IR Session13

7/29/2019 IR Session13

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Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran,

Afghanistan and Pakistan.What is really going on in the Region?The intricate interdependence of

conflicts

International Relations Professor Armando Marques Guedes

2012/2013

003083 Francisca Bastos

003303 Maria Francisca Brito

002807 Emilie Pierlot

003080 Maria do Mar Carmo

003082 Ana Margarida Mendes da Maia

003126 Paula Beleza003150 Ana Rita Silva

003151 Guilherme Oliveira e Costa

FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA


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Introduction

This paper was written as a part of the International Relations Program.

We will focus on the topic of LIBYA, SYRIA, IRAQ, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. WHAT

IS REALLY GOING ON IN THE REGION? THE INTRICATE INTERDEPENDENCE OF CONFLICTS.

Our goal was to emphasize theunderlying tensions in the wide band running form the Wider

Middle East into Central Asia, analyze the interacting roles of Russia and the US, and China and

India in the region as well as to answer some questions:

Is conflict interdependence a parcel of global complex interdependence? Is a new Great

Game in the works?


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Table of contents

The underlying tensions in the wide band running form the Wider Middle East into Central

Asia ............................................................................................................................................ 3

The Black Sea Area .................................................................................................................... 5

The Sub-Region of Central Asia ................................................................................................. 6

What consequences may sociopolitical explosions in North Africa and the Middle East have

in regional global terms? ........................................................................................................... 7

Consequences of the political changes in the Middle-East....................................................... 7

Iran and global influences ......................................................................................................... 9

USA .......................................................................................................................................... 11

Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 14

The New Great Game in Central Asia ...................................................................................... 18

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 21

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 22


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The underlying tensions in the wide band running form the Wider

Middle East into Central Asia

After the end of the Cold War and, consequentially, the end of the bipolar world, a

new division between Europe and the Middle East was created.

First of all, as Professor Armando Marques Guedes stands out in his article, A Linha da

Frente Do Sudoeste das Balcs sia Central, the enlargements both for NATO and

the European Union, have been the same. This means that when a country joins NATO

shortly after it becomes a member of the EU as well or vice versa (there are very few

exceptions).

As can be seen in the maps (1 and 2) those enlargements have created a buffer

zone1.

1A neutral area between hostile or belligerent forces that serves to prevent conflict.

a) Map 1 - NATO's Memberships in 2004


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The Muslims in 1980 represented 18% of the world population and statistics estimate

that in the first quarter of the 21st

century, they will represent 30% with continued

growth.

In Europe, however the population will tend to stabilize and may even decrease.

According to the United Nations Development Program, the Arab States will have a

total amount of 450 million habitants despite the deterioration of their living

standards.

The technological and economic gap between Europe, Russia and the Middle East will

increase as well as their military power. Nevertheless their capacity to control these

regions will decrease.

The Middle East

b) Enlargements of the European Union (2007)


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According to the Freedom House - a U.S.-based non-governmental organization (NGO)

that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom and human

rights- the Arab Countries are considered to be the least free (map 3). The reason

behind these results is the rising of fundamentalists organizations such as the Al -

Qaeda and The Muslim Brotherhood that are becoming more and more powerful as

dictatorships, ruled by strong and charismatic leaders, are coming to an end.

The Black Sea Area

In the Bipolar period the region of the Black Sea was divided between NATO and the

Warsaw Pact, belonging mainly to the Warsaw Pact, with the exception of the area

bordering Turkey (NATOs Member). The location of Turkey was essential during this

period because it helped protecting the left side of Occidental Europe from USSR.

When the Bipolar World came to an end, many states were created and this region

now has different political entities; Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and

c) representation of Freedom in the world


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Georgia. Moldavia, Greece and Armenia, even though they dont have borders in the

seaside, are very close to it and whatever happens in that region affects them directly.

This zone has been in constant conflict. For instance the insurgency in the North

Caucasus, a direct result of the two post-Soviet wars fought between Russia and

Chechnya, the Kurds in Turkey and so forth.

When Russia started losing its interest regarding the region (due to the change of

political orientation of some of the countries that used to belong to USSR), it also

began reacting with political and military pressure, essentially because of the

substantial oil and natural gas distribution of the region.

