IntroductoryVolumetoSystematic

Theology

byLouisBerkhof

TABLEOFCONTENTS

Preface

TheIdeaandHistoryofDogmaticTheology

I.NamesAppliedtotheSystematicPresentationofTheology

II.TheNatureofDogmas

III.TheIdeaofDogmaticTheology

IV.TheTask,Method,andDistributionofDogmatics

V.HistoryofDogmatics

ThePrincipiaofDogmatics

I.PrincipiainGeneral

II.Religion

III.ThePrincipiumCognoscendiExternum(Revelation)

IV.TheInspirationofScripture

V.ThePrincipiumCognoscendiInternum

PREFACETOTHEREVISEDEDITION

ITisnotnecessarytosayverymuchnowthattherevisededitionofmyIntroductiontothestudyofSystematicTheologyappearsonthemarket.IcanonlysaythatIamtrulygrateful forthereceptionwhichthisworkhasenjoyed,andfor itsuseinever-increasingcircles.Whilethegeneralplanof theworkremained thesame, ithasbeenre-writtenandrevisedfrom cover to cover. In some cases small changes were brought on, inorder to clarify the thought, while in others the modifications wereconsiderable. A great deal of historical material has been added, andmore attention has been paid to recent movements in theology. ThisbringstheIntroductionmoreinharmonywiththesecondeditionofmySystematicTheology.Myonlyprayer is that thework in thisnew formmay be of even greater usefulness, and may contribute in some smallmeasuretothestudyofReformedtheologyinourCountry.

-L.BERKHOF

TheIdeaandHistoryofDogmaticTheology

I.NamesAppliedtotheSystematicPresentationofTheology

Therewas littleornoattempt inthe first twocenturiesof theChristianeratopresentthewholebodyofdoctrinaltruth,gatheredfromtheWordofGod, inasystematicway.Yet theurgeof thehumanmindtosee thetruthasmuchaspossibleasawholecouldnotlongbesuppressed.Manisendowedwithreason,andthehumanreasoncannotrestsatisfiedwithamerecollectionofseparatetruths,butwantstoseethemintheirmutualrelationship,inorderthatitmayhaveaclearerunderstandingofthem.Itinvoluntarilybeginstogroupdisconnectedtruths,toclassifythem,andtointegrate them, so that their interrelation becomes evident. Objectionshave frequently been raised against a systematic presentation of thedoctrinal truths of Scripture; and also in the present day some aredecidedlyaversetoit.Thereseemstobealurkingfearthatthemorewesystematize thetruth, the fartherwewander fromthepresentationof it

that is found in theWordofGod.But there isnodanger of this, if thesystem is not based on the fundamental principles of some erringphilosophy,butontheabidingprinciplesofScriptureitself.Godcertainlyseesthetruthasawhole,anditisthedutyofthetheologiantothinkthetruthsofGodafterHim.ThereshouldbeaconstantendeavortoseethetruthasGodsees it, even though it isperfectlyevident that the ideal isbeyondthegraspofmaninhispresentcondition.

TheChurchhasneverhesitatedonthispoint.Fromthebeginningofthethird century on several works appeared which aimed at giving acompletepresentationofthedoctrinaltruthsofScripture.Theiraimwassimilar,buttheydifferedincharacteranddidnotalwaysbearthesametitle. Origen was the first one of the Church Fathers who gave asystematicpresentationofdoctrinaltheologyunderthetitlePeriArchon.Onlyfragmentsoftheoriginalhavebeenpreserved;butthewholeworkhascomedowntothepresentintheLatintranslationofRufinus,datingfromthefourthcentury,underthetitleDePrincipiis.By'FirstPrinciples'Origen meant the "fundamental doctrines and leading articles of thefaith." Lactantius was the second to write a work of that nature. Heentitled his work Divinarum Institutionum Libri VII. It is really anApologyfortheChristianreligioncharacterizedbygreateleganceofstyle.Augustine followed in the fifth century with his Enchiridion (meaning,'Handbook'),anddesignated itscontentsbyadding"sivede fide, speetcaritate."ItisreallyanexpositionoftheCreed,inwhichtheauthorexaltsthe sovereign grace ofGod and the savingwork of Christ as connectedwithHisdeathonthecross.Thisworkbecamealmostasauthoritativeinthe Church as the Creed itself. Toward the end of the patristic periodJohn of Damascus wrote a systematic treatise under the title EkdosisAkribesTesOrthodoxouPisteos(anAccurateExpositionoftheOrthodoxFaith). This ismore like amodernwork onDogmatics than any of thepreceding. Itwasdivided into fourbooks,dealingwith (1)Godand theTrinity; (2) Creation and the Nature of Man; (3) Christ and HisIncarnation, Death, and Descent into Hades; and (4) the ResurrectionandReignofChrist,includingtherestoftheology.

DuringtheMiddleAgesthenatureofthedoctrinalworksthatappearedwere of a somewhat different nature. They were not grounded on

Scripturetothesameextent,butwerebasedlargelyonwhattheearlierFathershadwritten.ItwasthenthatthenameSententiaecameintouse.Thenameitselfindicatesthattheworksconsistedlargelyofcompilationsfrom the Fathers. The most important of these was that of Peter theLombard,DeLibresSententiarum.Thisisnotmerelyacompilation,butalsocontainsagreatdealoforiginalmaterial.ItremainedtheHandbookforthestudyoftheologyparexcellenceforthreecenturies.Along-sideofthenameSententiae thenameSummagradually came intouse, and incourse of time supplanted the earlier title. The most important of theSummae is that of Thomas Aquinas, the great authority of the RomanCatholicChurch.Theauthordidnotlivetofinishthework.Additionstoit from some of his other works supply at least in a measure what islacking.

At the time of the Reformation, and after that, still other titles ofdoctrinal works came into use. Melanchton was the first greatdogmatician of the Lutheran Church. He entitled his work LociCommunes rerum theologicarum (Common-places of TheologicalMatters).ItgrewoutofacourseoflecturesontheEpistletotheRomans.SeveralotherLutherantheologiansusedverysimilar titles. Incourseoftime,however, italsofell intodisuse.ZwingliwroteaCommentariusdevera et falsa religione, which has been called "the first systematicexpositionoftheReformedfaith."AndCalvinentitledhisprincipalworkInstitutio Religionis Christianae, a title which was adopted by severalothers.EveninthenineteenthcenturyitappearedinamodifiedforminRichard Watson's Theological Institutes, and without any change inGerhart'sInstitutesoftheChristianReligion.

AftertheReformation,however,thenameTheologiabecameincreasinglyprevalent among Lutheran and Reformed theologians. And when thenumber of theological studies increased, it became quite apparent thatthis name required some delimitation, and the adjectives didactica,systematica, theoretica, positiva, and dogmatica served the purpose. L.Reinhart(1659)seemstohavebeenthefirstonetousethelastterm.HeentitledhisworkSynopsis theologiaedogmaticae.Since thecontentsofthe Christian faith had long been designated as dogmata, themodifierwasgraduallyusedindependently,andtheprincipalterm(theologia)was

dropped, though it is always understood. Under the influence ofSchleiermacher,whocalledhisprincipalworkChristlicherGlaubenachdenGrundsaetzen der evengelischen Kirche, the title Doctrine of Faith(Dutch:Geloofsleer)cameintouse.

Inmore recentworkswe find a variety of titles, such as The ChristianFaith (Haering, Curtis); Christian Theology (Knapp, Pope, Valentine);Dogmatics,Dogmatik,GereformeerdeDogmatiek, ChristlicheDogmatik(Kaftan,Bavinck,Honig,Barth);DogmaticTheology (Shedd,Hall);andSystematic Theology (Raymond, Hodge, Miley, Strong). Reformedscholars inGermanyand in theNetherlandsshowadecidedpreferencefor thetitleDogmatics,withorwithoutamodifier. Inourowncountry,however, the term Systematic Theology seems to have amore popularappeal. From an ideal point of view the former certainly deservespreference,(1)becauseit isthemorespecificofthetwo,anddesignatesthe real object of study with greater precision; and (2) because themodifier 'systematic' in 'Systematic Theology' is apt to create theimpression that the study under consideration is the only theologicalstudywhichtreatsitssubject-matterinalogicalorder,orthatamongthetheologicaldisciplinethereisnootherthatissystematicinstructure;andthisisnottrue.Forpracticalreasons,however,itseemsmoredesirable,especially in our country and in our day, to use the title SystematicTheology. This does not require the sacrifice of any principle. Dr.Warfield even considers this title better than the other, and thereforecomestoitsdefense.

II.TheNatureofDogmas

A.TheName'Dogma'

SYSTEMATIC Theology or Dogmatics deals with the dogmata, theaccepted doctrines of the Church. This makes it necessary to considertheir general character first of all. In this connection thename 'dogma'

deservesbriefconsideration.

1.DERIVATIONANDMEANINGOFTHETERM.Theword 'dogma' isderived from the Greek verb dokein. In classical Greek the expressiondokeinmoimeantnotonly, itseemstome,or,Iamoftheopinion,butalso,Ihavecometotheconclusion,Iamcertain,itismyconviction.Andit is especially this idea of certainty that finds expression in the word'dogma'.Whileadogmamightintheabstractbeamereprivateopinion,in common parlance it was generally regarded as an axiomatic or self-evident truth, an official ordinance, or a well founded and formulatedarticle of belief. There are not only religious dogmas, but scientific,philosophical, and political dogmas as well. The fundamental andsupposedlyunchangeableprinciplesofscience,theestablishedteachingsof philosophy, the decrees of governments, and the generally accepteddoctrines of religion,—they are all dogmata.Modern liberal theologiansmight well bear this in mind, for a great deal of their criticism of theconcept of dogma proceeds from the mistaken assumption that it issomethingentirelypeculiartoreligion.Alldogmatahavethisincommon,thattheyareclothedwithacertainauthority.Naturally,thebasisofthisauthority differs. Scientific dogmas have the authority of axiomatic orself-evident truth.Philosophicaldogmasderive theirauthority fromthegenerally admitted arguments by which they are established. Politicaldogmasareclothedwiththeauthorityof thegovernmentbywhichtheyaredecreed.Andreligiousdogmasarebasedondivinerevelation(eitherrealorsupposed),andarethereforeauthoritative.

2.THEBIBLICALUSEOFTHEWORD.Theword'dogma'isfoundbothintheGreektranslationoftheOldTestament(theSeptuagint),andintheNewTestament.Itisusedseveraltimestodenotegovernmentaldecrees,Esth.3:9;Dan.2:13;6:8;Luke2:1;Acts17:7.IntwopassagesitservesasadesignationoftheMosaicordinances,Eph.2:15;Col.2:14.AndinActs16:4 it is applied to the decisions of the assembly of the apostles andelders recorded in the preceding chapter. The use of the term in thispassage is particularly important, because it speaks of an ecclesiasticaldecision,andthereforevirtuallyfurnishesabasisforthetheologicaluseof the term. It is true that theassemblyatJerusalemdidnot formulateanydoctrine,butitsdecisioncertainlyhaddoctrinalbearings.Moreover,

this decision was clothed with divine authority, and was absolutelybinding on the churches for which it was intended. It was not amereadvicewhichthesechurchescouldfollowuporignore,astheysawfit,buta burden placed upon them to which they had to submit. The passageunderconsiderationthereforecontainsat leastan intimationof thefactthatareligiousdogmaisadoctrineofficiallydefinedbytheChurchanddeclaredtorestupondivineauthority.

3.VARIOUSUSESOFTHETERMINTHEOLOGY.Intheologytheword'dogma' has not always been used in the same sense. The theologicalliteratureofthepastsometimesemploysthewordinaratherloosesense,as practically equivalent with 'doctrine'. But when it speaks of dogmaswithprecision,itreferstothosestatementsorformulationsofdoctrineswhichareregardedasestablishedtruthsbythebodyofChristianswhichformulated them, and which are therefore clothed with authority. Theearly Church Fathers speak of the truths of the Christian faith, as theywererecognized in theChurch,asdogmata,andalsoapply this termtotheteachingsof theheretics.DuringtheMiddleAgesasomewhatmorespecific conception of dogmas was developed by the Roman CatholicChurch.InthatChurchadogmahascometoberegardedas"arevealedtruth which has in some way been defined by an infallible teachingauthority,andassuchisproposedtotheacceptanceofthefaithful."Sucha truth need not necessarily be revealed in Scripture, but may also berevealedinoraltradition.TheimportantthingisthattheChurchdeclaresittoberevealed,andimposesitassuchupontheChurch.ThusitisreallymadetorestontheauthorityoftheChurch.

The Reformers, and Protestant theology in general, broke with thishierarchicalview,andregardeddogmasasdivinetruths,clearlyrevealedin theWord ofGod, formulated by some competent Church body, andregarded as authoritative, because they are derived from the Word ofGod.Thoughtheyascribedtothemagreatmeasureofpermanenceandstability,theydidnot,anddonotnow,regardthemasinfallible.

AnotablechangecameaboutthroughSchleiermacher,whoveeredfromtheobjectivetothesubjectiveinhisconceptionofthesourceofdogmas.SinceheconsideredChristianexperienceastheirsource,hesawinthemthe intellectual expressions, authorized by the Church, of the inner

meaning of the religious experiences of the Christian community.Ritschlian theology pretends to be more objective in its conception ofdogmas,butis,asamatteroffact,justassubjective.Itregardsdogmasasthe scientific affirmations of the faith of theChurch, that is, not of thecontents of this faith, but of that which is involved in it. In thisrepresentation faith, the fides qua creditur, becomes the source ofdogmas,andthisis justassubjectiveasreligiousexperience.Whileit isperfectly true that this faith does not arise apart from the divinerevelation, this is equally true of the religious experience of whichSchleiermacherspeaks.

TheSchleiermacherianandRitschlianconceptionsofdogmasstillprevailin many circles. But in more recent theology a new tendency ismanifestingitselftorecognizetheirobjectivecharacter.P.T.Forsyth,ofwhom McConnachie speaks as "a Barthian before Barth," speaks ofdogmaas"finalrevelationingerminalstatement,"andas"God'sactputastruth."ThefundamentalredemptiveactsofGod,revealedintheBible(and therefore expressed inwords), constitute the dogma,which is thefoundation of the Church. In distinction from it, doctrine is theinterpretationof the revealeddogma,and thereforenot the foundation,buttheproductoftheChurch.EventheinterpretationsoftheactsofGodfoundinScripturemustberegardedasdoctrinesratherthanasdogmas.

ThereisindeedsomeagreementbetweenthepositionofForsythandthatofBarth, though therearealsopointsofdifference.Barthdistinguishesbetween 'dogma' in the singular and 'dogmas' in the plural.He defines'dogma'as"Churchproclamation,sofarasitreallyagreeswiththeBibleastheWordofGod."Inanotherplacehespeaksofitas"theagreementofChurch proclamation with the revelation attested in Holy Scripture."3Andthisrevelation isnot toberegardedasadoctrinalproposition,butratherasdivineaction,asabehestordecree,callingforactiononman'spart. 'Dogmas' in the plural, however, are "the doctrinal propositionsacknowledgedandconfessedby theChurch,whicharedeposited in theChurchSymbols,withtheirrelativeauthority."Theyarethewordofmanwhichcomesoutof theWordofGod,worthyofvenerationandrespectindeed,yetonlythewordofman.Theydonotconstitutetheobject,(like'dogma'),butonlytheexpressionoffaith.

Finally,Micklemisalsoverymuchinlinewiththesetwomen,whenhesays:"ThefundamentalanddistinctivedogmasoftheChristianfaitharenotintermsofabstracttruth,butintermsofthemightyactsofGod.Thatwhichformsanessentialpartofthegospelstoryisdogma;thatwhichisinterpretationofthestoryistheology."ThefinalstatementalsoappliestotheinterpretationthatisfoundintheBibleitself.Itneedhardlybesaidthat the views of these men are moving along lines which are quiteforeigntoReformedtheology.

B.TheFormalCharacteristicsofDogmas

Some have spoken of dogmas simply as the substance of the Christianfaith,but thisview is too indefiniteand findsnosupportwhatsoever inScripture.Itdoesnotdojusticetotheirofficialcharacter.TheyaretruthsderivedfromtheWordofGod,butthefactthattheyaresoderiveddoesnotyetmakethemdogmasinthestrictsenseoftheword.Therearenodogmasas such in theBible, though thedoctrinal teachingswhich theyembodyare found there.But thesebecomedogmasonlywhen theyareformulated and officially adopted by the Church. It may be said thatreligiousdogmashavethreecharacteristics,namely:theirsubject-matterisderivedfromScripture;theyarethefruitofthereflectionoftheChurchonthetruth,asitisrevealedintheBible;andtheyareofficiallyadoptedbysomecompetentecclesiasticalbody.

1. THEIR SUBJECT-MATTER IS DERIVED FROM SCRIPTURE. TheBible is God's Word, the book which is His continuous revelation ofredemptionforallsuccessivegenerations.Itacquaintsuswiththemightyredemptive acts of God, and also furnishes mankind with a reliableinterpretationoftheseacts.Itmaythereforebesaidtobebothaword—and a fact—revelation; and both these words and facts have doctrinalsignificance.Naturally,themeaningofthefactscanonlybeexpressedinwords. Both the facts and the words have doctrinal significance, andtherefore furnish the subject-matter of dogmas. The position of thosewho find the real revelation of God in Scripture only in the mightyredemptiveactsofGod(asForsyth,Barth,Bultmann,Micklem)involvesadenialofthefactthateverypartoftheBibleisequallytheWordofGod.Moreover,itdoesnottakesufficientaccountofthefactthatwehavenoreliable information respecting theactsofGodapart from thewords in

whichHeHimselfdescribesthese.AndtheideathatonlytheactsofGodputas truth,orproclaimedby theChurch, formthereal foundation fordogma(s), clothed with divine authority, really makes an unwarranteddistinctionbetweentheScripturalwordswhichdescribethefactsandthewordswhichinterpretthem,byregardingthelatteraslessauthoritative.According to our Reformed conception the Bible does not containdogmas, but does contain the doctrinal truths which they embody.Doctrinalpropositions,whicharenotderivedfromtheWordofGod,canneverbecomeecclesiasticaldogmas.

Roman Catholics speak of dogmas in the strict sense of the word as"truths contained in the Word of God, written or unwritten—i.e. inScriptureor tradition—andproposedbytheChurchfor thebeliefof thefaithful." The Vatican Council expresses itself as follows: "Further allthose thingsare tobebelievedwithdivineandCatholic faithwhicharecontained in theWordofGod,writtenorhandeddown, andwhich theChurch, eitherbya solemn judgment, orbyherordinaryanduniversalmagisterium, proposes for belief as having been divinely revealed."Historical Protestantism, of course, does not thus coördinate Scriptureandtradition.Itmaintainsthatthedoctrinaltruthsembodiedindogmasare either contained explicitly in Scripture, or are deduced from it by"goodandnecessary consequence."Dogmasarenotmere repetitionsofScripture statements, but careful, albeit human and therefore fallible,formulationsof doctrines contained in theWordofGod.Their subject-matter isderived fromHolyWrit. If itwerenot soderived, theywouldnotbedogmas.

It is not superfluous to stress this fact at the present time. Since thebeginning of the nineteenth century another view of the derivation ofdogmas gradually gained the ascendancy in some Protestant circles.Schleiermacher, the father of modern theology, does not derive thematerial content of the dogmas of the Church from the facts or truthsrevealedinScripture,but fromtheChristianconsciousnessorChristianexperience.Hedeclares the articles of faith tobe "conceptionsofpiousfeelingsetforthinlanguage."Onthatviewtheyceasetobestatementsofthe truth respectingGodandHiswill, andbecomemereexpressionsofthe meaning of the ever changing experience of man. Mackintosh

correctlysays:"Ifwordsmeananything,doctrineisforhimastatementaboutourfeeling,notaboutGod."Andfromthis italsofollowsthat forSchleiermacheritisnotthequestion,whetherthedogmasofreligionareobjectivelytrue,butonlywhethertheyrightlyexpressthevariousstatesof feeling.Edghill says thathe conceivesofdogmaas the expressionof"ever varying life," and points out that this involves the denial of anypermanentauthorityinthestatementofreligious"belief."2

The Ritschlian view does not differ from this materially, though itpretendstobemoreobjectivebytakingitsstartingpointintherevelationofGodgiveninJesusChrist.ItseemsratherencouragingtofindKaftansaying: "Voraussetzung ist dabei, dass die Dogmen aus goettlicherOffenbarung stammen und, auf evangelischem Gebiet, dass sie demGlauben und Bekenntniss der Gemeinde entsprechen." But it soonbecomes apparent that,while he certainlywants to take account of theobjectiverevelationofGodinJesusChrist,heinterposesthefaithoftheChurchbetweenthisrevelationandthedogmatician.Andwhenhespeaksoffaith,heisnotthinkingoffaithintheobjectivesense,asitisexpressedinthesymbolsoftheChurch,thefidesquaecreditur,butoffaithinthesubjective sense, the fides qua creditur. Moreover, he does not evenconceiveofthisfaithasanintellectualapprehensionofthetruthrevealedin the Word of God, but as fiducia, trust, that is, as a practicallyconditionedspiritualrelationshiptoitsobject,whichispresentedintheWord of God. This faith includes knowledge, but this knowledge ispractical,experientialratherthanintellectual,knowledgeresultingfroma life in communionwithGod.Man cannot knowGod, except asHe ismirrored in faith. (Kantian) And this practical knowledge, involved infaith, is expressed in dogmas. Thus dogmas are not the object, but theexpressionoffaith.Faithbecomesthesourceofdogmas.ThismeansthatRitschliantheologyrejectstheolderProtestantconceptionofdogmasasformulationsofthetruththatisfoundintheWordofGod,andseekstoderive their content from the Christian faith as this is determined in arather speculative way by value judgments. "Dogma," says Lobstein,anotherRitschlianscholar,"is thescientificexpositionof theProtestantfaith."Onpage75ofthesameworkhestatesexplicitlythat"thesourceofdogmaticsisfaith."

Asomewhatsimilarsubjectiveview isalso foundamongtheEthicals intheNetherlands.J.VanderSluisinhisworkonDeEthischeRichting,p23, quotes a word of Prof. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, which is verymuch in harmony with the Ritschlian position: "De leer onstaat na endoor het leven. Zij is de vrucht van het nadenkend verstand over dewaarheid,wanneerdiewaarheidtotlevengewordenisindeziel."AndDr.Is.VanDijksays:"Indienwijeenbepalingvandogmemoestengeven,wijzoudenhetaldusdoen:Hetdogmeisdevruchtderpoging,eenbepaalderelatievanhetlevendergemeenteindetaaldesverstandsomtezetten."2

2. DOGMAS ARE THE FRUIT OF DOGMATIC REFLECTION. TheChurchdoesnotfindherdogmasinfinishedformonthepagesofHolyWrit,butobtainsthembyreflectingonthetruthsrevealedintheWordofGod. The Christian consciousness not only appropriates the truth, butalso feelsan irrepressibleurge to reproduce itand tosee it in itsgrandunity.Whiletheintellectgivesguidanceanddirectiontothisreflection,itisnotpurelyanintellectualactivity,butonethatismoralandemotionalaswell. The understanding, thewill, the affections, in short, thewholeman, is brought into play. All the faculties of his soul and all themovementsofhisinnerlifecontributetothefinalresult.Broaderstill,itisnotmerelytheindividualChristian,butrathertheChurchofGodasawhole,under the guidanceof theHolySpirit, that is the subject of thisreflective activity. The spiritual man is the only one that is fit for thiswork,andevenhecanobtainaproperandadequateunderstandingofthetruth in all its relations, and in all its fulness and grandeur, only incommunionandincoöperationwithallthesaints.WhentheChurch,ledbytheHolySpirit,reflectsonthetruth,thistakesadefiniteshapeinherconsciousness and gradually crystalizes into clearly defined doctrinalviews and utterances. The formation of dogmas is not always a shortprocess,norisitasimpleone.Itscourseisfrequentlydeterminedmoreorlessbylong-drawncontroversies.Thesearenotalwaysedifying,sincethey often generate a scorching heat and frequently lead to unholyantagonisms.At thesametimetheyareof thegreatest importance,andserveto focustheattentionsharplyonthequestion indebate, toclarifythe issue at stake, to bring the different aspects of a problem into theopen, and to point theway to a proper solution. The Church is largelyindebtedtothegreatdoctrinalcontroversiesofthepastforitsprogressin

the understanding of the truth. Seeberg calls attention to the variouselements that entered into the construction of dogmas when he says:"Dogma is an exceedingly complicated historical structure. It has in itvarious constituent parts, constructed as they have been in the face ofmultifarious forms of opposition, and under the inspiration of manypractical (ethical and devotional) impulses and external (political andcanonical) occasions, received the impress of different theologicaltendencies."2Not all periods of historyhave been equally conducive tothe reflection required for the formation of dogmas. It calls for deepspirituality,forreligiousfervor,forwillingsubjectiontothetruthasitisrevealed in theWordofGod, for a consumingpassion to gain an ever-increasinginsightintothetruthinallitsbearings,fordiligentexegeticalstudy, and for constructive ability. Cold Rationalism and sentimentalPietismare equally inimical to it.And certainly suchanage asours, inwhichphilosophicalspeculationsandpsychologicalanalyseshavelargelytaken the place of real theological study, is not favorable to theconstructionoftheologicaldogmas.Thereisverylittlerecognitionofthesupreme importance of reflecting on the truth as it is revealed in theWordofGod.Infact,thereisawidespreadanddecidedoppositiontotheideathatmanmustleadhisthoughtscaptivetotheobedienceofChrist,andmust in his search for the truth respecting God andman, sin andredemption,lifeanddeath,basehisthoughtonthewordofauthority,theinspiredWordofGod, rather thanon thediscoveries of falliblehumanreason.

3. DOGMAS ARE OFFICIALLY DEFINED BY SOME COMPETENTECCLESIASTICALBODY. The final step in the formation of dogmas istheirspecificformulationandformalacceptancebysomeofficialChurchbody. It isgenerallyagreed that suchanofficialactionof theChurch isnecessary.RomanCatholicsandProtestantsareof thesameopiniononthispoint.Andevenmodern theologians, in spiteof their subjectivism,voice their concurrence, because they believe that "dogma must haveattached to it an idea of collectivity and an idea of authority."Schleiermacherrecognizedonlythosereligioustruthsasdogmas,whichwereacceptedassuchbytheChurch.Lobsteinsays:"Itisveryevident,ineffect, that dogma, in its precise and historical sense, is nothing otherthanacreedofficiallydefinedandformulatedbyacompetentauthority,

that is to say, in this case, by theChurch going hand in handwith theState." And even George Burman Foster declares: "Dogmas aredeliverancesconcerningfaith,sustainedbyecclesiasticalauthority."2

Thequestionmayarise,WhatChurchbodyhasthepowertodeterminewhat shouldbebelieved?Harnackvirtually takes theposition thatonlyanecumenicalcouncil,representingtheChurchasawhole,candothis.For that reasonhe alsodenies the existenceof aProtestantdogma.HepointsoutthatProtestantismbrokeuptheunityoftheChurch,anditselfdoes not present a united front. Naturally, the Churches of theReformationdonotsharethisview.ReformedChurchesparticularlyhavealways stressed the fact that every local church is a completerepresentationof theChurchofJesusChrist,andthereforealsohasthepotestas dogmatica or docendi, the power to determine what shall berecognizedasadogmainherowncircle.

Butifsuchalocalchurchisaffiliatedwithanumberofsimilarchurchesinalargerorganization,itwillnaturallyhavetoleavethismattertomajorassemblies. It goeswithout saying that thedogmasofficiallydefinedbytheecumenicalcouncilsbestsatisfy thecommunalconsciousnessof theChurch; but it is arbitrary to speak of the dogmas formulated by thesecouncilsastheonlyrealdogmas.

Thedogmasofficiallyattestedbythechurchhaveauthority inthecircleinwhichtheyarerecognized.Thereisadifferenceofopinion,however,astothenatureofthisauthority.TheRomanCatholicChurchascribestoitsdogmasabsoluteauthority,notonlybecausetheyarerevealedtruths,buteven more particularly because they are infallibly apprehended andproposed by the Church for the belief of the faithful. The followingstatementinACatholicDictionary,ArticleDogmaissignificant:"Hencewithregardtoanewdefinition—such,e.g.,asthatofTransubstantiation,Christianshaveatwo-foldduty.Theyareobligedtobelieve,first,thatthedoctrine so defined is true, and next that it is a part of the Christianrevelation." Here the declaration of the Church has priority. Scriptureand tradition, says Wilmers, are "only the remote or mediate rules offaith,whiletheimmediateruleistheteachingChurch."Faithconsistsintheimplicitacceptanceofthetruthfromthehandsoftheecclesiadocens(the priesthood). And the authority of dogmas is really based on the

formaldeclarationoftheChurch.Thatauthorityisabsolute,becausetheChurchisinfallible.

The Churches of the Reformation broke with this view. While theymaintainthatadoctrinedoesnotbecomeadogma,anddoesnotacquireecclesiastical authority, until it is officially defined and accepted by theChurch, they ascribe authority to it only because, and in so far as, it isfounded on theWord ofGod. Their view of thematter can perhaps bebeststatedas follows.Materially(that is,as tocontents)dogmasderivetheirauthorityexclusivelyfromtheinfallibleWordofGod,butformally(thatis,astoform)theyderiveitfromtheChurch.Barthhasasomewhatdifferentviewonthispoint.Accordingtohimdogma,inthesingular,isChurchproclamationinsofarasitagreeswiththerevelationattestedinScripture. That revelation is not primarily a disclosure of truth, thoughthisisinvolved,butakerugma,aherald'scall,adivineimperative,whichcallsforaresponseonthepartofman.Thatkerugma,thatbehest,mustbemade contemporary in Church proclamation.Hence this should notintroduceGodasanobjectaboutwhichmanmustspeak,butasasubjectwhichaddressesman,andtowhichmanmustrespond.Andinsofarasitdoesthis,andisthereforereallyinagreementwiththerevelationattestedintheBible,itisdogma.Churchproclamationisanapproximationtotheoriginalrevelation,andnotaperfectreproductionofit;butinsofarasitdoesagreewithitandisthereforereallyGodspeakingtosinners inthepresent, it is clothed with divine authority. The dogma so conceivedshouldbedistinguishedfromthedogmas(plural),inwhichitisnotGodwhospeaks,buttheChurch,andwhichforthatreasonhaveonlyrelativeauthority.TheyaredoctrinalpropositionsacknowledgedandformulatedbytheChurch,thewordofmanwhichcomesoutoftheWordofGod.InthemtheChurchofthepastspeakstopresentgenerations,andpassesonorreproducesthetruthofGod'srevelationinsofaras ithas learnedtounderstanditundertheguidanceoftheHolySpirit.

Naturally,thefollowersofSchleiermacher,andeventhoseofRitschl,donot share the Reformed conception of the authority ascribed to thedogmasoftheChurch,thoughtheypretendtobeinagreementwiththeposition of the Reformers. They regard the view, presented in theprecedingasthatofReformedtheology,asbeinginrealitythemistaken

ideaofProtestantScholasticismwhichcamenighwrecking theworkoftheReformation.For themdogmasarenotderived fromScripture, butfrom the Christian consciousness, that is, from religious experience orfrom the Christian faith. They are clothed with authority only becausethey are sanctioned by the communal consciousness of the Church(Schleiermacher), or by that of Church and State combined (Lobstein).Moreover,theauthoritywhichtheyhaveisnotnormativeandregulative,so as to require submission and demand obedience, but is merely, asLobstein calls it, "a manifestation of the intrinsic force of the truth, ademonstrationofthespiritandofpower."HenceitisalsoregardedasaseriousblundertoascribealegalcharactertotheCreeds,whichembodythe dogmas of the Church, and to regard them as a possible basis fordisciplinaryaction.

C.TheNecessityofDogmas

Thepresentageisanundogmaticage.Thereisamanifestaversion,notonlytodogmas,buteventodoctrines,andtoasystematicpresentationofdoctrinaltruth.Duringthelasthalfacenturyveryfewdogmaticalworksmadetheirappearance,whilethemarketwasfloodedwithworksontheHistory ofReligions, the Philosophy ofReligion, and thePsychology ofReligion.Theassertion isoftenheardthatChristianity isnotadoctrinebuta life,and that itmakesvery littledifferencewhatwebelieve, ifwebutsharethelifeofChrist.Thereisaninsistentcry,especiallyinourowncountry,foraChristianitywithoutdogmas.Dogmaticalpreachingisnotin favor and is therefore avoided in many circles. Many conservativeChristians clamour for purely experiential preaching, while others of amoreliberaltypegreatlypreferethicalorsocialpreaching.

1.CAUSESOFPRESENTDAYOPPOSITIONTODOGMAS.Thequestionnaturally arises as to the possible explanation of this opposition todogmas.IntheChristianChurchatlargeitcanonlybeexplainedastheresult of certain philosophical tendencies. Under the influence of Kantthe dogmas of the Church gradually fell into disrepute. He denied thepossibility of theoretical knowledge of those things that transcend thephenomenalworld,andthereforealsoofsuchknowledgeofdivinethings.His epistemology was of far reaching influence, and received a newimpetus inthetheologyofRitschlandhisdisciples.Theresultwasthat

so-called theoretical knowledge of God and divine things soon fell intodisreputeinmanycircles.Hegelcomplainedabouttheundogmaticspiritof his day and sought to rehabilitate Christian dogma by means ofspeculative philosophy. Like the Gnostics of the second century, heproceededontheassumptionthat,ifitwerepointedoutthatChristianityis really a philosophy, it would naturally become popular in educatedcircles. And therefore he stressed the fact that true philosophy,consistently carried through, necessarily leads to the tenets of theChurch; and that Christian doctrines are nothing less than speculativetruths inpictorial form.Inhisopinion itwasonlynecessarytostripoffthis form, in order to liberate and disclose the real spiritual kernel ofphilosophicaltruth.ButtheattempttochangethefoolishnessofGodintothe wisdom of the world proved abortive. In the hands of left-wingHegelians, like Strauss and Biedermann, it soon became evident that,after the so-called huskwas removed, therewas very little Christianityleft,andthatthephilosophicalkernelwassomethingquitedifferentfromthe truth revealed in the Word of God. The Hegelian operation reallyresulted,asKaftansays,in"thebreaking-upofdogma."

ThereactionthatarosetooktheformofNeo-KantianisminthetheologyofRitschl.SaysDr.Orr inhisworkonTheRitschlianTheology,p.33f.:"Asaprimaryservice,KantfurnishedRitschlwithatheoryofknowledgepreciselysuitedtotherequirementsofhissystem.Thatourknowledgeisonly of phenomena; that God is theoretically incognoscible; that ourconviction of His existence rests on a practical, not on a theoreticjudgment—thesearethoughtswhich,weshallsee,areraisedinRitschliancirclesalmosttotherankoffirstprinciples."Henceitisnowonderthatthe work of Ritschl, and of such followers of his as Lotze, Herrmann,Harnack,Sabatier,andothers,wasonthewholeunfavorabletoChristiandogma,thoughtheoreticallyitdidnotruleitoutaltogether.

Finally, Dreyer in his Undogmatisches Christentummakes a plea for aChristianitywithoutdogma.Heargues(a)thattheancientdogmaswerenaturallycastintheconceptualformsofthedayinwhichtheyarose,andthattheseformsbecomeahindranceinatimewhenreligiousviewshaveundergone a fundamental change; and (b) that dogmas endanger theindependenceandfreedomthatisindispensablefortheChristianfaith.It

willreadilybeseenthatonlythesecondargumentbearsagainstdogmasassuch,butitisexactlythisargumentthatmarkstherealtendencyoftheworkunderconsideration.KaftanandLobsteinquiteagreewithDreyer,thatdogmashaveoftenbeenahindrance to faith,butat thesametimeconsiderthemnecessaryandpleadforanewdogma.Troeltschcomestothe conclusion that "an Ecclesiastical Protestant system of dogma nolongerexists,"andthattheProtestantChurcheswillhavetoseek"unionandcohesion"insomeotherspherethanthatofdogma.

Alongsideofthisdirectionofphilosophicalthought,therehave,ofcourse,been many other influences, too many to enumerate, which haveoperatedandcontinuetooperatetomakedogmasunpopular.Religiousfree-thinkersrepeatedlyraisetheirvoicesagainstdogmas,asencroachingupontheirreligiouslibertyandcallforfreedomintheChurch.Theynotinfrequentlyposeastherealchampionsoftherightofprivatejudgment,oneofthefundamentalprinciplesoftheReformation.Onmorethanoneoccasion a one-sided dogmatism led to a pietistic reaction. And it ischaracteristicofPietismthatitishostiletoallintellectualisminreligionandexaltsemotionalismandexperienceastheonlyrealmanifestationofthe religious life. It bidsChristianpeople escape from thewrangling ofdoctrinalcontroversiesbywithdrawing into thecitadelof theheart, theseat of the affections. In our own country Pietism has found a ratherwelcomeally in anActivism,whichholds that itmakes little differencewhatonebelieves,providedone isonlybusy intheworkof theLord.AgreatnumberofAmericanChristiansaremuch toobusy in all kindsofchurchactivitiestoconcernthemselvesverymuchaboutthestudyofthetruth.Theyarepracticalpragmatistsandareinterestedonlyinareligionthat promptly yields tangible results. Their knowledge of dogmas hasbeen reduced to a minimum. In fact both Pietists and Activists oftenclaim that Christian people should disengage themselves from thecomplexitiesofpresentdaydoctrinalsystemsandreturntothesimplicityof theApostolicAge,andpreferably to thewordsofJesus,whodidnotconcern Himself about dogmas. Many other anti-dogmatic tendenciesmight be mentioned, but these are sufficient to give us at least someunderstandingofpresentdayoppositiontodogmas.

2.DOGMASESSENTIALTOCHRISTIANITY.Thenecessity of dogmas

maybearguedinvariousways.EventhefollowersofSchleiermacherandRitschldefenditinspiteoftheirsubjectivism,andnotwithstandingtheirmysticism and moralism. Several reasons at once suggest themselves,whyChristianitycannotdispensewithdogmas.

a.ScripturerepresentsthetruthasessentialtoChristianity.Theassertionoftenheardinourday,thatChristianityisnotadoctrinebutalife,mayhavea ratherpious sound, and for that very reason seems to appeal tosome, but is after all a dangerous falsehood. It has been pointed outrepeatedly,andhasinrecentyearsagainbeenemphasizedbyDr.Machenin his Christianity and Liberalism, that Christianity is a way of lifefoundedonamessage.Thegospelistheself-revelationofGodinChrist,whichcomestousintheformoftruth.Thattruthisrevealed,notonlyinthe Person and work of Christ, but also in the interpretation of thesefound in the Bible. And it is only by a proper understanding and abelievingacceptanceofthemessageofthegospel,thatmenarebroughttothenecessaryself-surrendertoChristinfaith,andaremadepartakersofthenewlifeintheSpirit.Thereceptionofthatlifeisnotdependentonsomepurelymysticalinfusionofgrace,norontheproperethicalconductofman,but isconditionedbyknowledge."Andthis is lifeeternal,"saysJesus, "that they shouldknow thee, theonly trueGod, andHimwhomthoudidst send,evenJesusChrist."Paul says thatGodwouldhave "allmentobesaved,andcometotheknowledgeofthetruth."Herepresentsitasoneofthegrandidealsoftheministry,thatallbelieversmay"attainuntotheunityofthefaith,andoftheknowledgeoftheSonofGod,untoafull-grownman,untothemeasureofthestatureofthefulnessofChrist."AndPetersaysthatthedivinepower"hathgranteduntousallthingsthatpertainuntolifeandgodliness,throughtheknowledgeofhimthatcalledusbyhisowngloryandvirtue."ParticipationinthelifeofChristianityiseverywhereintheNewTestamentmadeconditionalonfaithinChristasHe has revealedHimself, and this naturally includes knowledge of theredemptive facts recorded in Scripture. Christians must have a properunderstandingofthesignificanceofthesefacts;andiftheyaretouniteinfaith,mustalsoarriveat someunitaryconvictionandexpressionof thetruth. Jesus concludesHis prayer forHis immediate discipleswith thewords: "Sanctify them in the truth: thy word is truth," and thencontinues:"NeitherfortheseonlydoIpray,butforthemalsothatbelieve

onmethroughtheirword;thattheymayallbeone."Theacceptanceofthe Word of God and spiritual unity go hand in hand. The sameremarkable conjunction is found in thewordofPaul: "Tillweall attainuntotheunityofthefaith,andoftheknowledgeoftheSonofGod."4TheBiblecertainlydoesnotcreatetheimpressionthattheChurchcansafelydisregardthe truth,as it is revealed in theWordofGod.Jesusstressedthe truth,Matt. 28:20; John 14:26; 16:1–15; 17:3, 17; and the apostleswereverymuchinearnestaboutit,Rom.2:8;2Cor.4:2;Gal.1:8;3:1ff.;Phil. 1:15–18:2Thess. 1:10;2:10,12,13;1Tim.6:5;2Tim.2:15;4:4:2Pet. 1:3, 4, 19–21; 1 John 2:20–22; 5:20. They who minimize thesignificanceof thetruth,andtherefore ignoreandneglect it,will finallycometothediscoverythattheyhaveverylittleChristianityleft.

b. The unity of the Church demands doctrinal agreement. The Bibleteaches the unity of the Church of Jesus Christ, and at the same timespeaksof itas"thepillarandgroundofthetruth."InEphesians4PaulstressestheunityoftheChurchofGod,andclearlyindicatesastheidealthat itsmembers all attain to the unity of the knowledge of the Son ofGod. This receives further emphasis in the 15th verse: "That we be nolonger children, tossed toand froandcarriedaboutwitheverywindofdoctrine."He exhorts the Philippians that they shall "stand fast in onespirit,withonesoulstriving for the faithof thegospel." In thispassagetheword "faith" has in all probability the samemeaning as in Jude 3,where thewriter exhorts his readers "to contend earnestly for the faithwhichwasonce foralldeliveredunto thesaints." If itdoesnotentirelyhave the same meaning, it certainly approaches it. The apostleadmonishes the Corinthians, that they "all speak the same thing," andthattherebenodivisionsamongthem.Theyshouldbeofoneaccordandofonemind.Heconsidersthissoimportantthathehurlshisanathemaatthosewhopreachagospeldifferent fromthatwhichhehadpreached,2and even insists on the exclusion of heretical persons. It is a sternjudgment,whichhepronouncesin1Tim.6:3–5;"Ifanymanteachethadifferentdoctrine,andconsentethnottosoundwords,eventhewordsofour Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according togodliness; he is puffed up, knowing nothing, but doting aboutquestioningsanddisputesofwords,whereofcomethenvy,strife,railings,evil surmisings,wranglingsofmencorrupted inmindandbereftof the

truth,supposingthatgodlinessisawayofgain."Unityintheknowledgeof the truth is evidently regarded as of the greatest importance to thewell-beingoftheChurch.If it includesmenofallkindsofconviction, itwillharborinitsbosomtheseedsofdiscord,strife,anddivision.Andthatcertainly will not minister to the edification of the saints and to thewelfareoftheChurch,norbeconducivetoitsefficiencyintheworkoftheLord.AndinstrivingfortheunityoftheChurchitwillhardlydotorestsatisfied with the least common denominator in the confession of thetruth, nor to say, Let us forget about doctrine, and get together byworkingtogether.

c. The duty of the Church requires unity in doctrine. Naturally, theChurch as such can only be one in doctrine, if it has a commonconfession. This means that the Churchmust formulate and thus giveexpressionto itsunderstandingof thetruth.Unity indoctrinethereforeinvolvestheconfessionofacommondogma.ItwillnotdotoadmitthattheChurchmayneeddoctrines, and at the same time todeny that sheneeds dogmas. The Church cannot perform her function in the world,unless she becomes conscious of, and gives clear expression to, thecontentsofher faith.TheChurchofJesusChristwasappointedtobeadepository,aguardian,andawitnessofthetruth,andcanonlybetruetoher calling, if she has a definite conception of the truth.Ministers areexhortedtoholdfastthepatternofsoundwords,andbelieversingeneral,to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints, but howcantheyaccomplishtheir importanttask, if there isnoagreementastothe"soundwords"andastowhattheChurchbelieves.TheChurchmustdeal with errorists, correcting, rebuking, and possibly excluding themfromthefold,butcannotdothis intelligentlyandeffectively,unlessshehasaclearapprehensionofthetruthandthereforeadefinitestandardofjudgment.History clearly teaches that, before a Church can really passjudgmentonheresies,shemusthavesomeofficialstandardortest.Andit goes without saying that she can never bear a united and powerfultestimonytothetruth,unlesssheherselfpresentsaunitedfront.

d.Thepositionof theChurch in theworld calls foraunited testimony.Every Church owes it to other Churches and to theworld round abouther,tomakeapublicdeclarationofherteachings.Ifitisbutnaturalthat

wedesiretoknowsomethingaboutthecharacterandconvictionsofthepeopletowhomwewouldentrustourmaterialinterests,itwillcertainlybeconsideredhighlydesirable,andinfactquiteessential,thatweknowexactlywhereaChurchstands,inwhichwewouldseekspiritualguidancefor ourselves and for our children.Moreover, one Church will have toknowwhereanotherstands,inordertobeabletodetermineinhowfaritcancorrespond,coöperate,andpossiblyaffiliatewithsuchaChurch.TheChurch of JesusChrist should never seek refuge in camouflage, shouldnot try to hide her identity. And this is exactly what she does in themeasureinwhichshefailstogiveaclearandunequivocalexpressionofherfaith.

e.Experience teaches thatdogmasare indispensable.EveryChurchhasitsdogmas.EventheChurchesthatareconstantlydecryingdogmashavethem in effect. When they say that they want a Christianity withoutdogma,theyarebythatverystatementdeclaringadogma.Theyallhavecertaindefiniteconvictionsinreligiousmatters,andalsoascribetothemacertainauthority, though theydonotalways formulate themofficiallyand acknowledge them candidly. History clearly proves that even thepresentdayopposition,isnotreallyanoppositiontodogmasassuch,butsimply opposition to a certain kind of dogmas, or to certain specificdogmas, which do not find favor in the eyes ofmodern theologians. AChurch without dogmas would be a silent Church, and this is acontradiction in terms.A silentwitnesswouldbenowitnessat all, andwouldneverconvinceanyone.

D.TheElementsInvolvedinDogmas

Christian dogmas involve various elements, which are of greatimportanceforthelifeoftheChurch.Ofthesethefollowingthreedeservespecialmention.

1. THE SOCIAL ELEMENT. Religious dogmas are not the product ofindividual Christians, but of the Church as a whole. Though theappropriationofthetruthrevealedintheBibleisfirstofallpersonal, itgradually assumes a communal and corporate aspect. It is only incommunion with all the saints that believers can understand andconfidentlyreproducethetruth.Thepersonalreflectionoftheindividual

Christian thus gains the advantage of collective control, and theconfidence which hemay have in his own findings is naturally greatlystrengthened by the fact that thousands of others reach the sameconclusion. The communal or social character, which the dogmas thusacquire,maynotberegardedassomethingaccidentalandofonlyrelativeimportance, but should be thought of as something that is absolutelyessential.Personalopinions,howevertrueandvaluabletheymaybe,donot constitute Christian dogmas. Some extremists object to the socialelementofdogmas.Theyadmit thenecessityof reflectingon the truth,butareoftheopinionthatpersonalself-respectshouldprompteachoneto decide for himself what is true. Each one should construct his ownsystemof the truth, and shouldnot concernhimself about the ideas ofothers. It cannot be said, however, that they represent the prevailingtendency of our day in theological thought. Both Schleiermacher andRitschl, in spite of the fact that their subjectivism makes forindividualism in religion, strongly emphasize the communal element ofdogmas.Harnacksays,thatthereis"introducedintotheideaofdogmaasocial element …; the confessors of one and the same dogma form acommunity." Sabatier, in speaking of the origin of dogmas, expresseshimself as follows: "Dogma only arises when the religious society,distinguishing itself from the civil, becomes amoral society, recruitingitselfbyvoluntaryadherents.Thissociety,likeeveryother,givestoitselfwhat itneedsinorderto live,todefenditself,andtopropagateitself."2And, finally,McGiffert says: "Schleiermacher's recognition of the socialelementhasbeenreinforcedinmoderntimesbythestudyofthehistoryandpsychologyofreligionwhichhasmadeitabundantlyevidentthatourbeliefsarelargelysocialproducts,andthatthenotionthatourindividualreasonsworkinisolationtocreateourownindependentfaithsisapurefiction."

2. THE TRADITIONAL ELEMENT. Dogmas also contain a traditionalelement. Christianity rests on historical facts which come to ourknowledgethrougharevelationgivenandcompletedmorethannineteencenturiesago.Andthecorrectunderstandingandinterpretationofthesefactscanonlyresultfromthecontinualprayersandmeditation,fromthestudyandstruggles,oftheChurchofallages.NooneChristiancaneverhope to succeed in assimilating and reproducing properly the whole

content of the divine revelation.Neither is one generation ever able toaccomplishthetask.TheformationofdogmasisthetaskoftheChurchofall ages, a task which requires great spiritual energy on the part ofsuccessivegenerations.Andhistoryteachesusthat,inspiteofdifferencesof opinion and protracted struggles, and even in spite of temporaryretrogressions, the Church's insight into the truth gradually gained inclarity and profundity. One truth after another became, the center ofattention, and was brought to ever greater development. And thehistoricalCreedsoftheChurchesnowembodyinconcentratedformthebestresultsofthereflectionandstudyofpastcenturies.ItisatoncethedutyandtheprivilegeoftheChurchofourdaytoenterintothatheritageofbygoneyears,andtocontinuetobuildonthefoundationthatwaslaid.

There is a manifest tendency, however, on the part of modern liberaltheology to break with the past. Many of its representatives are oftenrather loud in their praises of the Creeds of the Church as historicaldocuments, but refuse to acknowledge their doctrinal value for thepresent.And, sad to say, the so-called Fundamentalists of our day joinhandswith the liberalson thispointwith theirwell-knownslogan, "NoCreedbuttheBible."Theydonotseemtorealizethatthisreallyinvolvesabreakwith thehistoricalpastof theChurch,a refusal toprofitby thelessonswhich theChurchesof theReformationpassedonasapreciousheritage to followinggenerations in theirgreatCreedsandConfessions,andavirtualdenialoftheguidanceoftheHolySpiritinthepasthistoryof theChurch.Butmodern liberal theologydoesnot stopeven there; italsobreakswiththeBibleitselfastheauthoritativesourceofalldoctrinaltruth. This is stated without any hesitation by Reville in the followingwords:"Notonlyhasit(Liberalism)thrownofftheyokeoftheProtestantconfessionsoffaith,becauseathoroughexaminationoftheseprovedthattheybynomeansfaithfullyreflectedtheteachingofChrist.Butfurther,owing to the immense results reachedby thehistoricalandphilologicalsciencesduringthenineteenthcentury,ithasrecognizedthatintheBibleitself there aremany doctrines which come neither from the prophets,norfromJesus,andwhichconsequentlyarenottobeconsideredasthefaithfulexpressionoftheteachingofChrist."Suchaposition,ofcourse,involvesarejectionoftheBibleastheWordofGod,andfurtheranutterdisregard and denial of the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the past

doctrinal history of the Church, a lack of respect for the prayers, thelabors, and the strugglesof thegreatest andmostpious teachersof theChurch.Itrepresentsanunwarrantedindividualisminthedevelopmentand formulation of the truth, an exaggerated notion of the ability of asingleindividual,oroftheChurchofasinglegenerationtoreardenovoabetter structure of religious truth than the time-honored system of thepast.

3. THE ELEMENT OF AUTHORITY. When the Churches of theReformationofficiallydefinetheirdoctrinesandtherebyturnthemintodogmas,theyalsoimplicitlydeclarethemtorestondivineauthorityandtobeexpressionsofthetruth.Andbecausetheyregardtheirdogmasasembodiments of the truth revealed in theWord of God, they considerthemasentitledtogeneralrecognition,andinsistonsuchrecognitionintheirowncircles.TheRomanCatholicChurchclaimsabsoluteinfallibilityfor its dogmas, partly because they are revealed truths, but especiallybecause they are proposed for the faith of the faithful by an infallibleChurch.Her dogmas are absolutely unchangeable. TheVaticanCouncildeclared: "If any one shall assert it to be possible that sometimes,accordingtotheprogressofscience,asenseistobegiventothedoctrinespropounded by the Church different from that which the Church hasunderstood andunderstands: let himbe anathema." This absolutism isnotsharedbytheProtestantChurches.While theyexpectacceptanceoftheir dogmas, because they regard them as correct formulations ofScripturetruth,theyadmitthepossibilitythattheChurchmayhavebeeninerrorindefiningthetruth.AndifdogmasarefoundtobecontrarytotheWordofGod,theyceasetobeauthoritative.

It is exactly this element of authority that meets with the greatestopposition in the present day. Both Roman Catholics and ProtestantsregardreligionfirstofallassomethinggivenanddeterminedbyGod,andthereforefindtheseatofauthorityinHim.AccordingtotheformeritisespeciallytheChurch,whileaccordingtothelatteritistheBible,thatisbasictothisauthority.Bothrecognizeanobjectivestandardofthetruth,whichfindsexpressioninthedogmasoftheChurchandwhichdemandssubmission, faith, and obedience. Eighteenth century Rationalism andDeism broke with the "medieval principle of religious authority," and

substitutedforitthestandardofhumanreason,thusplacingtheseatofauthorityinmanandmakingitpurelyindividual.ForSchleiermacherthecontentofdogmasisdeterminedbyreligiousexperience,andforRitschl,ostensiblybyJesusChristastheFounderoftheKingdomofGod,butinrealitybythesubjectivefaithoftheChurch.Inthecaseofboththerealseat of authority is in the religious consciousness; and the authority, ofcourse,isnotthatofanobjectivenorm,butthatofaninternalprinciple.Lobsteinsays:"FromthepointofviewoftheProtestantitisnecessarytocondemnevery conceptionwhichmakesofdogmaanauthoritativeandobligatory decision of the church in the sense of a statutory and legalordinance."AccordingtothedictumofSabatier,anotherRitschlian,"Theoutwardauthorityoftheletterhasgivenplacetotheinwardandpurelymoral authority of the Spirit."2 This French scholar argues that thehuman spirit has finally been emancipated from the principle ofauthority,andhasbecomeautonomous,whichmeans that"theconsentof the mind to itself is the prime condition and foundation of allcertitude."Thisistantamounttotherejectionofallrealauthority.Barthrejects both the Roman Catholic and themodern liberal conception ofdogmas. He ascribes absolute authority to dogma (singular), since itagrees with revelation, and relative authority to dogmas, that is, to hedoctrinalpropositionsformulatedbytheChurch,insofarastheyspringfromtherootofrevelation.

QUESTIONSFORFURTHERSTUDY:HastheChurchofRomepowertomakenewdogmas?DoesitassumethatthePopehasthispower?Ifnot,does it not follow that, according to this Church, dogmas as such arecontainedintheWordofGod?HowdoesCardinalNewman'sconceptionofthedevelopmentofdogmasfitinwiththeRomanCatholicviewoftheunchangeableness of dogmas? What is the Protestant view as to theformulation of new dogmas? Do science and philosophy also furnish apartofthecontentofdogmas,ordotheyaffecttheirformonly?WhatisHarnack's conception of dogma? How does he conceive of its origin?What objections are there to his view?What factors in present-day lifeserve to strengthen the aversion to dogmas? Is there any Church inexistencethathasnodogmas?

REFERENCES:Bavinck,Geref.Dogm.I,pp.1–10;Hepp,DeWaardeVan

HetDogma; Is. VanDijk, Begrip enMethode derDogmatik, pp. 1–28;Hodge, The Idea of Dogmatic Theology, in The Princeton TheologicalReview,Jan., 1908,pp.52–60;Lobstein,An Introduction toProtestantDogmatics,pp.1–57;Kaftan,TheTruthoftheChristianReligion,Vol.I,andDogmatik, pp. 1–9; Ihmels,CentralfragenderDogmatik, pp. 1–30;Sabatier, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, pp. 229–343; Otten,Manual of the History of Dogmas I, pp. 1–4; Meyrick, Is Dogma aNecessity?;Barth,TheDoctrineoftheWordofGod,pp.11–15,284,304ff.;TheWordofGodandtheWordofMan,229.

III.TheIdeaofDogmaticTheology

A.TheRelationofDogmastoDogmatics

THE discussion of dogmas naturally leads on to an inquiry as to therelation in which they stand to Dogmatics. The very name 'Dogmatics'suggests a very close relation. It is derived from the singular 'dogma'ratherthanfromtheplural'dogmata,'andassuchpointstothefactthatitdealsnotmerelywithcertainseparatedogmas,butwiththedogmaoftheChurchasawhole.TheexactrelationbetweendogmaandDogmaticshas not always been conceived of in the sameway. Themost commonview is that dogma forms the subject-matter of Dogmatics, so that thelattermightbecalledthescienceofChristiandogma.ThusitmaybesaidthatDogmaticsdealswiththedoctrinaltruthofScriptureinasystematicway, and more particularly with that truth as it is confessed by theChurch. It studies thedoctrineof theChurchasawhole,andconsiderseach article of faith in its relation to the whole. As such it is not onlyScriptural, though it must be this first of all, but also bears anecclesiasticalimprint.Schleiermacher'sconceptionofdogmadiffersfromthatoftheProtestantChurchingeneral,sincehedoesnotacknowledgeits derivation fromScripture, but agreeswith it in its representationofdogma as the subject-matter ofDogmatics. According to him dogmatictheologyisthescienceofthedoctrineprofessedbyaChristianChurchat

agivenmomentofitshistoricaldevelopment.TheRitschlianviewoftherelation between dogma and Dogmatics does not differ from that justindicated. Kaftan says: "Die Dogmatik hat es demnach mit einemgegebenenobjectzu thun,mitderchristlichenWahrheit,diedieKircheauf grund der goettlichen Offenbarung glaubt und bekennt." Harnackclaims, however, that the Church has not been altogether honest in itsrepresentationoftherelationbetweendogmasandDogmatics.Accordingto him history teaches that dogmas are the product of theology. TheChurch,however,obscuredtheirrealorigin,declaredthemtoberevealedtruths,andassuchmadethembasicfortheology.2AccordingtoForsythdogma is "final revelation in germinal statement. It is God's act put astruth,"andisthereforeapartofGod'srevelation."Doctrineistruthaboutdogma, dogma expanded … It is secondary theology, or the Church'sgrasp—asinthecreeds.Theologyisdoctrineinthemaking.Itistertiaryand tentative theologyor theChurch's reach—as in 1Pet. 1:18, 19, 20."Dogmais forhimthemarrowof thegospel, thevitalcoreofrevelation,and is therefore found inScripture. It is theroot,outofwhichdoctrinedevelops through the theological study of the Church. "Theology istentativedoctrine;doctrineisselectedtheology."Thisisratherstrikinglysimilar to the view of Barth. Defining dogma (singular) as Churchproclamation, so far as it is in real agreement with theWord of God,Barth regards Dogmatics as the science, not of dogmas, but of dogma,whichinquiresintotheagreementofdogmawiththerevelationattestedinScripture. It thereforeserves to testdogma.Hedoesnotbelieve thatdogmas (plural) form the subject-matter of Dogmatics, though theirunderstandingandformulationmaybegreatlypromotedbyDogmatics.Forsyth looksupondogmaasapart,and in fact thevitalcore,ofGod'srevelation,andBarthcomesveryclosetothesameevaluation;socloseinfactthathetoo, likeForsyth,regardsdogmaastheobjectoffaith.Theyfurtheragreeindenyingthatdogmasordoctrinesshouldberegardedasobjects of faith, and insist on it that these aremere expressions of thefaith of the Church. Both are also of the opinion that the prevalentconceptionofdogmaisthatofProtestantScholasticism,andnotthatofthe Reformers. In the discussion of the historical conception of theProtestant Churches respecting the relation between dogmas anddogmaticsattentionmustbecalledtoseveralpropositions.

