Iranian Shiite Terror Cell in Nigeria Followed a Familiar Pattern

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Iranian Shiite Terror Cell in NigeriaFollowed a Familiar PatternCol. (ret.) Dr. Jacques NeriahMarch 5, 2013

Vol. 13, No. 6 5 March 2013• Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the fifth largest

provider of oil to the U.S. More than half the population practicesIslam.

• On February 20, 2013, Nigeria’s State Secret Service accused a local

Shiite cleric, Mallam Abdullahi Mustaphah Berende, 50, of heading aterrorist group backed by Iran that was plotting to assassinateNigerian officials and attack Israeli and American targets in Nigeria.

• The Berende case offers a rare look at the work of Iranianintelligence agencies. Berende first visited Iran in 2006 to study atImam Khomeini University, and was recruited when he returned forfurther studies in 2011. He was trained in the use of the AK-47 rifle,pistols, and the production of improvised explosive devices.

• In April 2012 Berende was asked to establish a terrorist cell in Lagos.With two of his followers, he identified and gathered intelligence onpublic places and places frequented by Americans and Israelis. Theyalso provided specific details on such agencies as USAID and thePeace Corps, as well as the Israeli Zim international shippingcompany and the Jewish cultural center in Lagos.

• Sheikh Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, the undisputed leader of the IslamicMovement of Nigeria, is another Nigerian Shiite. A protégé of Iran, heis creating a radical socio-economic and military system thatresembles that of Hizbullah in Lebanon. He is said to have asupporter base numbering over a million. His organization has beeninvolved in many confrontations with the army and the Christian



population. (See photos of a Hizbullah parade in Nigeria in thisarticle.)

• Similar Iranian-Hizbullah terrorist efforts in Cyprus, Bahrain,Bulgaria, and elsewhere confirm the pattern revealed in the Berendeaffair. Handlers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards use localShiite agents or those with dual nationalities. In the first phases theyconcentrate on the collection of intelligence, and train in the use ofweapons and explosives in Iran. In a later phase they will seek tocarry out their terrorist attacks through proxies.

On February 20, 2013, Nigeria’s State Secret Service (SSS) paraded withgrand fanfare a local Shiite cleric, Mallam Abdullahi Mustaphah

Berende, 50. According to Nigerian authorities, he headed a terroristgroup backed by “Iranian handlers” that was plotting to assassinateformer Nigerian president Gen. Ibrahim Babangida and the deposedSultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, father of the current nationalsecurity adviser, Col. (ret.) Sambo Dasuki, and to attack Israeli andAmerican targets in Nigeria.1

Previous Iranian Operations in NigeriaThis new crisis in Nigerian-Iranian relations comes barely less thanthree years after an Iranian weapons shipment was discovered in LagosApapa Port (on October 26, 2010) concealed in thirteen containersaboard a ship sailing from Bandar Abbas, in clear violation of UNSecurity Council Resolution 1929 (of June 2009) imposing additionalsanctions on Iran. (This episode was followed by the discovery of $10million worth of heroin hidden in engine parts shipped from Iran thatwas seized at Lagos Airport that same year.) When Nigerian authorities

requested information from Tehran about the identity of the weaponscargo’s recipient, they were rebuffed. Foreign Minister ManouchehrMottaki was then sent to Nigeria to solve the problem. Mottaki met withNigerian authorities and explained that there had been a mistake andthat the weapons’ destination was actually Gambia. Meanwhile, new



shipping documents were produced for the cargo, which listed theprivate address of Gambian President Jammeh as the destination. 2