Therefore, we can distinguish two periods in this regions history: the first one from

1917-1918 to the bipolar period, a period of relative peace, though occasionally tense,

interrupted by the Second World War; and the second one which extend from 1991 tillnowadays and can be considered much tenser and a less stable time. The Black Sea has

become a space between borders and geo-economic limits, a region where there is a

presence of NATO and Russia, a fragile and unpredictable region where the rise of

efforts is definitely needed.

The Sub-Region of Central Asia

The sub-region of Central Asia (the strip that goes from Caucasus to the Chinese

frontier, including the north and central region of Persian Gulf, Iraq, Syria, Iran,

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia visible in map 4) is, without a doubt, a tense

area both in internal and external relations encompassing a variety of ethnic, religious,

political and economic factors, that cant be separated.

In 1983, the North American administration, worried about the USSR invasion in

Afghanistan, created the United States Central Command known as CENTCOM. The

CENTCOMs area of intervention was the Middle East, Oriental Africa and Central Asia.

It was responsible for the American participation in the first Gulf War (1990), the

attack in Afghanistan (2001-2002) and the invasion in Iraq (2003), there are also

military forces in a variety of locations in this region.

In 2005, George W. Bush made a new deal with India about nuclear technologies, and

established a new political-military pact with Mongolia. With Japan and both North

and South Korea, he created an enforcement of the navy force.

In 2001, before the attack in Afghanistan, the USA had agreed to establish two military

bases in Central Asia, one in Kyrgyzstan and another one in Uzbekistan. Both of thesemilitary bases are still there even though the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is


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strongly against it. The USA definitely has an important presence in this region despite

the other powers (China and Russia) antagonism.

Nowadays, the division between Europe, Russia and the Middle East is much weaker

than it was during the domination of the Bipolar World. However, because of the

different conflicts that have taken place in the region, we are now confronted to a

series of local power, and strips that divide the different blocs. Each power try to

find a way to decrease lost and increase the gains.

What consequences may sociopolitical explosions in North Africa and

the Middle East have in regional global terms?

The growing social problems generated by demographic situations (namely the rapid

population growth in the last three decades), pervasive corruption, high rates ofunemployment, flagrant social polarization, weak and corrupt judicial systems and rule

of law in general as well as frequent violations of humans rights and fundamental

freedoms seem to have simulated social tensions followed by sociopolitical revolutions

in many Arab countries.

Many believe that the United States and leading European powers were the financiers

and organizers of the Arab revolts. According to this line of thought, by using its whole

arsenal of political and information technologies, the West has changed regimes in a

set of Arab countries in order to strengthen its influence in the Middle East and take

regional energy resources and transportation routes under its direct control.

We can then ask ourselves; why did it not start with Saudi Arabia, United Arab

Emirates, and Oman that possess roughly half of the worlds discovered energy

reserves?

The oil monarchs made an offer the West could not refuse, specifically to make the

entire Arab world politically loyal, trouble-free in economic and financial terms, and,

most importantly, religiously autonomous, especially from Iran and its bid for religious

domination in the Islamic world.

By coordinating and encouraging changes of secular regimes in a set of Arab countries,

the West is splitting up the Islamic world, having at one extreme theocratic Iran,

capable of forging a new coalition of fundamental forces and movements, and at the

other Saudi Arabia, successfully preaching its own version of orthodox Islam.

Consequences of the political changes in the Middle-East

The countries of Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and probably Syria will be actively splitting for theforeseeable future. The Libyan oil-rich province of Cyrenaica has already declared its


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autonomy from the central government and has started demarking new territorial

boundaries with barbed wire. A similar secessionist movement was sparked recently in

the south of the country. Yemen has failed to become a unified state. Its expected

division into North Yemen and South Yemen currently seems unreal, and it will

probably split into more than two independent entities. Iraq has practically dividedinto three parts and maintains the status of a unitary state only in diplomatic

documents. Egypt, according to many analysts, has all the preconditions for splitting

into more than two separate entities.

