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Canadian Public Policy
Invited Commentaries/Commentaires sollicités: The Politics of the Census: Lessons fromAbroadAuthor(s): Debra ThompsonSource: Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 36, No. 3 (September/septembre2010), pp. 377-382Published by: University of Toronto Press on behalf of Canadian Public PolicyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20799663 .
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Invited Commentaries/
Commentaires sollicit?s
The Politics of the Census:
Lessons from Abroad
Debra Thompson
Department of Government/Center for American Political Studies Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts
In late June, Minister of Industry Tony Clement
announced the government's decision to elimin
ate the mandatory long form of the 2011 Census
and replace it with a voluntary survey to be sent
to one-third of Canadian households. The decision
was reportedly made by Prime Minister Stephen
Harper last December and has largely been framed
by Conservative cabinet ministers as an import ant change to safeguard the privacy of Canadians.
They maintain that the state has no business in the
bedrooms of society, or, more specifically, that the
state has no business asking Canadians how many bedrooms they have in their places of residence.
The Prime Minister's Office has stated, "The
government made this decision because we do not
believe Canadians should be forced, under threat of
fines, jail, or both, to disclose extensive private and
personal information" (Valpy 2010). Clement, the
minister responsible for Statistics Canada, argued before a parliamentary committee on 27 July that
though the information gathered in the long form
is "valuable," a "balance must be drawn" between
collecting data and the privacy rights of Canadians.
In spite of the Conservative government's con
sistent references over the summer months to their
goal of protecting privacy, there is a prominent disconnect between rhetoric and evidence. In a state
ment on 13 July, Tony Clement noted that "in the
past, the Government of Canada received complaints about the long form Census from citizens who felt
it was an intrusion of their privacy." However, the
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has
revealed that just three complaints were filed about
the census over the past decade, and Federal Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart testified before the
parliamentary committee that there have been 50
complaints about the census over the past 20 years.
In the weeks following the government's an
nouncement, critics have said that the shift to a
voluntary long form is driven far more by ideology than by a genuine threat to Canadians' privacy
(Simpson 2010). However, the move is puzzling because the Tories seem to be attempting to appeal to a populist base whose concerns with regards to
the census are largely unknown. Another rationale,
put forward by political scientist Paul Saurette, is
that this latest development is not the short-sighted
policy decision it appears to be but rather is part of
Harper's longer-term ideological goal, "the trans
formation of the broad public philosophy of Canada
Canadian Public Policy - Analyse de politiques, vol. xxxvi, no. 3 2010
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378 Debra Thompson
and the cultivation of an enduring set of conservative
values and philosophical principles in Canadians"
(Saurette 2010).
The Conservative government's commitment to
eliminating the mandatory long form in the 2011
Census risks alienating many of their traditional
allies in the private sector, including the Canadian
Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Association
for Business Economics, the Toronto Board of
Trade, and the Canadian Marketing Association, which have all publicly opposed the change. Organ izations and individuals against the voluntary survey have expressed concern about the adequacy of data
not collected as part of a census. A voluntary survey, in the words of former Chief Statistician Munir
Sheikh, who resigned over the issue, cannot replace the mandatory form. The opponents of the govern ment's position on the long form argue that only a mandatory census can produce the accurate and
reliable data on the Canadian population required for the development of good public policy, necessary
programs and services, and trustworthy research.
The reach of a voluntary survey simply does not
compare?and indeed, may affect the comparability of this data set with its predecessors?while the
self-selection of respondents who volunteer to fill
in the form will impair the reliability of the data and
representativeness of the sample.
For many of us, the census is yet another govern ment form that appears in our mailboxes once every five or ten years. It is hardly the stuff that real polit ical contention is made of. And yet, as I demonstrate
below, the census has often been the battleground of elite politics. Against this comparative backdrop, Canadian institutions have not only largely worked
to isolate our statistical system from these debates
but have also created very specific opportunities and
constraints for the ways in which the government can collect data. These circumstances speak to the
necessity of both ensuring the independence of our
statistical system and protecting it from outside
interference by political forces.
Lessons from Abroad
The recent events represent neither the first time nor
the first place in which political parties have tried
to influence the development of statistics. While
the census and the statistical agency responsible for it are supposed to be ideology free and non
partisan, the census and the policy consequences that arise from its results often have effects on par tisan politics, linked to the two central concerns of
government: money and representation.
