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Rhetoric in Presidential Campaign Ads: Party Mobilizer, Public Informer or Both? ¹

Joseph Cobetto,Department of Political Science

University of Missouri, Columbia113 Professional Building

Columbia, MO [email protected]

Abstract: A major debate concerning the level of partisanship within the American electorate (Fiorina 2006, Abramowitz (20008, 2010) and their ability to find information concerning public matters within major party presidential ads. This paper seeks to offer some insight into the role that partisanship may contribute to both the usefulness of finding policy information within these ads, but also offering implicit assumptions concerning the media strategies candidates must employ in order to have any chance of winning. Using partisanship levels on a seven point scale as my dependent variable and performing content analysis on a set of 275 presidential campaign ads aired between 1952 and 2008, I conclude that while the strongest partisan categories did not appear to have gain much from the presence of policy, personal or valence mentions, those respondents belonging to the most independent categories were shown to have a positive relationship with the presence of these mentions within campaign ads.

*Prepared for the 9th Annual APSA Pre-Conference on Political Communication at the University of Washington, Wednesday, August 31, 2011.

¹I wish to express my gratitude for all of the work offered by my second coder, Daniel Williams, a MPH candidate at the University of Missouri, Columbia for this project,

[email protected].

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

Introduction

Politics can be segmented into two distinct yet interconnected facets. There is a

politics of actuality highlighted by the shaping and enactment of public policies by

policymakers and there is a politics of possibility highlighted by the political campaigns

and elections conducted either by those seeking to become or those seeking to remain

policymakers. In contemporary American politics, the interplay between the two often

blurs the line for many citizens, making it difficult for them to tell where the one ends

and the other begins. A major feature helping to blur this line is the role of media in the

televised portions of election campaigns and in our wider political discourse. In most

state and all national contests, the prospective policymaker’s public image and standing

is likely to contribute to both their credibility and electoral success.

Yet, even while candidates make use of media outlets in order to enhance the

recognition of the names and policy positions, their competition over the airwaves leaves

open the potential for citizens to gain relevant political information. While candidates can

perform this role of public informer, it is often not their primary one. Candidates are also

the selected representatives of political parties. The two major parties are the single

greatest organizing extra-constitutional entities. Political parties historically have been

ideologically heterogeneous entities, representing conflicting ideologies even while

agreeing on policy interests.

However, the past several decades have seen a shift in both their composition and

aims, with the two major parties becoming increasingly ideologically homogenous and

their political aims being colored by ideology as much as by interests. With this

development in American political parties, a reasonable question worth posing centers

around the purpose and use of political ads for candidates in this changing party

environment. If parties are less ideologically diverse and their candidates are

still expected to develop an advertising campaign to maximize public support, is

the content of ads as relevant today as they were in earlier election cycles? Are

campaign ads still a source of information for all voters?

This paper seeks to examine the evidence pertinent for offering possible answers

to these questions. Looking at the textual evidence offered by general election campaign

ads for major party presidential candidates between 1952 and 2008, an effort will be

made to account for the relative utility of ads over time as the national electorate’s

partisan makeup has changed, offering an implicit campaign strategy.

A cursory yet thoughtful review of the relevant prior literature will be followed by

a thorough discussion of the data and methods employed to examine these questions.

The paper will conclude with a discussion of the results, their possible implications for

future research on political advertising and communication. A careful attempt will be

made to offer both theoretical and substantive dimensions to this discussion.

Prior Literature

Politics & Media Effects

Television has been with the American public for going on seven decades and its

role in electoral politics and its place as a focus for academic research has been around

for nearly as long. The ability of words and images from this medium to generate interest

is something that candidates have long been convinced of as an acceptable conclusion,

even while its level of influence and relationship has been a source of debate for scholars

(Popkin 1994; Graber 1998).

