Iraq Iran and the Next Move

8/7/2019 Iraq Iran and the Next Move

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Iraq, Iran and the Next Move

April 26, 2011

By George Friedman

The United States told the Iraqi governmentlast weekthatifit wants U.S. troops toremain

in Iraq beyond the deadline ofDec. 31, 2011, as stipulated by the current Status ofForcesAgreement between Washington and Baghdad, it would have toinform the United States

quickly. Unless a new agreementis reached soon, the United States will be unable toremain. The implication in the U.S. position is thata complex planning process must be

initiated toleave troops there and delays will notallow thatprocess totake place.

Whatis actually going on is thatthe United States is urging the Iraqi governmentto changeits mind on U.S. withdrawal, and it would like Iraqto change its mind right now in orderto

influence some ofthe events taking place in the Persian Gulf. The Shiite uprising inBahrain and the Saudiintervention, along with events in Yemen, have created an extremely

unstable situation in the region, and the United States is afraid that completing the

withdrawal would increase the instability.

The Iranian Rise

The American concern, ofcourse, has to do with Iran. The United States has been unable toblock Iranian influence in Iraqs post-Baathist government. Indeed, the degree to which the

Iraqi governmentis a coherent entity is questionable, and its military and security forceshave limited logisticaland planning ability and are not capable ofterritorial defense. The

issue is notthe intentofPrime MinisterNourial-Maliki, who himselfis enigmatic. Theproblem is thatthe coalition that governs Iraqis fragmented and still not yetfinalized,

dominated by Iranianproxies such Muqtadaal-Sadrand itonly intermittently controlsthe operations ofthe ministries underit, orthe military and security forces.

As such, Iraqis vulnerable tothe influence ofany substantialpower, and the most

important substantialpowerfollowing the withdrawalofthe United States will be Iran.There has been much discussion ofthe historic tension between Iraqi Shiaand Iranian Shia,

allofwhich is true. But Iran has been systematically building its influence in Iraqamong allfactions using money, blackmailand ideology delivered by a sophisticated intelligence


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service. More important, as the United States withdraws, Iraqis, regardless oftheirfeelingstoward Iran (those Iraqis who haventalways feltthis way), are clearly sensing that

resisting Iran is dangerous and accommodation with Iran is the only solution. They see Iranas the rising powerin the region, and thatperception is neitherunreasonable norsomething

to which the United States orSaudiArabia has an easy counter.

The Iraqi governments response tothe American offerhas been predictable. While somequietly wantthe United States toremain, the generalresponse has ranged from dismissalto

threats ifthe United States did notleave. Given thatthe United States has reportedlyoffered toleave as many as 20,000 troops in a country that 170,000 American troops could

notimpose orderon, the Iraqiperception is thatthis is merely a symbolic presence and thatendorsing it would get Iraqintotrouble with Iran, which has farmore than 20,000 troops

and ever-presentintelligence services. Itis not clearthatthe Iraqis were everprepared toallow U.S. troops toremain, but 20,000 is enough to enrage Iran and not enough to deal

with the consequences.

The American assumption in deciding toleave Iraq and this goes backto George W.Bush as wellas Barack Obama was thatoverthe course offouryears, the United States

would be able toleave because it would have created a coherent governmentand military.The United States underestimated the degree to which fragmentation in Iraq would prevent

thatoutcome and the degree to which Iranian influence would undermine the effort. TheUnited States made apledge tothe American public and atreaty with the Iraqi government

to withdraw forces, butthe conditions that were expected to develop simply did not.

Not coincidentally, the withdrawalofAmerican forces has coincided with tremendous

instability in the region, particularly on the Arabian Peninsula. Allaround theperiphery ofSaudiArabiaan arc ofinstability has emerged. Itis notthatthe Iranians engineered it, but

they have certainly taken advantage ofit. As aresult, SaudiArabiais in aposition where ithas had to commitforces in Bahrain, is standing by in Yemen, and is even concerned about

internalinstability given the rise ofboth reform-minded and Shiite elements atatime ofunprecedented transition given the geriatric state ofthe countrys topfourleaders. Iran has

certainly done whateverit could to exacerbate this instability, which fits neatly intotheIraqi situation.

As the United States leaves Iraq, Iran expects toincrease its influence there. Iran normally

acts cautiously even while engaged in extreme rhetoric. Therefore, itis unlikely to sendconventionalforces into Iraq. Indeed, it might not be necessary to do soin orderto gain a

dominantpoliticalposition. Noris itinconceivable thatthe Iranians could decide toact

more aggressively. With the United States gone, the risks decline.

Saudi Arabias Problem

The country that could possibly counterIran in Iraqis SaudiArabia, which has been known

tofunnel money to Sunni groups there. Its military is no match forIrans in a battle forIraq, and its influence there has been less than Irans among most groups. More important,


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as the Saudis face the crisis on theirperiphery they are diverted and preoccupied by eventstothe eastand south. The unrestin the region, therefore, increases the sense ofisolation of

some Iraqis and increases theirvulnerability to Iran. Thus, given that Iraqis Irans primarynational security concern, the events in the Persian Gulfworkto Irans advantage.

The United States previously had an Iraqquestion. Thatquestion is being answered, andnottothe American advantage. Instead, whatis emerging is a SaudiArabian question.SaudiArabia currently is clearly able to handle unrest within its borders. It has also been

able to suppress the Shiain Bahrain fornow, atleast. However, its ability to manage itssouthernperiphery with Yemen is being tested, given thatthe regime in Sanaa was already

weakened by multiple insurgencies and is now being forced from office aftermore than 30years inpower. Ifthe combined pressure ofinternalunrest, turmoilthroughoutthe region

and Iranian manipulation continues, the stress on the Saudis could become substantial.