It can be assumed that the disintegration of regional countries and the formation of

smaller entities will make the latter much more susceptible to external political

influence and therefore will ease the task of reviving the all-Arabian national idea. So

too it is with oil. Influencing the oil policy of smaller and consequently weaker political

entities would require lesser diplomatic and political efforts. But it is without

considering the current crisis that has arisen since the beginning of the Arab spring.

There have been a lot of political changes in the Middle East countries for the past

three decades. These political changes are the result of a variety of reasons such as

technological innovations, especially with the Internet and television, which allows the

population to have access to an infinite flow of information. A better educated

population will, obviously, expect more economic and social rights from the

government.

This region is also an area rich in natural resources, especially oil. Its estimated, by theAmerican Department of Energy, that the global consume of oil will increase from 77, 8

million barrels per day in 1955 to 104, 6 million barrels in 2015. This means that the

Persian Gulf and Central Asia will have to double their production to face the rise of

consumption.

This concentration of energetic resources (oil and natural gas) in the Middle East is

partly what turns it into a very instable region, particularly with the demographic

explosion which makes controlling the population more difficult every day. All the

above mentioned factors might explain why conflicts are prone to arise. ProfessorArmando Marques Guedes in the article mentioned before-, refers to four major

areas of tension, which are:

Politic Islam, with the violent rising of Shia Islam -the second largest

denomination of Islam- in the area of Iran, Libya, Syria, Iraq.

The radicalization of another version of political Islam, the Sunni Islam - the

largest branch of Islam- that have Al-Qaeda as a major symbol.

The radical nationalism, with the Palestine and Anti-Israel case.


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Another sovereignty reaction in the strip that goes from Central Maghreb to

Caspian Sea, mainly because it is an area rich in resources that the

industrialized countries would like to control.

Iran and global influences

As mentioned earlier, the division of Iraq into three parts is gaining momentum. As a

result, the possibility of new states emerging in southern, central, and northern Iraq is

becoming more and more realistic.

The developments around the Southern part of the country (richer with hydrocarbons)

may influence regional geopolitics greatly. Although this area is populated mainly by

Arabs, they are Shiites and recognize Tehran as their spiritual (religious) center. Hence,

one may infer that if a new state emerges in the south of Iraq, it will most likely be

oriented toward Iran politically and thus may be influenced by Tehran significantly, or

even fall under the latters control. Needless to say, the emergence of an oil-rich, pro-

Iranian state in the south of Iraq will significantly change the regional balance of forces

in Tehrans favor.

The Arab Spring democratic revolutions swept out the regimes that were resisting

Irans bid for spiritual hegemony and ended up giving way to Irans greater influence in

the region. Today, Tehrans anti-Western, anti-American, and especially anti-Israelirhetoric, maintained in the background of the extensive Islamization of Arab countries,

will strengthen Irans position in the Greater Middle East. One of Tehrans regional

archrivals, Egypt, was considerably weakened without much effort by Iran.

In the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) report from November 2012, the

UN agency confirmed that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and reiterated the need

to address this situation as soon as possible.

Across the Arab Middle East, the Iranian nuclear program is raising grave concerns,

primarily with regards to Iran's intentions for regional dominance. In 2009, then-

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said, "A nuclear armed Iran with hegemonic

ambitions is the greatest threat to Arab nations today.

As for the United States of America, as it faces down Iran over its nuclear program,

while backing rebels in Syria and governments in the Gulf, Washington risks being

drawn ever deeper into the historic Sunni-Shi'ite sectarian divide within Islam. Already

having to face up to its dwindling influence over Iraq, it must broker its exit from

Afghanistan and try to keep nuclear armed Pakistan from chaos.


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Then, there are relations with its two key regional allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, both

troublesome in different ways.

