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Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

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Page 1: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Intrusion Detection System

Alan TAM

Program Committee, PISA

Page 2: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Definition and Needs

• IDS = Intrusion Detection System

• Not firewall

• Content inspection

Page 3: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Technology

• Signature detection

• Anomaly detection

Page 4: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

General IDS Model

• Sensor• Analyzer• Manager• Administrator• Operator

Sensor

Analyzer

Manager

Sensor

Administrator

Operator

Data SourceActivity

Sec

urity

Pol

icy

Sec

urity

Pol

icy

Sec

urity

Pol

icy

Sec

urity

Pol

icy

Not

ifica

tions

Res

pons

e

AlertsEvents

Eve

nts

Page 5: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Basic Classification

• NIDS - Network Based– e.g. Cisco Secure IDS , Axent Netpowler,

Snort, ISS RealSecure Network Sensor, NAI Cybercop Monitor

• HIDS - Host Based– e.g. Axent Intruder Alert, ISS RealSecure OS

Sensor, Tripwire

Page 6: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Functional Classification

• Packet capturing + Pattern matching

• Log parser

• Host firewall

• File integrity checker

• Activity monitor

Page 7: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Deployment Tips (1)

• Dual NIC– No TCP/IP binding– Network Performance– Security

• NIC optimization settings

• Promiscuous mode

Page 8: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Deployment Tips (2)

• Locations– DMZ– In front of firewall– Behind firewall– Server segments– “Power user” segments

Page 9: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Deployment Tips (3)

• Generic OS hardening & optimization– TCP/IP services– NetBIOS services– File & directory permission– Useless background process– Peripherals

Page 10: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Deployment Tips (4)

• Miscellaneous– Automatic mass deployment of HIDS– Downtime against SLA– Tuning of false alarms– Do policy customization (no kidding)– Monitor log grow-up rate

Page 11: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Problem Scenarios (1)

• Signature quality– False POSITIVES– False NEGATIVES– Threshold values– Duplicates elimination

• Encrypted traffic– SSL, IPSEC & PPTP tunnels, PGP attachment

Page 12: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Problem Scenarios (2)

• Switch instead of Hub– Collision domain– Port Spanning/Mirroring/Monitoring– Performance degrade

• High speed network– Packet drop– DoS

Page 13: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

How to choose an IDS (1)

• Attack Signature– Quality– Update frequency– Update mechanism

Page 14: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

How to choose an IDS (2)

• Scalability– Traffic handling capacity– Shutdown mechanism– Supported platforms (HIDS)

Page 15: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

How to choose an IDS (3)

• Manageability– Examining log– Cross reference– Archiving– Centralized console

Page 16: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

How to choose an IDS (4)

• Hardware platform– Intel based– SPARC based

Page 17: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Response Actions (1)

• Log– Header, significant application data– Raw packet

• Alert– Console– Email– SNMP Traps

Page 18: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Response Actions (2)

• Termination– TCP kill– Kernel drop

• Third-party Integration– Firewall– Router

Page 19: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Response Actions (3)

• User Script– Increase log level– Modem to Pager– Email to SMS– Redirect to Honey Pot

Page 20: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Previous Battlefield

• IP defragmentation

• TCP stream reassembly

Page 21: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Today…

• IDS load balancing

• Hardware IDS– ASIC IDS module in a Chassis– ASIC Switch appliance

Page 22: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Standards

• CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures)

• IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format)

Page 23: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

CVE (1)

• Standardized name

• Interoperability between tools

• Tool comparison guidelines– CVE-Compatible– No. of signatures

Page 24: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA
Page 25: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

CVE (2)

• Version– As of August 2001: 20010507

• Classification– CVE candidate

(CAN-YYYY-XXXX)

– CVE entry(CVE-YYYY-XXXX)

Discovery

Assign candidatenumber

Editor propose to theboard

Modification votes

Accepted or Rejectedthen Published

Page 26: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Data Sources

• Security Focus - SecurityFocus.com weekly Newsletters(http://www.securityfocus.com/vdb)

• Network Computing and the SANS Institute - weekly Security Alert Consensus(http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/securityexpress/current/)

• ISS - monthly Security Alert Summary(http://xforce.iss.net/alerts/summaries.php)

