Although it is possible that negotiationsbetween the leading powers in the internationalcommunity and Iran may produce a settlement tothe vexing issue of Iran’s nuclear program, it ismore likely that those negotiations will fail. If thathappens, U.S. policymakers face a set of highlyimperfect options.

One option—and the most likely initialresponse—is to seek a UN Security Council reso-lution imposing economic sanctions on Tehran.However, sanctions have a poor record of gettingregimes to abandon high-priority policies. Evenif Russia and China can be induced to overcometheir reluctance to endorse sanctions, it is unlike-ly that such measures would halt Iran’s quest fornuclear weapons.

A second option is to intensify efforts to sub-vert Iran’s clerical regime. Washington already hasa modest program to do that under the IranFreedom Support Act. Unfortunately, such astrategy may backfire, undermining the domesticlegitimacy of Iranian dissidents. Moreover, there isno certainty that a democratic Iran would chooseto be nonnuclear.

Option three is to launch preemptive air

strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations. Thatis the most unwise strategy. At most, such strikeswould delay, not eliminate, Tehran’s program.There is also a grave risk that Iran would retaliatewith the full range of options at its disposal,including attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq andthrough proxy organizations. Attacking Iranwould also further alienate Muslim populationsaround the world, creating the very real prospectof a war of civilizations.

Option four is to reluctantly accept Iran as amember of the global nuclear weapons club and relyon the deterrent power of America’s vast nucleararsenal. While that strategy is not without risk, theUnited States has successfully deterred other volatileand unsavory regimes, most notably Maoist Chinaduring that country’s Cultural Revolution.

The best option, though, is to try to strike agrand bargain with Iran. Washington should offerto normalize diplomatic and economic relationswith Iran in exchange for Tehran’s agreement toopen its nuclear program to rigorous, on-demandinternational inspections to guarantee that thereis no diversion of nuclear material from peacefulpurposes to building weapons.

Iran’s Nuclear ProgramAmerica’s Policy Options

by Ted Galen Carpenter

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of sevenbooks on international affairs, including Peace and Freedom: Foreign Policy for a Constitutional Republic.

Executive Summary

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Introduction

Iran would be at or near the top of a list ofcountries Americans would least like to seehave nuclear weapons, and the reasons forapprehension have deepened dramatically inthe past year with the election of PresidentMahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran under themullahs since the revolution of 1979 hasbeen a weird and ominous country. WithAhmadinejad’s new prominence, the weird-ness quotient has reached new levels. Iran isnow headed by an individual who expressesthe hope that Israel be wiped off the map anddenies that the Holocaust ever occurred.Those are sentiments not found in civilizedcircles anywhere in the world.

If one could wave a magic wand and elimi-nate Iran’s nuclear program, all responsiblegovernments would be grasping for thatwand. Alas, in the real world such magicalsolutions do not exist. U.S. policymakers haveonly a choice among problematic options.Some choices, though, are clearly better thanothers.

Above all, as policymakers consider thevarious options, they need to avoid a sense ofpanic. U.S. intelligence agencies have con-cluded that Iran will not be able to buildnuclear weapons for another 5 to 10 years.1

Prominent independent experts agree withthat assessment.2 Even the Israeli govern-ment, which has an obvious interest in pre-senting a worst-case scenario of the Iraniannuclear threat, concedes that Tehran will notbe able to build such weapons for another 3years.3 Based on recent information, someBush administration policymakers nowembrace a similar conclusion, although theintelligence community has not changed itsofficial estimate.4 Yet even 3 years is a signifi-cant amount of time to craft a response. Onlythe most intense members of the factionpushing war with Iran argue that the dangeris more imminent.5 Their most recent thesisis that, although Iran might not be able tobuild nukes on its own in the immediatefuture, there is a very real danger that NorthKorea, whose program is more advanced,

might sell Tehran a bomb or two.6 Thosewho advance that thesis present little evi-dence that Pyongyang would take such astep, knowing that not only the United Statesbut other countries in the international com-munity (including North Korea’s principalallies, Russia and China) would be most dis-pleased with such reckless proliferation.

Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, scholars at the Center for Strategicand International Studies, note that mostgovernment and independent analyses ofIran’s nuclear program in the 1990s predict-ed that the country would be able to buildnuclear weapons by 2000. That clearly didnot happen. The reason for the faulty esti-mates, according to Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, is that they “often were based on theunrealistic assumption that Iran’s nuclearprogram would evolve without interrup-tions, technical difficulties, or voluntary sus-pensions.”7

Given that track record, we should bedoubly skeptical of newer predictions thatTehran is on the brink of becoming a nuclearpower. The bulk of expert opinion bothinside and outside the U.S. government nowconcludes that Iran is still a long time awayfrom having a nuclear arsenal. When a poten-tial threat is measured in years, it allows poli-cymakers to carefully consider alternativeways of addressing the problem. There is noneed for precipitous action.

Prelude to Confrontation:The European-Led

NegotiationsThere has been a diplomatic effort under-

way for more than three years to dissuade Iranfrom trying to become a nuclear power. Thateffort began in 2003 when Britain, France, andGermany—the so-called EU-3—became suffi-ciently worried about Tehran’s apparent objec-tives that they decided to address the problemthrough engagement and negotiations. Theyurged the United States to join that effort, butthe Bush administration spurned the over-

2

The bulk ofexpert opinionnow concludes

that Iran is still along time awayfrom having a

nuclear arsenal.

tures of its allies and decided to remain on thesidelines. That posture did not preventPresident Bush and other U.S. officials fromissuing periodic statements stressing that anuclear-armed Iran was “intolerable.” Indeed,from the earliest stages of the European diplo-matic initiative, Washington urged that Iranbe referred to the UN Security Council for pos-sible sanctions.8

Russia and China (especially the former)have from time to time offered proposals fromthe diplomatic sidelines. Indeed, the mostpromising initiative has been Russia’s proposalto have Iran enrich uranium for power-genera-tion purposes on Russian soil, with the productthen being returned to Iran. That methodwould (at least in theory) prevent Iran from pro-ducing highly enriched uranium—which is theraw material for building nuclear weapons.Tehran has given conflicting signals regardingMoscow’s proposal.9 On some occasionsIranian leaders have expressed interest in theoffer and have even indicated that it could bethe basis of a settlement to the crisis. On otheroccasions, however, they have criticized the pro-posal and emphasized that Iran has a rightunder the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT) to have a nuclear program on Iraniansoil for peaceful purposes.

The EU-3 effort has achieved little. Irandid suspend its uranium enrichment pro-gram from November 2004 to August 2005,but for the most part the negotiations pro-ceeded in a desultory fashion. European pres-sure on the Bush administration did lead to amodest shift in U.S. policy in the spring of2005. Washington finally agreed to endorsethe EU-3 negotiations and to authorize theEuropeans to offer the Iranians some infor-mal U.S. concessions if Tehran agreed toabandon its uranium conversion process per-manently. Those concessions includedWashington’s agreement to end its blockingof Iran’s admission to the World TradeOrganization. The Bush administration alsoagreed to consider licensing the sale of spareparts for Iran’s aging fleet of civilian airliners.

Although the Europeans were gratifiedthat the U.S. administration had become

more supportive and cooperative, those con-cessions reportedly came at a price. At theurging of Vice President Cheney’s office, theadministration insisted that the foreign min-isters of the EU-3 sign a letter stating that, ifthe talks failed, they would support U.S.efforts to refer Iran to the Security Councilfor possible sanctions.10

The crisis turned more intense in August2005, when Ahmadinejad took office. A fewdays later, Iran rejected the European pro-posals, which included the concessionsagreed to by the United States. Indeed, Iran’snew chief nuclear negotiator declared thathis country would never halt its conversionof uranium. A month later, the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency found Iran in non-compliance with inspection requirementsthat were part of the country’s obligationsunder the NPT. In February 2006, the IAEAvoted to report Iran to the Security Council.A Security Council vote on sanctions seemedjust a matter of weeks or a few months away.

Washington made another significantshift in policy. At the end of May, the Bushadministration agreed to join the EU-3 nego-tiations as an active participant.11 Shortlythereafter, negotiators made a new offer toIran, providing a number of concessions(including the previous concessions offeredindirectly and informally by the UnitedStates) if Tehran agreed to put its uraniumenrichment activities on hold. The offerapparently included a provision for Westernaid to build proliferation-resistant lightwater reactors in Iran, which would allowTehran to have a peaceful, nuclear power-generation program.12 Washington and itsallies pressed the Iranian government for aprompt response to the offer, at one pointdemanding an answer by mid-July. TheIranians refused to be pressured in that man-ner, instead telling the Western powers thatthey would provide an answer by late August.On August 22, Tehran did reply, indicatingthat it would undertake “serious negotia-tions.” There was no indication, though, thatIran was prepared to halt the enrichment ofuranium—the key demand of the United

3

From the earliest stages ofthe Europeandiplomatic initiative,Washingtonurged that Iranbe referred to theUN SecurityCouncil for possible sanctions.