In the United States the census has long been
acknowledged to be an undertaking with political
consequences. These consequences are most clearly illustrated by the contentious issue of census adjust
ments?that is, whether the bureaucracy adjusts census results after the fact to reduce known under
counts (Freedman and W?chter 2001). The highly controversial decision to not adjust the census in
1980 was made by the Census Bureau alone, which, as Skerry notes, is a testament to the significant auton
omy the agency once enjoyed (2000, 22). However, in recent decades the Bureau's autonomy has eroded
significantly. Former Census Director Barbara Bryant
complained that there was a "bureaucratic takeover"
of the Census Bureau by the Department of Com merce in the late 1980s and 1990s. When several cities
sued the Secretary of Commerce, the Department of
Commerce, and the Census Bureau over urban under
counts, census adjustment decisions were moved away from the statistical arena into the congressional realm
(Bryant and Dunn 1995, 158-9).
As the Department of Commerce increased its
involvement in the Census Bureau's affairs, congres sional incursion into the census also began to reach
new heights. After the 1994 election the Republicans
gained control of the House of Representatives and
Senate under a Democratic executive. Congressional involvement in, and oversight of, the 2000 Census
was unprecedented. For example, starting two
years before the 2000 Census, the director of the
Census Bureau, political scientist Kenneth Prewitt,
Canadian Public Policy -
Analyse de politiques, vol. xxxvi, no. 3 2010
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The Politics of the Census: Lessons from Abroad 379
"testified before Congress 23 times, responded to
over 150 letters from the House Subcommittee on
the census (which itself held 17 hearings on Census
2000 design issues), and cooperated with 522 field
visits by the US General Accounting Office, the
Congressional Monitoring Board, and the Commerce
Department inspector general" (Hillygus et al. 2006,
1-2). The issue of census adjustment became the
target of partisan animosities in congressional com
mittees since the populations that have historically been undercounted by the census are disproportion
ately racial and ethnic minorities living in urban
areas and are far more likely to vote Democrat than
Republican. This also makes the review of census
administration in the United States a very public
affair, forcing the Census Bureau to respond to criti
cisms stemming from Congress, the press, the public, and the courts on the occasions when census results
have been challenged (Choldin 1994).
In Great Britain, where a privacy movement against the intrusive nature of the census has existed for some
time, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher foreshadowed
the Canadian Tories' argument that census questions are an unwarranted incursion of the state into the
private lives of individuals. She found many of the
questions proposed for the 1981 Census?for example, whether one was working, retired, or a housewife?
"completely unnecessary" and jettisoned them from
the final questionnaire. As Secretary of State Patrick
Jenkin noted, Thatcher was "very concerned about
the intrusion into the private affairs of individuals and
feels strongly that the Government will lay itself open to justifiable criticism unless it can be shown that these
questions are really necessary for policy analysis and
decisions" (UK PRO 1979). This neo-conservative
concern about Big Brother in Britain continues in
more recent incarnations of census politics. While in
opposition in 2009, the Conservative Party called the
census "invasive and intrusive."
Interestingly, anxiety about the quality of data
produced, far more than ideology, has driven the
overhaul of Britain's statistical system over the past
20 years. After several government reviews ques tioned the quality of the statistics being produced
by Government Statistical Service (GSS), and the
Royal Statistical Society (1990) noted that there was
a serious erosion of public confidence in UK official
statistics, the government centralized responsibility for statistics in a new Office for National Statistics
(ONS) in 1996 (Pullinger 1997). Since this develop ment the British government has furthered its pursuit of an autonomous statistical agency. The 1998 Green
Paper sought to stimulate public debate on future
arrangements for the UK's statistical system (HM Government 1998). After consultations with stake
holders, the government published a White Paper in
1999 outlining new accountability and governance
arrangements for the ONS, including the creation
of the UK Statistics Authority, a body independent of both ministers and the producers of national
statistics (HM Government 1999).
In spite of these developments, the future of the
census in the UK remains unclear. Some countries,
especially in Western Europe and Scandinavia, have
rejected an expensive decennial census in favour
of systems that can link and use the administrative
data routinely collected from others sources. Though some believe that the census is a vital resource that
cannot be replicated even by pooling other sources
of administrative data (Boyle and Dorling 2004), Cabinet Office Minister Francis Maude revealed
in July that the 2011 Census would be Britain's
last (Hope 2010). However, it is important to note
that the UK's "Beyond 2011" project was years in
the making, put into place by the Labour govern ment back in 2009 and involving massive public consultations within and outside the government. In comparison, Harper's decision has consistently
disregarded public and stakeholder input.
Census Politics in Canada
The structure of Canadian institutions means that the
census is, at least for the foreseeable future, here to
Canadian Public Policy - Analyse de politiques, vol. xxxvi, no. 3 2010
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380 Debra Thompson
stay. The breadth of Statistics Canada's autonomy, however, is up for debate. A cursory glance at census
politics over the past few decades demonstrates that
Canada is not immune to the political battles over
statistics that are commonplace in other countries.