Israel is threatening military action against Iran over its nuclear program, and U.S.

officials fear Americans would feel the consequences if Israel does attack. If Iran

decides to take measures in order to protect itself there is a good probability that

they would shut down the Strait of Hormuz, one of two of the most vital oil transit

checkpoints in the world. In late December 2011, Iran began to warn that it would

close the strait to shipping if the United States and Europe imposed an embargo on

Irans oil exports as a way of pressuring it to rein in its nuclear program. An Iranian

blockade by means of mining, airstrikes or sabotage is logistically well within Tehrans

military capabilities and would send oil prices soaring. The Obama administration has

warned that any such move would constitute a red line that would provoke an

American response. In the summer of 2012, the United States quietly moved

significant military reinforcements into the Persian Gulf to deter the Iranian military

from any possible attempt to shut the strait, and to have more fighter jets on hand

capable of striking deep into Iran if the standoff over its nuclear program deepened.

Let us now take a look at the situation in Syria:

Around January 2011, following on from the Arab Spring where protests against ruling

regimes erupted in a number of Middle East countries, protesters in Syria came out

demanding President Bashar al-Assad and his government step down. In response,

Assad sent in troops with some cities and regions being besieged for weeks andmonths.

The ruling regime is a sect of Shia, so has support from Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah,

while the opposition is largely Sunni, thus receiving support from other Middle East

countries, such as Saudi Arabia and others.

Since then, Syrias civil war has developed into something quite frightening, well

beyond the blind insurrections of the so-called Arab Spring.

In 2006, Iran and Syria signed a mutual defense treaty in response to the growingpossibility of conflict with the West. Both countries are highly inclined to fulfill this

treaty, and it would seem that Iran is already doing so at least financially as Syria

spirals into civil war.

Iran has steadfastly supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his bid to suppress

an uprising which both Tehran and Damascus see as a proxy war by Israel and Western

states to extend their influence in the Middle East.

"If America were to attack Syria, Iran along with Syria's allies will take action, which

would amount to a fiasco for America," Mohammad Ali Assoudi, the deputy for culture


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and propaganda of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was quoted as

saying.

The Russian government has also clearly stated on numerous occasions that it will not

step back during a strike against Syria. Russia has begun positioning naval ships and

extra troops at its permanent base off the coast of Tartus, Syria. Tartus, Russias only

naval base outside the periphery of its borders is strategically imperative to the nation.

Action by the United States or Israel against Syria would invariably elicit, at the very

least, economic retaliation, and at the most, Russian military involvement and possible

widespread war.

The Russian government along with China repeatedly vetoed a UN draft resolution

seeking to condemn the growing pressure being applied to protesters by the Syrian

government, and by doing so, they have Western diplomats capacity for creative

contempt. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described their veto as despicable,U.N.

Ambassador Susan Rice used the terms dangerous and deplorable. Britain said it was

appalled, and Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant singled out Moscow and Beijing for

having chosen to put their national interests ahead of the lives of millions of Syrians.

Syria and Iran are, as it appear, the first dominos in a long chain of possible terrible

events.

USA

The situation to be analyzed is set mainly between three countries the United States of

America, Israel and Iran. These three nations are divided in two factions, Israel, which has the

support of the U.S.A., versus Iran. The tensions between both factions have created an

environment of fear which resembles the one felt during the Cold War.

This scenery has its origin in the fact that Iran is battling to enrich its uranium stash. The

reaction of the opposite faction is an attempt to lead Iran either into a policy change, or to

profit from its internal conflicts. The U.S.A. and Israel act together, each one playing a different

part. The first has a subtle approach, whilst the latter plays a more threatening role. Strategies

based on pressuring enemies, leaking of misleading information and the urge for militarization

characterize the approach that both factions have taken.

We can also consider an opposite perspective which shows the consequences of their choices

of action. The worst sin of intelligence is complacency (Friedman, 2008), this conception lays

on the idea that the past events should not dictate the future ones, nor should they cloud the

present judgment. In this case, we may refer to the threats of war that were never


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materialized as being a fixed model for the current situation, as neither sides of the conflict

expect an attack. Nevertheless, the truth is that it might, eventually, happen.

STRATFOR has developed a series of thorough reports concerning the Iranians possibility of

becoming the lead player in the war game.