States and other powers.13 Indeed, as theAugust 31 deadline imposed by the UNSecurity Council resolution expired, theIranian government remained as defiant asever on the issue of enrichment.14 Given theapparent failure of the EU-3-led negotia-tions, the United States faces a set of highlyimperfect options.

Option 1: Impose MultilateralEconomic Sanctions

Washington will now seek a resolutionfrom the UN Security Council imposing anarray of sanctions against Tehran. Most ofthose sanctions would focus on three areas:curtailing transfers of technology, impedingfinancial flows to and from Iran (includingfreezing Iranian assets worldwide), andrestricting the ability of Iranian officials totravel abroad. How restrictive these sanctionsare likely to be remains an open question.When it agreed to end its policy of boycottingtalks with Iran and join the EU-3 negotia-tions, the Bush administration clearlybelieved that it had a commitment from allfive permanent members of the SecurityCouncil to impose serious sanctions if thosenegotiations failed.

Since then, however, signs have emergedsuggesting that Russia may not be on board,as the Putin government expressed reserva-tions about key wording of the U.S.-backeddraft resolution merely to put Iran on noticethat the UN might impose sanctions ifTehran did not respond by the end of Augustto the diplomatic offer that was on thetable.15 There are also questions about howfirmly committed China is to imposingmeaningful sanctions on Iran.16 Indeed, resis-tance from Moscow and Beijing requiredWashington to accept diluted language inthe preliminary resolution that the SecurityCouncil passed at the end of July.17 If Irancontinues its refusal to comply, one canexpect the negotiations among the perma-nent members of the Security Council over

the wording of a resolution actually impos-ing sanctions to be even more contentiousthan in the first round.

Moreover, even if the United States ulti-mately gets the Security Council to passsomething other than a watered-down sanc-tions resolution, there is reason to doubtwhether it would have much impact on Iran’snuclear program. Sanctions have a less thanstellar record of inducing regimes to changepolicies—especially to abandon high-priority,high-prestige projects. And Iran’s nuclearprogram clearly belongs in that category.

The Dismal Record of SanctionsUnilateral U.S. economic sanctions have a

poor track record of inducing policy change.18

Washington has maintained a comprehensiveembargo on trade with and investment in Cubafor more than 45 years. Yet the Castro govern-ment remains entrenched in power, and Havanastill pursues retrograde communist economicand social policies—much to the annoyance ofthe United States. Washington’s attempt to iso-late North Korea has entered its seventh decade,again without having much discernible impacton Pyongyang’s policies.19 In both cases, U.S.efforts have been badly undercut by the refusalof other nations to go along with policies of eco-nomic coercion. That problem is even more pro-nounced with Washington’s sanctions againstIran, which date from the 1979 Islamic revolu-tion and the subsequent seizure of the U.S.embassy in Tehran and the resulting hostage cri-sis. Today, Russia, China, Japan, and severalmembers of the European Union conduct sig-nificant trade with Iran and have importantinvestments in that country. Those actions ren-der the U.S. sanctions largely ineffective exceptwith respect to a few sectors, most notably spareparts for aircraft.

Even when sanctions are imposed on acomprehensive multilateral basis, they have amixed record at best. The most highly toutedsuccess story was the decision of SouthAfrica’s white minority government to aban-don the policy of apartheid and turn overpolitical power to the black majority. Most ofthe other apparent success stories involve far

4

Even if the UnitedStates ultimatelygets the SecurityCouncil to pass

something otherthan a watered-down sanctions

resolution, thereis reason to doubtthat it would have

much impact onIran’s nuclear

program.

more limited policy changes by the targetregime. But even the transformation of SouthAfrica was a highly complex process, and eco-nomic sanctions were merely one factoramong many that led to political change.20

Moreover, the process took decades. We don’thave the luxury of that amount of time withregard to Iran’s nuclear program.

The most detailed study on the coercivepower of sanctions remains Gary Hufbauer,Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliott’s EconomicSanctions Reconsidered.21 The authors examined115 cases in which sanctions were imposedand determined that, in 41 cases, or approxi-mately 36 percent of the time, sanctions werethe primary reason that a target state shiftedits behavior. Other scholars have challengedthat assessment, however, contending thatHufbauer, Schott, and Elliott substantiallyoverstated the effectiveness of economic sanc-tions.22 Even if those criticisms are not valid, itis clear that sanctions were in only a minorityof cases—and the vast majority of successesinvolves a combination of broad cooperationby important countries and relatively narrowpolicy changes or low-priority objectives forthe target regime.

One of the major problems with multilat-eral sanctions is the incentive for some sanc-tioning parties to defect. As political scientistDaniel Drezner notes, that phenomenonoccurs repeatedly.23 For example, during theU.S.-led grain embargo against the SovietUnion following that country’s invasion ofAfghanistan, the defection of grain-richArgentina fatally undermined the campaign.24

Why Iran Is a Poor Target for SanctionsIran is an especially unpromising candi-

date for a successful campaign of economiccoercion. Even if the United States caninduce the major EU powers, Russia, China,Japan, and India to impose serious sanctionsagainst Iran, the defection of one or more ofthose countries is very likely. All of them haveimportant investments in Iran. Japan, forexample, is extremely worried that if it goesalong with a sanctions regime, China willswoop in and displace Tokyo’s investments

in Iran’s oil industry.25 Some smaller coun-tries may also defect from any sanctionsregime. Australia, for example, has alreadyvoiced reservations about its participation.26

The fact that Iran is a major oil produceris another factor reducing the probable effec-tiveness of any UN sanctions resolution.Theoretically, the Security Council couldauthorize an embargo on Iranian oil andestablish a blockade of Iran’s ports to executethat edict. Given Tehran’s dependence on oilrevenues, sanctions directed against its oilexports might force the country to the brinkof bankruptcy and create powerful pressuresto alter course on the nuclear issue. But withglobal crude oil prices already approaching$70 a barrel, it strains credulity to imagine amajor oil consumer like China approvingsuch a measure. Indeed, it is not certain thateven the United States would be willing toendure the resulting economic pain. Someexperts predict that such an embargo wouldlikely send oil prices well above $100 a barrel,with highly unpleasant consequences for theglobal economy.27

Yet without an embargo on Iranian oil,there is almost no chance that economic sanc-tions will cause Tehran to abandon its nuclearprogram. If the United States and the otherpowers are determined to keep Iran nonnu-clear, they must look to other strategies.

Option 2: Orchestrate Regime Change

A strategy of regime change is the favoritepanacea of most neoconservatives, and theyusually argue that it is possible to orchestratean overthrow of the clerical regime without anextensive U.S. military role. According toenthusiastic proponents of regime changesuch as American Enterprise Institute activistMichael Ledeen, there is so much Iranian pub-lic opposition to the mullahs that a U.S. prop-aganda offensive combined with financial andlogistical assistance to prospective insurgentswould be sufficient to topple the regime.Ledeen has boasted, “I have contacts in Iran,

5

According toenthusiastic proponents ofregime change, aU.S. propagandaoffensive combined with financial andlogistical assistance toprospective insurgents wouldbe sufficient totopple theregime.

fighting the regime. Give me twenty million[dollars] and you’ll have your revolution.”28

Proponents of regime change were activeeven before the Iranian nuclear crisis becameprominent; most hawks during that earlierperiod emphasized Tehran’s support for ter-rorist organizations as the principal justifica-tion for seeking to oust the clerical govern-ment.29 Calls for regime change have becomeeven more pronounced since Hezbollah’sattack on northern Israel in July 2006 and theresulting conflict.30 Increasingly, the counter-terrorism justification has melded with argu-ments about the need to thwart Tehran’snuclear ambitions.

The initial stage of the regime-changestrategy is already underway with congres-sional passage of the Iran Freedom SupportAct in the spring of 2005, and a dramaticboost in funding for anti-regime activitiesthe following year. As outlined by Secretaryof State Condoleezza Rice, the expanded pro-gram funds radio broadcasts and other prop-aganda activities and provides modest sup-port for trade unions and other dissidentgroups.31 The Bush administration proposedan infusion of an additional $75 million forthe campaign (augmenting the $10 millionthat had previously been appropriated fordemocracy support activities); Congress ulti-mately approved $66 million.