The paper’s opening remarks note this blending of intellectual or cognitive

properties associated with media messages and their visual, auditory and otherwise

sensory ones. The media effects associated with political campaigns and messages has

enjoyed an extensive intellectual history. A number of early studies (Klapper 1960;

Nimmo 1970; Patterson & McClure 1973 & 1976) found only limited significance

in the relationship between media exposure and political attitudes and/or behavior

generally. A number of recent studies, thought have found a connection between

media exposure and political knowledge, issue salience and priority and/or policy opinion

(Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Graber 1988; Zaller 1992; Bartels 1993). Beyond the color and

spectacle of elections, the ability of citizens and audience members to gain policy

knowledge has been a major focal point within the existing literature. So, too, has been

the mood (positive and/or negative) of those messages transmitted (Braden 2006; Geer

2006).

Benoit (2007) helps define the strategic elements of a political media campaign

with his functional theory of campaign discourse. This structure, beginning with its

assumption that voting being a comparative act and that media messages should focus

on highlighting those elements that best advance this aim, is both a sound and reasonable

approach by which media messages can be examined with. Its focus on the roles of

acclaims and attacks in helping either to make the sponsoring candidate seem more

attractive by comparison or to at least appear less undesirable to the opposing candidate

by comparison is discernable, testable and replicable in future studies. These features

were of importance for my own research.

Within the political science canon more specifically, a significant amount of

research has been conducted concerning the affects negative and/or positive ads have on

voter knowledge, attitudes and behaviors (Ansolabehere & Iyengar 1995; Finkel & Geer

1998; Brians &Wattenberg 1999; Geer 2006). Many of these studies look to the ads’

content for clues in discerning a relationship between ad messages and possible affects on

political attitudes and behaviors. This focus on ad messages will also be a part of my

research efforts.

Political Parties & Partisanship

Political parties have a single central function: to select candidates that can win

elections and help shape the creation or preservation of public policy. Political parties

therefore do not undertake the expense and effort of staging public spectacle of an

election campaign primarily as a source of entertainment for the nation’s electorate. They

undertake the effort to both energize interest and behaviors (i.e. voting) amongst their

committed membership while also attempting to stimulate interest and support amongst

those outside of the membership’s ranks, primarily uncommitted voters and potentially

even disaffected members from rival parties. Among the various steps in a political

party’s role within a political campaign alongside candidate recruitment, fundraising and

policy position formation, voter mobilization can be considered the final or ‘harvesting’

phase of the election campaign timeline.

While the existence of a link between political advertising and voter mobilization

has been fairly agreed upon by prior works, the exact relationship has been a point of

contention. Hansen & Rosenstone (1993) makes it clear those members of the electorate

with a partisan identity have added incentive to cast a ballot and are reminded often

enough by their party through direct personal contact. Leighley (1996) and Gerber &

Green (2005) offer further clarification to this point. Leighley cleverly notes that political

parties seek to “intentionally mobilize” their members to go to the polls.

As a means for achieving this aim, television exposure, whether through

advertisements or newscasts, are chief instruments in any candidate’s campaign strategy.

The national dimensions surrounding a run for the Presidency only make this usage more

central in a campaign’s overall general election strategy since it is both unreasonable and

highly unlikely that any candidate could or be expected to effectively disseminate his or

her message(s) through retail politics.

The presidential general election campaign advertisement is not only the most

likely form of exposure individual voters will ever have with the candidates and the chief

expenditure of any candidate’s campaign budget, it is also the prime example of the

interplay between politics and media. The two need each other. There can be no politics

without communication and the media have historically played an informative role in

connecting the citizens with government. There have been various stylistic and

substantive changes to the content and presentation of campaign ads over the past six

decades. Candidates have gone from offering ads with singers singing, offering little

substantive policy information to today’s often vicious attack ads, using sound clips and

video of rival candidates offering either embarrassing or contradictory statements.

The phenomena of partisanship, which is not be confused with polarization, has

been a driving force in political science research since the empiricism revolution in the

middle of the past century. Partisanship itself is a characteristic of party identification.

