Iran’s  Plans  to  Take  Over  Syria  Brg.-­Gen  (ret.)  Dr.  Shimon  Shapira,    May  2,  2013                    

         

In  mid-­‐April,  Hizbullah  leader  Hassan  Nasrallah  paid  a  secret  visit  to  Tehran  where  he  met  with  the  top  Iranian  officials  headed  by  Supreme  Leader  Ali  Khamenei  and  Gen.  Qasem  Suleimani,  the  commander  of  the  Quds  Force  of  the  Revolutionary  Guard  Corps.  Suleimani  prepared  an  operational  plan  named  after  him  based  upon  the  establishment  of  a  150,000-­‐man  force  for  Syria,  the  majority  of  whom  will  come  from  Iran,  Iraq,  and  a  smaller  number  from  Hizbullah  and  the  Gulf  states.  

Suleimani’s  involvement  was  significant.  He  has  been  the  spearhead  of  Iranian  military  activism  in  the  Middle  East.  In  January  2012,  he  declared  that  the  Islamic  Republic  controlled  “one  way  or  another”  Iraq  and  South  Lebanon.  Even  before  recent  events  in  Syria,  

observers  in  the  Arab  world  have  been  warning  for  years  about  growing  evidence  of  “Iranian  expansionism.”  

An  important  expression  of  Syria’s  centrality  in  Iranian  strategy  was  voiced  by  Mehdi  Taaib,  who  heads  Khamenei’s  think  tank.  He  recently  stated  that  “Syria  is  the  35th  district  of  Iran  and  it  has  greater  strategic  importance  for  Iran  than  Khuzestan  [an  Arab-­‐populated  district  inside  Iran].”  Significantly,  Taaib  was  drawing  a  comparison  between  Syria  and  a  district  that  is  under  full  Iranian  sovereignty.  

Tehran  has  had  political  ambitions  with  respect  to  Syria  for  years  and  has  indeed  invested  huge  resources  in  making  Syria  a  Shiite  state.  The  Syrian  regime  let  Iranian  missionaries  work  freely  to  strengthen  the  Shiite  faith  in  Damascus  and  the  cities  of  the  Alawite  coast,  as  well  as  the  smaller  towns  and  villages.  In  both  urban  and  rural  parts  of  Syria,  Sunnis  and  others  who  adopted  the  Shiite  faith  received  privileges  and  preferential  treatment  in  the  disbursement  of  Iranian  aid  money.  

Iran  is  also  recruiting  Shiite  forces  in  Iraq  for  the  warfare  in  Syria.  These  are  organized  in  a  sister  framework  of  Lebanese  Hizbullah.  Known  as  the  League  of  the  Righteous  People  and  Kateeb  Hizbullah,  its  mission  is  to  defend  the  Shiite  centers  in  Damascus.  It  is  likely  that  Tehran  will  make  every  effort  to  recruit  additional  Shiite  elements  from  Iraq,  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  even  from  Pakistan.  

Iran  Cannot  Afford  to  Lose  Syria  In  mid-­‐April,  Hizbullah  leader  Hassan  Nasrallah  paid  a  secret  visit  to  Tehran  where  he  met  with  the  top  Iranian  officials  headed  by  Supreme  Leader  Ali  Khamenei  and  the  commander  of  the  Quds  Force  of  the  Revolutionary  Guard  Corps,  Gen.  Qasem  Suleimani,  who  is  in  charge  of  Iranian  policy  in  Lebanon  and  Syria.  The  visit  was  clandestine  and  no  details  were  divulged  on  an  official  level  –  except  for  the  exclusive  posting  on  Hizbullah’s  official  website  of  a  photograph  of  Khamenei  with  Nasrallah  beside  him  in  the  former’s  private  library,  with  a  picture  of  Ayatollah  Khomeini  above  them.1  