1.DOGMASARISEOUTOFTHENECESSITIESOFTHEBELIEVINGCOMMUNITY. Seeberg says in opposition to Harnack: "Although theform of dogma is thework of theology, its content is derived from thecommonfaithof theChristianChurch."This isawelcomecorrectionofHarnack'sviewthatdogmasaretheproductof theology,butcanhardlybeconsideredasacorrectdesignationofthesourcefromwhichdogmasarederived.ItismoreinharmonywiththeRitschlianposition.RainyismoreReformed in his thinking,whenhe first points out that doctrines(dogmas)arederivedfromScripture,andthensays:"Idonotthinkthatit is the scientific interest which primarily calls out Christian doctrine;nor is it an obligation to complywith the formal conditions of science,which this activity properly obeys; nor do I think that the scientificimpulse has been, historically, the creative force in this department.…Doctrine is maintained to arise not primarily in obedience to thescientific interest or impulse, but out of thenecessities of the believingmind."3

Dogmascannotbemadetoorder.Theycannotbeproducedbyindividualtheologians,norbyscientifictheologyingeneral,andthenimposeduponthe community of believers fromwithout. Chances are that dogmas soconstructed and proposed would not really express the faith of theChurch, would not strike a responsive chord in the communal life ofbelievers, and consequently would not be recognized as authoritative.Theyare formedonly inperiodsof intensespiritual life,ofwide-spreadandearnestreflectiononthetruth,andofdeepreligiousexperience.Itisonly when the Church thinks deeply on the truths of Scripture, whenunderthestressofreligiouscontroversiesshehaslearnedtoseethetruthsharplyandclearly,andwhendefiniteconvictionshavegraduallybecomethecommonpropertyofthereligiouscommunity,andthusacommunisopinio is formed,—it is only then that shewill be ready to confess, andwillfeelwithinherselfanirresistibleurgetogiveexpressiontoherfaith.Only the truth so confessed really constitutes a confession of faith, isrootedinthelifeandexperienceoftheChurch,andthereforealsohasagripontheChurch.OnlythedogmasthatspringfromthislivingsoilcanbecalledinthewordsofRainy"thehumanechotothedivinevoice,"or"thehumanresponsetothedivinemessage."

2. THEOLOGY MAY AND HAS FREQUENTLY SERVED AS ANAUXILIARY IN THE FORMATION OF DOGMAS. While denying thatdogmasaremerelytheproductoftheology,weneednotcloseoureyestothe fact that, for their final formulation, the Church was often greatlyindebtedtotheology.Itneedhardlybesaidthatinthereflectiveactivityof the Christian community some would be far more influential thanothers; and that, if all other things were equal, those who had specialreligioustrainingwouldformthevanguard.Asthespiritualleadersofthepeople,andastheinterpreters,thehistorians,andthesystematiciansoftheChurch,theywouldnaturallypointthewayinthecarefulformulationof dogmas. And it was but natural that, when the science of theologydeveloped, this should also be pressed into service and become apowerfulauxiliaryintheprocess.Thiscouldnotbeotherwise,becauseithas, in its own field, the special task of reflecting on the truth as it isrevealedintheWordofGod,andofreproducingthistruthinsystematicform. Yet it should be borne inmind that thework of theology in thissphereisofapurelyformalnature.Itdoesnotfurnishthesubject-matterofthedogmas,butmerelyhelpstheChurchinforminganddefiningherdogmas.Naturally,inthemeasureinwhichtheologytookahandintheformationofdogmas, these assumedamore systematic form than theywouldotherwisehavehad.

3.DOGMATICTHEOLOGYFINDSTHENUCLEUSOF ITS SUBJECT-MATTER INTHEDOGMASOFTHECHURCH. Though theologymayserve as an auxiliary in the formation of dogmas, this is not its mainconcernwith thedogmasof theChurch.These form thenucleus of thematerial with which it must build and which it must rear into asystematic structure, and will therefore naturally have a determininginfluence on the texture and the complexion of the system as a whole.They will occupy a very important place in it and lend it a distinctivecharacter.ThedogmaticiantakeshisstandintheconfessionalteachingsoftheChurchtowhichhebelongs;theseformhisbias,ifyouwill.Itmaybeobjectedthatthisnaturallyendangershisintellectualliberty,butthisis not necessarily the case. As long as he remains a member of thatparticularChurch,itmaybeassumedthathedoesthisfromconviction.Andifthisisthecase,hewillnaturallyregardthedogmasofhisChurchmoreas friendlyguides,acquaintinghimwiththedirectioninwhichhe

should move, than as hateful fetters that impinge on his liberty.Moreover,itiswelltorememberthatnooneiseverentirelyunbiasedinhisscientificwork;andthatthedogmaticianwhorefusestobebiasedbythedogmasofhisChurch shouldnotposeas itsdogmatician.Todo sowouldbeethicallyreprehensible.Werepeatthatthesedogmasconstitutethe most important part of the materials which he must use in theconstructionofhissystem,andwillsoenterintothestructureofitastoformitsnucleusandcore,andalsoitsunifyingelement.

Butthetheologiancannotlimithimselftothedogmasthatarecontainedin theConfession of theChurch, for this is by nomeans an exhaustiveexpression of its faith.Hemust utilize all the doctrinal truths that arerevealed intheWordofGod,anddoingthat,ofcourse,alsodrawuponthefruitsofotherstudies,suchasExegesis,BiblicalTheology,HistoryofDoctrines, and others. He may find it profitable to levy contributionsfrom individuals andgroups.Butwhatever elementshe incorporates inhis system, he must present, not merely as historical data, but ascomponent parts of the structure which he is rearing, and which heregardsnotmerely as an expressionofhis ownbelief but as absolutelyvalidtruth.Moreover,hecannotconsiderthesedoctrinesasbareabstractintellectual formula, and as so many isolated truths, but will have tostudyandpresentthemaslivingplants,whichhavecometodevelopmentin the course of the centuries and strike their roots deep down intoScripturalsoil,andmustviewthemintheirgrandunity.

Naturally,modern theology, under the influence of Schleiermacher andRitschl, has a somewhat different conception of the relation betweendogmas and dogmatics. Litchtenberger states the position ofSchleiermacherinasinglesentence,whenhesaysthat,accordingtothefatherofmoderntheology,"Dogmaticsdescribesnotdoctrinesnorfactswhichhavebeenrevealedinasuper-naturalmanner,butexperiencesofthehumansoul,orthefeelingswhichthereligioussoulexperiencesinitsrelations with Jesus the Savior." Lobstein represents the Ritschlianposition. Says he: "Like dogma, like dogmatics. There obtains betweenthe notion of dogma and the role of dogmatics a necessary and directrelation.…ItisclearthatareturntothevitalprincipleoftheReformationand the corresponding transformation of the idea of dogma in the

evangelicalChurchinvolvesaparallelmodificationofthetaskentrustedto the dogmatician. Dogmatics … is the scientific exposition of theProtestant faith.… Dogmatics creates nothing; itmerely formulates theproblemswhoseelementsaregiventoitbythereligiousexperienceoftheChristianinthepresenceofthelivingrealitiesofthegospel.Dogmaticsisan experimental and positive science, but it receives its material fromfaith;ratheritsmaterialisfaithitselfwiththedivinecontentoffaith."2

Is. Van Dijk, a representative of the Ethical Movement in theNetherlands,which remindsone somewhatofbothSchleiermacherandRitschlbutseemstooweitsgreatestdebttoVinet,putsitasfollows:"Hetdogme is de vrucht der poging om een bepaaldmoment, een bepaalderelatievanhetlevendergemeenteindetaaldesverstandsomtezetten,terwijl de dogmatiek dan is de beschrijving, de omzetting in begrippenvan dat leven in zijn geheel." The objection that this obliterates thedistinction between dogmatics and ethics, is met by the remark that,thoughbothdescribelife,theydonotcontemplatelifeinthesamesense:… "de dogmatiek beschrijft den grond en den inhoud, deethiek deopenbaringenhetideaalvanhetleven."

B.TheObjectofDogmaticTheology.(ItsDefinition)

The question of the object of theology, and therefore also of dogmatictheology, can be considered very appropriately in connection with itsdefinition.Theologyhasnotalwaysbeendefinedinthesameway.Abriefconsiderationofthemostimportantdefinitionsthathavebeensuggestedin course of time may be helpful in determining what has been andshouldbeconsideredastheobjectoftheology.

1.THECONCEPTIONOFTHEOBJECTOFDOGMATICTHEOLOGYINEARLY PROTESTANT THEOLOGY. Previous to the Reformation therewerevariousideasrespectingtheobjectofDogmaticTheology.AccordingtoAugustineitdealswithGod,theworld,man,andthesacraments.PetertheLombardsharedthisview.Others(AlexanderofHales,Bonaventura)regardedthemysticalbodyofChrist,thatis,theChurch,andstillothers(Hugo of St. Victor), the redemptive work of God, as the object ofDogmatic Theology. Thomas Aquinas expressed himself as follows:"TheologiaaDeodocetur,Deumdocet,etadDeumducit"("Theologyis

taught by God. teaches God, and leads unto God"). This is more inharmonywththeetymologyofthewordinsofarasitrepresentsGodasthe object of theology. A considerable number of both Lutheran andReformedtheologiansofthepost-Reformationperioddefinedtheologyastheknowledgeorscienceof(concerning)God.Someobjectedtothisonthe ground that it is not possible forus tohave aperfect knowledgeofGodonearth.ButthemenwhousedthisdefinitionweregenerallyquitecarefultopointoutthattheydidnothaveinmindtheknowledgewhichGod has of Himself (archetypal knowledge), but the knowledge whichman has of God in virtue of His Self-revelation, (ectypal knowledge.)They considered such knowledge of God possible, becauseHe revealedHimself. The desire to stress the practical nature, of this scienceprompted some seventeenth century theologians to define it withreferencetoitsendorpurposeratherthanwithaviewtoitsobject.Theyconceivedof itas teachingmanthe truereligionuntosalvation, the lifefor God in Christ, or the service of God that is well-pleasing to Him.Theseandother,somewhatsimilar,descriptionsarefoundintheworksof Hollaz, Quenstedt, Gerhard. Amesius, Mastricht, and à Marck. Ingeneralitmaybesaid,however,thatReformedtheologiansconceivedoftheology as the science of (concerning) God. However, this simpledefinition frequently receivedcertaincomplementaryadditions. Itoftenassumedsomesuchformasthefollowing:TheologyisthescienceofGodandofdivinethings;or…ofGodandHisrelationstotheuniverse;or…ofGodasHeisinHimselfandasHeisrelatedtoallHiscreatures.

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW CONCEPTION IN MODERNSUBJECTIVE THEOLOGY. The phenomenalism of Kant had a ratherrevolutionaryeffectonthecommonconceptionoftheology.Itlimitedalltheoreticalknowledge,scientificorotherwise,tothephenomenalworld.Thismeansthataccordingtoitmancanhavenotheoreticalknowledgeofthatwhich transcendshumanexperience,and therefore theologyas thescienceofGodisanimpossibility.Thepracticalreasonistheonlyreliableguide in religion, and its propositions are not susceptible of rationalproof, but must be accepted by faith. God is highly exalted above ourobservation and experience. We can accept Him and the relations inwhichHestandstoHiscreaturesonlyby faith,andwhat issoacceptedcannotbeconstructed intoascientificsystem.Godisanobjectof faith,

andnotofscience.

The epistemological principles of Kant paved the way for thatsubjectivism in religion, of which Schleiermacher became the greatspokesman.HedefinedDogmaticsas"thescienceoftheChristianfaith,"thatis,ofthecontentsoftheChristianfaith.Thiscontentdoesnotconsistin truths or facts supernaturally revealed, but in religious experiences,primarilyundertheinspirationofthepersonalityofJesus,bywhichmanbecomes conscious of the super-natural and eternal. The intellectualexpressions of the devout feeling, or ofChristian experience,which arecurrent in thepreachingandteachingofaparticularChurch,constitutethe raw material of theology. And an inquiry into the cause of thisexperience will naturally lead themind to God. Ritschlians also defineDogmaticsas"thescientificexpositionof theProtestant faith."Yet theydonotagreewithSchleiermacher'sconceptionoftheobjectofDogmatics,forwithrespecttohisworkLobsteinsays:"Theclassicalworkofthegreattheologian is not, to tell the truth, a systematic exposition of theProtestant faith; it is composed of reflections upon the soul of theChristian,uponthedifferentmodificationsofthereligiousconsciousnessof the subject." Ritschlians generally claim greater objectivity, and itsounds somewhat more objective, when the author just quoted says:"Dogmatics…receivesitsmaterialfromfaith;ratheritsmaterialisfaithitselfwiththedivinecontentoffaith,thatis,thegospel."Yetintheendthe Ritschlian view turns out to be just as subjective as that ofSchleiermacher,asweshallshowinoneofthefollowingchapters.

Thissubjectivetendencyincourseoftimegaverisetothedefinition,sopopularinourday,accordingtowhichtheologyisdefinedas"thescienceofreligion"or,morespecifically,as"thescienceoftheChristianreligion."In this definition, as it is generally used inmodern theology, theword'religion' is used in the subjective sense, to denote religion as aphenomenonofhumanlife.Moreover,thisreligionisoftenconceivedofinaveryone-sidedandunsatisfactoryway,andissometimesrepresentedinapurelynaturalisticfashion.Thusthataspectofhumanlife,whichisindicative of man's relation to a divine Being, became the object oftheology.Thisviewresultedinanincreasedemphasisonthestudyofthehistoryofreligion,ofthephilosophyofreligion,andofthepsychologyof

religion.

Thereare,ofcourse,seriousobjectionstothisconceptionoftheology:(a)itdivorcestheologyfromitsobjectivefoundationintheWordofGod,andbases it entirely on subjective experiences which have no normativevalue; (b) it robs theology of its positive character and reduces it to apurely descriptive science, describing historical and psychologicalphenomena insteadof aiming at absolute truth; and (c) it involuntarilyleads to a representation of the Christian religion asmerely one of themany religions of theworld, differing from them indeed in degree, butnotinessence.

Attention should be called to the fact, however, that the definition oftheologyasthescienceofreligionissometimesfoundintheworksoftheolderReformedtheologians,andisstillfoundinthetheologicalwritingsof such men of a previous generation as Thornwell, A. A. Hodge, andGirardeau. But when these men so define theology, they use the term'religion'inanobjectivesense,thatis,asdenotingthedivinerevelation,which is the standard for the true service of God, the rule of man'sreligiouslife,devotion,andworship.Sounderstood,thedefinitionisnotexposed to the criticism that was offered. At the same time it isambiguous,andthereforedoesnotdeservecommendation.

3.RECOGNITIONOFTHEOBJECTIVECHARACTEROFDOGMATICTHEOLOGY IN RECENT TIMES. Though some conservative scholarsadapted themselvesmore or less to the use of the new definition, andspoke of theology as the science of religion or of the Christian faith(McPherson), theydidnotatallmean to indicate thereby that they tooregardedman'ssubjectivereligionorfaithastheobjectoftheology.Someof them evidently chose this definition as an indication of the fact thattheologywasnotlimitedtothestudyofjustoneobject,namely,God,butincludedthestudyofallthedoctrinesofreligionoroftheChristianfaith.Thismeansthatintheirdefinitionstheterms'religion'and'faith'didnothaveasubjective,butanobjectiveconnotation.

The greater number of conservative scholars, however, continued toconceive of theology as the science of God, though frequently with thedistinct understanding that they did not regard God apart from His

creation as the object of theology, butGod as related toHis creatures.ThusSheddsays:"TheologyisasciencethatisconcernedwithboththeInfinite and the Finite, with both God and the Universe." And A. H.Stronggivesthefollowingdefinition:"TheologyisthescienceofGodandof the relations between God and the universe."2 Other well-knowntheologians, who regard God as the object of theology, and thereforespeakof theology,asthescienceofGod,areHill,Dick,Heppe,Schmid,Dabney,Boyce,Hastie,Orr,andWarfield.

TheprecedingparagraphmakesnomentionofDutch theologians.Thisdoesnotmean,however, that theirstanddiffersmaterially fromthatofthemenjustmentioned.Theyarenamedseparatelymerelybecausesomeof themvaried their definition somewhat, just asCharlesHodgedid inour own country. This change was, at least in part, prompted by thedesire to obviate the difficulty suggested by the consideration that wecannotmakeGodthedirectobjectofourscientificstudy.Hodgefindstheobject of theology in the "truths" and "facts" of Scripture, which thetheologian must "collect, authenticate, arrange, and exhibit in theirnatural relation toeachother." InKuyper's estimation thisdefinition is"inthemainnotincorrect,"butbothheandBavinckrightlyobjecttotheidea that the theologianmust "authenticate" the truths and the facts ofScripture, because this virtually destroys the concept of the ectypaltheology, and logically brings the theologian once more under thedominionofanaturalisticscience.

KuyperproceedsontheassumptionthatGodcannotbethedirectobjectofscientificstudy.Insuchastudythesubjectrisessuperiortotheobject,and has the power to examine and to comprehend it. But the thinkingmanisnotsorelatedtoGod,1Cor.2:11.AccordingtoKuyperitisquiteessential to distinguish between two kinds of theology, namely: (a)theology as the knowledge of God, of whichGod is the object, and (b)theologyasascience,whichfindsitsobjectinthedivineSelf-revelation.TheformeristheectypalknowledgeofGod,containedinScripture,andadapted to the cognitive faculties ofman;while the latter is defined as"thatsciencewhichhastherevealedknowledgeofGodastheobjectofitsinvestigation and raises it to sunesis (insight)." By means of thisdistinctionheseekstoestablishanorganicconnectionbetweentheology

andscienceingeneral.Nowthequestionarises,whetherthispositionisequivalenttoadenialofthefactthatGodistheobjectoftheology.Ontheonehanditcertainlyseemsso,andasamatteroffactKuyperclearlysaysthattherevealedknowledgeofGod,anditonly,istheobjectoftheologyasascience.4ThispointevenbecamethesubjectofatheologicaldebateintheNetherlands.Atthesametimehealsosaysthatthissciencewouldnotyetbeentitledtothenametheology,ifitdidnotdeepenourinsightintheectypalknowledgeofGod.Thequestionarises,whetherKuyper'swayof putting things is not merely another way of saying that God is theobjectoftheologyasascienceonlyinsofarasHehasrevealedHimselfinHisWord.Or,toputitinotherwords,thatGodisnotthedirect,thoughHeistheultimateobjectoftheology;thatHeisnottheimmediateobject,but theobject asmediated throughHisdivineSelf-revelation.After all,onhisview,theologyasasciencedealswiththeKnowledgeofGod,seekstoappropriateandassimilateitsvariousdata,torepresentthemintheirgrand unity, and to cast them into a form that satisfies the humanconsciousness, and can be called theology only in so far as it deepensinsight into the knowledge of God.Moreover, it deserves attention (a)thatKuyperassertsthatthescienceoftheologyadmitsofnoothermotivethan"toknowGodortolearntoknowHim";(b)thathisdenialthatGodcan be the object of human science simply means that we cannot ofourselves attain to a scientific knowledge ofGod, but are bound toHisSelf-revelation; (c) that he regards it as a very precarious phenomenonthat in theology"nomore the realityGod,but thereality religion is theobjectofinvestigation.

This view of the matter finds corroboration in the fact that BavinckconsidersGodastheobjectoftheology,andyetdefinesDogmaticsas"thescientific systemof the knowledge ofGod"; thatHepp, one ofKuyper'sdisciplesandsuccessorssaysthatDogmatics"isthatpartofsciencethathasGodforitsobject,asHecanbeknownthroughHisrevelation,ortoexpressitmorebriefly,thathasScriptureforitsobject";5andthatHonig,one of the earliest disciples of Kuyper, also maintains that bothdefinitions,namely,thattheologyisthescienceofGod,andthatitisthescienceoftheknowledgeofGod,aregood,andthatthedisputeaboutthiswas largelyadisputeaboutwords.EvidentlyDr.Warfield too feels thatthesetwodonotconflict.Hedefinestheologyas"thesciencewhichtreats

ofGodandoftherelationsbetweenGodandtheuniverse,"butalsosays:"Nowtheobjectoftheology,asDr.Kuyperhasoftenjustlyinsisted,istheectypalknowledgeofGod."ForhimthisisnotequivalenttosayingthattheScripturesconstitutetheobjectoftheology,forheexplicitlysaysthat"The Scriptures, after all, are not the object of theology, but only itssource."7

InGermanyareactionaroseinrecentyearsagainstthesubjectivismthatwas introduced into theologybySchleiermacherandresulted inplacingmanratherthanGodinthecenter.Therearethosewhoemphasizeanewthe fact that God is the proper object of theological study. This newtendency finds expression in the two-volume work of Schaeder. Thisauthorbeginshissecondvolumewiththesesignificantwords:"MitGotthatesdieTheologiezutun;immerundueberalmitGott.JedeFragederTheologie,auchwennsiesichaufdieWeltinNaturundGeschichteoderaufdenMenschenund seinLeben richtet, ist nurunterderBedingungeine wirklich theologische, dass sie sich im letzten Grunde um Gottdreht." The theology of crisis differs considerably from Schaeder'stheocentric theology, and that among other things in breaking morecompletely and radically with the method of Schleiermacher. WhileSchaedermakes theWordofGodmoreprominent inhis theology thanSchleiermacher,hedoesnotrisesuperiortothesubjectivismofthelatter.ThetheologyofcrisisontheotherhandplacestheWordofGod,thatis,God's super-natural revelation, prominently in the foreground, and isthereforealsocalled"thetheologyoftheWordofGod."BarthdefinesthetaskofDogmaticsasfollows:"Asatheologicaldiscipline,dogmaticsisthescientific test to which the Church puts herself regarding the languageabout God which is peculiar to her." In Credo he expresses himself asfollows: "Dogmatics endeavors to take what is first said to it in therevelationofGod'sreality,andtothinkitoveragaininhumanthoughtsandtosayitoveragaininhumanspeech.TothatenddogmaticsunfoldsanddisplaysthosetruthsinwhichthetruthofGodconcretelymeetsus."It deals therefore with the doctrinal material which the Church hasderivedfromGod'srevelation.

There is reallynogood reasonwhywe shouldnot continue to speakoftheologyas thescienceof (concerning)God. It is,of course,possible to

consider the ectypal knowledge of God as the immediate object oftheology, and under certain circumstances it may be desirable torepresent itassuch;butonthewhole itwouldseemtobepreferabletospeakofHim,asHehasrevealedHimselfinHisWord,astherealobjectoftheology.ThisdoesnotimplythatthethinkingsubjectcanplaceitselfaboveGodas theobject,andcanof itselfelicit fromHimknowledgeofthedivineBeing;nor that thehumansubjectcancomprehendGodandthusattaintoaperfectknowledgeofHim.Inemployingtheolddefinitionitisassumed:(a)thatGodhasrevealedHimselfandthusconveyedtrueknowledgeofHimselftoman;(b)thatman,createdintheimageofGod,is capable of appropriating and apprehending thisdivine truth; and (c)thatman has an urgewithin him to systematize this knowledgewith aview to a better understanding of God and of His relations to Hiscreatures. With Bavinck we may define Dogmatics as "the scientificsystemoftheknowledgeofGod."

C.TheologyasaScience

1.THESCIENTIFICCHARACTEROFTHEOLOGYDENIED.

a.Thegroundforthisdenial.Theologywasoncegenerallyrecognizedasthequeenofthesciences,butdoesnotenjoythatdistinctiontoday.DunsScotusalreadyheldthattheologywasnotascienceinthestrictsenseofthe word, but simply a practical discipline. This view was ratherexceptional, however, and did notmeetwith a great deal of favor. TheScholastics in general stressed the scientific character of theology andtreated it as such; and in the theologicalworksof theReformationandpost-Reformationperiodsitisalsofullyrecognized.Itisespeciallysincetheendoftheeighteenthcenturythattherightoftheologytobecalledasciencewascalledinquestion,andwasevenpositivelydenied.Thiswasdue inpart toKant's criticismof the facultyofknowledge,according towhichitisimpossibletoobtainanytheoreticalknowledgeofGodandofthesupersensible ingeneral;and inpart to thepretentiousclaimof thenaturalsciencestobetheonlysciencesworthyofthename.ThisnegativeattitudewasgreatlystrengthenedbyPositivismwithitsnotionthateachbranchofknowledgepasses,successively,throughthreedifferentstages:thetheologicalorfictitiousstage,themetaphysicalorabstractstage,and

thescientificorpositivestage.Themanwhohasreachedthefinalstagehas left theology far behind. Herbert Spencer, the great agnostic, alsoinvariably proceeded on the assumption that theology is outside of thedomainofscience.

Thegreatest objection to the scientific statusof theologywas especiallytwofold. In the first place theology is devoted to the study of an objectthatliesbeyondthekenofhumantheoreticalknowledge,sinceitcannotbeobservednorsubjectedtoexperimentaltests.Andinthesecondplaceitfindsitsgroundofcertitudeinanauthoritativerevelationratherthaninhumanreason,theonlyauthorityrecognizedinscience.Inourdayitisquite common to find scientists smiling significantly, when they hearpeople speak of the science of theology. Harry Elmer Barnes evendeclares the theologian utterly incompetent to deal with the subject-matter of his own chosen field of study. Says he: "The new view ofmattersmakesitveryevidentthattheclergymancannolongerpretendtobea competentexpert in thewayofdiscovering thenature,will andoperationsofthenewcosmicGod.Ifundertakenandsolvedatall,thisisaproblemforthecoöperativeendeavorsofthenaturalscientistandthecosmicphilosopheroftheDeweytradition.Thetheologianatbestcanbeonly a competent second—or third—hand interpreter of the facts andimplications gathered about the cosmos and its laws by specialists inscienceandphilosophy.…Butnow,whenGodmustbesought,ifatall,interms of the findings of the test-tube, the compound microscope, theinterferometer,theradiumtubeandEinstein'sequations,theconventialclergyman is rather hopelessly out of place in the premises." There ismore than amere grain of truth in the following words ofMacintosh:"Among the empirical sciences theology can find none so poor as torecognizeher,much lessdoherreverence.Moreover,eventheworldatlarge, including hosts of persons who still think of themselves asreligious, is coming to share in the contempt of the scientists fortheology."2

b. Reaction of theologians to this denial. This widespread denial ofscientistsandphilosophers,re-echoedby largenumbersof lesser lights,whopopularizetheprevailingopinion,didnotfailtoaffecttheattitudeoftheologiansandofreligiouspeopleingeneral.Thereactiononthepartof

those theologians who accepted the dictum of the scientists, has beenespecially twofold. Some simply relinquish the claim of theology to thehighhonorofbeingscientific,andappearperfectlywillingtoassigntoita lesser position. Says Macintosh: "Of late, under the stress of muchhostile criticism, there has been a strategic retreat, and the definitionsgenerallyfavoredaremodeststatementstotheeffectthattheologyistheintellectualexpressionofreligion."

Others, however, set themselves the task of reconstructing theology insuch a manner as to vindicate its time-honored claim to a scientificposition.Theysubstitutedreligiousexperience,religiousfaith,orreligionin general for God as the object of theology, which means that theyturnedfromtheobjectivetothesubjective,fromthedivinetothehuman,from the supersensible to certain psychological phenomena, which fallunder human observation. They have been seeking ever-increasingly tostudy and interpret the religious life by the application of the truescientific method, which Macintosh describes as "the method ofobservation and experiment, of generalization and theoreticalexplanation." This author adds that, "if theology is to become reallyscientific,itmustbebybecomingfundamentallyempirical."Hedoesnotbelieve that themethodsofSchleiermacher,Ritschl,andTroeltschhavebeensuccessful,butdoesnotonthataccountabandonallhope.Sayshe:"Systematictheologyisnotnowandneverhasbeenanempiricalscience.Andyetthisdoesnotmeanthatitcannotbecomeascience,andthatinthe very near future."2 It is rather remarkable that this moderntheologian, like Schaeder in Germany, again stresses the fact that notreligion butGod is the object of theology, but thenGod as revealed inreligiousexperience(takingexperienceinitsbroadestsense),andinthehistoryofreligions.

2. THE POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING THE SCIENTIFICCHARACTEROFTHEOLOGY.

a.Fromonepointofviewitisimpossible.InourdaymanybasetherightoftheologytobecalledascienceonthefactthatitisdevotedtothestudyofChristianityorof religion,and thereforedealswithhistoricaldataordata of experience, which can be studied according to the strictlyscientificmethodofobservationandexperiment.Sincewedonotshare

this conception of theology, we cannot avail ourselves of the ground itaffords for maintaining the scientific character of theology. For us thequestion is, whether it is possible tomaintain the scientific status of atheologywhichaimsatthestudyofGodratherthanofreligion.Andtheanswer one gives to this question will depend on one's conception ofscience.Thismeansthatitwillbenecessaryfirstofalltocometoaclearunderstanding as to what constitutes a science. Many present dayscholars,especially inourcountry,regardtheterm 'science'asaproperdesignationofwhatareusuallycalled"thenaturalsciences,"andofthemonly, since they are the only studies that dealwithmatters that can beobservedandthatcanbetestedinthelaboratory.Thedecidingquestionseems to be, whether a study deals with facts of observation. But thequestionmayberaised,whetherthisisnotaratherarbitrarylimitation.Dr.Harrissaysthatitcanbejustifiedonly"byrevertingtothecompletePositivism of Comte, and avowing and maintaining that knowledge islimited to the observation made by the senses." But this is an utterlyuntenableposition,for,sayshe,"iftheydothis,theymustrenouncetheimportantpart of their own sciences knowby inferencesdepending fortheir validity on rational intuitions." They who insist on taking thispositionwillnaturallyexclude theology fromthedomainof science, fortheology as the science of God does not deal with data given byobservationorexperience.Itdoesnotgreatlyimprovematterstosay,asHuxley does: "By science I understand all knowledgewhich rests uponevidenceandreasoningofalikecharactertothatwhichclaimsourascenttoordinaryscientificpropositions(italicsmine);andifanymanisabletomakegoodtheassertionthathistheologyrestsuponvalidevidenceandsoundreasoning,thenitappearstomethatsuchatheologymusttakeitsplaceasapartofscience."MacintoshreferstothesewordsofHuxleyonpage25ofhisTheologyasanEmpiricalScience,andis inclinedtotakeupthechallenge.Butfromourpointofviewthiswouldseemtobequitehopeless. We may not lose sight of the fact that the methods of thenatural sciences do not apply in the study of theology, nor even in thestudy of religion. Theology is entitled to its own method, a methoddetermined by the nature of its subject-matter. Dr. Mullins correctlyremarks: "It is a false issue whenmen deal with religion as if it werephysicsorchemistryorbiology,orpsychology,orsociology.Thereisnonecessaryconflictbetweenanyoftheseandreligion.Butwhenmencrave

religion and a solution of its problems, then religious criteriamust beemployed.Whenmodernscienceoffersanyotheritgivesastoneinsteadofbread,aserpentinsteadofafish."

b. From another point of view it is possible. The situation is quitedifferent,if'science'istakeninthesenseoftheGerman'Wissenschaft'ortheDutch 'wetenschap.'Eisler inhisHandwoerterbuchderPhilosophiedefines Wissenschaft as "systematisiertes Wissen, der Inbegriffzusammengehoeriger. auf ein bestimmtes Gegenstandsgebiet sichbezienhender oder durch den gleichen Gesichtspunkt der Betrachtungverbundener, zu systematischer Einheit methodisch verknupfter,zusammenhaengenderErkenntnisse."According to this definition thereis no good reason why we should not regard dogmatic theology as ascience. Science is simply systematized knowledge. It is reared on thebasis of the common knowledge of mankind. This knowledge may beobtainedinvariousways,dependingonthenatureofitsobject.Itmaybeacquiredbyobservation,byreflection,orbyrevelation,butmustbetrueknowledge.Experimentaltestsmayandshouldbeappliedinthecaseofthe natural sciences, rational tests in the case of theGeisteswissenschaften, and Scriptural tests in the case of theology. Thesubject-matterof theologycanonlybegivenby revelation,and it is thedutyof thetheologiantosystematizetheknowledgesoacquired,andtotest it rigidly by the analogy of Scripture. If he takes a comprehensiveview of the subject-matter, and unifies it, he is dealing with it in asystematicway,andtheresultofhisworkisscientific.

Theologyhasitsowndistinctivemethod,butthereisafterallagreatdealwhichithasincommonwiththeothersciences.Ifthematterwithwhichtheology deals is given by revelation, so is, strictly speaking, also thematterwhich the other sciences build into a system.Reason cannot beregardedasthesourceofthismatter,butonlyastheinstrumentbywhichitisgrasped,analyzed,classified,andsystematized.Andifthesciencesingeneral employ human reason in the construction of their system ofknowledge, so does theology depend on sanctified human reason in itsinvestigationandconstructivework.Itistruethattheelementoffaithisfundamental in the work of the theologian, but there is not a singlescientistwhocanexcludethis fromhisworkaltogether.Andif theology

must leave a greatmany ultimate questions unsolved, this is true to alargedegreealsoofeveryotherscience.

Theology,then,doesnotmoveinthesphereofthenaturalsciences,andthereforedoesnotandcannotapplyitsmethods.Itwouldsucceedonlyindestroyingitselfbytheapplicationoftheexperimentalmethod.Ithasfarmoreincommonwiththeso-calledGeisteswissenschaften,atermwhichBaillie renders "sciences of spirit." It should be borne in mind thattheology isnotmerelyadescriptivescience,whichyieldsonlyhistoricalknowledge, but very decidedly a normative science which deals withabsolutetruth,givenbyrevelationandbindingontheconscience.Sheddspeaksofitasanabsolutescience,whichistruenotonlyforthehumanintellectbutforallrationalintelligence.Healsocallsitapositivescience,toindicatethatfaithyieldsrealandtrueknowledgeofitsobject,thoughitmustleavemanymysteriesunexplained.Ifothersoccasionallydenythatitisapositivescience,theyusuallymeanthatitisnotapositivescienceintheComtiansenseoftheword.

D.TheEncyclopaedicPlaceofDogmatics

UnderthisgeneralcaptionweshallconsiderthequestionastothegrouptowhichDogmaticsbelongs,andmoreparticularlytherelationinwhichitstandstoApologeticsandEthics.

1. THEGROUPOF STUDIESTOWHICH ITBELONGS. There is verylittledifferenceofopinionastothegroupoftheologicalstudiestowhichDogmaticsbelongs.ItisalmostinvariablyclassedwiththeSystematicor,as Kuyper calls it, the Dogmatological group, that is, the group whichcentersaboutthedogmaoftheChurch.Themostimportantoftheotherstudies which he includes in this group are Symbolics, the History ofDogma,Ethics,Apologetics,andPolemics.Schleiermacherdepartedfromthe ordinary classification, however, and classified it under HistoricalTheology.ThiswasduetothefactthatheconceivedofDogmaticsasthesystematic exposition of the Christian faith at a certain stage of itsdevelopment, and more specifically as the science of the doctrineconfessed by a particular Christian Church at a certain stage of itshistorical development. According to him dogma is characterized bychange rather than by stability. It is the product of the constantly

changing religious experience of a Church, having real value andsignificance only in so far as it is in agreement with the immediatebelievingChristianconsciousness.Inaccordancewiththisconceptionofdogma,dogmatictheologyisrepresentedas"thescienceoftheconnectedpresentationofthedoctrineprevailinginaChristianChurchassociationat a given period." As an expression of ever varying religious life,Dogmaticsinhisestimationisnotanexpressionofabsolutetruth,andisthereforeentirelywantinginpermanentauthority.

This view of Schleiermacher, however, did not find great favor in thetheologicalworld,notevenamongliberaltheologians.RotheandDornerare the most notable scholars who followed Schleiermacher in thisrespect.Raebigercorrectlysays:"AccordingtotheplaceassignedtoitbySchleiermacher, dogmaticsmust be a history of doctrine current at thepresent time."EvenGeorgeBurmanFosterraisesobjectionsto it in thefollowingwords:"Buthistoricaltheologyisconcernedwithfacts,notwithtruth; with what was, not with what ought to be. And indeed thislimitation of the dogmatic task to historical theology has not beenadheredto,evenbytheseevangelicaltheologiansthemselves,leastofallbySchleiermacher,whoisthegreatchampionoftheconception."2

2. THE RELATION OF DOGMATICS TO APOLOGETICS. There neverhas been and is not now general agreement as to the exact nature ofApologetics,andasaresultopinionsdifferverymuchwithrespecttotheplacewhichitshouldoccupyintheencyclopaediaoftheology.Somehavegivenitaplaceintheexegeticalgroupoftheologicalstudies,andothershave incorporated it with Practical Theology. It has been morecustomary,however,toregarditasapartofSystematicTheology,eitherasan introductorystudyorassomething in thenatureofanadjunct toDogmatics.

In thismatteralso,as inmanyothers,Schleiermacherstruckoutonanentirelynewpath,whenhedeclared it tobean introductorydiscipline,basictothewholesystemoftheology,whichassuchshouldprecedeeventheexegeticalgroupof theologicalstudies.HerepresentsApologeticsasthesciencethatisdevotedtothevindicationofChristianityasawholebymeansofrationalargumentation.ItwasratherinconsistentonthepartofSchleiermachertotakethisposition,sinceheconsidereditimperativeto

excludephilosophy fromtheology,andyet in thisway laidanelaboratephilosophical basis for theology. Apologetics became a sort ofFundamentallehr, and has since his day sometimes been calledFundamentalTheology.

This view of Schleiermacher was adopted by Ebrard, a Reformedtheologian.BeattiealsofavorsitinhisworkonApologetics.Sayshe:"Itmay be best, therefore, to give Apologetics a place of its own, and toregarditasanintroductorydisciplinetothewholesystemoftheology.…This, no doubt, is the best view." Dr. Warfield shares this view ofApologetics. He conceives of it as "the department of theology whichestablishes the constitutive and regulative principles of theology as ascience;and inestablishing these itestablishesall thedetailswhicharederived from them by the succeeding departments, in their soundexplicationandsystematization."HesaysfurtherthatitisthebusinessofApologetics"toestablishthetruthofChristianityastheabsolutereligiondirectly only as a whole, and its details only indirectly."With a directappeal to reason for its evidences,Apologetics is supposed todealwiththegreat topicsofGod, religion, revelation,Christianity, and theBible.TheremainingdepartmentsoftheologycanonlybuildonthefoundationlaidbyApologetics.AccordingtoBruceitthusbecomesasortofmediatorbetweenphilosophyand theologyandamediator, inwhichhedoesnothave the greatest confidence.Hehimself conceives ofApologetics as "apreparerofthewayoffaith,anaidtofaithagainstdoubtswhencesoeverarising, especially suchas are engenderedbyphilosophyand science."2Thisspeakingofitas"apreparerofthewayoffaith"wouldseemtobringhisviewofitmoreorlessinlinewiththeconceptionofSchleiermacher,howeverdifferent itmaybe inother respects.ThepositionofHenryB.Smith is expressed in thesewords: "It is best to regard it as historico-philosophicalDogmatics. It is thewhole contents and substance of theChristianfaith,arrayedfordefenseandfor(defensive)assault."

Kuyper, Bavinck, and Hepp have serious objections to theSchleiermacherianconceptionofApologetics,andtheirstrictureswouldseem to be fully warranted. They register especially the followingobjections: (a) While, as the name indicates, Apologetics is properly adefensivescience, it ison thisviewchanged intoaconstructivescience,

which aims at the construction of an independent system fromphilosophical data and by means of purely rational arguments. (b)According to this view Apologetics precedes the four departments oftheology as a sort of Prinzipienlehre, and theology must build on afoundation laid by human reason. (c) Theology is thus robbed of itsindependent character, and derives its principles from a system that isthe product of pure reason; all of which conflicts with the nature oftheology.

These theologians assign to it a place in connection with the study ofDogmatics,andascribetoitthetaskofvindicatingtheChristiansystemofthetruthoveragainsttheattacksoffalsephilosophyandscience.Theytry toavoidoverratingApologeticson theonehand,andunderrating itontheotherhand.Theydonotwanttoneglectit,nortoconsideritasastudyofpurelypracticalsignificance,butassigntoitthemodestandyetimportanttaskofdefendingthedogmaoftheChurchagainstallattacks,andofdoingthisinaconstructiveandprincipialmanner,andnotmerelyinanoccasionalwayasdeterminedbycurrentcontroversies.

3. THE RELATION OF DOGMATICS TO ETHICS. No branch oftheological study is so closely related to Dogmatics as Christian orTheologicalEthics.BeforeandduringtheReformationmanytheologiansincorporatedChristianEthicsintheirDogmatics,andseveraltheologiansoftheseventeenthcenturytreat it inasecondpartafterDogmatics.Yetevenatthatearlytimesomebegantodiscussitasaseparatediscipline,in order to do more justice to it than could be done in a week onDogmatics. According to Geesink, Daneau was the first to publish aReformedEthicsin1577.ThisseparationofDogmaticsandEthicsdidnotat once become general, though theologians began to make a sharperdistinction in their works between the dogmatical and the ethicalmaterial,thecredendaandthefacienda.Gradually,however,thepracticeofseparatingthetwoincreased.Whilethiswasinitselfquiteharmless,itdid have disastrous results, since Ethics gradually drifted from itsreligious moorings. Under the influence of the philosophy of theeighteenth century. Christian Ethics was gradually robbed of itstheological character. In the philosophy of Kant religion was based onEthicsratherthanEthicsonreligion.Andinthewritingsofsuchmenas

Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Rothe, Herrmann, and Troeltsch morality isdivorcedfromreligionandacquiresanautonomouscharacter.

Such writers as Dorner, Wuttke, and Luthardt, again linked Ethics upwiththeChristianreligion,butinaratherunsatisfactoryway.Asamatterof fact there is no principial difference betweenDogmatics and Ethics.The principia of the one are also those of the other. It is no wondertherefore that somehave again sought a closer connectionbetween thetwo. In the previous century Raymond included a separate system ofEthics in his Systematic Theology. George Burman Foster in hisChristianity in its Modern Expression did the same thing. And suchReformed theologians as Charles Hodge and Robert L. Dabneyincorporated a discussion of the ten commandments in their works onSystematic Theology. Kuyper considers it desirable to treat TheologicalEthicsseparately,because(a)ethicaltruthshavecometodevelopmentinadifferentwaythandogmaticaltruths;and(b)thestudyofeachofthesehasitsownrequirementsandmethods.Dogmaticsdiscussesthearticulafidei. and Ethics the praecepta decalogi. And Geesink says that it isgenerally admitted that the separation of Dogmatics and Ethics isincorrect, even though their separate treatment is commendable. It isundoubtedlytruethatthetwoshouldalwaysberegardedandstudiedasstanding in the closest relation to eachother.The truth revealed in theWord of God calls for a life that is in harmony with it. The two areessentiallyinseparable.

QUESTIONSFORFURTHERSTUDY:Isitcorrecttospeakofdogmasasthe fruit of theology? What does history teach as to the function oftheologyintheformationofdogmas?Isthesubject-matterofDogmaticslimited to what is found in the Creeds? How does Barth conceive ofdogma, dogmas, and the Creeds? How do Schleiermacher, Ritschl,Wobbermin,Troeltsch,Schaeder,andBarthdifferintheirconceptionofDogmatics? What objection is there to making Dogmatics a purelydescriptivescience?Doesitstillremaintheology,ifitconsistentlymakesreligion or the Christian faith its object? Onwhat grounds is it deniedthattheologyisascience?Howcanitsscientificcharacterbemaintained?Is it important that this shouldbedone?DoBarthandBrunner regardDogmaticsasascience?

REFERENCES:Bavinck,Geref.Dogm.I,pp.1–41;Kuyper,Enc.derHeil.Godgel, I, pp. 241–283; Hepp, DeWaarde van het Dogma; id., Geref.Apologetiek;Honig,DogmatiekenEthiek;VanDijk,BegripenMethodeder Dogm., pp. 7–51; Hodge Syst. Theol. I, pp. 1–22; Shedd, Dogm.Theol.I,pp.3–58;Strong,Syst.Theol.,pp.1–24;McPherson,ChristianDogm.,pp.1–9,Schmid,Doct.Theol.oftheEv.Luth.Church,pp.25–35;Girardeau,DiscussionsofTheol.Questions,pp.1–44;Hastie,Theol.asaScience,pp. 1–58;Lobstein,AnIntrod. toProt.Dogm.,pp. 1–96;H.B.Smith,Introd.toChr.Theol.,pp.49–59;Meyrick,IsDogmaaNecessity?;Kaftan,Dogm., pp. 1–9; id., The Truth of the Chr. Ref I;Haering, TheChr. Faith I, pp. 1–31; Hall, Dogm. Theol., Introduction, pp. 10–32;Warfield,Introd.toBeattie'sApologetics,pp.19–32;id.,TheIdeaofSyst.Theol. andApologetics, both in Studies inTheology;C.W.Hodge, TheIdeaofDogm.Theol.,PrincetonReview,Jan.1908,pp.52–82;Raebiger,Theol.Enc.II,pp.330–338,362–367;Beattie,Apologetics,pp.48–48–67;Barth,TheDoct.of theWordofGod,pp.1–10,284–335;Geeseink,Geref.EthiekI,pp.149–184.

IV.TheTask,Method,andDistributionofDogmatics

A.TheTaskofDogmatics

1. MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE TASK OF DOGMATICS. One'sconceptionofdogma(s)andofDogmaticswillnaturallydetermineone'sview of the task of Dogmatics. Since the notion of dogma(s) andDogmatics that became prevalent in the nineteenth century differsradically from the view prevailing in the theology of the Reformation,thereisalsoafundamentaldeparturefromtheearlierviewofthetaskofDogmatics.Weshallcallattentiononlytosomeofthemostimportantofthemodernconceptions.

a. Schleiermacher's conception. According to Schleiermacher, it is thetaskofDogmaticstodescribethefeelingswhichtheChurchexperiencesin union with Jesus Christ, the Saviour. For him religion is neitherknowledge normoral action, but feeling,more specifically, a feeling ofdependenceonanultimatereality,whicharisesonlywithintheChristiancommunity; and dogma is merely the intellectual expression orinterpretation of the inner significance of this religious feeling.Experience rather than the Word of God is therefore the source ofdogmas, thoughSchleiermacher still regards theNewTestament as thenormbywhich this experiencemustbe tested.Thematerials furnishedby the communal experience of the Church form the subject-matter ofDogmatics. Its task is togiveasystematicexpositionof theDogmaofaChristianChurchatagivenmomentofitshistoricaldevelopment,whichcanboastofhistoricalexactness,but isnotnecessarilyanexpressionofabsolute truth. In this way it becomes something purely subjective,divorced from the external authority of the Word of God, a merelyhistoricalordescriptivesciencewithoutanynormativesignificance.

The Erlangen school, including such men as J. C. K. Hofmann,Thomasius,andFrank,representsareactionagainstthesubjectivismofSchleiermacher in favor of orthodoxLutheranism. It does indeed share

the subjective starting point of Schleiermacher, and is in so far also atheologyofexperience,butfromexperienceitworksbacktoanobjectivebasis,whichisfoundnotincertainisolatedpassagesofScripture,butinthedoctrinaltruthofScriptureasawhole.SpeakingofHofmann,Edghillreally indicates itsmethodclearly inthefollowingwords:"Startingwiththe personal experience of the Christian he worked backwards to theexperience of the Christian Church, as expressed in its creeds andconfessions; and thus further to the documentary proofs in Scriptureuponwhichallisbased."

ApositionsomewhatsimilartothatofSchleiermacher,thoughreflectingevenmore clearly the influence of Vinet, is that of the Ethicals in theNetherlands. It takes its starting point in the life of believers incommunionwithChrist, that is, notmerely in the life of the individualbeliever, but in that of believers collectively, of the community ofbelievers, which is the Church. When the Church reflects on this life,whichconsistsnotmerelyinfeelings,butalsointhoughtandaction,thisgivesrisetodogmas,whicharemerelytheintellectualexpressionofthatlife.Andthe taskofDogmatics is todescribe the lifeof theChurchataparticulartimeinasystematicandscientificway.VanDijk,oneoftheirprominent representatives, defines Dogmatics as the description of thelifeoftheChurchHepreferstheterm'life'totheSchleiermacherianterm'feelings,' because it points to something more permanent, and is alsomore comprehensive and Scriptural. Moreover, he maintains that thisdescriptionofthelifeoftheChurchshouldbeundertheconstantcontrolofScriptureasarecordofwhatthewritersexperiencedofthelifeoftheLord,andrefusestoconsiderDogmaticsasapurelyhistoricaldiscipline,devoidofnormativeauthority.

b.TheRitschlianconception.InRitschliancirclesitisquitecustomarytospeak of Dogmatics as "the scientific exposition of the Christian faith"(Lobstein),oras"thescienceoftheChristianfaith"(Haering).Thisfaith,however,isnotalwaysconceivedinthesameway.Herrmanndivorcesitasmuchaspossiblefromallknowledge,andregardsitpurelyasfiducia(trust). The content of this faith consists merely in religious-ethicalexperiences,whicharealwaysindividualandcannotbesystematized,andwhichdevelopoutof faith itself.On this viewDogmatics canhardlybe

anythingelsethanadescriptionofreligious-ethicalexperiences.Yetthereis in the Ritschlian school a manifest desire to break away from thesubjectivismofSchleiermacher.This tendency findsexpressionperhapsmost of all in Kaftan, the real dogmatician of the school. He definesDogmatics as follows: "Die Dogmatik ist die Wissenschaft von derChristlichenWahrheit,dieaufGrunddergoettlichenOffenbarunginderKirchegeglaubtundbekanntwird."Thisdefinitionseemstoacknowledgethe objective character ofDogmatics. But his description of the task ofDogmatics on page 104 makes a different impression. Says he: "DieeigentlicheHauptaufgabederevangelischenDogmatikbestehtdarin,dieErkenntniss darzulegen, die sich dem Glauben aus der Aneignung dervon der Schrift bezeugten Gottesoffenbarung ergiebt." Thismeans thatDogmaticsmustsetforthfaith,thatis,theknowledge-contentinvolvedinfaith,whichresultsfromtheappropriationofthedivinerevelationgiveninScripture.InthestudyofScripturefaithfastensoncertaintruthsandappropriates these. It does not accept them, however, because they areinfallibly given by revelation and therefore authoritative, but becausethey commend themselves by their practical value for the religioussubject. The knowledge-content of faith is therefore after all a contentselected by man. Consequently, even Kaftan does not succeed inmaintainingtheobjectivecharacterofDogmatics.

ThepositionofLobsteinagreeswiththatofKaftan.HespeaksoffaithasbeingboththeobjectandthesourceofDogmatics,butalsomentionsthegospel as the source. The synthesis of these two is expressed in thefollowingwords: "Faith is the legitimate and pure source ofDogmaticsonly when it is in union with the divine factor which inspires it andwhich, without ceasing, conditions and establishes it. The source ofDogmaticsisthatfaithwhichhasassimilatedtoitselftheeternalessenceofthegospel,orthegospelinitsapprehensionbythemysteriouspoweroffaith."Theknowledge-contentoffaithisinspiredbythegospel,butitsextentisdeterminedbytheselectiveactivityoffaith.ItisonlyinthelightofthesefactsthatwecanreallyunderstandhisdefinitionofDogmaticsas"thescientificexpositionoftheProtestantfaith."Bothofthesemenwanttomaintain theobjective andnormative characterofDogmatics, but inview of the fact that with them faith is really the immediate source ofDogmatics,itcanhardlybesaidthattheyhavesucceeded.

c.TheviewofTroeltsch.TroeltschwasmotivatedbyadesiretosecureforDogmatics a greater measure of objectivity, and therefore suggested areligious-historical norm of more universal validity than that of theRitschlians,inordertoestablishthetruthoftheChristianreligion.Inhisestimation this should not be sought merely in the study of what thehistoryoftheChristianreligionhastooffer,butinthestudyofreligionsingeneral.InhisschemeDogmaticsreallyderivesitssubject-matterfromhistory,thehistoryofreligions.Accordingtohimithasathreefoldtask.The firstof these is toestablish thesupremacyof theChristianreligionover other religions. Thedogmaticianmust beginwith the study of thehistoryofthevariousreligions.Inthecourseofthisstudyastandardornorm emerges in virtue of a religious a priori in the humanconsciousness, which cannot be demonstrated but is nevertheless realanddeterminative,andenablesustodecideinfavorofChristianity.Thejudgment so reached is not a mere value judgment, but one that hasontologicalsignificance.HavingestablishedthesupremecharacteroftheChristianreligion,thedogmaticianmust,inthesecondplace,determinethe realmeaning of Christianity or discover its essence. Troeltsch saysthat it is characteristic of Christianity that it ever leads to newinterpretations,sothattheconceptionofitsessencewillnaturallychangefrom time to time. He expresses his own view of it in these words:"Christian religious faith is faith in the regeneration of man who isalienated from God, a regeneration effected through the knowledge ofGod inChrist. The consequence of this regeneration is unionwithGodandsocialfellowshipsoastoconstitutethekingdomofGod."Finally,thethird task of Dogmatics is to expound the content of Christianity soconceived,andtoformulatethedoctrinesofGod,man,andredemptionthat are involved in this general conception of it. This view is moreobjective than that of the Ritschlians in its appeal to the history ofreligions in general, but doesnot entirely breakwith the empiricismofSchleiermacherandRitschl.Indistinctionfromtheviewofthesemenitdoesnotwanttoexcludemetaphysics.However, itdoesnotrepresentareturntotheobjectivebasisfoundintheWordofGod.

d. The position of Schaeder. Schaeder criticizes both the Ritschlianposition and that of Troeltsch. The former simply postulates a God, inorder to secure certainmoral interests; and the latter leaves Jesus too

muchamidtherelativismofhistory,insteadofseeinginHimtheuniquerevelationofGod inhistory.History recordsman's search forGod,andnotGod'sfindingmanthroughHisrevelation.Theologymustceasetobeman-centered, and shouldbecomeGod-centered. InSchaeder's opinionthe glory and the majesty of God were compromised too much in theanthropocentrictheologythatprevailedsincethedaysofSchleiermacher.This sounds very promising, but Schaeder does not succeed in risingabovethesubjectivismofthetheologywhichhecondemns.HedoesnotrecognizetheWordofGodastheonlysourceandnormoftheology.Hisstarting point is, after all, also purely subjective. It is the revelationwrought by the Spirit ofGod inman, a revelationwhich becomes oursonlythroughthefaithwroughtinus.TothisrevelationScripture,nature,history, and Christ also make their contribution. From this revelation,mediated to us through faith, Dogmaticsmust draw itsmaterial, all ofwhichcentersaboutGod.Dogmaticsmustdealfirstofallwiththatwhichis most fundamental in God, namely, His majesty or absolutesovereignty; then it must treat of the holiness of God in its close andunqualified relationship to the majesty of God; and, finally, it mustunfold the idea of the love of God, especially as it is revealed in JesusChrist, inorganic connectionwithboth themajesty and theholinessofGod."AufdieseWeiseergebensichdreieinfacheTeiledesdogmatischenEntwurfes: Gott derHerr, Gott der heilige, Gott der liebende oder derVater…SoistdieganzeTheologiewirklichGotteslehre.Sie istaberausdemGlaubenundfuerdenGlauben."ThemethodofSchaederdoesnotdiffer fundamentally from that of Schleiermacher; but whileSchleiermacher's theology can hardly be said to rise above the level ofanthropology,thatofSchaederstronglyemphasizesthefactthatitmustbeGod-centered.Andinstrivingtomakeitthishedoesnotruleoutthetheoreticelement.

e. The Barthian view. The conception of Barth respecting the task ofDogmatics can best be indicated briefly by quoting some of his ownwords. Says he: "As a theological discipline, dogmatics is the scientifictest towhich the Christian Church puts herself regarding the languageaboutGodwhichispeculiartoher."ThetaskofDogmaticsisthereforetotest the language of the Church respectingGod, in order tomake surethatitisinagreementwiththedivinerevelation.InGodinAction,p.53

Barth expresses himself as follows: "Dogmatics must test dogma (notdogmas) tosee thatdogmacorresponds to the trueobject…Dogmaticshasthetaskofinterpretingthecorrespondingco-relationofthedogmas.Butbeyond that its task is tocarryonacomprehensive investigationoftheentireChurch'slanguage,concepts,phrases,andwaysofthinkinginthe present." He rejects the Roman Catholic conception of Dogmatics,andthetendencytowardsasimilarviewintheoldProtestanttradition,tothe effect that the task of Dogmatics is merely "the combination,repetition, and transcription of a number of already present 'truths ofrevelation,'onceforallexpressedandauthenticallydefinedastowordingandmeaning."InCredoheexpresseshimselfinaslightlydifferentway:"Dogmaticsendeavors to takewhat is firstsaidto it in therevelationofGod'sreality,andtothinkitoveragaininhumanthoughtsandtosayitoveragaininhumanspeech.TothatenddogmaticsunfoldsanddisplaysthosetruthsinwhichthetruthofGodconcretelymeetsus.Itarticulatesagainthearticlesoffaith;itattemptstoseethemandtomakethemplainin their interconnection and context; where necessary it enquires afternewarticlesoffaith,i.e.articlesthathavenotuptonowbeenknownandacknowledged."

The fundamental idea from which to start, in order to understand therepresentationofBarth,isthatof"Churchproclamation."JustwhatdoesBarthmeanbythat?HetellsusthatnotalllanguageoftheChurchaboutGodisChurchproclamation.WordsaddressedtoGodinprayer,singing,andconfession,donotformapartofit;neitherdothesocialactivitiesoftheChurch.Eventheinstructionoftheyouthcannotbesocalled,sinceit"has to teach, not to convert, not to 'bring to a decision,' and to thatextentnottoproclaim."Theologycannotclaimtobesuchproclamation,though it is also language about God to men. "Proclamation is itspresupposition,itsrawmaterialanditspracticalgoal,notitscontentoritstask.Naturally,proclamationalsomeanstospeakaboutGod,butinit"is concealed, as themeaning of this action, the intention to speak thewordofGodHimself."It isspeakingwiththeexpectationthatinitGodHimself will be the speaker. "Proclamation is human language in andthroughwhichGodHimselfspeaks,likeakingthroughthemouthofhisherald.…WherehumanlanguageaboutGodisproclamation,itraisesthisclaim, it lives inthisatmosphereofexpectation."NowdogmaisChurch

proclamation in so far as it really agrees with the original revelationattested in Scripture, in which God is, of course, the speaker. It isrevealed truth, and therefore quite different from dogmas, which aremere doctrinal propositions formulated by the Church, and thereforewordsofmen.Andnow"Dogmaticsmusttestdogma(notdogmas)toseethatdogmacorrespondstothetrueobject."4"ItistheinquiryabouttheWordofGod inChurchproclamation,mustbe thecritical inquiryas tothe agreement of Church proclamation, not with any norm of humantruth or human value … but with the revelation attested in HolyScripture." The goal of Dogmatics is dogma, that is, it aims at theagreement of Church proclamation with the original revelation. Barthremindsus,howeverof the fact that "thedogmaafterwhichDogmaticsinquiresisnotthetruthofrevelation,butitisonthewaytothetruthofrevelation."

2.THEREFORMEDCONCEPTIONOFTHETASKOFDOGMATICS.Indistinction from the views discussed in the preceding, Reformedtheologians maintain that it is the task of Dogmatics "to set forth inscientific form absolutely valid truth, and to embrace the entirety ofChristian doctrine." (Hodge) Bavinck expresses it in these words: Dedogmatiekheeftjuisttottaak,omdieninhoudderopenbaring,welkeopdekennisseGodsbetrekkingheeft,denkendtere-produceeren."Itseeksto give a systematic presentation of all the doctrinal truths of theChristianreligion.Itmaynotrestsatisfiedwithadescriptionofwhatwasat one time the content of the faith of the Church, but must aim atabsoluteoridealtruth.Itisnotapurelyhistoricalordescriptivescience,butone thathasnormativesignificance. In the task tobeperformedbyDogmaticswecandistinguishthreedifferentphases.

a.Aconstructivetask.Thedogmaticiandealsprimarilywiththedogmasembodied in the confession of his Church, and seeks to combine theminto a systematic whole. He must do this in such a manner that theorganic relations of the various elements of the divine truth stand outclearly. This is not quite as easy a task as Lobstein seems to think. Itrequires more than a mere logical arrangement of the truths that areclearlyformulatedintheconfessionoftheChurch.Manytruthsthataremerelystatedingeneraltermsmustbeformulated;theconnectinglinks

between the separate dogmas must be discovered and supplied andformulated in such a way that the organic connection of the variousdogmasbecomesclear;andnewlinesofdevelopmentmustbesuggested,whichareinharmonywiththetheologicalstructureofthepast.Forallitscontent it must draw directly on Scripture, and not on religiousexperience or faith (Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Kaftan, Schaeder), nor onhistory (Troeltsch), nor on Church proclamation (Barth), thus makingGod'srevelationinScripturemerelyanormbywhichtotestitscontent.

b.Ademonstrativeanddefensivetask.It isnotsufficienttosystematizethe dogmas of the Church, since this would make Dogmatics merelydescriptive.Thedogmaticianmustdemonstrate the truthof the systemwhichhepresentsashisown.HemustshowthateverypartofitstrikesitsrootsdeepdownintothesubsoilofScripture.Bibleproofwhichtakesaccount of the progressive character of the divine revelation should begivenfortheseparatedogmas,fortheconnectinglinks,andforthenewelementssuggested.Dogmaticsisinsearchofabsolutetruth.Itmaynotbeabletoreachthisineveryparticular,butshouldneverthelessseektoapproachitasmuchaspossible.Moreover,accountmustbetakenofthehistoricaldeparturesfromthetruth,inorderthatthismaystandoutwithgreater clearness. All attacks on the dogmas embodied in the system,shouldbewardedoff, so that the real strengthof thepositionassumedmayclearlyappear.

c.Acriticaltask.Thedogmaticianmaynot,withHarnack,proceedontheassumptionthat thedoctrinaldevelopmentof thepastwasonegiganticerror, and that hemust therefore begin his work de novo. This wouldreveal a lack of respect for the guidance of theHoly Spirit in the pasthistory of the Church, and give evidence of an undue amount of self-confidence.At the same timehemustbe severely critical of the systemwhichheproposes,andallowforthepossibilityofadeparturefromthetruthatsomepointorother. Ifhedetectserrorseven in thedogmasoftheChurch,hemust seek to remedy them in theproperway; and ifhediscoverslacunae,heshouldearnestlyendeavortosupplywhatislacking.He should bend every effort to the advancement of the science ofDogmatics.