Evidence for the growth in partisanship in recent decades can be found a number of

recent works (Bartels 2000; Stonecash 2006). This paper is focused upon the competition

between the parties. Kauffmann, Petrocik & Shaw (2008) correctly note that while

recent elections have produced close partisan majorities, these election have not in

fact produced evidence a of polarized electorate. Many citizens and scholars may be

too quick to jump onto the polarization bandwagon. This is not to say that there are

not clear, sincere differences between the opinions of members of the major parties,

especially when comparing their most partisan members, but each party also continues

to have weak and leaning members that while having a partisan identification are capable

of acting furtively against their partisan identity by not helping their party’s candidates

(i.e. not voting) or through more active, though tentative support for the opposing party’s

candidate from time to time (i.e. Reagan Democrats). This division between these varying

degrees of party members rather than a focus on the partisan identification itself does need

to be given greater focus in order to get beyond the more descriptive differences between

partisanship’s relationship to various political phenomena.

Campaign Effects & Advertising

At the same time some scholars have been looking at the role of candidates and

their messages in relation to having any effect on the citizens’ political attitudes and

behaviors, a growing literature has been looking at the role that the effects associated

with the overall campaign has affected these same citizens (Holbrook 1996, Shaw 2006).

As elements of the overall general election campaign, television ads present a significant

piece to the puzzle. Additional evidence have helped tie ad messages and other elements

with the overall reach of partisan identity (Petrocik 1996; Benoit, Petrocik & Hansen

2003). The result is the ability to raise media message that offer cue to partisanship

without the candidate or ad explicitly describing itself as either a ‘Democratic’ or

‘Republican’ ad. Understanding how candidates and their campaigns can craft messages

capable of reaching a diverse audience without needing to give attention to one’s party

label is necessary if one is to account for the role of partisanship in presidential elections.

At the same time, a number of scholar have noted the ability of individual voters

to view media messages that fall outside of their own political viewpoint and filter them

in such a way as to receive the message without necessarily having the information much

alter their opinions, if at all (Lutz 1987; Kaid 1997; Kaid & Johnson 2002). Being able to

see if candidates’ ad messages offer information content capable of reaching voters

possess of a less partisan identity is worth investigating to help offer some conformation

of these earlier findings from the communication literature, and even perhaps to arrive at

some additional insights which time over the course of time can make itself apparent.

Even the political marketing literature has begun to offer some insight, if not description

of the phenomena under investigation. Maarek (2011) notes that campaign communication

can be divided into two main approaches. There is what he describes as ‘conquest’

communication, meaning the candidate’s campaign media strategy seeks to articulate a message

intended to not only maintain their own party’s rank and file, but to also reach into the opposing

candidate’s likely cast of supporters. The other approach is what he describes as ‘maintenance’

communication, meaning the candidate’s campaign media strategy seeks to articulate a message

that will secure their likely supporters while avoiding any attempts to reach out beyond those

grouping for fear of losing any likely support (44-46). As the options for members of the

electorate for securing their political information continues to grow, the ability for candidates to

reach those desired persons with their message has become increasingly segmented, with less in

the way that appeal was communicated during the middle of the last century when most

Americans had three or four television channels to choose from.

The challenge this paper sets out to take up is one of determining what role words

within campaign ads have in shaping voters’ minds and intents. Decades earlier a long

running debate was initiated between thinkers like John Dewey and Walter Lippmann

concerning both the capacity of individual persons to become knowledgeable citizens and

how technology would play a role in making this happen. In more recent years, a similar

debate has was initiated with the advent of the Internet and social media. Using content

analysis, I hope to offer some insight into whether certain aspects of presidential general

election campaign ads like the number of policy mention candidates employ in their ads,

for example, has connections with the viewers’ varying levels of partisanship of and

using them to help make assessments concerning whom they are likely to support during

the general election. As my research question centers on words, it seems reasonable that

words ought to be the focus of my investigation. It is worth determining what implicit campaign

strategy one can deduce from the sorts of information being offered by candidates in their ads.

Research Design

Trying to offer insight on factors concerning the texts of political campaign ads

made the choice of content analysis appear to be a reasonable, especially as the much of

the existing secondary data concerning data elements is largely descriptive or explains

other aspects unrelated to this research effort. Content analysis has a long and storied

history within the discipline. Lasswell (1965)’s work The Language of Politics is aptly

named. He and a number of subsequent scholars understood that political phenomena

may not always fit within the contemporary standard of large, survey datasets as now

available courtesy of the National Election Studies (NES), the General Social Survey

(GSS), Annenberg, Correlates of War, among many others (Finkel & Geer 1998; Geer

2006). All work using content analysis requires a potential data source and a manner for

examining those data points in the form of a codebook. The data source used for this

analysis comes from the series of ads made available on The Living Room Candidate

website.

