Intuitings, Intuiteds, and I-languages:

Data and Explananda

Paul M. Pietroski

Dept. of Linguistics, Dept. of Philosophy

University of Maryland

Intuitions: Why Care?

Perhaps many reasons, but for me…

• intuitions as reliable data points that can be used to assess theories of human language

(see Aspects, ch. 1, Rules and Representations)

• the natural phenomenon, calling for explanation, that humans “have reliable linguistic intuitions”

• the potential conclusion that episodes of intuiting are not episodes of judging (cp. Williamson)

• the potential relevance of these points for externalist/internalist conceptions of linguistic meaning

Some Working Terminology from Lycan and Chomsky

• Intuitings: psychological episodes of a certain sort

• Intuiteds: propositional contents of intuitings

• I-Languages: procedures (of a certain sort) that generate endlessly many expressions, which pair signals of some kind with interpretations of some kind

• Human I-Languages: I-Languages, including ASL and creoles, that human children can naturally acquire (and hence implement) given a “minimally decent” course of human experience

Infant Child

Modules: Vision Audition …

initialrange ofconcepts

Experience+ and Growth

HumanLanguage

Facultyin its

Initial State

Modules: Vision Audition …

Human LanguageFaculty in a

Mature State(an I-Language):

COMBINATORICS LEXICON

maturerange ofconcepts+ Lexicalization

Some Working Terminology from Bogen-and-Woodward

• Data provide evidence of stable phenomena• Phenomena are candidates for (theoretical) explanation• Explanations target phenomena, not mere causal chains

that run through experimental apparatus• In controlled contexts, thermometer “readings” can confirm the

abstract (not directly observable) claim that lead melts at 327.5°C. A theory of chemical composition can explain why lead melts at this

temperature without explaining any particular thermometer reading. Even if one can formulate the relevant ancillary assumptions, so that

each thermometer reading is predictable (within a certain range of variation, ceteris paribus), this isn’t always possible in science.

Moreover, adding a hodgepodge of assumptions to a theory doesn’t yield a more detailed theory: it yields a theory-plus-a-hodgepodge.

Overview of Talk

• The “intuitions” that matter for (careful) linguists are intuitions of contrast—often concerning the interpretive possibilities for “minimal pairs” of word-strings

• Distinguish: acceptability/grammaticality/well-formedness

data/phenomena

intuitings/intuiteds/judgments• “Intuitions” suggest at least two kinds of phenonema

(i) constraints on grammaticality (ii) semantic intuitings

• Intuitings do not reflect well-formedness or truth-conditions; they reflect instructions to build concepts, which are neither syntactic nor classically semantic

Two Possible (Kinds of) Languages

(E) a set of expressions, characterized by rules of well-formedness

includes endlessly many sentences that have compositionally determined truth conditions

(I) a procedure that generates expressions, whichpair “signaling” instructions (PFs, PHONS) with “interpreting” instructions (LFs, SEMs)

semantic instructions are compositional, but “sentential” SEMs don’t have truth conditions

Human LanguageFaculty in a

Mature State(an I-Language):

COMBINATORICS LEXICON

maturerange ofconcepts

PHONs

SEMs

“articulatory/perceptual” systems

“conceptual/intentional” systems

maturerange of“sounds”

can think of SEMs as instructions to build complex concepts from lexicalizable constituents

Minimalist Sidebar

DS DS LEX | | | SS SS /\ | | / \ PF / \ PF LF PF LF (PHON) (SEM)

LEX

LEXconcepts

concepts concepts

can think of SEMs as instructions to build complex concepts from lexicalizable constituents

LEX

SEM

PHON conceptsa “sound system” may come later)

‘I’ is for Intensional/Implemented (Church/Marr)

(E) a set of expressions(I) a procedure that generates expressions

|x – 1| +√(x2 – 2x + 1)

{…, (-2, 3), (-1, 2), (0, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1), (3, 2), … }

λx . AbsoluteValue[Subtract(x, 1)]

λx . Pos□Root[Add{Subtract[□(x), Multiply(x, 2)]}, 1]

λx . |x – 1| ≠ λx . +√(x2 – 2x + 1)

λx . |x – 1| = λx . +√(x2 – 2x + 1)

Extension[λx . |x – 1|] = Extension[λx . +√(x2 – 2x + 1)]

Underdiscussed issue:--what are the plausible candidates for natural composition ops (supervenience realizers; cp. Szaboe)--are they sufficiently permissive for truth?

we usually worry about whether TCs can be comp at all, but we should also worry about whether “easy” TCs are naturally compositional

A Further Chomskyan Thought (needing arguments)

(E) a set of expressions(I) a procedure that generates expressions

The natural phenomena of understanding and intuiting concern I-languages, which are (along with I-linguistic meanings) individuated internalistically.