Suleimani’s  involvement  in  the  meeting  with  Nasrallah  was  significant.  He  has  been  the  spearhead  of  Iranian  military  activism  in  the  Middle  East.  In  January  2012,  he  declared  that  the  Islamic  Republic  controlled  “one  way  or  another”  Iraq  and  South  Lebanon.2  He  now  appeared  to  be  prepared  to  extend  Iran’s  control  to  all  of  Syria.  A  media  source  normally  hostile  to  Iran  and  Hizbullah  but  which  nonetheless  contains  accurate  information,  reported  that  Iran  has  formulated  an  operational  plan  for  assisting  Syria.  The  plan  has  been  named  for  Gen.  Suleimani.  It  includes  three  elements:  1)  the  establishment  of  a  popular  sectarian  army  made  up  of  Shiites  and  Alawites,  to  be  backed  by  forces  from  Iran,  Iraq,  Hizbullah,  and  symbolic  contingents  from  the  Persian  Gulf.  2)  This  force  will  reach  150,000  fighters.  3)  The  plan  will  give  preference  to  importing  forces  from  Iran,  Iraq,  and,  only  afterwards,  other  Shiite  elements.  This  regional  force  will  be  integrated  with  the  Syrian  army.  Suleimani,  himself,  visited  Syria  in  late  February-­‐early  March  to  prepare  the  implementation  of  this  plan.3  In  the  past,  senior  Iranian  officers,  like  Major  General  Yahya  Rahim-­‐Safavi,  the  former  commander  of  the  Revolutionary  Guards  who  is  an  adviser  to  Khamenei,  have  said  that  Lebanon  and  Syria  gave  Iran  “strategic  depth.”4  Now  it  appears  that  Tehran  is  taking  this  a  step  further,  preparing  for  a  “Plan  B”  in  the  event  Assad  falls.  Nasrallah  rarely  makes  such  trips.  The  last  time  he  went  on  a  visit  outside  Lebanon  was  in  February  2010  when  he  met  in  Damascus  with  Syrian  President  Bashar  Assad  and  Iranian  President  Mahmoud  Ahmadinejad.  Nasrallah  has  taken  great  care  not  to  appear  in  public  since  the  Second  Lebanon  War  in  2006,  and  even  more  so  since  the  assassination  of  the  head  of  Hizbullah’s  military  wing,  Imad  Mughniyeh,  in  Damascus  in  February  2008.  Even  in  Iran  itself  Nasrallah  maintained  total  secrecy  for  fear  of  becoming  an  assassination  target  there.  After  the  visit,  he  gave  a  speech  in  Lebanon  on  April  30,  but  did  not  say  anything  about  his  visit  to  Iran.  He  did  remark  that  Syria  “has  real  friends”  that  wouldn’t  let  it  fall,  implying  that,  if  necessary,  he  would  

redouble  his  efforts  to  defend  Iranian  interests,  which  has  always  been  one  of  the  missions  of  Hizbullah.  It  appears  that  Hizbullah’s  ongoing  involvement  in  Syria,  and  the  extent  of  this  involvement,  formed  the  main  issue  on  the  agenda  during  Nasrallah’s  visit  to  Tehran.  The  more  time  passes,  the  more  Iran  appears  to  regard  Syria  as  a  lynchpin  of  its  Middle  Eastern  policy,  in  general,  and  of  leading  the  jihad  and  the  Islamic  resistance  to  Israel,  in  particular.  Hizbullah’s  inclusion  in  the  armed  struggle  in  Syria  is  intended  first  and  foremost  to  serve  the  Iranian  strategy,  which  has  been  setting  new  goals  apart  from  military  assistance  to  the  Syrian  regime.  Iran  already  seems  to  be  looking  beyond  the  regime’s  survivability  and  preparing  for  a  reality  where  it  will  have  to  operate  in  Syria  even  if  Assad  falls.  Even  before  recent  events  in  Syria,  observers  in  the  Arab  world  have  been  warning  for  years  about  growing  evidence  of  “Iranian  expansionism.”5  An  important  expression  of  Syria’s  centrality  in  Iranian  strategy  was  voiced  by  Mehdi  Taaib,  who  heads  Khamenei’s  think  tank.  He  recently  stated  that  “Syria  is  the  35th  district  of  Iran  and  it  has  greater  strategic  importance  for  Iran  than  Khuzestan  [an  Arab-­‐populated  district  inside  Iran].  By  preserving  Syria  we  will  be  able  to  get  back  Khuzestan,  but  if  we  lose  Syria  we  will  not  even  be  able  to  keep  Tehran.”6  Significantly,  Taaib  was  drawing  a  comparison  between  Syria  and  a  district  that  is  under  full  Iranian  sovereignty.  What  was  also  clear  from  his  remarks  was  that  Iran  cannot  afford  to  lose  Syria.  