B.TheMethodofDogmatics

Theword'method'doesnotalwayshavethesameconnotation,andisnotalways used with the same latitude in works on dogmatic theology. InsomeofthemthediscussionofthemethodofDogmaticsincludes,ifitisnot limited to, a consideration of the necessary qualifications for thestudyofDogmatics,andthedistributionofthecontentsofDogmaticsintheconstructionofthesystem.Strictlyspeaking,however,themethodofDogmatics concerns only theway inwhich the content ofDogmatics isobtained,thatis,thesourceorsourcesfromwhichitisderived,andthemanner in which it is secured. It is to the consideration of these twopointsthatthepresentdiscussionwillbelimited.

1. VARIOUS VIEWS AS TO THE SOURCE FROM WHICH THECONTENTOFDOGMATICSISDERIVED.ThefirstquestionthatcomesintoconsiderationisthereforethatofthesourceandnormofDogmatics.Historically, there are especially three views that come intoconsideration,namely:(a)thatScriptureisthesourceofDogmatics;(b)that the teachingof theChurchconstitutes thereal source;and(c) thattheChristianconsciousnessmustberegardedasthesource.Thesethreewillbeconsideredinsuccession.

a. Holy Scripture. Holy Scripture was generally recognized from theearliesttimes,ifnotasthefonsorprincipiumunicum,atleastasthefonsprimarius of theology, and therefore also of Dogmatics. God's generalrevelation in nature was frequently, and is also now sometimes,recognizedasasecondarysource.Warfieldsays that"thesolesourceoftheology is revelation." Taking into consideration, however, that GodrevealedHimselfindiversmanners,healsorecognizesas"trueandvalid"sourcesGod'srevelationinnature,providenceandChristianexperience.They all furnish some data for theology. "But," says he, "it remainsnevertheless true thatwe should be confined to ameager anddoubtfultheologywerethesedatanotconfirmed,reinforced,andsupplementedbythesurerandfullerrevelationsofScripture;andthattheHolyScripturesarethesourceoftheologyinnotonlyadegreebutalsoinasenseinwhichnothingelseis."HewouldcertainlycallHolyScripturethefonsprimariusoftheology.

Other Reformed theologians, such as Turretin, Kuyper, Bavinck,

Thornwell,andGirardeau,donothesitatetospeakofitastheprincipiumunicum ('unicum' in the sense of 'only,' and not merely in that of'unique'),orasthesolesourceandnormoftheology.They,ofcoursedonotmeantodenythatthetheologiancanalsoobtainsomeknowledgeofGod from His general revelation; but they maintain that, since theentrance of sin into theworld,man can gather true knowledge of GodfromHisgeneralrevelationonlyifhestudiesitinthelightofScripture,in which the elements of God's original self-revelation, which wereobscuredandpervertedby theblightof sin, are republished, corrected,and interpreted. Consequently, the theologian must always turn toScripture for reliable knowledge of God and of His relations to Hiscreatures. Moreover, he can obtain no knowledge whatsoever of God'sredemptiveworkinJesusChrist,exceptfromspecialrevelation,andthisisknowledgeofsupremesignificance.ItisonlyonthebasisofScripturethereforethatonecanconstructasystemofdogmatictheology.

Inhis use of Scripture thedogmaticianwill naturally take into accounttheresultsofhispreviousstudiesconcerningRevelationandInspiration,General and Special Introduction, SacredHistory, and especially of theHistoria Revelationis or Biblical Theology. In the opinion of some thismeans that he should regard the Bible as a collection of old Israelitishand early Christian literature of very unequal verity and value, shouldacceptashistoricallytrueonlythosepartsthatareattestedbyhistoricalcriticism,andshouldascribenormativesignificanceonlytotheelementsthatapprovethemselves to theChristianconsciousness.SuchprinciplesnaturallyleadtoallkindsofarbitrarylimitationsofthespecialrevelationofGodasasourceoftheology.

Modern empirical theologians, averse to the idea of an authoritativerevelation of God, and eager to secure the scientific character of theirtheologybyapplyingscientificmethodsinitsstudy,discredittheBibleasa source of theology entirely, though in some cases still ascribing to itsome sort of normative significance. They seek the source of theirtheologyintheChristianconsciousness.ThetheologyofSchleiermacheris purely subjective and experimental. The Ritschlians, it is true, stillascribe revelational significance to Scripture, but restrict it to the NewTestament,andmoreparticularlytothoseelementsonwhichthefaithof

theChurchfastens,andwhichareapprehendedandverifiedbyfaith.

Reformed theologians, however, refuse to be led into that labyrinth ofsubjectivism, andaccept thewholeofScripture as thedivinely inspiredrevelationofGodandasthesourceoftheology.Nevertheless,theyrealizethat all parts do not have equal doctrinal significance, that the earlierrevelationsarenotasfullandexplicitasthelaterones,andthatdoctrinesshouldnotbebasedon isolatedpassagesofScripture,buton the sum-totalofthedoctrinalteachingsoftheBible.Theyfeelthatitisabsolutelywrong to followwhata certainwriter calls "the cafeteria style"ofusingthe Bible, selecting only what satisfies one's taste and ignoring all therest. The dogmatician should always study Scripture according to theanalogiaScriptura.

Atthesametimetheydonotfollowtheso-calledBiblicalmethodofBeck,whowasstronglyundertheinfluenceofOetinger,thoughheavoidedthemysticismofthelatter.BeckopposedthesubjectivismofSchleiermacherandhisfollowers.HestressedthefactthatthetheologianmustgatherallhismaterialfromScriptureandfromScriptureonly,ignoringnotonlyallphilosophical theories, but also all Church doctrines. He regarded thedivine revelation inScriptureasanorganicwhole, consistingof severalinterrelatedparts,movingforwardinaunitarydevelopment,andfinallyreaching its consummation under the guidance of theHoly Spirit. Thetheologiansimplyhasthetasktoreproducethetruthas it isobjectivelygiveninScripture,andindoingthisshouldfollownoothermethodthanthatwhichScriptureitselfsuggests.HisexpositionshouldfollowthelineofdevelopmentindicatedinScripture,inwhichallpartsofthetruthareorganicallyrelated.

ThismethoddoesnotsufficientlytakeintoaccountthefactthatScripturedoesnotcontainalogicalsystemofdoctrine,whichwecansimplycopy;that the order which it follows as the record of God's revelation ishistorical rather than logical; that dogmatic theology should be anexposition of the thoughts ofGod, appropriated and assimilatedby thehuman consciousness, and expressed in a language and scientific formadapted to thedogmatician'sowntime;andthat thedogmaticiannevercomes to the studyofScripturewithoutanyprepossessions,butalwaysrepresents a certain ecclesiastical standpoint and has certain positive

personalconvictions,whichwillnaturallybereflectedinhiswork.

One of the most recent names applied to the theology of Barth is"Theology of the Word of God." Barth denies general revelation, isviolently opposed to the subjectivism ofmodern theology, and stressesthenecessityofspecialrevelationfortheknowledgeof(concerning)God.Itwouldbeamistake,however,toinferfromthisthatheagreeswiththeProtestantism of the Reformation in its conception of the Bible as thesource of theology. In the first place the Bible should not be identifiedwiththespecialrevelationofGod,butcanonlyberegardedasawitnessto that revelation. And in the second place special revelation is alwayssimply God speaking; it can never be objectified and made static in abook, so that this becomes, in thewords ofDr.Machen, "the supremetext-bookonthesubjectoffaith."God'sspecialrevelationisnotabook,fromwhichthetheologiancansimplygatherhismaterial.Consequentlyit isnot theBible,norapartof theBible,butsimplyGod'sspeaking toman, to which the Bible bears witness, and by which the Church'sspeakingaboutGodmustbetested.Andifthequestionbeasked,Wheredoes theology find itsmaterial, theanswercanonlybe: in theChurch'sproclamationoftheWordofGodinsofarasthisisreallythespeakingofGod."InDogmatics,"saysBarth,"itcanneverbeaquestionofthemerecombination, repetition, and summarizing of Biblical doctrine." SaysMackintoshinstatingBarth'sview:"Dogmatics,therefore,startsfromthemessagepreachedand taughtby theChurch,and finds thematerialsofits discussion there. When the Church speaks of God, it claims to bedeclaringHisWord.AndforDogmaticthecentralquestionisthis:howisthe Church's language, in its intention and content, fit to serve andexpresstheWordofGod."2InviewofallthisitisnowonderthatBarthsays:"Thereis,tobesure,ahistoryoftheReformedChurches,andthereare documentary statements of their beliefs, together with classicalexpositionsoftheirtheoryandpractice,whichcommand(andalwayswillcommand) the attention, respect, and consideration of every one whocallshimselfaReformedchurchman;but inthetruestsensethereisnosuchthingasReformeddoctrine"(italicsmine).

b. The teaching of the Church. The teaching of the Church or itsconfessionisalsoregardedbysomeasthesourceoftheology.TheRoman

Catholic Church in a certain sense indeed regards Holy Scripture as asource of theology, but denies that it is the complete supernaturalrevelation of God and supplements it with what is called "apostolictradition."Thesetwoinawayconstitutethesourceoftheology,andyetitishardlycorrect tosaythat, in theestimationof thisChurch, thesetwotogether constitute the source and norm of theology, though RomanCatholicwriters often speak as if they do. In reality they constitute thesourceandnormoftheologyonlyastheyareinfalliblyauthenticatedandinterpreted by the Church. Roman Catholics do say that Scripture andtradition are the sources of theology, but deny the right of privateinterpretation. They maintain that we receive both Scripture andtradition at the hands of the Church, which determines what booksbelongtothecanon,andwhattraditionisauthentic.Moreover,theyholdthatbothmustbereadthroughthespectaclesoftheChurch.

Consequently, though both Scripture and traditionmay be regarded assources of theology, only the teachings of the Church, which areirrevocable,constitutetherealsourceandtheruleoffaith.Inconsideringthequestion,whencetheChurchdrawsitsteaching,orwhererevelationisdepositedandpreserved,Wilmerssays:Weanswer:fromtwosources—Scripture and tradition. As these two sources contain the subject-matterofourfaith,theyarecalledsourcesoffaith;andastheydetermineourfaith, theyare likewisecalledrulesof faith.Theyare,however,onlythe remote or mediate rules of faith, while the immediate rule is theteachingChurch.AndGibbonsassertsthat"GodneverintendedtheBibletobetheChristian'sruleoffaith,independentlyofthelivingauthorityofthe Church.'5 Dr. D. S. Schaff says: "The Tridentine position wasreaffirmedbytheVaticanCouncilwhenitstatedthat"allthosethingsaretobebelievedwithdivineandCatholic faithwhicharecontained intheWordofGod,writtenorhandeddownandwhich theChurch,eitherbysolemn judgment or by virtue of her ordinary and universal teachingfunctionoffersforbeliefashavingbeendivinelyrevealed."Thesituationis this, thatnothing canbeacceptedas trueor receivedasanarticleoffaith,whichhasnotbeendefinedandproposedbytheChurch."Shestillretains the apostolic commission," says Thornwell, "and is the onlyaccreditedorganofGod'sSpiritfortheinstructionofmankindinallthatpertains to life and godliness."2 Strictly speaking, it is the voice of the

Church that is heard in both Scripture and tradition. She only is thesupremeoracleofGod,and therefore it isnowonder that shedoesnotregard the reading of the Bible as an absolute necessity, and evendiscouragesthisamongthelaity.

ThisRomanCatholicviewisamisconceptionoftherelationthatobtainsbetweentheChurchandthetruthwithwhichtheologydeals.ItwasthetruththatgavebirthtotheChurch,andnottheChurchthatproducedthetruth. Consequently, she cannot be regarded as the principiumtheologiae. All her claims and all her teachings must be tested byScripture,andarevalidonlyinsofarastheyhaveScripturalwarrant.TheChurch of Rome cannot maintain her claim to a perpetual apostolicinspiration,andthereforeevenhersocalledtraditionmustbesubmittedto the test of Scripture. The tests which the Roman Catholic Churchherselfappliesarenotsufficient.

ButiftheChurchofRomehasanexaggeratedviewofthesignificanceoftheChurchanditsteachings,othersareclearlyinclinedtominimizetheirimportance.Thereisawidespreadaversionatthepresenttimetoascribeanybindingcharacter,anyauthoritywhatsoever,totheChurch'screedalformulations of the truth. While the historical value of the creeds isfrankly admitted, their normative significance is questioned, if notexplicitlydenied.Curtisregardsitasaverydubiouspracticetodemandof theofficersof theChurch that theysubscribe to its creed.AllencallsuponthemembersoftheAnglicanChurchtostandfastinthelibertywithwhichChristhasmadethemfree,andtoshakeoff theyokeofbondageplacedupontheminthecreed.4AndWilliamAdamsBrown,whileinhisrecentwork.ACreed forFreeMen, still pleading for aCreed,doesnotwant tobemisunderstood,andthereforesays: "ByaunifyingCreed, letme hasten to explain, I do not mean a set of beliefs prescribed byauthority,whetheritbeofChurchorState,whichonemusttakeasit isgiven to one as a test of orthodoxy. I mean a definite grouping of theconvictions which givemeaning to life and direction to activity, whichmayserveasaguideforpersonalconductandameansofunderstandingwith one's neighbors." Even Barth and Brunner. while regarding theCreeds as venerable and worthy of respect, refuse to ascribe to themauthorityandtoregardthemasrigidtestsoforthodoxy.Theystressthe

fact that the Creeds are expressions but not objects of faith.2 Quitegenerallythepositionistakenthatthetheologian,whileappreciatingthehistoricalvalueoftheCreedsandConfessionsoftheProtestantChurchesand gratefully using them as historical guides, should not feel himselfbound by their teachings, but should be entirely untrammeled in hisscientificinvestigations.

It isonlyproper,however, toavoidbothof theextremes justdescribed.Creedsandconfessions,itgoeswithoutsaving,mayneverbeplacedonalevel with Holy Scripture as sources of theology. The Bible is the onlysource,andtheCreedsshouldbeinterpretedinthelightofScripture,andnot Scripture in the light of the Creeds. At the same time the CreedscontainthetestimonyoftheChurchrespectingthetruthrevealedintheBible;andthefactthatshewasguidedinthedevelopmentofthetruthbytheHolySpirit is, to express it in thewordsofThornwell, "a venerablepresumptioninfavorofthedivineauthorityofallthatsheproposes."TheChurchindrawingupaCreedproposesitashercarefullyconsideredandprayerfully accepted conception and expression of the absolute truthrevealed in the Word of God; and they who join that Church therebysignifytheiradherencetothetruthofGod'sWordasitisconfessedinitsCreed.Commonhonestydemandsof them that, as longas they remainmembersofthatChurch,theyshallabidebyherexpressionofthetruthandteachnothingthatiscontrarytoherstandards.

This demand, of course, holds very emphatically for the officers andteachers of the Church. The theologian is always the theologian of aparticularChurch.He receives the truth inher communion, shares herconvictions,andpromisestoteachandpropagatetheseaslongastheydonotprovetobecontrarytotheWordofGod.Whilehedoesnotconsiderthe Creed to be infallible, he accepts its teachings as the expression ofabsolute truth until the contrary appears. It may be said that theseteachings constitute a bias, and this is perfectly true; but no one evertakesupastudywithoutanyprepossessions.Everytheologianinenteringuponhis taskhas certain convictionswhichhe cannot set asideatwill,becausehecannoteliminatehimself.

c. The Christian consciousness. Under the influence of SchleiermacherandRitschlithasbecomequitecustomaryinmanycirclestoregardthe

Christianconsciousnessas the sourceof theology, theonly source fromwhich it derives its material. For Schleiermacher the dogmas of theChurch are the scientific expression of the pious feelings which thebeliever, on close and conscientious self-examination, perceives in hisheart.TheChristianconsciousnessoftheindividual,butespeciallyofthereligious community, is the goldmine from which the dogmas of theChurch must be drawn. At the same time he believes that the truthsderived from this source, in order to become an integral part of theorganismofevangelicaldoctrine,shouldfindsupport intheconfessionsoftheChurchandintheNewTestament.WhilehedoesnotrecognizetheBible as the source of theology he does ascribe a certain normativesignificancetotheNewTestament,sinceitcontainstherevelationofGodin Jesus Christ, and describes the experiences of those who lived inimmediatecontactwithHim.Becauseof their intimateassociationwithChristtheirexperienceshavenormativesignificanceforus.

RitschlianscriticizethesubjectivismofSchleiermacherandhisfollowers,which results in changing Dogmatics from a normative to a purelydescriptive science, and make an attempt to safeguard the objectivecharacteroftheology.Theyclaimtoderivetheirdogmasfromahistoricalrevelation, therevelationofGodinJesusChrist,as it isrecordedintheGospels,thatis,therevelationembodiedinthelifeandtheteachingsofJesus,andespeciallyinHisworkasthefounderoftheKingdomofGod.Theyoftenspeakof that revelationas the sourceof theology.Thisdoesnot mean, however, that they regard this as the direct source oftheological doctrines. They even deny explicitly that it should be soconsidered,andthisisbutnatural.SincetheylimittheScripturalsourcetothehistoricalrevelationofGodinJesusChrist,thequestionnaturallyarisesas to theground for this limitation;and this is foundonly in thefaith of the Church. Faith fastens on those elements of the historicalrevelationthatareofrealvaluefortheChristianlife,sincetheyengendertruepiety.Andtheelementssoappropriatedconstitute thematerial forthe doctrinal system.Hence the faith of the Church is really the directsource of its theology, and so the contents of the theological system isafter all subjectively determined. Faith comes in between the historicalrevelation in Christ and the theologian. The religious consciousness isstill the source of theology. But even so the full subjectivity of the

Ritschlian position does not yet appear. Dogmatics should not beregardedas"thescienceoftheobjectsoffaith,"butas"thescienceoftheChristianfaith."Thetaskofthedogmatician,saysLobstein,"consists inanalyzingthefaithoftheChurch,indevelopingitscontent,inconnectingtogetheritsaffirmations."2Heisconcernedwithfaith'sunderstandingofrevelation, and considers the data of faith in the light of a particulartheoryofreligiousknowledge,andthetestwhichheappliesisprimarilyof a pragmatic kind.Whatworks in religion is true in theology.GarviesaysthataccordingtoRitschl,"Adoctrineistrue,notbecauseitisintheBible,butbecauseitverifiesitselfexperimentallyandpractically."

The idea that the Christian consciousness is the source of theology israthercommon inpresentday theological literature.Even theErlangenschooltakesitstartingpointinexperience,andTroeltsch,inspiteofhisappeal to the history of religions in general, did not succeed in risingabove the subjectivism of Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Wobbermin inprinciple goes back to Schleiermacher, and even Schaeder with histheocentric emphasis does not escape his subjectivism. The sameexperimentalviewisfoundinLemme'sChristlicheGlaubenslehre,andinSchultz'sGrundrissderevangelischenDogmatik.ItalsocharacterizesthetheologyoftheEthicalsintheNetherlands.AndinourowncountrytheChristian consciousness is regarded as the source of theology by suchmen as Wm. Adams Brown (Christian Theology in Outline), Beckwith(Realities of Christian Theology), D. C. Macintosh (Theology as anEmpirical Science), and G. B. Foster (Christianity in its ModernExpression).Manyof thosewhoadopt thispositionare still inclined torecognizeScriptureinsomesenseasanobjectiveauthority,thoughnotasaninfalliblyinspiredrevelationofGod.

Now thereare someobviousobjections to thenotion that theChristianconsciousness is the source, or even one of the sources of theology. (1)Historyandexperienceteachusthatitistheacceptanceandassimilationof the truth,which is revealed in theWordofGod, thatdetermines thenature of our Christian experience, and not vice versa. (2) In theinterpretation of his experience man is always in danger of confusingwhat is frommanwithwhat is fromGod,andofallowingthe imperfectthoughtoftheindividualorofthecommunitytoconditionandlimithis

theology. (3) Many truths which are of the greatest importance intheology cannot be experienced. In the strict sense of the word mancannotexperienceGod, thoughhemayexperienceHisoperations.Howcan he experience such objective historical facts as the creation of theworld,thefallofman,theincarnationoftheLogos,theatoningdeathofChrist,His resurrection from thedead,Hisphysical return, and soon?Consistency in thismatterwill result inoneof two things:either itwillimposeuponexperienceaburdenwhichitcannotbear,oritwillseriouslyimpoverish theology. (4)The interpretationof thedataof theChristianconsciousness with its currents and cross-currents, and with all itsfluctuations, is a process, which is so delicate and in whichman is soliabletoerror,thatinallprobabilityveryfewsatisfactoryinferencescanbedrawnfromit.Absolutetruthcannotbereachedinthatway,andyetthisistheverythingatwhichdogmatictheologyaims.(5)Whileitmaybetruethatsavingfaith,atleastinageneralway,implicatesasystemofdoctrine, itdoesnot followthatsuchasystemcanbededucedfromtheChristian consciousness, even when this is more or less controlled byScripture.Frankattemptedtoderiveawholesystemfromtheprincipleofregeneration,but itcanhardlybesaidthathewassuccessful.(6)It isastriking fact that they who so confidently speak of the Christianconsciousness as the source of theology, frequently insist on it that itsdeliverances be brought to the touchstone of Scripture, and can beregardedasvaliddata for theconstructionofa systemof theologyonlywhentheyareinagreementwiththewrittenWordofGod.

The fact thatChristianexperienceor theChristian consciousness isnotthesourceoftheologydoesnotmeanthatitisnotafactor,andevenanimportant factor, in the construction of the dogmatic system. SomeReformedtheologians,suchasH.B.Smith,VanOosterzee,McPherson,and Warfield, even speak of it as a real, though subsidiary, source oftheology. The latter says, however, "that probably few satisfactoryinferences could be drawn from it, had we not the norm of Christianexperience and its dogmatic implications recorded for us in theperspicuous pages of the writtenWord." If we bear inmind, however,thatreligiousknowledgediffersfromallotherknowledgeinthatitdoesnotrestonone'sowninsight intothetruth,norontheauthorityofanyman, but only on the authority of God, then we feel that the religious

consciousness can hardly be an independent source of theology. TheattempttomakemanautonomousinthisrespectexposesoneontheonehandtothedangerofDeism,whichmakesmanindependentofGod,andontheotherhand,tothedangerofPantheism,whichidentifieshimwithGod.ScriptureneverreferstotheChristianconsciousnessasasourceandnormofthetruth.Moreover,thereligiousconsciousnessisdeterminedtoagreatextentbytheenvironmentinwhichmanlives,revealssignificantvariations,andthereforecannotberegardedasadependablesource.

Atthesametimethereligiousconsciousnesswillalwaysbeanimportantfactor in the construction of a system of dogmatic theology. Only theChristiantheologianhasaproperinsightintothetruthasitisrevealedinthe Word of God, and is therefore qualified to give a systematicrepresentationofit.Whilehisfaithcannotberegardedasafountainfromwhichthelivingwatersspring,itisneverthelessthechannelthatcarriesthemtohimfromtheperennialwellspringofScripture.Andhispersonalappropriationofthetruthsofrevelationwillnaturallybereflectedinhisconstructionofthetruth.Thedogmatician,engaginginhiswork,willnotbeabletosetasidehisindividualconvictions,northeconvictionswhichhehasincommonwiththeChurchtowhichhebelongs.Theproductofhistheologicallaborswillnecessarilybearapersonalimprint.Moreover,Christian experience may serve to verify many of the truths of theChristian religion and tomake them stand out as living realities in theChristianlife.WhileitaddsnothingtothetruthofwhatisrecordedintheWordofGod,itmaygreatlystrengthenthesubjectiveapprehensionofit,andthereforehasgreatapologeticalvalue.

2. THE MANNER IN WHICH THE MATERIAL IS SECURED ANDTREATED. Several methods of obtaining and dealing with theologicaltruth have been suggested and applied, of which the followingmay beregardedasthemostimportant.

a.TheSpeculativeMethod.The term 'speculative' isnotalwaysused inthe same sense in philosophy and theology. Speculative thought in onesense of the word is simply the antithesis of that Empiricism whichmaintains that all knowledge is based on experience. ConsistentEmpiricism reduces all knowledge to the comprehension of the thingsthat fall directly under the observation of the senses, and is therefore

calledSensualism.Ityieldsknowledgeofparticularfacts,butknowsofnouniversal laws andprinciples,which unite them into an organicwhole,and is therefore really equivalent to the negation of all scientificknowledge. It is the functionof reason to gobeyond theparticular andcontingent fact, and to seek the underlying general and necessaryprinciple, which unites the particular facts and ideas into a unity andgives them the coherence of a system. This function of reason issometimesdesignated as 'speculation'.Now speculation in this sense isabsolutely essential in raising any kind of knowledge to the level of ascience, and therefore cannot be dispensedwith in theology. DogmatictheologyaimsatasystematicexpositionoftheknowledgeofGodintherelations inwhichHestands toHiscreatures,andwillneverbeable toaccomplishitstaskwithouttheorganizingfunctionofreason.

This is not the ordinary meaning, however, which, in the sphere oftheology, attaches to 'speculation' and 'the speculative method'. Itdenotesratherthemethodofphilosophersandtheologianswhorefusetotaketheirstartingpointingivenfactsandseektoconstructasysteminanapriori fashion, that, is,without takingaccountof thedatagivenbyobservationandexperience.Itproceedsfromtheabsoluteanduniversaltotherelativeandparticularinapurelydeductiveway.Flemingsaysthatit ischaracteristicofthismethod"nottosetoutfromanythinggivenasits subject,but fromdeterminationswhich thought finds in itselfas thenecessary and primary ground of all being as of all thinking." In theapplication of thismethod the test of truth lies in its coherence or theconsistencyofitsvariouspropositions.Whateveramanmustnecessarilythinkaccordingtothelawsoflogicmustberegardedastrue.ThisisthemethodwhichBaconhadinmindwhenhesaid:"Therationalistsarelikethe spiders; they spin all out of their own bowels." The speculativemethod operates purely with abstract thought, and proceeds on theassumptionthattheworldofthoughtisalsotheworldofreality.Kaftanstatesthepeculiarityofthespeculativemethod,whenhesays:"Itisbasedonthepresuppositionthatthereisacreativefunctioninherentinhumanthought;thatinthehumanmindthereslumbersthepowerofextendingour knowledge beyond all experience, and that it only requires to beawakened by the intercoursewith things; that to the so-called Laws ofThoughtthereaccruesasupernaturalsignificance."2Caldecottexpresses

himself on thispoint as follows: "Thekernel of the full doctrine is thatNecessary thought isconstructiveof intelligentexperience,and that the'idea'or'object'whichitpresentsisentitledtoourfullbeliefasReal.Thatwehavesomeintelligentexperience,andthatit isveridical, istakenforgranted;itisthefacttobeexplained:whateveridea,orthought,orbeliefcanbeshowntobenecessarilyinvolvedorimpliedthereinasitspriusisatruethought;asveridicalasthedatumitself,tosaytheleast."Accordingto thismethodhuman reason is notmerely the instrument of thought,butistheverysourceofthought,andallnecessaryandcoherentthoughtisalsotheReal.Andnotonlyphilosophybutalsotheology(whichHegelregards as philosophy speaking in symbols) is spun out of the humanmind. The philosophy of Hegel furnishes the classical example of thismethod,andthisexampleisfollowedintheworksofabsoluteIdealists.

Thereareseveralobviousobjectionstotheapplicationofthespeculativemethod,asithasbeendefined.(1)Itproceedsontheassumptionthattheconsciousnessofman,whichishererepresentedasabsolutethought, isthesourceoftheology;but,aswehaveseeninthepreceding, it isquiteimpossible that thehumanconsciousness should serve in that capacity.(2)Inthismethodwearemovingentirelyintherealmofthought,anddonottouchtheobjectiveinthesenseofsomethingindependentofand,soto speak outside of our own mental life, while in theology we areconcerned with objective realities. It may be said that what mannecessarilythinksisobjectivelyreal,butthisisanunwarrantedidea.(3)ItignoresthehistoricalfactsofChristianity,whichexistindependentlyofhumanreasonandcannotbededucedfromit.Moreover,it islimitedtoverygeneralideas,since,asSchleiermacherpointedout,purethoughtisalwayslimitedtothatwhichisgeneralandcanneveryieldparticulars.(4)It obliterates the essential distinctionbetweenphilosophy and theologyand makes theology something purely intellectual. According to Hegelphilosophy interprets ultimate reality in terms of pure thought, whiletheologyrepresentsthesamerealityinpictorialform,thatis,intermsofthe imagination. Philosophy is higher theology, and theology is lowerphilosophy.(5)ItrobsfaithofitsrealBiblicalcharacterbyreducingittopurecognition.It is theknowledgeof theordinaryChristian,whichcanonly be raised to the level of true knowledge by means of speculativereason.Faith thusbecomessomething like thepistisof theGnostics,as

distinguishedfromthegnosisonwhichtheypridedthemselves.

b.Theempiricalmethod.Theterms'empiricalmethod'and'experimentalmethod'areoftenusedinterchangeably.Empiricismisquitetheoppositeof a priorism. In the acquisition of knowledge it proceeds inductivelyratherthandeductively.It"allowsnothingtobetruenorcertainbutwhatisgivenbyexperience,andrejectsallaprioriknowledge."Theologiansoftheempiricalschoolgenerallytakeexperimentalreligiontobetheobjectoftheology.Inthestudyofthisobjecttheydesiretoemploythemethodof modern science, that is, the method of observation and induction.Religion is made the object of careful observation, and all itsmanifestationsare subjected to close scrutiny, in thehistorical studyofthereligionsofthehumanraceandinthatofthepsychologyofreligion.After these manifestations are carefully described and classified, theirexplanationissoughtingeneralprinciples;andwhentheseprinciplesarecarefully formulated, they are, in turn, tested by further observation.Fromthematerialssogatheredasystemisconstructed,whichconstitutesaphilosophyofreligionratherthanasystemoftheologicaltruth.

The preceding description is of a very general nature, and gives noindicationof thedifferentvariationsof theexperimentalmethod,whichare rather numerous.Macintosh classifies under the empirical methodwhat he calls the mystical, the eclectic, and the scientific types.Wobbermin speaks of the religio-psychological method, which he alsocalls the Scheiermacherian-Jamesian method, and Lemme calls themethod which he employs "die empirisch-descriptive Methode." Theexisting variations result from the various attempts that weremade toovercomesomeoftheweaknessesoftheempiricalmethod,andtomeetsuchobjectionsasthefollowing:thatitisaltogethersubjective;thatitispurely individual and therefore has no general validity; and that itreducestheologytoaratherhighlyspecializeddivisionofanthropology.Somemoderntheologiansrealizethattheymustdealwiththeirsubject-matter theologically,andthat thisrequiresaveryspecialefforton theirpart.MacintoshwantsitclearlyunderstoodthatGodistheobjectofhis"TheologyasanEmpiricalScience."AndSchaederverydefinitelywantshistheologytobeGod-centered.

Schleiermachermayberegardedasthefatheroftheempiricalmethodin

theology. Ritschl and the Ritschlians were opposed to his subjectivismandsuggestedamoreobjectivemethod,buteventheirmethodisinthelast analysis experimental. The Erlangen theologians continued thismethod,andevenTroeltschdidnotentirelybreakwithit.Wobbermin'sreligio-psychological method is in fact a return to the position ofSchleiermacher; and even Schaeder finds God primarily in theexperiences of the soul. Thus it has been characteristic of moderntheologytoseekGodinman,andtoregardhimasinsomesenseofthewordcontinuouswithman.Barth,itistrue,stressestheinfinitedistancebetweenGodandman,andemphasizesthefactthatmancanonlyknowGodbymeansofaspecialdivinerevelation.Butifthequestionisasked,Justwhere isGod'srevelation?Barthcannottell, for ithasnoobjectiveindependentexistence.Itdoesnotexistinadefiniteform,soastoenableone to say, Here it is. The Bible cannot be regarded as the infalliblyinspired Word of God. It merely bears witness to the original divinerevelationtotheprophetsandparticularlyinChrist.HecanonlysaythatGod's revelation is there,whereGodspeaksdirectly to thehumansoul,speaksawordwhichisrecognizedastheWordofGodonlybyaspecialoperationoftheHolySpiritineachparticularcase.ThespeakingofGodis a revelationofGodonly for the one towhomGodbrings it home infaith. The reception of this revelation is a unique experience for thosewho receive it. Has Church proclamation, strictly speaking, any othersource todrawon?And ifnot,how fardoesBarth thenreallygetawayfrom the experimentalmethod? Itmay be said that, according to him,ChurchproclamationmustbetestedbytheoriginalrevelationattestedbyScripture, but that does not changematters.Most of the experimentaltheologiansregardtheBibleas,insomesenseoftheword,anormforthestudy of theology. It is not surprising to find Rolston saying: "OnBarthian premises, there is no way to preventmen from falling into apositionwhichtheBarthiansthemselveswouldabhor.Thesystemwouldinevitably tend to a vast subjectivity in which each man decided forhimselfjustwhatportionofScripturehadauthorityforhim."

However much the empirical method may be in vogue in moderntheology, it is nevertheless open to several serious objections. (1) TheapplicationofthismethodeoipsorulesoutGodastheobjectoftheology,for it is not possible to investigate God experimentally. He cannot be

broughttothetestsofobservationandexperience.IfsomeofthosewhoapplythismethodfeelthatinthestudyoftheologytheyshouldproceedbeyondtheknowledgeofthephenomenaofreligiontotheknowledgeofGod,andreallymakeaseriousattempttomoveinthatdirection,theydoit at the expense of their empirical method. (2) Because the empiricalmethoddealswith thephenomenaof experimental religion rather thanwithGodasitsobject,itdoesnotreallysucceedinconstructingasystemof theology at all, but merely yields a study in religious psychology.James' The Varieties of Religious Experience is regarded as a classicproductionofthismethod.Buthoweverimportantthisbookmaybe,itisnot theological. (3)The strict application of the empiricalmethoddoesnot enable one to get beyond the surface even in the study of religion.Externaltestscanbeappliedtothephenomenaofthereligiouslife,butnottotheinnerlifeitself,nottothehiddendepthsofthesoulfromwhichtheexperiencesofreligionarise.Theempiricalmethodpureandsimpleties one down to a bare phenomenalism without unity or conscience,which is not even entitled to the name of science. (4) Finally, theempiricalmethod,evenwhenitceasestobepurelyempiricalandallowsthevalidityof reflectionand inference,andadmitsof theapplicationofgeneral categories of thought, does not, as a rule, get beyond thedescription of subjective states of consciousness with their constantfluctuations.Theresult isapurelydescriptivescience,andnotone thathasnormativesignificance.Itabandonsthefieldofobjectivereligion,andseekstoachieveitstriumphsintherealmofthesubjective.

c. The genetico-syntheticmethod. Thismethod is sometimes called thetheologicalmethod, or themethod of authority, because it proceeds onthe assumption that the divine self-revelation in Scripture is theprincipiumcognoscendiexternumoftheology.ThepresuppositionisthatGod,andnotreligion,istheobjectoftheology,andthattheobjectcanbeknownonlybecause,andinsofaras,ithasrevealeditself.Consequentlythe data with which theology deals are not given in the Christianconsciousness, but in the objective special revelation of God. This self-revelation only can give us absolutely reliable knowledge of God.Whateverknowledgemaybederivedfromothersources,suchasnatureandtheChristianconsciousness,mustbetestedbytheWordofGod.

Accordingtothismethodthedogmatician,whiletakinghisstandintheconfessionofhisChurch,yet intheconstructionofhissystemproceedsfrom thedata given inScripture.He enters into the richharvest of theworkthatwasdoneespeciallyinexegesisandinthehistoryofrevelationorBiblicaltheology,andseekstoshowhowthedogmasoftheChurcharerooted,notinisolatedpassagesofScripture,butinScriptureasawhole,andaredevelopedoutofthedivinerevelationinanorganicway.Insofaras he gathers his materials from Scripture his method may be calledinductive, but this should not be represented as a sort of experimentalmethod,as isdone inameasurebyHodge,andalsobyEdgar.ForhimScripturenotmerelyrevealscertainfactswhichmanmayinterpretasheseesfitandashedeemsnecessaryintheageinwhichhelives,butalsogivesan infallible interpretationof the facts,an interpretationwhichhemaynotsetasideatwill,butmustacceptasauthoritative.

IntheapplicationofthesyntheticmethodthetheologianwillnotmerelyreceiveisolateddoctrinesfromScripture,butratherthedivinetruthasawholerevealedinfactsandwords.Thefactsaretheembodimentsofthetruthsthatarerevealed,andthetruthsilluminethefactsthatstandouton thepages ofHolyWrit. The teachings of Scripture are seen in theirgrand unity, since the Bible indicates in variousways how its separatedoctrines are interrelated. Bearing all these data in mind, thedogmaticianwillseektoconstructhissysteminalogicalway,supplyingwhateverlinksmaystillbemissingintheconfessionoftheChurchfromtheBibleasthefountain-headofreligioustruth,andcallingattentiontothevariousdeviationsfromScriptureinthehistoricaldevelopmentofthetruth. It will be his constant endeavor to set forth all the treasures ofwisdom and knowledge that are hidden in Christ and revealed inScripture.

C.DistributionofDogmatics

There has been quite a variety of opinion respecting the properdistribution of thematerial of Dogmatics. The principle of distributionhasbeenderivedfromthesubject-matteroftheology,fromthesourcesofitsmaterialcontent,fromthemannerinwhichthisistreated,orfromitshistorical development. Naturally, this principle may not be chosenarbitrarily,butshouldbegermanetothesubject,shouldcoverthewhole

field and assure to each part a natural place, and shouldmaintain theproper proportions of the separate parts. Logic would seem to requirethatintheology,asinallothersciences,theprincipleofdivisionshouldbederived,notfromitssources,itsmanneroftreatment,oritshistoricaldevelopment, but very decidedly from its subject-matter. The followingare the most important methods of distributing the dogmatic materialadoptedintheProtestantChurchsincethedaysoftheReformation.

1.THETRINITARIANMETHOD.ToacertainextentCalvinandZwinglipaved theway for the trinitarian distribution of the dogmaticmaterial.Theirclassificationwasnotstrictlytrinitarian,butwasderivedfromtheApostolic Confession. They followed up their discussion of God asCreator,GodasRedeemer,andGodasSanctifier,withaseparatebook,dealing with the Church and the Sacraments. The Dutch theologian,MelchiorLeydekker(born1642),afollowerofVoetius,wasthefirstoneto apply the strictly trinitarian method. It did not become popular,however.Hegel,who regarded thedoctrineof theTrinityas the centraldoctrineofChristianity,broughtitintoprominenceoncemore;anditisfollowedbyMarheinekeandMartensen.Thismethodnaturally leads toan undue emphasis on the metaphysical in Dogmatics. Logically, itexcludes the discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity. This can only betreated as a presupposition in a preliminary chapter. Moreover, thismethod, with its excessive emphasis on the separate persons of theGodheadtendstoobscurethe fact that thedivineoperaadextraarealloperaessentialia,thatis,worksofthedivineBeingasawhole,andtogivethemtheappearanceofoperapersonalia,worksoftheseparatepersons.Finally,thevariouselementsofanthropologyandsoteriologydonotfinda natural place in such a scheme. For these reasons this method ofdistributionhasfoundlittlefavor,anddoesnotdeservecommendation.

2.THEANALYTICALMETHOD.WhilethesyntheticmethodbeginswithGod, and then proceeds to discuss man, Christ, redemption, et cetera,until it finally reaches the end of all things, the analytical method,proposedbyCalixtus(1614–1656),beginswithwhatitconsidersthefinalcause or end of theology, namely, blessedness, then proceeds to thesubject(God,angel,man,sin),andfinallytreatsofthemeansbywhichitis secured (predestination, incarnation, Christ, justification, the Word,

the Sacraments, and so on). It surelymakes a strange impression thattheology should begin with the end, and that the end should beblessednessratherthanthegloryofGod.Itisequallystrangethatinthesecond part God, angels, and men should be coördinated, as ifblessednessweretheendoftheologyfortheoneaswellasfortheother.Moreover,thethirdpartdoesscantjusticetoSoteriology,sinceitissilentonsuchsubjectsasregeneration,calling,conversion,faith,sanctification,and good works. Notwithstanding this, the method of Calixtus wasfollowedbyseveralLutherantheologians,thoughitmeetswithnofavoratthepresenttime.

3. THE COVENANTAL METHOD. Coccejus was the first to derive aprincipiumdivisionisfromthecovenantidea.Hedistinguished,anddealtsuccessivelywith, the foedusnaturaeetoperum,and the foedusgratiaewithitsthreesubdivisions:antelegem,sublege,andpostlegem.AmongtheReformedtheologiansoftheNetherlandshewasfollowedbyWitsiusandVitringa,butinothercircleshissystemfoundnofavor.AndeveninReformedtheologyitwasshort-lived.AmongtheSouthernPresbyteriansofourowncountryDr.Thornwellfollowedasomewhatsimilardivision.He derives his principle of distribution from themoral government ofGod, and treats of themoral government in its simple form, themoralgovernment modified by the covenant of works, and the moralgovernmentmodified by the covenant of grace.But in this division theprincipleofdistributionisclearlynotderivedfromthesubject-matterassuch,butfromthehistoryofitsdevelopment.TakingitsstartingpointinthecovenantbetweenGodandman,itcannaturallydiscussthedoctrineof God and ofman only by way of introduction.Moreover, it virtuallyobliterates the distinction between the History of Revelation andDogmatics, deprives Dogmatics of its absolute character, and leads toconstantrepetitions.

4. THE CHRISTOLOGICAL METHOD. Several theologians, both inEurope and in America, are of the opinion that all genuinely Christiantheology should be Christocentric, and should therefore derive itsprinciple of distribution fromChrist or the saving operations of Christ.This position is taken by Hase, Thomasius, Schultz, T. B. Strong, A.Fuller,H.B.Smith,andV.Gerhart.SchultztreatsofGodandtheworld,

and ofman and sin, as presuppositions of the Christian salvation, andthen proceeds to the discussion of the saving work of the Son of God(Person and work of Christ), and the saving acts of the Spirit of God(Church, means of grace, ordo salutis, perfecting of salvation). AsomewhatsimilarcourseisfollowedbySmith,whotreatssuccessivelyofthe antecedents of redemption, the redemption itself, and theconsequentsor (tousea later term) thekingdomof redemption. It isasufficientcondemnationofthismethodthatthedoctrinesofGod,ofman,and of sin, must be placed outside of the system, and treated asprolegomena.ChristisindeedthecenterofGod'srevelation,butforthatvery reason cannot be the starting point. Moreover, this method issometimes (as, for instance, in theworkofGerhart) combinedwith thefalsenotionthatChrist,andnotScripture,istheprincipiumcognoscendiexternumoftheology.

5. THE METHOD BASED ON THE KINGDOM IDEA. Under theinfluence of Ritschl, who makes the Kingdom of God central in histheology, some theologians would derive the principle of distributionfromthisimportantconcept.Ritschlhimselfdoesnotapplythisdivision;neitherdoKaftan,Haering,andHerrmann,someofthemostimportanttheologiansoftheRitschlianschool.VanOosterzeeoffersanexampleofitwhichisnotveryconvincing.Inrealityhegivesthecustomarysyntheticdivision,andmerelysubstitutesfortheoldtitlesofthevariousdivisionsdesignations derived from the idea of the Kingdom. He discussessuccessively God or the supreme King (theology), man or the subject(anthropology), Christ or the founder (Christology), redemption or thesalvation(objectivesoteriology),thewayofsalvationortheconstitution(subjectivesoteriology),theChurchorthetrainingschool(ecclesiology),andthefuturecomingoftheLordortheconsummation,oftheKingdom(Eschatology). This division is purely formal, and is by no meansorganicallydeducedfromtheKingdomidea.Moreover,adivisionbasedontheKingdomidearobsDogmaticsof its theologicalcharacter,and islogicallyimpossible.ThedoctrineofGod,ofmaningeneral,ofsin,andofChristinHismany-sidedsignificancecannotbederivedfromtheideaoftheKingdomofGod.

6.THESYNTHETICALMETHOD.Thisistheonlymethodthatwillyield

the desired unity in Dogmatics. It takes its starting point in God, andconsiderseverything that comesup fordiscussion in relation toGod. Itdiscussesthevariousdoctrinesintheirlogicalorder,thatis,intheorderin which they arise in thought, and which lends itself to the mostintelligible treatment. In such an order of treatment each truth, exceptthefirst,mustbesorelatedtoprecedingtruthsthatitwillbeseenintheclearestlight.Godisthefundamentaltruthintheology,andisthereforenaturally first inorder.Every following truth, inorder tobe seen in itstrue perspective,must be viewed in the light of this primary truth. Forthat reason Anthropology must precede Christology, and ChristologymustprecedeSoteriology,andsoon.Proceedingaccordingtothislogicalmethod,wediscuss:

I.ThedoctrineofGod(Theology).

II.Thedoctrineofman(Anthropology).

III.ThedoctrineofChrist(Christology).

IV.Thedoctrineofappliedsalvation(Soteriology).

V.ThedoctrineoftheChurch(Ecclesiology).

VI.Thedoctrineofthelastthings(Eschatology).

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY:What is the difference betweenbiblical and dogmatical theology, and how are the two related? Whatobjections have been raised to systematizing theological truth? Whatdistinction do modern theologians make between the source and thenormofdogmatic truth?Is thisdistinctionvalid?WhyshouldtheBibleberegardedastheprincipiumunicumoftheology?HowdoKuyperandBavinck distinguish between a principium and a source or fons?Whatimportant truth is contained in themodern emphasis on the Christianconsciousness?HowdotheviewsofTroeltsch,Schaeder,andBarthdifferas to the taskofDogmatics?What is theBarthianviewof thesourceoftheology?Isitpossibleforadogmaticiantobeunbiasedinhistheologicalstudies?Whatisthemysticalmethod?Thereligious-historicalmethodofTroeltsch?Thepragmaticmethod?

REFERENCES: Bavinck, Geref. Dogm. I, pp. 41–103; Kuyper, Enc. derHeil.Godgel. III,pp.405–415;Hodge,Syst.Theol. I,pp.1–150;Shedd,Dogm. Theol. I, pp. 3–15;Miley, Syst. Theol. I, pp. 7–54;McPherson,Chr. Dogm., pp. 1–43; Thornwell, Collected Writings I, pp. 39–52:Macintosh, Theol. as an Emp. Science, pp. 1–46; Foster, G. B.,Christianity in its Modern Expression, pp. 1–79; Van Oosterzee, Chr.Dogm.I,pp.20–42,84–109;Raebiger,Theol.Enc.II,pp.335–339;VanDijk, Begrip enMethode derDogm., pp. 7–89; Lobstein, An Introd. toProt.Dogm.,pp.58–275;Smith,H.B.,Introd.toChr.Theol.,pp.60–83;Lemme, Christl. Glaubenslehre, pp. 14–31; Girardeau, Discussion ofTheol.Questions, pp.45–272;C.W.Hodge,The IdeaofDogm.Theol.,ThePrincetonTheol.Rev.,Jan.,1908;Warfield,TheIdeaofSyst.Theol.,Studies in Theology, pp. 49ff.; Schaeder, Theozentrische Theologie;Barth,TheDoctrineoftheWordofGod,pp.1–51.

V.HistoryofDogmatics

ThehistoryofDogmaticsdoesnotgobacktothetimeoftheApostles,butonly to the beginning of the third century,whenOrigenwrote his PeriArchon.Severalperiodsmaybedistinguished,namely,theperiodoftheOld Catholic Church, the period of theMiddle Ages, the period of theReformation, the period of Protestant Scholasticism, the period ofRationalismandSupra-naturalism,andtheperiodofModernTheology.

A.ThePeriodoftheOldCatholicChurch

InthebeginningofthisperiodsomevaluablepreparatoryworkwasdonebythecatecheticalschoolofAlexandria,butitwasnotuntilthebeginningofthethirdcenturythatanyimportantworkappearedwhichpurportedtobeasystematicpresentationoftheologicaltruth.Infact,theperiodoftheOldCatholicChurchproducedonlythreeworksofsuperiorvalue inthefieldofsystematictheology,andeventheseareratherdeficient.

1.ORIGEN'SPERIARCHON(DEPRINCIPIIS).Origenwas the first toconstruct something like a system of theology. His work was writtenabout the year 218 A. D. In it the author attempts to transform thedoctrine of the Church into a speculative science, acceptable to thecultural andphilosophical classesofhisday.His great ambitionwas todevelopthecontentsoffaithintoasciencethatdidnotrestonauthority,butonitsowninherentrationalevidence.Inthiswayhedesiredtoraisepistis to the level of gnosis.While the work testifies to the intellectualclarityandprofundityoftheauthor,italsorevealsatendencytosacrificetheology to philosophy. It departs from the current teachings of theChurch particularly (a) in the doctrine that human souls preëxisted,sinned in their previous existence, and are now for punishmentimprisoned inmaterialbodies; (b) in thenotionthat thehumansoulofChristwas already in its preëxistence unitedwith the Logos; (c) in thedenial of the physical resurrection; and (d) in the teaching of therestorationofallthings,Satanincluded.Thegeneralplanoftheworkisdefective,anddoesnotprovideforanadequatetreatmentofChristology,Soteriology,andEcclesiology.

2.AUGUSTINE'SENCHIRIDIONADLAURENTIUM:DEFIDE,SPE,ETCARITATE.Asthesubtitleindicates,theplanofthisworkisderivedfromthe threePaulinevirtues, faith,hope, and love.Under the firstheadingthe author discusses the main articles of faith; under the second, thedoctrineofprayer, following theorderof the sixpetitionsof theLord'sprayer; and under the third all kinds of moral questions. Though thisarrangement is by no means ideal and the work is not always self-consistent,itgivesevidenceofdeepthoughtandofanearnestattempttoconstruethewholeofChristiandoctrinefromastrictlytheologicalpointofview.Theauthorcontemplatestheentireworldwithallitsrichvarietysub specie aeternitatis,making the whole universe subservient to God.Through this and his many other dogmatical treatises Augustineexercised a tremendous influence, which is potent, especially inReformedcircles, evendown to thepresentday.Hedidmore thananyotherscholarofpre-ReformationtimestodeveloptheScripturaldoctrineofsinandgrace.

Mentionshouldbemadeinthisconnectionalsoof theCommonitorium

ofVincentiusLerinensis,whichgivesarepresentationofthedoctrineofthe Old Catholic Church, but can hardly be regarded as a systematicexpositionofdogmaticaltruth.Itserved,however,togivedefiniteformtotheteachingsoftheFathers.Theauthor'sidealwastogiveanexpositionofdoctrineinharmonywiththetraditionoftheChurch,whichhedefinedasquodubique,quodsemper,quodabomnibuscreditumest.TheworkhasaSemi-Pelagianflavor.

3. John of Damascus' EKDOSIS AKRIBES TES ORTHODOXOUPISTEOS(AnAccurateExpositionoftheOrthodoxFaith),700–760.ThisworkrepresentsbyfarthemostimportantattemptintheEasternChurchtogiveasystematicexpositionofdogmatictheology,atoncespeculativeandecclesiastical.Itisdividedintofourbooks,dealingwith(a)GodandtheTrinity;(b)creationandthenatureofman;(c)Christ's incarnation,death,anddescentintohades;and(d)theresurrectionandthereignofChrist,andfurthersuchsubjectsasfaith,baptism,image-worship,andsoon.Theorderof the lastbook isverydefective.Yet thework isofgreatimportance, and is, from a formal point of view, certainly the bestsystematic presentation of the truth in this period. It is on the wholeconservative and in harmonywith the teachings of the Church as theyhadcomedowntotheauthor.

B.ThePeriodoftheMiddleAges

The period following John of Damascus was characterized by aremarkabledialecticalactivity,especially intheology.Thefirstcenturieswereratherbarren,buttowardstheendofthetenthcenturytherewasascientificawakening.IntheeleventhcenturyScholasticismarose;inthetwelfthMysticismappearedalongsideofit;andinthethirteenthcenturythe former, in leaguewith the latter, gained complete ascendancy, andreached its highest glory. Scholasticism represented an attempt to dealwith the doctrinalmaterial found in Scripture according to the strictlyscientificmethodoftheschools.Onthewholeitacceptedthecontentsofthe Bible with childlike faith, but it attempted at the same time torepresentthevariousdoctrinesofScriptureintheirinnerunity,soastopromote a deeper knowledge of the truth. In course of time it becamesubject to the controlling influence of philosophy, Platonic andAristotelian, Nominalistic and Realistic, and developed in a rather

precariousdirection. Itderived fromphilosophy,notonly itsdialecticalmethod,butalsomanyproblemsandquestionsofapurelyphilosophicalkind. As a result Dogmatics gradually degenerated into a philosophicalsystem. The interrogatory form, in which the material was often cast,frequently promoted doubt, and in many instances had the result ofplacingauthorityandreasoninantitheticalrelationtoeachother.Amongthedogmaticaltreatisesofthisperiodthefollowingareoutstanding.

1. WORKS OF ANSELM. The first name of more than ordinaryimportance is that of Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109). He wascharacterizedatoncebydeeppietyandgreat intellectualacutenessandpenetration. While he did not produce a comprehensive systematicexpositionoftheology,hewroteseveralworksofgreatdogmaticalvalue,such as his Monologium and Proslogium, in which he discusses thenatureofGodanddevelopshisontologicalprooffortheexistenceofGod;hisdefideTrinitatisetdeincarnationeVerbi,which,asthetitleindicates,dealswiththedoctrineof theTrinityandof the incarnation;andhisdeConcordia, devoted to a discussion of predestination in the spirit ofAugustine. Surpassing all these in importance, however, his Cur DeusHomo? offers a classical exposition of the satisfaction theory of theatonement.Anselmwasthefirsttodealwiththisimportantsubjectinathoroughandsystematicway.HisgreatopponentwasAbelardwithhismoralinfluencetheory.

2. THE SENTENCES OF PETER THE LOMBARD. The first importantsystematic work of the Scholastic period, which aims at covering thewhole field, is Peter the Lombard's Sententiarum libri IV, consisting offour books: the first onGod, the second onHis creatures, the third onredemption,andthefourthonthesacramentsandthelastthings.Onthewhole theworksimplyreproduces theteachingsof theFathers, though,in distinction frommany other works of this period, it also contains agooddealoforiginalmaterial.Forseveralcenturiesitwaswidelyusedasa handbook of theology, and regarded as the most authoritativeexpositionofthetruth.ManyscholarsfollowedtheexampleofPetertheLombardinwritingSentences.

3. THE SUMMA OF ALEXANDER OF HALES. Alongside of theSentences Summae theologiae gradually made their appearance.

AlexanderofHales, amanof great learning,wrote aSummauniversaetheologiae,whichisreallyacommentaryontheworkofLombardus.Hiswork is cast in a strict dialectical and syllogistic form, and served toestablish the scholasticmethod. It treatsofGod,of the creature, of theRedeemerandHiswork,andofthesacraments.Fromaformalpointofview this work is somewhat similar to modern works on Dogmatics.Alexanderpresents both sides of a question, stateswhat canbe said infavor of each, and then gives his own conclusion. Bonaventura, hisdisciple, added to the dialectical acuteness of his master the mysticalelement,whichwascomingtotheforegroundatthistime.

4. THE SUMMA OF THOMAS AQUINAS. Thomas Aquinas isundoubtedlythegreatestoftheSchoolmen.HisSummatotiustheologiaecovers in three volumes nearly the whole field of Dogmatics. The firstbookdealswithGodandHisworks;thesecondwithmanastheimageofGod,findinginGodthehighestendofhisexistence;andthethirdwithChrist and themeansof grace.Thework remained incomplete, but thematerial for the doctrine of the sacraments and of the last things wasculledfromsomeofhisotherworksandaddedtotheSumma.Formally,theworkiscontrolledbytheAristotelianphilosophy;andmaterially,bythe work of Augustine, though the work of this early Church Father ismodified in important points and brought into greater agreement withthedoctrineoftheChurch.ThomasAquinasisthegreatauthorityoftheRoman Catholic Church, and Thomism is its standard theology. DunsScotus was the great opponent of Thomas Aquinas, but his work wascriticalanddestructiveratherthansystematicandconstructive.ItmarksthedeclineofScholasticism.

C.ThePeriodoftheReformation

The theology of the Reformation is characterized by the specialprominencegiven to theabsolutenormativeauthorityofScripture, andby the strong emphasis on the doctrine of justification by faith only.Luther was far more practical and polemical than scientific anddogmatical in his writings. The only doctrinal treatise with which heenrichedthetheologicalworld,ishisDeServoArbitrio,whichcontainsaclearexpositionoftheAugustiniandoctrineofpredestination.Theperiodof the Reformation produced especially three works of a systematic

characterthatwereofmorethanordinarysignificance.

1.MELANCHTON'S LOCI COMMUNES. Thiswork ofMelanchtonwasthe first Protestant handbook of Dogmatics. It follows the order of theEpistletotheRomansinitsexpositionofthetruth.InthefirsteditionoftheworktheauthorwasinentireagreementwithLuther,butinthelatereditions he made concessions to several opponents and thus partedcompanywithLutheronmorethanonepoint.IndistinctionfromLuther,MelanchtonstressedtheethicalelementinChristianityandpreferredtoplacespecialemphasisonfaithasthemoralactivityoftheredeemed.Incourseoftimeherevealedaninclinationalsotosoft-pedalthedoctrineofpredestination, and to sponsor the doctrine of the free will ofman. InthesepointsheyieldedtothepowerfulinfluenceofErasmus.Atthesametime he alsomade concessions to Calvin in his Christology and in thedoctrineoftheLord'sSupper.Hisfinalpositionwassomewhatofahalf-waypositionbetweenLutherandCalvin.

2. ZWINGLI'S COMMENTARIUS DE VERA ET FALSA RELIGIONE.Schaff speaks of this work of the great Swiss Reformer as the firstsystematicexpositionoftheReformedfaith.But,whileitdoescontainthefundamental thoughts of the Reformed faith, it can hardly be called awell-rounded,systematicwhole.Theauthordoesnot,likeLuther,stressthe doctrine of justification by faith above all others, but rather theabsolutesovereigntyofGodandtheutterdependenceofman.Hespeaksin stronger and less guarded terms than Calvin about the doctrine ofpredestination.AndinthedoctrineoftheLord'sSupperheapproaches,butyetfallsshortof,thespiritualviewofCalvin.

3.CALVIN'S INSTITUTIOCHRISTIANAERELIGIONIS.The InstitutesofCalvinissofarsuperiortotheCommentariusofZwingliastobeatrulyepoch-making work. It consists of four books, of which the first threefollowthetrinitarianorder,andthe fourthtreatsof theChurchandtheSacraments. The central thought, controlling thewholework, is that oftheabsolutesovereigntyofGod.Throughoutthewholeexpositionofthetruthdoctrineandethicsarecloselyinterwoven,andthepracticalsideoftheChristian life ismadeveryprominent.ThisworkofCalvin isrightlylauded for its conciseness, for its clarity of thought, for its well-proportioned parts, and for its warmth of expression. It forms quite a

contrast with the later, more scholastic, productions of Protestanttheology, and is easily themost importantworkof theReformation.Asanother very important work of the Reformation period Ursinus'CommentaryontheHeidelbergCatechismmaybementioned.