One can introduce notions of outerstanding and extuition, such that individuals (in different environments) can share an I-Language yet have different extuitions and outerstand words/phrases differently. Such notions may have a place. But they do no explanatory work. And at this point, they are more distracting than helpful.

Complication: Possible Ψ-Languages

(E) a set of expressions, characterized by rules of well-formedness

includes endlessly many sentences that have compositionally determined truth conditions

(Ψ) an externalistically individuated procedure, which generates SEMs that do have truth conditions

(I) a procedure that generates expressions, whichpair “signaling” instructions (PFs, PHONS) with “interpreting” instructions (LFs, SEMs)

semantic instructions are compositional, but “sentential” SEMs don’t have truth conditions

Two Conceptions of Linguistic Data

“acceptability” intuitions provide evidence for

rules of well-formedness (grammaticality)

“applicability” intuitions provide evidence for axioms of a truth theory (satisfaction conditions)

intuitions of contrasts, concerning the acceptabilty of interpreting a sound/sign in a certain way,

provide evidence for hypotheses about the procedures that pair PHONs with SEMs

we can also make judgments about whether our concepts apply to (actual/hypothetical) cases

(1) no cat likes every mat

(2) *every likes mat no cat

(3) no big cat has been on every red mat

(4) *big has on red every been mat cat no

S NP VP Q every, no

NP Q N N cat, mat

N A N A big, red

VP V NP V likes

VP has been PP P on

PP P NP

Tempting Analogy: Resist!

S F var var x

S R var var for all α: if var α, then var α’

so: S Fx, Fx’, Fx’’, Fx’’’, …, Rxx, Rxx’, Rx’x, Rx’x’, …

S ~S S (S & S )

Q ∀ var Q ∃ varS Q(S) so: S x( x’( x’’(Fx & ~Rx’x’’)))∀ ∃ ∀

∀x x’(∃ ∀x’’(Fx & ~Rx’x’’))

∃x’ x’’(Fx & ~Rx’x’’))∀

∀x’’ (Fx & ~Rx’x’’)

Fx & ~Rx’x’’

(3) no big cat has been on every red mat

(3a) *no big cat been has on every red mat

S NP aux VP

…

aux has been (*been has)

(5) Was the cat that saw a vet found on a mat?

(5a) *Was the cat that found on a mat saw a vet?

(6) The cat that saw a vet was found on a mat.

(6a) The cat that was found on a mat saw a vet.

Absent Meanings (not Absent WFFs)

(7) Was the cook who fed waffles fed the thief?

(7a) Yes or No:

the cook who fed waffles was fed the thief

(7b) #Yes or No:

the cook who was fed waffles fed the thief

(8) The cook saw the thief with binoculars

(8a) The cook saw the thief who had binoculars

(8b) The cook saw the thief by using binoculars

(8c) #The cook saw the thief and had binoculars

General Moral

• if speakers report that a string of words cannot support an interpretation supported by a similar string (of the same open class lexical items), this can confirm a claim that the string has n but not n+1 readings, for a certain n

• in special cases, n = 0(4) *big has on red every been mat cat no

or more interestingly…

(3a) *no big cat been has on every red mat

• such examples, when “robust,” can confirm hypothesized constraints on the procedures (I-Languages) that connect the relevant “sounds” with “interpretations”

• mere “well-formedness” constraints do not explain the phenomena

The cook saw the thief with binoculars

(8b) meaning:the seeing(of the thief)was donewith binoculars

But why does this structure have this meaning?Why doesn’t it (also) have another meaning:

The cook saw the thief and (the cook) has binoculars

the cook has two features

&

(8) The cook saw the thief with binoculars(8a) The cook saw the thief who had binoculars(8b) The cook saw the thief by using binoculars(8c) #The cook saw the thief and had binoculars

Why (8b) and not (8c)?

