i red 4 h a t tunnel entrmccs on CJUSA.

ok s ta t ion i n screen of T.G. 77.3 fo r night retirement t o stward. Group remained clear of objective area during the

16 FaBRlLiRY 1945

635 Proceeded i n company with F i re Support Unit "B" t o assigned area in South channel.

Comonced scheduled bombardtaont of C.~BAliO Island.

Bonbiydc~nt completed, s tan South Channel t o rendor unter-bat t c r y f i re .

f loa t ing nine swept by with 4 h f i r e .

1317 Sank six mare f loa t ing e

Took s ta t ion in v ic in i ty of BOISji i n North Channel t o stand by f o r ccuntor-battery f i re .

\o CLiiXTON (DD571) fo r duty in connectii-in with night nation fire. Best of Task Group cleared arda f o r the

Took patrol s ta t ion 3 miles South of LA i610NJi. Island and established coninunicatioo w i t h shore f i r e control party pre-

' , paratory t o delivering Night Illluaination Fire ~c COaUiGIDCU.

menced f i r i n g . s t a r shells a t request of SFCP. Rate of f i re : e s t a r every 15 minutes u n t i l dawn, stars to burst over

I M A H i l l .

, checked I l lumjna-

3, 01345 of 20 FEBRUARY

16 FEBRUARY 19b5

TIME - 2310 Contact ident i f ied as f r iendly PT boots; resumed s ta t ion and

continued i l l h a t i o n fire.

0630 BOISE, PHOENIX, FLETCHER and JEKKINS returned ti- resume bofflbard-

0&5 Directed by SFCP t o cease illumination f i re . Proceeded t o v ic in i ty BOISE in North Channel and stood by for f i r e support nis sion,

0830 Recovered from water and made prisoners three Japanese de- sor te rs from COIiiIDO2.

Prisoners transferred to PT Boat for further transportation t o PHOENIX. Continued lying-to in North Channel awaiting f i r e support nission,

1507 On request from SFCP, opened f a re an machine gun ndst a t coordinates 34.5 - 4l.2.

521 b a s e d fire, machine gun nost reported doaolishcd.

533 Commenced f i r ing a t pill-box in v i c i d t y of previous target. Spotting by SFCP.

153 Ceased fire, SFCP unable to evaluate fire due t o diff icul ty of observing target. Continued lying-to awaiting additional orders.

1738 Proceeded t o join BOISE and FLETCHLR and continued i n c o q n y t o SUBIC b y , arr iving a t 1915.

1. Ship's gunnery.

a. hornunition expended, by caliber a d type.

600

- 5 -

CONFIDENTIAL U.3 .S . ABBOT (DD629) ACTION AiPORT FOR 13 - 17 FESBJuRY 1942

1. Ship's Gunnery (Cont'd).

b,. Fire Discipline, gunnery comunications, radar f i r e control methods.

Fire discipl ine was satisfact,ory. The 17 KC was used i n con- junction with t he ad.vo buzzer to control i i r i ng , while acknowledgement s were t ransf i t t ed over JF circui t . W i t h exception of two groups of f ive rapid f i r e salvos, t he r a t e of f i r e was slow and iio d i f f i c u l t i e s were experi- enced. Target discrir-iin?.tion on the Mk I V Radar was aLu^-t impossible on most t a rge ts duo t o l a rge land masses in the vicini ty . For this reason and because all except illuiainaticn was f i r e d during daylight, t he 1'ik I V was not used.

c. 3ffcctiveness of gunnery.

Because most of the targets fircdupon wore tunnels, caved and concretomplaccments which were undw almost constant a t tack by destroyers, cruisers, and a i r c r a f t , specif ic r e s u l t s of our own gunfire were d i f f i c u l t to determino. The cariibincd e f fec t of the bcrcbc.rdnont i^f t he Task Group was t o almost conpletoly e l ~ a t c a l l enomy mjo r -cd ibc r bzbtories, anci f i r e by t h i s vessel contributed t o a proportionate share of the damage. One in- stance in which results of f i r i n g were observed by SFCP i s mentioned i n PAtiT V. Destruction of mines by &dam f i r e i s discusssd i n P2.T V I .

d. Material and t ra in ing clef iciencics.