Syria  as  a  Shiite  State  All  in  all,  then,  Iran  will  have  to  step  up  its  military  involvement  in  Syria.  Khamenei’s  representative  in  Lebanon  will  have  to  take  part  in  building  the  new  strategy  in  Syria,  acting  in  tandem  with  Iran  against  the  Sunni  Islamic  groups  that  threaten  Iran’s  interests  in  Syria.  Tehran  has  had  political  ambitions  with  respect  to  Syria  for  years  and  has  indeed  invested  huge  resources  in  making  Syria  a  Shiite  state.  The  process  began  during  the  rule  of  Hafez  Assad  when  a  far-­‐reaching  network  was  created  of  educational,  cultural,  and  religious  institutions  

throughout  Syria;  it  was  further  expanded  during  Bashar’s  reign.  The  aim  was  to  promote  the  Shiization  of  all  regions  of  the  Syrian  state.  The  Syrian  regime  let  Iranian  missionaries  work  freely  to  strengthen  the  Shiite  faith  in  Damascus  and  the  cities  of  the  Alawite  coast,  as  well  as  the  smaller  towns  and  villages.7  A  field  study  by  the  European  Union  in  the  first  half  of  2006  found  that  the  largest  percentage  of  religious  conversions  to  Shiism  occurred  in  areas  with  an  Alawite  majority.8  In  both  urban  and  rural  parts  of  Syria,  Sunnis  and  others  who  adopted  the  Shiite  faith  received  privileges  and  preferential  treatment  in  the  disbursement  of  Iranian  aid  money.  The  heads  of  the  tribes  in  the  Raqqa  area  were  invited  by  the  Iranian  ambassador  in  Damascus  to  visit  Iran  cost-­‐free,  and  the  Iranians  doled  out  funds  to  the  poor  and  financial  loans  to  merchants  who  were  never  required  to  pay  them  back..9  The  dimensions  of  the  Iranian  investment  in  Raqqa,  which  included  elegant  public  buildings,  mosques,  and  Husayniyys  (a  Shiite  religious  institute),  were  recently  revealed  by  Sunni  rebels  who  took  over  the  remote  town  and  destroyed,  plundered,  and  removed  all  signs  of  the  Iranian  and  Shiite  presence  there.10  As  of  2009  there  were  over  500  Husayniyys  in  Syria  undergoing  Iranian  renovation  work.  In  Damascus  itself  the  Iranians  invested  huge  sums  to  control  the  Shiite  holy  places  including  the  tomb  of  Sayyida  Zaynab,  the  shrine  of  Sayyida  Ruqayya,  and  the  shrine  of  Sayyida  Sukayna.  These  sites  attract  Iranian  tourism,  which  grew  from  27,000  visitors  in  1978  to  200,000  in  2003.  Iran  also  operates  a  cultural  center  in  Damascus  that  it  considers  one  of  its  most  important  and  successful.  This  center  publishes  works  in  Arabic,  holds  biweekly  cultural  events,  and  conducts  seminars  and  conferences  aimed  at  enhancing  the  Iranian  cultural  influence  in  the  country.  The  Iranian  cultural  center  is  also  responsible  for  the  propagation  and  study  of  the  Persian  language  in  Syrian  universities,  including  providing  teachers  of  Persian.11  