The Nigerians were not convinced by Mottaki’s explanations anddemanded the arrest of the two Iranians responsible for the shipment.One of them, Azim Aghajani, was arrested (and released on $260,000bail), but his trial was postponed and the location of the trial was movedfrom the capital Abuja to Lagos “for convenience.” It turned out thatAghajani received his Nigerian visa on the recommendation of SheikhAli Abbas Usman, better known as Abbas Jega, who used to work atRadio Tehran’s Hausa-language service and studied in Iran. Abbas Jegawas also arrested, along with two customs officers, and they are all

awaiting sentencing. 3

The second Iranian, Sayyed Akbar Tabatabaei, the Africa commander ofthe Quds Force (the branch of the Revolutionary Guards charged withexporting the revolution overseas), had received his entry permit toNigeria to “provide administrative support” to the Iranian Embassy, asper the request of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Holding diplomaticimmunity, Tabatabaei found refuge on Mottaki’s plane and flew withhim to Iran. Subsequently, according to reports, he was sent toVenezuela to oversee Quds Force recruitment in Latin America. Mottakiwas replaced as foreign minister during a later visit to Senegal, asTehran was dissatisfied with his failure. Nigeria reported Iran to the UNSecurity Council, of which it was a member, where all the known detailswere disclosed. The case of Aghajani and his Nigerian accomplices isstill being tried in a Nigerian court.4

The Newest Case – Berende’s Confession

However, unlike the previous cases, the arrest of Berende (on December17, 2012) and his group directly involves Nigerian national security andsovereignty at a time when Nigeria is struggling against local terrorismand participating in a campaign in Mali against al-Qaeda groups. Indeed,it seems that Iran has chosen to escalate its subversive efforts in Nigeriaby taking aim at precise targets defined as pro-American and pro-



Israeli. Most important is the fact that the Berende case offers a rarelook at the work of Iranian intelligence agencies in Nigeria (andprobably in other areas populated with Shiites).Berende’s confession to the press underlines the pattern followed by his“Iranian handlers.” 5

Berende, the leader of a local Shiite group in Llorin (in Kwara state), hadcome to Iran in 2006 to study in a six-month course on modern ShiaIslamic teachings (da’awa) at Imam Khomeini University, and wasrecruited by “Iranian elements” when he returned for further studies in2011. He was trained in the use of the AK-47 rifle, pistols, and theproduction of improvised explosive devices.

Berende flew to Dubai in April 2012 for further briefings by his handlersand was asked to establish a terrorist cell in southwest Nigeria withspecific emphasis on Lagos. Accordingly, Berende asked two of hisfollowers to assist him in identifying and gathering intelligence onpublic places and prominent places frequented by Americans andIsraelis in order to facilitate their attack by Iranian terrorists. They alsoprovided specific details on such agencies as USAID and the PeaceCorps, as well as the Israeli Zim international shipping company and theJewish cultural center in Lagos.Berende received money as well as code names (such as Uncle for Israeland Aunt for the U.S.) by his Iranian handlers in order to facilitate hismission in Nigeria and provide for basic, secure communicationsbetween him and his handlers. The financial support was meant also toestablish a small business as a decoy. Indeed, Berende relocated toLagos and set up a small business there as recommended by his

handlers.Berende confessed that Lagos was chosen for attack because theIranians believed that Israel has an intelligence facility in the area forspying on Iran.Berende’s confession underlined what was common knowledge tointelligence agencies: Shiite communities around the world represent



the infrastructure upon which Iran builds its subversive policiesworldwide. This has been the case in most terrorist actions carried outby Iranian agents or proxies such as Hizbullah operatives, and Nigeria isno exception.Iranian and Islamist Interest in NigeriaYears before Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran became interested inNigeria, the most populous country in Africa and the fifth largestprovider of oil to the U.S., where more than half the population practicesIslam. Iran identified Nigeria as a regional power that could serve itsinterests in Africa and provide support at international forums.Economic ties between the countries were forged in the late 1990s and

were accelerated after Iranian President Khatami’s visit there in 2005.The main topic during the Iranian visit was Nigeria’s energy shortage.While Nigeria is an oil exporter, the country suffers from chronicshortages of refined fuel products due to limited refinery capacity andwidespread corruption in the energy sector. Iran urged Nigeria to adoptnuclear technology, which greatly worried the United States. During hislast visit to Nigeria in July 2009, President Ahmadinejad promotednuclear energy as a cheap energy source.Iran has also closely followed the ongoing violent tensions in Nigeriabetween radical Muslim and Christian groups, and especially betweenMuslim radicals and the government, which declared an all-out war onthem. Islamist activity is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria, but datesback to the 1960s. At the time, Saudi Arabia stood behind the financingand instruction of the different Islamic groups. It is estimated that therewere over two hundred organizations involved in activities aimed at

strengthening Nigeria’s Islamic character. Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, astudent of the Saudi school, established The Society for the Eradicationof Evil and the Establishment of the Sunna, better known asIan Izala ,which flourished during the military rule in Nigeria and was committedto supporting Islamic education.