Dubious Exile AlliesThe regime-change thesis might seem

more plausible if we had not heard similararguments in the years leading up to the Iraqwar.32 Indeed, the argument for regimechange and the strategy embodied in the IranFreedom Support Act33 are eerily reminiscentof the approach adopted with respect to Iraqbetween 1998 and 2003. Congress alsopassed and funded an Iraq Liberation Actduring that period. American policymakersswallowed the self-serving propaganda ofAhmed Chalabi and the Iraqi NationalCongress, which said that with just modestU.S. financial and logistical support Iraqi fac-tions opposed to Saddam Hussein would beable to overthrow his regime. It has since

become apparent that the INC never hadmore than a meager domestic following.(Chalabi’s party garnered less than 0.5 per-cent in the December 2005 parliamentaryelections in Iraq.)

There are manipulative (and in some casesutterly unsavory) Iranian exiles waiting in thewings to pull the same con game on Washing-ton.34 They include notorious arms dealerManucher Ghorbanifar, a shadowy figure in theIran-Contra scandal during the Reagan admin-istration.35 Perhaps the most unsavory opposi-tion group is the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK),which even the U.S. State Department considersa terrorist organization.36

The MEK , an organization founded on acombination of Islamism and Marxism, has along history of terrorism and cult-like behav-ior. The MEK is the military wing of theNational Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI),regarded by many neoconservatives as a keyally in the effort to overthrow the Iranian cleri-cal regime. After moving its base of operationsfrom France to Iraq in 1986, the MEK wasreportedly funded by Saddam Hussein’sBaathist regime and sent into combat againstIran. It has also been implicated in the killingof American citizens.37 Currently led by a mar-ried couple, Masoud and Maryam Rajavi, theorganization has increasingly become a cult ofpersonality.38

That reputation does not discourage someneoconservative proponents of regime changefrom making common cause with MEKactivists.39 In May 2003, scholars Daniel Pipesand Patrick Clawson of the WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy recommendedthat “when the secretary of state next decideswhether or not to re-certify the MEK as a ter-rorist organization,” that official “shouldcome to the sensible conclusion that it posesno threat to the security of the United Statesor its citizens.” Pipes and Clawson went on topraise the MEK as a potential U.S. ally, citingthe organization’s “key information” aboutIran’s nuclear program and other activities ofthe Iranian regime.40 In November 2005,Raymond Tanter, a senior fellow at theWashington Institute for Near East Policy,

6

The argument forregime change

and the strategyembodied in the

Iran FreedomSupport Act are

eerily reminiscentof the approach

adopted withrespect to Iraqbetween 1998

and 2003.

stated that an effective U.S. policy

requires working with Iranian oppositiongroups in general and with the mainopposition in particular. The NationalCouncil for Resistance of Iran (NCRI) andMujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) are not onlythe best source for intelligence on Iran’spotential violations of the nonprolifera-tion regime. . . . The NCRI and MEK arealso a possible ally of the West in bringingabout regime change in Tehran.41

He declared, with little evidence, that theMEK and the NCRI were the only oppositiongroups the clerical leaders feared.

In addition to the dubious wisdom ofsupporting groups like the NCRI and theMEK, the assurances that significant U.S.military assistance would be unnecessary toeffect regime change in Iran should be greet-ed with skepticism. In the case of Iraq, suchassurances were quietly buried when regime-change advocates became impatient withSaddam Hussein’s continuing ability to clingto power. Saddam’s overthrow was carriedout by a massive application of U.S. militarypower, with the much-touted exiles playingthe role of embarrassing hangers-on. If theUnited States adopts a strategy of regimechange in Iran, it is likely that an even greatermilitary effort will be required.42

Why a Regime-Change Strategy MightBackfire

Aggressive democracy promotion is astrategy that is likely to backfire in anotherway. There is little doubt that a growing num-ber of Iranians (especially young Iranians) arefed up with the repressive rule of the mullahsand want a more open society. But outspokenU.S. endorsements of their resistance cam-paign could be the kiss of death. U.S. supportgives the religious hierarchy the perfect pre-text to portray even cautious advocates ofpolitical reform as traitors and Americanstooges.

We must remember that there are mil-lions of Iranians who have not made up their

minds yet about whether to support the cur-rent ruling elite or back the challengers.Many of those moderates seem increasinglydisillusioned with the mullahs, but they arenot necessarily fond of the United States.43

Moreover, it is a nearly universal trait inworld affairs that populations resent pres-sure and interference from foreign powers.The typical reaction is to rally around theincumbent domestic regime and reject thoseopposition figures tainted by foreign influ-ence—even if the public might normally besympathetic to the reformers’ political val-ues. In other words, nationalism usuallytrumps allegiance to abstract principles.

Some Iranian dissidents seem to under-stand that point and are very nervous about aU.S. political embrace. Iranian human rightsactivist Emad Baghi complained, “We areunder pressure from both the hardliners inthe judiciary and that stupid George Bush.”Vahid Pourostad, editor of the pro-reformNational Trust newspaper, noted that wheneverthe United States “supported an idea publicly,the public has done the opposite.”44

Popular resentment against a heavy-hand-ed U.S. role is especially likely in Iran.45 Agood many Iranians remember that theUnited States interfered once before in theircountry’s internal affairs, and the outcomewas not a happy one. It was a coup orches-trated by the CIA in 1953 that ousted ademocratic government and restored theautocratic shah to power. His corrupt andrepressive rule for the next quarter centurypaved the way for the Islamic fundamentalistrevolution.46 Any hint of U.S. meddling todaywould probably cause Iranian moderates tomake common cause with the ruling reli-gious elite.

Would a Democratic Iran RemainNonnuclear?

Moreover, in the unlikely event that theUnited States and the Iranian exiles were ableto bring a secular, democratic regime to powerin Tehran, that would not necessarily meanthe end of Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons.Proponents of regime change seem to assume

7

There is littledoubt that agrowing numberof Iranians arefed up with therepressive rule ofthe mullahs. Butoutspoken U.S.endorsements oftheir resistancecampaign couldbe the kiss ofdeath.

that Tehran’s nuclear program is the pet ini-tiative of the Islamic elite, while most Iraniansare indifferent or hostile. Regime change,according to that logic, would not onlyremove an odious regime, it is the ultimatesolution to the nuclear problem.

That is yet another dubious assumption.Tehran’s nuclear ambitions date back to the1970s when Iran was still ruled by the shah.47

The bulk of the evidence suggests that a“peaceful” nuclear program has widespreadsupport in Iran for reasons of national prideand regional prestige.48 The goal of a nuclear-weapons arsenal is more controversial, butgiven the dangerous neighborhood in whichIran is located, support for that objectiveextends well beyond the mullahs and theirstaunch supporters. Washington could bemaking a serious miscalculation if it assumesthat a democratic Iran would be content toremain nonnuclear.

Option 3: Preventive Air Strikes

Proponents of preventive military actiontypically cite the successful Israeli strike onIraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 as a model forderailing the Iranian nuclear program. Somesuggest that the United States undertakethat mission on its own; others suggest thatWashington encourage Israel to do so—aform of security outsourcing. In terms of thelarger geopolitical consequences, it would bea distinction without a difference. Even ifIsrael undertook the task (either with U.S.encouragement or on its own initiative), theUnited States would be blamed, given theclose political ties between Washington andTel Aviv. The perception of collusion wouldbe deepened because to reach targets in Iraq,Israeli planes would probably have to overflyU.S.-controlled Iraq.49 Clearly, they could notdo that without Washington’s approval.

The drumbeat among American hawks forair strikes against Iran has redoubled since warbroke out in July between Israel and theIranian-supported Hezbollah in Lebanon. The

comments of Weekly Standard editor WilliamKristol epitomize those recommendations. Hesuggests “countering this act of Iranianaggression with a military strike againstIranian nuclear facilities.” And he is in a hurry,asserting that it “would be easier to act soonerthan later.” Kristol is sanguine about the con-sequences. “Yes, there would be repercus-sions—and they would be healthy ones, show-ing a strong America that has rejected furtherappeasement.”50

Problems with the Air Strikes OptionThere are numerous problems with the

strategy of preemptive air strikes whetherthey are conducted by Israel or the UnitedStates.51 Iraq’s Osirak facility was one easilyidentified, above-ground site. There arenumerous nuclear-related sites in Iran—many of which are in or near major popula-tion centers, maximizing the probable num-ber of civilian casualties in an attack. Indeed,thousands of innocent Iranians would likelyperish in a campaign of air strikes.