• NIPC CyberNotes - biweekly issues(http://www.nipc.gov/cybernotes.htm)

Page 27: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Reference Source

AIXAPAR

ALLAIRE

ASCEND

ATSTAKE

AUSCERT

BID

BINDVIEW

BUGTRAQ

CALDERA

CERT

CERT-VN

CHECKPOINT

CIAC

CISCO

COMPAQ

CONECTIVA

CONFIRM

DEBIAN

EEYE

EL8

ERS

FREEBSD

FarmerVenema

FreeBSD

HERT

HP

IBM

INFOWAR

ISS

KSRT

L0PHT

MANDRAKE

MISC

MS

MSKB

NAI

NETBSD

NETECT

NTBUGTRAQ

NetBSD

OPENBSD

REDHAT

RSI

SCO

SEKURE

SF-INCIDENTS

SGI

SNI

SUN

SUNBUG

SUSE

TURBO

URL

VULN-DEV

WIN2KSEC

XF

Page 28: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Tips for using CVE

• Do not use general terms (e.g. buffer overflow) to search

• Use exact process name (e.g. sendmail)

• Go to the “references” for Fix

Page 29: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

IDWG

• Intrusion Detection Working Group• Aims

– Define data format– Define exchange procedure

• Outputs– Requirement document– Common intrusion language specification– Framework document

Page 30: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

IDMEF

• Standard data format (using XML)

• Interoperability

• Typical deployments:– Sensor to Manager– Database– Event correlation system– Centralized console

Page 31: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

IDMEF Addressed Problems

• Inherently heterogeneous information

• Different sensor types

• Different analyzer capabilities

• Different operation systems

• Different objectives of commercial vendors

Page 32: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Message Classes (1)

• IDMEF-Message Class

• Alert Class– ToolAlert– CorrelationAlert– OverflowAlert

• Heartbeat Class

Page 33: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Message Classes (2)

• Core Classes– Analyzer– Source– Target– Classification– Additional Data

Page 34: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Message Classes (3)

• Time Class– CreatTime– DetectTime– AnalyzerTime

Page 35: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Message Classes (4)

• Support Class– Node– User– Process– Service

Page 36: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Example<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<!DOCTYPE IDMEF-Message PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD RFCxxxx IDMEF v0.3//EN"

"idmef-message.dtd">

<IDMEF-Message version="0.3">

<Alert ident="abc123456789" impact="successful-dos">

<Analyzer analyzerid="hq-dmz-analyzer01">

<Node category="dns">

<location>Headquarters DMZ Network</location>

<name>analyzer01.bigcompany.com</name>

</Node>

</Analyzer>

<CreateTime ntpstamp="0x12345678.0x98765432">

2000-03-09T10:01:25.93464-05:00

</CreateTime>

<Source ident="a1b2c3d4">

<Node ident="a1b2c3d4-001" category="dns">

<name>badguy.hacker.net</name>

<Address ident="a1b2c3d4-002" category="ipv4-net-mask">

<address>123.234.231.121</address>

<netmask>255.255.255.255</netmask>

</Address>

</Node>

</Source>

<Target ident="d1c2b3a4">

<Node ident="d1c2b3a4-001" category="dns">

<Address category="ipv4-addr-hex">

<address>0xde796f70</address>

</Address>

</Node>

</Target>

<Classification origin="bugtraqid">

<name>124</name>

<url>http://www.securityfocus.com</url>

</Classification>

</Alert>

</IDMEF-Message>

Page 37: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Summary

• IDS Classification

• IDS Deployment Considerations

• How to choose an IDS

• Industry standards

Page 38: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

HKCERT/CC

• Web - http://www.hongkongcert.org• Telephone - 2788 6060

• Fax - 2190 9760

• Email - mailto:[email protected]

Page 39: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Reference

• http://cve.mitre.org/cve

• http://www.silicondefense.com/idwg/

• http://www.securityfocus.com/

Page 40: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Thank You

• For suggestions and corrections, please send email to

[email protected]

or

[email protected]

Page 41: Intrusion Detection System Alan TAM Program Committee, PISA

Discussion

• SLA - cannot stop service immediately

• Switch to standby system if possible• Contingency planning

• Trace the source; Track its activity