D.ThePeriodofProtestantScholasticism

Itisnotsurprisingthatthetheologyoftheseventeenthcenturyisonthewhole, strongly polemical. The Reformation had to break with theimmediatepastwithanappeal to theremoterpast. Ithad toshowthatthe hierarchical Church of theMiddleAges hadwandered far from thepath indicated by the theology of the early Church.Moreover, with itsdefense of the right of private judgment it had disturbed traditionalfoundations.Asaresultdivergentopinionssoonmadetheirappearancein the Churches of the Reformation and were embodied in separateConfessions. Therewas a great deal of hair-splitting discussion, and incourseoftimeaspiritofformalismandintellectualismgainedtheupperhand with chilling effect, and led to the introduction of the scholasticmethodinthestudyoftheology.

1. DOGMATICAL STUDY AMONG THE LUTHERANS. The vacillatingposition of Melanchton soon led to reaction. Towards the end of thesixteenthandintheearlieryearsoftheseventeenthcenturyapartyarose,whichmanifestedastrong,andsometimesratherfanatical,attachmenttothe early Lutheran faith, the faith of Luther himself and of the firsteditionoftheAugsburgConfession.ThispartyfoundablespokesmeninHutterus and, especially, John Gerhardo (1582–1637), lauded as "thegreatestofallLutherantheologians."HisLocicommunestheologici isawork of primary importance, noted for the philosophical developmentand the systematic arrangement of its subject-matter. Calixtus opposedthe attitude of the strict Lutherans and insisted on going back to theApostles'Creedandtothedoctrineof thefirst fivecenturies.Hewasofan irenical turn of mind and sought to continue the theology ofMelanchton. The Calixtine movement met with violent opposition,however,inthepersonofCalovius,amanofgreatlearningandardentlydevoted to the strict Lutheran position. In his Systema locorumtheologicorum,consistingoftwelvevolumes,hegivesacarefulexpositionof the orthodox Lutheran faith. The works of two other noted and

influential Lutheran theologians, namely, Quenstedt and Hollaz, movealongthesamelines.

2. DOGMATICAL STUDY AMONG THE REFORMED. Differences ofopinion were not limited to the Lutherans, but also made theirappearanceamongtheReformed.Someofthesewereofapurelyformal,andothersofamorematerial,nature.Thereweretheologianswhowereperfectly loyal to the truth,butwent farbeyondCalvin in its schematicarrangement and in all kinds of logical distinctions; and there wereothers who minimized and even explained away fundamental truths.Some were unduly influenced in their doctrinal expositions by thephilosophical tenets of the age, and especially by the philosophy ofCartesius.

a. The original type of doctrine. Theodore Beza, Calvin's successor atGeneva, was more scholastic than Calvin and more extreme in hissupralapsarian viewofpredestination.Hedidnotwrite anydogmaticaltreatiseof importance,butneverthelessexercisedgreat influenceonthedogmaticiansoftheseventeenthcentury.WollebiusandWendelinusbothwroteworksofgreatlearning,strictlyCalvinistic,butgreatlyaffectedbytheconflictwithLutheranism,and thereforescholastic in form.Besidesthese,PolanusandPictetalsoeachproducedasystematicexpositionofthe Reformed faith. After Beza, Wm. Twisse, the prolocutor of theWestminsterAssembly,wasoneoftheearliesttodevelopthedoctrineofpredestination with great logical precision and in a rather extremesupralapsarianform.Hisworksgiveevidenceofgreatspeculativepower,andfurnishoneofthebestexamplesoftheinexorableapplicationofthebasic thought of Supralapsarianism inReformeddoctrine. Three of thevery best Calvinistic works of this period are the Synopsis PuriorisTheologiaebythefourprofessorsofLeydentheelaborateworkofPetrusMastricht on Beschouwende en Practicale Godgeleerdheit, in which hetakes issue with the position of Coccejus; and Turretin's InstitutioTheologiaeElencticae,averycompleteexpositionofReformeddoctrine,and one that has exercised great influence on American Reformedtheology.InEnglandandScotlandtheworksofPerkins,Owen,Goodwin,andBostonwereofgreatimportance.

b. The Federal Modification of Reformed doctrine. With Coccejus a

reactionset inagainstthespeculativeandscholasticmethodofsomeofthe thorough-goingCalvinists.He substituted a purelyBiblicalmethod,distributing his material according to the scheme of the covenants.However,hispositionrepresentednotonlyaformaldivergence,butalsoamaterial departure, from traditional Reformed theology, and enteredeverincreasinglyintoleaguewithCartesianism.Itsreallynewthingwasnot the covenant doctrine, for this is already found in the works ofZwingli, Bullenger, Olevianus, Snecanus, Gomarus, Trelcatius, andCloppenburg,butitsfederalisticmethod.ItvirtuallychangedDogmaticsintoBiblicalTheology, thusmaking itahistoricaldiscipline.Itsmethodwas anthropological rather than theological. Two of the bestrepresentativesofthisschool,areBurmannusandWitsius.TheSynopsisTheologiaeoftheformerisbyfarthebestofthetwo,andisfreefromthatforced exegesis which so often characterizes the work of the Cocceianschool. The work of the latter, Over de Verbonden (Eng. tr. On theCovenants), is inferior to it, but is better known in this country. Itrepresentsa laudiblebut futileattempt to reconcile themore scholasticandthefederaltrendintheology.OtherrepresentativesofthisschoolareLeydekker, Van Til, C. Vitringa, Lampe, d'Outrein, and the Van derHonerts. This type of theology gradually gained the ascendancy at thistimeintheNetherlands,thoughitwasstronglyopposedbyVoetius,andthoughthemorescholastictypeoftheologystillcontinuedtoappearinàMarck's Merch der Christene Godgeleertheit and in Brakel's RedelijkeGodsdienst.

c. The more radical modifications. The Arminians or Remonstrantsrepresented a radical departure from Calvinism. They opposed itsdoctrines of predestination, total depravity, irresistible grace, particularatonement,andtheperseveranceofthesaints.Arminiushimselfdidnotgototheextremesthatweredefendedbyhisfollowers.Episcopiusgaveaclear and complete expositionofArminian theology inhis Institutionestheologicae,whileGrotiusinhisDefensiofideicatholicaedesatisfactioneChristi developed the governmental theory of the atonement. WithLimborgh'selaborateworkentitledTheologiaChristiana,thispartyturnsin thedirection ofRationalism.Maccovius andVoetiuswere among itsstrongestopponents.

The school of Saumur represents another attempt to modify strictCalvinism.Amyraldustaughtahypotheticaluniversalism,andPlacaeus,the doctrine of mediate imputation. These errors were combatted byHeidegger and Turretin, two of the authors of the Formula ConsensusHelvetica.

3. DOGMATICAL STUDYAMONGTHEROMANCATHOLICS. Duringthis period, remarkable for the development of Protestant Dogmatics,there were also a few noted Roman Catholic dogmaticians. Bellarmin(1542–1621) is recognized as a prince among them. His great work,entitledDisputationesde controversiis christianae fideimarkshimas aman of literary elegance and as a skilful controversilist. It contains arathercompleteexpositionofRomanCatholicDogmatics,andrepresentstheultramontanestandpointoftheJesuits,whichisSemi-Pelagianinitsdoctrine of sin and grace. Another distinguished scholar was Petavius,whopublishedanelaborate,thoughincompletework,underthetitleDetheologicis dogmatibus (1644–1650). This work of great erudition isprimarily a history of dogma, and is favorably known also amongReformedtheologians.Finally,mentionshouldalsobemadeofJansen'sAugustinus, published in 1640, which contains a defense of theAugustiniandoctrineofgrace,asopposedtotheSemi-PelagiandoctrineoftheJesuits.JansenismwascondemnedbythePopein1713.

E.ThePeriodofRationalismandSupranaturalism

TheDogmaticsofthisperiodareofasomewhatreactionarycharacter.Onthe one hand there was reaction against the formalism and the coldintellectualismof thecurrentstudyof theology,againstwhatwascalled"dead orthodoxy," and an attempt to inject new life into the study oftheologyandtomakeitmoredirectlysubservienttoalivingandpracticalfaith. And on the other hand there was a particularly strong andpersistent reaction to the dominating influence of Scripture and ofecclesiastical tradition in Dogmatics, and to the doctrines that weretaught in the historical Creeds of the Church; and a widespreadmovementtostrikeoutonnewpaths,untrammeledbyauthority,underthe guidance of human reason. Old barriers were broken down, and aRationalisticapostasybecamealarminglyprevalentintheChurch.

1.PIETISTICDOGMATICS.ThecloseoftheseventeenthcenturyandthebeginningoftheeighteenthcenturysawtheriseofPietism,especiallyintheLutheranChurch.ItsprincipalrepresentativeswereSpener,Francke,Freylinghausen, J. Lange, Rambach, and Oetinger. They desired toreleaseDogmaticsfromscholasticformalism,andinsistedonareturntoBiblical simplicity. From this point of view some of them made realcontributions to Dogmatics, as, for instance, Spener, Francke,Freylinghausen, and Oetinger, though none of them produced anoutstandingsystematicexpositionofthetruth.Currentorthodoxyatfirstopposedit,butfinallyyieldedtoitsspirit.Consequently,anewtendencydevelopedinthestudyoftheology,whichemphasizedpracticalpiety,wasinimical to all scholastic subtlety, and showed great moderation inpolemics.

2.RATIONALISTICDOGMATICS.TheprincipalinfluencethatmilitatedagainstPietismappearedintheformofRationalism,intherigidmethodintroduced by Wolff, whose ambition it was to reduce all theologicalstatements to mathematical formulae. According to him anything thatcouldnotbemadeperfectlyplainbyactualdemonstration,wasnotfittobetaught.Carpzoviousessayedtodemonstratethetruthoftheteachingsof the Church according to this method. Baumgarten and Mosheimmovedalong the same line. In themain thesemenwere still orthodox,but had no proper appreciation of the religious value of the truth. Forthem the dogma of the Church was primarily an object of historicallearningand intellectualdemonstration.But the influenceofWolff alsomarkedtheinceptionofathoroughlyrationalistictendencyinthestudyof theology. The light of reason induced many theologians to adopt aposition thatwaspartlySocinianandpartlyArminian.This tendency isseen especially in the writings of Toellner and Semler. In England therationalisticmovementappearedmoreparticularlyintheformofDeism,whichdeniedsupernaturalrevelationandaimedatthedevelopmentofasystem of natural religion. The English Deists, however, furnish littlematerial for the history of Dogmatics. Of greater importance is theUnitarianmovement,whichcontinuestheSocinianelementintheology.Priestly constructed a system of pure Naturalism in his Institutes ofNaturalandRevealedReligion.InGermanyKantwasthefirsttoopposesuccessfully the superficial Rationalism that glorified in its intellectual

enlightenment; but his Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossenVernunft is still purely rationalistic. Tieftrunk elaborated Dogmatics inthe Kantian spirit, and Wegscheider still assumed an advancedrationalisticposition.

3. SUPRANATURALISTIC DOGMATICS. Orthodoxy reacted againstRationalismintheweakformofSupranaturalism.Thisacknowledgedasupernatural revelation andhonoredScripture as thenormof religioustruth,butneverthelessallowedreasontodetermineinvariouswayswhatisandwhatisnotessentialintheBible.Thusitreducedthecontentsofrevelationandbyallkindsofconcessionssoughttomakeitsquarewithreason.Itwasreallyacompromisebetweenreasonandrevelation.Thisweak position is represented by Doederlein, Knapp, and Storr. AreconciliationbetweenRationalismandSupranaturalismwasattemptedespecially by Bretschneider,who exercised great influence bymeans ofhis two works: Systematische Entwickelung aller in der DogmatikvorkommendenBegriffe,andHandbuchderDogmatikderevangelischenKirche.AsomewhatsimilarpositionistakenbyDeWetteinhisLehrbuchderchristlicheDogmatik,andhisUeberReligionundTheologie.Herisesabove thesuperficialityandwantofspiritualitywhichcharacterized theillumination,seekstodojusticetothereligiousfeelings,andexplainsthefundamental truths of Dogmatics as the symbolical expression of thesubjectivetruthsofpersonalexperience.

F.ThePeriodofModernTheology

Inthenineteenthcenturythetheologicalcurrentsmultiply,sothatitwillbenecessarytocallattentiontoseveralschools, thoughtheycanhardlybe called schools in the strict sense of theword. Some of them simplyrepresentageneraltendencywhich,however,expressesitselfinavarietyofways,andmayevenrevealsharpdifferences.

1.SCHLEIERMACHERANDHISSCHOOL.Schleiermacherstandsasanintellectualgiantat thebeginningof the theologicaldevelopmentof thenineteenthcentury.Heunitedinhimselfthevarioustheologicalcurrentsofhisday,andsoughttofusethemintoareligiousunity.Thisresultedina syncretism of Rationalism, Supranaturalism, and Pietism. He hadlearnedbyexperiencethatChristianityhadintroducedanewandhigher

lifeintotheworld,andwasconvincedthatthislifehadtoincorporateallpossible religious currents. His big heart caused him to take asympathetic attitude with respect to all schools of thought, and toassimilate the good elements in each. But when he attempted totransform his religious experiences into intellectual concepts, and tocombinetheseintoacoherentdogmaticsystem,hedidnotsucceed.Histheology became in fact a confirmation of all kinds of opinions. Thisaccounts for the fact that both Roman Catholics and Protestants, bothRationalists and Mystics, appeal to him. However great a religiousthinkerhewas,hisscientifictheologywasnotasuccess.Itiscomposedofall kinds of heterogeneous elements, and is therefore full ofcontradictions. In his Reden ueber die Religion and his Monologen(Monologues) he is entirely under the influence of Romanticism, aninitialphaseofGermanidealism,whichservedasatransitionfromKanttoHegel.ReligionisthesenseofGod,oftheInfinite,andoftheUniverse,for the Universe is God. Schleiermacher speaks of it as a "HinneigungzumWeltall."AndGodisnotanobjectofthought,butonlyanobjecttobe enjoyed in the depths of one's feelings. That enjoyment of God isreligion. His Glaubenslehre contains the same philosophical principleswiththisdifference,however,thatreligiousfeelingisnowdescribedasafeeling of complete dependence, that God is represented as absolutecausality,andthatChristianity ischaracterizedasanethicalreligion, inwhicheverythingisrelatedtotheredemptionthroughChrist.Accordingto Schleiermacher dogmas are descriptions of subjective states ofconsciousness or feeling, more particularly, of such states ofconsciousnessasaredeterminedby theChristiancommunity,orby thePersonofJesus.WithhimDogmatics leaves thesolid foundationof theWord of God and is made to rest on the shifting sands of humanexperiences.

NooneadoptedtheDogmaticsofSchleiermacherasawhole,andyethehad a controlling influence on thewhole theological development afterhim.AmongtheimmediatedisciplesofSchleiermachernonewassotruetohisdogmaticprinciplesasA.Schweizer.Hismostimportantworksare:Die Glaubenslehre der reformirten Kirche; Die ProtestantischenCentraldogmen innerhalb der reformirten Kirche, and Die christlicheGlaubenslehre.InthefirstoftheseworkshecombinesSchleiermacher's

feelingofdependencewiththeReformeddoctrineofpredestination;andinhislaterworkshestressesthefactthatDogmaticsmustgotothelivingChristianconsciousnessforitsmaterial.HisrepresentationofReformeddoctrineisopentoseveralobjections.SomewhatsimilartohisworksarethoseofJ.H.Scholten,DeLeerderHervormdeKerk,andSchenkel,DiechristlicheDogmatikvomStandpunktedesGewissens.Lipsiusassumedastandpoint essentially distinct from that of Schleiermacher, but yet hasthisincommonwiththelatter,thatheseekstobuilduphissystemfromthe standpoint of the Christian consciousness. For him religion is notonly a feeling dependence, but also a sense of freedom.He denies theuniquesignificanceoftheincarnationandmakesChristthetypicalSonofMan, in whom man first realizes his spiritual communion with God.Rothemayalsobementionedinthisconnection.LikeSchleiermacher,hetookhisstartingpointintheChristianconsciousness,theconsciousnessof communion with God and of redemption through Christ, andconsideredDogmaticsasahistoricaldiscipline.

2. THE SPECULATIVE SCHOOL. The philosophical movement fromKanttoHegelhadadetermininginfluenceonthehistoricalandscientificdevelopment of theology. The influence of Hegel was the most far-reaching.LikeSchleiermacher,hedidagreatdealtobrushasidetheoldvulgarRationalism,and to show theuntenablenessofSupranaturalism.ButwhileSchleiermachersoughttodelivertheologyfromthedominationofphilosophy,Hegelencouragedthestudyoftheologyintheverytermsof philosophy.The theologianswho accept and apply his principles arerightlycalledspeculativetheologians.Theirtheologyisessentiallyandinprinciplespeculative.

Daubhasbeencalled"thefounderofProtestantspeculativetheology."Hecame successively under the influence of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, andHegel. Together with Marheineke and Rosenkranz, he thought it wasquitepossibletoharmonizetheprinciplesofHegelwiththetruthsoftheChristianreligion,andmadeuseofthoseprinciplesintheformulationofthe truth. These theologians were on the whole comparativelyconservative, and constitutewhat is generally called "the rightwing"oftheHegelianschool,ofwhichMarheinekewastherecognizedleader.InhisSystemderchristlichenDogmatikheappliedtheprinciplesofHegel

and follows the trinitarian method. The work of John Caird on TheFundamental Ideas of Christianity is also strongly influenced by theHegelianphilosophy.

The"leftwing"oftheHegelianschoolisrepresentedespeciallybyStraussandBiedermann.ItsacrificestheoldcontentoftheChristiantruthtothenewspeculativeform.TheChristlicheGlaubenslehreofStraussispurelycriticalanddestructive.Thevariousdogmasaretestedbythedemandsofmodern science and found wanting. In the Christliche Dogmatik ofBiedermann the principles of Hegel are worked out in a purelypantheisticway.TheauthorityoftheBibleisnotacknowledged,andthepersonalityofGodandpersonal immortalityarebothdenied.PfleidererdiscardedtheHegelianterminology,but isentirely inharmonywiththefundamentalprinciplesofHegel.

3. THE NEO-LUTHERAN SCHOOL. The negative position of theHegelian school naturally evoked reaction. Some reiterated theconfessional doctrine of the Lutheran Church, and others sought a viamedia.Atpresentweareconcernedwiththeformeronly.Theso-calledNeo-Lutheransmadeanearnestattempt to restore theold confessionaltruth on the basis of Scripture. Thomasius of Erlangen in his work onChristi Person und Werk presents an evangelical type of LutheranDogmatics,inwhichhemakesChristologycentral.Hiskenosisdoctrine,however, is scarcely compatible with the Lutheran doctrine of Christ'subiquity.Hemaintains the satisfaction theory of the atonement, but inthe doctrine of the Trinity hardly escapes a certain type ofsubordinationism. A second representative, Kahnis, maintains asomewhat freer attitude toward Lutheran orthodoxy. He follows thetrinitarian method in his Lutherische Dogmatik. His doctrine of theTrinity is more or less Sabellian, and his Christology is marked by acertain subordinationism and by a kenosis doctrine similar to that ofThomasius.

FrankofErlangenalsodepartsinseveralpointsfrompureLutheranism.In his System der christlichen Wahrheit he postulates two principiacognoscendi in theology, namely, Scripture and the believing subject,held inunityby theprincipiumessendi,which isGod.The ideaofGodbecoming man is the central thought of his theology, and from it he

deriveshisprincipiumdivisionis.Initsbroadfeatureshistheologyis inharmonywith thedoctrineof theChurch.TheworkofKaehlerofHalleshows some resemblance to that of Frank. He also proceeds from thestandpoint of Christian experience, and postulates a special kind ofknowledge in the Christian. Philippi is the best representative of pureLutheranism in Germany. His Kirchliche Glaubenslehre is a clear andwell arranged exposition of the doctrine of the Church from a strictlyconfessional point of view. According to him Dogmatics seeks toelaboratethethoughtoftherestorationofmanincommunionwithGod,and it is fromthispoint thathederiveshisprincipleofdivision. Inourown country strict Lutheranism finds expression in Schmid's DoctrinalTheology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Pieper's ChristlicheDogmatik,andMueller'sChristianDogmatics.

4. THEMEDIATING SCHOOL. There weremany theologians who didnot go as far as the Neo-Lutherans in their reaction against thespeculative movement in theology. They preferred to steer a middlecourse and to seek a compromise. Hence they are called "mediatingtheologians." On the whole these scholars are clearly dependent onSchleiermacher, and with him take their starting point, not in theobjectiverevelationofGod,butinthesubjectivereligiousconsciousness.But with this Schleiermacherian starting point they combine Hegelianspeculation.What is first acceptedas the contentof experience, isnextsetforthspeculativelyasanecessityofthought,andthusjustifiedbeforethe bar of philosophy. Only a few names can be mentioned here. Thegreatest of the mediating theologians is Dorner, who on the one handassumesasympatheticattitudetowardstheconfessionoftheChurch,buton the other hand freely criticizes it and incorporates in his system allkinds of speculative elements, which cannot be harmonized with theorthodox. Scriptural position. This is quite evident in his attempt toexplaintheTrinity,andinhisconceptionofChristastheidealman,withwhom the Logos is progressively united. His System der christlichenGlaubenslehre contains a wealth of dogmatical and historical material,andisnotedforitselaborateandacutecriticism.

AlongsideofDornermentionshouldbemadeofJuliusMueller,amanofgreat moral earnestness and of deep insight into the truth. His Die

christlicheLehrevonderSuende is still thegreatestmonographon thesubject of sin. He revived the ancient idea of a pre-temporal self-determination of each man to sin, in order to maintain the voluntaryorigin of sin in the life of each individual despite the fact that man issinful from the timeofhisbirth.NitzschandMartensenalsobelong tothisclassoftheologians.TheChristlicheDogmatikofthelatter,writteninaveryattractivestyle,revealsasyncretistictendency.Onthewholeheistrue to the Lutheran doctrine, but connects with it a mystical and aspeculativeelement.HefollowsthetrinitariandivisioninDogmatics,andinhisChristologydefendsacertaintypeofkenosisdoctrine.

5.THESCHOOLOFRITSCHL.AnotherGermantheologianwhoformeda school is Albrecht Ritschl; and even of him this cannot be assertedwithoutqualification.ItisdifficulttosaywhatconstitutestheunityoftheRitschlian school. His followers scarcely agree in any point, except intheir gratitude for the inspiration derived from their common master,andintheirconvictionthatthecharacteristicfeatureofChristianityasahistoricalreligionisfoundinChristasitsFounder.Ritschlgavethemostcomplete exposition of his system in his Die christliche Lehre von derRechtfertigung und Versoehnung. He claims to be in harmony withProtestantismingeneraland,moreparticularly,withthedoctrineoftheLutheran Church. While he desires to banish metaphysics (especiallyontology)fromtheology,heishimselfcontrolledbyapurelyspeculativetheoryofknowledge.Strictlyspeaking,hisscientificpositionisthatofanagnostic.InhisdoctrineofGodheisreallyaUnitarian,andinconnectionwith the atonement he accepts the moral influence theory as the onlytenableone.Hedistinguishesbetweenscientificandreligioustruth.Thelatterisbased,notonjudgmentsofbeing,butexclusivelyonjudgmentsofvalue.Thetruthofareligiousideaisdeterminedbythevaluewhichithas for the Christian life. We honor Christ as God, not because weconsiderHim tobe veryGod, butbecauseHehas forus the valueof aGod. In the doctrine of sin and redemption he deviates from theconfessionoftheChurch.HelargelyignorestheworkoftheHolySpirit,and professes ignorance respecting the future life. The doctrine of theKingdomofGod is central in his system. Christ is its Founder, and allthosewhocomeunderHisinfluenceareitscitizens,andarecontrolledbytheprincipleoflovetoGod.

Hermann accepts the principles of Ritschl in general. Bymeans of hiswork on Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott he did a great deal topopularize the leadingprinciplesof theRitschlian theology.He ismoresubjectiveandeven lessBiblical thanRitschl,andrevealsa tendency toexchange the rationalistic element of Ritschl for a certain religiousmysticism. The most prominent dogmatician of the school is JuliusKaftan.Hemodifies thedogmaticpositionsofRitschl inmorethanonerespect, asserts that judgments of value cannot be dissociated fromjudgments of being, and denies the distinction between scientific andreligious truth as it is usually represented by the critics of Ritschl.Hiswork on Die Wahrheit der christlichen Religion is important for theintroduction to Dogmatics, and his Dogmatik is a clear systematicpresentation of the truth. He seems to be inclined to make importantconcessions to orthodox theology in thedoctrine of sin, of redemption,and of the Person of Christ. Of all the followers of Ritschl no one hasreturnedingreatermeasuretothedoctrinesoftheChurchthanHaeringinhisworkonTheChristianFaith.

6. REFORMED THEOLOGY. Reformed dogmatic theology had severaldistinguished representatives during this period, who were absolutelyopposed alike to vulgar Rationalism and Supranaturalism, to thespeculative movement and to the theology of experience with itssubjectivism.Itwasindeedinasadstateofdeclineattheopeningofthenineteenth century and during its first decennia. Supranaturalism hadmade large inroads in the circles of Reformed theologians; and this,according to thewords ofDr. Bavinck, "wanted to be Biblical, butwasanti-confessional, anti-philosophical, anti-calvinistic; it produced adogmatics which was deistic in theology, Pelagian in anthropology,moralisticinChristology,collegialisticinecclesiology,andeudaemonisticin eschatology." But there has been a repristination of Reformedtheology, especially in the Netherlands, through the labors of Kuyper,Bavinck,andmanyothers.Itisregrettablethattheirworksarenotbetterknown inourcountry. InScotlandagreatdealwasdone in the fieldofDogmatics by such men as Hill, Dick, Cunningham, Bannerman,Crawford,Candlish,andothers.AndforourowncountryweneedonlytomentionthenamesofBreckenridge,Thornwell,Dabney,Ch.Hodge,A.A.Hodge,Shedd,H.B.Smith,Warfield,andGirardeau.Mentionmayalso

bemadeoftheBarthiantheology,thoughitsReformedcharacterisofaratherdubiousnature.

REFERENCES:Bavinck,Geref.Dogm.I,pp.104–206;McPherson,Chr.Dogm., pp. 43–97; Van Oosterzee, Chr. Dogm. I, pp. 42–84; Briggs,HistoryoftheStudyofTheology,2vols.;Workman,ChristianThoughttothe Reformation; McGiffert, Christian Thought Before Kant; Moore,Christian Thought Since Kant; Heppe, Dogmatik des deutschenProtestantismus im zechzehnten Jahrhundert, 3 vols.; Gruetzmacher,Textbuch zur systematischen Theol.; Lichtenberger, Hist. of GermanTheol. in the Nineteenth Century; Hurst, History of Rationalism;Pfleiderer,TheDevelopmentofTheol.inGermanysinceKant;Storr,TheDevelopment of English Theol. in the Nineteenth Century; Walker,Scottish Theology and Theologians; Aubrey, Present TheologicalTendencies;Burtt,TypesofReligiousPhilosophy;Mackintosh,TypesofModernTheology;Horton, ContemporaryEnglish Theology; andTypesofContinentalTheology;W.A.Brown,TheEssenceofChristianity.

ThePrincipiaofDogmatics

I.PrincipiainGeneral

A.PrincipiainNon-TheologicalSciences

1. DEFINITION OF 'PRINCIPIUM.' In a discussion of principia it isnaturally of the greatest importance to know exactly what the termdenotes. 'Principium' is a term that is widely used in science andphilosophy.ItistheLatinrenderingoftheGreekwordarche,beginning,a termwhich Aristotle used to denote the primary source of all being,actuality, orknowledge.TheEnglishword 'principle' isderived from it,andcorrespondswithitinmeaning,especiallywhenitdenotesasourceorcausefromwhichathingproceeds.Thetermfirstprincipleisanevencloser approximation to it. After giving several meanings of the wordarche,Aristotlesays:"Whatiscommontoallfirstprinciples,isthattheyare theprimary source fromwhichanything is, becomes,or is known."Eisler in his Handwoerterbuch der Philosophie gives the followingdefinition: "Prinzip ist also sowohl das, woraus ein Seiendes

hervorgegangen ist oder was den Dingen zugrunde liegt (Realprinzip,Seinsprinzip),alsdas,waraufsichdasDenkenundErkennennotwendigstuetzt (Denkprinzip, Erkenntnisprinzip, Idealprinzip formaler undematerialer Art), als auch ein oberster Gesichtspunkt, eine Norm desHandelns (praktisches Prinzip)." The statement of Fleming in Krauth-Fleming's Vocabulary of the philosophical Sciences is in perfectagreement with this: "The word is applied equally to thought and tobeing; and hence principles have been divided into those of being andthose of knowledge, or principia essendi and principia cognoscendi.…Principia essendi may also be principia cognoscendi for the fact thatthings exist is the ground or reason of their being known. But theconversedoesnothold;fortheexistenceofthingsisinnowaydependentonourknowledgeofthem."Inancientphilosophyprincipiaessendi,andinmodernphilosophyprincipiacognoscendi,receivethegreateramountof attention.There is on the onehand a remarkable similarity betweentheprincipiathatapplyinthenon-theologicalsciencesandthosethatarepertinenttotheology;butontheotherhandthereisalsoadifferencethatshould not be disregarded. The former bear a natural and thereforegeneralcharacter.Theyaregivenwithcreationitself,areassuchadaptedtoman asman, and have a controlling influence in all non-theologicalsciences.

2.PRINCIPIAOFTHENON-THEOLOGICALSCIENCES.Thesearethefollowingthree:

a.Godistheprincipiumessendi.Godisthesourceandfountainofallourknowledge.Hepossessesanarchetypalknowledgeofall created things,embracingall the ideas thatareexpressed in theworksofHiscreation.This knowledge of God is quite different from that of man. While wederive our knowledge from the objectswe perceive,He knows them invirtueof the fact thatHehas frometernitydetermined theirbeingandform.Whileweattaintoascientificinsightintothingsandrelationsonlyby a laborious process of discursive thought, He has an immediateknowledgeofall things,andknows themnotonly in their relationsbutalsointheirveryessence.Andevensoourknowledgeisimperfect,whileHis knowledge is all-comprehensive and perfect in every way. We areonly partly conscious of what we know, while He is always perfectly

consciousofallHisknowledge.Thefulnessofthedivineknowledgeistheinexhaustible source of all our knowledge, and therefore God is theprincipiumessendiofallscientificknowledge.Naturally,Pantheismwithits impersonal and unconsciousAbsolute cannot admit this, for aGod,whohasnoknowledgeHimself, canneverbe theprincipleor sourceofour knowledge. In fact, all absolute Idealism would seem to involve adenial of this principle, since it makes man an autonomous source ofknowledge.Theoriginofknowledgeissoughtinthesubject;thehumanmind is nomore amere instrument, but is regarded as a real fons orsource.

b.TheworldasGod'screationistheprincipiumcognoscendiexternum.Instead of "the world as God's creation" we might also say "God'srevelationinnature."OfHisarchetypalknowledgeGodhasconveyedanectypal knowledge to man in the works of His hands, a knowledgeadaptedtothefinitehumanconsciousness.Thisectypalknowledgeisbuta faint reproductionof thearchetypalknowledge found inGod. It isonthe one hand real and true knowledge, because it is an imprint, areproduction, though in temporal and therefore limited forms, of theknowledgeofGod.Ontheotherhandit is, justbecause it isectypal,nocompleteknowledge,andsincesinputitsstamponcreation,noperfectlyclear nor absolutely true knowledge. God conveyed this knowledge tomanbyemployingtheLogos,theWord,astheagentofcreation.Theideathat finds expression in the world is out of the Logos. Thus the wholeworldisanembodimentofthethoughtsofGodor,asBavinckputsit,"abookinwhichHehaswrittenwithlargeandsmallletters,andthereforenot a writing-book in which we, as the Idealists think,must fill in thewords." God's beautiful creation, replete with divine wisdom, is theprincipiumcognoscendiexternumofallnon-theologialsciences.Itistheexternalmeans,bywhichtheknowledgethatflowsfromGodisconveyedtoman.This viewof thematter is, of course absolutely opposed to theprinciple of Idealism, that the thinking man creates and construes hisownworld:notonlytheformoftheworldofthought(Kant),butalsoitsmaterialandcontents(Fichte),andeventheworldofbeing(Hegel).

c.Humanreasonistheprincipiumcognoscendiinternum.Theobjectiverevelation of God would be of no avail, if there were no subjective

receptivity for it, a correspondence between subject and object. Dr.Bavinck correctly says: "Science always consists in a logical relationbetweensubjectandobject."Itisonlywhenthesubjectisadaptedtotheobject that science can result. AndGod has also provided for this. ThesameLogosthatrevealsthewisdomofGodintheworldisalsothetruelight,"whichlightetheverymancomingintotheworld."HumanreasonwithitscapacityforknowledgeisthefruitoftheLogos,enablesmantodiscover the divine wisdom in the world round about him, and isthereforetheprincipiumcognoscendiinternumofscience.Bymeansofitmanappropriatesthetruthrevealedincreation.Itisnotsatisfiedwithanaphoristicknowledgeofdetails,butseekstounderstandtheunityofallthings. Inaworldofphenomenawhicharemanyandvaried, itgoes inquest of that which is general, necessary, and eternal,—the underlyingfundamentalidea.Itdesirestounderstandthecause,theessentialbeing,andthefinalpurposeofthings.Andinitsintellectualactivitythehumanmindisneverpurelypassive,orevenmerelyreceptive,butalwaysmoreorlessactive.Itbringswithitcertaingeneralandnecessarytruths,whichareof fundamental significance for scienceandcannotbederived fromexperience.ThisthoughtisdeniedbyEmpiricismintwodifferentways:(1) by regarding the human spirit as a tabula rasa and denying theexistence of general and necessary truths; and (2) by emphasizinganalyticalexperienceratherthansyntheticreason.Dr.BavinckpointsoutthatitendedinMaterialism.Sayshe:"Firstthethought-content,thenthefaculty, and finally also the substance of the spirit is derived from thematerialworld."

B.PrincipiainReligionorTheology

Religion and theology are closely related to each other. They are botheffects of the same cause, that is, of the facts respecting God in Hisrelationtotheuniverse.Religionistheeffectwhichthesefactsproduceinthesphereof the individualandcollective lifeofman,while theology isthe effectwhich they produce in the sphere of systematic thought. Theprincipiaoftheonearealsotheprincipiaoftheother.Theseprincipiaarenotofanaturalandgeneral,butofaspiritualandspecialcharacter.Theydo not belong to the realm of creation as such, but to the sphere of

redemption. Notwithstanding this fact, however, they are also ofinestimable value for the Christian pursuit of scientific knowledge ingeneral.

1.GODISTHEPRINCIPIUMESSENDI.ThisisequivalenttosayingthatallourknowledgeofGodhasitsorigininGodHimself.Godpossessesacomplete and in every way perfect knowledge of Himself. He knowsHimselfintheabsolutesenseoftheword,notonlyasHeisrelatedtoHiscreatures, nor merely in His diversified activities and their controllingmotives,butalsointheunfathomabledepthsofHisessentialBeing.Hisself-consciousnessisperfectandinfinite;thereisnosub-consciouslifeinHim, no subliminal region of unconscious mentality. And of thatabsolute,perfectlyconsciousself-knowledgeofGod,theknowledgewhichmanhasofthedivineBeingisbutafaintandcreaturelycopyorimprint.All human knowledge of God is derived fromHim,Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor.2:10f.AndbecausetherecanbenoknowledgeofGodinmanapartfromself-consciousness inGod,Pantheism spells death for all theology. It isimpossible to deduce a conscious creature from anunconsciousGod, acreaturethatknowsGodfromaGodthatdoesnotknowHimself.WecanfindtheprincipiumofourtheologyonlyinapersonalGod,perfectinself-consciousness,asHefreely,consciously,andtrulyrevealsHimself.

2.THEPRINCIPIUMCOGNOSCENDIEXTERNUMISGOD'SSPECIALREVELATION.TheknowledgewhichGoddesiresthatweshouldhaveofHimisconveyedtousbymeansoftherevelationthatisnowembracedinScripture.OriginallyGod revealedHimself in creation, but through theblight of sin that original revelation was obscured. Moreover, it wasentirelyinsufficientintheconditionofthingsthatobtainedafterthefall.OnlyGod'sself-revelationintheBiblecannowbeconsideredadequate.ItonlyconveysaknowledgeofGodthatispure,thatis,freefromerrorandsuperstition, and that answers to the spiritual needs of fallen man.BecauseithaspleasedGodtoembodyHisspecialrevelationinScripturefor the timebeing, this, in thewordsofBavinck,has thecharacterofa"causa efficiens instrumentalis of theology." It is now the principiumunicum, from which the theologian must derive his theologicalknowledge. Someare inclined to speakofGod's general revelation as asecondsource;butthisishardlycorrectinviewofthefactthatnaturecan

comeintoconsiderationhereonlyasinterpretedinthelightofScripture.KuyperwarnsagainstspeakingofScripture,orGod'sspecialrevelation,asthefonstheologiae,sincethewordfonshasaratherdefinitemeaninginscientificstudy.Itdenotesingeneralacertainobjectofstudywhichisinitselfpassive,butwhichembodiescertainideas,andfromwhichmanmust,bymeansofscientificstudy,extractorelicitknowledge.TheuseofthatwordinthisconnectionisapttogivetheimpressionthatmanmustplacehimselfaboveScripture,inordertodiscoverorelicitfromthesetheknowledgeofGod,whileasamatteroffactthisisnotthecase.GoddoesnotleaveittomantodiscovertheknowledgeofHimandofdivinethings,but actively and explicitly conveys this to man by means of His self-revelation. This same idea was later on also stressed by Schaeder andBarth, namely, that in the study of theologyGod is never the object ofsomehumansubject,but isalwaysHimselfthesubject.Weshouldbearinmindthattheword'principium,'asweuseitintheology,hasacasualsignification, just as the correspondingHebrew andGreekwords do intheBible,whenitspeaksofthefearoftheLordastheprinciple(reshith)of wisdom (Ps. 111:10) or knowledge (Prov. 1:7), and of Christ as theprinciple(arche)ofcreationandoftheresurrection(Col.1:18;Rev.3:14).By means of His self-revelation God communicates the requisiteknowledgeofHimself andofdivine things toman.MancanknowGodonlybecauseandinsofarasGodactivelyrevealsHimself.Andifwedospeak of Scripture as the fountain-head of theology, we shall have torememberthatitisalivingfountain,fromwhichGodcausesthestreamsof knowledge to flow, and that we have but to appropriate these. Thesamepointshouldbeborneinmind,whenwefollowthecommoncustomin speaking of God's special revelation as the source of theology. Mancannotplacehimselfabovehisobject in theology;hecannot investigateGod.

3.THEPRINCIPIUMCOGNOSCENDIINTERNUMISFAITH.Asinthenon-theologicalsciences,soalsointheologytheremustbeaprincipiumcognoscendi internum that answers to the principium cognoscendiexternum. Scripture sometimes represents regeneration (1 Cor. 2:14),purity of heart (Matt. 5:8), doing the will of God (John 7:17), and theanointingoftheHolySpirit(1John2:20)assuch.Butitmostfrequentlypoints to faith as the principium internum of the knowledge of God

(Rom. 10:17; Gal. 3:3, 5; Heb. 11:1, 3), and this name undoubtedlydeserves preference. The self-communication ofGod aims at conveyingtheknowledgeofGodtoman,inorderthatGodmayreceivehonorandglory throughman.Therefore itmaynot terminateoutsideofman,butmust continue right on into themind and heart ofman. By faithmanacceptstheself-revelationofGodasdivinetruth,byfaithheappropriatesit in an ever increasing measure, and by faith he responds to it as hesubjectshis thoughts to thethoughtsofGod.Theprincipiuminternum,says Bavinck, is sometimes called the verbum internum or even theverbum principale, because it brings the knowledge of God into man,whichisafteralltheaimofalltheologyandofthewholeself-revelationofGod.BarthstressesthefactthatitisonlybyfaiththattheknowledgeofGod becomes possible. These three principia, while distinct, yetconstitute a unity. The Father communicates Himself to His creaturesthroughtheSonastheLogosandintheHolySpirit.

QUESTIONSFORFURTHERSTUDY:Hasthedoctrineof theprincipiaalwaysreceivedadequateattentioninReformedtheology?WhattooktheplaceofitundertheinfluenceofRationalism?Whatwasthenatureoftheso-called 'Prolegomena,' 'Prinzipienlehre,' or 'Fundamentaldogmatik,'which came into vogue under the influence of Schleiermacher? Shouldtheology derive its principia from other sciences or from philosophy?Whicharethefundamentalobjectionsofmoderntheologytothedoctrineoftheprincipia,asitwasstatedinthepreceding?DoesBarthalsoregardScriptureastheprincipiumcognoscendiexternumoftheology?

REFERENCES:Bavinck,Geref.Dogm.I,pp.207–237;Kuyper,Enc.derHeil. Godgel. II, pp. 291–346; Girardeau, Discussions of TheologicalQuestions, pp. 72–272; Thornwell, Collected Writings I, pp. 43–52;Strong,Syst.Theol.,pp.1–15;Miley,Syst.Theol.,pp.7–47;McPherson,Chr.Dogm.,pp.18–37.

II.Religion

Abriefdiscussionofreligionatthispointwillhaveadoubleadvantage.It

willenableustoseetherationalityoftheprincipiatowhichattentionwascalledinthepreceding,andwillprepareusforamoredetaileddiscussionof God's special revelation, the necessary corollary of religion, and theprincipium cognoscendi externum of theology. There is a very closerelationbetweenreligionandtheology.Thisisevidentfromtheveryfactthat many regard theology as the science of religion. While this iscertainly a mistake, the fact remains that the two are inseparablyconnected. There is no such thing as theology apart from religion.Religion consists in a real, living, and conscious relationshipbetweenaman and his God, determined by the self-revelation of God, andexpressing itself in a life of worship, fellowship and service. It pre-supposesthatGodexists,thatHehasrevealedHimself,andthatHehasenabled man to appropriate this revelation. And where man doesappropriate therevealedknowledgeofGod, reflectson itandunifies it,therethestructureoftheologyarisesonthebasisofGod'srevelation.Wedonotproceedontheassumption,socommonamongmodernstudentsofreligion,thattheessentialnatureofreligioncanbedeterminedonlyinthe light of its origin and history, and therefore do not begin thisdiscussionwithahistoricalstudyofthereligionsoftheworld.SinceourconceptionofreligionisfranklydeterminedbyScripture,itseemsmoredesirabletofollowthelogicalorderinitsdiscussion,andtoconsiderfirstofalltheessenceofreligion.

A.TheEssenceofReligion

1.THEDERIVATIONOFTHEWORD'RELIGION'.Thederivationoftheword 'religion' is still uncertain, andeven if itwere certain,wouldonlyyield a historical, and not a normative, definition of religion. It wouldonly shed some lighton the conceptionof religion that gave rise to theuseofthisparticularword.Severalderivationsofithavebeensuggestedin courseof time.The earliest of these is that ofCicero,whoderived itfromre-legere, tore-read, torepeat, toobservecarefully. Inthe lightofthis derivation religion was regarded as a constant and diligentobservanceofall thatpertainsto theknowledgeof thegods.Oneof theinfluentialChurchFathersofthefourthcentury,Lactantius,heldthattheword was derived from religare, to attach, to establish firmly, to bindtogether,andthereforepointedtoreligionasthebondbetweenGodand

man.Gelliussuggestedthederivationfromrelinquereinthesenseoftoseparateoneself fromsomeoneorsomething.Theword 'religion'wouldthen indicate thatwhich by reason of its holiness is separated from allthat is profane.Finally, Leidenroth assumed that itwasderived fromasupposedrootligere,meaningtosee.Religerewouldthenmean,tolookback,andreligion,tolookbackwithfear.ThederivationofGelliusfoundnofavorwhatsoever.ThatofLactantiuswasgenerallyacceptedforalongtime, but was gradually relinquished when Latin scholars pointed outthat it was linguistically impossible to derive 'religion' from 'religare'.SomeadmitthepossibilityofthederivationsuggestedbyLeidenroth,butthederivationofCiceroisnowpreferredbymosttheologians.Calvinalsogavepreference to this, thoughhedidnot shareCicero'sexplanationofthe term.Sayshe:"Cicero trulyandshrewdlyderives thenamereligionfromrelego,andyetthereasonwhichheasignsisforcedandfar-fetched,namely,thathonestworshippersreadandreadagain,andponderwhatistrue.Iratherthinkthenameisusedinoppositiontovagrantlicense—thegreaterpartofmankindrashlytakingupwhateverfirstcomestheirway,whereaspiety, that itmay standwith a firm step, confines itselfwithinduebounds."

2. SCRIPTURAL TERMS FOR RELIGION. The Bible contains nodefinition of religion, nor even a general term descriptive of thisphenomenon. It has become customary in Reformed theology todistinguishbetweenobjectiveandsubjectivereligion.Theword'religion'is clearly used in a two-fold sense. When we speak of the Christianreligionindistinctionfromotherreligions,wemeanonething;andwhenwesaythataman'sreligionistoointellectualortooemotional,wehavesomethingdifferentinmind.Intheonecasewerefertosomethingthathasobjectiveexistenceoutsideofman,and in theother, toasubjectivephenomenonintheinnerlifeofman,whichfindsexpressioninavarietyof ways. The term 'religio objectiva' is used to denote that whichdeterminesthenatureofman'sreligion,itsregulativenorm,namely,theknowledgeofGodandofman'srelationtoHim,asthisisprescribedbythe Word of God. It is sometimes practically equivalent to 'the divinerevelation.' And the term 'religio subjectiva' serves to designate the lifethatissoregulatedordeterminedbytheWordofGod,andthatexpressesitself in worship, fellowship, and service. Now the Bible uses different

termsforeachoftheseaspectsofreligion.

The religio objectiva is, as was said, practically identical with God'srevelation,andisindicatedintheOldTestamentbysuchtermsas'law,''commandments', 'precepts', 'judgments', 'ordinances',andsoon. In theNewTestamenttherevelationofGodisembodied,notprimarilyinasetof laws,but inthePersonofChrist, inHisredemptivework,and intheapostolic kerugma, which centers about Christ, and is merely aninterpretationofthefactsofredemption.Suchtermsas'thegospel', 'thefaith',and'thekerugma'servetodesignatethereligioobjectiva.

The religio subjectiva corresponds to the religio objectiva, and isdescribed in the Old Testament as "the fear of the Lord," which isrepeatedlycalled"thebeginningofwisdom."ThetermisexpressiveoftheinnerdispositionofthepiousIsraelitewithreferencetothelawofGod.This fear of God should be distinguished, however, from that anxioussolicitude, accompaniedwith dread, that is so characteristic of heathenreligions. The really God-fearing Israelite was not controlled by thedistrust, the dread anxiety, and slavish fear, with which the Gentilesthoughtof theirgods.Inhiscasethe fearof theLordwasaccompaniedwithother religiousdispositions, such as faith, hope, love, trust, takingrefuge in, leaning on, and clinging to,God, and thereforewas perfectlyconsistent with joy and peace, childlike confidence and blessedness, incommunionwithGod.

TheNewTestamentrarelyemploysthetermsthataremostprominentinclassicalGreekasdesignationsofreligion,suchasdeisidaimonia(fearorreverenceforthegods),Acts25:19,theosebeia(reverencetowardsGod),1Tim.2:10,andeulabeia(circumspectioninreligiousmatters,fearofGod,reverence,piety),Heb.5:7;12:28.Theonlywordthatoccurswithsomefrequency is eusebeia (piety towards God, godliness), which is foundfifteen times. Thesewords do not express the characteristic element ofNewTestamentreligion.ThefearoftheLordisindeedmentionedhereasanelementinreligion,Luke18:2;Acts9:31;2Cor.5:11;7:1,butisfarlessprominentthanintheOldTestament.TheusualNewTestamenttermforthe religio subjectiva in the New Testament is pistis, faith. In classicalGreek this word is used to denote: (a) a conviction based on thetestimony of another; and (b) trust in a person whose testimony is

accepted. It does not stand out as a designation of trust in the gods,though it is occasionally so used. And it is exactly this element that isbrought to the foreground in the New Testament. To the gloriousmessage of salvation, there is an answering faith on thepart ofman, afaithconsistinginchildliketrustinthegraceofGod,andbecomingatthesametimeafountainoflovetoGodandofdevotiontoHisservice.Thisfaith is not the natural expression of any so-called inborn religiousdispositionofman,but is the fruitof the supernaturaloperationof theHolySpirit.Thewordslatreia,Rom.9:4;12:1;Heb.9:1,6,andthreskeia,Acts26:5;Col.2:18;Jas.1:27,areusedtodenotetheserviceofGodthatspringsfromtheprincipleoffaith.

3. HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION.Religionisoneofthemostuniversalphenomenaofhumanlife.Manhassometimesbeendescribedas"incurablyreligious."ThisneednotsurpriseusinviewofthefactthatmanwascreatedintheimageofGod,andwasdestined to live incommunionwithHim.Andwhile it is true thatmanfellawayfromGod,hisfalldidnotinvolveacompletelossoftheimageofGod. The Belgic Confession states in Art. XIV that man "lost all hisexcellentgiftswhichhehadreceivedfromGod,andonlyretainedafewremains thereof, which, however, are sufficient to leave man withexcuse."AndaccordingtotheCanonsofDortIIIandIV,ArtIV:"Thereremain,however,inmansincethefall,theglimmeringsofnaturallight,wherebyheretainssomeknowledgeofGod,ofnaturalthings,andofthedifferencebetweengoodandevil,anddiscoverssomeregard forvirtue,goodorderinsociety,andformaintaininganorderlydeportment."Thisremaining light, however, does not avail unto salvation, and is evenabusedbymaninnaturalandcivilthings.Atthesametimeitdoesservetoexplainthepresenceofsomeformofreligionevenamongthe lowestand most barbaric tribes of the earth. But however general thisphenomenonmaybeamongthenationsoftheworld,thisdoesnotmeanthatthereisgeneralagreementastotheessentialnatureof it.EventhehistoryoftheChristianChurchrevealsconsiderabledifferenceofopinionon this point. The following are the most important conceptions thatcomeintoconsiderationhere:

a.TheconceptionoftheearlyChurch.TheBibledoesnotfurnishuswith

a definition of religion, nor even with a description of it, though itcontainsinitsentirecompassaclearrevelationofwhatGodrequiresofman. There are a few passages, however, which contain some specificindications. Thus Paul says in Rom. 12:1; "I beseech you therefore,brethren,bythemerciesofGod,topresentyourbodiesalivingsacrifice,holy, acceptable toGod,which is your spiritual (or: reasonable) service(latreia)." The Epistle to the Hebrews contains this admonition:"Whereforereceivingakingdomthatcannotbeshaken,letushavegrace,wherebywemay offer service well-pleasing to Godwith reverence andawe,"12:28.Inthispassagethewordslatreioandeulabeiaarebothused.James adds a specific element in the words: "Pure religion (threskeia)andundefiledbeforeourGodandFatheristhis,tovisitthefatherlessandwidowsintheiraffliction,andtokeeponeselfunspottedfromtheworld,"1:27.

IntheearlyChurchChristiansenjoyedreligiousexperiencesandengagedinconsecratedserviceandinreverentialworshiplongbeforetheybegantoreflectontheexactnatureofreligion.Oneoftheearliestdefinitionsofit was that of Lactantius in the beginning of the fourth century. Hedefined religionas recta verumDeumcognoscendi et colendi ratio (therightmannerofknowingandserving the trueGod).Thisdefinitionhasalwaysmetwithconsiderablefavor,andisevennowfoundinsomeworkson dogmatic theology. During the previous century, however, it wascriticized as favoring an external conception of religion, in which theheart is not concerned. But this criticism is hardly justified, since thedefinition does not pretend to specify what is the right manner ofknowingandservingGod.Thereisnothinginittopreventanyonefromassuming that the author had inmind a knowledge, which is not onlyintellectual, but also experiential, and a servicewhich springs from theheartandistrulyspiritual.TherightmannerofknowingandservingGodisafteralldeterminedbytheWordofGod,whichisnotsatisfiedwithapurely intellectual knowledge, nor with a merely external service. It istrue, however, that the definition applies to the religio objectiva, thereligion as prescribed by God in His Word, rather than to the religiosubjectiva,religionasexperiencedandpracticedbymen;andthatitdocsnot indicate the connection between the right knowledge and the rightserviceofGod.

b.TheconceptionoftheMiddleAges.ItisawellknownfactthatduringtheMiddleAges,undertheinfluenceoftheChurchofRome,religiouslifewasgraduallyexternalized.Theone-sidedemphasisontheChurchasanexternal organization brought with it a similar emphasis on theperformanceofexternalritesandceremonies,totheneglectoftheinnerdisposition of the heart. And this undue attention to mere ritualpunctuality reached its culmination in the scholastic period.Moreover,sincetheauthorityoftheChurchandoftraditiongraduallysurpassed,ifitdidnotsupersede, thatofScripture,andtheBiblewasexcludedfromthe hands of the laity, the element of knowledge was reduced to aminimum in the religious lifeof thepeople.The conceptionof religion,which was then present, finds its best expression in Thomas Aquinas'definitionof it as "thevirtuebywhichmen render toGod the requiredservice and honor." Thus religion takes its place among the humanvirtues, and is practically identified with the single element of latreia.Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between the theological virtues, faith,hope,andcharity,whichhaveGodfortheirobject,andthemoralvirtues,justice, fortitude, prudence, and temperance,which find their object inthe things that lead us toGod.He looks upon religion as a part of thevirtueofjustice,becauseinitmanrenderstoGodwhatisHisdue.Whilethis definition does indeed stress the religio subjectiva, it contemplatesthisone-sidedlyasservice.Religionisnotmerelyserviceandworship;itis primarily a disposition of the heart, which expresses itself in serviceand worship. The definition of Thomas Aquinas is even now found insome Roman Catholic works. Spirago voices the same externalconceptionofreligion,whenhesays:"Religionisnotamatteroffeeling;it isamatterof thewillandofaction,andconsists in followingout theprinciplesthatGodhaslaiddown."

c. The conception of the Reformers. The Reformers broke with theexternalismoftheChurchofRomeingeneral,andalsowithitsexternalconception of religion. They could not conceive of religion as beingmerelyoneofthemoralvirtues.Infacttheydidnotregarditasahumanvirtueatall,but ratheras spiritual communionwithGod, coupledwithreverential fear, and expressing itself in grateful worship and lovingservice. Says Calvin: "Such is pure and genuine religion, namely,confidenceinGodcoupledwithseriousfear—fear,whichbothincludesin

itwillingreverence,andbringsalongwithitsuchlegitimateworshipasisprescribed by the law." Moreover, he adds: "And it ought to be morecarefully considered, that all men promiscuously do homage God, butveryfewreverenceHim.Onallhandsthereisabundanceofostentatiousceremonies,butsincerityofheartisrare."

Since the Reformers regarded religion as a conscious and voluntaryspiritual relation to God, which expresses itself in life as a whole butparticularlyincertainactsofworship,theydistinguishedbetweenpietasastheprincipleandcultusastheactionofreligion.Andeventhiscultustheyregardedastwofold.Theydrewaclearlineofdistinctionbetweenacultus internus,whichmanifests itselfprimarily in faith,hopeand love,and a cultus externus, which finds expression in the worship of theChurch and in a life of service. Furthermore they spoke of a religiosubjectivaandareligioobjectiva,andindicatedtherelationbetweenthetwo.Thereligiosubjectiva,whichisprimarilyadispositionoftheheart,disturbed,degenerated,andfalsifiedbysin,butrestoredbytheoperationoftheHolySpirit, isdetermined,directed,andfructifiedby,andpassesintoactionundertheinfluenceof,thereligioobjectiva,consistingintherevealed truthofGod, inwhichGodHimselfdetermines the adoration,worship,andservicethatisacceptabletoHim.Allwill-worship,suchasthe detailed ritualism of the Roman Catholic Church, and theindividualismoftheAnabaptists,wasregardedacontraband.

Thequestionmayberaisedatthispoint,whatshouldberegardedasthereallycharacteristicdispositionofthesoulinreligion.Therehasbeennogeneral agreement on this point. It has been found in piety, fear,reverence, faith, a feeling of dependence, and so on; but these are allemotionsoraffectionswhicharealsofeltwithreferencetoman.Ottoinhispsychologicalstudyofreligionseemstohavehitupontherightidea.Hefeelsthat,whileSchleiermachersuggestedanimportantidea,whenhespokeof"afeelingofdependence,"yetthiscanhardlyberegardedasanadequatestatementofwhatisfeltinreligion.Hefindssomethingmore,for instance, inthewordsofAbraham,whenheundertakestopleadforthemenofSodom:"Beholdnow,IhavetakenuponmetospeakuntotheLord, which am but dust and ashes." Gen. 18:27. Says he: "There youhave a self-confessed 'feeling of dependence,' which is yet at the same

timefarmore,andsomethingotherthan,merelyafeelingofdependence.Desiring to give it a name of its own, I propose to call it 'creature-consciousness'or'creature-feeling.'Itistheemotionofacreature,abasedand overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which issupremeaboveallcreatures."Thereallycharacteristicthingisthis,thatinreligiontheabsolutemajestyandinfinitepowerofGodandtheutterinsignificanceandabsolutehelplessnessofmancomeintoconsideration.This does not mean, however, that religion is merely a matter of theemotions,northatman'sabsolutesubjectiontotheinfiniteGodissimplyanecessityimposedonman.TherelationofmantoGodinreligionisaconsciousandvoluntaryone,andinsteadofenslavingmanleadshimintotheenjoymentof thehighest liberty. InreligionmanknowsGodontheonehandasaholyPoweronwhichhe isabsolutelydependent,andontheotherhand,asthehighestGood,thesourceofallnaturalandspiritualblessings.InitheentrustshimselfvoluntarilytoGodwithallhisinterestsfor time and eternity, and thus acknowledges his dependence onHim.Anditisexactlybythisacknowledgmentthatthemorallifeofmangainsthe highest victory through the grace of God and enters upon theenjoymentoftrueliberty.

d. The modern conception of religion. In more recent times theconception of religion handed down by the Reformers, was changedconsiderably. TheReformersmaintained the right of private judgment,andthissoonresultedinaratherconsiderablenumberofChurchesandConfessions.ConsequentlyatendencymanifesteditselfincourseoftimetoseektheessenceofthereligioobjectivainthatwhichallChurcheshadin common. Some found this in the truth as it is expressed in theApostolic Confession. Quite a different note, however, was sounded byRationalism,whichbrokewith theWordofGodand limited religion intheobjectivesensetothefamiliartriadofGod,virtue,andimmortality.Thus the religio objectiva was reduced to a minimum. Kant andSchleiermacher went still farther by transferring the center of gravityfromtheobject to thesubject,anddivorcing thereligiosubjectiva fromthe religio objectiva. The former regarded religion simply as a form ofmoral action, in which man recognizes his duties as divinecommandments. According to him, says Moore, "morality becomesreligion when that which the former shows to be the end of man is

conceived also to be the end of the supreme law giver, God." AndSchleiermacher considered religion to bemerely a condition of devoutfeeling, a feeling of dependence, a "Hinneigung zum Weltall." In thesystemofHegelreligionbecomesamatterofknowledge.Hespeaksofitas"theknowledgepossessedbythefinitemindof itsnatureasabsolutemind"; or, regarded from the divine side, as "the divine Spirit'sknowledgeofitselfthroughthemediationofthefinitespirit."ThismakesGod, not only the object, but also the subject of religion. Thus, in thewordsofvanOosterzee, religionbecomes"aplayofGodwithHimself."EversincethedaysofSchleiermacherreligionhascometoberegardedassomething purely subjective, and in modern theology it is generallyrepresentedasman'ssearchforGod,asifitwerepossibletodiscoverGodapartfromdivinerevelation,andasifGoddidnotfirsthavetofindmanbefore men could really find Him. In fact the idea of religion as aconscious and voluntary relation of man to his God, a relationdeterminedbyGodHimself,was gradually lost. It isnowoftendefinedwithout any reference to God whatsoever, as may be seen from thefollowing examples: Religion is "morality touched with emotion"(MatthewArnold),"asumofscrupleswhichimpedethefreeexerciseofourfaculties"(Reinach),"faithintheconservationofvalues"(Hoeffding),or"thebeliefthatthereisanunseenorderandthatoursupremegoodliesinharmoniouslyadjustingourselvesthereto"(James).

e.TheBarthianconception.Modern theology turned from theobjectiveto the subjective; it relegated the idea of revelation to the background,and brought the idea of religion prominently to the fore. Moreover, itcontemplated religion as something native to man, as the highestachievement of man in the life of the human race, and as a prizedpossession,onthebasisofwhichmancanrise totheheightsofGod.Itsawinreligionthemanifestationofthedivineinman,whichmakeshimcontinuouswithGod, enable him to scale the heavens, andmakes himentirely fit to dwell in the presence of God. Over against this modernsubjectivism, Barth again stresses the objective in religion, and centersattention oncemore on the divine revelation, on theWord of God.Heneverwearies of dinning it into the ears of the present generation thatthere is noway fromman toGod, not even in religion, but only awayfromGodtoman.HepointsoutthattheBiblehasnothingcommendable

to say about the kind of religion of which the Modernists boast, butrepeatedlyspurnsandcondemnsit.ItislikethereligionofthePhariseesin the days of Jesus, and of the Judaists in the days of Paul. He evenshockedandhorrifiedhismodernistcontemporariesbystigmatizingthisreligionas thegreatestsinagainstGod.Accordingtohimthehistoryofreligion,whichbecame soprominentduring the last decennia, is reallythehistoryofwhat isuntrue inreligion."For,"sayshe,"at themomentwhen religion becomes conscious of religion, when it becomespsychologically andhistorically conceivable, it falls away from its innercharacter, from its truth, to idols. Its truth is its other-worldliness, itsrefusal of the idea of sacredness, its non historicity." It is his desire tobreakthestrangle-holdwhichSchleiermacherhadforsolongatimeonmoderntheology.Sayshe:"Withallduerespectforthegeniusshowninhiswork,IcannotconsiderSchleiermacheragoodteacherintherealmoftheologybecause,sofarasIcansee,heisdisastrouslydimsightedinregard to the fact thatman asman is not only in need, but beyond allhopeofsavinghimself;thatthewholeofso-calledreligion,andnotleasttheChristianreligion,sharesinthisneed;andthatonecannotspeakofGodsimplybyspeakingofman ina loudvoice."Barthdoesnot regardreligionasapossessionofman,somethingwhichmanhas,andwhichisthereforesomethinghistoricalratherthansomethingthatcomestomanfromabove.It isnotsomethingbywhichmancanimprovehimselfandthus become fit for heaven, since this loses sight of the qualitativedifferencebetweenthisworldandtheworldtocome.Itisnotahistoricalquantum, on the possession of which man can base his hope for thefuture,butratheranattitude,aframeofmind,adisposition,intowhichman is brought when he is confronted with the divine revelation. Thetrulyreligiousmanisthemanwhodespairsofhimselfandofallthatispurelyhuman,themanwhocriesoutwithIsaiah,"Woeisme!forIamundone,"orwithPaul, "Wretchedman that I am!who shalldelivermeoutofthebodyofthisdeath?"InhisRoemerbrief(2nded.p.241)Barthexpresses himself as follows: "It (religion) gives him no solution of hislife'sproblems,butrathermakeshimaninsolubleenigmatohimself.Itisneitherhissalvation,noradiscoveryofit:itisratherthediscoverythatheisnotsaved.…Itisamisfortunewhichfallswithfatalnecessityuponsomemen,andfromthemiscarriedtoothers.ItisthemisfortuneundertheweightofwhichJohntheBaptistgoes intothewildernesstopreach

repentanceandthejudgmenttocome;undertheweightofwhichsuchadeeply moving long drawn-out sigh as the second Epistle to theCorinthians was put on paper; under the uncanny weight of which aphysiognomy like thatofCalvinbecomeswhat it finallywas."While allthisisbynomeansacompletestatementofwhatBarthhastosayaboutreligion,itdoesindicatesufficientlywhatheregardsastheessenceofit.