Moreover, there is no certainty that we haveidentified all of the relevant targets. Therecould be many other covert facilities, sinceTehran has had nearly three decades to pursueits nuclear activities. Worst of all, some of theinstallations may be in reinforced, under-ground locations. Taking out such sites withconventional weapons would be problematicat best. Although some ultra-hawkish typeshave apparently mused about using nuclear“bunker busters” for the required strikes,52

crossing the nuclear threshold is a momen-tous step that could come back to haunt theUnited States in multiple ways.

Even launching conventional strikes wouldbe extremely dangerous. Contrary to BillKristol’s optimistic assessment, there are likelyto be highly negative repercussions. At the veryleast, Tehran would be tempted to cause evenmore trouble than it is already doing for U.S.and British occupation forces in Iraq. The infil-tration of a few thousand dedicated Revolu-tionary Guards, working with tens of thousandsof Iraqis in Shiite militias, could accomplish thatgoal. The Iranian regime would also be tempted

8

The drumbeatamong American

hawks for airstrikes against

Iran has redoubled since

war broke out inJuly between

Israel and theIranian-support-ed Hezbollah in

Lebanon.

to unleash its terrorist ally, Hezbollah, onAmerican targets throughout the Middle East.And there is always the risk that an attacked andhumiliated Iran might do something incrediblyrash, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz orlaunching attacks against Israel, triggering amassive regional crisis.

Bomb Iran to Win the Support of theIranian People?

Perhaps the most bizarre incarnation ofthe air strike thesis is the argument made bysome American hawks that it would serve asthe needed catalyst for regime change.According to that thesis, the Iranian peoplewould be so enraged at the clerics for bring-ing destruction upon them that they wouldoverthrow the regime. Bill Kristol, onceagain, is the most explicit with that rationale.Asserting that “the Iranian people disliketheir regime,” he predicts that “the right useof military force . . . could cause them toreconsider whether they really want to havethis regime in power.”53

The notion that populations will rise upagainst their government and make commoncause with the country that is bombing themand killing their loved ones is based on high-ly dubious logic. Moreover, the historicalrecord lends little support to the thesis.Despite massive bombing of Germany andJapan in World War II, the fascist regimesremained in power to the bitter end in bothcases. U.S. bombing of North Vietnam dur-ing the 1960s and early 1970s did not dis-lodge Ho Chi Minh or his successors frompower. NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999actually caused Slobodan Milosevic’s popu-larity to increase for a time. It was not untilmuch later—and the election that drove himfrom power was based on largely domesticissues—that the democratic opposition wasable to get rid of him.54

Bombing Iran would almost certainly becounterproductive for the goal of regimechange. Iranians, like most other people,could be expected to “rally around the flag” iftheir country comes under attack. Nobel lau-reate Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian liberal critic of

the clerical regime, likely expressed the viewsof most of her fellow citizens when shewarned Washington not to attack Iran: “Wewill defend our country till the last drop ofblood.”55 If that is the attitude of a pro-Western liberal Iranian, one can only imaginewhat the attitude would be of Iranians lesshostile to the current government.

Finally, there is the probable impact on therest of the Muslim world. If the United Statesattacks yet another Muslim country (whichwould make three in the last five years), mostMuslims from Morocco to Malaysia willbelieve that Washington is out to destroy theirculture and religion. America’s troubles withthe Islamic world do not yet constitute a warof civilizations, but attacking Iran could wellproduce that result. The military option is onethat no rational U.S. policymaker shouldembrace.

Option 4: Acceptance and Deterrence

An alternative to sanctions, forcible regimechange, or air strikes is simply to grudginglyadmit Iran into the global nuclear weaponsclub. The United States would then rely on itsown vast nuclear arsenal to deter Iran fromcontemplating an attack on American targetsor threatening important American interests.Admittedly, the presence of Ahmadinejadmakes the deterrence option more nerve-wracking than it would be otherwise. Havingsuch an emotionally volatile and hate-filledindividual as Iran’s head of state understand-ably makes people wonder whether deterrencewould work in this case.

That is a legitimate concern. It is worthremembering, though, that Iran’s politicalsystem is fairly diffuse, and Ahmadinejad isonly one actor among many. Indeed, despitehis lofty title of president, he had to submitseveral candidates before he induced the par-liament to approve his nominee for oil min-ister. Other Iranian officials have openly dis-agreed with his policies, not only on thenuclear issue, but on other foreign policy

9

Bombing Iranwould almost certainly be counter-productive forthe goal ofregime change.Iranians, likemost other people, could beexpected to “rallyaround the flag”if their countrycomes underattack.

matters as well.56 Iran, under Ahmadinejad, isnot a tightly centralized system like Germanyunder Hitler or the Soviet Union underStalin, where one man’s decision couldplunge the nation into war.

America Has Deterred Other OdiousRegimes

The experience of dealing with Stalin isrelevant in another way. The United Stateshas successfully deterred other repugnantand bizarre regimes. Stalin was a genocidalpsychopath, yet he was never so reckless as toattack a nuclear-armed America or even U.S.allies in Western Europe. Washington’s expe-rience with China in the 1960s and early1970s is perhaps even more pertinent.57

China became a nuclear power under MaoZedong, a leader who exceeded even Stalin’srecord of genocide. Mao’s publicly enunciat-ed views on nuclear warfare also were alarm-ing in the extreme. His boast that Chinacould outlast the United States in a nuclearwar of attrition so disturbed the other com-munist giant, the USSR, that Soviet leadershastened to assure their American counter-parts that such thinking in no way reflectedthe Kremlin’s views.58

China also emerged as a nuclear power onthe eve of the Cultural Revolution. China dur-ing that orgy of fanaticism makes today’s Iranlook like a normal, even sedate, country. U.S.policymakers were understandably veryuneasy about China joining the ranks ofnuclear-weapons states. Yet they rejected theadvice of those inside and outside governmentwho advocated military action to take outBeijing’s nuclear program. Given the construc-tive changes that have taken place in China,and the important relationship that hasgrown up between Washington and Beijing inthe past three decades, history has vindicateda policy of restraint. A similar policy of cautionand deterrence may also pay off with Iran.

In any case, the obnoxious nature of theIranian regime (or other rogue regimes) doesnot negate the underlying realities of deter-rence.59 The United States has an enormousnuclear arsenal and the delivery systems to

launch retaliatory strikes with pinpoint accu-racy. Any government in Tehran, whetherheaded by Ahmadinejad or some other figure,would know that an attack on America wouldbe a regime-extinguishing event. Such anattack would be suicide, both politically andliterally. And while nonstate actors thatembrace terrorism may sometimes be suicidal,political leaders seldom are. We have littlecredible evidence that the Iranian leadership isan exception to that rule.

Most people who reject a strategy ofacceptance and deterrence tacitly acknowl-edge the improbability that Iran wouldlaunch a suicidal attack on the Americanhomeland. Instead, a majority of the objec-tions focus on other fears about Iranian mis-conduct. Those objections are based on sev-eral assumptions of varying plausibility.

Would a Nuclear Iran Attack Israel? Advocates of a hard-line policy toward

Tehran argue that if Iran acquires nuclearweapons, it will use those weapons against itshated adversary, Israel. Fears of such a scenariohave risen sharply in the past year followingcomments by Ahmadinejad that it would be agood thing if Israel were wiped off the map.

Such a comment is certainly reprehensible,but does it invalidate the long-standing reali-ties of deterrence? Israel has between 150 and300 nuclear weapons of its own. Even if Irancan go forward with its nuclear program, itwill not be able to build more than a dozen orso weapons over the next decade—even assum-ing the most alarmist predictions of the cur-rent state of the program prove valid.Moreover, Israel is moving to expand its sub-marine fleet to have at least one nuclear-armedsubmarine on station at all times, giving thecountry a secure second-strike capability.60

Once that process is complete, Tehran couldnot hope to launch a “decapitation” sneakattack based on the (already remote) possibili-ty that Israel would be unable to retaliate. As inthe case of contemplating an attack on theUnited States, it would be most unwise forIran to contemplate attacking Israel. The samerealities of deterrence apply, albeit on a small-

10

Any governmentin Tehran would

know that an attack on

America would be a regime-

extinguishingevent.

er scale. Iranian rhetoric about wiping Israeloff the map is so much ideological blather.Israel has more than a sufficient capability todeter an Iranian nuclear attack.

Would Iran Pass Along Nuclear Weaponsto Terrorist Groups?

This concern has slightly greater plausibili-ty. Tehran does have a cozy relationship with anumber of terrorist organizations in theMiddle East, most notably Hezbollah. The per-vasive assumption among American hawks isthat if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, sooner orlater it will pass one along to a terrorist ally.