Iran’s  Sponsorship  of  Shiite  Forces  in  Syria  

At  present,  bloody  battles  are  being  waged  over  the  centers  of  Iranian  influence  in  Syria,  most  of  all  the  mausoleum  of  Sayyida  Zaynab  –  sister  of  the  Imam  Husayn  –  who  in  680  carried  his  severed  head  to  Damascus  after  the  massacre  at  Karbala.  In  Iranian  historiography,  the  great  victory  over  the  Sunnis  is  marked  in  Damascus  in  the  form  of  a  Shiite  renaissance  in  the  capital  of  the  hated  Umayyad  Empire.  The  Sunnis,  however,  are  now  threatening  these  Iranian  achievements.  Hizbullah  has  been  recruited  to  the  cause,  with  hundreds  of  its  fighters  coming  to  Syria  from  Lebanon.  These  fighters  try  to  downplay  their  Hizbullah  affiliation  and  instead  identify  themselves  as  the  Abu  El  Fadl  Alabbas  Brigade,  named  after  the  half-­‐brother  of  the  Imam  Husayn.  Iran  is  also  recruiting  Shiite  forces  in  Iraq  for  the  warfare  in  Syria.  These  are  organized  in  a  sister  framework  of  Lebanese  Hizbullah.  Known  as  the  League  of  the  Righteous  People  and  Kateeb  Hizbullah,  its  mission  is  to  defend  the  Shiite  centers  in  Damascus.12  Hizbullah  fighters  are  also  operating  in  other  areas,  some  of  them  beyond  the  Lebanese  border  in  the  Shiite  villages  in  Syrian  territory  on  the  way  to  Homs,  thereby  creating  a  sort  of  territorial  continuity  for  ongoing  Alawite  control  under  Iranian  influence.  This  continuity  is  strategically  important  to  Iran  since  it  links  Lebanon  and  Damascus  to  the  Alawite  coast.13  Iran  aims  to  have  a  network  of  militias  in  place  inside  Syria  to  protect  its  vital  interests,  regardless  of  what  happens  to  Assad.14  The  war  in  Syria  persists  with  no  decisive  outcome  on  the  horizon.  Hizbullah’s  battle  losses  are  growing.  Subhi  Tufayli,  the  first  head  of  Hizbullah  who  was  dismissed  from  its  leadership  by  Iran  at  the  start  of  the  1990s,  has  been  one  of  the  prominent  critics  of  Hizbullah’s  involvement  in  Syria.  Tufayli  claimed  that  138  Hizbullah  fighters  had  been  killed  there  along  with  scores  of  wounded  who  were  brought  to  hospitals  in  Lebanon.15  Ceremonies  for  burial  of  the  dead  are  frequently  held  clandestinely,  sometimes  at  night,  so  as  to  avoid  anger  and  resentment.  These  casualties,  however,  did  not  disappear  from  sight,  and  the  families  have  raised  harsh  questions  about  such  unnecessary  

sacrifice  that  is  not  in  the  sacred  framework  of  jihad  against  Israel,  which  is  Hizbullah’s  raison  d’être.  Tufayli,  for  his  part,  asserted  that  Hizbullah  fighters  who  are  killed  in  battle  in  Syria  “are  not  martyrs”  and  “will  go  to  hell.”  Syria,  he  remarked,  “is  not  Karbala”  and  the  Hizbullah  men  in  Syria  “are  not  fighters  of  the  Imam  [Husayn].  The  oppressed  and  innocent  Syrian  people  is  Karbala  and  the  members  of  the  Syrian  people  are  the  children  of  Husayn  and  Zaynab.”  Tufayli  went  on  to  say  that  he  “lauds  the  fathers  and  mothers  who  prevent  their  children  from  going  to  Syria  and  says  to  them  that  God’s  blessing  is  with  them.”  Tufayli  further  pointed  out  that,  legally  speaking,  no  fatwa  has  been  issued  that  permits  Hizbullah’s  participation  in  the  war  in  Syria.  He  said  he  had  appealed  to  the  supreme  religious  authority  –  the  sources  of  emulation  (Maraji  Taqlid)  in  Najaf  and  in  Lebanon  –  not  to  issue  such  a  fatwa.16  In  the  Lebanese  Shiite  community,  Tufayli  is  not  alone  in  leveling  severe  criticism  at  Hizbullah’s  role  as  an  arm  of  Iran  in  Syria.  Voices  within  Hizbullah  itself  are  increasingly  casting  doubt  on  the  wisdom  of  involving  the  movement  on  Bashar  Assad’s  side.  Others  refuse  to  go  and  fight  in  Syria,  and  there  have  already  been  desertions  from  Hizbullah’s  ranks.  So  far,  though,  it  does  not  appear  that  all  this  is  deterring  Hizbullah  from  persisting.  At  the  end  of  the  day,  Hizbullah  is  not  a  Lebanese  national  movement  but  a  creation  of  Iran  and  subject  to  its  exclusive  authority.  Nasrallah  was  summoned  to  Tehran  so  as  to  encourage  him  and  order  him  to  continue  as  a  faithful  and  obedient  soldier  of  Velayt-­e  Faqih  (literally:  the  Rule  of  the  Jurisprudent,  referring  to  Ayatollah  Ali  Khamenei).  It  is  likely  that  Tehran  will  make  every  effort  to  recruit  additional  Shiite  elements  from  Iraq,  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  even  from  Pakistan.  For  the  Islamic  Republic,  this  is  a  war  of  survival  against  a  radical  Sunni  uprising  that  views  Iran  and  the  Shiites  as  infidels  to  be  annihilated.  This  is  the  real  war  being  waged  today,  and  it  is  within  Islam.  From  Iran’s  standpoint,  if  the  extreme  Sunnis  of  the  al-­‐Qaeda  persuasion  are  