While this data is a limited one and does focus mainly on better known ads for

each campaign, those ads available being prominent need not necessarily mean their ad

text message would be unrepresentative, all concerns being understood (Goldstein and

Freeman 2002). The ads on the website offer an objective source from which one’s results

can be replicated and tested. While accepting the limitations my data source presents my

analysis, I suspect that even this collection of data should offer analysis results capable of

helping me to illuminate the research questions presented in this work.

Using Geer (2006)’s caveats for helping to select the ads chosen, namely 1.) The ad

needed to have been aired on television, 2.) The ad needed to be the product of the candidate’s

campaign or their political party, 3.) The ad needed to have been broadcast in more than a

single state, 4.) The ad had to have been broadcast in English and 5.) I only coded unique ads,

and not duplicate ads (26). His first caveat that the ads needed to be no longer than 60 seconds,

was accepted in spirit rather than in practice. In practice, any ad longer than 64 seconds was

rejected for examination. Using these qualifiers were left me with a total of 275 ads for

examination.

These caveats having been adopted, a codebook was drafted and tested. After a revision

of earlier attempts at a codebook, the codebook used was finalized. The codebook used has 58

questions. These questions range from identifying questions such the ad’s given name, its spoken

and textual word count, and sponsoring candidates to a series of questions pertaining to mentions

of the candidates’ names and parties, the origin of the spoken voice in the ad, any policy

positions or public issues, any personal characteristics and any possible mentions of valance

issues. Mentions concerning party identification, valence and public policy issues each have two

lines of questioning, with one pertaining to direct mentions and another pertaining to indirect

mentions. For the purpose of the statistical analyses, direct mention were treated as a one and

indirect mentions were treated as a half. As shown in Figure 1, the role in policy mentions in ads

has varied over time.

The transcript provided by the website were collected over a period of three days in the

middle of June 2011 and a final codebook having been completed and employed for analysis in

middle of July 2011. The author also served as the principle coder, coding all 275 cases with a

second coder completing 28 cases using stratified sampling. Upon completion of the work, the

Cronbach’s Alpha offered by the combined effort was .865, indicating a solid though not great

level of reliability in these findings. These first hand data were then transformed into a series of

new data point that helped account for the total number of mentions concerning public policy,

personal characteristics and valence issues.

In addition, I also sought to use the policy mention types to help generate new variables

concerning whether the predominant issue in the ad could be classified as having a partisan

‘ownership’ or not, and if it did, which party ‘owns’ it. Using prior literature to inform these

choices, policy areas such Education, the Environment and Health or Social Spending were

classified as issues owned by Democrats while Crime, Defense, Foreign Policy and Taxes were

classified as issues owned by Republicans (Petrocik 1996, Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen 2003).

Issue ads involving Social Issues and Reforming Government were not classified with either.

These data were used in tandem with a series of data gathered from the National

Elections Studies (NES) attempting to account for respondents’ level of partisanship, level of

party identification, their expressed interest in the given election campaign, whether they were

encouraging other people to vote for their chosen candidate in the given election and whether

they were following the election campaign on television.

Evidence from Figure 1 would suggest that while policy may not receive as much

attention as valence or personal qualities, when policy is presence in an ad message, that

message focuses intently upon offering voters at least cosmetic amounts of information. This is

not to say that earlier findings relating to ad content should not be kept in consideration, but

rather these ratio measures would indicate that policy mentions may be interwoven with other

forms of mentions. Two great spikes in the ratio of policy to valence and personal qualities

occurred in 1972 and 1984, indicating that perhaps electoral competiveness may make policy

mentions relative to other mentions less attractive as a message option.