No m t e r i a l o r tri-.ining deficicncics were noted.

Report was made by ships on tho South s ide of tho Island of several r icochets f a l l i n g i n t he i r vicinity while t h i s s h i p was f i r i n g ca l l f i r e a t CORHEGIDOB on 17 February. To prevent such occurrences tho t i m fuses on a l l she l l s f i m d wore s e t t o burst 200 yards beyond the gun range. Such bursts evidently did not occur, prcbi.bly a s a r e su l t of t he time fuses being daaaged by tho impact. There appeared t o be a nunbcr of she l l s t h a t did not detonate' upon impact during tho period cuvi-rcd by th i s report . The 'i pcrcentago of duds i n t h i s category is es t ina ted t o be nbo'-it 1%. la &st I

cases tho duds occurred a t sail1 angles of impact. \ken f i r i n g at s h ~ e r / c l i f f s very few duds occurred. If t i l l s is an inherent charac te r i s t ic of the 1 base detonating fuses currently i n s t a l l ed in 5"/38 Cal. AA Comon amunit ion such information was not available on board.

B. There were no opportunities t o observe psrIormancc of eneqy '6 ordnance as no enemy gunfire f o i l in tho h o d i a t e vic ini ty of t h i s s..ip.

- 6 -. ¡ ENCLOSURE (A) TO CO ABBOT LEI. DD629/Al6-l, SEr(I..L 01345, of Xl Fl33&U;SS 1945

, > ,< ,

' %

ACTION REPORT FOR 13 - 17 FEBRUAOT 1945

PART V DiWtGB. -'

A. This vessel sust l ined no damage.

B. Battle danage t o enemy units.

A s noted i n part I V , e f fect ive observation of r e su l t s of our f i r i n g were not possible i n most instances. it 1507 on 17 February, however, one f i r e support mission was f i r e d a t a machine gun nest near KALIt"PA H i l l . '

at co-ordinates 34.5 - 41.2. The SFCP reported d i rec t h i t s with ai.ununition and debris f lying i n a l l directions, an:l s ta ted tha t tho ta rge t was effect ively doiaolished.

PAHT VI . SPECIAL CCMENTS.

A. Hat applicable.

B, Not applicable.

C. Not appliccble.

D. Special coments.

1. Brief chronological swiiaary of C I C o:~crations.

a. General.

Coobat Information Center played a re la t ive ly minor ro l e during tho period being reported because most of the bombardment was direct f i r e . Actually C I C par t ic ipated on only t-ivo occasions; during the c a l l f i r e of

afternoon of 17 February and aga in during tho night of 16 February f o r urnination f i r i ng .

Eaployment and performance of radars.

The performance of SGA Rrd2.r was uniformly excellent. k t r e n e ranges were obtained on surface vessels, up t o 60,000 yards on one occasion while operating i n t h i s area, and posit ion was maintained a t ni.pht exclu- sively with this radar. The usual d i f f i c u l t i e s of obtaining a ra.J:.r L:X by use of tangents was experienced, but presence of such sheer pinn;:.cles a s EL FRtiILLE and LA XONJA. Islands made the problem much sinpler. It was noted tha t EL FKtiILLE f a i l e d t o cut i n sa t i s fac tor i ly when used in conjunction

i t h other r e l i ab l e points. T h i s was a consistant cVndition and in2.c.-'tos possible e r r o r in the chart provided.

In regard t o the illumination on the night "f 17 Februnr;" it i s clioved tha t DET charts of t h e s ca l e of 1000 yards to the inch instead of

the odd-scaled charts provided would have saved considerable work involved converting t h e l a t t e r to a convenient s c d c without t h e use of a pntagraph. T he charts provided were of such a scale t ha t rapid s h i f t t o tracking a sur-

'^? face ta rge t would have boon d i f f i c u l t and frequent repositioning of t uc chart would have been required.