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's first government
originally cancelled the mid-decade census in 1986 to "save money," but was forced to reverse its deci sion in part because of"pushback" from government
departments that needed census data for administer
ing programs like equalization (Curry 2010). The
government also needed to reverse the decision
because of constitutional provisions dating back to
when the Prairie Provinces joined Confederation
that require a mid-decade census to occur. Statistics
Canada has also been influenced by tirades against
Big Government from Conservatives and Liberals
alike: like other federal departments, its budget was
cut during the government-wide program review in the 1990s and more recent incarnations of slashed
government spending (Thompson 2010).
Comparatively speaking, however, our statistical
agency has guarded its autonomy from the ideologic al agendas of the government in power. According to a Statistics Canada representative interviewed well
before the elimination of the mandatory long form was announced, one of the strengths of Statistics Canada is its autonomy from politics. "That doesn't mean that we don't have to manage our budgets," he
said, "but there's no political influence in anything that we do. And we've worked very, very hard to maintain that" (Thompson 2010, 330). The statis tical system itself is also designed to preserve the
agency's independence. Unlike Britain, where the
"Beyond 2011" project seeks to identify alterna tives to a decennial census, our census is mandated
by constitutional provision. Unlike the United
States, in which over 70 different federal govern ment agencies collect statistics, responsibility for the decennial census and all statistical activities of the state is governed by the 1971 Statistics Act and
responsibility lies with Statistics Canada alone. By
operating under a single law, Statistics Canada is able to share data with other government agencies;
by contrast, in the United States confidentiality and disclosure provisions sometimes preclude the ability of statistical agencies to access data. Each of the ten
provinces has a statistical office that works closely with Statistics Canada, and interdepartmental co
ordination is often conducted through project teams
with specific data collection or analytical tasks (US GAO 1996).
These safeguards are magnified by one of the cen
tral tenets of our Westminster model of government, the notion of a professional, non-partisan public ser
vice (Rhodes, Wanna, and Weiler 2009). The Chief
Statistician of Canada is a senior civil servant who holds the rank of deputy minister and reports to the Minister of Industry. A long-standing tradition holds
that deputy ministers, including the Chief Statisti
cian, are retained through changes in government; for example, Dr Ivan Fellegi held his position as
Chief Statistician in Canada from 1985 to 2008,
through numerous changes of the party in power.
Accountability and responsibility mechanisms in the Canadian political system work to protect the
autonomy of Statistics Canada. Statistics Canada has the makings of an arms-length agency, even though
Minister Clement has commented that the agency and its staff are not independent: "Sometimes, some of them like to think they are?but that doesn't make it so. They report to a minister" (Chase 2010). For
example, the Minister of Industry cannot overrule the Chief Statistician on issues of confidentiality, and the Chief Statistician will defend the budget for Statistics Canada before parliament, while in other government departments deputy ministers
accompany the responsible minister.
Other aspects of Canadian institutions constrain the extent to which the various levels of government can collect data. Though the highly centralized statis tical system works to facilitate the horizontal sharing of data among government departments, federalism
poses significant challenges for the independent col lection and dissemination of statistical data by the
provinces. Only Quebec's Institut de la Statistique has the capacity to fill some of the many statistical gaps
Canadian Public Policy -
Analyse de politiques, vol. xxxvi, no. 3 2010
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The Politics of the Census: Lessons from Abroad 381
that the elimination of the mandatory long form will
leave. All provinces and territories including Quebec
rely heavily on Statistics Canada's collection of raw
data. Rather than this being an issue of the provinces
getting an easy ride "while the government of Canada
was the heavy," as Tony Clement complained after
several provinces called on the Conservatives to re
consider their decision (Chase and Howlet 2010), it
is in part a consequence of a centralized but federal
statistical system at work. Simply put, the fiscal fed
eral structure makes some alternative data collection
arrangements infeasible and the government's recent
decision all the more troubling.
Conclusion
Statistics Canada has been internationally recog nized as one of the best statistical agencies in the
world because of its isolation from the political influence that has plagued the politics of the census
in other countries. According to the UN Statistical
Commission, "Objective, reliable and accessible
official statistics give people and organizations,
nationally and internationally, confidence in the
integrity of government and public decision-making on the economic, social and environmental situation
within a country ... Compilation and release of data
should be free from political interference, so as to
ensure impartiality of the national statistical office"
(UN Statistical Commission 2004).
Objectivity in the development of statistics is the
cornerstone of the production of the reliable, high
quality data required for making informed policy choices. The statistics produced through the census
and other surveys must be objective and accurate in
order to inform decision-making inside and outside
government and to allow the society to question and
judge whether or not the government is acting in its
best interests. The record of political interference in
censuses elsewhere and the recent events in Canada
point to the need for an informed discussion over
the desirability and feasibility of strengthening the
institutional autonomy of Statistics Canada.
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