(Insert Figure 1 Here)

Using partisanship levels on the seven point scale as my dependent variable, I ran a

series of four analyses. Each analysis included one main analysis and three analyses each using

separate control variables. I did not analyze pure independents in these analyses since the

interplay attempting to be examined is the interplay between partisanship and reception of media

content. According to a number of prior efforts dealing with negativity, Democrats were likely

to suppress voter turnout and other forms of political participation when the ads turned negative

while the effects were reduced for Republicans (Ansolabehere & Iyengar 1994, Kahn & Kenney

1999). While this analysis is not concerned with questions of mood as it is with question of facts

and the opportunity to acquire them, the potential difference between the two parties and the

varying shades of party identification in terms of their potential for the reception of information,

whether it be policy, personal or valence in nature is something that will be looked for.

Careful attention will also be given to the effects accounted for by the three control

models. The three behavior being accounted for, advocating for a candidate, viewing the

campaign on television and having a general interest in the campaign itself. Each control appears

to be a valid and useful measure for accounting for potential variance not accounted for in the

main models. Finding out how much variance each of these controls is able to separately

account for will also be important for helping to determine the main model’s utility and

applicability.

Accounting for the role of interest in the campaign is necessary if one is able to make any

statement differentiating between respondents being interested in the campaign and people being

informed by the campaign. The main model serves as evidence for determining the relationship

between party identification and knowledge gain while the control models serve as evidence for

the determining the relationship between party identification and political mobilization. There is

something of debate concerning which members of the electorate benefit from ad message most.

Abramowitz (2010), among others, asserts that the most partisan members of the electorate

should generally be the most engaged and informed by media message, even if these messages

are not fully accepted or the respondent has been inoculated by preexisting viewpoints (Pfau &

Kenski 1990).

On the other hand, it would seem intuitively correct that those with the greatest partisan

commitment should be the least concern with acquiring information about the parties and

candidates. While there can be described a paucity of policy messages in these ads, they remain

for many persons the easiest point of access to policy information pertaining to the candidates

and parties’ positions. Those with less commitment to their stated party should have the most to

gain from these ads’ messages.

A cursory analysis of the 275 ads shows descriptive evidence in line with other works. In

Table 1, one can see that while the number of ads with policy mentions (either for the sponsoring

candidate or for an opposing candidate), one can see a greater concentration of efforts in these

ads towards valence mentions either to help advance or to help stall a given candidate’s appeal.

(Insert Table 1 Here)

As highlighted by prior research, Republican ownership of ad policy messages has been

more prominent during the television era than those owned by Democrats. Of the 187 ads which

had at least an indirect policy mention, 71 were in Republican owned issues, 60 were in

Democratic owned issues with the remaining 56 being in policy areas not found by prior research

to offer either party a significant advantage. This dominance was also found amongst valence

and personal mentions.

Part of the task in this analysis will be to demonstrate how this balance between the

various forms of ad messages can help explain the statistical findings given. The rate of valence

mentions does offer some implicit insight into the candidates’ media strategy. The focus on

valence issues (Patriotism, Family, Faith) is capable of helping a candidate expand the electoral

playing field in ways that a pure policy or party based approach may not be capable of doing.

While policy should be most effective in helping partisans closer to the middle, valence issues

should be able to generate interest amongst all members of the electorate.

In summation, my research hypotheses are 1.) Respondents belonging to partisan

categories farther from the middle should be less statistically influenced in the main model by

the various messages, particularly policy mentions, since as strong partisans they are likely

already filtering these messages through a clear political lens., 2.) Respondents belonging to

partisan categories closer to the middle of the partisan divide should be influenced by all

mentions in the main model generally, though personal and valence mentions should be

especially more convincing, and 3.) Democrats consistently being a greater proportion of the

electorate should be more likely to be influenced generally than Republicans.

Findings

The findings presented in Tables 2 – 6 offer evidence generally supportive of the research

hypotheses. Amongst the varying partisan categories, policy mentions were significant in the

main model only among Weak and Independent Democrats. None of the Republican categories

or the Strong Democrats were found to have any significant relationship with policy mentions.