General Moral via Chomsky and Austen

• intuitions that a string cannot support an interpretation can confirm that the string has n but not n+1 readings

• Elizabeth, on her side, had much to do. She wanted to ascertain the feelings of each of her visitors, she wanted to compose her own, and to make herself agreeable to all; and in the latter object, where she feared most to fail, she was most sure of success, for those to whom she endeavoured to give pleasure were prepossessed in her favour. Bingley was ready, Georgiana was eager, and Darcy determined to be pleased.

(9) __ was eager to please

(10) __ was easy to please

(11) __ was ready to please

eager for __ to please E#eager for E to please __# easy for __ to please E easy for E to please __ ready for __ to please E ready for E to please __

More Constraints on Interpretations

(12) The cook, the thief, his wife, and her lover

[count the possible readings]

(13) The cook thinks he saw the thief

(14) The cook thinks the thief saw him/himself

(15) The cook wants the thief to see him/himself

(16) The cook wants him/himself to see the thief

[count the possible readings]

(17) *The child seems sleeping

(17a) The child seems to be sleeping

(17b) #The child seems sleepy

Implemented Procedures do what they do

Higgy = SEM(‘The child seems sleeping’)

Halle = PHON(‘The child seems sleeping’)

Ludlow = SEM(‘The child seems to be sleeping’)

Smith = SEM(‘The child seems sleepy’)

At least to a first approximation…

<Halle, Higgy> is not an expression of my I-Language, yet

Halle has one reading (Higgy = Ludlow) and not two.

Smith is not a possible reading of Halle.

I-Languages need not determine sets of WFFs.

This is certainly not all they determine.

And intuitings are not intuitings of well-formedness.

Repair by Ellipsis (Ross/Merchant/Lasnik…)

(18) Howard asked if someone was going to fail, but I can’t remember whoi he asked if _he asked if _i was going to fail was going to fail

pairing the “short” PHON with the SEM is OK,

but pairing the full PHON with the same SEM is not

Maybe what we can intuit is (just) the “pairability” of a given phonological instruction with a semantic instruction.And maybe we can intuit this kind of pairability,

even when any pairing is doomed to imperfection, as with ‘The child seems sleeping’.

SEMs as Instructions to Build Concepts

(18) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously

(19) France is hexagonal, and France is a republic

• An instruction may not be easily executable• An instruction may be executable in more than one way• Go into the next room:

find a box, find a toy, and put the toy in the box

PHON I-Language:LEXICON

COMBINATORICS SEM

InstructionExecuter

one or more complex concepts

(polysemy)

Unambiguous (non-homophonous) PHON

PHON I-Language:LEXICON

COMBINATORICS SEM

InstructionExecuter

one or more complex concepts

First Stage Representation of Scene(including any representations of speakers intentions)

ENVIRONMENT

Second Stage Representation of Scene

Relevant Perceptual

and InferentialSystems

one of theconstructed concepts (perhaps “refined”)

Judger

JUDGMENT: Yes or No( the concept applies/doesn’t)

Ambiguous (homophonous) PHON

PHON I-Language:LEXICON

COMBINATORICS

SEM 1 InstructionExecuter

one or more concepts constructed by executing SEM 1

SEM 2

one or more concepts constructed by executing SEM 2

Unambiguous (non-homophonous) PHON

PHON I-Language:LEXICON

COMBINATORICS SEM

InstructionExecuter

one or more complex concepts

Down and To the left

Up andTo the right

Familiar Analogy for ambiguity/homophony

Intuiting Instructions

• maybe we can intuit the “pairability” of a given phonological instruction with a semantic instruction

• intuiting a reading may just be recognizing that one’s I-Language can pair a given PHON with a certain SEM

• intuiting the absence of a reading may be recognizing that one’s I-Language cannot pair a certain PHON with the SEM of a superficially similar PHON

• no need to appeal to infallibility

• one can miss readings (‘I almost had my wallet stolen’), have limited memory (‘The rat the cat the dog chased chased ate the cheese’), be subject to illusions, etc.

Linguists and Eye Doctors

(7) Was the cook who fed waffles fed the thief?