B.TheSeatofReligion

Abriefconsiderationofthequestionastotherealseatofreligioninthehuman soul will undoubtedly promote a proper understanding of itsessential nature. The questionhas been raised in the course of history,whetherithasitsseatin,andthereforeoperatesthrough,justoneofthefaculties of the soul—to speak in the language of the old facultypsychology—,oroccupiesacentralplaceinthelifeofmanandfunctionsthroughallthepowersofthesoul.Ithasbeenerroneouslyrepresentedasa function, now of this, and then of that, faculty, while it shouldundoubtedly be regarded as something in which the soul of man aswhole, with all its psychical powers, is operative. Its place in life isfundamental and central, and consequently it affects all themanifestationsof life.Thefollowingviewscomeintoconsiderationhereandcallforabriefdiscussion.

1. IT HAS ITS SEAT IN THE INTELLECT. There is an intellectualconception, which seeks the essence of religion in knowledge, andthereforelocatesitspsychicalbasisintheintellect.ItwasespeciallyHegelthat sponsored the intellectual view and brought it to the foreground.According tohim thewhole life ofman ismerely aprocess of thought,andreligionissimplyapartoftheprocess.InthefinitespiritofmantheAbsolute becomes conscious of itself, and this self-consciousness of theAbsoluteinthehumanspiritisreligion.Accordingtothisviewreligionisneitherfeelingnoraction—thoughthesearenotentirelyexcluded—,butessentially knowledge. At the same time it is not the highest form ofknowledge, but a knowledge clothed in symbols, from which onlyphilosophycanextractthatwhichisidealandpermanent.Religionnevergetsbeyondthestageofapprehendingrealityinconcreteandimaginativeterms,whilephilosophymakestheattempttodiscoverthepureideathatliesbehindtheimage.Thisviewiscertainlyaveryseriousmisconception

of the essence of religion, since it reduces this to a sort of imperfectphilosophy. This virtually means that one's knowledge determines themeasureofone'spiety.Certainly,thereisalsoknowledgeinreligion,butitisknowledgeofaspecifickind;andtheattainmentofknowledgedoesnot constitute the real end in religion. Science aims at knowledge, butreligionseekscomfort,peace,salvation.Moreover,religiousknowledgeisnot purely intellectual, but above all experiential, a knowledgeaccompanied with emotions and resulting in action. Religion is notmerelyamatteroftheintellect,butalsoofthewillandoftheaffections.This consideration should also serve as a warning to all those in theChristianChurchwhospeakandactasiftruereligionwereonlyamatterofaproperconceptionofthetruth,ofsounddoctrineandofanorthodoxprofession of the verities of the Christian religion; and as if Christianexperience and the Christian life in all its varied manifestations werematters of comparative insignificance.Cold intellectualismwouldneverhavemadeChristianitythepoweritprovedtobeintheworld.

2.ITHASITSSEATINTHEWILL.Somehavesimplydefinedreligionasmoral action and sought its seat in thewill. Theway for this viewwaspaved by Pelagianism in its various forms, such as Semi-Pelagianism,Arminianism, Socinianism, Deism, and Rationalism, all of whichrepresentChristianityasanovalex,andstressthefactthatfaithisanewobedience.Doctrineismadesubordinateasameanstoahigherend,andthatendispracticalpiety.ItwasespeciallyKantthatgaveprominencetothismoralistictypeofreligion.Hestressedthefactthatthesupernaturalisbeyondthereachofpurereason,and that thegreatconceptsofGod,virtue,andimmortality,arebutthenecessarypostulatesofthepracticalreason. In this view faith becomes a knowledge resting on practicalgrounds, and religion is reduced to moral action determined by thecategorical imperative.Moraldutiesare fundamental in the lifeofman,and religion begins at the point whereman recognizes these duties asdivine commands, that is, where he comes to the discovery that Godrequiresthosedutiesofhim.Thustheintimaterelationbetweenreligionandmorality is indeedmaintained,buttheorderofthetwoisreversed.Morality loses its foundation in religion, and in turn itself becomes thefoundationof religion.Manbecomesmorally autonomous, and religionlosesitsobjectivecharacter.Butamoralitythatisnotrootedinreligion

cannotitselfbereligious.Moreover,religionisnevermeremoralaction.There is also knowledge in religion, and a far greater measure ofknowledgethanthatforwhichthesystemofKantmadeallowance.Andinadditiontothatthereisinreligionalsoaself-surrenderofmantoGod,by which he is delivered from guilt and pollution, and becomes aparticipant inall theblessingsofsalvationas therewardof the faithful.This moralistic conception of religion has become very popular in theAmerican religious world. This is undoubtedly due in part to theinfluenceofRitschl,whoadoptedthefundamentalprinciplesofKantandfound many followers in our country, but also in part to the practicaltemperoftheAmericanpeopleandtoPragmatism,inwhichthattemperfound philosophical expression. There is a one-sided emphasis onreligiousactioninourcountry.Manyconcernthemselvesverylittleaboutreligiousexperience,andevenlessaboutreligiousknowledge.'Service'isthe great watchword of the day, and service only is the mark of trueChristianity.Thereislittleconcernaboutthequestionwhetherthisactionsprings from true religious principles. It is no wonder that the term'Activism'isusedtocharacterizeAmericanChristianity.

3. IT HAS ITS SEAT IN THE FEELINGS. There have been those whodefined religion as feeling, especially in mystical and pietistic circles.Romanticism,whichwas a reaction of the free emotional life against arather formal and inflexible classicism, was in no small measureconducivetothisview.Schleiermacherwasitsgreatapostle.Accordingtohimreligionisessentiallyasenseoftheinfinite,afeelingofdependence,notsomuchonapersonalGodasontheuniverseconceivedasaunity.Hence he spoke of religion as a "Hinneigung zumWeltall." In religionman feels himself one with the Absolute. Religion is pure feeling,disconnectedfromthoughtontheonehand,andfrommoralityoractionon the other. It is, to use the words of Edwards, "a warm, intimate,immediate awareness of the Infinite in the finite, the Eternal in thetemporal, a senseofdependenceon theWhole."Now it isundoubtedlytruethatfeelinghasanimportantplaceinreligion,butitisamistaketoregarditastheexclusiveseatofreligion.Anditisevenmoreincorrecttoregarditasthesourceofreligion,asSchleiermacherdoes.Hisconceptionofreligionmakes itentirelysubjective,aproductofhumanfactors,andignoresitsrelationtoabsolutetruth.Inhumanfeelingthegreatquestion

is,whetherasensationorperception ispleasantorunpleasant,andnotwhether it is true or false; and yet this is the all-important question inreligion.Thisviewofreligionisjustasone-sidedastheothertwo.Truereligionisnotmerely,andisnotevenfundamentally,amatteroffeeling,but also of knowledge, and of volition or moral action.Moreover, thisconceptioneasily leads toa confusionof religiousandaesthetic feeling,andtoan identificationofreligionandart.Andalso inconnectionwiththis philosophical view it is necessary to remark that it is not a mereabstract theory,butone that reverberates inpractical life.Many regardreligion purely as a matter of emotional enjoyment, good enough forwomen,buthardly fit formen.Accordingto themit issomethingapartfrom the lifeofman ingeneral. It reallymeans littleornothing for theseriousbusinessoflife.Ithasnocontrollinginfluenceonthethoughtsofman, neither does it determine his action in any way. One can be aChristianwithhis heart (feeling), and aheathenwithhis head.He cansay, "Lord, Lord" in private or public worship, and at the same timerefuse to do the Lord's bidding in daily life. This is not only an un-Scriptural,butalsoanunpsychologicalviewofreligion,andonethathasdoneagreatdealofharmtothecauseofGodinthepast.

4. IT HAS ITS SEAT IN THE HEART. The only correct view is thatreligionhas its seat in theheart.Somemightbe inclined to regard thispositionas identicalwith theprecedingone, since theword 'heart'maydenote the seat of the affections and passions in the life of man, indistinction from the intellect and the will. In that case it is really adesignationoftheemotionalnature,thatis,ofthefeelings.Itisusedinthatsense,whenitissaidthataman'sheartisbetterthanhishead.Buttheword'heart'isalsousedinafarmoregeneralsense,andmaydenoteeven the entire personality of man as capable of being influenced ormoved. It is so employed,when it is said that aman loveswith all hisheart. It is in a somewhat related sense, a sense that is derived fromBiblicalpsychology, that theword isusedhere.Theword isnot alwaysusedinthesamesenseevenintheBible,butinsomecaseshasageneral,andinothersamorespecificmeaning.Andwhenit issaidthatreligionhasitsseatintheheart,it isemployedinitsmostgeneralsense.Tothequestionwhatismeantwiththe'heart,'wemayanswerwithLaidlawthatthe'heart'inthelanguageofBiblicalpsychologymeans"thefocusofthe

personalandmorallife.Itneverdenotesthepersonalsubject,alwaysthepersonalorgan.All the soul'smotionsof lifeproceed from it, and reactuponit."Itisthecentralorganofthesoul,andhassometimesbeencalled"theworkshopofthesoul."ReligionisrootedintheimageofGodinman,and that image is central. It reveals itself in thewholemanwithallhistalents and powers. Consequently,man's relation toGod is central andinvolvesthewholeman.ManmustloveGodwithallhisheart,andwithallhissoul,andwithallhismind.HemustconsecratehimselftohisGodentirely,bodyandsoul,withallhisgiftsandtalents,andinallrelationsoflife. Thus religion embraces the entire man with all his thoughts andfeelingandvolitions.Ithasitsseatintheheart,whereallthefacultiesofthehumansoulareseenintheirunity.InviewofthisfactwecanreadilyunderstandtheScripturalemphasisontheheartasthatwhichwemustgiveuntotheLord,Deut.30:6;Prov.23:26;Jer.24:7;29:13.Outoftheheart are the issues of life, Prov. 4:23. And in religion the heart takespossessionoftheintellect,Rom.10:13,14;Heb.11:6,ofthefeelings,Ps.28:7;30:12,andof thewill,Rom.2:10, 13;Jas. 1:27, 1John1:5–7.Thewhole man is made subservient to God in every sphere of life. "In dereligie," says Dr. J. H. Bavinck, "dalen wij af tot het wezen van denmensch. Daar waar de waarlijk religieuze krachten in den mensch totontwakingkomenhebbenwijhetmeestmethemzelftedoen.Daarkloptde ziel zelve in,demensch, indewereldgevangen, staatopen zegt totzichzelven:ikzalnaarmijnenVadergaan."

C.TheOriginofReligion

Differentmethodshavebeenappliedinthestudyoftheoriginofreligion.Duringthelastcenturypersistentattemptshavebeenmadetoexplainitas a purely natural phenomenon. This was the inevitable result of theapplication of the philosophy of evolution. Both the historical and thepsychologicalmethodswerethefruitofthistendency.Itmaybesaidthatin these naturalism is largely pitted against supernaturalism. In thischapterlittlemorethanabareindicationofthesemethodscanbegiven.

1. THE HISTORICAL METHOD. The historical method aims atdiscoveringtheoriginofreligionbystudyingthehistoryofmankind,withspecial attention to its primitive religions. According to Edwards thismethod seeks to answer such questions as the following: "How did

religion first appear in time and place? In what way did the religiousnatureofmanfirstexpressitself?Whatwasthemostrudimentaryformofreligion, fromwhichallotherformsmaybesaidtohavedeveloped?"Butthesearequestionswhichnohistoriancananswerwithanydegreeofassurance.Hecannotgobackfarenoughinhistorytoobservemanintheprocess of becoming religious, for man is already religious at the verydawn of history.Moreover, there are no records of the oldest forms ofreligion,eitherinwrittendocumentsorintrustworthytraditions.Andifthisisso,thenthequestionnaturallyarises,Howcanthehistorianeverfind a satisfactory answer to the questions which present themselveshere?Edwardssaysthat"byasympatheticstudyofthemindandwaysofmodernsavagesandofchildren,andbyconstructiveimaginationonthebasisofsuchstudy,theanthropologistmayrebuildforusthereligionofthe primitive man. His reconstruction must necessarily be purelyhypothetical."Allthismeansthatthehistorianwhowouldinvestigatetheoriginofreligionmusttakehisstandonpre-historicalground,andthatasaresulthecanonlysuggesttheories,whichmaybeshrewdguessesbutdonotcarryconviction.Moreover,theadvocatesofthehistoricalmethodmake a fundamental mistake, when they proceed on the assumption,based on the theory of evolution, that the religious life of the mostprimitivepeoplesreflectsreligioninitsearliestandoriginalform.Thisis,ofcourse,merelyabareassumptionratherthananestablishedfact,anddoesnot take intoaccount thepossibility that theearliestknown formsmay be corruptions of a far earlier form. It has long been taken forgranted that the original form of religion was polytheistic, but theinvestigationsofLang,Radin,Schmidt,andothershave foundtracesoftherecognitionof"highgods,"alsocalled"creatorgods,"amongpeoplesof very low culture, and regard these as evidences of an originalmonotheism.

Weshallmentionafewofthetheoriessuggestedtoexplaintheoriginofreligion,notbecauseoftheir inherentvalue,butmainlytoillustratetheinsufficiency of thismethod. Some anthropologists found the historicalexplanationofreligioninthecunningofpriestsorthecraftofrulers,whoexploited thecredulityandthe fearsof the ignorantmasses, inorder togaincontroloverthem.Thisviewissosuperficialthatitfindsnosupportin scientific circles today. Others were of the opinion that the higher

forms of religion developed out of fetish-worship. But while this mayexplain the origin of certain forms of religion, it does not explain theoriginofreligionassuch,sincethisfetish-worshipisalreadyreligionandtherefore itself requires explanation.Moreover,wherever it is in vogue,there are generally also manifest traces of an earlier higher form ofreligion.Thefetishesthemselvesarefrequentlymeresymbolsofreligiousobjects.ThetheoriesofTylerandSpencerarecloselyrelated.Theformeris of the opinion that the conception of a soul or other-self, locatedsomewhere in thebodyandcontinuingafterdeath,graduallydevelopedamong the earliest men; and that animism (from anima, soul), as thedoctrine of souls, expanded in the course of time into the doctrine ofspirits, whether gods or devils, as objects of worship. The theory ofSpencer is related to that of Tyler but is more specific. It suggestsancestorism,theworshipofthesoulsofdepartedancestors,asthemostfundamental form of religion. According to him primitive peoplesascribed great influence to the spirits of departed ancestors, andconsequentlyacquiredthehabitofpraying,andofofferingsacrifices,tothem.Butthesetheoriesarealsounsatisfactory.Theyfail toexplainthevery forms theyassume, theworshipof the spiritsof thedeparted,andthe universal underlying conviction that these spirits are gods highlyexalted above men. Moreover, wherever this spirit-worship is found,there is also a separate and distinct worship of the gods. Durkheimcriticized these theories of Tyler and Spencer, and offered instead asociological theory of the origin of religion. He found the origin ofreligious belief in the idea of amysterious impersonal force controllinglife, a sense of power derived from the authority of society over theindividual.Thesenseof thepowerof thesocialgroupdevelops into theconsciousnessofamysteriouspowerintheworld.Thetotemisthevisibleemblemofthispower;itistheemblemofthetribe;andinworshippingthe totem man worships the tribe. Man's real god is society, and thepowerwhichheworshipsisthepowerofsociety.Butthistheorywasalsoseverely criticized by other scientists, and that from various points ofview.It isnomoresatisfactorythantheothersasanexplanationof theoriginofreligion.ThetheoryofnaturismwasbroughtintothelimelightespeciallybyPfleiderer.According to this theory religionwasoriginallymerely respect for thegreatand imposingphenomenaofnature, in thepresence of which man felt himself weak and helpless. This feeling of

respectledtotheworship,insomecasesofthesephenomenathemselves,and in others of the invisible power(s) revealing itself in them.But thequestion naturally arises, How did man ever hit upon the idea ofworshippingnature?Maynotthisnature-worship,whichisundoubtedlyprevalentinsometribes,betheresultofadeclinefromapurerstageofreligious belief and practice? Like all the preceding hypotheses, thistheory also fails to offer any explanation whatsoever of religion on itspsychologicalside.Inmorerecenttimesitwassuggestedthattheoriginof religion is connected with the belief in magic. Some think that theformerinsomewayevolvedoutofthelatter,butFrazer,whoisthegreatauthorityonthissubject,claimsthatthecontributionofmagictoreligionwas negative rather than positive. Man tried magic first, but wasdisappointed, and the despair of magic gave birth to religion. On thewholetheresultofthishistoricalinvestigationisverydisappointingasanexplanationoftheoriginofreligion.

2. THE PSYCHOLOGICALMETHOD. It was felt in the course of timethatthehistoricalmethodhadtobesupplementedbythepsychological,andthisisnowregardedasthemoreimportantofthetwo.Thismethodraisesthequestionastothesourceofreligioninman'sspiritualnature,notmerely in thebeginning, but everywhere and always.Edwardsputsthequestionsthus:Whataretheconstantfactorsintheinnerlifeofmanwhich,ininterplaywiththeenvironment,generatetheattitudewhichwecall religious?What are the impulses, promptings, motives, felt needs,whichleadhimtoapprehendthesupernaturalandtoadjusthislifetoit?What is there in his mental make-up that accounts for the fact thatwherever man is found he has some form or other of religion?" Thepsychological method seeks to derive religion from certain factors inman,whicharenotthemselvesreligious,butwhichbycombinationandincooperationwithman'snaturalenvironmentgiverisetoreligion.

Itwillhardlydotosay,assomehavedone,thatmanisreligiousbecausehehasareligiousinstinct,forthissupposedinstinctisalreadyreligious,andisthereforetheverythingtobeexplained.Itisequallyunsatisfactorytoaccount for religion,asothershavedone,byholding thatmanhasareligiousfaculty,forthereisnoprooffortheexistenceofsuchafaculty,and if there were, this faculty itself would require explanation.

Schleiermacher sought the explanation of religion in feeling, moreparticularly,inafeelingofdependence,butfailedtoexplainhowamerefeelingofdependencepassedintoareligiousattitude.Somesuggestthatthetransitionmaybefoundinafeelingofawe,whichisakintofear, inthepresenceofunknownbutmightypowers.Butfearisnotyetreligionanddoesnotnecessarilyleadtoworship.Moreover,religiousemotionisfartoocomplextobeexplainedinsuchasimpleway.Itincludesnotonlyawe, wonder, and admiration, but also gratitude, love, hope, and joy.Kant and Ritschl find the origin of religion in the desire of man tomaintainhimself as a freemoralbeingoveragainst thephysicalworld.Manisconsciousofthefactthathe,asaspiritualbeing,isoffargreatervaluethanthewholenaturalworld,andthereforeought tocontrol this.Atthesametimehecannothelpfeelingthat,astothephysicalsideofhisbeing,he is simplyapartofnature,and that in striving forethicalandspiritual ends he is repeatedly thwarted by natural conditions. Thistensionresultsinanattemptonthepartofmantorealizehisdestinybybelievingandrestinginahigherbeingthatcontrolsthenaturalorderandmakesitsubservienttospiritualends.OnthisviewGodbecomesmerelyahelperintimeofneed.Butseekinghelpwithahigherbeingisnotyetreligiousadoration.Moreover, thistheorydoesnotexplaintheoriginofsuchreligiousphenomenaasconsciousnessofguilt,penitence,desireforredemption,prayerforforgiveness,andsoon.Neitherdoesitaccountfortheuniversalityof the feltneedofGod,despite the fact thatdiscoveriesandinventionsmakeitincreasinglypossibleformantomaintainhimselfoveragainstnature.Evolutionistsmade theattempt todemonstrate thedevelopment of religion out of such characteristics as a sense ofdependence, fidelity, attachment, and love, as these are present in theanimal world. But this attempted explanation can hardly be calledsuccessful.Theso-called"doctrine"ofevolutionisstillamerehypothesis,and what is said about the inner "soul" life of the animals is largelyconjectural.Andtheassumptionsthatseemtobewarrantedonthispointstill leavethemost importantelementsofreligionunexplained.Modernpsychologists differ so greatly in their suggested explanations of theorigin of religion that we cannot begin to enumerate them.Nor doweconsideritnecessarytodothis.

The psychologicalmethod labors under a difficulty similar to thatwith

whichthehistoricalmethodisburdened.Itmusttakeitsstartingpointinahypotheticalman,soundevelopedandbarbarianthathehasnotevenasparkof religion inhim.Religionmustbederived fromfactors thatarenotthemselvesreligious.ButDr.BavinckcorrectlysaysthatsuchamanisapureGedankending,anemptyabstraction.Inrealitysuchmendonotexist.Moreover,thismethodmakesreligiondependentonanaccidentalconcourseof circumstances. If the complex inwhich the explanationofreligion is soughthadbeenslightlydifferent, religionwouldneverhaveoriginated.This,ofcourse,robsreligionof its independentsignificance,of its universality and necessity, and of its incalculable worth. If it ispurelyaccidental, it lacksthefirmfoundationonwhichitoughttorest.But this is not all: religion really becomes an absurdity, when it isexplained without assuming the existence of a God. According to thepsychologicalmethodmancreateshisownGod,anddetermineshowthatGodmust be served.The relationbetween the religio objectiva and thereligio subjectiva is reversed, and the latter becomes the source of theformer.Inprinciplethismethodconflictswiththeessenceofreligionandvirtuallydestroysthephenomenonwhichitoughttoexplain.

3. THE THEOLOGICAL METHOD. Speaking of the origin of religion,Edwardssaysthattherearetwoviews"whichwereoncewidelyprevalent,but which are now obsolete or obsolescent. The first is the view thattraced religion back to a primitive or a special Divine revelation." Herejects this view as being, in its usual forms, too intellectual andmechanical,pre-scientificandcrudelyunpsychological.However,itistheBiblicalviewoftheoriginofreligion,andisfarmoresatisfyingthananyofthehistoricalandpsychologicalviewsthatwereofferedtotheworld.Indistinction from these, it alone contains a real explanation of theuniversal phenomenon of religion. Both the historical and thepsychological method proceed on the assumption that religion, likescience and art,must be explained in a purelynaturalisticway, thoughsomeoftheirprotagonists—Edwardsbeingoneofthese—feelthatitmaybenecessaryinthelastanalysistoappealtosomesortofrevelation.Thetheologicalmethod,on theotherhand,maintains thatreligioncanonlyfinditsexplanationinGod.Religion,beingcommunionofthesoulwithGod,naturallyimpliesthatGodexists,thatHehasrevealedHimself,andthatHehassoconstitutedmanthatthelattercanknowHim,isconscious

ofkinshipwithHim,andisevenpromptedbynaturetoseekafterHim.While the historical and psychological methods are not even able toexplainreligioninitsmostprimitiveforms,thetheologicalmethodoffersus the key to the explanation, not only of the lowest, but also of thehighest there is in religion. And of course a real explanation can besatisfied with nothing less than that. It is the only method that is inharmonywiththerealnatureofreligion.Scientistsdonotstartoutwithanormativeviewofreligion,andthenundertaketoexplaintheoriginofit.Theybeginwithastudyofthephenomenaofthereligiouslife,andthenadapttheirviews,theirdefinitions,ofreligiontotheirfindings.Thisgivesrise to a great number of historical definitions which utterly fail to dojusticetothatwhichisessentialinreligion.

On the basis of God's revelation, the theological method posits thefollowingtruths:

a. The existence of God. If in religionwe are concernedwith themostintimate relationship between God andman, then it naturally involvesthe assumption that God exists. And we frankly proceed on theassumption that there is a personal God. It is true, many consider itunscientifictoreferanythingbacktoGod.TheyadmitthattheHebrewsdid this, but find the explanation for that in the fact that these peoplelived in a pre-scientific age. Consequently their explanationsmaymeetwithanindulgentsmile,butcannotnowbetakenseriously.Overagainstthis itmaybe said,however, that it is apoor science thatmaynot riseabovethevisibleandexperimental,andisnotpermittedtotakeGodintoaccount.And this isdoubly trueof all scientific attempts to explain theorigin of religion without any reference to God, for apart from Himreligionisanabsurdity.Religioniseitheranillusion,becauseGoddoesnot exist or cannot be known; or it is founded on reality, but then itpresupposestheexistenceandtherevelationofGod.

b.TheDivineRevelation.Wealsoproceedon theassumption thatGodhas revealedHimself. The idea of revelation is, in some form or other,found in all religions, and this proves quite sufficiently that it is anecessary corollary of religion.There isno religion in any real senseofthewordapartfromadivinerevelation.IfGodhadnotrevealedHimselfinnature, in providence, and in experience, therewould beno religion

among the Gentile nations of the world; and there would be no truereligioninanypartoftheworldtoday,ifGodhadnotenrichedmanwithHisspecialrevelation,enbodiedinHisdivineWord,becauseitisexactlythisrevelation,asthereligioobjectiva,whichdeterminestheworshipandservice that is acceptable to Him. The religio subjectiva owes itsinception, its development, and its proper regulation instrumentally tothe religio objectiva. Divorced from its objective foundation, religionturnsintoawill-worshipthatispurelyarbitrary.

c.Man'screationintheimageofGod.AthirdpresuppositionisthatGodsoconstitutedmanthathehasthecapacitytounderstandandtorespondtotheobjectiverevelation.Religionisfoundedintheverynatureofman,andwasnotimposeduponhimfromwithoutinasomewhatmechanicalway.It isamistaketothinkthatmanfirstexistedwithoutreligion,andwasendowedwiththislateronasasortofsuperadditum.Theveryideaof revelation presupposes the existence of a religious consciousness inman. Created in the image of God, man has a natural capacity forreceivingandappreciatingtheself-communicationofGod.Andinvirtueof his original endowment man seeks communion with God, thoughunder the influence of sin he now, as long as he is left to his unaidedpowers,seeksitinthewrongway.ItisonlyundertheinfluenceofGod'sspecial revelation and of the illumination of the Holy Spirit, that thesinnercan,at least inprinciple,rendertoGodtheservicethat isduetoHim.

ThisviewisnotopentothecriticismvoicedbyEdwardsinthefollowingwords: "In its usual forms the doctrine of revelation has explained theorigin of religion in far too intellectual andmechanical a fashion, as ifreligionbeganwiththeimpartationtomanofasetofideas,ready-madeand finished ideas poured into a mind conceived as a kind of emptyvessel.Thisisacrudelyunpsychologicalview."Hespeaksoftheviewthatmust be traced back to a primitive or special revelation as "obsolete orobsolescent," but admits that the "category of revelation may beultimatelynecessaryinastatementoftheobjectivegroundofthevalidityof religious beliefs and in order to safeguard the place of the divineinitiativeinthereligiouslifeofman."Heinsists,however,thatitshouldbetheideaofacontinuousandprogressiverevelation.Butwhenhesays

thishehas inmindthekindof revelationwhich, fromanotherpointofview,mayalsobecalledhumandiscovery.

QUESTIONSFORFURTHERSTUDY:DoesthepresentemphasisontheimmanenceofGodinanywayaffectthecurrentconceptionsofreligion?Canthepsychologyof religionbeofgreatassistance in thestudyof theessentialnatureofreligion?Howdoesthephilosophyofthepsychologistsaffecttheirinvestigationsinthefieldofreligion?Isitpropertospeakofmanashavinga religious instinctor a religious faculty? Is it correct tosay that affections are more fundamental in religion than either theintellectorthewill?Whyisitwrongtostudymerelythelowestformsofthe religious life ofman, in order to explain the origin of religion?Arethereconclusiveproofsthatthehigherformsofreligiondevelopedoutofthelower?Whatcanbesaidinfavoroftheideathatthehistoricalprocessinreligionwasoneofdeteriorationratherthanofdevelopment?

REFERENCES:Bavinck,Geref.Dogm.I,pp.207–290;Kuyper,Enc.derHeil.Godgel.II,pp.291–369;Wisse,ReligieenChristendom,pp.25–57;J. H. Bavinck, Inleiding in de Zielkunde, pp. 265–277; Galloway. ThePhilosophyofReligion,pp.54–187;Edwards.ThePhilosophyofReligion,pp. 29–178; Wright, A Student's Philosophy of Religion; Leuba, APsychological Study of Religion; Jevons, Introduction to the Study ofComparativeReligion;Kirkpatrick,ReligioninHumanAffairs,pp.1–166;Lidgett, The Christian Religion, pp. 138–224; Beattie, Apologetics, pp.139–247; Bruce, Apologetics, pp. 71–163; Patton, FundamentalChristianity,pp.1–208;Clark,TenGreatReligions;Menzies,HistoryofReligion; Aalders, De Heilige Schrift en de Verelikende GodsdiensTwentenschap;Sabatier,OutlinesofaPhilosophyofReligion,pp.3–117;Brown,TheEssenceofChristianity;Pratt,TheReligiousConsciousness;Hughes, The New Psychology and Religious Experience; Moore, E. C.,TheNatureofReligion.

III.ThePrincipiumCognoscendiExternum(Revelation)

A.NameandConceptofRevelation

1.CONNECTIONBETWEENRELIGIONANDREVELATION.The ideaof religion naturally leads on to that of revelation as its necessarycorollary. In the study of comparative religion it is recognized everincreasinglythatallreligionisbasedonrevelationofsomekind,andthatthere is no purely "natural," as distinguished from "revealed," religion.Dr. Orr says: "In a wider respect, there is probably no proposition onwhichthehigherreligiousphilosophyofthepasthundredyearsismoreagreedthanthis—thatallreligionoriginatesinrevelation."ThestudyoftheHistoryofReligionsyieldsabundantevidenceofthefactthatbeliefinrevelationisquitegeneralamongthenationsofdieworld,andthateveryreligionofanyimportanceappealstosomeformofrevelation.Buddhismhassometimesbeenregardedasanexceptiontotherule,butinrealityitisnoexception, forwhenitbecameareligion itregardedBuddhaas itsgod.Notonlyconservative,butalsoliberalscholars,grantexplicitlythatthe knowledge of God, and therefore also religion, rests on revelation,though their conception of revelation varies a great deal. To quite anextenttheterm'naturaltheology'hasfallenintodisuse,andevenwhenitisstillused,itisoftenwiththedistinctunderstandingthatitshouldnotbe regarded as the designation of a theology which is the opposite of'revealed theology.' W. Fulton finds fault with this old mediaevaldistinction,which is still tacitly accepted by J. G. Frazer in his GiffordLectures,andsays:"theknowledgeofGodderivedfromtheconsiderationof nature, or from the light of reason, is asmuch entitled to be calledrevealed knowledge as the knowledge of God mediated through theScripturesandtheChurch."3JohnCairddeclares:"Thereistherefore,werepeat,no such thingasanatural religionor religionof reasondistinctfromrevealedreligion."McPhersonwasperfectlyjustifiedinsaying:"Intheideaandfactofreligion,therefore,revelationastheoperationofGodisthenecessarycorrelateoffaithasthespiritualactofman."5Thiscouldnotbeotherwise,becausereligionbringsmanincontactwithaninvisible

Power, inaccessible tohuman investigation. Ifman isever toknowandserveGod,thelattermustrevealHimself.Thisisallthemoretrueinviewofthefactthatinreligionmanisseekingsomethingwhichhecannotfindin scienceandart, in commerceand industry, in sensualpleasuresandworldly riches, namely, redemption from sin and death, and life incommunionwithGod.HecanobtaintheseblessingsonlyifGodrevealsHimselfinrelationtomanandpointsoutthewayofsalvation.

2. THE GENERAL IDEA OF REVELATION. The word 'revelation' isderived from the Latin 'revelatio,' which denotes an unveiling, arevealing. In its active sense it denotes the act of God by which Hecommunicates to man the truth concerning Himself in relation to Hiscreatures, and conveys to him the knowledge of His will: and in thepassivesenseitisadesignationoftheresultingproductofthisactivityofGod. It should be observed that in theology it never denotes a merepassive, perhaps unconscious, becoming manifest, but always aconscious,voluntary,andintentionaldeedofGod,bywhichHerevealsorcommunicatesdivinetruth.Theideaofrevelationassumes(a)thatthereisapersonalGodwhoactivelycommunicatesknowledge; (b) that thereare truths, facts, and eventswhichwould not be knownwithout divinerevelation;and(c)thattherearerationalbeingstowhomtherevelationismade and who are capable of appropriating it. The words moreparticularly used in Scripture for revelation are the commonwords for'disclose,''makeknown,'or'reveal,'withadeepenedmeaningasappliedto supernatural communications, or the effect of these. In the OldTestamenttheoutstandingwordis'galah,'theoriginalmeaningofwhichis 'to be naked.' As applied to revelation, it points to the removal of acoveringwhich obstructs the view. There is no noun derived from thisverb, which denotes the concept of revelation. The corresponding NewTestamenttermis'apokalupto,'whichalsosignifiestheremovalofaveilorcovering,inorderthatwhatisbackofitorunderitmaybeseen.Thenoun 'apokalupsis' denotes an uncovering, a revelation. Another wordthat is frequently used is 'phaneroo' (noun, 'phanerosis'), to makemanifest, to expose to view. The classical passage concerning therevelationofGodtomanisHeb.1:1–2:"God,havingofoldtimespokenunto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in diversmanners,hathattheendofthesedaysspokentousinhisSon."

3. HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF REVELATION. The idea ofrevelation has had a rather checkered history. There was no generalagreement as to just what constituted divine revelation. Bailliedistinguishesfiveperiodsinthehistoryofhumanthoughtonthissubject,and a brief characterization of these periods will serve to indicate theconflictingopinionsthatgainedcurrencyinthecourseoftime.

a.Intheearliesttimes.Primitivepeoplesfoundthefinalcourtofappealinallreligiousmattersinthemassoftribaltraditionsthatwerehandeddownconscientiouslyfromonegenerationtoanother.Theyregardedtheknowledgeofthegodsandofdivinethings,containedinthesetraditions,asperfectlyreliable,becauseithadbeenacquiredbytheinspiredmenofthe race by divination, that is, by signs provided by the gods in theentrailsofanimals,theflightandcriesofbirds,theconstellations,andsoon. These signs were interpreted by those who were skilled in suchmatters(artificialdivination),orbycommunicationswhichweredirectlycleartothemind,andwhichweremadeduringsleeporinawakingstateofecstacyorfrenzy(naturaldivination).Thetraditionswhichoriginatedinthisfashionweresometimesembodiedinsacredbooks.

b.InthephilosophyoftheGreeks.TheGreeksvirtuallysetasidetheideathatthegodsrevealedthemselvestoman,andsubstitutedforittheideathatmangraduallydiscoveredthegods.Theydidnotdenytherealityofdivination altogether, butdidnot consider this sufficient to explain thewholebodyof religiousknowledge. In theiropinion the truthabout thegodswas not suddenly acquired in dreams or visions, but bymeans ofcalmandperseveringthought.TheprevailingopinionwasthatGodandnature were one, and that the study of nature would therefore yieldreligiousknowledge.ThephilosophyofSocratesandPlatorepresented,atleasttoacertainextentaprotestagainstthisidea.Inameasuretheyroseabovethepolytheismoftheirday.

c. In the Christian era up to the latter half of the seventeenth century.UndertheinfluenceoftheSemiticandtheChristianreligionadistinctionwasmadebetweenarevelationofGodinnatureandaspecialrevelation,finallyembodiedinScripture.Thisideaofatwofoldrevelationprevailedformorethansixteenhundredyearswithoutbeingseriouslyquestioned.Theonlypointindisputewasthatoftheexactlineofdemarcation.This

wasnotalwaysstatedinthesameway.ThomasAquinasheldthatnaturalrevelationcould leadtotheknowledgeofGodasaunity,andfurnishedanadequatebasisforascientifictheology,butthatonlyspecialrevelationcouldacquaintmanwithGodastriuneandasincarnateinJesusChrist,andconveyedtomanaknowledgeofthemysteriesoffaith.

d. In the latter half of the seventeenth century and the eighteenthcentury.During thisperiod therewasagrowing tendency toemphasizetherevelationofGodinnatureattheexpenseofHisspecialrevelationinScripture. The idea, fostered especially byDeism andRationalism,wasthatthelightofnatureisquitesufficientforman,andthattheChristianrevelationreallyaddsnothingtoit,butismerelya"republication"ofthetruths of nature for thebenefit of thosewho cannotdiscover or reasonout things for themselves. By the "light of nature" they meant "partlycertain intuitive or self-evident religious beliefs, and partly certaindiscursiveproofsbasedonscientificandmetaphysicalspeculation."

e.Sincethebeginningofthenineteenthcentury.UndertheinfluenceofKant,andespeciallyofSchleiermacher, thedifferencebetween the lightof nature and the light of God's special revelation was supposedlytranscended. They are nomore regarded inmodern liberal theology astwodifferentavenues to theknowledgeofGod,butonlyas twodistinctways of conceiving of the only avenue there is. The doctrine of theimmanenceofGodisbeginningtoplayanimportantpart.BothKantandSchleiermacher are "convinced that the only argument capable ofreaching Deity is one that starts not from external, but from human,nature; and theybelieve, too, that it is inhumannature, andnot in itsabeyanceintranceordreamorfrenzy,thatGodcharacteristicallyrevealsHimself."They representneither thedoctrineof the lightofnaturenorthat of special revelation in its old form, but resolve both in a higherunity.Thisnewrepresentationis inameasureareturntothatofGreekphilosophy, and it is especially this view of revelation that is stronglyopposedbytheTheologyofCrisis.

4.THEIDEAOFREVELATIONINMODERNTHEOLOGY

a. The Deistic conception. Eighteenth century Deism believed in apersonal God and in a general revelation in nature and history, but

denied the necessity, the possibility, and the reality of a supernaturalrevelation.Itdeniedthenecessityofsucharevelationinviewofthefactthathumanreasoncandiscover,inthegeneralrevelationofGod,allthataspecialrevelationmightconveytoman.Theonlyconceivableadvantageof a special revelation is that itmight facilitate the acquirement of thenecessary knowledge. Lessing, though not himself a Deist, agreed withthem in asserting the all-sufficiency of natural revelation. According tohim special revelation offers man nothing "worauf die menschlicheVernunft,sichsellbstueberlassen,nichtauchkommenwuerde;sondernsiegabundgibt ihmdiewichtigstendieserDingenur fruehrer."Deismalso considered a supernatural revelation as impossible, that is,metaphysically inconceivable and morally unworthy of God. Such arevelation would imply that the existing world is defective and,consequently,thattheCreator,whenHecalleditintobeing,waswanting,eitherinthenecessarywisdomtoplanabetterworld,orintherequisitepowertocreateasuperiorworld.Theoneisjustasinconceivableastheother, andboth involveanunworthy conceptionofGod.Finally, it alsoboldly denied the existence of any supernatural revelation, since itconsideredsucha revelationasabsolutelycontrary to the fact thatGodalwaysworks according to the established laws of nature. Theworld isunder the control of an iron-clad system of laws, and thereforenecessarily excludes the intrusion of supernatural elements. Prophecyandmiraclesdonotprovetheexistenceofarevelationtranscendingtheboundsof reason, since theyadmitof anatural explanation.TheDeist,then,ruledoutthesupernatural,andretainedonlythenaturalrevelationof God, and he was followed in that respect by the philosophy of theEnlightenment.EvenKantdidnottranscendthisview,butarguedjustasLessingdidbeforehim.Hisreligionwasareligionwithintheboundsofreason.

b. The modern Idealistic conception. While Deism placed God at adistance from theworld and allowed no point of contact, the idealisticphilosophy of the beginning of the previous century stressed theimmanence of God in the world, and thereby gave rise to a newconceptionofrevelation.Thatphilosophywasessentiallypantheisticandtherefore excluded revelation in the sense in which it was alwaysunderstood by the Church. The fundamental principle of Pantheism is

thatGodandtheworldareone.Godhasnoindependentexistenceapartfromtheworld;neitherdoes theworldexist indistinction fromGod.Adistinction is usually made between the monistic, infinite, and self-sufficient ground of all things, and the temporal, finite, and constantlychanging phenomena that necessarily flow from it. These phenomenalformsareonlymodificationsoftheunknownsomethingthatliesbackofthem, and that has been variously designated as Brahm (in Indianphilosophy),PureBeing(Greeks),Substance(Spinoza),orPureThought(Hegel).Theseareallpureabstractionswhich,asBavinckremarks,maymeaneverythingornothing.Opinionsdifferedastothewayinwhichtheworld of phenomena comes forth out of this hidden background. TheIndian philosophers spoke of emanation, the Greeks, of manifestation,Spinoza,ofmodification,andHegel,ofaprocessof idealisticevolution.Butthisprocess,ofwhateverkinditmaybe,doesnot,strictlyspeaking,revealtheAbsolute;thisremainsanunknownquantity.Moreover,onthisstandpointonecanatbestspeakofabecomingmanifest,andnotatallofaconscious,voluntary,andactiveself-communication.And, finally, thispantheistic view knows no object, to which knowledge could becommunicated. Subject and object are one. Moore correctly says that,accordingtoHegel,"Godisrevealer,recipient,andrevelationallinone."

ThroughSchleiermacherandhisfollowerstheone-sidedemphasisoftheIdealists on the immanence of God also became popular in theologicalcircles, andwas often stressed to thepoint ofPantheism.Thewhole ofnaturewasnotonly regardedas amanifestationof the immanentGod,but often identified withHim. The divinity ofman was emphasized inviewofthefact thatthemost importantrevelationofGodwasfoundintheinnerlifeofman,inwhich,accordingtoHegel,theInfinitecomestoself-consciousness.AndsinceChristwasregardedasthepurestflowerofthe human race, the highest revelation of Godwas also found inHim.primarily in His inner life, but secondarily also in His historicalappearance. Thus the continuity of God andman wasmade emphatic,andtheideaofthedistanceseparatingthetwowasminimizedandoftencompletely ignored.McGiffert, speakingof the influenceof thedoctrineofimmanenceontheideaofrevelation,says:"AsGodisimmanentinthelifeofmandivine revelation comes fromwithin,not fromwithout.Thereligiousman looks intohisownexperience for thedisclosureofdivine

truth, and if he also turns to the pages of a sacred book, it is simplybecause it is a record of the religious experiences of others who havefoundGodintheirownsoulsandhavelearnedfromHimthere."

ThisIdealismalsorulesoutthesupernaturalrevelationofGod.Itistruethat, while Deism denies the supernatural, Idealism in a formal sensedenies thenatural,since itregardsall thoughts, facts,andevents inthenaturalworldasthedirectproductsoftheimmanentGod.AllthatDeismcallednaturalisdenominatedsupernaturalbyIdealism.Initsestimationthesupernaturalis,inthelastanalysis,notdistinctfromthenatural,butfindsexpressioninthecommonlawsofnatureandintheordinarycourseof events. All the natural is supernatural, and all the supernatural isnatural. In viewof this fact it is nowonder that present day liberalismsometimesspeaksofa"naturalsupernaturalism"andofa"supernaturalnaturalism."Itmightseemthereforethat,inthisidealisticview,theywhocontend for a supernatural revelation receive evenmore than they areasking for; but the gain is merely apparent. It only means that allrevelation is regardedassupernatural inorigin, that is,ascoming fromGod.Hence thequestionremains,whether there isa revelationofGod,which transcends all that man can learn by his natural powers, arevelation,whichnotonly flows fromasupernatural source,but isalsomediated andbrought toman in a supernaturalway.And at this pointIdealism, in spite of all its pretended belief in the supernatural, joinsDeisminitsdenial.Overagainstit,wemustemphasizethefactthatthereis a revelation of God, which was mediated and brought to man in asupernaturalway.

There is another point that deserves particular attention here, namely,that concerning the content of the divine revelation. The Church hasalwaysregardedtherevelationofGodasacommunicationofknowledgetoman:knowledgeof thenatureandof thewillofGod.But inmodernliberaltheology,whichisdominatedbyIdealismwithitsdoctrineofthedivineimmanence,werepeatedlymeetwiththeassertionthatrevelationis not a communication of divine truth, but assumes the form ofexperienceorofahistoricalperson,namely,JesusChrist.SometimesitissaidthatGodrevealsHimselfinactsratherthaninwords.ThisisentirelyinlinewiththecommonviewthatChristianityisnotadoctrinebutalife.

G.B.FostersaysthattheChristianconceptofrevelationdiffersfromthat"of the orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics. The latter rests on theequivalenceofrevelatiospecialiswithSacredScriptures.Inconsequenceof this, revelation is conceived (a)ascommunicationofdoctrine; (b)asinternallyauthoritativeandstatutory;(c)asmiraculousinthesensethatmain stress is placed on the absence of natural mediations; (d) ashistoryless." According toGerald Birney Smith "revelation ismore andmore being considered as exceptional spiritual insight rather than as anon-humancommunicationoftruth."2Edwardsadmitsthatthecategoryofrevelationmaybeultimatelynecessary,but"itmustbearevelationofGod in terms of the whole life of man and not in terms of mereintellectual knowledge or ideas, conveyed to the mind of man fromabove."Modestydoesnotpermitthemodernliberalstopretendthattheyare in possession of the truth, and therefore they assume the humbleattitudeofbeingseekersaftertruth.Atthesametimetheyhaveenoughconfidenceinmantothinkthathecandiscoverthetruth,andhasevendiscoveredGod.Andeveniftheydostillbelieveindivinerevelation,theymustinsistthathumandiscoverygoeshandinhandwithit.

c. The conception of the Theology of Crisis. The Theology of Crisis,representedbysuchmenasKarlBarth,EmilBrunner,E.Thurneysen,F.Gogarten, andA.Bultmann, represents in no smallmeasure a reactionagainstthemodernidealisticviewofrevelation.Severalofitsinterpretershave already suggested that it might appropriately be called "TheTheologyoftheWordofGod."Thiswouldbequiteinharmonywiththetitle of Barth's Prolegomena, "Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes." In thistheologythe"infinitequalitativedifferencebetweentimeandeternity"isstressed,andwithitasitsnecessarycorollarythediscontinuitybetweenGod and man. By taking this position it at once cut the ground fromunder themodern subjective conception of revelation, inwhich humandiscoveryplayssogreatapart.Itrebukestheprideofthosewhoimaginethattheycanbuildatowerhighenoughtoreachheaven,andplacesgreatandrepeatedemphasisonthefactthatthereisnowayfrommantoGod,butonlyaway fromGodtoman.God isahiddenGod,andman inhisspiritual blindness cannever findHim. It is aGodwho findsman andtherebyputshiminacrisis.Revelation,accordingtothistheology,hasnoconcretehistoricalexistence,notevenintheBible,andthereforeitwould

notbecorrecttosay,ThisistheWordofGod.Itwouldinvolvebringingthe Word of God down to the level of the historical and relative, andputtingitinthepowerofmantomakeGodanobjectofstudy,while,asamatterof fact,God isneverobject, but always subject. In revelationalltheemphasisfallsonthefreeactofGod.ItisGodintheactofspeaking,and speakingnow to this and then to thatman, andbringing thewordhometothesoulinfaith.

TheTheologyofCrisisspeaksofarevelationgivenonceforall.Andifthequestion is raised,when this revelationwasgiven, theanswer is, in theincarnation, inwhichGodactually came toman toperformagreat all-decisivedeed inorder toconstituteafreshourhumanity.However, it isnotinthehistoricallifeofJesusthatthesupremerevelationofGodwasgiven,as themodern liberalsclaim,butonly in thatwhich isabsolutelynewinHim,thatinwhichtheeternalcomesverticallydownfromaboveand penetrates into the horizontal line of history. Camfield says in hisBarthianstudy:"Christmakestheentranceintohistoryofsomethingthatisnew.InthatwhichmakesHimChrist,therevelationofGod,heisnotcontinuouswithhistorybutdiscontinuous.InHim,historyisliftedoutofitstemporalsequentialsettingandset inthelightofthedivineeventofrevelation." Brunner speaks in a similar vein: "Jesus Christ meanseternityintime,theAbsolutewithinrelativity,thefulfilmentoftime,thebeginningofthatwhichisabovealltemporalchange,theaionmellon,thecomingofthewordofGodandsalvation."TherevelationofGodcametomantherefore inagreatcentral factrather than inacommunicationofknowledge.InitGodapproachesman,notwithateachingthatmustbebelieved, but with a challenge that must be met, with a behest or acommand thatmust be obeyed. There is no revelation, even in Christ,however, until there is faith. Faith is not, strictly speaking, to beunderstoodasaspiritualactivityofman,bywhichheacceptsthedivinerevelation,forthiswouldmakemansubjectandputhiminpossessionoftherevelation.Itisratherthenegationofmanassubject.ItisthecreativeworkofGod,andparticularlyoftheHolySpirit,bywhich,andbywhichalone, the revelation finally becomes an accomplished fact. Faith is amiracle, thedeedandgift ofGod; it is revelationon its subjective side.Camfield says: "In faithmanbecomes the subject of a great aggressionupon his life, a great approach of God, which disqualifies his

consciousness, his thought-world for purposes of revelation." It is truethatBarthsometimesspeaksoffaithastheresponseofmantothedivinerevelation,butthismustbeunderstoodinthelightofthepreceding.HesaysthatitistheWordofGodinChrist,therevelationtherefore,whichitselfcreatestheapprehensionofit.

BarthalsospeaksoftheWordofGodthatcametotheprophetsandtheapostlesastheoriginalrevelation;andthequestionnaturallyarises,howthisWordisconnectedwiththerevelationinChrist.InhisworkonGodinActionBarthrepresentsGodashavinggoneforthasawarriortomeetthehostsofsinfulmeninaterriblecontest,andthensays:"ThiseventisGod's revelation to man; and whoever fails to understand it in thismanner does not know what he is saying when he takes the word'revelation' on his lips."He points out that the great central revelationcameinJesusChrist,andthatthemenwhoborethebruntoftheattackwere themenof the first line, that is theprophetsand theapostles.TothemtherevelationofGodinChristcamefirstofall;andsincethereisnorevelationapartfromtheapprehensionofit,therevelationthatcametothemmaybecalledtheoriginalrevelation.

TheyinturnbearwitnesstotherevelationintheBible,sothattheBiblemaybecalledawitness to,ora tokenof, thedivinerevelation,andcanonlyinsofarbecalledtheWordofGod.Itisnotitselftherevelation,forthisalwayscomesasanactofGod.SaysBarth:"HolyScriptureassuchisnot therevelation.AndyetHolyScripture is therevelation, ifand insofarasJesusChristspeakstousthroughthewitnessofHisprophetsandapostles." And again: "The prophetic apostolic Word is the word, thewitness,theproclamationandthepreachingofJesusChrist.Thepromisegiven to the Church in this word is the promise of God's mercy—expressed in the person ofHimwho is trueGod and trueman—whichtakestoitselfuswho,becauseofourenmitytowardsGod,couldliterallynever have helped ourselves."4 The word of Scripture may and doesbecomeformantheWordofGod,therevelation,whenitcomestohimwiththecreativeforcethatengendersfaith.BarthspeaksoftheBibleasthe second,andof thepreachingof theWord, as the third, formof theWord of God. Church proclamation is the gospel of Jesus Christ,preachedwiththeexpectationthat itwillbecomeforsometheWordof

God. Itbecomes thisonly in thosecases inwhich it isbroughthometotheheartinfaith,anditisrecognizedasadivinerevelationthroughtheoperation of the Holy Spirit,—a testimony of the Holy Spirit in eachparticularcase.

The characteristic thing of the revelation of God is not that itcommunicatestruthtoman,butthatitcomestohimasachallenge,asacommand,asabehest,whichcallsforobedienceonthepartofman,anobediencewhichisagainwroughtinfaith.Itisfactualratherthanverbal,thatis,itcomestomanasanactratherthanasawordor,tospeakinthewords of Forsyth,whohas been called "aBarthianbeforeBarth," as "aword in the formof an act."Moreover, it is notmerely something thattookplaceinthepast,butisalsosomethingactualandcontemporaneous.ThisiscorrectlystressedbyWalterLowrieinthefollowingwords:"Whenwe say that revelation is not a question of fact but of actuality, wecompletely alter the statement of the problem as it was conceived byProtestantaswellasbyCatholicorthodoxy.ThequestionnowisnotfirstofallwhetherGodspoke—sometimeinthepast,moreor lessremote—andbywhatcriterionwecandeterminethattherecordofthisspeech,awordrecordedinHolyScripture,wasreallyaWordofGod.InsteaditisaquestionwhetherGodactually speaks,now,at thismomentand tome.AndwhetherIhear.ForifIhearawordaddressedtomeinGod'svoice,thequestioncannotarisehowIamtorecognizeitasGod'sWord.AndifIdonotthushearit,Icanhavenointerestinaskingsuchaquestion.ThedoctrineoftheReformersthattheWordofGodauthenticatesitself,orisauthenticated to the individual by the testimony of the Holy Ghost, ismuch more evidently applicable here than in the connection in whichtheyused it.Regardedasactual theWordofGod iseitherheardas theWordofGod,oritisnotheardatall."

5. THE PROPER CONCEPTIONOF THENATUREOF REVELATION.Theexistingvarietyofopinionsrespectingtheideaofrevelationnaturallygives rise to the question, howwe can arrive at a proper conception ofrevelation. Is it possible to determine precisely what constitutes agenuinedivine revelation, and to define it in away thatwillmeetwithgeneralapproval?Andifitispossibletoarriveataproperconceptionofrevelation,whatmethodshouldbepursuedinquestofit?

a.Thehistoricalmethod.Manyareoftheopinionthattheanswertothequestionunderconsiderationshouldbesoughtbythestudyofthehistoryof religions. The investigator should approach the study of the subjectwithanunbiasedmind,placehimself,asitwere,outsideofallreligionsand their supposed revelations, take careful notice of the claimswhichtheypresent,and then finallydrawhisconclusions.Theyregard thisasthe only scientific way in which the essential elements of a divinerevelation can be discovered, and inwhich a unitary view of revelationcan be obtained. But this method is bound to disappoint for variousreasons.(1)Itispureself-deceptiontothinkthatanyonecanevertakehisstandoutsideofhistory,studythevariousbeliefsrespectingrevelationinthedifferentreligionsoftheworldwithoutanypresuppositions,andthusreachapurelyobjectiveconclusionastoitsnature.Weareallhistoricallyconditioned, and cannot possibly take our stand outside of history.Moreover, we cannot set ourselves aside in our investigations, nor thereligious content of our consciousness, and usually reach a conclusionwhichwas in principle determined beforehand. (2) On the suppositionthat one does succeed in approaching one's subject in an entirelyunbiasedmanner,without any presuppositions on the subject, one, forthatveryreason,entersuponthestudyofthesubjectwithoutastandardbywhichtodeterminethegenuinenessofarevelation.Approachingthematter in such a fashion, it is simply impossible to reach a soundjudgment.Andifontheotherhandonecomestothestudywitharatherdefinitestandardinmind,oneisnomoreunbiasedandisguiltyofpetitioprincipii, a begging of the question. (3)No science, however, objective,willeverbeabletoremovethedifferencesofopinionrespectingtheideaof revelation, and to unify all nations and individuals in the deepestconvictionsoftheheart.Onlyunityofreligioncanleadtosuchaspiritualunity.Itcannotbesaidthatthestudyofthehistoryofreligionshasledtoverygratifyingresultsinthisfield.

b. The theological method. In the study and evaluation of the idea ofrevelationwemusthaveastandardof judgment.And theall-importantquestionis,Whenceshallwederiveit?Certainlynotfromphilosophy,forthis has no right to determine a priorily what constitutes genuinerevelation. The Christian can derive the real concept of revelation onlyfromwhatherecognizesasthespecialrevelationofGod.Thismeansthat

wemust turn towhatwe consider to be the divine revelation itself, inorder to learnwhat revelation really is. Itwill of coursebe said that infollowingthismethodofprocedurewearealsoreasoninginacircle,andwefranklyadmitthis;butitisthesamekindofcircleasthatinwhichthescientistmoveswhenheturnstotheearth,inordertolearnwhatreallyconstitutes it. Edwards feels constrained to resort to the same kind ofreasoning,whenheseekstodeterminethenormofreligioninahistoricalway.Sayshe:"Inpursuingthisinquiryitwillbedifficultforustoavoidreasoning in a circle—i. e., to avoid using our norm to guide us in ourdescriptionofthecommonelementaswellasusingthecommonelementtoguideus inoursearch for thenorm.…Itmaybedoubtedwhether inour actual reasoning we ever quite avoid the 'circles,' except when ourreasoningispurelyformal,sterile,andpedantic."Thesituationisthis:Ifnorevelationhasevertakenplace,alleffortstoreflectonthenatureofitwillbeinvain;butifthereisarevelation,thenthisitselfmustshedlighton itsessentialnatureandthussupplyuswithastandardof judgment.Themanyso-calledrevelationsconstitutenoreasonwhytheChristianinhisscientificstudyshouldsetasidehisconvictionsrespectingthetruthofGod's special revelation in Scripture. If it did, then the contention ofmany in our day that the true, the good, and the beautiful are relativeconcepts, would also have to constrain us to abandon our convictionsconcerning the lawsof logic,ofmorals, andofaesthetics. It isperfectlytrue thatpeopleof other religionsmayargue in the sameway,but thismakesnoessentialdifference.Inthelastanalysiseachonestandethandfalleth to his own Lord. It is true that this method does not lead to aunitaryviewofrevelation,butneitherdoesanyothermethod.And it isquite possible that we can do more to heal the existing breach byadhering to our Christian faith also in our scientific study than in anyotherway.Bavincksaysthatasciencewhichseeksrefugeinindifferencedoesnotknowwhattodowithreligionandrevelation,andfinallyclassesbothassuperstition.