In July 2009s report, Iran was seeking to upgrade its stash of uranium. In spite of their

determination to obtain it, it was assumed that the technology to transform it into a nuclear

weapon was still not available. The table turned when, in the same year, an alliance between

Russia and Iran was disclosed. The Russian support froze and the report analysis showed a new

side. Iran had three responses to a possible air strike from the U.S.A. and Israel faction:

Shiite militant groups (namely Hezbollah)

Triggering chaos in Iraq

Blocking the Strait of Hormuz

The discussion of these hypothetic counter attacks has centered itself in the latter. The risk

imposed by this situation actually taking place is massive. Being Strait of Hormuz the spot

where approximately 45% of global oil is exported from, the consequence would most likely be

the rise of a devastating economic crisis. Therefore, the American strategy of starting withaerial attacks was taken out of the prospects.

The present view is that, although Iran has the materials, it doesnt have the technological

means to build a nuclear weapon. The attempt to strip Iran from its accumulation of uranium,

by striking its nuclear base, seems too fade as its faults come to light.

Adding to the previously stated, there is still an unconsidered menace. It consists in the fact

that Iran has the largest military force in the Persian Gulf. Whilst the U.S.A. is on the verge of

demilitarizing Iraq, Iran is highly upgrading its military influence in the area. This demonstrates

that the U.S.A. might lose the capacity to contain Iranian forces, raising the question: Would an

air strike on Irans nuclear base bring any benefit? Or would it create an insolvable chaos?

Minding the three counter measures available for Iran to use, it is essential to stress their

individual importance. Hezbollah, for instance, is interpreted by the U.S.A. as the less

hazardous, leaving us with two other options in hand.

Assuming Iraq would form a government that would effectively contain pro-iranian factions,just as Hezbollah has been, the second of Irans possibilities would be taken out of the picture.


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Finally, the most menacing ofIrans measures still floats and pressures the U.S.A.s

government to take action Hormuz.

The only way to approach this threat is to do it before the decision to attack the nuclear sites.

Therefore, any infrastructure near to a port, every maritime transport and any maritime war

material would have to be destroyed. The damage in this situation would be mindblowing.

This strategy is supported by two main benefits. First, there is no damage done to nuclear

facilities. Instead, the targets are aimed to all the facilities which produce any kind of

composing part of the weapon. The attack would also bring security and assure the

expectations that Americans have of Iran not possessing the technological means to develop a

nuclear weapon, since it would provoke the immediate escape of the scientists behind it.

Secondly, the counter-nuclear approach would not end one of the most critical parts of Iran'smilitary power their ground forces. Whilst a nuclear-centered attack would leave untouched

several of Iran's military, a carefully planned air attack, using the qualities and the

effectiveness of the American air force, would severely damage Iran's power of fighting back.

Combining all the units the U.S.A.'s military has stationed around Iran and the ones available to

travel across seas, engaging them in a thorough bombing campaign would be the most

plausible option on the table. Most surely this would be the worst case scenario, at Iran's eyes.

The solution lies, not in threatening solely the Iranian nuclear bases, but in guaranteeing that

Iran's options of game play are destroyed. Namely, Hormuz and the other counter-measures.

The idea is to shut their options down, leave them airless and in need to reinvent their

approach.

The nuclear facilities never posed as one of the U.S.A.'s major features against Iran. What they

fear is the withdrawal of military from Iraq and Iran's conventional forces. In spite of that fact,

the destruction of nuclear bases is an added benefit to the American strategy.

Iranians are not fearful of what the sanctions for their behavior might be. The internal tension

grows and the discussion appeals to the conservation of their conventional forces, to avoid the

threatening of their goals in the wider Islamic world and a policy shift.

Iranians seem nervous with the constant menace of an American strategy shift, but

considering Washington, we can only remain in mystery. Obama's government was bombed

with new, shiny, pieces to add to their war game the withdraw from Iraq, Saudi pressure not

to withdraw while Iran remains a threat, Saudi moves against Hezbollah to split Syria from Iran

and Israeli pressure to deal with nuclear weapons and given the chance to create a new


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strategy in the mist. The answer remains, now, in if the assessment of Iranian forces was

bound by the truth or if they do require a broader treatment to the military problem their

pose.

Russia

Considering President of Russia Dimitry Medvedev speech at the Meeting with Russian

Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organisation, we can

highlight, what some call the Medvedev Doctrine and Russias role in the

international scene.

