaries should make clear when these repres nt d minority

views, as in the case of the Daily Worker. On the other hand, the BBC rej ct d a ugg tion

that more time hould be spent correcting misrepresentation of HMG's polici n th

grounds that this would surrender the initiative to the Communists. 46

Although there were ·on1 doubt· that the confidential natur of th uld

preserved, a supply of IRD briefi wa arranged for th Con troll r of th rv1

and the Editor of th Europ an S rvic . Sir Ian Jacob thought that th y w uld find th

papers 'very useful a backgr und information fl r p ak r and a priva m rial fl r th

drawing of con1pari pn and th refutation f glaring mis- tat m nt .4 7 H wa al o

responsibl for ~ uo·ae ting th intr ducti n of a p ri di ind x. h BB

monitoring for ian br adca t [! r xampl in zb k in which IRD had an in r and

IRD in turn provided n1aterial fr m its ources to 1neet BBC n d and brought publication

of interest such a Ruth Fischer' talin and the German Communist Par~, to th BB ' noti .48

Coordination with other Govemmenlf

There was considerable discussion of how far anti-Communist propaganda should b

coordinated among Western governments, focused on the Western Union countri s (i the

signatories of the 1948 Brussels Treaty: Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg and the

Netherlands). At a meeting on 4 October 1948 with the French Foreign Minist r, Robert

Schuman, and the US Secretary of State George Marshall, Bevin sought their opinion on th

46 PE 2030/55/967 FO 953/229A· PR 228/227/913, FO 1110/49. 47 Letter fromjacob to Warner of28 May 1948, PR 377, FO 1110/16. 48 PR 578/578/91 3 of 23 Ju1 1948, FO 1110/84· PR 1292/265/913 of9 December 1948, FO 1110/55.

18

to pr

Western

out i

informati

Within IR

time and 1

Althou hI

they a fi

them on a p

the ext n

Europ

enli t

mouth pi

U Inti rmati

although i ~

0

in th

u a poke with one voice, whereas the West tended

· w . 9 H did not propose a common line in

in the xchange of information. The

d 1 t r that month that each country would carry

t n tion I n d and circumstances but an exchange of

id ological aspects of defence would be instituted.

tion to a coordinated policy: if every statement had

rna b quit hopelessly bogged down from time to 50

at ri 1 to estern European governments to use as

bri ~ for individual contacts separately and distribute

ba ed on th requirement not to disclose

maintain nfid ntiality and also on the practical

wa mor d veloped than those of its

ur p an pi tal to xplain the working of IRD and

· h n f in~ rmation and consideration was given to

lw -v hi h ir ulat d in anou ountry editions into a

n h k pt th v rnment fully informed of the new

· na th m th d partment ommissioning telegram (with

train apitali m deleted). In fact the US had

dopt d a imilar policy with their Directive on

rd to anti-Am rican Propaganda' of 1 December 194 7,

ountri bordering the Soviet Union, which the Americans

thought offi r d th ibilitie of penetration. 52 It was decided that no arrangement

should b nt r d into " hi h mia-ht ti IRD hands: collaboration and consultation were

ruled out in fa our of xchan of information· each government would be free 'to shoot at

th am targ t from diffi rent anale and Warner suggested to colleagues in Washington

49 Record ofmeetin /48/44 F 800/502. 50 PR 860 985/860/913G FO I ll 0/ 126. 51 Repon oftour PR ll 62/860/913G FO 11 10/126· PR 392/1/913G, FO 1110/10. 52 PR41 /41G FO 1110/24.

19

that 'cooperation should be on the lines of that existing on a political matter, namely, that we

should exchange information and ideas where desirable without any obligation on either side

only to act after consultation had resulted in agreement. This exchange of information would

take place, no doubt between Foreign Office and State Department and between their

representatives in the field'. 53

HM Missions were notified formally of this arrangement, 54 whereas the American

government preferred to allow local cooperation to develop spontaneously; by the end of the

year the exchange of material between capitals was operating smoothly. In Washington, the

Embassy adopted a two-pronged approach, maintaining contact on both political and

information networks. 55 Warner also paid an instructive visit to the United States in the

autumn of 1948 and found that while underlying policy was similar, methods of countering

Communist propaganda differed considerably. The two main US channels were the 'Voice

of America' (which caine under State Department control from 1 October 1948), and

bulletins sent out to US Posts abroad. Much of the content was drawn from material

published in the US. The American telegraphic system was also more advanced when it

came to transtni tting back us ful peeches made overseas. Where information on the Soviet

Union wa oncerned th Division of Research for Europe of the Office of Intelligence

Research in th tate Department had begun in Septetnber 1948 to produce background

paper on subjects imilar to th tackled by IRD. 56

III IRD'S FIRST YEAR

At the end of 1948 the Soviet Union's policies and intentions were still a matter of serious

concern to the British Government . Guided by the Joint Intelligence Committee's forecast

that the risk of war was likely to increase after 1956, the Russia Committee set up a sub­

Committee to examine a counter-offensive against Soviet political warfare, with wide-ranging

objectives for de tabilising the satellite (then known as 'orbit') countries. Amongst the

proposed weapons were general publicity, broadcasting and covert propaganda. 57

53 Letters from Warner to Sirj Balfour, lVIinister in Washington, 16 & 26 February 1948, PR 7/l/913G, FO 1110/l. 54 Circular1ettertoPostsofl2May 1948 PR229/l/G, FO 1110/6. 55 PR 1188/865/913G, FO 1110/129; PR 9911/913, FO 1110/3. 56 PR 865/865/913 FO 1110/128. 57 N 13467/1/38G FO 371/71632A.

20

Although the urgenc and cal of the e concerns were not yet reflected in IRD's output,

which concentrated on informing public opinion of the state of affairs in the Soviet Union

and Communist countrie the e de elopments showed that the establishment and early work

of IRD were meeting an on oing and de eloping need. IRD's methods and output were both

increasing and improving and om novel ideas had been thrown up, such as the preparation

of a glossary of th meaning gi en b the Russians to familiar terms (this arose from a

suggestion by Con 0 eill n the u of lab Is such as reactionary 58). IRD's administrative,

editorial and distribution arrangements were in place and developing into a workable system,

although Posts till complain d that what they needed were short, ready-made and quickly­

produced articles (Lima put it in a nutshell: IRD s product was too long, too statistical and

not in Spanish5 ) . Links 'th other departments and governments were starting to bear fruit.

IRD' first ar had b n mean b en eas or comfortable. As one of the researchers in the

cramped offi f arlton Hou T errac pointed out it was 'manifestly ridiculous that

characters dedi t d t bibliograph and brooding should occupy the same room as eight

other who f r - hat and cupboard clanging. Despite its administrative,

procedural and p liti al pr bl m h er IRD had established a uccessful method of

production and n rk of uti t n which th ba i of it future activity would be built.

In the ords of 'ving ad ·ce n tactic at th United ations, IRD's task was

to whittle a a t tacti b con tant expo ure of the fallacy of Soviet

theory. ) It had mad a lid tart t that task and was ready t move forward.

58 PR 148/l/913G FO 1110/ 4. 59 PR 272/57/913 FO 1110/26. 60 Minutes of Russia Committee, 14 October 1948, PR 902/71/913, FO 1110/33.

21