But how likely is it that Iran would makesuch a transfer? At the very least, it would bean incredibly high-risk strategy. Even themost fanatical mullahs in Tehran realize thatthe United States would attack the probablesupplier of such a weapon—and Iran wouldbe at the top of Washington’s list of suspects.

It is significant that Iran has possessedchemical weapons for decades, yet there is noindication that it has passed on any of thoseweapons to Hezbollah or to Palestinian groupsthat Tehran supports politically. Why shouldone assume that the mullahs would be morereckless with nuclear weapons when theprospect of devastating retaliation for an attackwould be even more likely? The more logicalconclusion is that Iran, like other nuclear pow-ers, would jealously guard its arsenal.

Just in case the mullahs might entertainthoughts of transferring such weaponry,though, U.S. leaders should be explicit aboutthe consequences, making it clear that such atransfer is a very bright red line that noregime can cross and hope to survive. Thereason for such an uncompromising posi-tion on that point is that al-Qaeda and its ilkare not deterrable; they are not rationalnation-state actors, and they have no fixed“return address” for the purposes of retalia-tion. The message to Tehran should be thatwe can tolerate Iran in the global nuclearclub, albeit reluctantly, but any transfer ofnuclear material or weapons to nonstateactors will be considered an act of war, and aregime-ending event.

Would a Nuclear Iran Engage inBlackmail?

Prominent hawks insist that an Iran armedwith nuclear weapons would seek to establishits hegemony in the Persian Gulf region andwould seek to undermine U.S. interests thereand elsewhere in the world whenever possible.Edward Luttwak, a scholar at the Center forStrategic and International Studies, states thatthesis starkly: “Given what Iran’s regime isnow doing to attack American interests world-wide from Venezuela to Iraq even without theshield of nuclear weapons, it is irresponsible todo nothing and merely wait to see how theywill behave when they feel more secure.”61

American Enterprise Institute scholar ReuelMarc Gerecht makes a similar argument.“We—America and Europe—have done anawful job confronting the clerical regime forits terrorism when the Islamic Republic wasn’ta nuclear power.” Given that record, he pre-dicts that “the Europeans (certainly) and theAmericans (probably) would be likely to blinkand give way to Iranian intimidation backedby a nuclear threat, especially one that had aterrorist edge to it.”62

There may be some truth to the blackmailthesis. Iran might become more assertive inthe geopolitical arena—especially in thePersian Gulf region—once it had a securenuclear deterrent. The prospect of at leastsubtle blackmail becomes more likely ifTehran’s neighbors choose to remain nonnu-clear, perhaps counting on the U.S. nuclearumbrella to shield them from Iranian pres-sure. That would create a dilemma for theUnited States. Extended deterrence (protect-ing third parties from attacks) has alwaysbeen more problematic than primary deter-rence (protecting the United States fromattack), since a challenging power mightdoubt that the United States would reallyrisk adverse consequences by putting its ownsecurity on the line for an ally or client.

Extended deterrence is especially prob-lematic if the country being protected is onlya marginal ally or client of the United States.Although Israel (and probably Saudi Arabia)would not fall into that category, other

11

The message toTehran should bethat any transferof nuclear material orweapons to non-state actors willbe considered anact of war, and aregime-endingevent.

nations in the region do. Tehran might won-der whether the United States would reallyrisk a major war with a nuclear-armed Iranmerely to prevent some modest muscling of,say, one of the small Persian Gulf states.

Nevertheless, one can overstate both theprobability and the effectiveness of blackmail.It is again useful to recall that analystsexpressed similar fears about China when itacquired nuclear weapons, yet Beijing’s behav-ior for the most part did not validate thosefears. Although China did attack Vietnam in1979, the PRC’s conduct since the late 1960shas generally been less, rather than more, bel-licose than it was when China lacked anuclear capability. That episode illustrates thelarger point that nuclear weapons are muchmore useful as a deterrent against possibleadversaries than they are as a mechanism forintimidating those adversaries, much less forwar-fighting purposes.63 There are indica-tions over the past several years that the twonewest nuclear powers, India and Pakistan,have reached that conclusion. As in the case ofChina after the 1960s, New Delhi and Islama-bad appear to have become more cautiousand restrained since they built nuclear arse-nals. One cannot guarantee that Tehranwould follow that pattern, but by the sametoken it is unwarranted to assume that theIranian regime would engage in rampantblackmail.

Would a Nuclear Iran Lead to FurtherNuclear Proliferation in the Region?

Finally, those who favor a more con-frontational policy toward Iran warn that ifTehran succeeds in its quest for nuclearweapons, other nations in the region willquickly do the same, creating an especiallydangerous security environment. As do con-cerns about possible blackmail, this fear hassome validity. Because of the uncertain relia-bility of the protection afforded by the U.S.umbrella for some U.S. allies and client statesin the Middle East, there is a very realprospect that if Iran develops a nuclear arse-nal, sooner or later such countries as SaudiArabia, Egypt, and Turkey might follow suit.

Whether additional proliferation wouldreach epidemic proportions and create thenightmare scenarios forecast by some ana-lysts is uncertain. It is important to recallthat pundits and even international relationsexperts have tended to overestimate both theprobability and the extent of proliferation inthe past. The conventional wisdom in the1960s was that there would be as many astwo dozen nuclear-weapons powers within ageneration.64 Similar predictions were madein the late 1970s and early 1980s.65

Moreover, it is not an established fact thatnuclear weapons in the hands of a largernumber of nations would necessarily be abad development. Indeed, a few respectedinternational relations scholars have arguedthat nuclear proliferation might be stabiliz-ing rather than destabilizing.66 Given itsvolatile political makeup, though, the MiddleEast is probably not the best region to testthat thesis.

Admittedly, acceptance and deterrence arenot an easy or comfortable course to advo-cate, but that course is more realistic and lessdangerous than the confrontational options.On balance, though, we should make everyreasonable effort to dissuade Tehran fromproceeding down the nuclear path. The bestway to do that is to propose a “grand bar-gain” to the Iranian government.

Option 5: Try for a Grand BargainWe should make a serious diplomatic

effort to get Iran to give up its quest fornuclear weapons—and that means going sub-stantially beyond the scope of the EU-3-lednegotiations. Washington should propose agrand bargain to Tehran. That means givingan assurance that the United States will notuse force against Iran the way we did againstsuch nonnuclear adversaries as Serbia andIraq.67 It also means offering restored diplo-matic relations and normal economic rela-tions. In return, Iran would be required toopen its nuclear program to unfettered inter-

12

We should makeevery reasonable

effort to dissuadeTehran from

proceeding downthe nuclear path.

The best way todo that is to

propose a “grandbargain” to the

Iranian government.

national inspections to guarantee that theprogram is used solely for peaceful power-gen-eration purposes.

The strategy of offering a grand bargainalso attempts to understand why Iran mightbe pursuing a nuclear-weapons program andwhat it is likely to take to get that country tochoose a different course. Why would Iranwant to build nuclear weapons? In attempt-ing to answer that question, we need to lookat why the vast majority of countries decideto remain nonnuclear. Only a small numberhave ventured down the path of creating anuclear capability, and some of them haveturned around while on that path. SouthAfrica is a notable example.

Why Nations Choose to Build NuclearWeapons

There are important reasons why mostnations choose not to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability. For one thing, it is veryexpensive. The opportunity cost to most soci-eties is regarded as prohibitive. Occasionally,a poor country such as North Korea will bewilling to make a nuclear-weapons programthe highest priority, but most governmentswill not make that sacrifice. A decision to gonuclear has important adverse diplomaticrepercussions as well. Trying to build anuclear arsenal is not the way to win friendsin the international community. The majori-ty of governments become extremely agitatedwhen a country seeks to break out of thenonproliferation system and become anuclear weapons state, and any would-benuclear power has to take that hostility intoconsideration. Finally, by trying to acquire anuclear arsenal, a country may trigger orexacerbate a regional arms race, and at theend of the process end up no more securethan it was at the beginning. In fact, it mightbe even less secure.

On the other hand, there are some impor-tant reasons why a country might decide togo nuclear. One reason is prestige. The glob-al nuclear weapons club is a very exclusiveassociation. All five permanent members ofthe UN Security Council are nuclear weapons

states, and a sixth, India, is likely to become apermanent member of the council in the nextfew years. Countries that have nuclearweapons are treated differently than are non-nuclear powers. Before they became nuclearpowers in 1998, India and Pakistan weretreated with less than a great deal of respectby other international actors. India was con-sidered a chronic Third World underachiever,and Pakistan was viewed as a problem state—if not a potential failed state. Consider howthose countries are treated now, since theyhave joined the nuclear weapons club. It ismarkedly different.