With respect to valence and personal mentions, Weak and Independent Democrats and

Independent Republicans were found to have significant relationships with valence and/or

personal mentions. What is worth noting is how amongst the Independent Democrats and

Republicans the significant relationships are generally in a positive direction, indicating

the mentions have been an informative influence while the significant results amongst the Weak

Democrats were in a negative direction, indicating that mentions are not really informing these

voters in the same way. If anything, these policy mentions were not helpful in reaching these

members of the electorate. Amongst the Strong and Weak Republican respondents in the main

or control models, no significant influence is being felt by any manner of ad messages, meaning

these messages are neither significantly mobilizing them or informing them. All of the

movement appears to be amongst the Democrats’ categories. Considering that over the past

several decades the fifty-first voter has consistently fallen within the Democrats’ partisan

adherence, these findings should not be particularly surprising.

(Insert Tables 2 – 7 Here)

This point is further supported by the various R² levels. Results for the Democratic

categories are consistently greater than among the Republican categories, indicating that among

the Republican categories some element or elements helping to explain this relationship are not

being accounted for. Results amongst Democrats fell between .31 and .68 while it was between

.31 and .44 for Republicans. These results would at least on the surface to refute Abramowitz’s

assertion concerning an engaged public amongst the most partisan members of the electorate.

If these are the most engaged members of the electorate, then they are gaining their political

information beyond the world of political campaign ads. If they are amongst the most engaged

members of the electorate, this is a strong possibility, though given the availability of all persons

to view a campaign ad, even if the ad is being aired for a favored candidate’s opponent, they

should still be as likely as anyone else to view it, even controlling for selective exposure.

Further confirmation was offered by the results given the control models. Within both

Weak Democrats and Weak Republicans they was a significant and negative relationship given

for the influence of claiming interest in the given election campaign, indicating that the efforts of

the campaigns themselves could at times be counterproductive in their aims. This may be a

somewhat curious finding considering that both Independent and Strong Democrats and

Republicans were found to have a significant and positive relationship given for the influence on

this same variable, though such a finding both make intuitive sense and is possessed of prior

research to support its presence. Those most connect with a party and those whose votes are

perceived to be most in play in a given election cycle are the most likely people to be engaged in

a campaign. Those lacking with sufficient partisan commitment and/or efforts being made to

persuade one politically are going to be less engaged (Bartels 2000; Holbrook & McClurg 2005).

Given the ubiquity of television in American life through this period, it should not be

terribly surprising to find that when the effects of those NES respondents claiming to follow

the campaign on television was accounted, it produced little impact relative to the main model’s

findings. If one is to influenced by television ads, it would be reasonable to expect they would be

following the campaign on television.

The last control model concerning the efforts of respondents attempting to convince

others to vote for one’s chosen candidate follows a predictable pattern with the most independent

voters having a positive, significant relationship with the control and all other partisan categories

producing a negative, significant relationship. It would seem that once a voter from the most

middle grouping is convinced to support a given candidate, they seek to get others to support the

candidate too. At the same time, when members of the strongest partisan categories are presented

with an opportunity to convince others to cast a ballot for their given candidate, they are less

likely to do so. A significant explanation for this dichotomy could be that those belonging to the

most partisan categories likely are surround by other persons sharing their given political

outlook, leaving open little opportunity to convince to vote a given candidate since they already

intended to do so.

The role of issue ownership in these models is very limited. Amongst Democrats, only

among its most independent members is any statistically significant relationship between their

level of partisan identity and the role of party-owned themes. In this particular instance, there

was a significant, positive relationship towards ads where Democrats own the main policy topic

and a significant negative relationship towards ads where Republicans own the main policy

topic. Among Republicans, issue ownership proved to be something of a statistical wash, with

Strong Republicans apparently not being significantly influenced by the party’s ownership over

an ad’s issue topic, Weak Republicans being positively and significantly influenced and

Independent Republicans being negatively and significantly influenced.

Overall, there appears to be support for each of the tested hypotheses, though with

respect to the research questions, the answers are not as clear cut. While the analyses present

a picture of relationships that seems to accept certain point concerning Abramowitz’s viewpoint,

namely that partisan actors are more likely to be engaged members of the electorate, it is

important that one thinks about this solely in partisan terms rather than terms of polarization.