not  defeated  in  Syria,  they  will  assert  themselves  in  Iraq  and  threaten  to  take  over  the  Persian  Gulf,  posing  a  real  danger  to  Iran’s  regional  hegemony.  Khamenei  does  not  intend  to  give  in.  Hizbullah’s  readiness  to  fight  shoulder-­‐to-­‐shoulder  with  Iran  against  the  radical  Sunnis  could  shatter  the  delicate  internal  order  upon  which  the  Lebanese  state  is  based  and  bring  about  a  Hizbullah  take-­‐over  of  Lebanon  in  its  entirety.  

*          *          *  Notes  

1.  On  the  picture  and  its  significance,  see  Ali  al-­Amin,  Al-­Balad,  April  23,  2013,  

http://www.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=74383&cid=76.  

2.  “Chief  of  Iran’s  Quds  Force  Claims  Iraq,  South  Lebanon  under  His  Control,  Al  Arabiya  News,  

January  20,  2012,  http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/20/189447.html.  

3.  A-­Shiraa,  March  15,  2013.  

4.  Nevvine  Abdel  Monem  Mossad,  “Implication  of  Iran  Accepting  Military  Role  in  Syria,  

Lebanon,”  The  Emirates  Center  for  Strategic  Studies  and  Research,  October  7,  2012.    

5.  Abdul  Rahman  Al-­Rashed,  “Iran  and  Its  Expansionist  Tendencies,”  Arab  News,  February  6,  

2013,  http://www.arabnews.com/iran-­and-­its-­expansionist-­tendencies;  “US  Embassy  Cables:  

Omani  Official  Wary  of  Iranian  Expansionism,”  The  Guardian,  November  28,  2010,  

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-­embassy-­cables-­documents/165127.  

6.  Ali-­al-­Amin,  Al-­Balad,  February  17,  2013.  

7.  On  the  Shiization  of  Syria,  see  Khalid  Sindawi,  “The  Shiite  Turn  in  Syria,”  Hudson  Institute,  

Current  Trends  in  Islamist  Ideology,  vol.  8,  82-­127,  

http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-­shiite-­turn-­in-­syria.  

8.  Ibid.,  84.  

9.  Ibid.,  89-­90.  

10.  Martin  Kramer,  “The  Shiite  Crescent  Eclipsed,”  April  16,  2013,  

http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/2013/04/the-­shiite-­crescent-­is-­broken.  

11.  Nadia  von  Maltzahn,  “The  Case  of  Iranian  Cultural  Diplomacy  in  Syria,”  Middle  East  Journal  

of  Culture  and  Communication  2  (2009):  33-­50.    

12.  Rabbiah  Jamal,  “Iraq’s  Kateeb  Hezbollah  announces  involvement  in  Syria,”  Now  Lebanon,  

April  7,  2013.  

13.  See  the  excellent  article  by  Hanin  Ghadder,  “Hezbollah  sacrifices  popularity  for  survival:  In  

Syria,  The  Party  of  God  is  struggling  for  an  un-­divine  victory,”  Now  Lebanon,  April  10,  2013.  

14.  Karen  DeYoung  and  Joby  Warrick,  “Iran  and  Hezbollah  Build  Militia  Networks  in  Syria  in  

Event  that  Assad  Falls,  Officials  Say,”  The  Washington  Post,  February  10,  2013,  

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-­02-­10/world/37026054_1_syrian-­government-­

forces-­iran-­and-­hezbollah-­president-­bashar.  

15.  www.metransparent.com,  April  25,  2013.  

16.  Subhi  Tufayli,  interview,  Al  Arabiya,  February  26,  2013.