Another motive for going nuclear is to deteror possibly intimidate a regional adversary.That appeared to be a consideration for bothIndia and Pakistan. India had long sought tooverawe its smaller neighbor, and possessing anuclear arsenal eventually became part of thatstrategy. Pakistan, in turn, concluded that ithad to neutralize India’s growing conventionalmilitary advantage as well as its new nuclearcapability. A nuclear deterrent was the mostdecisive and cost-effective way to achieve thatgoal. Beyond its regional rivalry with Pakistan,India was also concerned about the rising mil-itary power of China. There was no questionthe perceived Chinese threat was a factor inIndia’s decision to go nuclear, as then–ministerof defense George Fernandes has empha-sized.68

In addition to the motive of deterrencewithin a region, there is a potential motive ofbroader deterrence—especially to deter theUnited States. With regard to that factor, weneed to be realistic about the unintended con-sequences of some U.S. actions. The UnitedStates has taken major military action on nineoccasions since the end of the Cold War.Although many Americans may think thatthose episodes were justified, other countriesdon’t necessarily see it the same way. In partic-ular, countries such as Iran and North Koreahave seen how the United States has treatednonnuclear adversaries such as Serbia andIraq, and that may have led them to concludethat the only reliable deterrent to U.S. coercionwas a nuclear arsenal.

13

The strategy ofoffering a grandbargain attemptsto understandwhy Iran might be pursuing anuclear-weaponsprogram andwhat it is likely totake to get thatcountry to choosea differentcourse.

Why Iran Might Want to Be a NuclearPower

So what are Iran’s possible motives forgoing nuclear? Prestige is certainly one consid-eration—that was a factor even when the shahwas in power. But prestige does not appear tobe the dominant reason in Iran’s case today.Deterrence, both regional and extraregional,seems to be a more important consideration.Iran is located in a volatile region, surroundedby hostile neighbors. Russia, Israel, Pakistan,and India all have nuclear weapons already, soregional deterrence issues probably loom largefor Tehran.69 Iran very likely is also reacting toU.S. actions. President Bush’s “axis of evil”speech, linking Iran to Iraq and North Korea,came as a prelude to an invasion and occupa-tion of Iraq. A policymaker in Tehran (orPyongyang) seeing his country linked to Iraqin that fashion might well assume that hiscountry will also be on the U.S. hit list at somepoint.

In addition to President Bush’s hostilerhetoric, the United States has deployed itsforces in ways that many Iranians find menac-ing. U.S. troops are already in several PersianGulf states, and have been in the region sincethe first Persian Gulf war. Additional forceshave now been deployed to some of theCentral Asian republics, to Afghanistan, and,of course, most recently to Iraq. To leaders inTehran, those moves look suspiciously like anencirclement strategy with Iran as the next tar-get for U. S. military action. Iran’s apparentresponse in wanting to build nuclear weaponsis not irrational; it is quite logical.

A grand bargain is the one offer thatmight induce Iran to abandon the quest for anuclear arsenal, despite the various powerfulincentives to pursue that goal. Normalizedrelations, an end to economic sanctions, theremoval of any threat of a campaign offorcible regime change, and a settlement ofTehran’s multi-billion-dollar financial claimsare very appealing carrots that Washingtoncan offer. But it is hard to imagine Iran givingup its long-standing effort to build a nucleararsenal for much less than that package ofincentives.

It is possible, though, that Tehran wouldspurn a proposed grand bargain, despite theattractiveness of the incentives. The Iranianpolitical elite still seems uncertain aboutwhether even to seek a rapprochement withthe United States.70 Those who propose agrand bargain also have to acknowledge thatIran may be unalterably determined to jointhe global nuclear weapons club for reasonsof prestige and security. But we will neverknow unless we make the offer.

Signs That Tehran Might Want anImproved Relationship with Washington

There are intriguing signs that at leastsome portions of the clerical regime wouldlike an improved relationship with theUnited States. According to the WashingtonPost, the Iranian government approached theBush administration in 2002—after Bush’shostile “Axis of Evil” comment in his State ofthe Union address—and proposed cooperat-ing with the United States against Al Qaeda.As a gesture of good faith, they informedWashington of the identities of 290 membersof Al Qaeda that Iran had captured and sentback to their home countries. The Bushadministration spurned that overture. Aidesto Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretaryof Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that anydiplomatic engagement would “legitimate”Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism.71

In the spring of 2006 Ahmadinejad sur-prised Washington and the rest of the interna-tional community by sending a lengthy letterto President George Bush—the first communi-cation to an American chief executive from anIranian head of state in decades. It was a curi-ous document—a rambling 18-page treatiseon history, religion, politics, and world affairs.As a foundation for serious, substantive nego-tiations on the Iranian nuclear crisis, the letterwas decidedly inadequate. Nevertheless, it wasa sign that even the hardest of the Iranianhardliners was interested in some dialoguewith Washington.

Ahmadinejad’s letter was not the onlyfeeler for negotiations. A few days later, Timemagazine published an open letter from

14

Countries such asIran and North

Korea have seenhow the United

States has treatednonnuclear adver-

saries such asSerbia and Iraq,

and that may haveled them to con-

clude that theonly reliable

deterrent to U.S.coercion was a

nuclear arsenal.

Hassan Rohani, representative of Iran’sSupreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini.That letter was considerably more focusedand substantive than Ahmadinejad’s mis-sive.72 The former speaker of the Iranian par-liament, Mehdi Karroubi, has been perhapsthe boldest of all in favoring a rapproche-ment with the United States. “This silencebetween the two countries cannot go on for-ever,” he said. “The ice should be broken andthe walls of mistrust should fall.”73

Although those initiatives may have beena factor that finally induced Washington tojoin the EU-3-led negotiations with Tehran,74

U.S. leaders still avoid any suggestion ofbilateral negotiations with the Iranian gov-ernment. Indeed, Secretary of State Rice wentout of her way to stress that U.S. participa-tion in the multilateral talks in no wayimplied that Washington was willing to con-sider a grand bargain.75 That attitude needsto change. Bilateral negotiations will be nec-essary to pursue the strategy of a grand bar-gain, because the United States holds most ofthe carrots that Iran desires. The Europeanpowers (and Russia and China) might be ableto facilitate such negotiations, but progresswill be unlikely unless there are direct talksbetween Tehran and Washington.

And we have little to lose by making theoffer of a grand bargain—unless we were tolet negotiations drag on endlessly. Proposingthe grand bargain to Tehran and indicatingthat the offer would remain on the table for amaximum of six months would have no sig-nificant downside. If the Iranians rejected theproposal—or if they simply stalled—all of theother options would still be available.

The Need to Deal with ObnoxiousRegimes

To create the possibility of achieving agrand bargain, however, the United Stateshas to overcome an entrenched reluctance tonegotiate with repressive and obnoxiousregimes. We simply do not have the luxury ofconfining our diplomacy to friendly govern-ments.76 One of the great challenges of effec-tive diplomacy is to deal with, and get results

from, regimes that most Americans wouldprefer did not exist. Unfortunately, that is anunpleasant reality that seems to elude recentgenerations of U.S. policymakers. Since thedays of Woodrow Wilson, Washington’s typ-ical response to unfriendly, repressive govern-ments (especially of small countries) is to tryto isolate and berate them. Before Wilson, thegeneral U.S. practice was not to apply a morallitmus test for diplomatic relations. That pol-icy was far more realistic and productive. Thecurrent approach is akin to the maturity levelone would expect from an elementary schoolstudent: “I don’t like you, and I’m not goingto speak to you.” We need a far more sophis-ticated, flexible, and mature approach to dealwith Iran.

If Iran turns down the proposal for a grandbargain, Washington’s fall-back positionshould be to rely on deterrence, despite thelimitations of that strategy and its unpleasantside effect of creating incentives for greaternuclear proliferation. The one thing weshould not do is start yet another war thatwould further destabilize the Persian Gulfregion and threaten the lives and welfare ofmillions of people.

Notes1. Steven R. Weisman and Douglas Jehl, “EstimateRevised on When Iran Could Make NuclearBomb,” New York Times, August 3, 2005. See alsocomments of Director of National IntelligenceJohn Negroponte, “Iran Still Years Away fromHaving Nukes: U.S. Intelligence Chief,” AgenceFrance Presse, April 20, 2006.

2. See, for example, the views of former UN chiefweapons inspector Hans Blix. “Blix: Iran YearsAway from Nuclear Bomb,” Associated Press,April 3, 2006. The most detailed independentassessment of Iran’s nuclear potential can befound in Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R.Al-Rodhan, Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: TheReal and Potential Threat (Washington: Center forStrategic and International Studies, 2006).