After the Cold War, the underlying reasons for most of bloc politics and bloc disciplinesimply disappeared and nowadays the world is still searching for a new equilibrium.

Russia believes that even an influential country as the United States shouldnt make all

the decisions and the world should be multipolar. This position is enforced by Russias

strength and ability to assume greater responsibility for solving problems on a regional

and global scale.

() the world is not just listening to Russia but looking to us for help with solving

problems.(Medvedev, 2008)2

Russias Foreign Policy Concept is based on an analysis of all aspects of contemporary

international life recognizing the primacy of fundamental principles of international

law. Their relations with other countries will be built within the framework of these

principles and the concept of international law that defines the relations between

civilized people. Therefore, Russia has no intention of isolating itself neither wants

confrontation with any other country. Only by working together and without double

standards, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug

trafficking, crime, global poverty, climate change and the spread of infectious diseases

can be fought.

However Russia foreign policy decisions will be based on the need to protect the lives

and interests of Russians wherever they are. This policy provides doctrinal basis for

intervention in countries if Russia finds it necessary.

2

Medvedev, D. (2008). Speech at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives

to International Organisations. Moscow.


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Finally there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests because of their

historical relations and for that, bound together as friends and good neighbours.

Globally, the Russians want to use this general redefinition of the regional and global

system to create a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center, plus

substantial nuclear assets, to be a part of a global system in which the United States

loses its primacy.

Russia sees the United States as the most influent state, still living in a paternalistic

regime where they take decisions for the rest of the world.

Russia interest in the Middle East lays on the American presence in the region.

Since 2001, the United States are fighting a war with the Islamic World. Their

main theatres are Afghanistan and Iraq.

In Iraq the situation isnt very critical, in fact its just ideal. The government in Bagdad

isnt pro-American but neither is an Iranian puppet. In Afghanistan, Talibans

influence is increasing: large areas are falling to its control and US and NATO forces are

insufficient.

The United States are also in confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program

demanding that Tehran must stop its enrichment of uranium or face U.S action.

The U.S assembled a group of six countries that agreed with the U.S goal [engaging

negotiations with Iran] and that sanctions should be imposed on Iran if Tehran failed to

comply. This group also agreed not to sell arms to Tehran creating a sense of isolation

in Iran.

Due to all of these circumstances, the United States forces were stretchered from Iraq

to Pakistan and their ground forces were stretchered to the limit. Also U.S air force,

naval and land-based forces have to always be on standby for the possibility of an air

champagne in Iran (just to maintain the bluff).

As U.S forces are too busy in the Middle East, a window of opportunity was created forRussia to strike. For the likely future, the United States had no significant forces to

spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain a combat. Also, the

United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in

Afghanistan. Consequently the U.S needed the Russians and couldnt block the

Russians.

The Russians are raising the possibility that U.S forces could be isolated in Afghanistan.

Supply lines into the landlocked country never have been under the United States or

NATO control. All supplies must come through third countries and their willingness to

permit transit is the foundation of U.S strategy.


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The Russians took advantage of this and stroke, invading Georgia on August 8 following

a Georgian attack on South Ossetia.

As U.S is off balance in the Islamic World, there is an opportunity for Russia to create a

new reality before the United States is ready to fight back. This opportunity is also

based on the fact that Europe hasnt the military power nor the will to actively resist

Russia because of its heavily dependence on Russians natural gas supplies.

A U.S action against Russia would result in counteractions, so considering the present

situation the Russian response would be to strike at the heart if American strategy in

the Islamic World.

The Russians have a long history of supporting Middle Eastern regimes with weapons

shipments, and it was no accident that the first world leader they met after invading

Georgia, was Syrian president Bashar al Assad.

Russia could deliberately send weapons to factions in Iraq that do not support the

current regime, as well as groups like Hezbollah. Moscow also could encourage the

Iranians to withdraw their support for the Iraqi government and immerse Iraq back

into conflict. Finally, Russia could ship weapons to the Taliban and work to further

destabilize Pakistan.