The basic problem the Saudis face is thatthey dont know the limits oftheirability (whichis not much beyond theirfinancial muscle) to manage the situation. Ifthey miscalculate and

overextend, they could find themselves in an untenable position. Therefore, the Saudis mustbe conservative. They cannotafford miscalculation. From the Saudipointofview, the

critical elementis a clearsign oflong-term American commitmenttothe regime. Americansupportforthe Saudis in Bahrain has been limited, and the United States has not been

aggressively trying to manage the situation in Yemen, given its limited ability to shape anoutcome there. Coupled with the Americanposition on Iraq, which is thatit willremain

only ifasked and then only with limited forces the Saudis are clearly not getting thesignals they wantfrom the United States. In fact, whatfurtherworsens the Saudiposition is

thatthey cannotovertly align with the United States fortheirsecurity needs. Nevertheless,they also have nootheroption. Exploiting this Saudi dilemmais a keypartofthe Iranian

strategy.

The smallercountries ofthe Arabian Peninsula, grouped with SaudiArabiain the Gulf

Cooperation Council, have played the role ofmediatorin Yemen, butultimately they lackthe force needed by a credible mediatorapotential military option to concentrate the

minds ofthe negotiatingparties. Forthat, they need the United States.

Itis in this contextthatthe crownprince ofthe United Arab Emirates (UAE), SheikhMohammed binZayed al-Nahyan, will be visiting Washington on April 26. The UAE is one

ofthe few countries on the Arabian Peninsulathat has not experienced significantunrest.As such, it has emerged as one ofthepoliticallypowerful entities in the region. We

obviously cannot know whatthe UAE is going toaskthe United States for, but we would

be surprised ifit wasntfora definitive sign thatthe United States was prepared tochallenge the Iranian rise in the region.

The Saudis will be watching the American response very carefully. Theirnational strategy

has been touncomfortably rely on the United States. Ifthe United States is seen asunreliable, the Saudis have only twooptions. One is to hold theirposition and hope forthe

best. The otheris toreach outand see ifsome accommodation can be made with Iran. Thetensions between Iran and SaudiArabia religious, cultural, economic and political are


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profound. Butin the end, the Iranians wantto be the dominantpowerin the Persian Gulf,defining economic, politicaland militarypatterns.

On April 18, Iranian Supreme LeaderAyatollah Ali Khameneis adviserformilitary affairs,

Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, warned SaudiArabiathatit, too, could be invaded on the

samepretextthatthe kingdom sentforces into Bahrain to suppress alargely Shiite risingthere. Then, on April 23, the commanderofIrans elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jaafari, remarked that Irans military might was strongerthan

thatofSaudiArabiaand reminded the United States thatits forces in the region were withinrange ofTehrans weapons. Again, the Iranians are notaboutto make any aggressive

moves, and such statements are intended to shape perception and force the Saudis tocapitulate on the negotiating table.

The Saudis wantregime survivalabove all else. Deciding between facing Iran alone or

reaching an unpleasantaccommodation, the Saudis have little choice. We would guess thatone ofthe reasons the UAE is reaching outto Obamais totry to convince him ofthe dire

consequences ofinaction and to move the United States intoa more active role.

A Strategy of Neglect

The Obamaadministration appears to have adopted an increasingly obvious foreign policy.

Ratherthan simply attemptto control events around the world, the administration appearsto have selected apolicy ofcareful neglect. This is not, in itself, a bad strategy. Neglect

means thatallies and regionalpowers directly affected by theproblem willtakeresponsibility forthe problem. Mostproblems resolve themselves withoutthe need of

American intervention. Ifthey dont, the United States can considerits posture later. Giventhatthe world has become accustomed tothe United States as firstresponder, other

countries have simply waited forthe American response. We have seen this in Libya, wherethe United States has tried toplay a marginalrole. Conceptually, this is notunsound.

The problem is thatthis will workonly when regionalpowers have the weightto deal with

the problem and where the outcome is not crucialtoAmerican interests. Again, Libyais analmostperfect example ofthis. However, the Persian Gulfis an areaofenormous interestto

the United States because ofoil. Absentthe United States, the regionalforces will not beable to contain Iran. Therefore, applying this strategy tothe Persian Gulfcreates a situation

ofextreme riskforthe United States.

Re-engagementin Iraqon alevelthat would deterIran is notalikely option, notonly

because ofthe Iraqiposition butalso because the United States lacks the force needed tocreate a substantial deterrence that would not be attacked and worn down by guerrillas.Intruding in the Arabian Peninsulaitselfis dangerous fora numberreasons, ranging from

the military challenge tothe hostility an American presence could generate. Apure navaland airsolution lacks the ability tothreaten Irans centerofgravity, its large ground force.

Therefore, the United States is in a difficultposition. It cannot simply decline engagement


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nordoes it have the ability to engage atthis moment and itis this momentthat matters.Nordoes it have allies outside the region with the resources and appetite forinvolvement.

Thatleaves the United States with the Saudioption negotiate with Iran, a subject Ivewritten on before. This is notan easy course, norarecommended one, but when allother

options are gone, you go with what you have.

The pressure from Iran is becoming palpable. Allofthe Arab countries feelit, and whatevertheirfeelings aboutthe Persians, the realities ofpowerare whatthey are. The UAE has

been senttoaskthe United States fora solution. Itis not clearthe United States has one.When we ask why theprice ofoilis surging, the ideaofgeopoliticalrisk does come to

mind. Itis notafoolish speculation.

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Iraq Iran and the Next Move