3. Abraham Rabinovich, “Tehran Found EvenCloser to Nukes,” Washington Times, May 1, 2006.

4. Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel, “IranCloser to Producing Nuclear Weapons Fuel, U.S.

15

One of the great challengesof effective diplomacy is todeal with, and getresults from,regimes thatmost Americanswould prefer didnot exist.

Officials Worry,” Knight Ridder, March 23, 2006.Proliferation expert David Albright concludes thatthe three-year timetable could prove accurate, butonly as a worst-case scenario. See David Albrightand Corey Hinderstein, “The Clock Is Ticking, ButHow Fast?” Institute for Science and InternationalSecurity, March 27, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/clockticking.pdf.

5. For examples, see Michael Rubin, “NuclearHostage Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2006,and the views of Ilan Berman of the AmericanForeign Policy Council. Monisha Bansal, “IranWill Have Nukes Soon, Says Policy Expert,”Cybercast News Service, May 22, 2006.

6. “A Korea, Iran Link?” editorial, Investor’s BusinessDaily, July 26, 2006; and Jack Kelly, “ApocalypticVisions,” Washington Times, July 27, 2006.

7. Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, p. 210. For a list ofthe vague or faulty estimates since the early 1990s,see ibid., pp. 210–13.

8. Lionel Beehner, “Iran: Nuclear Negotiations,”Council on Foreign Relations, May 16, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publications/7730/iran.html.

9. Paul Hughes, “Iran Sounds Positive Note onRussia Atomic Plan,” Reuters, December 28, 2005;and “Iran Insists on Right to Enrich Uranium atHome,” Agence France Presse, January 2, 2006.

10. Connie Bruck, “Exiles: How Iran’s ExpatriatesAre Gaming the Nuclear Threat,” New Yorker,March 6, 2006, p. 60; and conversation with for-mer Heritage Foundation senior fellow JohnHulsman, one of the intellectual architects of theU.S.-EU-3 deal.

11. Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Makes Offer to MeetIranians on Nuclear Plan,” New York Times, June 1,2006.

12. The text of the offer remains secret, but someprovisions, outlining both concessions and possi-ble penalties, have leaked to the news media.George Jahn, “Diplomats: Package Gives IranSome Leeway,” Associated Press, June 7, 2006;Helene Cooper, “U.S. Is Offering Deals on Trade toEntice Iran,” New York Times, June 6, 2006; ElaineSciolino and William J. Broad, “Iran Quietly Learnsof Penalties in a Nuclear Incentives Deal,” New YorkTimes, June 16, 2006; and Ali Akbar Dareini, “IranCalls Western Incentives Acceptable,” AssociatedPress, July 16, 2006.

13. Michael Slackman, “Iran Won’t Give Promise toEnd Uranium Effort,” New York Times, August 23,2006.

14. Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, “U.S.

Drafting Sanctions As Iran Is Defiant.” New YorkTimes, August 31, 2006. See also Nasser Harimi,“Iran’s President Defies UN on Deadline,” AssociatedPress, August 31, 2006.

15. George Jahn, “Russian Opposition ThreatensUnity on Iran,” Associated Press, July 22, 2006.

16. Qin Jize, “China Urges Restraint in Iran NukeStandoff,” China Daily, August 2, 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-08/02/content_655005.htm.

17. Warren Hoge, “UN Sets Aug. 31 Deadline forIran to End Nuclear Work,” New York Times, August1, 2006, p. A3; and Nick Wadhams, “Weaker UNResolution Sets Iran Deadline,” Associated Press,July 31, 2006.

18. Richard N. Haass, ed., Economic Sanctions andAmerican Diplomacy (Washington: Council onForeign Relations, 1998).

19. Gary Hufbauer, “Confronting the ‘DearLeader,’” Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2006.

20. For a discussion of South Africa’s special cir-cumstances, see Ian Bremmer, The J Curve: A NewWay to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp. 149–66.

21. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, andKimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered:History and Current Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington:Institute for International Economics, 1990).

22. See especially Robert Pape, “Why EconomicSanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22,no. 2 (Fall 1997): 99–105; and Robert Pape, “WhyEconomic Sanctions Still Do Not Work,”International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998):66–77. For somewhat more positive views of sanc-tions as a tactic, see David A. Baldwin, “TheSanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,”International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999–2000):80–107; and Hossein Askari, John G. Forrer, HildyTeegen, and Jiawan Yang, Economic Sanctions:Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy (London:Praeger, 2003).

23. Daniel Drezner, “Bargaining, Enforcement,and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is CooperationCounterproductive?” International Organization54, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 73–102.

24. Ibid., p. 85.

25. Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer, “Japan Waryof Plan for Sanctions against Iran,” Washington Post,June 13, 2006.

26. David Nason, “Australia May Not Join U.S. on

16

Iran Sanctions,” The Australian, August 2, 2006,http://theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,19990909,00.html.

27. “Iran’s Oil Could Reach $200 on Sanctions,”Reuters, August 3, 2006; and Jeffrey Schott,“Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee,United States Congress, Hearing on ‘Energy andthe Iranian Economy,’” July 25, 2006, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchI=649.

28. Quoted in Bruck, p. 50. Only slightly less ebul-lient is Ledeen’s AEI colleague, Michael Rubin, whorecommends that the United States adopt the“Gdansk strategy”—supporting independent tradeunions and other potential opposition groups inIran. Michael Rubin, “Diplomacy Is Not Enough,”Prospect, June 2006, http://www.aei.org/publication24497.

29. For extreme examples of that argument, seeMichael Ledeen, The War against the Terror Masters:Why It Happened, Where We Are Now, How We’ll Win(New York: Truman Talley Books, 2002); DavidFrum and Richard Perle, An End to Evil: How to Winthe War on Terror (New York: Random House,2003), and Kenneth R. Timmerman, Countdown toCrisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran (NewYork: Three Rivers Press, 2005).

30. Examples include Michael Ledeen, “The SameWar,” NationalReviewOnline, July 13, 2006, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter/foreign,pubID.24651/pub_detail.asp; and Newt Gingrich, “Now Isn’tthe Time for Restraint,” USA Today, July 18, 2006.

31. Glenn Kessler, “Rice Asks for $75 Million toIncrease Pressure on Iran,” Washington Post, February16, 2006.

32. See, for example, the optimistic comments ofRichard Perle. “Military Airstrikes against Iraq: AShow of Power or an Exercise in Futility?” CNN’sCrossfire (featuring Richard Perle and Ted GalenCarpenter), February 16, 2001, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0101/16/cf.00.html. Seealso the comments of President Clinton on signingthe Iraq Liberation Act. White House, “The IraqLiberation Act, Statement by the President,”October 31, 1998, http://www.library.cornell.edu/coodev/mideast/libera.htm, and the comments ofvarious members of Congress who supported thelegislation. U.S. Congress, “Debate on the IraqLiberation Act of 1998,” H.9486, October 5, 1998,http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec98/cr100598.htm.

33. Compare the comments of Sen. Rick Santorum(R-PA) on Iran to the earlier comments of support-ers of the Iraq Liberation Act. Meghan Clyne,“Congress Outbids Bush on Iran Democracy Aid,”

New York Sun, March 3, 2006.

34. For a detailed discussion of the Iranian exilesand how they are exploiting Washington’s fears ofIran’s nuclear program to advance their ownpolitical agendas, see, Bruck, pp. 48–63.

35. Jay Solomon and Andrew Higgins, “ExiledIranian Has Another Run as a U.S. Informant,”Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2006.

36. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports onTerrorism, 2004 (April 2005), pp. 104–5.

37. Council on Foreign Relations, “Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (Iranian rebels),” October 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9158/.

38. Human Rights Watch, “Human RightsAbuses in MKO Camps,” May 2005, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/4.htm.

39. For a discussion of the MEK and its activities inthe United States, see Bruck, pp. 54-56.

40. Patrick Clawson and Daniel Pipes, “Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK): A Terrorist U.S. Ally?” New York Post,May 20, 2003, http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1100.

41. Raymond Tanter, “Iran Building Nuclear-Capable Missiles in Secret Tunnels: Options forthe International Community,” Statement to theNational Press Club, Washington, DC, November21, 2005, http://www.nci.org/05nci/11/Tanter-Statement-Nov-21.htm. In fairness, not all neo-conservatives flirt with the MEK. Both MichaelRubin and Michael Ledeen have given the organi-zation a wide berth.