Concluding, with active Russian hostility plus the current situation in the region, thestrategic situation in the Islamic World can spin out of control at any time.

We now will focus our attention in the relations between Israel and Russia. Although

they operate in the same areas of interest, their agendas seem disconnected but not

always opposed.

The Russians have complex relationships in the region, especially with Syria and Iran.

As we have already said, Russia sees the United States as their prime adversary and

consequentially believes that the U.S used the breakup of the Soviet Union to extendNATO and contain Russia, by supporting pro-democracy movements in the Middle

East, and using these movements to create pro-American governments.

This is why the Russians value the conflict in the Islamic World. They have interest in

encouraging processes that draw the United States into this region in order to weaken

them. Leading this is the support of Iran and Syria, not because they support these

countries but because they oppose actions that might deteriorate Iran or undermine

Syrian government.


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Russia relation with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad represented a

major danger to Israel. Nevertheless with the fall of the Soviet Union, Syria lost its

sponsor and weakened as a threat.

For Israel, the al Assad regime presented two situations:

First they were predictable and their interests didnt include conflict with Israel.

As a result, Syria held Hezbollah in check until it was forced out of Lebanon by

the United States in 2005;

Secondly, the regime wasnt Sunni but Alawite (a Shiite sect)3

With the withdraw of United States from Iraq and Iran filling the void left, Iran became

a bigger threat to Israel, even bigger than the Hamas and the Sunnis. For this reason

Israel now wants a Sunni regime in Syria that would block Iran wishes.

Russians weapons supplies offers help on the maintenance of this regime. The ability

of Russia to prevent or avoid sanctions helps, a lot, both countries but doesnt allow

the Russians to create or impose solutions. However they can create circumstances

that might draw in the U.S and diverted.

The Russians have no interest in a radical Sunni group in Syria but could live with a

more moderate one if they fail to keep al Assad or his regime in power.

This is where Israels and Russias agendas coincide: Israel would accept the survival of

al Assad regime as long as Syria stays out of Irans influential areas.

Regarding to Syria theres even one more question to consider: Turkey has asked

NATO some kind of intervention in Syria, this position is supported by their hostility

towards al Assads regime from early on and this provides the opportunity to appeal

the alliance under its common defense policy.

From the Russian point of view, a NATO intervention involving large amounts of U.S.

forces would be the best as they would spent a lot of U.S forces. From the Israeli point

of view, having NATO take responsibility for Syria would be the best possible outcome

by far.

In conclusion:

Israel would like Russia as a mild counterweight to the United States, but

without disturbing relationships with them;

Russia would like to have additional options in the Middle East beyond Iran and

Syria but without isolating those states;

3During the 2000s, Israel and the West believed the main threat emanated from the Sunni world. Al

Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas were all Sunni.


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Theres little conflict between Russians and Israelis interests because neither

is nearly as powerful as would like to be in, so it is in their both best interests to

make themself appear to have more weight than they have.

The New Great Game in Central Asia

After the Cold War and all the conflicts in the XX century, a new great world game is emerging

between USA, Russia, China and Central Asia.

In fact, since 9/11, Americas priority in Central Asia has been to defeat the Taliban in

Afghanistan. But as the US and NATO pulls out, there is a new danger: the West could become

entangled in regional rivalries, local strongman politics and competition with Russia and China.

Central Asian governments have tried for years to manipulate foreign powers interest in the

region for their own benefit.

As an example we can refer that in 2009 Kyrgyzstans president, Bakiyev, engaged war

between Washington and Moscow over the fate of the Manas air base, the main staging

facility for American troops in Afghanistan. The truth is that Kyrgz officials claimed that many

of these payments had been laundered through a complex network of offshore bank accounts

controlled by the former first family.

d) The Caucasus and Central Asia


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As America is withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Central Asia states are likely to increase their

demands for tacit payoffs for cooperation among other things, conduits hundreds of millions

of dollars in fuel contracts to local suppliers and intermediaries.

Most controversially of all, NATO and the Central Asian states are still negotiating over the

potential transfer of military equipment, used by coalition forces in Afghanistan, to Central

Asian governments security services, which have a bloody human rights record.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan also elevates the risk that the USA, together with other external

powers, will be drawn into a number of local disputes and escalating regional rivalries.