6.DISTINCTIONSAPPLIEDTOTHEIDEAOFREVELATION.Incourseof time twodifferentdistinctionswereapplied to the ideaof revelation.Theearliestoftheseisthatbetweennaturalandsupernaturalrevelation.Lateronmanyabandonedthisinfavorofthedistinctionbetweengeneraland special revelation. Each one of these modes of distinguishing

between different kinds of revelation has its own peculiar fitness anddescribes a real differencebetween the two in their essential nature, intheircomprehensiveness,andinthepurposewhichtheyserve.

a. Natural and supernatural revelation. Scripture does not make thedistinctionbetweennatural and supernatural revelation, though it doesafford a basis for it. Neander mistakenly regarded phaneroun andapokaluptein as being respectively designations of natural andsupernaturalrevelation.Inacertainsenseitmaybesaidthat,accordingto Scripture, all revelation of God is supernatural, since it comes fromGodandrevealsGod,whopossessesalifedistinctfromthatofnature.Asa rule the Bible does not trace the phenomena of nature to secondarycauses,buttotheirprimarycause,whichisGodorthewillofGod.Thedistinction was made rather early in history, however, but was notintendedasadesignationofatwo-foldoriginofrevelation.Itwasclearlyunderstood that all revelation ofGod is supernatural in origin, since itcomes fromGod. It servedrather todiscriminatebetweentwodifferentmodes of revelation. Natural revelation is communicated through themedia of natural phenomena, while supernatural revelation implies adivineinterventioninthenaturalcourseofevents;itissupernaturalnotonly in origin, but also in mode. The distinction between natural andsupernaturalrevelationbecameveryprominentintheMiddleAges,andoccupiedanimportantplaceinthediscussionsoftheScholastics.Itwasespecially theproblemof therelationbetweenthetwothatengagedtheattentionofseveralofthemostprominentSchoolmen.Intheirmindsthequestion was really that of the relationship between reason andrevelation.Someascribedtheprimacytorevelationandexpressedtheirconviction in the words "Credo ut intelligam," while others regardedreasonasprimary.Towardtheendofthescholasticperiod,however,thedistinctiontooktheformofanantithesis,particularlyintheteachingsofThomas Aquinas. He considered it necessary to keep the truth ofphilosophy and the truth of revelation each in its own place, and tohandle the problems of philosophy as a philosopher, and those oftheology,asatheologian.Ofthetwomethodstobefollowedtheoneleadstoscientificknowledge,andtheothertofaith,thatis,toanacceptanceofthe truth, which is not based on intellectual insight. He considered itpossibletoconstructascienceonthebasisofreason,butnotonthebasis

of faith, though he recognized the possibility of proving some of thepropositions of faith or revelation bymeans of rational argumentation.Revelation, itwas thought, added to the knowledge obtainedby reasonspecificallytheknowledgeofthemysteria(Trinity,incarnation,etc.),andthese,as restingexclusivelyonauthority, remainamatterof faith.Thisview led to a dualism, involving an over-valuation of natural, and anunder-valuationofsupernatural,revelation.

TheReformersretainedthedistinction,butsoughttogetawayfromthedualismofThomasAquinas.TheydeniedthepossibilityofarrivingatastrictlyscientificknowledgeofGodfromnaturalrevelation,andheldthatthrough theentranceof sin into theworldGod'snatural revelationwascorruptedandobscured,andman'sunderstandingwassodarkenedthathe was unable to read and interpret correctly God's handwriting innature.Asaresultof the fall twothingsbecamenecessary:(1) that inasupernaturalrevelationGodshouldre-publish,correct,andinterpretthetruths which man could originally learn from nature; and (2) that Heshouldso illuminemanby theoperationof theHolySpiritas toenablehim to see God once more in the works of His hands. Consequentlynatural theology,which had been emphasized by Scholasticism, lost itsindependence on the basis of reason, and was incorporated in theChristian system of doctrine. This does not mean, however, that theChurches of the Reformation attached little or no value to naturalrevelation.BoththeLutheransandtheReformedcontinuedtomaintainitsgreatsignificance.SeveralReformedscholarsdefended itagainst theSocinians,whoregardedallknowledgeofGodasthefruitofanexternalcommunication. It may be said that even the Churches of theReformation did not entirely escape the dualistic representation of theScholastics. Reformed scholars have sometimes given the impression—anddo thisoccasionally evennow—that there is still a sphere,howeversmall, where human reason reigns supreme and does not need theguidanceof faith.Underthe influenceof theCartesianphilosophy,withits emphasis on reason as the source of all knowledge, some of thempublishedseparateworksonnaturaltheology.IntheeighteenthcenturyEnglish Deism and German Rationalism gave such prominence to thetheologia naturalis that the theologia revelata was made to appear asaltogethersuperfluous.ThisculminatedinthephilosophyofWolff,who

considered it possible to prove everything by a rationalistic procedureandadeductivemethod,andtopresentitinaclearway.Kantoverthrewthis position entirely by pointing out that the supersensual andsupernatural lies beyond the reach of human reason. Moreover, thehistoryofthestudyofreligionsprovedthatnoneofthesearebasedonapurelynaturalrevelation.

b. General and special revelation. Alongside of the distinction betweennatural and supernatural revelation, another distinction arose, namely,thatbetweengeneralandspecialrevelation.The formerwasconsideredfaulty, since it was found that even heathen religions are based, notexclusively on the revelation of God in nature, but in part also onelementsofasupernaturalrevelation,handeddownbytraditionandtoagreat extent perverted. The distinction between general and specialrevelationrunstoacertaindegreeparalleltotheprecedingone,thoughitis not entirely the same. It contemplates the extent andpurpose of therevelation rather than itsoriginandmode.There is,however, a certainoverlapping. General revelation rests on the basis of creation, isaddressedtoall intelligentcreaturesassuch,andisthereforeaccessibletoallmen;thoughastheresultofsintheyarenomoreabletoreadandinterpretitaright.Specialrevelationontheotherhandrestsonthebasisof re-creation, is addressed to men as sinners with a view to theirredemption, andcanbeproperlyunderstoodonlyby the spiritualman.General revelation is not exclusively natural, but also containssupernatural elements; and special revelation also comprises elementswhich assume a perfectly natural character. The revelation of thecovenantofworksbeforethefallwassupernaturalandatthesametimegeneral.AndwhenthesphereofspecialrevelationwaslimitedtoIsrael,God repeatedly gave supernatural revelations to non-Israelites, andtherefore outside of the sphere of special revelation, Gen. 20;40, 41;Judg.7:13;Dan.2;5:5.Andontheotherhand,whenGodrevealsHimselfin the history of Israel, in the providential vicissitudes of that ancientpeople,andintheritualworshipintabernacleandtemple,HeisclothingHis special revelation in natural forms. Of course, in so far as theseelementsarenowembodiedintheinspiredWordofGod,theycometousasapartofGod'ssupernaturalrevelation.Inviewoftheprecedingitcanhardlybesaidthatnaturalandgeneralrevelationontheonehand,and

supernaturalandspecialrevelationontheotherhand,areinallrespectsidentical.RomanCatholics still givepreference to theolderdistinction,whileReformedtheologianspreferthelaterone,thoughtheydonotuseitexclusively.

B.GeneralRevelation

Generalrevelation,asweknowit,doesnotcometomaninaverbalform.It is a revelation in res rather than in verba. It consists in those activemanifestationsto theperceptionandconsciousnessofmanwhichcometohimintheconstitutionofthehumanmind,inthewholeframeworkofnature, and in the course of God's providential government. Divinethoughts are embodied in the phenomena of nature, in the humanconsciousness,and in the factsofexperienceorhistory.Aswaspointedoutinthepreceding,thisgeneralrevelationhassometimesalsoincludedelements of supernatural revelation. The existence of such a generalrevelationwastaughtinReformedtheologyfromtheverybeginning.InCalvin's Instituteswe read: "That there exists in the humanmind, andindeed by natural instinct, some sense of Deity, we hold to be beyonddispute, since God himself, to prevent any man from pretendingignorance, has endued all men with some idea of his Godhead, thememoryofwhichHeconstantlyrenewsandoccasionallyenlarges,thatalltoamanbeingawarethatthereisaGod,andthatHeistheirMaker,maybe condemnedby theirownconsciencewhen theyneitherworshiphimnorconsecratetheirlivestohisservice."InafollowingchapterhepointsoutthatGodhasnotonlybeenpleased"todepositinourmindstheseedof religion of which we have already spoken, but so to manifest hisperfectionsinthewholestructureoftheuniverse,anddailyplacehimselfin our view, that we cannot open our eyes without being compelled tobehold him."2 Still farther on he speaks of God's revelation in theprovidentialguidanceoftheworld.Atthesametimehestressesthefactthat man does not derive great benefit from this revelation. Says he:"Bright,however,asisthemanifestationwhichGodgivesbothofhimselfand his immortal kingdom in the mirror of his works, so great is ourstupidity,sodullareweinregardtothesebrightmanifestations,thatwederivenobenefitfromthem."

InanswertothequestionbywhatmeansGodisknowntous,theBelgic

Confession says: "We know Him by two means: First by the creation,preservation,andgovernmentoftheuniverse;whichisbeforeoureyesasa most elegant book, wherein all creatures, great and small, are as somanycharactersleadingustoseeclearlytheinvisiblethingsofGod,evenHiseverlastingpoweranddivinity,astheapostlePaulsays(Rom.1:20).Allwhich thingsare sufficient toconvincemenand leave themwithoutexcuse."ThesewordscontainaclearrecognitionofthegeneralrevelationofGod,asitistaughtinScripture,andastatementofitssignificanceforman.AfurtherrecognitionofthisgeneralrevelationisfoundinArt.XIV,whichspeaksofthecreationofmanintheimageofGod,ofhisfallinsin,whereby he lost all his excellent gifts, and of the fact that he "retainedonly small remains thereof,which,however,are sufficient to leavemanwithoutexcuse."

Liberal theologygreatlyover-emphasized thegeneral revelationofGod.IndistinctionfromDeism,itfoundthisrevelationprimarilyinmanandinhis religious experiences, and supremely in themanChrist Jesus, inwhom the divine element that is in every man, reached its highestmanifestation. The Bible, and particularly the New Testament, wasregarded merely as a record of the religious experiences of men whoenjoyedspecialprivilegesintheirclosecontactwithChrist,thesourceoftheir deep God-consciousness. In this way it was robbed of itssupernaturalcharacterandmadetodifferonlyindegreefromotherpartsof God's general revelation. The self-disclosure of God in humanexperiencebecametheall-sufficientrevelationofGoduntosalvation.TheimmanentGodispresentineverymanandsavesallthosewhoheedHispromptings.

Over against this view the Theology of Crisis once more places allemphasis on special revelation. In fact, Barth goes to the extreme ofdenyingallnaturalrevelation,whetheritbeinnatureroundaboutus,inthehumanconsciousness,orinthecourseofhistoricalevents.Thatis,hedeniesthatthere is intheworkofcreationarevelation, fromwhichthenaturalman can learn to knowGod, and on the basis ofwhich he canconstruct a theology, and rejects absolutely the analogia entis of theRomanCatholicChurch.HeiswillingtoadmitthattheinvisiblethingsofGodarevisibleintheworld,butonlytoseeingeyes,andthenaturalman

isblind.Therewouldbea revelation forhim in these things,only ifhecould see them. But the subjective condition of revelation is utterlywantinginhiscase.Thereisnopointofcontactinhim,sincetheimageofGod was utterly destroyed by sin. Right here an important differenceemergesbetweenBarthandBrunner.The latterdoesbelieve innaturalrevelation,anddeniesthattheimageofGodwasutterlydefaced,sothatnot a trace of it is left. He holds that the image of God was utterlydestroyed materially but not formally, and that there is still anAnknuepfungspunkt in the natural man to which revelation can linkitself.InthisrespecthecertainlycomesclosertothehistoricalpositionofReformed theology. Barth takes issue with him on this point in hispamphletentitled"Nein."

1.THEVALUEANDSIGNIFICANCEOFGENERALREVELATION.ThefactthatafterthefallthegeneralrevelationofGodwassupersededbyaspecialrevelation,isapttoleadtoanunder-valuationoftheformer.Butwemay not neglect the data of Scripture on this point. The Gospel ofJohnspeaksofalightthatlightetheveryman(John1:9).Paulsaysthatthe invisible things of God "since the creation of the world are clearlyseen, being perceived through the things that are made, even Hiseverlasting power and divinity; that theymay be without excuse," andspeaksoftheGentilesas"knowingGod"(Rom.1:20,21).Inthefollowingchapter he says that "they show the work of the law written in theirhearts, their consciences bearing witness therewith, and their thoughtsonewithanotheraccusingorelseexcusingthem(Rom.2:15).Goddidnotleave Himself without a witness among them (Acts 14:17). There istherefore a general revelation ofGod, forwhich the naturalman has acertainsusceptibility, for it rendershimwithoutexcuse.Andwhile theywho enjoy only this general revelation never live up to the light, andmanydeliberatelygocontrarytoit,therearealsosomewhodobynaturethe things of the law. In spite of the fact that God has now revealedHimself in a superiormanner,His original revelation remains of greatimportance.

a.InconnectionwiththeGentileworld.Thoughthereisnopurelynaturalreligion,yetthegeneralrevelationofGodinnatureandhistoryfurnishesthefirmandlastingfoundationfortheGentilereligions.Itisinvirtueof

this general revelation that even the Gentiles feel themselves to be theoffspringofGod,Acts17:28,thattheyseekGod,ifhaplytheymightfindHim,Acts17:27,thattheyseeGod'severlastingpoweranddivinity,Rom.1:19,20,andthattheydobynaturethethingsofthelaw,Rom.2:14.Inspite of that fact, however, Scripture does not regard their religions astruereligions,differing fromtheChristianreligiononly indegree,assomanystudentsofreligiondoatthepresenttime,butascribesthemtoawilfulperversionofthetruth.Itpassesaseverejudgmentonthem,anddescribestheconditionoftheGentileworld,devoidofthelightofGod'sspecial revelation, as one of darkness, Isa. 9:1 f.; 60:2;Luke 1:79;Eph.4:18,ignorance,Acts17:30;Rom.1:18f.;1Pet.1:14,folly,1Cor.1:18ff.;2:6; 3:19 f.; and of sin and unrighteousness, Rom. 1:24 f.; 3:9 f. Theheathengodsarenogods,butidolswhichhavenorealexistenceandarereallyliesandvanity,Isa.41:29;42:17;Jer.2:28;Acts14:15;19:26;Gal.4:8; 1 Cor. 8:4; and the heathen religions even give evidence of theoperationofdemoniacalpower,Deut.32:17;1Cor.10:20f.;Rev.9:20.

But though Scripture passes a severe judgment on the religions of theGentiles,andrepresentsthemasfalsereligionsoveragainstChristianityastheonlytruereligion,italsorecognizestrueelementsinthem.ThereisalsoamongtheheathenarevelationofGod,anilluminationoftheLogos,andanoperationoftheHolySpirit,Gen.6:3;Job.32:8;John1:9;Rom.1:18 ff.; 2:14, 15; 14:16, 17; 15:22–30. Nevertheless, it beholds in theGentile world only a caricature of the living original which is seen inChristianity.Whatismereappearanceintheformer,isrealinthelatter,andwhatissoughtintheformerisfoundinthelatter.

Philosophyhasnot been satisfiedwith the explanationwhichScripturegivesofthereligionsoftheGentiles,andsubstitutedforitanotherunderthe influence of the doctrine of evolution. According to this, mankindgraduallydevelopedoutofanirreligiouscondition,throughthestagesoffetishism, animism, nature-worship, and henotheism, into ethicalmonotheism.But in recent years some renowned scientists, engaged inarchaeological researches, such as Langdon, Marston, and Schmidt,declared themselves in favor of anoriginalMonotheismas theprimaryformofreligion.

b.InconnectionwiththeChristianreligion.Generalrevelationalsohasa

certain value for the Christian religion. Not that it provides us with areligionaturalis,which isquite sufficient in itselfand therefore rendersallsupernaturalrevelationsuperfluous.Suchanaturalreligiondoesnotexist,and is in fact impossible.Neithercan itbesaid that theChristianderiveshisknowledgeofGodfirstofallfromgeneralrevelation,andthensupplementsthiswiththeknowledgeofChrist.Hederiveshistheologicalknowledge of God from special revelation only; this is his principiumunicum.Yetthereisacloserelationbetweenthetwo.Specialrevelationhasincorporated,corrected,andinterpretedgeneralrevelation.AndnowtheChristian theologian takeshis standon theWordofGod, and fromthat point of vantage also contemplates nature and history. He readsGod's general revelationwith the eye of faith and in the light of God'sWord,andfor thatveryreason isable toseeGod'shand innature,andHisfootstepsinhistory.HeseesGodineverythingroundabouthim,andis thereby led to a proper appreciation of theworld.Moreover, generalrevelationoffers theChristianabasis,onwhichhecanmeetandarguewithunbelievers.ThelightoftheLogosthatlightetheverymanisalsoabond thatunitesallmen.Thewholecreation testifieswithmanyvoicesthatman iscreated in the imageofGod,and thereforecannot findrestexceptinGod.Finally,itisalsoduetoGod'sgeneralrevelationthatHisspecialrevelationisnot,asitwere,suspendedintheair,buttouchesthelife of the world at every point. It maintains the connection betweennatureandgrace,between theworldand thekingdomofGod,betweenthenaturalandthemoralorder,betweencreationandre-creation.

2.THEINSUFFICIENCYOFGENERALREVELATION.Pelagianstaughtthesufficiencyofgeneralrevelationandof thereligionaturalis foundedonit.Theyspokeofthreedifferentwaysofsalvation,theverynamesofwhichpointtoautosoterism,thedoctrinethatmansaveshimself.Thesethreewayswerecalled:(a)thelexnaturae,(b)thelexMosis,and(c)thelexChristi.AtthetimeoftheReformationboththeRomanCatholicsandthe Protestants regarded general revelation as insufficient. But in theeighteenth centuryDeists andRationalists again followed thePelagiansintheirover-estimationofgeneralrevelation.AndundertheinfluenceofSchleiermacherandoftheidealisticphilosophyofthenineteenthcentury,with its one-sided emphasis on the immanence ofGod,many began toregard the revelationofGod inmanasquite sufficient for the spiritual

needsofman,andthiswastantamounttoanadmissionofthesufficiencyofgeneralrevelation.Overagainstthismoderntendencyitisnecessarytostress its insufficiency.Thereareespecially three reasonswhy it cannotbeconsideredadequate.

a. It does not acquaintmanwith the onlyway of salvation. By generalrevelationwe receive some knowledge ofGod, ofHis power, goodness,andwisdom,butwedonotlearntoknowChrist,thehighestrevelationofGod,inHisredemptiveworkandinHistransformingpower.AndyetanexperimentalknowledgeofHimistheonlywayofsalvation,Matt.11:27;John14:6;17:3;Acts4:2.Sincegeneralrevelationknowsnothingaboutgrace and forgiveness, it is entirely insufficient for sinners. Moreover,whileitteachescertaintruths,itchangesnothinginthesphereofbeing.Andyetitisabsolutelynecessarythatthesinnershouldbechanged,thatanewelementshouldbeintroducedintohistory,andthatanewprocessshouldbesetinmotion,ifthedivinepurposeistoberealizedinthelifeofmankind.

b. It does not convey toman any absolutely reliable knowledge ofGodandspiritual things.TheknowledgeofGodandof spiritualandeternalthingsderivedfromgeneralrevelationisaltogethertoouncertaintoformatrustworthybasis,onwhichtobuildforeternity;andmancannotaffordtopinhishopesforthefutureonuncertainties.Thehistoryofphilosophyclearly shows that general revelation isno safe and certain guide.Eventhebestofphilosophersdidnotescape thepowerof error.And thoughsomerosetoaheightofknowledgethatcompelsadmiration,theyprovedquiteinadequatetopresentthatknowledgeinsuchaformthatitbecamethecommonpropertyofthemasses.Asaruleitwasofsuchanaturethatonlythelimitednumberofintellectualscouldreallyshareit.PaultellsusthattheworldthroughitswisdomknewnotGod.

c. It does not furnish an adequate basis for religion. The history ofreligionsprovesthatnotasinglenationortribehasbeensatisfiedwithapurely natural religion. Through the devastating influence of sin God'srevelationinnaturewasobscuredandcorrupted,andmanwasdeprivedof the ability to read it aright. This noetic effect of sin remains, andgeneralrevelationitselfmakesnoprovisionforitsremoval,butleavesthespiritualconditionofmanasitis.Thereforeitcannotserveasabasisfor

true religion. The so called natural religion of the Deists and theVernunftreligionofKantarepureabstractions,whichneverhadanyrealexistence. It has become increasingly evident that such a religion doesnot,andcannotexist.Itisgenerallyadmittedatpresentthatallreligionsarepositiveandappeal toagreateror lessdegreetoasupposedorrealpositiverevelation.

C.SpecialRevelation

1.THESCRIPTURALIDEAOFREVELATION.Alongsideofthegeneralrevelation in nature and history,we have a special revelation,which isnow embodied in Scripture. The Bible is the book of the revelatiospecialis, and is in the last analysis the only principium cognoscendiexternumoftheology.It is thereforetothissourcethatwealsoturnforourknowledgeofspecialrevelation.SeveralwordsareusedinScriptureto express the idea of revelation, such as certain forms of the Hebrewwords galah, ra'ah, and yada', and the Greek words epiphanein(epiphaneia), emphanizein, gnorizein, deloun, deiknunai, lalein, andespecially phaneroun and apokaluptein. These words do not denote apassive becoming manifest, but designate a free, conscious, anddeliberate act ofGod, bywhichHemakesHimself andHiswill knownunto man. Barth stresses the fact that God is absolutely free andsovereigninrevealingHimselftoman.Scholtenhadthemistakennotionthat apokaluptein refers to subjective internal illumination, andphaneroun, to objectivemanifestation or revelation. The former is alsousedtodenoteobjectiverevelation,Luke17:30;Rom.1:7–18;8:18;Eph.3:5; 2 Thess. 2:3, 6, 8, etc. Neander was equally mistaken, when heregarded phaneroun as a designation of God's general revelation innature,andapokalupteinasadenominationof the special revelationofgrace. The former is also used of special revelation, John 17:6; Rom.16:26;Col. 1:26; 1 Tim. 3:16; 2Tim. 1:10, etc., and the latter serves, atleastinonepassage,todenotegeneralrevelation,Rom.1:18.

Itisdifficult,ifnotimpossible,tomakeadistinctionbetweenthetwothatwillholdinallcases.Etymologically,apokalupteinreferstotheremovalof a covering by which an object was hidden, and phaneroun, to themanifestationorpublicationofthematterthatwashiddenorunknown.Apokalupsis removes the instrumental cause of concealment, and

phanerosismakes thematter itselfmanifest. This also accounts for thefactthatphanerosisisalwaysusedofobjective,andapokalupsisofbothsubjective and objective, revelation; and that phanerosis is repeatedlyusedtodenoteeithergeneralorspecialrevelation,whileapokalupsis is,withasingleexception,alwaysusedofspecialrevelation.Thereisalsoacharacteristic difference between these two words and the wordsgnorizeinanddeloun.Theformerstressthefactthatmattersarebroughtto light, so that they fall under our observation; and the latter indicatethat these matters, by virtue of that revelation, now also become theobjectofourconsciousthought.

2.THEMEANSOFSPECIALREVELATION.TheChristianreligionisnotonly like the heathen religions in its appeal to revelation; even in themeansofrevelationacertainsimilaritycanbeseen.Ingeneralthesecanbereducedtothreeforms.

a.Theophanies.Gentilereligionsarefrequentlyassociatedwithtraditionsrespecting appearances of the gods. The gods are not considered to belike man and to be living with him on a footing of equality, but arenevertheless represented as coming toman occasionally and bestowingrichblessingsuponhim.InthisrespectthesereligionsaresomewhatliketheChristianreligion,whichalsohas,notonlyaGodafaroff,butalsoaGodathand.ScriptureteachesusthatGoddweltamongthecherubiminthedaysofold,Ps.80:1;99:1,etc.Hispresencewasseenincloudsoffireandsmoke,Gen.15:17;Ex.3:2;19:9,16f.;33:9;Ps.78:14;99:7,instormywinds, Job 38:1; 40:6; Ps. 18:10–16, and in the gentle zephyr, 1 Kings19:12. These appearances were tokens of God's presence, in which HerevealedsomethingofHisglory.AmongtheOldTestamentappearancesthatof "theAngelof theLord"occupiesa specialplace.ThisAngelwasnot a mere symbol, nor a created angel, but a personal revelation, anappearance of God among men. On the one hand He is distinguishedfromGod,Ex.23:20–23; Isa.63:8,9,buton theotherhandHe isalsoidentifiedwithHim,Gen.16:13;31:11,13;32:28,andotherpassages.Theprevailing opinion is thatHe was the second Person of the Trinity, anopinion that finds support in Mal. 3:1. Theophany reached its highestpointintheincarnationoftheSonofGod,inJesusChrist,inwhomthefulnessoftheGodheaddweltbodily,Col.1:19;2:9.ThroughHimandthe

SpiritwhichHesent,God'sdwellingamongmenisnowatruespiritualreality.TheChurchisthetempleoftheHolySpirit,1Cor.3:16;6:19;Eph.2:21. But an even fuller revelation of this will follow, when the newJerusalemdescendsoutofheavenfromGodandthetabernacleofGodispitchedamongmen,Rev.21:2,3.

b.Communications.Inallreligionswemeetwiththeideathatthegodsreveal their thoughts andwill in someway.Theusual representation isthat they do this by means of natural phenomena, such as theconstellationof the stars, the flight of birds, the intestines of sacrificialanimals, and soon.But alongsideof this there is another, according towhich they do it through the mediation of men in the capacity ofsoothsayers,visionaries,interpretersofdreams,diviners,consulterswithfamiliar spirits andothers claiming special powers. In aparallel line ofthoughtScriptureteachesusthatGodrevealedHisthoughtsandHiswillinvariousways.SometimesHespokewithanaudiblevoiceandinhumanlanguage,Gen.2:16;3:8–19;4:6–15;6:13;9:1,8, 12;32:26;Ex. 19:9 f.;Deut.5:4,5;1Sam.3:4.InothercasesHeadaptedHimselftotheuseofformsthatwererathercommonamongthenations,asthelotandUrimand Thummim. The dream was a very common means of revelation,Num.12:6;Deut.13:1–6;1Sam.28:6;Joel2:28,andwasusedrepeatedlyinrevelationstonon-Israelites,Gen.20:3–6;31:24;40:5;41:1–7;Judg.7:13; Dan. 2; 4:4 ff; Matt. 2:12. A closely related but higher form ofrevelationwasthevision.ItwasinthisformthattheLordoftenrevealedHimselftotheprophets.Asaruletheydidnotreceivethesevisionswhiletheywereinastateofecstasy,inwhichtheirownmentallifewasheldinabeyance,butinastateinwhichtheirintelligencewasfullyalert.Insomecases the visions seem to have been objective, but in others they wereclearlysubjective, thoughnot theproductsof theirownminds,butofasupernatural factor. In distinction from the true prophets, the falseprophets brought messages out of their own hearts. The following aresomeof thepassages that speakof this formof revelation, Isa. 1:1;2:1;6:1;Jer.1:11;Ezek.8:2;Dan.7:2,7;8:1,2;Amos7:1;8:1;9:1;Zech.1:8,18; 2:1; 3:1. Most generally, however, God revealed Himself to theprophetsbysomeinnercommunicationofthetruth,ofwhichthemethodis not designated. After the prophets received their revelations of God,theyinturncommunicatedthemtothepeople,andhabituallydesignate

theirmessagetothepeopleasdebharYahweh,theWordofGod.IntheNewTestamentChristappearsas the true, thehighest,and, ina sense,the only prophet. As the Logos He is the perfect revelation of God,Himselfthesourceofallprophecy,andastheMediatorHereceivesthefulnessoftheSpiritinpreparationforHispropheticwork,John3:34.Hecommunicated the Spirit to His disciples, not only as the Spirit ofregeneration and sanctification, but also as the Spirit of revelation andillumination, Mark 13:11; Luke 12:12; John 14:17; 15:26; 16:13; 20:22;Acts6:10;8:29.

c. Miracles. Finally, we also find in all religions a belief in the specialintervention of the gods in times of need. The practice of magic iswidespread,inwhichmenseektomakethedivinepowersubservienttothem by the use of mysterious means, such as sacred words, magicformulas, amulets, and so on. Little understood powers of the humansoulwereoftenappliedto theperformanceofso-calledmiracles.At thepresent day we often see the operation of these occult powers inspiritualism, theosophy, telepathy, and hypnotism. Scripture clearlytestifies to the fact that God also revealed Himself in miracles. ThatmiraclesarealsoregardedinScriptureasmeansofrevelation,isevidentfromthe followingpassages:Deut.4:32–35;Ps. 106:8;John2:11;5:36;10:37, 38; Acts 4:10.Word-and fact-revelation go hand in hand in theBible, the former explaining the latter, and the latter giving concreteembodimenttotheformer.ItisespeciallyfromthispointofviewthatthemiraclesofScriptureshouldbestudied.Theyaredesignatedbyvariousnames. Sometimes they are called niphla'oth, mophthim, Gr. terata,nameswhich point to the unusual in themiracle, that which fillsmenwith amazement. Again, they are called gebhuroth, ma'asim, Gr.dunameis,toindicatethattheyarerevelationsofaspecialpowerofGod.Finally, they are also designated as'othoth, Gr. semeia, since they aresigns of a special presence ofGod and often symbolize spiritual truths.Themiraclesare founded in thecreationandpreservationofall things,which is a perpetual miracle of God. At the same time they are madesubservient to theworkof redemption.Theyserverepeatedly topunishthewicked and to help or deliver the people of God. They confirm thewordsofprophecyandpointtotheneworderthatisbeingestablishedbyGod. Themiracles of Scripture culminated in the incarnation,which is

thegreatestandmostcentralmiracleofall.ChristHimselfisthemiracleinthemostabsolutesenseoftheword.InHimcreationisagainbroughtback to its pristine beauty, forHiswork results in the apokatastasis orrestorationofallthings,Acts3:21.

3.THECONTENTSOFSPECIALREVELATION.ItgoeswithoutsayingthattheknowledgeofGodformsthecontentofspecialrevelation.Inthenature of the case all revelation of God is self-revelation. God revealsHimself in nature andhistory, but the study of these is not necessarilytheology, since both can be studied simply as they are in themselves,apart from their revelational implications. It is only when they arecontemplated in relation toGodandconsidered subspecieaeternitatis,that they assume the character of a revelation and enable us to knowsomething of God. God is also the content of special revelation. Thedifference between general and special revelation does not primarilyconsist inthisthatthe latter, indistinctionfromtheformer, is inall itspartsandineverywaystrictlysupernatural,butmoreparticularlyinthisthatitisarevelationofthegratiaspecialis,andthereforegivesrisetotheChristianreligionofredemption.Itisarevelationofthewayofsalvation.While general revelation gives prominence to the theiotes (Rom. 1:20),the divine greatness of God, His absolute power and infinite wisdom,specialrevelationrevealswithincreasingclearnessthetriuneGodinHispersonaldistinctions,andthedivineeconomyofredemption.ItrevealsaGodwho ison theonehandholyandrighteous,buton theotherhandalsomerciful andgracious.Threepointsdeserveparticular attention inconnectionwithspecialrevelation.

a. It is a historical revelation. The content of special revelation wasgradually unfolded in the course of the centuries. This is clearlydemonstrated in the historia revelationis, sometimes called BiblicalTheology. This study shows that special revelation is controlled by asinglethought,namely,thatGodgraciouslyseeksandrestoresfallenmantoHisblessedcommunion.ThereisaconstantcomingofGodtomanintheophany, prophecy, andmiracle, and this coming reaches its highestpoint in the incarnation of the Son of God, which in turn leads to theindwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Church. The divine telos, towardswhichthewholeofrevelationmoves,isdescribedinRev.21:3:"Behold,

the tabernacle of God is withmen, andHe shall dwell with them, andthey shall beHis peoples, andGodHimself shall bewith them and betheirGod."

b. It is bothword and fact-revelation. The Socinianswere undoubtedlywrong in holding that special revelation merely serves the purpose offurnishing man complete information respecting God and the duty ofman;butBarth is equallywrongwhenhe speaks as if the revelationofGodisfactualratherthenverbal,andconsistsinredemptiveactsratherthan in a communication of knowledge. Special revelation does notconsist exclusively in word and doctrine, and does notmerely addressitself to the intellect.This ismore clearlyunderstoodatpresent than itwasformerly.TheOldTestamentrevelationisnotfoundinthelawandtheprophetsonly,butalso in theophanyandmiracle,and in thewholehistoryof Israel.And in theNewTestamentChrist isnotonlyprophet,but also priest and king. He is not merely the Word, but also theappearance and servant of God.He is the personal revelation of God'srighteousnessandholinessontheonehand,andofHismercyandgraceontheother.Andwhentheapostlesentertheworldwiththeirmessageofredemption, not only their words, but also their charismatic gifts andmiracles were revelations of God. The view, once widely held, thatrevelation consists exclusively in a communication of doctrine, wasclearly one sided. At present, however, some go to the other extreme,equally one-sided, that revelation consists only in a communication ofpower and life. It finds expression in the familiar slogan, that"Christianityisnotadoctrine,butalife."

c. It is a soteriological revelation. Special revelation is a revelation ofsalvation,andaimsattheredemptionoftheentireman,bothinhisbeingand inhis consciousness. Thismust bemaintained over against a falseintellectualism, which connects salvation with historical faith, as if theonlythingthatisnecessaryisthecorrectionoftheerror,andtheremovalof the darkness, of the understanding. But in combatting this view,weshould not go to the other extreme. ThoughGod's special revelation isthoroughly soteriological this does not mean that it consists only in acommunication of life. The entire man is corrupted by sin and needsredemption. Sin also includes the lie, the power of error, and the

darkness of theunderstanding, and therefore revelationmust also be acommunication of truth. Not only grace, but also truth came by JesusChrist,John1:17.Heistheway,becauseHeisthetruthandthelife,John14:6.

4. THE PURPOSE OF SPECIAL REVELATION. In speaking of thepurpose of revelationwemay distinguish between its final end and itsproximate aim. The final end can only be found in God. God revealsHimself,inordertorejoiceinthemanifestationofHisvirtues,especiallyas these shine forth in the work of redemption and in redeemedhumanity. The proximate aim of revelation, however, is found in thecomplete renewal of sinners, in order that theymaymirror the virtuesand perfections of God. If we bear inmind that revelation aims at therenewal of the entire man, we shall realize that it cannot seek therealization of its aim merely by teaching man and enlightening theunderstanding(Rationalism),orbypromptingmantoleadavirtuouslife(Moralism),orbyawakeningthereligiousemotionsofman(Mysticism).The purpose of revelation is far more comprehensive than any one ofthese,andevenmoreinclusivethanallofthemtakentogether.Itseekstodeliverfromthepowerofsin,ofthedevil,andofdeath,theentireman,body and soul, with all his talents and powers, and to renew himspiritually,morally, and ultimately also physically, to the glory ofGod;andnotonlytheindividualman,butmankindasanorganicwhole;andmankindnotapartfromtherestofcreation,butinconnectionwiththatwhole creation, of which it forms an organic part. This purpose alsodetermines the limits of special revelation. The historical process ofrevelationmaybesaidtoreachitsendinameasureinChrist.YetitdoesnotendwiththeascensionofChrist.ThisisfollowedbytheoutpouringoftheHolySpirit and the special operationof gifts andpowersunder theguidanceoftheapostolate.Suchacontinuedrevelationwasnecessary,inordertoensurespecialrevelationapermanentplaceinthemidstoftheworld,andthatnotonly inScripture,butalso in the lifeof theChurch.ButaftertherevelationinChrist,appropriatedandmadeeffectiveintheChurch, has thus been introduced into the world, a new dispensationbegins.Thenspecialrevelationceasesandnonewconstitutiveelementsareadded.TheworkofChrist in furnishing theworldwithanobjectiverevelationofGodisfinished.ButtheredemptionwroughtbyChristmust

stillbeapplied,andthisrequiresaconstantoperationoftheHolySpirit,alwaysinconnectionwiththeobjectiverevelation,fortherenewalofmanin his being and consciousness. By the Spirit of Christ man is led toaccept the truth revealed in Scripture, and becomes a new creature inChristJesus,makingGod'srevelationtheruleofhislife,andthusaimingat the glorification of God. This representation is not in harmonywiththatoftheTheologyofCrisis,exceptinthatwhichissaidrespectingthepurpose of revelation. Says Barth: "The revelation, Jesus Christ, is thework inwhichGodHimself restores the shatteredorder of the relationbetweenHimselfandman.Wemustalwaysapprehendtherevelationasthisworkofrestoration,whetherweseektoapprehenditrelativelytoitsessenceor its tokens.AshatteredrelationbetweenGodandmanhastoberestored;hencetheworkofGod,if it isnottoconsist inabandoningmanorinannihilatingwhatHehascreated,mustconsistinrevelation."NeitherBarthnorBrunnerbelieve in a completed, andnowobjectivelyexisting, revelation. They stress the fact that revelation is simply Godspeaking,andatthesametime,creatively,elicitingfrommanthedesiredresponse.TheresponseiswroughtinmanbytheHolySpiritthroughthewordof revelation itself.Without it there isnorevelation, though thereare tokens of it. Thewordof revelationwas addressed toprophets andapostlesinthedaysofold,andisstilladdressedtomenuptothepresenttime, and may in that sense be called continuous, or, perhaps better,frequentative.The revelation isnever completed andneverbecomes anobject onwhichman can lay hold. This refusal to ascribe to the divinerevelationanobjectivecharacterseemstobebasedfundamentallyonanidealistic conception of an object. "An object," saysBrunner, "iswhat Ican think myself; a subject is what I cannot think. In my thinking itbecomesanobject."Toregardrevelationasanobjectwouldseemtoputman in control of it. Thequestionmaybe raised,whether on this viewGod'srevelationisnotinthelastanalysissimplyequivalenttothecallingofGodinChristJesus,madeeffectivebytheHolySpirit.Ifthisisreallywhat is meant, it naturally follows that is continues up to the presenttime.

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY: What is the relation betweenreligion and revelation? In how far can we maintain that all religionoriginatesinrevelation?Whyisitbettertospeakofgeneralandspecial,

than of natural and supernatural, revelation? Can the necessarymanifestations of God as the ground of all existing things, or as theindwelling spirit in all creation, properly be called revelation?What isincludedinwhatisgenerallycallednaturalrevelation?Isthisrevelationstaticorprogressive?Isthereanysuchthingasapuremind,whichmayserve as an undimmedmirror of natural revelation?How do theywhoapply the doctrine of evolution to the history of revelation conceive ofwhatwecallspecialrevelation?HowdotheGentilestestifytotheneedofspecial revelation? Does the existence of revelation depend on itssubjectiveapprehension?

REFERENCES:Bavinck,Geref.Dogm.I,pp.291–369;Kuyper,Enc.derHeil.Godgel.,II,pp.205–241;Warfield,RevelationandInspiration,pp.3–49; Orr, Revelation and Inspiration, pp. 1–154; Mead, SupernaturalRevelation,pp.1–278;Fisher,NatureandMethodofRevelation,pp.1–86; Ladd, The Doctrine of Sacred Scriptures II, pp. 302–451; Smith,Introduction to Chr. Theol., pp. 84–187; Ewald, Revelation, Its NatureandRecord, pp. 1–299; Given, Revelation, Inspiration, and the Canon,pp.9–103;McGregor,TheRevelationandtheRecord;Sabatier,Outlinesof a Philosophy of Religion, pp. 32–66; Baillie, The Interpretation ofReligion, pp. 71–76, 449–470; id., Our Knowledge of God, pp. 3–43;Dickie, Revelation and Response; Lewis, A Philosophy of the ChristianRevelation;Camfield,Revelation and theHoly Spirit (Barthian);Barth,TheDoctrine of theWord of God; Brunner, TheWord and theWorld;Revelation(editedbyBaillieandMartin);Gilson,ReasonandRevelationintheMiddleAges.TheWordofGodandtheReformedFaith.pp.51–79,102–111.

D.SpecialRevelationandScripture

1.HISTORICALVIEWSOFTHERELATIONBETWEENTHETWO.

a.Inthepatristicperiod.TheGnosticsandMarcionhaderroneousviewsrespecting theBible, but the early Church Fathers regarded it in all itspartsastherevealedWordofGod.Theyfranklyspokeof itas inspired,but did not yet have a clear conception of its inspiration. Justin andAthenagoras clearly thought of the writers as passive under the divineinfluence,andcomparedthemtoalyreinthehandsofaplayer.Clement

of Alexandria and Tertullian asserted that both the Old and the NewTestament were equally inspired, and as such constituted the infallibleWord of God. Eusebius regarded it as presumptious to admit thepossibility of error in the sacred books; and Augustine said that theapostleswrotewhatChristdictated.Chrysostomcalledtheprophets"themouthofGod,"andGregorytheGreatspokeoftheHolySpiritastherealauthor of Scripture. All this goes to show that these Church Fathersregarded theBible as theWordofGod, and therefore identified itwiththedivinerevelation.

b.During theMiddleAges. The firmbelief in theBible as theWordofGod was not shaken during the Middle Ages. At the same time thethoughtwasdevelopedthatthereisnotonlyawritten,butalsoanoral,revelationofGod.Theideaofanapostolictradition,handeddownfromgeneration to generation, gradually gained currency. This traditionwasconsiderednecessaryfortheestablishmentoftheauthorityofScripture,andforthedeterminationofitspropermeaning.Itwassaidthatwithoutthe guidance of tradition Scripture could bemade to speak in somanydiscordant ways that its authority was destroyed altogether. Thedevelopmentof this theorywasdetrimental to theproperconceptionofScripture.Itistrue,theBiblewasstillregardedastheinfallibleWordofGod, but its authority and proper meaning was made dependent ontradition,andthatmeans,ontheChurch.Theimportanceascribedtoso-calledapostolictraditioneveninvolvedadenialoftheabsolutenecessity,thesufficiency,andtheperspicuityoftheBible.

c. At the time of the Reformation. The Reformers took position overagainsttheRomanCatholicChurchonthispoint.WhentheyspokeoftheWord of God, they had the Bible, and the Bible only, in mind. Theyrejected the authority of what was called apostolic tradition, andacknowledgedtheBibleonlyasthefinalauthorityandtheabsolutenorminallmattersof faithandconduct. Insteadofadmitting itsdependenceon the testimony of the Church, they boldly declared its autopistia.Thoughtheydidnotyetdevelopthedoctrineofinspirationasfullyasitwas developed by seventeenth century theologians, it is quite evidentfrom their writings that they regarded the whole Bible as the inspiredWordofGodinthestrictestsenseoftheword.Thoughithasoftenbeen

saidbyliberaltheologiansthattheydrewadistinctionbetweenthedivinerevelation and Scripture, and conceived of the former, not as identicalwith,butascontainedin,theformer;andthoughthisviewisnowechoedbytherepresentativesoftheTheologyofCrisisinaslightlydifferentway,—this contention cannot bear close scrutiny. On the basis of theirwritings itmustbemaintained that theReformers identified thedivinerevelationandScripture.ItwasespeciallyintheseventeenthcenturythatthedoctrineoftheperfectionsofScripturewasdeveloped.

d. In modern theology. Under the influence of Rationalism strongopposition arose to the strict conception of the Bible as the infallibleWordofGod.Variousphilosophicalandscientific,criticalandhistorical,studiesservedtounderminetheprevalentbeliefinthesupernatural,andthereforealsothedoctrineofthedivineinspirationofScripture.TheoldconceptionoftheBibleastheinfallibleWordofGodwasbrushedasideasuntenable, and several other views of itwere suggested as alternatives,butnotasingleoneofthemhasbeenabletoentrenchitselfintheheartsandmindsofChristianpeopleingeneral.Foratimetheideawasratherpopular that theBible ispartlyhumanandpartlydivine,and itbecameratherpopulartosaythatthedivinerevelationiscontainedintheBible,and that parts of the Bible are therefore inspired. But it soon becameevident that it was impossible to say where the divine ended and thehumanbegan,orwhatpartsoftheBiblewere,andwhatpartswerenot,inspired. Others discarded the idea of inspiration and simply regardedthe Bible as the human record of a divine revelation. Idealisticphilosophy, with its doctrine of the divine immanence, and thesubjectivism of Schleiermacher, led to a new conception of bothrevelationand inspiration. Inspirationcame tobe regardedasa specialdivine illumination, differing only in degree from the spiritualillumination of Christians in general; and revelation, as the resultingheightenedinsightintothenatureofthings.Thisincourseoftimeledonto a certain identification of revelation and human discovery. On thisview the Bible becomes a record of rather exceptional humanexperiences,—arecordwhichispurelyhuman.TheTheologyofCrisis isanattempttorestorethe ideaofrevelationasasupernaturalactonthepartofGod to its rightfulplace.But it alsodisowns thedoctrineof theinfallible inspiration of Scripture, and therefore does not identify the

revelationofGodandtheBible.TheBibleismerelyahumanwitnesstothe divine revelation, which may, just because it witnesses to therevelation,becalledtheWordofGodinasecondarysense.

2. THE REFORMED CONCEPTION OF THE RELATION BETWEENTHETWO.AccordingtothegreatReformersofthesixteenthcenturythespecial revelation of Godwas given permanent form in Scripture. Thisidea is not in itself anything out of the ordinary. Among all culturednations we find magical formulas, liturgical texts, ritual tracts,ceremonial laws, and historical and mythological literature, connectedwiththeirreligiouslife.Severalreligionshaveholybooks,towhichdivineauthority isascribed,andwhichserveas rulesofdoctrineandpractice.Every prominent religion possesses a dogma which is expressed inlanguage and assumes a permanent form inwriting. Christianity formsnoexceptiontotheruleinthatrespect.Itwasoftheutmostimportancefor the special revelationofGod that it shouldbe embodied inwriting,becauseitwasgiveninthecourseofmanycenturiesandcomprisesdeedsand events that are not repeated, but belong to the past, so that theknowledge of them would soon be lost in oblivion, if they were notrecordedandthuspreservedforposterity.Anditwasimportantthatthisknowledgeshouldnotbelost,sincethedivinerevelationcontainseternaltruths,thatarepregnantwithmeaningforalltimes,forallpeoples,andunderall circumstances.ThereforeGodprovided for its inscripturation,so that His revelation now comes to us, not in the form of deeds andevents, but as a description of these. In order to guard it againstvolatilization,corruptionandfalsification,Hegaveitpermanentforminwriting.FromthisitfollowsthatthereisaverycloseconnectionbetweenspecialrevelationandScripture.

Itshouldbepointedout,however,thattheword'revelation'isnotalwaysused in the samesense. Itmay serve todenote thedirect, supernaturalcommunicationsofGodtoman,whichwerefarmorefrequentintheolddispensationthaninthenew,andculminatedintheWordmadeflesh.Iftheword 'revelation'beunderstoodinthatsense,thenitcannotbesaidthat special revelation is identical with the Bible, but only that it iscontainedor recorded in theBible. Scripture contains a great deal thatwasnotsocommunicatedbyGod.Itshouldbeborneinmind,however,

that this does not justify the distinction, sometimes made in moderntheology, between theWordofGod asdivine and its record ashuman.Neitherdoes itwarrant theunqualified statement that theBible is not,but merely contains the Word of God. The terms 'Word of God' and'special revelation' are also used in a sense in which they are identicalwith 'Scripture.' In most cases revelation or the direct self-communicationofGodprecededitsinscripturation.Theprophetsusuallyreceivedtheircommunicationssometimebeforetheycommittedthemtowriting,Jer.25:13;30:1,2;36:2.Thisistrueoftheapostlesaswell.WhentheyreceivedthehighestrevelationofGodinJesusChrist,theydidnotatonce record it for futuregenerations,butonlyafter the lapseof severalyears, and even then they did not record everything thatwas revealed,John 20:30; 21:25. It may be that some things were revealed to themwhile theywerewriting.Moreover, in somecasesmenwhoreceivednodirectrevelationsthemselvesyetrecordedthemforthefuture.InviewofallthisitmaybesaidthatthereisasenseinwhichwemustdistinguishbetweenspecialrevelationandScripture.

But the term 'revelation'mayalsobeused inabroadersense. Itcanbeapplied to thatwhole complex of redemptive truths and facts,which isrecordedinScriptureandhasitsguaranteeasadivinerevelationinthefactthatthewholeofScriptureisinfalliblyinspiredbytheHolySpirit.InthatsensetheentireBiblefromGenesistoRevelation,anditonly,isforusGod's special revelation. It is only throughScripture thatwe receiveany knowledge of the direct revelations of God in the past. We knowabsolutely nothing about God's revelations among Israel through theprophetsandfinally inChrist,exceptfromtheBible.If this issetaside,we abandon the whole of God's special revelation, including that inChrist. It is only through the word of the apostles that we can havecommunionwithChrist.Consequently,itisunthinkablethatGodgaveaspecialrevelationandthentooknomeasurestopreserveit inviolateforcoming generations. Scripture derives its significance exactly from thefactthatitisthebookofrevelation.BymeansofScriptureGodconstantlycarriesHisrevelationintotheworldandmakesitscontenteffectiveinthethought and life ofman. It is notmerely anarrative ofwhathappenedyearsago,buttheperennialspeechofGodtoman.RevelationlivesoninScriptureandbringsevennow,justasitdidwhenitwasgiven,light,life,

andholiness.BymeansofthatrevelationGodcontinuestorenewsinnersin their being and consciousness. Scripture is the Holy Spirit's chiefinstrument for the extension and guidance of the Church, for theperfecting of the saints, and for the building up of the body of JesusChrist. It forms a lasting bond of union between heaven and earth,betweenChristandHisChurch,andbetweenGodandHispeople. In itweheareveranewthevoiceofGod,foritremainstheinspiredWordofGod.Anditwillnothaveserveditspurposefullyuntilthenewcreationiscompleted,whenall thechildrenofGodwillbe inspiredandwill allbefullytaughtoftheLord.

IV.TheInspirationofScripture

A.TheDoctrineofInspirationinHistory

Revelationand inspirationstand in theclosestpossible relation toeachother.Asfarasspecialrevelationisconcerned,itmaybesaidthattheoneis inconceivablewithout theother.Peter tellsus that"noprophecyevercameby thewillofman:butmenspake fromGod,beingmovedby theHoly Spirit." 2 Pet. 1:21. The recognition of the Bible as the specialrevelation of God depends on the conviction that its authors wereinspiredbytheHolySpirit.But,howevercloselyrelatedthetwomaybe,they shouldnotbe identified.Dr.Hodge correctly calls attention to thefactthattheydifferbothastotheirobjectandintheireffects."Theobjectordesignofrevelationisthecommunicationofknowledge.Theobjectordesignof inspiration is tosecure infallibility in teaching.…Theeffectofrevelationwastorenderitsrecipientwiser.Theeffectofinspirationwastopreservehimfromerrorinteaching."Thedoctrineofinspirationwasnotalwaysheld inthesameform,andthereforeabriefstatementof itshistorywouldseemtobedesirable.

1. BEFORE THE REFORMATION. In a sense it may be said that thisdoctrine had no history before the Reformation, because it remainedessentially the same from the first century down to the sixteenth.Neverthelessitwillserveausefulpurposetocallspecificattentiontothe

fact that throughout all these centuries the Church stood firm in theconvictionthattheBibleistheinspired,andthereforeinfallible,WordofGod. It is a well known fact that the Jews held the strictest view ofinspiration.They regarded first of all theLaw as divinely and infalliblyinspired, and therefore ascribed to it absolute divine authority, andafterwards ascribed the same inviolable character and authority to theProphets and the Holy Writings. This view passed right over into theChristian Church. Even liberal scholars, who reject that strict view ofinspiration,feelconstrainedtoadmitthatJesusandtheNewTestamentwritersalsoheldthesameview.TheearlyChurchFathershadthesameexalted view of the Bible, as appears abundantly from their writings.Sandayadmitsthatfromtheveryfirsttheyarefoundusingexpressions,which even point to verbal inspiration. Some of their expressionscertainlyseemtosuggestthatthewritersofthebooksoftheBiblewerepassiveunder the influence of theHoly Spirit, and thereforepoint to amechanical conceptionof inspiration.ButDr.Orr calls attention to thefact that the general trendof their teaching shows that itwasnot theirintention to teach a doctrine of inspiration, which involved thesuppressionofthehumanconsciousness,thatOrigencontendedagainstsuchaview,andthatMontanism,whichheldit,wascondemnedbytheChurch. Between the time of the early Church Fathers and that of theReformation the prevailing opinion in the Church did not differessentiallyfromthatpreviouslyheld.TheScholasticssharedthecommonconviction of the Church, and merely tried to give a more precisedefinitionofsomeofthedetailsofthedoctrineofinspiration.Itmustbeadmitted, however, that equal inspiration was ascribed to apostolictradition,andthatinpracticethistendedtoweakentheconsciousnessoftheabsoluteauthorityofthewrittenWordofGod.Moreover,thereweresomeMystics,whogloriedinaspecialilluminationandinrevelationsofthedivinepresencewithin,andmanifestedatendencytoundervaluethesupernaturalinspirationofthewritersoftheBible,andtoreduceittothelevel of that gracious inner teachingwhich all Christians alike enjoyed.But their subjectivismdidnot seriouslyaffect theview thatwasheld intheChurchatlarge.

2. AFTER THE REFORMATION. It has become quite the vogue withthosewhoareopposedtowhatDr.Warfieldcalls"thechurch-doctrineof

inspiration," to saddle their own loose views on the greatReformers ofthesixteenthcentury.TheyfindintheworksofLutherandCalvinafewexpressions which seem to reflect a certain freedom in dealing withcanonicalquestions,andthenhastilyconcludefromthisthatthesegreatmen did not share the current doctrine of inspiration. But why shouldthey rely on mere inferences, when these great Reformers use severalexpressions and make many plain statements, which are clearlyindicativeofthefactthattheyheldthestrictestviewof inspiration,andthat this view was not at all, as the opponents claim, an invention ofProtestantScholasticismintheseventeenthcentury.TheyevenspeakoftheHolySpiritastheauthorofeverypartofScripture,andofthehumanwriters as havingwrittenwhat was dictated to them. Such expressionshadbeen common from the earliest times.At the same time it is quiteevidentfromtheirteachingsingeneralthatinspiration,astheyconceivedofit,didnotsuppresstheindividualityandtheintellectualactivityofthehuman authors. Seeberg speaks of Calvin as the author of the strict,seventeenthcenturyviewofinspiration.Theonlydifferenceonthispointbetween the Reformers and the following generation of theologians is,that the lattermadethesubjectof inspirationanobjectofspecialstudyand worked it out in details, and that some manifested a tendency to"reducetheinspiredman,whenundertheinfluenceoftheSpirit,tothelevelofanunconsciousandunintelligentinstrument."(Bannerman)Thistendency also found expression in one of the Confessions, namely, theFormula Consensus Helvetica, drawn up in 1675 in opposition to thelooseviewsof the schoolofSaumur.ThisConfessionnever foundwideacceptanceasanecclesiasticalstandard.

At a later date, however, when Rationalismmade its influence felt, LeClerc (1657–1736) impugned the strict infallibility of Scripture andassertedtheexistenceoferrorsintherecord,andmanyoftheapologists,whotookupthedefense,admittedhiscontentionsandfeltconstrainedtohave recourse to the theory of an inspiration, differing in degrees invariouspartsoftheBible,andthusallowingforimperfectionsanderrorsinsomeportionsofScripture.Thiswasatheorythatallowedofvariousmodifications.Oneofthese,whichenjoyedconsiderablepopularityforawhile, was the theory of a partial inspiration, that is, an inspirationlimited to parts of the Bible, but it soon became evident that it was

impossible to reach a unanimous opinion as to the exact extent ofinspiration.Sincethisviewwillbediscussedlateron,itisnotnecessarytoenlargeuponithere.

Aradicallydifferent theoryowes itsoriginespecially toSchleiermacher.In distinction from the theory of partial inspiration, which at leastascribed strict inspiration to some parts of Scripture, it altered thecharacter of inspiration altogether by excluding the supernaturalelement. It held inspiration to be (to express it in the words ofBannerman) "the natural, or at most the gracious, agency of Godilluminatingtherationalorthespiritualconsciousnessofaman,sothatoutofthefulnessofhisownChristianunderstandingandfeelingshemayspeak or write the product of his own religious life and beliefs." Hereinspiration is changed to a divine illumination, differing only in degreefrom that of Christians in general. The special, supernatural andmiraculous operation of the Holy Spirit, is superseded by one of Hisordinary operations in the lives of believers. Many of the works oninspiration, written since the days of Schleiermacher are simplyvariationsonthisgeneraltheme.Some,suchasWegscheiderandParker,wentevenfarther,andspokeofapurelynaturaloperation,commontoallmen. Such works as those of Lee, Bannerman, McIntosh, Patton, Orr,Warfield, and others naturally form exceptions to the rule. Sad to say,BarthandBrunneralsorejectthedoctrineoftheinfallibleinspirationofScripture, and regard it as a product of Protestant Scholasticism.Theirownviewsstillawaitclarification.

B.ScripturalProoffortheInspirationoftheBible

Thequestionarises,whethertherecordofthedivinerevelation,aswellasthe revelation itself, is from God, or whether God, after giving therevelationof redemption, simply left it toman to record thisasbesthecould. Have we in Scripture a merely human or a divinely inspiredrecord?AndifGod'sspecialrevelationwasgivenbyinspiration,howfardoes that inspiration extend? In seeking an answer to these and othersimilarquestions,weturntoScriptureitself.ThiswillnotseemstrangeinviewofthefactthatforustheBible istheonlyprincipiumcognoscendiexternumof theology. Just as theBible contains adoctrineofGodandman, of Christ and redemption, it also offers us a doctrine concerning

itself;andwereceivethisinfaithonthebasisofthedivinetestimony.Insaying this,wedonotmean to intimate thatScripturecontainsaclear-cutandwellformulateddogmaofinspiration,butonlythatitsuppliesallthedatathatarenecessaryfortheconstructionofsuchadogma.Weshallconsider the Scriptural proof for the inspiration of the authors ofScriptureunder twoheadings: (1)proof for their inspirationconsideredapartfromtheirwriting;and(2)prooffortheirinspirationinwritingthebooksoftheBible.