These results indicate the degree to which competition exists between the parties. No

examination pertaining to issues positions or ideology was offered in this analysis, making any

claims on polarization spurious ones. Moreover, his arguments were more often found among

the Democrats rather the Republicans in the analyses. Have a credible explanation about only

one half of the electorate is not an entirely satisfying result, even if it appears to be a valid one.

In looking at the role ad messages appear to have influenced various segments of the

electorate, it would be reasonable to state that the affects have been disproportionally tilted

among the Democrats with Republicans appearing not to have been as affected. Potential

explanations for this findings could be the disparity between the two parties in terms of their

ideological range of opinions. A party with a greater segment of an electorate in a two party

system composed of voters evenly distributed across the ideological spectrum should be have

more ideological diversity. This statement makes even more sense when one thinks about how

the Republican candidate since 1952 has won nine of the last fifteen presidential elections.

Members of the GOP alone could not expect to win this often without considerable electorate

assistance from members of the other party.

Future Considerations

There have been various debates that shaped this work: How partisan is the electorate? Is

this partisanship as a meaningful indicator?, What impact does partisanship play in the reception

and usage of messages gained from candidates’ ads? and What can these results inferred about

the informative and mobilizing impact ads will have in future election?. With respect to the first

two questions, the answer offered by this analysis would seem to confirm a Fiorina viewpoint,

namely that there is some overlap between people’s partisan identities and their willingness to

support candidates of other parties. Certainly the models concerning Independent Democrats

and Republicans would seem to support that claim. In the language of Maarek, it would be safe

assert that major party candidate have been engaging in communication strategies that sought to

reach into the opposing party’s membership. It may be precisely this effort at reaching out to

these voters from the other party that can help shed some light on the lack of influences facts,

valence, and candidate characteristics played in the thinking of the fiercest partisans.

On the other hand, the answers offered by this analysis for the third question would seem

to fall more in line with Abramowitz in his assertion that those with greater partisan convictions

are more likely to engage the inform provided to them (particularly if the respondent is a

Democrat). No one could assert that candidates’ campaigns are forgetting the political and

policy considerations of their most loyal members.

As to the remaining question concerning the future direction of ad campaign messages,

the given trajectory of these results would seem not to indicate any reason as to why these

general findings from the past fifteen elections would not hold up in subsequent campaigns. A

meaningful argument in opposition to this view may assert that with technological changes and

greater citizen mobility, many of our findings may not hold up when controlling for these

changes. Of course such an argument presupposes the potential effects of changes in political

campaign strategy that are beyond the knowledge and reach of this current research effort. If the

past is prologue, then one must think that further and more detailed examination of these

relationship will yield more evidence that can help in accurately portending what is yet to come.

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Appendix A

PENULTIMATE CODEBOOK

Case General Descriptive Variables

1. Case ID #

2. Case Year #

3. Case’s Candidate Name

4. Case’s Candidate Party

0 = The Sponsoring Candidate is a Republican. 1 = The Sponsoring Candidate is a Democrat. 2 = The Sponsoring Candidate belongs is an Independent or belongs to a third party. 3 = The Case is not Sponsored by either a Candidate or a political party.

5. Case’s Candidate Status

0 = The Sponsoring Candidate is not an Incumbent President. 1 = The Sponsoring Candidate is an Incumbent President.

6. Case’s Advertisement Name

7. Case’s Time Duration (in # of Seconds)

8. Case’s Spoken Word Count (Textual Words not included in Count)

9. Case’s Textual Word Count (Spoken Words not included in Count)

10. Case’s Advertisement Spoken Language

0 = Case’s Advertisement is presented in English. 1 = Case’s Advertisement is presented in a language other than English.

Case Message Information Variables

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Mentions

11. Case’s Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name

0 = No Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name. 1 = Any Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name.

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Mentions (Continued)

12. Case’s Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name - #

13. Case’s Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name

0 = There is no Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name. 1 = There are Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Name.