Over the last decade, Central Asia leaders have consistently invoked the specter of insurgents

spilling over from Afghanistan to justify their own counterterrorism efforts and the need for

security cooperation with Russia, China and the United States. Western withdrawal will

encourage local elites to stoke these fears, justifying domestic crackdowns, rendition of

political opponents and escalation of border tensions with neighbors.

Russia seems to reinforce this narrative to justify extending its military basing rights

throughout the country which Tajik officials will then use as leverage to demand more Western

assistance. Washingtons new strategy, which the objective is to promote a sustainable

development in Afghanistan infrastructure, energy transmission grids and pipelines to Central

Asia, may lead to further corruption. The promotion on some projects has already provoked

suspicion in Beijing and Moscow about the Wests regional ambitions.

Furthermore, Russia is pressing the inclusion of Kyrsgyzstan and Tajikistan in the new Moscow

union, while China continues to build new infrastructure and energy pipelines. But Washingtonseems to failed in the promotion of the same goals as Afghan government to improve

governance and create democratic institutions. The Afghanistan withdrawal is dragging the

West into a hotbed of domestic power struggles and regional rivalries.

Despite that, in post-11 September American intervention in Central Asia, a strategic

realignment was underway between US and India. Once the Soviet Union imploded, India

began to rethink its strategy. The truth is that the principal foreign policy and national security

officials in the new American government believed that with the disappearance of the Soviet

Union and China looming as challenger, India, not Pakistan, was the worthier partner.

e) Pipelines in Central Asia


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Moreover, as the five Central Asian states become increasingly important as a source of oil and

gas, (a market for consumer goods and as the core of the strategically-important Shanghai

Cooperation Organization) China is now clearly confident it can reorient Central Asia

towards Beijingand away from the worlds other major powers.

China is working to build its economic and political links with Central Asia and is now Central

Asias principal trading partner as well as it is its main source of foreign investment.

The truth is that the pressure on China to defend its interests in the region is rising.

As trade with the region grows and China comes to depend more and more on Central Asian

energy supplies, maintaining influence in the region is becoming a matter of crucial strategicimportance.

China is trying to position itself as a good neighbor to the countries of the region. They want

to straighten its energy cooperation with Central Asia and the countries of the Caspian Sea.

This cooperation is part of Chinas new strategic and geopolitical approach to this region of the

world, an area in which China increasingly thinks of itself as a neighbor and a privileged

partner.

Summing up, and knowing that the world has started taking more notice of Central Asia, wecan conclude that:

For the United States and its allies, the region is a valuable supply hub for the

Afghanistan war effort.

For Russia, it is an arena in which they utilize political influence.

For China, it is a source of energy and a critical partner for stabilizing and developing

the restive Xinjiang.

The truth is that the Central Asian case today is not a throwback to the past but a guide to

what is to come: the rise of new players and the decline of Western influence in a multipolar

world. The first lesson to take from China, Russia, and the United States' involvement in

Central Asia is that it has strengthened the hand of rulers, who have been able to play the

suitors off one another to extract economic benefits and political support where possible.


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Conclusion

When analyzing the present situation in Middle East it is easy to realize the intricate

connections between the different States and entities as well as the Westerns role.

The United States of America, Russia and China are among the most important decision-

makers of todays reality. Religion is a major factor in the conflicts that have risen since it is

deeply rooted in those societies. The Islamic conflict opens a window of opportunity for a

counterbalance of powers to Nations that have been, in the past, under ones domination.

The world is now facing a struggle for power and the threat from the Islamic States is getting

stronger as they are the holder of a powerful and valuable resource: oil.

Although the world may not be as divided as it was during the Bipolar Period, new conflicts

have emerged creating a new geopolitical situation. The regions in Middle East and Central

Asia have seen their importance increased in todays international political sphere. Theseregions can be compared to a chessboard where every move is played strategically by the

current powers in order to achieve their own personal agendas. The world is now looking for a

new equilibrium and is using the Arab conflicts as a way to redefine the global order.


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Documents

IR Session13