- 7 - @ FiNCLWUXE (A) TO CO LBBOT LT3. ~ ~ 6 2 9 / , ~ 6 - 1 , S E I U 013& of 20 FEBILIJAI3Y 19/+5

I

1 ACTION REPORT FOR 13 - 17 FEBRU'-iRY 19/15

PART TO. SPECIAL COMMENTS. - 1, Combat Information Center.

a. General. (Contld)

3. No special radar operational techniques were employed.

4. IFF performance was ~ a t i s f a c t ~ r y .

5. No radar riiaintcnance d i f f i cu l t i e s araae.

6. C I C communications, both external and internal , were sit-5- factory.

7. No enclosures,

2, communication^, own.

a. Voice radio.

Radio comunications were generally good, although excessive use of t h e MAN c i r cu i t f o r unimportant t r r f f i c made it v i r tua l ly useless in an emergency. TBS c i r c u i t s were sometil~us overcrowded but believe c i r cu i t d iscipl ine has improved over tha t noted in operations of a year o r two ago. Ins ta l la t ion of MM and MiÈ equipment has tedly helped i n tl-' a respect.

6 . No comments.

7. No comments.

f ac t largely a t t r i bu t ed to the methodof controlling f i r e i h th the 1.1:'37 Main Battery Director. In t he f i r s t instance, single shots were f i r e d u n t i l h i t s were observed on the ta rge t and then ad tomt ic f i r e was comiencerl~ Usually two o r three preliminary shots were suf f ic ien t and subsequi :iL :ire was extremely accurate and appeared t o be highly destructive.

- 8 - /6,g ENCLOSURE (A) TO CO ABBOT LTR. ~~629/~16-1, SERIAL 01345 of 20 FEBRUARY 1945

E. Special features and incidents.

f 401x1 f i r e was extended for t h o f i r s t tb . c on t h i s ship t o shore bombardment and to destrovine mines. Results w ~ r o excellent. a

I Pd lT VI. SPHiIriL COiiJiMTS,

1 E. Special features and incidents. ( ~ o n t ' d )

I Kines were sunk with guns f i r i n g single f i r e i n Gain Battery n t ro l . Ranges were from 700 t o 2200 yards, and although i h e s

present a small t a rge t a t these ranges, seven were b-nik with an average ammunition expenditure of about 40 rounds. While t h i s may appear consider- able, other ships without t he Main Battery control arrangement engaged in the sane operations were observed t o have considerably jjri-ater d i f f icu l ty h i t t i ng targets. The mine t h a t was sunk at a range of 2200 yards required 82 rounds.

PiiIlT V I I . PJfflSONNEL PERFOitlANCE AND CASUALTIES.

Personnel performance was excellent. There were no casualt ies.

. LESSONS LEiiBNED, COiQCLUSIONS nKD HECWNDATIONS.

Some d i f f icu l ty arose i n connection with Night Illumination r e due t o an apparent misunderstanding by the SFCP as to the capabi l i t i es our equipment. Request was made by the Ci'CP fo r one s t a r every 15 utcs, with the intent ion of spott ing several s t a r s a t the outset u n t i l

o change, no changott was received and then continuing from t h a t point t h a single s t a r every 1 5 minutes, presumably t o burst a t precisely t h e s i red spot. Because wo were underway and there was considerable time g between salvos, it was necessary obtain a new solution in C I C f o r c h s h o t . The inherant inaccuracies of any radar f i x &:us norm1 fuze

range errors made it impossible to deliver illumination within the l imi t s f accuracy requested by the SFCP. U n t i l our s i tua t ion was c la r i f ied , pots of up 200, down 150 f e e t were received.

It i s recommended t h a t SFCP personnel have opportunity t o end several days on ships of a typo with xhich they expect t o work i n dcr tha t an exchange of ideas nay benefit both par t ies , and & & % g - a b o u t awareness of the capabi l i t i es of and the problem..; i?.,cing each gr~u.:i,

om tho ship, it appeared t h a t the SFCP desired t o have the s t a r s burst an a l t i tude of about 300 feet . A s a r e su l t t he s t a r s actual ly burned r about 1/3 of the time possible. ThLs appeared t o bo a wastu of --rail- l e illumination, but the ship did not know tho s p e c i l ' i ~ probluii~s thdt

onfronted the troops on the Island. Their problem may ii:ivu bt-cn difforerit han those encountered i n previous operations.