1.PROOFSFORTHEINSPIRATIONOFTHESECONDARYAUTHORSOFSCRIPTURECONSIDEREDAPARTFROMTHEIRWRITING.Itmaybewell to point out first of all that the secondary authors of Scripturewere inspired as the organs of divine revelation, even apart from theiractivityinrecordingthespecialrevelationofGod.Thenitwillappearthatinspiration was deemed necessary for the immediate purpose ofrevelation.Wederiveourproofinthisrespectprimarilyfromprophecy,orwhatmaybecalledthepropheticinspiration,butalsoinpartfromtheapostolicinspiration.

a. Prophetic inspiration. Several points deserve attention here: (1) Thenatureofaprophet.TherearetwoclassicalpassagesintheBible,whichshed light on theBiblical conception of a prophet, namely, Ex. 7:1 andDeut. 18:18. According to these passages a prophet is simply themouthpiece of God. He receives a message from God, and is in dutybound to transmit it to the people. In his capacity as a prophet of theLord,hemaynotbringamessageofhisown,butonlythemessagewhichhereceivesfromtheLord.Itisnotlefttohisowndiscretiontodeterminewhat he shall say; this is determined for him by his Sender. For themessagedivinelyentrustedtohimHemaynotsubstituteanother.(2)Theconsciousnessoftheprophets.TheprophetsofIsraelknewthattheywerecalledoftheLordatacertainmoment,sometimescontrarytotheirowndesire,Ex.3:1,ff.;1Sam.3;Isa.6;Jer.1;Ezek.1–3.Theywereconsciousof the fact that the Lord had spoken to them, and in some cases evenknew that He had put His words into their mouth, Num. 23:5; Deut.18:18; Jer. 1:9; 5:14. This consciousness was so strong that they evendesignatedthetimeandplacewhenandwheretheLordspoketothem,anddistinguishedbetweentimesinwhichHedid,andtimesinwhichHe

didnot,speaktothem,Isa.16:13,14;Jer.3:6;13:3;26:1;27:1;33:1;Ezek.3:16;8:1; 12:8.Hence theyalsomadea sharpdistinctionbetweenwhattheLordrevealedtothemandwhataroseoutofthedepthsoftheirownhearts, Num. 16:28; 24:13; 1 Kings 12:33; Neh. 6:8. They accused thefalseprophetsofspeakingoutoftheirownhearts,withoutbeingsentofthe Lord, Jer. 14:14; 23:16, 26; 29:9; Ezek. 13:2, 3, 6. When theyaddressed thepeople, they knew that theywerenot bringing their ownword,butthewordoftheLord,andthisbecausetheLorddemandeditofthem,Jer.20:7–9;Ezek.3:4ff.;Amos3:8;Jonah1:2.(3)Thepropheticformulae. The prophetic formulae were also very significant in thisrespect. They were in themselves clear indications of the fact that theprophetswereconsciousofbringingamessagethatwas inspiredbytheLord. There is quite a variety of these formulae, but they all agree inascribingtheinitiativetotheLord.ThefaithfulwatchmenonthewallsofZion were deeply impressed with the fact that they received the word,withwhichtheycametothepeople,atthemouthoftheLord.TheywereevermindfulofthewordoftheLordtoEzekiel:"Sonofman,IhavemadetheeawatchmanuntothehouseofIsrael:thereforehearthewordatmymouth, and give them warning from me." Ezek. 3:17. Moreover, theyclearly wanted the people to understand this. Such formulae as thefollowing testify to this: "Thus saith the Lord," "Hear the word of theLord,""Thewordthatcameto…fromtheLord,""ThustheLordshowedme," "The burden of the word of the Lord." (4) Failure to understandtheir own message. The fact that the prophets sometimes failed tounderstand themessagewhich theybrought to thepeople, also goes toshow that it came to them fromwithout, anddidnot arise out of theirown consciousness. Daniel brought a message which was entrusted tohim,butdeclaresthathedidnotunderstandit,Dan.12:8,9.Zechariahsawseveralvisions,whichcontainedmessagesforthepeople,butneededthehelpofanangel to interpret these forhim,Zech. 1:9;2:3;4:4.AndPeter informs us that the prophets, having brought their messagerespectingthesufferingsandthefollowinggloryofChrist,oftensearchedintothedetailsofit,inorderthattheymightunderstanditmoreclearly,1Pet.1:10,11.

b.Apostolicinspiration.TheoperationoftheHolySpiritafterthedayofPentecostdifferedfromthatwhichtheprophetsintheirofficialcapacity

enjoyed.TheHolySpiritcameupontheprophetsasasupernaturalpowerandworkeduponthemfromwithout.Hisactiononthemwasfrequentlyrepeated, but was not continuous. The distinction betweenHis activityandthementalactivityoftheprophetsthemselveswasmadetostandoutratherclearly.OnthedayofPentecost,however,HetookupHisabodeinthe hearts of the apostles and began to work upon them from within.SinceHemade their heartsHis permanent abode,His action on themwas no more intermittent but continuous, but even in their case thesupernaturalworkofinspirationwaslimitedtothoseoccasionsonwhichthey served as organs of revelation. But because of the more inwardcharacter of all the Spirit's work, the distinction betweenHis ordinaryand His extraordinary work was not so perceptible. The supernaturaldoesnotstandoutasclearly in thecaseof theapostles,as itdid in thecase of the prophets. Notwithstanding this fact, however, the NewTestament contains several significant indications of the fact that theapostles were inspired in their positive oral teachings. Christ solemnlypromised them the Holy Spirit in their teaching and preaching. Matt.10:19,20;Mark13:11;Luke12:11,12;21:14,15;John14:26;15:26;16:13.IntheActsoftheApostleswearetoldrepeatedlythattheytaught"beingfull of," or "filledwith," theHoly Spirit.Moreover, it appears from theEpistles that in teaching the churches they conceived of their word asbeinginverydeedthewordofGod,andthereforeasauthoritative,1Cor.2:4,13;1Thess.2:13.

2.PROOFSFORTHEINSPIRATIONOFTHESECONDARYAUTHORSINWRITING THE BOOKSOF THE BIBLE. The guidance of theHolySpirit was not limited to the spoken word, but also extended to thewrittenword.IfGoddeemeditnecessarytoguideprophetsandapostlesin their oral teaching, which was naturally limited to theircontemporaries, it would seem to follow as amatter of course thatHewouldconsideritfarmoreimportanttoensurethemofdivineguidanceincommittingHisrevelationtowritingforallfollowinggenerations.ItisonlyinitswrittenformthattheWordofGodisknownintheworld,andthatHisrevelationisthecontinuousspeechofGodtoman.Andthereareseveral indications in the New Testament that He did so guide theapostles.Thesearecontainedincertaingeneralpehnomena,andinsomedirectassertions.

a. Certain general phenomena. (1) Commands towrite theword of theLord. Repeatedly the writers of the Old Testament are explicitlycommandedtowritewhattheLordrevealsuntothem,Ex.17:14;34:27;Num. 33:2; Isa. 8:1; 30:8; Jer. 25:13; 30:2; 36:2, 27–32; Ezek. 24:1 f.;Dan.12:4;Hab.2:2.Someprophecieswereevidentlynotintendedtobespoken,buttobewrittenforthecarefulconsiderationofthepeople,Jer.29; 36:4ff., 27ff.; Ezek. 26; 27; 31; 32; 39. In such cases the propheticformulaenaturallyalsorefertothewrittenword.(2)Suppressionofthehuman factor. Inmany of the prophecies the divine factor, as it were,overpowersthehuman.ThepropheticwordbeginsbyspeakingofGodinthe third person, and then, without any indication of a transition,continues in the first person. The opening words are words of theprophet,andthenallatonce,withoutanypreparationofthereaderforachange, thehumanauthor simplydisappears fromview,and thedivineauthor speaks apparently without any intermediary, Isa. 10:12; 19:1, 2;Hos.4:1–6;6:1–4;Mic.1:3–6;Zech.9:4–6;12:8,9.ThusthewordoftheprophetpassesrightintothatoftheLordwithoutanyformaltransition.The two are simply fused, and thus prove to be one. Some passagesclearly indicate that the word of the Lord and that of the prophet areequallyauthoritative,Jer.25:3;36:10,11.Isaiahevenspeaksofhisownwrittenpropheciesas"thebookofJehovah."34:16. (3)ThedesignationoftheOldTestamentashegrapheorhaigraphai.IntheNewTestamentwe find that the Lord and the apostles, in their appeal to the OldTestament,frequentlyspeakofitashegraphe(atermsometimesappliedtoasinglepassageofScripture,Mark12:10;Luke4:21;John19:36),orashaigraphaiinviewofthefactthatitconsistsofseveralparts,Luke24:27;Rom. 1:2. Cf. also ta hiera grammata in 2 Tim. 3:15. They evidentlyregardedthiscollectionasauthoritative.Anappealtoitwasequivalentto"God says," as appears from the fact that the formula he graphe legein(the Scripture says) is used interchangeably with others, which clearlyindicatethatwhatisquotedistheWordofGod,andfromcasesinwhichthe word quoted is really spoken by God in the Old Testament, Rom.9:15–17;Gal.3:8.(4)Formulaeofquotation.TheLordandHisapostlesdo not always use the same formula in quoting the Old Testament.Sometimes they simply say, "It is written," Matt. 4:4; John 6:45, or"Scripture says," Rom. 4:3; Gal. 4:30. In some cases theymention thehumanauthor,Matt. 15:7;24:15,but frequently theyname theprimary

author,thatis,GodortheHolySpirit,Matt.15:4;Heb.1:5ff.;3:7.Paulinsome cases personifies Scripture, so that it is represented as identicalwithGod,Rom.9:17;Gal.3:8,22;4:30;cf.alsoRom.4:3;10:11;11:2;1Tim. 5:18. The writer of the Epistle to theHebrews usually names theprimaryauthor,1:5ff.;3:7;4:3;5:6;7:21;8:5,8;10:15,16.

b. Direct assertions. There are several passages in which the divineauthorityoftheOldTestamentisclearlyasserted,Matt.5:17;Luke16:17,29,31;John10:35;Rom.15:4;1Pet.1:10–12;2Pet.1:19,21.Thisistrueespecially of the locus classicus, 2 Tim. 3:16: "All (every) Scripture isgivenbyinspirationofGod,andisprofitableforteaching,forreproof,forcorrection,forinstructionwhichisinrighteousness."Wereadhereintheoriginal:Pasagraphe theopneustoskaiophelimosprosdidaskalian, etc.This passage has been interpreted in various ways, and that notinfrequently with the scarcely concealed intention of destroying itsevidentialvalue.Onthebasisoftranscriptionalevidencesomeproposedto leave out the word kai, but the weight of evidence clearly favors itsretention. Because pasa stands without the article, some insist ontranslatingpasagrapheby"everyScripture";butsuchpassagesasMatt.2:3;Acts2:36;Eph.2:21;4:16;1Pet.1:15,bearevidenceofthefactthatthewordpasmaymean"all"intheNewTestamentevenwhenthearticleiswanting.Materially,itmakesverylittledifference,whetherweread"allScripture,"or"everyScripture,"sincetheexpressioncertainlyrefersbackto tahieragrammata in the15thverse,and this serves todesignate theOldTestamentwritings.Thereisalsoastrongtendency(cf.eventheAm.Rev.Version)toregardtheopneustos,notasthepredicate,butasapartofthesubject,andthereforetoread:"All(or,"every")scriptureinspiredofGod is alsoprofitable for teaching," etc.But itwould seem that, if itweresointended,theverbestinshouldhavebeenusedafterophelimos,and there is no good reason why kai should have been used before it.Thereisnothingthatcompelsustodepartfromtheusualinterpretationof the passage. In connection with this statement of Paul, the word ofPeter in 2 Pet. 1:21 deserves special attention: "For no prophecy evercameby thewill ofman,butmen spake fromGodbeingmovedby theHoly Spirit." The writers of the New Testament were conscious of theguidanceof theHolySpirit in theirwriting, and therefore theirwrittenproductions are authoritative, 1 Cor. 7:10; 2 Cor. 13:2, 3; Col. 4:16; 1

Thess.2:13;2Thess.3:14.PeterplacestheEpistlesofPaulonalevelwiththewritingsoftheOldTestament,2Pet.3:15,16.AndPaulhimselfsays:"Ifanymanthinkethhimselftobeaprophet,lethimtakeknowledgeofthethingswhichIwriteuntoyou,thattheyarethecommandmentsoftheLord."1Cor.14:37.

C.NatureandExtentofItsInspiration

Therehasbeennogeneralagreementastothenatureandextentoftheinspiration of Scripture, and with a view to a proper understanding ofthese,itmaybewelltoconsiderthemostimportantviewsthatwereheldincourseoftime.

1. THE NATURE OF INSPIRATION. In dealing with the nature ofinspiration, we shall consider first of all two erroneous views, whichrepresentoppositeextremes,and thenstatewhatweconsider tobe thecorrectview.

a.Mechanical inspiration.There isarathercommonmisunderstanding,againstwhichwemustbeonourguard.Itisoftenrepresentedasifverbalinspirationwerenecessarilymechanical,butthisisnotthecase.Thetwotermsarecertainlynotsynonymous,fortheyrefertodifferentaspectsoftheworkofinspiration,theonebeinganindicationoftheextent,andtheother, of thenatureof inspiration.Andwhile it is true thatmechanicalinspirationisfromthenatureofthecaseverbal,itisnottruethatverbalinspiration isnecessarilymechanical. It is quitepossible tobelieve thattheguidanceoftheHolyextendedtothechoiceofthewordsemployed,butwasnotexercisedinamechanicalway.Accordingtothemechanicalviewof inspirationGoddictatedwhat theauctores secundariiwrote, sothatthelatterweremereamanuenses,merechannelsthroughwhichthewordsoftheHolySpiritflowed.Itimpliesthattheirownmentallifewasinastateofrepose,anddidnotinanywaycontributetothecontentsorformoftheirwritings,andthateventhestyleofScripture is thatof theHoly Spirit. This theory has very unfairly and rather persistently beenascribedby itsopponents toall thosewhobelieve inverbal inspiration,even after these have repeatedly disclaimed that view. It must beadmittedthatsomeoftheearlyChurchFathers,theReformers,andsomeLutheran and Reformed theologians of the seventeenth century

occasionallyusedexpressionsthatsavouredofsuchaview;butitshouldbe added that their general teachings clearly show that they did notregard thewritersof theBibleasmerepassive instruments,butas realauthors,whoseintellectualpowerswerealertandoperativeandwhogaveexpression also to their individuality in their writings. As far as theReformers are concerned, this appears very clearly from the fact thatmanyofthosewhodonotbelieveinanyrealdoctrineofinspiration,viewitheachotherintheirattemptstoprovethatLutherandCalvindidnothold thestrictviewof inspirationwhichwascurrent in theseventeenthcentury. The great historical Confessions, with the exception of theFormulaConsensusHelvetica(1675)donotexpressthemselvesastotheprecisenatureoftheinspirationofScripture.TheoneConfessionnamedcomesclosesttothepresentationofamechanicalviewofinspiration,butthisConfessionwasrecognizedonlybyafewcantonsinSwitzerland,thelandofitsbirth,andwaseventheresetasidebyafollowinggeneration.Moreover we should not lose sight of the fact that this Confessionrepresentsareactionagainstthe looseviewsoninspiration,whichweresponsoredbyCappelusoftheschoolofSaumur.Itmaywellbedoubted,whether there ever has been a considerable number of Reformedtheologians who consciously adopted amechanical view of inspiration.ThisviewisnotfoundinourownConfessioBelgica,andiscertainlynotnowtheaccepteddoctrineofReformedtheology.Reformedtheologiansnow generally have an organic conception of inspiration. They do notbelieve that the auctores secundarii of Scripture were mere passiveinstruments in thehandofGod; that theyweremere amanuenseswhowrotewhatGoddictated;thatwhattheywrotedidnotinanysenseofthewordoriginateintheirownconsciousness;northattheirstyleinsimplythe style of the Holy Spirit. To the contrary, they adopt a view whichrecognizes them as real authors and does full justice to their personalshareintheproductionoftheirwritings.

b. Dynamical inspiration. If we desire on the one hand to avoid themechanical view of inspiration, we are equally desirous, on the otherhand, tosteerclearof theso-calleddynamicalview.The term 'dynamicinspiration' is sometimes used to denote what we would call 'organicinspiration',but is employedhere todesignate the theoryof inspirationthat owes its inception to the teachings of Schleiermacher. This theory

renounces the idea of a direct operation of the Holy Spirit on theproduction of the books of the Bible, and substitutes for it a generalinspirationof thewriters,whichreallyamounts tonothingmore thanaspiritual illumination, differing only in degree from the spiritualilluminationofChristians ingeneral.Strictlyspeaking, iteliminates thesupernatural,transformstheideaofinspiration,andtransfersitfromtheintellectual to themoral sphere.Thewritersof theNewTestament (theOldTestamentisnoteventakenintoconsideration)wereholymen,whomoved about in the presence of Jesus and lived in the sphere ofrevelation,whichnaturallyhadasanctifyinginfluenceontheircharacter,thought,andspeech.SaysLadd:"Thegeneralconceptionofinspirationisthat of a divine influence coming like a breath of wind, or some otherfluid, into the soul of man, and producing there a transformation."2BannermancorrectlysaysthatinSchleiermacher'stheologyinspirationisheld to be "the natural, or at most the gracious, agency of Godilluminatingtherationalorthespiritualconsciousnessofaman,sothatoutofthefulnessofhisownChristianunderstandingandfeelingshemayspeakorwritetheproductofhisownreligiouslifeandbeliefs."Thisviewis entirely subjective, makes the Bible a purely human product, andallows for the possibility of errors in theWord of God. Inspiration soconceived was a permanent characteristic of the writers, and in so farnaturally also influenced their writings, but was by no means asupernatural operation of the Holy Spirit, which served to qualify thewritersforthespecifictaskofcommittingthedivinerevelationtowriting.It terminated on the writers rather than on their writings. While itnaturallyinfluencedtheirwritings,itdidnotaffectthemallinthesamemeasure.OntheonehandtheBiblecontains thehighest truths,butontheotherhanditisstillimperfectandfallible.Thistheory,whichisalsocalledthetheoryofspiritual insightorspiritual intuition,certainlydoesnotdojusticetotheScripturaldataoninspiration.ItrobstheBibleofitssupernaturalcharacteranddestroysitsinfallibility.

c. Organic inspiration. The term 'organic inspiration' is also somewhatambiguous, because some use it to designate what is usually called'dynamicinspiration.'Theterm'organic'servestostressthefactthatGoddidnotemploythewritersofthebooksoftheBibleinamechanicalway,just as awriterwields apen;didnotwhisper into their ears thewords

whichHewantedthemtowrite;butactedupontheminanorganicway,inharmonywiththelawsoftheirowninnerbeing.Heusedthemjustastheywere,withtheircharacterandtemperament,theirgiftsandtalents,their education and culture, their vocabulary, diction, and style. Heillumined theirminds,prompted themtowrite, repressed the influenceofsinontheirliteraryactivity,andguidedtheminanorganicwayinthechoiceoftheirwordsandintheexpressionoftheirthoughts.ThisviewisclearlymostinharmonywiththerepresentationsofScripture.IttestifiestothefactthatthewritersofthebooksoftheBiblewerenotpassivebutactive. In somecases they searchedoutbeforehand the thingsofwhichtheywrote,Luke1:1–4.Theauthorsof thebooksofSamuel,Kings,andChroniclesrepeatedlyrefertotheirsources.Themessagesoftheprophetsare generally determined by historical circumstances, and the NewTestamentEpistlesalsohaveanoccasionalcharacter.Thepsalmistsoftensing of their own experiences, of sin and forgiveness, Ps. 32 and 51, ofsurroundingdangersandgraciousdeliverances,Ps.48and116.Eachoneof the writers has his own style. Alongside of the sublime poetry andpoetical languageofpoets andprophets,wehave the commonproseofthe historians; alongside of the pure Hebrew of Isaiah, the Aramaic-tintedHebrewofDaniel;andalongsideofthedialecticstyleofPaul,thesimple language of John. The writers put on their literary productionstheir ownpersonal stamp and the stampof their times. Thus theBibleitselftestifiestothefactthatitwasnotmechanicallyinspired.TheHolySpirit used the writers as HeHimself had formed them for their task,withoutinanywaysuppressingtheirpersonality.Hequalifiedthemandguidedthem,andthusinspiredthebooksofScriptureorganically.

2. THE EXTENT OF INSPIRATION. Different views were held in thecourseofhistory,notonlyrespectingthenatureofinspiration,butalsoastoitsextent.Thethreeviewsthatcomeintoconsiderationhereespeciallymaybedesignatedaspartialinspiration,thoughtinspiration,andverbalinspiration.

a. Partial inspiration.Under the influence of eighteenth centuryDeismandRationalism laxviewsof inspirationwerezealouslypropagatedandfoundreadyacceptanceinthetheologicalworld,andinsomecasesevenmet with adherents in the Churches. Le Clerc, who was originally a

Reformed theologian, but later on became an Arminian professor atAmsterdam,deniedthe inspirationofmanyof thehistoricalportionsofScripture, resolved that of the apostles into a sort of spiritualenlightenment and a strengthening of the faculties of the soul, andlimited that of the prophets to the time when they received theirrevelations.Fromhis timeon it becamequite common for theologians,who desired to maintain the doctrine of inspiration, at least in somesenseoftheword,tospeakofdegreesofinspiration.Theydistinguishedbetween the doctrinal and the historical portions of Scripture, andregarded the former,containingessential truths,withwhich thewritersweremadeacquaintedbyrevelation,asplenarilyinspired;andthelatter,containingnonessentialtruths,ofwhichthewritershadknowledgeapartfromrevelation,asonlypartiallyinspired,andasmarredbyinaccuraciesandmistakes.Therewerealsotheologians,however,whowereevenmorecompletely under the influence of Rationalism, and who accepted theideaofapartialinspirationdevoidofsupernaturalism.AccordingtothemthewritersoftheBiblesimplyenjoyedaspecialspiritualenlightenmentandguidance,whichofferednoguaranteeagainstallkindsofhistorical,chronological, archaeological, and scientificmistakes, but didmake thewriters reliable witnesses inmoral and spiritualmatters. Among thosewho adopt a partial inspiration of Scripture there is no unanimitywhatsoever.Somewouldlimitinspirationtodoctrinalmatters,otherstotheNewTestament,otherstothewordsofJesus,andstillotherstotheSermon on theMount. This shows as clearly as anything can that thetheoryispurelysubjective,andlacksallobjectivebasis.Themomentoneacceptsitinanyoneofitsmanyformsonehasvirtuallylostone'sBible.

AccordingtotheBibleinspirationextendsequallytoallpartsoftheWordofGod.TheLawandthehistoricalbooks,thePsalmsandtheProphets,theGospelsandtheEpistles,—theywereallwrittenundertheguidanceoftheHolySpirit,andarethereforeallinthesamemeasurehegraphe.Anappealtoanypartofit,isanappealtotheWordofGod,andthereforetoGodHimself.This is indicated invariousways.TheEpistlesofPaulareplacedonalevelwiththewritingsoftheOldTestament,whichareclearlyregardedas inspiredandauthoritativebyJesusand theapostles,2Pet.3:15,16.ItshouldbenotedthattheNewTestamentcontainsquotationsfromtwenty-fiveOldTestamentbooks,andamongtheseareseveralofa

historical character,which in the estimationof some are least, if at all,inspired. The Lord Himself and the New Testament writers evidentlyregardedeachoneofthesebooksasapartofhegraphe,andascribedtothemdivineauthority.Moreover,thereareseveralcollectivequotations,orcatenaeofquotations,thatis,quotationsgatheredfromseveralbooks,whicharealladvancedasequallyauthoritativetoprovethesamepoint,Rom. 3:10–18; Heb. 1:5–13; 2:12, 13. We cannot explain theinterpenetration of the divine and the human factors in Scripture, anymore than we can explain that of the two natures in Christ. Scripturepresentsitselftousasanorganicwhole,consistingofseveralparts,thatareinterrelatedinvariousways,andthatfindtheirunity inthecentral,all-controlling,andprogressivelyunfolding,thoughtofGodreachingouttoman, in order to redeemhim from sin and to bestow upon him theblessingsofeternalsalvation.Andthereforeweshouldnotaskwherethedivineendsand thehumanbegins,norwhere thehumanendsand thedivinebegins.Wemightjustaswellaskwhereinmanthesoulendsandthe body begins. No such line of demarcation can be pointed out.ScriptureisinitsentiretyboththeWordofGodandthewordofman.

b. Thought inspiration. Some who would defend the doctrine ofinspiration against its complete denial, are of the opinion that theadvocates of the doctrine should retrench somewhat, and speak ofthought—ratherthanofword—inspiration.Thethoughts, theysay,wereevidentlydivinelyinspired,butthewordsinwhichtheyareclothedwerefreely chosen by the human authors, and that without any divineguidance.Inthatwaytheyconsideritpossibletosatisfytherequirementsof the Biblical teaching respecting inspiration, and at the same timeaccountfortheimperfectionsanderrorsthatarefoundinScripture.Butsuch an inspiration of thoughts without words is an anomaly, and isreally inconceivable. Thoughts are formulated and expressed in words.Girardeaucorrectlyremarks:"Accuratethoughtcannotbedisjoinedfromlanguage.Wordsareitsvehiclesbothsubjectivelyandobjectively.Whenwethinkaccuratelyandprecisely,wethinkinwords.Togivethethoughttherefore, is togive thewords."AndDr.Orr,whowouldhimself ratherspeakofplenary thanofverbal inspiration,admits that the latternameexpresses a true and important idea,where it "opposes the theory thatrevelationandinspirationhaveregardonlytothoughtsandideas,while

thelanguageinwhichtheseideasareclothedislefttotheunaidedfacultyof the sacred penman."Moreover, he says: "Thought of necessity takesshape and is expressed in words. If there is inspiration at all, it mustpenetrate words as well as thought, must mould the expression, andmake the language employed the living medium of the idea to beconveyed."2Asweshallpointoutinthesequel,ScriptureclearlyteachestheinspirationofthewordsofScripture.

c. Verbal inspiration. There are somewho believe in the inspiration ofeverypartoftheBible,butwouldrathernotspeakofverbalinspiration,becausethisisapttosuggestthemechanicalideathatGoddictatedwhatthesecondaryauthorswrote.Theywouldprefertousetheterm"plenaryinspiration." Others, however, reject the idea of verbal inspirationaltogether,becausetheydonotbelieveinanyplenaryinspiration.Itmaybewell therefore to call particularly attention to the Scriptural data onthis point. (1) References to verbal communications. The PentateuchrepeatedlyreferstoverbalcommunicationsoftheLord.Theexpressions,"TheLordsaiduntoMoses"and"TheLordspokeuntoMoses,"servesofrequentlytointroduceawrittenmessage,thattheyalmosthavetheforceof a formula,Ex.3and4;6:1; 7:1;8:1; 10:1; 12:1;Lev. 1:1;4:1;6:1,24;7:22, 28; 8:1; 11:1. The Lord certainly did not speak toMoses withoutwords.ThewordoftheLordrepeatedlycametoJoshuainthesameway,Jos. 1:1; 4:1; 6:2; 8:1. (2) Prophets are conscious of bringing the verywordsoftheLord.TheprophetswereconsciousofthefactthattheLordspokethroughthem.Isaiahbeginshisprophecywiththewords:"Hear,Oheavens,andgiveear,Oearth,forJehovahhathspoken,1:2;andheandotherprophetsconstantlyusethewellknownpropheticformulae,"Thussaith the Lord" and, "Hear theword of the Lord." Jeremiah even says:"ThenJehovahputforthHishand,andtouchedmymouth;andJehovahsaiduntome,Behold,Ihaveputmywordsinthymouth,"1:9.InEzekielwe read: "Sonofman, go, get theeunto thehouse of Israel, and speakwithmywordsuntothem.…Sonofman,allmywordsthatIshallspeakuntotheereceiveinthyheart,andhearwiththineears.Andgo,gettheetothemofthecaptivity,untothechildrenofthypeople,andspeakuntothem,and tell them,Thussaith theLordJehovah,"3:4, 10,11. It isnotnecessarytomultiplytheexamples.(3)TheapostlesspeakofthewordsoftheOldTestamentandoftheirownwordsasthewordsofGod.Paul

explicitlysaysthathegivesinstruction,notinwordsofhisownchoosing,butinSpirit-taughtwords,1Cor.2:13,andclaimsthatChristisspeakinginhim,2Cor. 13:3.And in theEpistle to theHebrewsseveralwordsoftheOldTestamentarequoted,notaswordsofsomehumanauthor,butaswordsofGod,oroftheHolySpirit,1:5ff.;2:11–13;3:7;4:4,5,7;8:8;10:15–17.(4)Argumentsbasedonasingleword.TherearethreecasesinwhichJesusandPaulbaseawholeargumentontheuseofasinglewordof theOld Testament, John 10:35;Matt. 22:43–45;Gal. 3:16. In doingthis they give clear evidence of the fact that they regard the separatewords as inspired and infallible, and that the readers share theirconviction. If thiswere not the case, theywould not have been able toconsidertheirargumentsasconclusive.

D.AttemptstoDiscredittheDoctrineofInspiration

Severalattemptshavebeenmadetodiscreditorsetasidethedoctrineofinspiration. Of these the following may be considered as the mostimportant.

1. THEYWHO DEFEND IT ARE REASONING IN A CIRCLE.We areoftenaccusedofreasoning inacircle,whenwederiveourproof for theinspirationoftheBiblefromScriptureitself.BecausetheBibleistrue,weacceptitstestimonyrespectingitsinspiration,andbecauseitisinspired,we regard it as true.Apologetically, this argument canbemet, andhasfrequentlybeenanswered.Itispossible,forthesakeofargument,tostartoutwith the assumption that the books of the Bible are purely humanproductions, which, however, as the productions of eye-and ear-witnesses, which are known as men of high moral standing, can beregardedasentirelytrustworthy.Thenitcanbeshownthat,accordingtothese books, Christ and the apostles held the strictest view of theinspirationof theOldTestament.Fromthatpoint it isquitepossible toreach the conclusion that the Old Testament necessarily required acomplementsuchasisfoundintheNewTestament.AndonthebasisofthisitcanbesaidthatthereforethewholeBiblemustberegardedasaninspiredbook.Byreasoninginthatfashionthecircleisavoided.Thislineof argumentation is followed by Bannerman, Patton Warfield, VanOosterzee,andothers.Butitisaquestion,whetherthecirclereferredtoisreallyasviciousassomewouldhaveusbelieve.Jesusevidentlydidnot

think so, when a similar objection was raised against His testimonyconcerningHimselfastheincarnateWordofGod,John8:13f.Insociallife people frequently move in the same circle. If they are firmlyconvinced thataperson is thoroughly reliableand trustworthy, theydonothesitatetoreceivehistestimonyconcerninghimselfandhisactions,when others accuse him of deception and dishonesty. Girardeaupertinentlyremarks:"Supposeweshouldusetheargument:GoddeclaresthatHeistrue;thereforeGodistrue.HereGod'struthwouldbeprovedbyHis truth.Would thatbeavicious reasoning ina circle?Theatheistmightsay,YouassumethatthereisaGodoftruth.Sowedo,andsodoallsensiblemen."ThroughthetestimonyoftheHolySpiritinhishearttheChristian stands in the unwavering faith that God is true in Hisrevelation, and therefore it is a matter of course that he accepts thetestimonyofScripturerespectingitself.

2.JESUSDIDNOTTEACHTHEDOCTRINEOFINSPIRATION.Thoughmodern liberal scholars generally admit that Jesus and the apostlesacceptedtheOldTestamentastheinspiredWordofGod,therearesomeamongthemwho,intheirdenialofthedoctrineofinspiration,appealtoJesusasoveragainsttheapostles,andespeciallyPaul.Theapostles,theysay, firmlybelievedthat thewritingsof theOldTestamentwerewrittenunder inspiration. but Jesus did not share their opinion. And becausethey regard the testimony of Jesus as decisive, they feel justified inrejectingthedoctrineofinspiration.Buttheirfundamentalassumptioniscontrary to the data of Scripture, and apart from these we have noknowledge of what Jesus thought on this subject. They point in quiteanotherdirection.ThepositivestatementsofJesusrespectingtheabidingsignificance,authority,andinviolabilityoftheOldTestament,Matt.5:17,18; 24:35; Luke 16:17; John 10:35. His quotations from it as anauthoritativesource,andHisrepeateduseofit,leavenodoubtastothefactthatHe,aswellastheapostles,recognizedthedivineauthorityoftheOld Testament. Some who feel constrained to admit the force of theavailableevidence,butarenotwillingtodrawtheinevitableconclusion,seek refuge in theold accommodation theoryofSemler.We fully agreewithDr.Burrell,whenhesays:"Onethingisclear:whenJesusreferredtotheScripturesaswrittenbymenundertheinfluenceoftheSpirit,Heseparated those Scriptures generically from all other 'literature'

whatsoever.Tohismind, the inspirationof thesewriterswasasingularsortof inspiration,whichproducedasingularbook.Inhisteachingit isrepresented as the one book having authority."Moreover, it should beremembered that such a contradistinction between Jesus and theapostlesastheopponentsassume,inwhichtheattemptismadetoplayofftheformeragainstthelatter,isabsolutelyfalse,andresultsinthelossof the Word of God. We know nothing about Jesus save through thetestimonyoftheapostles.Hewhodiscreditstheapostlesbarsthewayforhimself and will never be able to discover what Jesus taught. He evencontradicts Jesus,who appointed the apostles as faithfulwitnesses andpromisedthemtheHolySpirit,toguidetheminallthetruth.

3.THEPHENOMENAOFSCRIPTURECONTRADICTTHEDOCTRINEOF INSPIRATION. Under the influence of historical criticism stillanother method has been employed to set aside the doctrine ofinspiration. They who employ this method are, at least in some cases,willing to admit that the Bible teaches its inspiration, but at the sametime maintain that a correct conception of this inspiration can beobtainedonlybytakingaccountofthepeculiarphenomenaofScripture,suchasdoublets,mistakes,contradictions,misappliedquotations,andsoon.Onlysuchadoctrineofinspirationcanberegardedastrue,whichwillenable one to account for all thesephenomena.The reasoningof thosewho take thispositionoften sounds veryplausible.Theydonotwant atheoryofinspirationthatisimposedonScripturefromwithout,butonethat is basedon an inductive study of the facts.But, howeverplausiblethisrepresentationmayseem,itdoesnotfitthecase.Accordingtoitmanfaces the phenomena of Scripture just as he faces the phenomena ofnatureandthefactsofhistory,whichhemustinterpretandsetforthintheirtruesignificance.It losessightofthefactthattheBiblecontainsavery clear doctrine respecting itself, which man must accept withchildlike faith.Even the phenomena of Scripturemaynot be cited as awitness against this testimony of Scripture. He who does this eo ipsorejects the authority of the Bible and virtually adopts a rationalisticstandpoint. Instead of humbly accepting the testimony of Scripture, heplaces himself above it as judge, and opposes to the testimony ofScripture his own scientific insight. History clearly teaches us that thehistorical-critical method does not lead to a generally accepted and

permanent result. The representations vary according to the differentstandpoint of the critics, and do not lead to a satisfactory doctrine ofScripture. It has already become abundantly evident that this methodleadstovariousviewsofScripture,whichareabsolutelycontraryto theteachingsofScriptureitself,—averitablebabelofconfusion.Ladd,whomno one will accuse of being prejudiced in favor of a strict view ofinspiration,saysthat,whiletheoldconceptionofScriptureastheWordofGodwasbrushedasideasuntenable,andseveralother theoriesweresuggestedasalternatives,notasingleonesucceededinentrenchingitselfintheheartsandmindsofChristianpeopleingeneral.

4. THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION APPLIES ONLY TO THEAUTOGRAPHA, AND THEREFORE HAS NO REAL PRACTICALVALUE. The fact that the doctrine of inspiration, as set forth in theprecedingpages,appliesonlytotheautographa(theoriginalwritingsoftheBiblicalauthors),whicharenomoreinourpossession,hasledsometo the rather hasty conclusion, that the problem of inspiration is of apurelyacademiccharacterandhasnopracticalbearingwhatsoever.Howcantheinspirationoftheoriginalsbeofanyvalueforus,theyask,ifwehave in our possession nothing but defective manuscripts? They oftengive the impression that this renders the entire contents of Scriptureuncertain,andthatconsequentlynoonecanappealtoitasadivineandauthoritativeWord. But something may be said in answer to this. Wewouldcertainlyexpect that theHolySpirit,whosocarefullyguided thewritersofScriptureintheinterestoffuturegenerations,wouldalsoguardand watch over His revelation, in order that it might really serve itspurpose.HenceReformedtheologianshavealwaysmaintainedthatGod'sspecial providence watched over Scripture. Inspiration naturally calledforconservation.Andhistorycertainlyfavorsthisideainspiteofallthevariationsthatexist.

Ifwebearinmindthattherearemorethan4000GreekMSS.oftheNewTestament,andinadditiontothat6000MSS.oftheVulgate,and1000ofother Latin translations, then we understand that it was practicallyimpossiblethatScriptureshouldbelosttotheworldforcenturies,justasmany of the writings of the Church Fathers were. Then we alsounderstandwhatKenyon,aneminentauthorityonthesubject,says:"The

numberofmanuscriptsoftheNewTestament,ofearlytranslationsfromit,andofquotationsfromitintheoldestwritersoftheChurchissolarge,thatitispracticallycertainthatthetruereadingofeverydoubtfulpassageispreservedinsomeoneorotheroftheseancientauthorities.Thiscanbesaidofnootherancientbookintheworld."Textualerrorsdidcreepintothe text in thecourseof frequent transcriptions,and thenumberof theexisting variations even sounds very considerable. Nestle speaks of150,000intheNewTestament,butaddsthataboutnineteen-twentiethsof these are devoid of real authority, and that of the remaining 7,500nineteen-twentiethsdonotalterthesenseofScriptureinanyway.MosesStuart points out that about ninety-five percent of all the existingvariations have about as much significance as the question in Englishorthography, whether the word 'honour' should be spelled with orwithout the 'u'. According toNestle there are about 375 variations thatbearonthesenseofScripture,andevenamongtheseareseveraloflittleimportance.Whileadmitting thepresenceofvariations,weshouldbearin mind what Moses Stuart says: Some change the sense of particularpassagesorexpressions,oromitparticularwordsorphrases;butnoonedoctrine of religion is changed, not one precept is taken away, not oneimportant fact altered,by thewholeof the various readings collectivelytaken."2Fromtheexistenceofthesevariationsitdoesnotfollowthatthedoctrineofverbalinspirationhasnopracticalvalue;butonlythatwedonotknowatpresentinwhatreadingwehavetheWordofGodonthoseparticularpoints.The important fact remains,however, thatapart fromthe relatively few and unimportant variations, which are perfectlyevident,weareinpossessionoftheverballyinspiredWordofGod.Andthereforeitisofgreatpracticalimportancethatwemaintainthedoctrineofverbalinspiration.

E.ObjectionstotheDoctrineofInspiration

Several objections have been raised against the doctrine of inspiration,andparticularlyagainstthedoctrineofverbal inspiration,anditcannotbe denied that some of them present real difficulties. It will not do toignore them, nor to laugh them out of court. They deserve carefulconsiderationandamoredetaileddiscussionthanwecandevotetothemhere.Wecannotevenbegintodiscussseparateobjectionsherewiththe

necessarycare.Thismustbelefttoworkswhichdealexclusivelywiththedoctrine of inspiration, such as Lee, The Inspiration of Scripture;Brannerman,TheInspirationof theScriptures;andMcIntosh,IsChristInfallibleandistheBibleTrue?Wecanonlyindicatethegeneralnatureof the objections, and give some general suggestions as to the way inwhichtheycanbemet.

1. GENERALNATUREOF THEOBJECTIONS. Some of the objectionsresultfromtheapplicationofthephilosophyofevolutiontotheoriginofthebooksoftheBible,aschemewhichdoesnotfitthefacts,andisthenmadetomilitateagainstthem.Theirforcenaturallydependsentirelyonthe truth or falsity of that philosophy. Others are derived from thesupposedinnerdiscrepanciesthatarefoundinScriptureas,forinstance,between the numbers in Kings and Chronicles, between the account ofJesus' publicministry in the Synoptics and in theGospel of John, andbetween the doctrine of justification in the Epistles of Paul and in theEpistle of James.Still others aredrawn from theway inwhich theOldTestament is quoted in the New. The quotations are not always takenfromtheHebrew,butfrequentlyfromtheSeptuagint,andarenotalwaysliteral.Moreover,thequotedwordsareofteninterpretedinawaywhichdoesnotseemtobejustifiedbythecontextinwhichtheyarefoundintheOldTestament.Thereareobjections,whichresultfromacomparisonofthe Biblical narratives with secular history as, for instance, that of thetakingofSamariabyShalmanezer; thatofSennacherib'smarchagainstJerusalemandtheslayingof185,000AssyriansbyanangeloftheLord;that of Esther's elevation to the position of queen; and that of theenrollmentmentioned in thesecondchapterofLuke.Again, it is foundthat themiracles of Scripture cannot be harmonized with belief in theinflexible laws of nature. The narratives of these miracles are simplydeclared to be exaggerated, naive representations of historical eventswhichmadeadeep imprssion,andafter the lapseofyearsassumedtheproportionsofmiraclesintheconsciousnessofacredulouspeople.Someobjections are the products of the moral judgment passed on Biblicalinjunctionsandpractices.AttentioniscalledtothejustalionisinthelawofMoses,tothepolygamythatwasprevalentamongtheIsraelites,totheterrible scene of moral corruption in the last chapters of the book ofJudges, to David's immorality, to the harem of Solomon, and so on.

Finally, texual criticism also gives rise to objections. Scripture in itsoriginaltext,wearetold,iscorrupt,anditstranslationsaredefective.TheMSS.revealallkindsofvariations,whichtestifytothecorruptionoftheoriginal,andthetranslationsarenotalwaysacorrectrepresentationofit.

2.GENERALREMARKSONTHEOBJECTIONSRAISED.Firstofallthegeneral remark must be made that, though we cannot ignore theobjectionsthatareraisedbutmusttakeaccountofthem,noonehastheright to demand of us that we make our belief in the inspiration ofScripturecontingentonourabilitytoremoveallobjectionsbysolvingtheproblemswhich theypresent. The objections raiseddonot constitute asufficient reason for setting aside the doctrine of inspiration, which isclearly taught inScripture.Thedoctrinesof theTrinity,ofcreationandprovidence,andoftheincarnation,areallburdenedwithdifficulties,butthesedonot justify anyone in rejecting the clear teachings of Scripturewith respect to those truths. Many of the teachings of science aresimilarly burdened and present problems which cannot be solved atpresent,butarenotthereforenecessarilydiscounted.Peopleconfidentlyspeakofatomsandelectrons,ofgenesandchromosomes, thoughthesestill present many problems. We should always bear in mind thestatementofDr.Warfield,thatitis"asettledlogicalprinciplethatsolongas the proper evidence by which a proposition is established remainsunrefuted, all so-called objections brought against it pass out of thecategory of objections to its truth into the category of difficulties to beadjustedtoit."

In connection with the common objections against the doctrine ofinspirationthefollowingpointsshouldbeborneinmind:

a.ThepresentdayoppositiontoScriptureanditsinspirationistoagreatextent,notmerelyscientific,butethical.Itclearlyrevealstheaversionofthenatural heart to the supernatural.Opposition is evokedby the veryfactthatScripturedemandsabsolutesubjection,thesubjectionofhumanreason to its authority. This ethical conflict is clearly seen in theopposition to the miracles, the incarnation, the virgin birth, theresurrectionofChrist,andothersupernaturalevents.

b.Manyoftheso-calledobjectionshavenofactualbasis,butarebornof

faultyassumptions.Theyoftenresult fromthewrongscientificattitude,which the opponent assumes to Scripture. If one takes for granted apriorilythatthecontentsofScriptureisnotthefruitofrevelationbutofnaturalevolution,thenmanyfactsandeventsappeartobeoutofplaceinthe framework inwhich theBibleplaces them.Then the lawsofMosesbecome an anomaly at the beginning of Israel's national existence, andthe books of Chronicles must be regarded as unhistorical. Then Jesusespeciallybecomesanhistoricalenigma.Again, if it istakenforgrantedthat all the events of history are controlled by an iron-clad system ofnaturallaws,andthesupernaturaliseliminated,thenthereis,ofcourse,noplaceforthemiraclesofScripture.AndifinthestudyoftheSynopticsadoubleor triple source theory is taken for granted, and these sourcesaremadethestandardoftruth,agreatdealofmaterialwillnaturallybesetaside.Butallsuchobjectionsaretheresultoffalseassumptions,andthereforeneednotbetakenseriously.

c. Several of the objections are exaggerated and can easily be reduced.Discrepanciesandcontradictionsaresometimeshastilyassumed,whichoncloserinspectionprovetobenodiscrepanciesorcontradictionsatall.Thereareso-calleddoubletsinJoshua,Judges,andthebooksofSamuel,which in fact are merely complementary narratives, introduced incharacteristicallyHebrewfashion.TheGospelofJohnhasbeendeclaredunhistorical, because its representation of the life of Jesus differs fromthatoftheSynoptics;buteventhesedifferencescanlargelybeexplainedinthelightofthecharacterandpurposeofthedifferentGospels.Abooklike that of Gregory, Why Four Gospels? is very illuminating on thispoint.

d. There are also a number of objections that would apply on theassumptionofamechanicalconceptionofinspiration,butlosetheirforceentirely if the inspiration of Scripture is organically conceived. Verbalinspiration is sometimesdenied, because thewriters indicate that theirliterary work is based on previous investigations, because theindividualityofthewritersisclearlyreflectedintheirwritings,orbecausetherearemarkeddifferencesofstyleandlanguage.Butitisquiteevidentthat these objections militate only against a mechanical view ofinspiration.

e. Finally, objections are frequently derived from the low moralconditionswhicharereflectedintheBible,especiallyinitsearliestbooks,andfromtheimperfections,deceptions,polygamy,andevenimmoralityofsomeofthechiefBiblecharacters,suchasNoah,Abraham,Jacob,Eli,David,andSolomon.ButthefactthattheBiblegivesafaithfulpictureofthetimesandthelivesofthesesaintscanhardlyconstituteanobjectionagainstitsinspiration.Thesituationwouldbedifferent,ofcourse,iftheBibleapprovedof suchconditionsoracts,oreven if it condoned them:butasamatteroffactitdoesquitethecontrary.

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY: What is plenary, in distinctionfrom verbal, inspiration? Does the fact that the Bible contains truthswhich transcend reason prove anything as to its inspiration? Is thedoctrineofinspirationconsistentwiththeevolutionaryviewofScripture?IftheBibleisnotverballyinspiredinallitsparts,howcanwedeterminewhich parts are, and which are not, inspired? What is the differencebetweenprophetic, lyric,chokmatic,andapostolicinspiration?Doesthedoctrine of inspiration imply that the evangelists always recorded theipsissima verba of Jesus? How does it square with the fact that thehumanauthorsoftheBiblesometimesderivetheirmaterialfromwrittensources? Is it possible todeny thedoctrineof inspirationandmaintainthe veracity of Jesus and the apostles? How did the inspiration of thewritersofScripturediffer from theordinary illuminationofChristians?How,fromtheinspirationofthegreatpoets?

REFERENCES:Bavinck,Geref.Dogm.,I,pp.406–476;Kuyper,Enc.derHeil,Godgel.,II,pp.369–511;id.,Dict.Dogm.,DeSacraScriptura,I,pp.86–100; II,pp.3:179; id.,DeHedendaagscheScriftcritiek;Honig, IsdeBijbel op Bovennatuurlijke Wijze Geinspireerd? Daubanton, DeTheopneustie der Heilige Schrift; Bannerman, Inspiration of theScriptures; Lee, The Inspiration of the Scripture; McIntosh, Is ChristInfallible and is the Bible True?, Patton, Inspiration of the Scriptures;McGregor,TheRevelationandtheRecord,pp.79–117;Given,Revelation,Inspiration, and the Canon, pp. 104–202; Orr, Revelation andInspiration,pp.155–218;Ladd,TheDoctrineofSacredScriptures,II,pp.452–494;Sanday,Inspiration;Warfield,RevelationandInspiration,pp.51–456;Girardeau,DiscussionsofTheologicalQuestions,pp.273–384;

Cunningham, Theological Lectures, pp. 343–411; Mead, SupernaturalRevelation,pp.279–317.

F.ThePerfectionsofScripture

The Reformation naturally brought the doctrine of Scripture to theforeground.DuringtheMiddleAgesthefictionofanapostolictradition,whichwassupposedtohavecomedowninoralformfromthedaysoftheapostles gradually crystallized and secured a firm hold on the Church.This tradition was placed on a level with the Bible as an authoritativesource of theological knowledge, and in practice was often treated assuperior to the Bible. It was regarded as the necessarywarrant for theauthority of the Bible, and as the indispensable guide for theinterpretationofScripture.Moreover, thehierarchicalChurchofRome,withitsclaimtoinfallibility,placeditselfabovethemboth.Itposedastheonlybodywhichcoulddetermine infalliblywhatwasandwhatwasnot,apostolic tradition, and which could give an infallible interpretation ofScripture.GreatemphasiswasplacedonthefactthattheBibleowesitsorigintotheChurch,andstandsinconstantneedofthetestimonyoftheChurch. The Reformers clearly saw that this position of the Church ofRomewasthefruitfulsourceofmanyerrors,andthereforefeltthatitwasincumbentonthemtocallthepeoplebacktotheBible,whichhadbeengreatlyneglected,andtostressitsautopistia.TooffsettheerrorsofRomethey deemed it necessary to develop the doctrine of the perfections ofScripture.Theythemselvesdidnotyetincludeasystematicpresentationof this in their works, but their successors did. It occupies a veryimportantplace inthewritingsofMusculus,Zanchius,Polanus,Junius,and others. We conclude our study of the principium cognoscendiexternumwithabriefdiscussionoftheperfectionsofScripture.

1. THEDIVINEAUTHORITYOF SCRIPTURE. The divine authority ofScripture was generally accepted until the chill winds of RationalismsweptoverEuropeandcausedtheenthusiasmoffaithtogodowntothefreezingpoint.ThismeansthatinthedaysoftheReformationtheChurchofRomeaswell as theChurches thatparted companywith it, ascribeddivine authority to Scripture. But in spite of the fact that RomanCatholicsandProtestantshadtheprincipleofauthorityincommon,theywerenotaltogetheragreedastothenatureofthisauthority.Therewasa

veryimportantdifferenceofopinionwithrespecttothegroundonwhichitrests.OnthepartofRometherewasanever-increasingdenialof theautopistia of Scripture, that is, of its inherent authority. It maintainedthat the Church temporarily and logically precedes Scripture, andtherefore does not owe its existence to Scripture, but exists in and byitself, that is, through Christ or the indwelling Spirit of God. ScriptureratherowesitsexistencetotheChurch,andisnowfurtheracknowledged,preserved, interpreted,anddefendedby it.Without theChurch there isnoScripture,butwithoutScripturethereisstillaChurch.

Over against this position of Rome, the Reformers emphasized theautopistiaofScripture,thedoctrinethatScripturehasauthorityinandofitselfastheinspiredWordofGod.Theydidnothesitatetoascribegreatimportance to the testimony of the Church to Scripture as a motivumcredibilitatis, but refused to regard this testimony of theChurch as thefinalgroundfortheacceptanceofScripture.TheyfirmlymaintainedthepositionthattheBiblemustbebelievedforitsownsake.ItistheinspiredWord of God and therefore addresses man with divine authority. TheChurchcanandshouldacknowledgetheBibleforwhatitis,butcaninnosense of the wordmake it what it is. The Protestant principle is, saysThornwell,"thatthetruthsoftheBibleauthenticatethemselvesasdivinebytheirownlight."

InProtestantcircles,however,adisputearoseintheseventeenthcenturyrespecting the authority of Scripture. While Scripture as a whole wasrecognized as the only and sufficient rule of faith and practice, thequestion was raised, whether every part of it should be regarded asauthoritative. In seeking an answer to this question it became evidentthatitwasnecessarytodistinguishbetweentheWordofGodinaformaland in a material sense, and between an auctoritas historica and anauctoritasnormativa.Scripturehasfirstofallhistoricalauthority,thatis,it is a true and absolutely reliable record, and as such is entitled to abelievingacceptanceofallthatitcontains.Butinadditiontothatitalsohas normative significance, as a rule of life and conduct, and as suchdemandsabsolutesubjectiononthepartofman.Andinconnectionwiththis the difficult question arose, in how far the normative value that isascribedtoScriptureasawholealsobelongstoitsseparateparts.Dothe

historicalpartsoftheBible,dothelawsofMoses,anddothewordsofthespeakersthatareintroducedinScripturehavenormativesignificanceforus?Happily,weneednotgropeaboutentirely in thedarkhere, for theBible itself teachesus tomakedistinctionswith respect to thispoint. Itdoes not demand that we keep every one of the precepts which itcontains. It disapproves of some and calls attention to the temporarycharacterof others.Reformed theologiansnever attempted to laydownhardand fast rulesbywhichwecanbegoverned in thismatter.Heppegivessomeexamplesofthemannerinwhichtheydealtwiththematter.Voetiussaysthatabsolutenormativesignificancemustbeascribedtothewordsandworks(a)ofGod,(b)ofChristasGodandman,and(c)oftheangels. Moreover, he regards those words of the prophets and of theapostles as normative, in which they as public teachers, orally or inwriting,edifytheChurch.HeascribesnormativeauthoritytotheirdeedsonlywhentheyareapprovedbyScripture.Ontheotherhand,hedoesnotregardallthewordsofJobasnormative,northewordsofthefriendsofJob. Others explicitly exclude the words of the devils and of wickedpersons.VoetiusholdsthatthewritingsoftheOldTestamentarejustasnormative as those of theNew Testament. Grosheide calls attention tothe fact that absolute normative significancemust be ascribed to thosestatementsorcommandsofGodwhichareclearly intendedforallages,and toallpositivestatementsofanethicalordogmaticalcharacter;butthatnosuchauthoritycanbeascribed to thewordsofSatan,ofwickedpersons,orevenofthepious,exceptwhentheyareclearlyspeakinginthenameofGodormakestatementsthatarefullyinharmonywiththemorallaw;nor topurelyhistoricalnarrativespertaining to the thingsofeverydaylife.Ingeneralitwillnotbedifficulttodetermine,whetheracertainpartofScripturehasnormativevalueforus.Yettherearecasesinwhichthedecisionisnoteasy.Itisnotalwayspossibletosay,whetheracertainScripturalprecept,whichwasclearlynormativefortheoriginalreaders,stillhasnormativesignificanceforus.Onthewhole it iswell tobear inmind that the Bible is not exactly a code of laws, and is far moreinterestedintheinculcationofprinciplesthanintheregulationoflifebyspecificprecepts.EventhelawsofMosesandthehistoryofIsraelastheOldTestamentpeople ofGod embodyprinciples of permanent validity.Sometimes wemay come to the conclusion that, while certain laws nomoreapplyintheexactforminwhichtheywerecast,yettheirunderlying

principleisjustasbindingtodayasiteverwas.IndubiouscasesweshallhavetobeguidedtoagreatextentbytheanalogyofScriptureandbythemorallaw.

In modern liberal theology very little remains of the normativesignificanceoftheBible.SchleiermacherdeniedthenormativecharacteroftheOldTestamentaltogether,andregardedonlytheNewTestamentasa norm for the Church. And he ascribed this significance to the NewTestament,notonaccountofitssupernaturalinspiration,forhedidnotbelieve in this, but because he saw in it the record of the religiousexperiencesofmen,who,astheimmediateassociatesofJesus,enjoyedaspecial measure of spiritual illumination. Ritschl did not ascribenormative significanceeven to theNewTestament,but saw in itonlyavaluable historical record of the beginnings of Christianity, and in nosenseofthewordaruleoffaith.Hefeltfreetorejectallthoseelementswhichdidnotharmonizewiththepostulatesofhisownsystemandhadno real value for the revelation in Christ as the real founder of theKingdom of God, nor for the Christian life, as he conceived of it. Ingeneralitmaybesaidthatthesetwomendeterminedtheattitudewhichmodern liberal theology assumes with reference to the Word of God.Strange to say, some present day Dispensationalists, who are stronglyopposed to all Liberalism, alsomaintain that theOld Testament is notnormative for us. They fully recognize the inspiration of the OldTestament,andconsiderittobenormativefortheJews,butnotforNewTestament believers. Cook expresses himself very clearly on this point,whenhesaysthat"inalltheOldTestamentthereisnotasentencethatapplies to the Christian as a Rule of Faith and Practice—not a singlecommandthat isbindingonhim,as there isnotasinglepromise theregivenhimatfirsthand,exceptwhatisincludedinthebroadflowoftheplanofRedemptionastheretaughtinsymbolandprophecy."

2. THE NECESSITY OF SCRIPTURE. Because the Church of Romeproceeds on the assumption that the Church takes precedence overScripture, it cannotverywell acknowledge theabsolutenecessityof thelatter. The Church, which derives its life from the Holy Spirit, is self-sufficientand thereforeautopistos.While itdoesneed tradition, itdoesnot reallyneedScripture,nomatterhowuseful thismaybeasanorm.

TheLordreferredthosetowhomHebroughtHisdoctrine,nottoabook,buttothelivingvoiceofHisapostlesandoftheChurch."Hewhohearethyou," He said to the apostles, "heareth me." Moreover, nearly twentyyearselapsedaftertheascensionofChristbeforeasinglebookoftheNewTestamentcameintoexistence,andduringallthattimeanappealtotheNewTestamentwasnaturallyoutofthequestion.AccordingtoRomeitisfar more correct to say that the Bible needs the Church than that theChurch has need of the Bible. The denial of the necessity of Scripture,however, was not limited to the Church of Rome. Even in the earlyChurch some of the mystical sects, such as the Montanists and theCathari regarded theBible asquite superfluous.And in thedaysof theReformation the Anabaptists and the Libertines of Geneva were of thesameopinion.TheAnabaptists especially exalted the innerword at theexpenseoftheexternal.TheydidnotregardtheBibleasthetrueWordofGod, but only as a testimony, a description, a dead and thoroughlyimpotent letter. In their estimation the real and trueWord ofGodwasspokenbytheHolySpirit in theheartsofGod'speople.SchleiermacheralsotaughtthatScripturewasproducedbytheChurch,andissimplythesupreme,andthereforealsoauthoritative,expressionofitsreligiouslife.Thismaybesaid tobe theprevalentview inmodernLiberalism,whichdrawsforitstheologyfarmoreontheChristianconsciousness,informedbythecurrentteachingsofscienceandphilosophy,thanontheBibleastheWordofGod.

When the Reformers defended the necessity of Scripture over againstRome and the Anabaptists, they did not deny that the Church existedbeforeMoses'day,northattheNewTestamentChurchwasinexistencelong before therewas a canon of theNewTestament.Neither did theydefendthepositionthatScripturewasabsolutelynecessary,inthesensethatGodcouldnothavemademanacquaintedwiththewayofsalvationinsomeotherway.TheyconsideredScripturetobenecessaryinvirtueofthegoodpleasureofGodtomaketheWordtheseedoftheChurch.Evenbefore the time ofMoses the unwrittenword served that purpose.AndtheNewTestament did not come into existence apart from the spokenwordofJesusandtheapostles.Aslongasthesewitnessesofthefactsofredemptionlived,therewaslittleneedofawrittenword,butwhentheyfell away, this changed at once. The historical character of God's

revelation,thehistoryofredemption,andtheredemptivefactswhichdidnot admit of repetition, andwere yet of the greatest significance for allcominggenerations,madeitnecessarytocommitGod'sspecialrevelationtowriting. From that point of view Scripture remains necessary to theveryendoftime.InthissenseofthewordReformedtheologyhasalwaysdefendedthenecessityofScripture.EvenBarth,whodoesnotsharetheReformed conception of the Bible as the infallible Word of God, feelsconstrainedtodefenditsnecessityasawitnesstothedivinerevelation.

3. THEPERSPICUITYOFSCRIPTURE. In the estimation ofRome theBibleisobscure,andisbadlyinneedofinterpretationeveninmattersoffaithandpractice.Itcontainsdeepmysteries,suchasthedoctrineoftheTrinity,of the incarnation,andothers,and isoftensoobscure that it isliabletobemisunderstood.Forthatreasonaninfallibleinterpretationisneeded, and this is supplied by the Church. Peter says distinctly thatsome parts of the Bible are hard to understand, and the experience ofcenturiesprovesconclusivelythat,withouttheinfallibleinterpretationofthe Church, it is impossible to reach the desired unity in theinterpretation of Scripture. Over against this position of the RomanCatholicChurchtheReformersstressedtheperspicuityofScripture.Theydid not intend to deny that there are mysteries in the Bible whichtranscendhumanreason,butfreelyadmittedthis.Neitherdidtheyclaimsuch clarity for Scripture that the interpreter can well dispense withscientificexegesis.Asamatterof fact, theyengaged inexegetical laborsfarmore than thevotariesofRome.Moreover, theydidnotevenassertthat the way of salvation is so clearly revealed in Scripture that everyman,whetherhebeenlightenedbytheHolySpiritornot,andwhetherornothebedeeplyinterestedinthewayofsalvation,caneasilyunderstandit. Their contention was simply that the knowledge necessary untosalvation, though not equally clear on every page of Scripture, is yetconveyed to man throughout the Bible in such a simple andcomprehensible form that one who is earnestly seeking salvation can,undertheguidanceoftheHolySpirit,byreadingandstudyingtheBible,easilyobtainforhimselfthenecessaryknowledge,anddoesnotneedtheaidandguidanceoftheChurchandofaseparatepriesthood.Naturally,theydidnotmean tominimize the importanceof the interpretationsoftheChurchinthepreachingoftheWord.TheypointedoutthatScripture

itselftestifiestoitsperspicuity,whereitisdeclaredtobealampuntoourfeet,andalightuntoourpath.Theprophetsandtheapostles,andevenJesusHimself,address theirmessagestoall thepeople,andnever treatthemasminorswhoarenotabletounderstandthetruth.Thepeopleareevendeclaredtobeabletojudgeandtounderstand,1Cor.2:15;10:15;1John2:20.BecauseofitsperspicuitytheBiblecanevenbesaidtobeself-interpretive. The Reformers had this in mind, when they spoke of aninterpretatiosecundumanalogiamfideiorScripturae,andlaiddownthegreat principle, Scriptura Scripturae interpres. They did not regard thespecial task of the Church in the interpretation of the Bible assuperfluous, but explicitly recognized the duty of the Church in thisrespect.HencetheyspokeofthepotestasdoctrinaeoftheChurch.