42. Some hawks are already suggesting that theUnited States and other “like-minded” nations dowhatever is necessary to take out the Iranianregime in the wake of the new war between Israeland Hezbollah/Lebanon. See James Lyons Jr.,“Proportions . . and Motivations,” WashingtonTimes, July 23, 2006. Admiral Lyons is the formercommander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

43. Zogby International, “Poll of Iran—May/June2006,” June 2, 2006, http://www.rd.com/images/content/071306/iranpollresults.pdf.

44. Quoted in James Bovard, “Defining DemocracyDown,” American Conservative, April 24, 2006. Seealso Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iranian Democrats TellU.S. Where to Stick Its $85 M,” Asia Times, April 6,2006.

45. Karl Vick and David Finkel, “U.S. Push forDemocracy Could Backfire Inside Iran,” WashingtonPost, March 13, 2006.

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46. For a concise history of the troubled U.S.-Iranian relationship, see Ali M. Ansari, ConfrontingIran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and theNext Great Conflict in the Middle East (New York:Basic Books, 2006).

47. Chris Quillen, “Iranian Nuclear WeaponsPolicy: Past, Present, and Possible Future,” MiddleEast Review of International Affairs 6, no. 2 (June2002):17–18; and Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, pp.100–107.

48. Nasser Karimi, “In Iran, Even Critics BackNuclear Stance,” Associated Press, March 8, 2006;and Michael Slackman, “Nuclear Dispute ArousesPatriotism among Iranians,” New York Times,February 5, 2006.

49. Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas G.McInerney, now a Fox News consultant, concedesthat the United States would have to grant theIsraeli attack force the right to overfly Iraq. “Theyreally can’t do this without us.” Quoted in RowanScarborough, “Israel Capable of Air Strike on Iran,”Washington Times, July 18, 2006.

50. William Kristol, “It’s Our War: Bush ShouldGo to Jerusalem—And the U.S. Should ConfrontIran,” Weekly Standard, July 24, 2006.

51. For a detailed discussion of those difficulties,see Justin Logan, “The Bottom Line on Iran: TheCosts and Benefits of Preventive War versusDeterrence,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis, forth-coming.

52. Seymour Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” New Yorker,April 17, 2006. Hersh cites a “senior Pentagonofficial” who asserts that the Pentagon drew up anuclear option against Iran. Several high-levelmilitary officials reportedly threatened to resign,however, unless that option was tabled.

53. Interview on Fox News, July 19, 2006.

54. International Crisis Group, “Yugoslavia’sPresidential Election: The Serbian People’sMoment of Truth,” Balkans Report. no. 102,September 19, 2000.

55. Quoted in “Nobel Winner: Iranians WouldDefend Country to ‘Last Drop of Blood,’” ChicagoSun-Times, April 22, 2006.

56. Paul Hughes, “Mixed Views in Iran on NuclearStrategy,” Reuters, February 5, 2006; John R.Bradley, “Tehran Elite Turning on ExtremistPresidency,” Washington Times, March 14, 2006;Michael Slackman, “In Iran, A Chorus of DissentRises on Leadership’s Nuclear Strategy,” New YorkTimes, March 15, 2006; Tony Karon, “Iran’sPresident’s Bark May Be Worse than His Bite,”

Time, April 20, 2006; and Abbas Milani andMichael McFaul “Inside Iran’s Fractured Regime,”Washington Post, June 25, 2006.

57. For a discussion of that episode and its rele-vance to today’s concerns about nuclear-armed“rogue states,” see Francis J. Gavin, “Blasts fromthe Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,”International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004–5):100–35.

58. Author’s conversation with Walt W. Rostow,national security adviser to President Lyndon B.Johnson.

59. See Jeffrey Record, “Nuclear Deterrence,Preventive War, and Counterproliferation,” CatoInstitute Policy Analysis no. 519, July 8, 2004.

60. Ramit Plushnick-Masti, “Israel Buys 2 Nuclear-Capable Submarines,” Associated Press, August 25,2006.

61. Edward Luttwak, “The Three Options,” CatoUnbound, July 2006.

62. Reuel Marc Gerecht, “Another Round,” CatoUnbound, July 2006. For contrary views, see Barry R.Posen, “We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran,” New YorkTimes, February 27, 2006; and Christopher Layne,“Iran: The Logic of Deterrence,” American Conserv-ative, April 10, 2006.

63. Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of NuclearWeapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers no.171 (London: International Institute for StrategicStudies, 1981).

64. In March 1963, President John F. Kennedysaid that he was haunted by the fear that some-time in the 1970s the United States would “face aworld in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations” possessednuclear weapons. Quoted in Scott Sagan, “How toKeep the Bomb from Iran,” Foreign Affairs, 85, no.5 (September–October 2006): 49.

65. Lewis Dunn and Herman Kahn, “Trends inNuclear Proliferation,” Report prepared for theU.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,Hudson Institute, May 1976; Ashok Kapur, “AndWhere We Go: Nth Powers of the Future,” Annals ofthe American Academy of Political and Social Science,March 1977, p. 84; and William Epstein, “WhyStates Do—and Don’t—Go Nuclear,” Annals of theAmerican Academy of Political and Social Science,March 1977, pp. 17–19.

66. See Waltz; and Scott Sagan and KennethWaltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A DebateRevisited, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2002). Seealso John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Missthe Cold War,” Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 39–40.

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67. That is likely to be a key point in any bargain-ing with Iran. Sagan, p. 59.

68. In a February 2004 lecture, Fernandes admit-ted that in the past he “had qualified China as‘potential threat number one,’” Since Indiabecame a nuclear power, he noted that Indo-Chinese relations had warmed considerably.Quoted in C. Raja Mohan, “India Rethinks ChinaPolicy,” The Hindu, February 26, 2004.

69. There are also reports that Iran’s neighbor,Pakistan, is building a large reactor that wouldenable the country to significantly expand itsnuclear arsenal. Such a reactor could generateenough plutonium to build 40 to 50 weapons ayear. Joby Warrick, “Pakistan Expanding NuclearProgram,” Washington Post, July 24, 2006. U.S. gov-ernment officials, however, contend that the reac-tor in question will be “substantially smaller andless capable than reported.” Quoted in WilliamBroad and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Disputes Reporton New Pakistan Reactor,” New York Times,August 3, 2006. Even the addition of a smallerreactor, though, could enhance Pakistan’s nuclearcapabilities.

70. Sometimes even the same leader gives con-flicting signals within the span of a few days. Seethe comments of Iranian supreme leaderAyatollah Al Khamenei. “Khamenei DismissesIran-U.S. Talks,” Reuters, June 27, 2006; and Karl

Vick, “Ayatollah’s Moves Hint Iran Wants toEngage,” Washington Post, July 5, 2006.

71. Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Afghanistan,Iraq: Two Wars Collide,” Washington Post, October 22,2004.

72. Adam Zagorin, “A New Gesture from Iran?”Time, May 9, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/world/printout/0,8816,1192578,00.html.

73. Quoted in Brian Murphy, “Iranian PoliticianUrges U.S.-Iran Ties,” Associated Press, May 27,2006.

74. A more likely explanation, though, is that theBush administration came under growing pres-sure from prominent Republicans to adopt a dif-ferent strategy. Laura Rozen, “GOP Heavy HittersPressuring White House to Talk with Iran,” NewYork Times, May 27, 2006.

75. “Condoleezza Rice Holds News Conference onIran, Transcript,” Washington Post, May 31, 2006,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/31/AR2006053100937.html.

76. A few experts have recently pointed out thatimportant reality. John McLaughlin, “We Have toTalk to Bad Guys,” Washington Post, July 23, 2006;and Leslie H. Gelb, “Time to Talk (to the BadGuys),” Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2006.

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OTHER STUDIES IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES

577. The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency by Jeffrey Record (September 1, 2006)

576. Is the Sky Really Falling? A Review of Recent Global Warming Scare Stories by Patrick J. Michaels (August 23, 2006)

575. Toward Property Rights in Spectrum: The Difficult Policy Choices Ahead by Dale Hatfield and Phil Weiser (August 17, 2006)

574. Budgeting in Neverland: Irrational Policymaking in the U.S. Congress and What Can Be Done about It by James L. Payne (July 26, 2006)

573. Flirting with Disaster: The Inherent Problems with FEMA by Russell S. Sobel and Peter T. Leeson (July 19, 2006)

572. Vertical Integration and the Restructuring of the U.S. Electricity Industryby Robert J. Michaels (July 13, 2006)

571. Reappraising Nuclear Security Strategy by Rensselaer Lee (June 14, 2006)

570. The Federal Marriage Amendment: Unnecessary, Anti-Federalist, and Anti-Democratic by Dale Carpenter (June 1, 2006)

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