In the ‘80s and ‘90s, graduates of this movement established additionalradical movements like the Muslim Brothers and the Movement forIslamic Revival, whose leader, Abubakar Mujahid, proclaimed after 9/11that the destruction of the Twin Towers was an appropriate and justresponse to American provocation. Mujahid was earlier a student ofSheikh Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, the undisputed leader of the IslamicMovement of Nigeria. Zakzaky, born in 1953, is a Nigerian Shiite fromKaduna state. A protégé of Iran, he is involved in disseminating Shiitetheology and creating a radical socio-economic and military system thatresembles that of Hizbullah in Lebanon. According to estimates, thesheikh has a supporter base numbering over a million people. His

organization has been involved in many confrontations with the armyand the Christian population. Reports claim that his group is responsiblefor thousands of deaths in northern Nigeria in the last decade. Thesheikh himself ended up in almost every prison in Nigeria in the ‘80sand ‘90s, but he has kept up his activities. (See photos of a Hizbullahparade in Nigeria at the end of this article.)6

No doubt the whole Berende affair hurt Iran’s standing in WesternAfrica and its efforts to build a front against the United States and theinternational community. It is indeed a failure on the part of Iranianintelligence and someone will have to pay the price for the lack ofunderstanding of inter-African realities, for the disrespect of leaders,who were perceived as obvious supporters because of their corruption,and for the erroneous evaluation of the ability of U.S. and other foreignintelligence services to know what is taking place in Iran. The Nigerianauthorities are well aware of this phenomenon and follow the ties

between local Shiites and Iran very closely. However, it seems thatdespite all its failures, Iran continues to intensify its efforts in order todestabilize Jonathan Ebele Goodluck’s presidency in Nigeria.Part of a Wider Iranian-Hizbullah Terror OffensiveFinally, the Berende affair occurred at a time when a trial is being heldin Cyprus against a Lebanese (with a Swedish passport) who was also





use of weapons and explosives in Iran or other “friendly” territory. In alater phase (as in Burgas) they will seek to carry out their terroristattacks through proxies.All these events provide a rare view of the covert war conducted byIsrael, the U.S., and its allies against Iran and Hizbullah. In a majority ofcases, preventive measures have unmasked deadly attacks plannedagainst Jewish, Israeli, or American targets. Unfortunately, in a few ofthem, the attacks have resulted in deaths and casualties.

* * *1. The information on the Berende case is compiled from the following Nigerian newspapers:The

Vanguard, PM News, Leadership, Daily Independent, Punch, and This Day , all published on February 21,

2013 (Compilation hereinafter).

2. Jacques Neriah, “An Iranian Intelligence Failure: Arms Ship in Nigeria Reveals Iran’s Penetration of

West Africa,” Jerusalem Issue Brief , Vol. 10, No. 35, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, April 7, 2011.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Compilation.

6. “An Iranian Intelligence Failure.” Hassane Soulay, “Hassan Nasrallah, Superstar in Nigeria,” France

24, June 23, 2008.

7. Nicholas Kulish, “Trial Offers Rare Look at Work of Hezbollah in Europe,”New York Times,

February 20, 2013.

8. Raissa Kasolowsky, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Behind ‘Terror’ Cell,” Reuters, February 20, 2013.

* * *

August 30, 2007 – Hizbullah followers of Nigerian Shiite SheikhZakzaky in Zaria (Northwest Abuja)









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Iranian Shiite Terror Cell in Nigeria Followed a Familiar Pattern