4. THE SUFFICIENCY OF SCRIPTURE. Neither Rome nor theAnabaptistsregardedtheBibleassufficient.ThelatterhadalowopinionofScripture,andassertedtheabsolutenecessityoftheinnerlightandofallkindsofspecialrevelations.TheyattachedverylittleimportancetotheministryoftheWord.Oneoftheirpetsloganswas,"Theletterkilleth,butthe Spirit maketh alive." From the time of the Middle Ages Romemaintained the absolute necessity of oral tradition as a complement tothewrittenword.Thistraditionwasnotalwaysclearlydefined.Thetermoriginallycoveredoral teachingsandcustomsofapostolicorigin.But inthemeasure inwhich theChurchmoved fartherand fartheraway fromtheapostolicage, itbecame increasinglydifficult todetermine,whethercertain teachings really camedown from the apostles.Hence it becamenecessarytodefinethecharacteristicsofwhatmighttrulyberegardedasapostolictradition.AnattemptatthiswasmadeintheruleofVincentiusLerinensis, who declared that to be apostolic which was believedeverywhere,always,andbyall(ubique,semper,etabomnibus,creditumest). Real apostolic tradition could therefore be recognized by the factthat itwasbelieved everywhere, at all times, andby thewholeChurch.This definition was adopted by all later Roman Catholic theologians,though in actual practice it was modified. It was very difficult todetermine,whetheracertaintruthwasalwaysbelieved,andthereforethequestion gradually took on the more contemporaneous form, whethersuchatruthisatanyparticulartimegenerallybelieved.Theantiquityofthe truth was sacrificed to its universality, and the really important

questionwas ignored. Itwas tantamount to saying that it could not bedetermined, whether a certain teaching actually came down from theapostles. But even so a formidable difficulty remained. In seeking ananswertothequestionwhowastopassonthisquestionofuniversality,itwas held that the Church in general could not do this, but only theecclesiadocens,thebishopsintheircouncils.ThisisstillthepositionoftheOld Catholic Church. But even this position proved untenable. Thequestionarose,Whenarethebishopsinfallibleindeterminingthenatureofatradition,always,oronlywhentheyaremetincouncil?Andiftheycan give infallible decisions only when they have come together, musttheirvotebeunanimousorisamajoritysufficienttolendweighttotheirdecision? And if a majority is sufficient, how great must this be; is amajorityofonesufficient?Theresultofall thesedeliberationswas thatthePopewas finallydeclared infallible inmattersof faith andpractice,when speaking ex cathedra. If the Pope now declares something to beapostolic tradition, that settles the matter, and what is so declaredtherebybecomesbindingontheChurch.

Over against the position that Scripture needs some complement, theReformers asserted the perfectio or sufficientia of Scripture. Thisdoctrinedoesnotmeanthateverything thatwasspokenandwrittenbytheprophets,byChrist,andbytheapostles,isincorporatedinScripture.TheBibleclearlyprovesthatthisisnotthecase,1Kings4:33;1Cor.5:9;Col.4:16;2Thess.2:5.Neitherdoesitmeanthatallthearticlesoffaithare found in finished form inScripture.TheBible containsnodogmas;these can be derived from it only by a process of reflection. TheReformersmerelyintendedtodenythatthereisalongsideofScriptureanunwritten Word of God with equal authority and therefore equallybinding on the conscience. And in taking that position they took theirstandonScripturalground.InScriptureeachsucceedingbookconnectsupwiththepreceding(exceptincontemporarynarratives),andisbasedonit.ThePsalmsandtheProphetspresupposetheLawandappealtoit,and to itonly.TheNewTestament comes tousas the fulfilmentof theOldandrefersbacktonothingelse.OraltraditionscurrentinthetimeofJesus are rejected as human inventions,Matt. 5:21–48; 15:4, 9; 1 Cor.4:6. Christ is presented to us as the acme of the divine revelation, thehighest and the last, Matt. 11:27; John 1:18; 17:4, 6; Heb. 1:1. For the

knowledgeofthewayofsalvationwearereferredtoScriptureonly,totheword of Christ, and of the apostles, John 17:20; 1 John 1:3. TheReformers did recognize a Christian tradition, but only a Christiantradition based on, and derived from, Scripture, and not one thatequalledorevensurpasseditinauthority.

QUESTIONSFORFURTHERSTUDY:HowdoRomanCatholicsdefendthe authority of tradition alongside of that of Scripture?Why do theyattachsomuchimportancetoapostolictradition?IsitrighttolimitthenormativeauthorityofScripturetothosepartswhichteachthedoctrineofsalvation?HasScriptureanyauthority inmattersof scienceandart?Does the Bible in any way testify to its necessity? How does modernliberal theology judge of this? Do not the many contradictoryinterpretationsofScripturedisproveitsperspicuity?HowdotheorallawoftheJewsandtheoraltraditionoftheRomanCatholicscompare?IstheappealoftheMysticsto2Cor.3:6todisprovethesufficiencyofScripture,tenable?

REFERENCES: Bavinck, Geref. Dogm. I, pp. 476–527; Kuyper, Dict.Dogm.,DeSacraScripturaII,pp.190–241;Ladd,TheDoctrineofSacredScriptureII,pp.514–610;Cunningham,Theol.Lectures,pp.459–516;D.S.Schaff,OurFathers'FaithandOurs,pp.147–170;Wilmers,HandbookoftheChr.Rel.,pp.120–151;Heppe,Dogm.derev.ref.Kirche,pp.9–31;id.,Dogm.desdeutschenProtestantismusimzechzehntenJahrhundertI,pp.211–257;Mead,SupernaturalRevelation,pp.318–355;Schmid,Doct.Theol.of theEv.Luth.Church,pp.61–101;Gravemeijer,LeesboekoverdeGeref.GeloofsleerI,pp.244–267;Burgess,TheProtestantFaith,pp.59–94.

V.ThePrincipiumCognoscendiInternum

The knowledge of God presupposes, not only that God has revealedHimself,butalsothatmaniscapable,eitherconstitutionallyorbyvirtue

of a gracious work of renewal, of receiving and appropriating thisrevelation. Ifmandidnothave that ability, thedivine revelation,whileexistingobjectively,wouldforeverremainforeigntohimandexercisenoinfluence on his life. All knowledge, and consequently also all science,requires a certain correspondence between subject and object. Thismeans that alongside of the principium cognoscendi externum theremust also be a principium cognoscendi internum, a principium inmanwhichenableshimtodiscernandtoappropriateGod'sspecialrevelation.Naturally, theabsolute Idealistwouldnotsubscribe to thisposition, foraccordingtohimknowledgenotonlycallsforacorrespondencebetweensubjectandobject,but forthe identityof thetwo.EventheTheologyofCrisisfeelsconstrainedtoputthematterinadifferentform.Itrecognizesnoobjectivelyexistingrevelation;nordoesitbelieveinapointofcontactin the life of man for special revelation. Revelation simply is notrevelationuntil it isbroughthometotheheartofmaninfaith.Butthisfaith is not a permanent receptivity in man for an objectively existingrevelation, but is given in and with the revelation itself whenever GodrevealsHimself.Thismeansthatonthispointthedistinctionbetweenthesubjective and the objective is really cancelled. Reformed theology,however,recognizestheexistenceofaprincipiumcognoscendiinternum,andthequestionnaturallyarises.Whatisthenatureofthisprincipium?Inthecourseofhistoryseveralanswershavebeengiventothatquestion.Theorganbywhichman judgesandappropriates therevelationofGodwas sought successively: (A) in the human understanding, (B) inspeculative reason, (C) in devout feeling, and (D) in the moralconsciousness.Weshallconsiderthesesuccessively.

A.TheHumanUnderstanding

Some sought the principium cognoscendi internum in the humanunderstandingingeneral,asdistinguishedfromwhatismorespecificallycalledthespeculativereason.Itwastheirpersistentattempttoestablishthetruthonhistorico-apologeticalgrounds.

1.HISTORICALSTATEMENTOFTHISPOSITION.

a. Up to the time of the Reformation. In view of the fact that therevelation of God in Christ does not minister to the pride of man but

ratherhumbleshim,itnaturallymetwithagreatdealofoppositionandwas repeatedly in need of defense. This was necessary even in theapostolic age, so that theBible itself contains apologetical elements. InthesecondcenturytheApologetesdefendedthetruthofChristianityoveragainstJewsandGentiles,andgaveanaccountofthegroundsonwhichitrests.Theydidnottaketheirstartingpointindoubtorinanyso-calledneutrality,butinanunwaveringfaithandcalledattentiontothesuperiorexcellency of Christianity, to the redemptive message of specialrevelation, to the antiquity and unity, the simplicity and sublimity, thefulnessandmany-sidednessofScripture,topropheciesandmiracles,andto the testimony of the Church and the blessings of the gospel. TheseargumentswererepeatedinthewritingsoftheantiGnosticfathersandinlatertheology,thoughtheyweresometimestreatedinotherconnectionsanddidnotalwaysassumethesamecharacter.

Scholasticism also took its starting point in faith, but by its attempt tochange religious truths into concepts of reason effected a separation ofnaturalandsupernaturaltruthsthatwasdetrimentaltoboth.Accordingtothemtheformercouldbeprovedbyreason,butthelattercouldonlybeacceptedonauthority.Intheformerscientificcertaintywaspossible,butinthelatteritwasnotpossibletoriseabovetheleveloffaith.Theorderwhich they usually followed, though with several variations, was thefollowing:firsttheysoughttodemonstratebyrationalargumentationthetruths of natural revelation; then they proved in a similar way thepossibility, necessity, and reality of special revelation; and finally theyurgedreason,onthemeregroundoftheexistenceofaspecialrevelation,toacceptitscontentsblindlyinfaith.Themotivesthatwereadducedforbelief in a special revelationwere generally calledmotiva credibilitatis.TheargumentthatScriptureasadivinerevelationrestsonthetestimonyoftheChurchwasdevelopedbytheRomanCatholicsespeciallyaftertheReformation. All such arguments, however, though they maydemonstrate the reasonableness of accepting Scripture as theWord ofGod, can only produce a fides humana and never a fides divina. EvenamongtheRomanCatholicssomearewillingtoadmitthis,thoughonthewhole they have a high opinion of Apologetics. The general RomanCatholic representation as to the way in which man arrives at theknowledge of God's revelation is the following: (1) Supernatural

revelation rises on the basis of natural revelation, and can only beappropriated successively by degrees. (2) By various proofsman in hisnatural state is first led to the natural theology, which constitutes thepreambleoffaith.Atthispointevenscienceispossible,sincetheproofsaredemonstrative.Ordinarilywecannotyetspeakof faithat thisstage.(3) He who has reached this point is now, through the motives ofcredibility,ofwhichtheChurchisthemostimportant,putinapositiontosee and admit the trustworthiness of God's revelation and thereasonableness of faith. (4) After man has thus been led to the fideshumana (human faith) he is raised by an infused grace to thesupernaturalorderandprepareshimselfbygoodworksforthevisionofGod.

b.After theReformation.TheProtestants took adifferentposition, butdidnotalwaysconsistentlymaintainit.TheReformersdidnottaketheirstartingpoint inhuman reason,but in theChristian faith, and stressedthefactthatthisfaithrestsonlyondivineauthorityandiswroughtbytheHoly Spirit. Protestant theologians did not always remain true to thisprinciple, but frequently returned to thedoctrine of anatural theology,and to the historical proofs for the truth of revelation. Under theinfluenceofCartesius,whotookhisstartingpointindoubt,RationalismgraduallyfounditswayintotheChurches,andthehistorico-apologeticalmethod came into vogue. It clearly came to the foreground inSupranaturalism. In the application of thismethod the purposewas toprovethatGodhasrevealedHimselfinasupernaturalwayratherthantoexhibit the reasonableness of revelation. And in order to prove this,attention was called to the miracles of Scripture, to the fulfilment ofprophecies, often of a very special character, to the strikingcorrespondenceof thevariouspartsofScripture, to themoral influenceof thegospel, andsoon.Thepurposewas to leadmen to faithby suchintellectual considerations. It cannotbedenied that somewho followedthismethoddiditwiththebestintentions.SomeoftheirworksareevennowmentionedwithhonorinChristianApologetics,thoughthemethodnow followed and the arguments adduced are quite different. Yet thismethod was bound to lead to Rationalism. Even Butler could pen asentencelikethefollowing:"ForthoughnaturalreligionisthefoundationandprincipalpartofChristianity, it isnot inanysensethewholeof it."

Reason is accorded the right to examine and explain the credentials ofrevelation, and is thus placed above Scripture. For that reason thismethodstandscondemnedfromatheologicalpointofview.Moreover,itsuntenableness clearly appeared from the history of Supranaturalismitself,andfromthesharpcriticismofRousseauandLessing,ofKantandSchleiermacher. For a long time even Reformed authors continued tospeak of natural theology as fundamental theology, but in manyReformedcirclesitisentirelydiscreditedatpresent.

2.EVALUATIONOFTHISPOSITION.Asintimatedinthepreceding,thehistorico-apologetical method does not meet with approval from atheologicalpointofview,because itunderratesbothreligioustruthandfaith.Religioustruthisnotlikesometheoremofscience,andfaithisnotpurely intellectual insight into some result of scientific investigation.Baillie calls attention to the fact that thiswholemethodof reasoning iscalled in question today. It also does scant justice to the Christianreligion. TheWord of God presupposes the darkness and error of thenaturalman,andwouldthereforecontradictitself,ifitsubmitteditselftothe judgment of thatman. It would thereby acknowledge one as judgewhomithadfirstdisqualified.Finally, thismethoddoesnot leadto thedesired result. In the beginning of the previous century miracles andpropheciescouldserveasproofs,butinthepresentdaytheythemselvesrequireproof.

Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatApologeticsisdevoidofallrealvalue.Itmayundoubtedlyserveausefulpurposeinsomerespects,butcannot,without forfeiting its theological character, precede faith nor prove thetruth of revelation a priorily. It presupposes in its votaries a believingacceptance of the truth. A threefold valuemay be ascribed to it: (a) Itcompelstheologytogiveanaccountofitscontentsandofthegroundsonwhich it rests, and thus promotes theological self-consciousness, (b) Itmakes the Christian conscious of the fact that he need not feelembarrassed in the presence of the enemy, but finds support innatureandhistory,inscienceandart,andintheheartandconscienceofeveryman.(c)Thoughitcannotofitselfbringanymantotheacknowledgmentofthetruthbycompellingproofs, itmay, liketheministryoftheWord,give him a profound impression of the truth, which he cannot easily

shakeoff.

In actual practice, however. Apologetics has oftenmoved in the wrongdirection,(a)Ithasdivorceditselffromfaith,assumingaplaceoutsideofabove,andprecedingtheology,andhastherebylaidclaimtoanauthoritytowhich it is not entitled, (b) It has separated faith and knowledge insuchawayastocausereligioustruthtorestwhollyorinpartonpurelyintellectualgrounds,somethingthatisentirelycontrarytothenatureofthat truth. (c)Theresultwas that it cherishedexaggeratedexpectationswith reference to its scientific labors, as if it could change the heartthrough the intellect, and bymeans of sound reasoning could cultivatepiety.

B.SpeculativeReason

The position of thosewho regarded speculative reason as the organ bywhich to discern, and judge, and appropriate religious truth, did notdifferessentially fromthosewhoascribedthese functionsto thehumanunderstanding in general. The one as well as the other made humanreason the arbiter of the truth aswell as its appropriating organ. BothbelongtothatbroadercategorygenerallyknownasRationalism.Andoneof the fundamental assumptions ofRationalism, says Paterson is, "thatthe mind has been restricted to the use of its natural powers in thediscovery andappropriationof religious andmoral truth.Thenotion isrejected thatatanystageof theprocess themindhasbeenaidedbyanimmediateactionuponitoftheDivineSpirit,astheresultofwhichitisenabled to take possession of truth thatwould otherwise lie beyond itskenandgrasp."Atthesametimetheywhoexaltedspeculativereasontotheplace of honorpresented a system thatwas farmoreprofound andcomprehensive than thatofvulgarRationalism, that is, theRationalismof theWolffian type. Theymade speculative reason not only the normandthenecessaryfacultyforthereceptionofthetruth,butevenregardeditas thesourceof the truth,andbysodoingbroke themoreeffectivelywiththeideaofaspecialdivinerevelation.

1. HISTORICAL STATEMENT OF THIS POSITION. The vulgarRationalism of the eighteenth century, represented by Deism and theWolffianschoolofphilosophy,finallyyieldedtothecriticalonslaughtsof

Rousseau and Lessing, of Kant and Schleiermacher. The superficialstructurewhichitrearedwassweptfromitsfoundation.WithKantandSchleiermacher theautonomyof thesubjectbegan.At first thereactionwent so far as to discount the objectiveworld. According to Kantmancannot know noumena or the essence of things, but knows merelyphenomena,andeventheseonlyintheformswhichthethinkingsubjectimposesonthem.Thesubjectthusproducestheformofthephenomenalworld.Fichtewentastepfartheranddeniedtheexistenceofanobjectiveworld,indistinctionfromthesubject.Inhisopiniontheworldofexternalthings exists only in the one universalmind and is the product of thismind.AtfirstSchleiermacheralsoassumedthisstandpoint.Incourseoftimeitwasfelt,however,thattheremustbesomethingthathasobjectivereality and thereforenormative value.That consideration led to the so-called restauration, in which the attempt wasmade to get back to theobjective,while retaining the same subjective starting point.Hegelwasthegreatrepresentativeofthistendency.Heraisedthesubjective,ethicalIdealism of Fichte to an objective, logical Idealism, and substituted forthe idea of being that of becoming. In his systemof thought thewholeworldbecameaprocess, adevelopmentof the logical idea, inwhichallbeingissimplyrepresentedasthought.Inthatevolutionreligionalsohasits place. It, too, is pure thought or knowledge, namely, the knowledgewhichtheAbsolutehasofitselfinformsoftheimagination.Itisclothedin forms and symbols, or pictorial representations, of which onlyspeculativereasoncanfathomthedeepsignificance.AccordingtoHegelitisthetaskofphilosophytoridthedogmasofreligionoftheirhistoricalforms,whichareafterallmerehusks,andtodiscoverandelucidatetheidea, which is the precious hidden kernel. Thus the great truths ofChristianity,suchasthedoctrineoftheTrinity,oftheincarnation,oftheatonement, and others, not only became objects of philosophicalspeculation,butintheiressentialnatureandidealformreallybecamethefruitsofthisspeculation.ApartfromScriptureandeveryotherauthority,thesetruthswererepresentedasnecessarythoughtsofreason,andwerethereforeshowntobehighlyreasonable.Therealproofforthetruthsofreligionwasfoundinthefactthattheypresentedthemselvestothemindas necessary thoughts. This was in harmony with the fundamentalprinciple of Hegel: "All that is rational is real."Whatever one thoughtwith logical necessity and proved to be a coherent part of the whole

system of truth, was regarded as true. Logical necessity of thought orcoherence was thusmade the standard of truth inmatters of religion.This method was applied in theology by Daub, Marheineke, Strauss,Vatke,Weisse,Biedermann, andothers, thoughnot always to the samedegree, nor with the same result. It also found some favor among thefollowersofSchleiermacher, the fatherofmodern theology,whosharedthe subjective starting point of Hegel, though he took position in theaffectionsratherthaninreason.

2. EVALUATION OF THIS POSITION. They who regard speculativereason as the criterion of religious truth arewedded to the speculativemethod in appropriating and judging this truth. This methodundoubtedly has an advantage over the historico-apologetical method.Supranaturalism pretended to be able to demonstrate the dogmas ofreligionsoclearlyastosilenceallobjections.Itmadeadeterminedeffortto give a definite and clear representation of the truth, so that thereasonablenessofitcouldatoncebeseen.Butitssharpdistinctionsledto an intellectualism in which truth was divorced from life. Thespeculativemethodbrokewiththisdemandforclearness,andrecognizedthedeepsenseofthedogmata,andthemysteriouselementsinreligion.Moreover,itemphasizedthefactthatreligionoccupiesauniqueplaceinhuman life, and therefore demands a corresponding organ in humannature. Hegel found this in speculative reason, and Schleiermacher, inthefeelings.Bothweremistaken,butneverthelesscalledattentiontoanimportantmatter,whentheystressedthenecessityofaproperorganforreligion, a matter that is of the greatest importance for the study oftheology,andisthereforeentitledtogratefulrecognition.

Butthespeculativemethoddidnotstopatthethoughtthatthinkingandbeing necessarily correspond to each other; it proceeded to theidentification of the two. This is the fundamental error of speculativephilosophy.Thegreatquestionis,Dowethinkathingbecauseitexists,or does it exist because we necessarily think it. Speculative philosophyclaims the latter, butwithout anywarrant. At this pointHegel took animpossible leap. The existence of a thing does not follow from the factthatwethinkit,forexistenceisnotanemanationofthought,butrestsonan act of power. It is true that God thought things eternally, but He

brought the things which existed ideally into real existence only by acreativeact.WecanonlyreflectonwhatGodthoughtlongbeforeandhascreativelybroughttoourconsciousnessintheexistingworldofreality.Ifwe reject all that comes to us from without, we retain only a vagueprinciple without any content, from which nothing can be derived.Notwithstandingitshighpretensionsandits,ostensibly,goodintentions,the speculative method did not succeed in changing the despiseddoctrinesoftheChristianreligionintoaphilosophicalsystemofuniversaltruth, quite acceptable to the world. The word of the cross remainedfoolishnesstothemthatperish.ItbrokeawayfromtheobjectivebasisofGod's revelation,and thereforecouldnot succeed inconstructinga realsystemoftheology.

C.DevoutFeelingorReligiousIntuition

Athirdpositionwithrespecttotheprincipiumcognoscendiinternumoftheology, is thatof thosewho find theorganbywhichreligious truth isacquired and discerned in devout feeling or religious intuition.Schleiermacher is generally recognized as the father of this view. Thisconception of the internal or subjective principle of knowledge intheologyhasthisincommonwiththatofHegel,thatitdoesnotinvolveany preliminary assumption as to the derivation of the subject-matterfrom revelation. But in distinction from those who championed thespeculativemethodandvirtually changed theology intophilosophy, theadvocates of this method are inclined to banish all philosophy fromtheology. They are like the speculative philosophers and theologians,however,intheirfailuretodistinguishbetweenthenormorcriterionandthe source of religious truth. Since they recognize their own subjectivefeelingsasthesourceofthistruth,thequestionforthemisnotsomuchaquestionoftheappropriation,asoftheappraisal,ofreligioustruthor,toexpress it in a different way, a question of recognizing it as religioustruth.Theirspecialcharacteristicisthattheyseekreligiouscertitudeinareligious-empiricalway.Devoutfeelingisthecriterionofreligioustruth,andthetestappliedtoitisthetestofexperience.

1. HISTORICAL STATEMENT OF THE POSITION. When both of thepreceding methods led to no result, many theologians took refuge inreligiousexperienceandsoughtsupportinitforthecertaintyandtruthof

Christianity. It isparticularly in theapplicationof thismethod that theinfluenceofSchleiermacherisfelt.Heandhisfollowershadthelaudabledesire to restore theology to honor again, and they attempted toaccomplish this by taking position in the believing consciousness. Inanswer to the question, What prompts us to accept the truths ofChristianity?theadvocatesofthismethoddonotappealtohistoricalorrationalproofs,nortotheauthorityofScriptureoroftheChurch,buttothe experience of salvation in the heart of the sinner. Schleiermacherwants the theologian to startwith thedata given in the confessionof aparticularChurch,andbythesedatahemeans,notsomuchthedoctrinesthat are formulated in the Creeds, as the living and effectual beliefs,whicharevoicedinthepreachingandteachingoftheChurch.Thenthesedoctrinesorbeliefsmustbetracedtotheiroriginalsource,whichisnotfound in Scripture, but in the devout feeling which results from therelationofthesoultoJesusChrist.And,finally,theymustbereproducedinasystematizedforminthe lightof the fact that theyarethereflexofdistinctlypiousfeelings.Thismeansthatthedoctrinesarederivedfrompious or religious feelings, and also find in these the ground of theircertitude.It isonly inthe lightofsuchfeelingsthattheir trulyreligiouscharacterstandsout.

Frank, one of the outstanding theologians of the Erlangen school oftheology,isalsooneofthemostrepresentativeadvocatesofthistheory.His system alreadymarks a real advance upon that of Schleiermacher,since he does not start from a general state of feeling, but from thespecific experience of regeneration. In his work on The System of theChristianCertaintyheseekstheanswertothisquestion:Whatleadsmanto depend on the objective factors of salvation, such as God, Christ,Scripture,andothers,andtoacceptScriptureastheWordofGod?Andhisansweristhatthisisnotduetohistoricalorrationalproofs,nortotheauthority of Scripture, of the Church, or of tradition, but only to theexperienceofregeneration.TheChristiancertaintyofwhichhespeaksisnottheassuranceofsalvation,buttheassurancerespectingtherealityofthe truth. Christian certitude, in the sense of certainty respecting thetruth, findsitsbasis,accordingtoFrank, intheChristianlife, that is, inthebeliever'smoralandspiritualexperience.TheChristianknowsthatamighty change has taken place in his life, and from this experience of

regeneration he infers the whole content of Christian truth. This trutharrangesitselfinthreegroupsaroundtheexperienceofregeneration.(a)Therearetruthswhichareimmediatelyinvolvedinthatexperience,suchastherealityofsin,ofjudgment,andoffutureperfection(immanentandcentraltruths)(b)Thentherearetruthswhichmustbeassumed,inordertoexplain thenewcondition, suchas the realityof apersonalGod, theexistenceofGodastriune,andtheredemptionwroughtbytheGod-man(transcendent truths). (c) Finally, these lead right on to the means bywhichtheprecedingagentswork,suchastheChurch,theWordofGod,the sacraments,miracles, revelation,and inspiration (transeunt truths).This answer of Frank undoubtedly contains an important truth, sinceregenerationisindeednecessary,inordertoseetheKingdomofGod.Butthemannerinwhichheelaborateshisthoughtisverydubious,andthisisprobably the necessary result of his subjective standpoint.He does notconsistently work out a single thought, but constantly confuses themanner inwhichreligious truthsarederived,and themanner inwhichcertainty respecting these is obtained. Since his work is entitled TheSystemoftheChristianCertainty,itraisestheexpectationthattheauthorsimplydesirestoshowhowthebelieverreachesChristiancertitude.ButinthatcaseheshouldhavelimitedhimselftothetaskofelucidatingtheoriginandnatureofChristiancertainty,andshouldnotinadditionhavediscussedthecontentsofthereligiousconsciousness.Thenhewouldnothavegivenusasystemoftheobjectstowhichthiscertaintypertains;andyetthisisexactlywhathedoes,whenhederivesallreligioustruthsfromtheexperienceofregeneration.

2.EVALUATIONOFTHISPOSITION.Therearemanyobjectionstothisstartingpointandmethod.(a)Regenerationandallotherexperiencesofthe Christian are always connected with the objective factors of theChurch,theScriptures,andsoon,whileFrankdivorcesthetwo.(b)Inhissecond work, The System of the Christian Truth, he himself givesprecedenceto theseobjective factors,andthusrecognizes theirpriority.Forthatveryreasonheshouldhavemaintainedthisorderthroughouthissystem.(c)Themethodinwhichhederivestheobjectivedogmatafromthe certainty of the Christian, is one that does not fit in theology. It isborrowedfromspeculativephilosophy,whichderivesreligioustruthfromthenecessity of logical coherence. (d) Thismethod goes contrary to all

religious experience. No Christian ever obtained certainty respectingobjective truths in themannerdescribedbyFrank.Scarcelyanyonehasadopted his method. And even among those who have adopted it in amodified form there is a difference of opinion as to the significance ofexperience for theprincipiaof theology.Theapplicationof thismethodcarrieswith it a threefold danger. (a) It easily leads into the danger offorming a wrong conception of religious experience, and of expectingfrom it what it cannot yield.While it is possible to experience certainemotions, such as those of penitence, fear, hope, and so on, it is notpossibletoexperiencehistoricalfacts.(b)ItreallymakesitimpossibleforuneducatedChristians toobtainknowledgeandcertaintyrespectingthehistorical facts of Christianity, since these can only be deduced fromexperience by an elaborate process of reasoning. (c) It is apt to robhistorical Christianity ever increasingly of its real significance.Experienceisloadeddownwithaburdenwhichitcannotbear.ThetruthofChristianitycannotrestonitasafinalground.Andtheconsciousnessof this may easily lead to a reduction of the burden by divorcing thecontentsof faith fromallhistorical factsand limiting it toreligiousandethicalexperiences.

D.TheMoralConsciousness

Finally, there is stillanotherviewof thenormof religious truth,andofthemannerinwhichwecometorecognizeandacknowledgeitassuch,aview that is somewhat akin to the preceding, but which, in distinctionfrom the preceding, with its emotional appeal, stresses the ethicalelement in religion. It is a view that finds its roots in themoralism ofKant,andthatbecamepopular in theology throughthe influenceof theNeo-Kantianism of Ritschl and his followers. It makes the moralconsciousnesstherealjudgeofreligioustruth.Therealemphasisinthisviewisnotonemotionalexperience,butonethicalself-maintenance.Thegreatanddeterminativequestionis,whetheracertaintruthsatisfiesthemoralrequirementsoftheheartortheconscience,andthusanswerstoarealpracticalneed.Hence themethodappliedby itsadvocates iscalledethical-psychologicalorethical-practical.

1. HISTORICAL STATEMENT OF THE POSITION. If the immediatelyprecedingmethodconnectsupwithSchleiermacher,thismethodfindsits

mainsupportinKant.ForitsadherentsChristianityingeneralisnotsomuchadoctrinethatmustbedemonstratedandacceptedastrue,norahistorical fact thatcalls forproof,butareligiousandethicalpowerthataddresses itself to the heart and the conscience of man. According tothem Christianity cannot be made acceptable to all men withoutdistinction, but only to those who have a proper moral disposition, afeeling of dissatisfaction, a sense of the good, a desire for redemption,and so on. When Christianity comes in contact with such men, itcommends itself to theirheartsandconsciencesasdivine truthwithoutanyreasoningorfurtherproof.Itsatisfiestheirreligiousneeds,answerstotheirhigheraspirations,reconcilesthemwiththemselves,bringsthempeace,comfort,andsalvation,andthusprovesitselftobetheconsolationandthewisdomofGod.

This kindof argumentationdidnotbeginwithKant.Tertullian alreadyappealed to the testimony which the soul involuntarily gives to Christ.TheApologetespointedout that theheathenreligionsof theirdaywerenotabletosatisfythereligiousneedsofman,nortofosteratrulyethicallife. Duns Scotus called attention to the moral influence of God'srevelation and to its sufficiency in enabling man to reach his destiny.Both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians sought to prove thetruthoftheChristianreligionbypointingtoitsoperationandinfluenceon the intellectual, moral, social, and political life of individuals andnations. Pascal andVinet especially brought thismethod to honor, butdidnotyetplaceitinoppositiontohistoricalargumentation.Theformereven admitted the great value of historical proofs, though he did notassign to them their usual place; and the latter did not despise them,thoughheregardedthemasinferiortothemoralandreligiousproof.InlateryearsthismethodwasadoptedbyAstie,Pressencé,Secretan,delaSaussaye, and others, who generally neglected and sometimes evendisdainedhistoricalproofs.

However,theinfluenceofKantwasofgreatsignificanceforthismethod.According to him the theoretical reason necessarily yields three ideas,namely, those of God, freedom, and immortality. These three aretherefore general. It does not assure us, however, that there arecorresponding realities, nor enlighten us as to the nature of these

realities. The corresponding realities are demanded, however, by thepractical reason with its categorical imperative. This clearly testifies totheexistenceofamoralorder,anddemandsthatthisordershallfinallytriumph over the natural order. This being so, it naturally follows thatmanmustbefree,thattheremustbeafuturelifeinwhichthemoralwillbe really triumphant,and that theremustbeahighestJudge topunishviceandrewardvirtue.Onlythatviewoftheworldistruethatanswerstoourinnerlifeandsatisfiesourmoralneeds.

Whenthe insufficiencyof thespeculativemethodappeared, therewasatendency to go back toKant. In theologyKantianismwas reintroducedespeciallybyRitschlandLipsius,thoughthesemendifferedfromKantinseveralparticulars.ItisespeciallyintheschoolofRitschlthattheethico-psychological method is brought into prominence. This school regardsChristianityasahistoricalphenomenon,butespeciallyasareligiousandethicalpowerofthegreatestsignificancefortheheartandconscienceofman.Ritschl finds in religionespecially twoelements:on theonehandthatofdependenceonGod,andontheother,thatofspiritualfreedomorsupremacy over nature,which, in the estimation of Ritschl, is itsmainelement.TheChristianreligiongivesanswertothequestion,howmanasa freemoralbeing,who is yethemmed inbynatureand inmanywaysdependent on it, canmaintainhis freedomand rise superior tonature.And the answer is thatman can gain themastery over nature throughcommunionwithGodinChristandbymakingGod'sendhisown,thatis,by seeking theKingdomofGod ina life forGod,motivatedby love. Inthis practical power of Christianity Ritschl finds the real proof for thetruthoftherevelationofGodinChristandoftheChristianreligion.Itisnotatheoretical,butapracticalproof.LikeSchleiermacher,hetoowouldbanishallmetaphysicsfromtheology.Insciencetheoreticalproofsapply,but in religion only judgments of value. As a matter of fact, however,neither one of the two succeeded in excluding philosophy. Moreover,Kaftan, one of the most prominent and one of the ablest followers ofRitschl,stressedthefactthatjudgmentsofvaluecannotbedivorcedfromtheoreticaljudgmentsofbeing.

2. EVALUATION OF THIS POSITION. This and the immediatelypreceding method undoubtedly deserve to be preferred above the

historicalandspeculativemethods.Themethodnowunderconsiderationdoes not regard religion merely as a doctrine to be proved, nor as acondition of the subject to be analyzed intellectually, as the first twomethods do respectively. It looks upon the Christian religion as ahistorical,objectivepowerthatanswers to themoralneedsofman,andfinds in this its proof and justification. Nevertheless, there are seriousobjectionstothismethod.(a)Thoughareligionthatdoesnotsatisfythereligiousandethicallife,thatoffersnocomfortinsorrowanddeath,anddoesnotgivestrengthuntothebattlesoflife,isnotworthyofthenameofreligion; yet the fact that the Christian religion does do this, is noabsoluteproofofitstruth,sincethereareotherreligionswhichalsogiveacertaindegreeofsatisfactioninthisrespect.(b)ItisdangeroustomakethetruthofChristianitydependenton judgmentsofvalue.Therewouldbe no great objection, if it were only intended to stress the fact that adogmamustalwayshavereligiousandethicalvalue,or that intellectualreasoningcannevergiveusperfectcertaintyrespectingreligioustruths,whilethiscanbeobtainedbyexperiencingthereligiousvaluesexpressedbythedogmas.Inthatcase thesubjectiveevaluationwouldpresupposethe objective reality of the religious truths and would only serve as ameans to obtain certainty respecting that reality. Then the value of athingwouldnotberepresentedasthegroundofitsexistence,butwouldsimplyenableustoacknowledgeitsubjectively.InthesystemofRitschlitis quite different, however, since the judgments of value are divorcedfrom all metaphysics. (c) Moreover, in this way we can never reachobjectivity. The needs that find satisfaction in the Christian faith arevirtually created by that same faith through the work of the ministry.Hencethequestionarises,whetherthoseneedsarerealinthelifeofman,or have merely been awakened artificially and are therefore purelyimaginary. In other words, the question of the truth of the Christianreligionremains.

QUESTIONSFORFURTHERSTUDY:What is thedifferencebetweenafides humana and a fides divina? Can we be satisfied with historicalcertainty in theology? How can the transition from the historico-apologetical, to the speculative, method be explained? Is subjectivism,which makes the human reason or human experience the source ofChristian truth, compatible with absolute certainty? Can absolute

Idealism ever lead to a satisfying Christian certitude? Is the test ofexperienceandthepragmatictesteverappliedtothetruthinScripture?What makes these tests so popular in the present day? What moreobjective test does Troeltsch recommend?How shouldwe judge of thepsychological approach to religion, as exhibited in Horton's APsychologicalApproachtoTheology?DoesthepositiontakenbyBaillieinhisOurKnowledgeofGoddiffermateriallyfromthatofSchleiermacher?

REFERENCES: Bavinck, Geref. Dogm. I, pp. 528–602; Miley, Syst.Theol., I, pp. 34–47;Macintosh, Theol. as an Emp. Science, pp. 7–26;Dorner, SystemofChr.Doct., I, pp. 58–168;Girardeau,Discussions ofTheol.Questions,pp. 73–125;Paterson,TheRuleofFaith,pp.92–173;Kaftan,TheTruthoftheChr.Rel.,I.pp.230–316;Frank,TheSystemoftheChr.Certainty;Baillie,The InterpretationofReligion,pp. 174–339;Heffern, Apology and Polemic in the N. T.; Wenley, ContemporaryTheology and Theism, pp. 11–124; Schaeder, Theozentrische Theologie,Vol. I and II,pp. 1–55;Horton,APsychologicalApproach toTheology;Baillie, Our Knowledge of God; Dickey, Revelation and Response;Mackintosh,TypesofModernTheology.

E.Faith,theProperPrincipiumInternum

UndertheinfluenceofSchleiermachermosttheologianshavecometotheconclusionthatreligionisauniquephenomenoninhumanlife,andcanonlybeunderstoodinamannercorrespondingtoitsnature.Byassumingthis position theology takes its startingpoint in the subject, but shouldnot, simply for that reason, be accused of subjectivism.No science hasanotherstartingpoint,sincetheobjectiveworldexistsforusonlyasitisreflected in our consciousness. There must always be a principiuminternumthatanswerstotheprincipiumexternum.Moreover,Christiantheologyfromtheverybeginningtookitsstartingpoint inthebelievingsubject,wasbornoffaith,andwasguidedandcontrolledbytherule:perfidemadintellectum.AndthisisalsoentirelyinharmonywithScripture,whichspeaksnotonlyofarevelationofGodoutsideofus,butalsoofaninner illumination of the Holy Spirit. If the accusation of subjectivismcouldbe lodgedagainst this startingpointwithanydegreeof justice, itcouldalsobeurgedagainstallscience,againsttheologyasawhole,andeven against Scripture itself. Such an accusation is warranted only,

however, when the subjective condition absolutely necessary for theknowledgeofathingismadethesourceofthatknowledge.Anorganbywhichwe take cognizanceof theobjectiveworld roundaboutus, isnotthesourcefromwhichthatworldproceeds.

1.THENAMEOFTHEPRINCIPIUMCOGNOSCENDIINTERNUM.TheprincipiuminternumisusuallycalledfaithinScripture.Othertermsarealsoused,suchasregeneration,John3:3;1Cor.2:12,14,purityofheart,Matt.5:8,lovetothewillofGod,John7:17,andtheSpiritofGod,1Cor.2:13.Forseveralreasons,however,thetermfaithdeservespreference.(a)It is the term that stands out prominently in Scripture. (b) It directsattentionatoncetotheconsciouslife,andthusinvolvesarecognitionofthefactthatalltheknowledgeofmanismediatedbyhisconsciousness.And (c) it indicates better than any other name the close connectionbetweenreligiousknowledgeandallotherknowledgeofman.Ingeneralitmaybesaidthatweobtainknowledgeinnootherwayinreligionthanwedointheothersciences.Weshouldrememberthatfaithisnotaneworgan of science. Men sometimes speak of believing and knowing asopposites,butinsuchcasestheyusetheword'believe'intheweaksenseofhavinganopinionforwhichtheproperevidenceislacking.Theword'faith'hasafarmoreprofoundmeaning,however.Itisfrequentlyusedtodenotethepositiveknowledgethatdoesnotrestonexternalevidencenoronlogicaldemonstration,butonanimmediateanddirectinsight.Inthatsense itcaneverbesaidtobe fundamental toall thesciences.Intuitiveknowledgeand immediate insightoccupyan importantplace inhumanlife.There isnota single fieldofendeavor,nora singlephaseof life inwhichwecangetalongwithoutit.

2. DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF FAITH. Thecorrespondence between general and religious knowledge should notcauseustolosesightoftheexistingdifference.Thereisaveryimportantdifferencebetweenfaithinthesenseofimmediatecertaintyandfaithinthe religious sense. In the Christian religion faith has a uniquesignificance,asthefollowingpointswillshow.(a)IntheNewTestamentit denotes a religious relation of man to God, and includes not only acertainknowledge,thatis,anassuredknowledge,butalsoaheartfultrustinGod,acompletesurrendertoHim,andapersonalappropriationofthe

promisesofthegospel.(b)Whilethefaithweexerciseinconnectionwiththe external world, for instance with respect to the reliability of oursenses,thepertinencyofthelawsofthought,andsoon,restsonourowninnerobservation,Christianfaithisdirectedtothatwhichisinvisibleandcannot be observed, Heb. 11:1. (c) Faith in the religious sense isdistinguishedfromthatinthesenseofimmediatecertaintyinthisthatitrests on the insight of others rather than on our own. We are madeacquaintedwiththegraceofGodinJesusChristthroughthetestimonyofprophets and apostles. (d) Finally, Christian faith differs from faith asimmediatecertaintyalso inthefact that itdoesnotarisespontaneouslyinhumannature.Whileitisperfectlyhuman,andmayevenbecalledtherestoration of human nature, it grates on the pride of the naturalmanandarouseshostility inhisheart.Godisnotonly itsobject,butalso itsauthor.BarthandBrunnergosofarastocallGod,ratherthanman,thesubject of faith. While they also speak of it as man's response to thedivinerevelation,theyreallyregarditasthatinwhichGodcompletesHisrevelation.Therevelationitselfgivesbirthtotheresponse.Aslongasitdoesnotdothis,thereisnorevelation.

AccordingtoScripturethisfaithcarriesitsowncertaintywithit.Itdoesthis,notbecauseitissofirmandcertaininitself,butbecauseitrestsonthetestimonyandthepromisesofGod.Itmakestheinvisibleblessingsofsalvation just as certain forman, yea evenmore certain, than his owninsight or any scientific proof can ever make anything. Scripturerepresentscertaintyasoneofthecharacteristicsoffaith.Alongsideofthecertaintyofsciencewehave, therefore, thecertaintyof faith,practicallydemonstrated in the believing Church, in its martyrs and steadfastconfessors, and theoretically professed and developed in Christiantheology.Itisacertaintythatisunwaveringandindestructible.Butthisfaith does not necessarily involve the truth of that which is believed.There is a great difference between subjective certainty and objectivetruth.Inthisrespecteverythingdependsonthegroundsonwhichfaithrests.

F.TheGroundofFaith

By faithweaccept the testimonyofGodas it is contained inScripture.Butnowthequestionarises,Howdoweknowthatthattestimonyistrue,

andthereforeperfectlyreliable?WhatisthegroundonwhichourfaithintheWord of God rests? Or, perhaps better still, By whatmeans is theconvictionrespectingthetruthofthespecialrevelationofGodwroughtinourhearts?InanswertothesequestionsReformedtheologianspointtothe testimony of theHoly Spirit. It is this subject that calls for a briefdiscussioninthisconcludingchapter.

1.THEDOCTRINEOFTHETESTIMONIUMSPIRITUSSANCTIINTHECHURCH.Itwasadmitted fromtheearliestChristiancenturieson thatnoneof the intellectualorhistoricalproofsadduced for the truthof theChristianreligionprovideanadequateassurance.Whiletheymayleadtoafideshumana,divinegraceisnecessarytoengenderfaithintheheart.Augustinewas the first one of theChurchFatherswho clearly sawandtaught the absolute necessity of inward grace for the acceptance ofScriptureastheWordofGod.ItistruethathealsoattachedgreatvaluetothetestimonyoftheChurchasamotivumcredibilitatis,buthedidnotregardthisasthelastanddeepestgroundoffaith.Theoretically,eventheChurch of Rome held that only the Holy Spirit can give one absolutecertainty respecting the truth of revelation, but in practice therewas atendencytoreplacethetestimonyoftheHolySpiritbythetestimonyoftheChurch.

TheReformersconsciouslyanddeliberatelyplacedtestimonyoftheHolySpiritintheforeground.TheyderivedtheircertaintyrespectingthetruthofthedivinerevelationfromtheworkoftheSpiritofGodintheheartsofbelievers.TheytookpositionagainsttheChurchofRomewithitsundueemphasis on the testimony of the Church, and also against theAnabaptists and otherMystics,who revealed a tendency to divorce thetestimony of the Holy Spirit from the external testimony contained inScripture. Calvin was the first one to give a detailed exposition of thedoctrineofthetestimonyoftheHolySpirit.SincehisdaythisdoctrineisquitegenerallyacceptedbybothLutheranandReformedtheologians.Oflate,however, ithassufferedeclipse.This isdue inpart to the fact thatmany confuse the testimonyof theHolySpiritwith the argument fromexperience,whichissopopularinmanycirclestoday,andinpart,tothemysticalconceptionwhichsomehaveofthetestimonyoftheHolySpirit,inconnectionwiththewidespreadaversiontothesupernatural.Itisnot

unnecessary therefore to indicate precisely what is meant with thetestimonyoftheHolySpirit.

We should bear in mind, that the particular work of the Holy Spiritdescribedbythatnamedoesnotstandbyitself,butisconnectedwiththewhole work of the Holy Spirit in the application of the redemptionwroughtinChrist.TheSpiritrenewsthesinner,notonlyinhisbeing,butalso in his consciousness. He removes the spiritual darkness of theunderstandingandilluminestheheart,sothatthegloryofGodinChristis clearly seen. It is only in virtue of the special operation of theHolySpirit thatmanconfessesJesusChristasLord,1Cor.12:3.TheworkoftheHolySpiritenableshimtoaccepttherevelationofGodinChrist, toappropriate theblessingsof salvation, and toattain to theassuranceoffaith.And the testimonyof theHolySpirit ismerelya specialaspectofHismoregeneralworkinthesphereofredemption.Forthatreasonthetwoshouldneverbedissociated.

2.MISTAKENNOTIONSOFTHETESTIMONIUMSPIRITUSSANCTI.ThereareespeciallytwoviewsofthetestimonyoftheHolySpiritagainstwhichwemustbeonourguard.

a.Thatitbringsanewrevelation.TheMysticsconceivedofitasaninnerrevelation to the effect that the Bible is the Word of God. This wasevidentlytheconceptionwhichStrausshadofit,forhemaintainedthat,when Protestants accepted the doctrine of the testimonium SpiritusSancti,theyvirtuallyadoptedtheprincipleofMysticism.Heinterpreteditas thecommunicationofanew truth,namely, that theBible is reallytheWordofGod.Ifthisinterpretationwerecorrect,hisassertionwouldbe justified, for then the Christian would indeed be receiving a newrevelationthroughthetestimonyoftheHolySpirit, justastheprophetsdidinthedaysofold.Thisrevelationwouldthen,ofcourse,callforanewattestation,andsoonadinfinitum.Suchaconceptionofthetestimonyofthe Holy Spirit makes our belief in Scripture as the Word of Goddependenton thisnew revelation, andnaturally involvesadenial of itsautopistia.TheolderProtestanttheologiansneverhadsuchaconceptionof the testimony of the Holy Spirit. They all stressed the autopistia ofScriptureandwerestronglyopposedtothemysticismoftheAnabaptists.Eventhesomewhatrelatedrepresentation,thatwemustconceiveofthe

testimonyoftheHolySpiritasaninfluenceproducinginbelieversablindor unfounded conviction that the Bible is the Word of God, provedunacceptable to them. Faith is a conviction founded on a testimony,whichintheabsenceofproperevidencedoesnotmakeitsappearance.

b.Thatitisidenticalwiththeargumentfromexperience.Thetestimonyof the Holy Spirit should not be confused, as is often done, with thetestimony of experience. TheHoly Spirit does indeedwork in believersthe experience of salvation in Christ, which cannot be explained apartfromScripture,butiswroughtthroughtheinstrumentalityoftheWord,and therefore implicitly testifies to the fact that the Bible is of divineorigin. This is an inference, in whichwe conclude, from an experiencewhichweregardasdivine,thattheBible,throughwhichtheexperienceiswrought in us, is the inspired Word of God. This argument has beenelaborated, thoughnot in thesameform,bysuchtheologiansasFrank,Koestlin, Ihmels, Stearns, and many others. In itself it is perfectlylegitimateandisnotdevoidofevidentialvalue,butitissomethingquitedifferentfromthetestimonyoftheHolySpirit.Theywhoidentifythetwodonotdistinguishproperlybetween the efficient causeof faith and themotivesforfaith.Thetestimonyofexperiencemaycertainlybeamotivefor faith,but justascertainlycannotbe theoriginof it, since italreadypresupposesfaith.ThetestimonyoftheHolySpirit,ontheotherhand,isthecausaefficiensoffaith.Withoutitallthemotivesforfaithwouldhaveno convincingpower.Moreover, the testimonyof experience respectingScripture isnoobjective testimonyofGod,but simply the testimonyofourownheartrespectingtheScriptures.Finally,ithasthecharacterofamereinference,ormayevenbesaidtoinvolvemorethanoneinference,sinceitconcludesfromacertainexperiencetoScriptureasitsorigin,andfrom the fact that this experience is wrought through to theinstrumentality of the revealedWord to the fact that this revelation isindeedtheWordofGod.Itdoesnot,therefore,havethecharacterofanimmediate testimony of the Holy Spirit. And because the testimony ofexperience isentirely subjective, the faith that is foundedon it rests, inthe lastanalysis,on the innerexperienceof thesoul rather thanon theobjectivetestimonyofGodinHisWord,whichisafterallthegroundofallChristiancertitude.

3.CORRECTVIEWOFTHETESTIMONIUMSPIRITUSSANCTI.Calvinabsolutely rejects the idea that the authority of Scripture rests on thetestimony of the Church, as well as some other erroneous views. Hefinallysays:"Letitthereforebeheldasfixed,thatthosewhoareinwardlytaughtbytheHolySpiritacquiesceimplicitlyinScripture;thatScripture,carrying its own evidence alongwith it, deigns not to submit to proofsand arguments, but owes the full conviction with which we ought toreceiveittothetestimonyoftheSpirit.EnlightenedbyHim,wenolongerbelieve,eitheronourownjudgmentorthatofothers,thattheScripturesare fromGod;but, inawaysuperior tohuman judgment, feelperfectlyassured—asmuchsoas ifwebeheld thedivine imagevisibly impressedon it—that it came to us, by the instrumentality ofmen, from the verymouthofGod."TheTestimonyoftheHolySpiritissimplytheworkoftheHolySpiritintheheartofthesinner,bywhichheremovestheblindnessofsin,sothattheerstwhileblindman,whohadnoeyesforthesublimecharacteroftheWordofGod,nowclearlyseesandappreciatesthemarksof its divine nature, and receives immediate certainty respecting thedivineoriginofScripture.Justasonewhohasaneyeforthebeautiesofarchitecture, in gazing up into the dome of the St. Peter's Church atRome, at once recognizes it as the production of a great artist, so thebelieverinthestudyofScripturediscoversinitatoncetheearmarksofthedivine.TheredeemedsoulbeholdsGodastheauthorofScriptureandrestsonitstestimonywithchildlikefaith,withafidesdivina.ItisexactlythecharacteristicmarkofsuchfaiththatitrestsonatestimonyofGod.whileafideshumanamerelyrestsonahumantestimonyoronrationalarguments.Ofcourse,rationalargumentsmaybeadducedforthedivineorigin of Scripture, but these are powerless to convince the unrenewedman.TheChristianbelievestheBibletobetheveryWordofGodinthelast analysis on the testimonywhichGodHimself gives respecting thismatterinHisWord,andrecognizesthatWordasdivinebymeansofthetestimony of God in his heart. The testimony of the Holy Spirit istherefore, strictly speaking, not so much the final ground of faith, butrather themeansof faith.The finalgroundof faith isScriptureonly,orbetterstill,theauthorityofGodwhichisimpresseduponthebelieverinthe testimony of Scripture. The ground of faith is identical with itscontents,andcannotbeseparatedfromit.ButthetestimonyoftheHolySpiritisthemovingcauseoffaith.WebelieveScripture,notbecauseof,

butthroughthetestimonyoftheHolySpirit.

QUESTIONSFORFURTHERSTUDY: In howmanydifferent senses isthe word 'faith' used? How do faith and knowledge compare in theestimationofLocke,andinthatofKant?WhatdotheRitschliansmeanwhentheyspeakof"faith-knowledge"?Isfaithamatteroftheintellect,ofthewill,oftheemotions,orofallthreecombined?HowdoesCalvinworkout the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit? What is thedifference between the testimonium Spiritus Sancti generale andspeciale? Does the testimony of the Holy Spirit apply to the differentpartsoftheBibleseparately?

REFERENCES:Bavinck,Geref.Dogm.I,pp.603–670;Kuyper,Enc.derHeil.Godgel.,II,pp.501–511;Hodge,Syst.Theol.,II,pp.69–86;Wisse,GeloofenWetenschap,pp.41–212;Foster,StudiesinTheol.,Proleg.,pp.74–246;Hall,Dogm.Theol., Introd.,pp.84–141;Frank,TheSystemofChr. Certainty; Stearns, The Evidence of Chr. Experience; Ihmels,Centralfragen der Dogm., pp. 1–21, 134–165; Kaftan, The Truth of theChr.Rel.,II;Hepp,TestimoniumSpiritusSancti,Generale;C.W.Hodge,WitnessoftheHolySpirit,PrincetonReview,Vol.II,p.41ff.

SELECTLITERATURE

I.GeneralWorksonIntroduction

Barth,Dogmatik I. Prolegomena,Muenchen, 1927; TheDoctrine of theWordofGod,NewYork,1936.

Bavinck,GereformeerdeDogmatiekI.,Kampen,1906.

Foster,StudiesinTheology,Prolegomena,Cincinnati,1891.

Girardeau,DiscussionsofTheologicalQuestions,Richmond,Va.,1905.

Hall, Dogmatic Theology I., Introduction to Dogmatic Theology, NewYork,1907.

Ihmels,CentralfragenderDogmatikinderGegenwart,Leipzig,1921.

Kaftan,TheTruthoftheChristianReligion,2vols.,Edinburgh,1894.

Lobstein,AnIntroductiontoProtestantDogmatics,Chicago,1910.

Mackay,APrefacetoChristianTheology,NewYork,1941.

Smith,IntroductiontoChristianTheology,NewYork,1882.

TenBroeke,AConstructiveBasisforTheology,London,1914.

VanDijk,BegripenMethodederDogmatiek,Utrecht,1877.

Weidner,IntroductiontoDogmaticTheology,Chicago,1895.

II.Dogmas,Creeds,andAuthorityinReligion

Allen,FreedomintheChurch,London,1907.

Dreyer,UndogmatischesChristentum,Berlin,1901.

Forsyth,TheologyinChurchandState,London,1915.

Harris,CreedsornoCreeds,NewYork,1927.

Hepp,DeWaardevanhetDogma,Kampen,1920.

Hospers,TheReformedPrinciplesofAuthority,GrandRapids,1924.

Lamont,TheChurchandtheCreeds,Boston,1923.

Leckie,AuthorityinReligion,Edinburgh,1909.

Meyrick,IsDogmaaNecessity?London,1883.

Miller, The Utility and Importance of Creeds and Confessions,Philadelphia.

Paterson,TheRuleofFaith,London,1914.

Patton,FundamentalChristianity,NewYork,1926.

Sabatier, Religions of Authority, New York, 1904; Outlines of aPhilosophyorReligion

Stewart,CreedsandChurches,London,1916.

III.TheologyandTheologicalEncyclopaedias

Bavinck,KenenisenLeven,Kampen,1922.

Cave,IntroductiontoTheologyandItsLiterature,Edinburgh,1896.

Hagenbach, Encyclopaedie und Methodologie der theologischenWissenschaften,Leipzig,1889.

Hastie,TheologyasScience,Glasgow,1899.

Hodge, C. W., The Significance of the Reformed Theology Today,Princeton.

Honig,DogmatiekenEthiek,Kampen,1930.

Kuyper,EncyclopaediederHeiligeGodgeleerdheid, vol. II,Amsterdam,1894.TranslatedbyDr.H.DeVries.

Marshall,TheologyandTruth,London,1906.

Raebiger,TheologicalEncyclopaedia,2vols.,Edinburgh,1884.

TenBroeke,AConstructiveBasisforTheology,London,1914.

Warfield, The Idea of Systematic Theology; and Task and Method ofSystematicTheology,inStudiesinTheology,NewYork,1932.

IV.Religion,PhilosophyofReligion,andApologetics

Baillie,TheInterpretationofReligion,NewYork,1928.

Beattie,Apologetics,Richmond,Va.,1903.

Bruce,Apologetics,NewYork,1922.

Caldecott,ThePhilosophyofReligion,London,1901.

Edwards,ThePhilosophyofReligion,NewYork,1924.

Galloway,ThePhilosophyofReligion,NewYork,1921.

Hepp,GereformeerdeApologetiek,Kampen,1922.

Lidgett,TheChristianReligion,London,1907.

Kellogg,AHandbookofComparativeReligion,Philadelphia,1899.

Menzies,HistoryofReligion,NewYork,1895.

Ormond,ThePhilosophyofReligion,Princeton,1922.

Patton,FundamentalChristianity,NewYork,1926.

Puenjer, History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion, Edinburgh,1887.

Sabatier,OutlinesofaPhilosophyofReligion,NewYork.

Smith,Apologetics,NewYork,1882.

Warfield,Apologetics(inStudiesinTheology),NewYork,1932.

Wright,AStudent'sPhilosophyofReligion,NewYork,1925.

V.RevelationandInspiration

BaillieandMartin,Revelation,NewYork,1937.

Bannerman,InspirationoftheScriptures,Edinburgh,1865.

Bavinck,WijsbegeertederOpenbaring,Kampen,1908.

Daubanton,DeTheopneustiederHeiligeSchrit.

Dickie,RevelationandResponse,NewYork,1938.

Engelder,ReasonorRevelation,St.Louis,1941.

Ewald,Revelation,ItsNatureandRecord,Edinburgh,1884.

Fisher,NatureandMethodofRevelation,London,1890.

Gilson,ReasonandRevelationintheMiddleAges,NewYork,1938.

Girardeau,DiscussionsofTheologicalQuestions,Richmond,Va.,1905.

Given,Revelation,Inspiration,andtheCanon,Edinburgh,1881.

Honig,IsdeBijbelopBovennatuurlijkeWijzeGeinspireerd?Baarn,1909.

Kuyper,DeHedendaagscheSchriftcritiek,Amsterdam,1881.

Ladd,TheDoctrineofSacredScripture,2vols.,NewYork,1883.

Lee,TheInspirationofScripture,NewYork,1857.

Lewis,APhilosophyoftheChristianReligion,NewYork,1940.

MacGregor,TheRevelationandtheRecord,Edinburgh,1893.

M'Intosh,IsChristInfallibleandistheBibleTrue?Edinburgh,1901.

Orr,RevelationandInspiration,NewYork,1910.

Warfield,RevelationandInspiration,NewYork,1927.

VI.HistoryofTheologicalStudy

Boardman,AHistoryofNewEnglandTheology,1899.

Briggs,HistoryoftheStudyofTheology,2vols.,NewYork,1916.

Burggraaf, The Rise and Development of Liberal Theology in America,NewYork,1928.

Foster,AHistoryofNewEnglandTheology,NewYork,1907.

Frank,GeschichteundCritikderneucrenTheologie,Leipzig,1898.

Gruetzmacher,TextbuchzursystematischenTheologie,Leipzig,1923.

Haroutunian,PietyVersusMoralism,NewYork,1932.

Heppe, Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus in sechzehntenJahrhundert,3vols.,Gotha,1857.

Lichtenberger,History ofGermanTheology in theNineteenthCentury,Edinburgh,1899.

McGiffert,ProtestantThoughtBeforeKant,NewYork,1911;AHistoryofChristianThought,NewYork,1932,2vols.

Moore,HistoryofChristianThoughtSinceKant,NewYork,1922.

Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology in Germany Since Kant,London,1890.

Randall,TheMakingoftheModernMind,NewYork,1926.

Scholten,DeLeerderHervorndeKerk,Vol.I,Leiden,1870.

Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche,Zuerich,1844,2vols.

Storr,TheDevelopmentofEnglishTheologyintheNineteenthCentury,NewYork,1913.

Walker,TheTheologyandTheologiansofScotland,Edinburgh,1888.

Workman,ChristianThoughttotheReformation.

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