Which re-presentation is better?

(a) The cook who fed waffles was fed the thief?

or (b) The cook who was fed waffles fed the thief?

(18) John is eager to please

Which re-presentation is better?

(a) John is eager that he please relevant parties

or (b) John is eager that relevant parties please him

many cases are, of course, less clear cut; and recentdevelopments in testing for “gradable” intuitions are germane

Intuitings vs. Judgments

• Intuitings are not judgings, but there may be judgings with the same (or closely related) intuited contents

• One can judge (via testimony, or a theory) that one’s own I-Language can/cannot pair a certain PHON with a certain SEM without undergoing a relevant intuiting (triggered by the PHON in question)

• One can have such an intuiting without judging that one’s own I-Language can/cannot pair the PHON with the SEM in question

Unambiguous (non-homophonous) PHON

PHON I-Language:LEXICON

COMBINATORICS SEM

InstructionExecuter

one or more complex concepts

First Stage Representation of Scene(including any representations of speakers intentions)

ENVIRONMENT

Second Stage Representation of Scene

Relevant Perceptual

and InferentialSystems

constructed concept

Judger

JUDGMENT: Yes or No( the concept applies/doesn’t)

an intuiting may reflect this and nothing more: the PHON is paired with a certain SEM, which the mind can go to work on

Ambiguous (homophonous) PHON

PHON I-Language:LEXICON

COMBINATORICS

SEM 1 InstructionExecuter SEM 2

intuitings may reflect this and nothing more: the PHON is paired with two particular SEMs, which the mind can go to work on

QUESTION: if SEMs themselves have truth conditions, how do we intuit (or extuit) the availability/absence of readings?Wouldn’t this require that intuitings reflect a “larger portion” of the more complicated picture?

PHON I-Language:LEXICON

COMBINATORICS SEM

InstructionExecuter

one or more complex concepts

First Stage Representation of Scene(including any representations of speakers intentions)

ENVIRONMENT

Second Stage Representation of Scene

Relevant Perceptual

and InferentialSystems

one of theconstructed concepts (perhaps “refined”)Judger

JUDGMENT: Yes or No( the concept applies/doesn’t)

Judgments may have truth conditions; but they are not intuitings. Intuitings are good data for theories of the system that generates SEMs. But it is hard to see how SEMs could play this role for linguists, and still play the required role in our psychology, if SEMs themselves had truth conditions—as opposed to being instructions to build concepts.

Overview of Talk

• The “intuitions” that matter for (careful) linguists are intuitions of contrast—often concerning the interpretive possibilities for “minimal pairs” of word-strings

• Distinguish: acceptability/grammaticality/well-formedness

data/phenomena

intuitings/intuiteds/judgments

• “Intuitions” suggest at least two kinds of phenonema

(i) constraints on grammaticality (ii) semantic intuitings

• Intuitings do not reflect well-formedness or truth-conditions; they reflect instructions to build concepts, which are neither syntactic nor classically semantic

THANKS

• Slides that follow are not part of the talk• These are here in case there are questions about how a

single instruction might be executed in more than one way (yielding polysemy but not ambiguity/homophony), yet the result be a single concept “judged” to apply (because one way of executing the instruction “drops out” when other expressions are considered

SEM(‘hexagonal’) = fetch@‘hexagonal’

SEM(‘republic’) = fetch@‘republic’

SEM(‘hexagonal republic’) =

CONJOIN[fetch@‘hexagonal’, fetch@‘republic’]

HEXAGONAL(_)REPUBLIC(_)

Her country is hexagonal/mountainous/nearbyHer country is a republic/politically stable/wealthy

two or more fetchable concepts may reside at ‘country’

two or more fetchable concepts may reside at ‘country’

fetch@‘country’ TERRA-COUNTRY(_)

POLIS-COUNTRY(_)

CONJOIN[fetch@‘country’, fetch@‘hexagonal’] TERRA-COUNTRY(_)HEXAGONAL(_)

POLIS-COUNTRY(_)HEXAGONAL(_)

CONJOIN[fetch@‘country’, fetch@‘hexagonal’] TERRA-COUNTRY(_)REPUBLIC(_)

POLIS-COUNTRY(_)REPUBLIC(_)