14. Case’s Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate Name’s - #

15. Case’s Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name

0 = There are no Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name(s). 1 = There are Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name(s).

16. Case’s Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Name - #

17. Case’s Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name

0 = There are no Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name(s). 1 = There are Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Name(s).

18. Case’s Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate Name’s - #

19. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Spoken Presence – Sponsoring Candidate

0 = The Sponsoring Candidate does not speak in Advertisement. 1 = The Sponsoring Candidate does speak in Advertisement.

20. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Spoken Presence – Unspecified Narrator

0 = An Unspecified Narrator does not speak in Advertisement. 1 = An Unspecified Narrator does speak in Advertisement.

21. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Spoken Presence – Other than Unspecified Narrator or Sponsoring Candidate

0 = There is not a Spoken Presence other than Sponsoring Candidate or Unspecified Narrator. 1 = There is a Spoken Presence other than Sponsoring Candidate or Unspecified Narrator.

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Policy/Issue Position Mentions

22. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Spoken Presence – Other than Unspecified Narrator or Sponsoring Candidate

0 = The Spoken Presence is an Unspecified Narrator or Sponsoring Candidate. 1 = The Spoken Presence is a family member of the Sponsoring Candidate. 2 = The Spoken Presence is a political colleague of the Sponsoring Candidate. 3 = The Spoken Presence is a celebrity speaking on behalf of the Sponsoring Candidate, and not a political figure. 4 = The Spoken Presence is an ordinary citizen, not the sponsoring candidate, a celebrity, a political colleague or a family member. 5 = The Spoken Presence is a person that does not fit into any of the prior categories.

23. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions

0 = There are no mentions of public policy or issue positions as advocated by Sponsoring Candidate 1 = There are mentions of public policy or issue positions as advocated by Sponsoring Candidate

24. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions - #

25. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions – Main Focus

0 = There are no mentions of public policy or issue positions as advocated by Sponsoring Candidate 1 = The Main Focus is Microeconomic Policy. (Jobs, Wages, Taxes) 2 = The Main Focus is Macroeconomic Policy. (Debts, Deficits, Inflation) 3 = The Main Focus is Defense or Military Policy. (Defense Spending, Wars) 4 = The Main Focus is Diplomacy or Foreign Policy. (Treaties, Alliances) 5 = The Main Focus is Public Corruption or Reforming Government. (Campaign Finance) 6 = The Main Focus is Health or Social Spending Policy. (Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, Welfare) 7 = The Main Focus is Education Policy. (Public Education Funding, No Child Left Behind) 8 = The Main Focus is Civil Rights Policy. (Busing, Desegregation, Women’s Rights) 9 = The Main Focus is Crime and Punishment Policy (War on Drugs, Mandatory Sentences, Death Penalty) 10 = The Main Focus is Environmental Policy (Climate Change, Global Warming, Conservation) 11 = The Main Focus is a Social Issue. (Prayer in Schools, Gun Rights, Abortion, GLBT Issues) 12 = The Case’s Main Focus is on a Public Policy or Issue Position not described by the previous categories.

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Policy/Issue Position Mentions (Continued) 26. Case’s Opposing Candidate(s)’ Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions

0 = There are no mentions of Opposing Candidate’s public policy or issue positions by Sponsoring Candidate’s Advertisement 1 = There are mentions of Opposing Candidate’s public policy or issue positions by Sponsoring Candidate’s Advertisement

27. Case’s Opposing Candidate(s)’ Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions - # 28. Case’s Opposing Candidate(s)’ Public Policy or Issue Position Mentions – Main Focus

0 = There are no mentions of public policy or issue positions as advocated by the Opposing Candidate(s). 1 = The Main Focus is Microeconomic Policy (Jobs, Wages, Taxes) 2 = The Main Focus is Macroeconomic Policy (Debt, Deficits, Inflation) 3 = The Main Focus is Defense or Military Policy (Military Spending, Wars) 4 = The Main Focus is Diplomacy or Foreign Policy (Treaties, Alliances) 5 = The Main Focus is Public Corruption or Reforming Government (Campaign Finance) 6 = The Main Focus is Health or Social Spending Policy (Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, Welfare) 7 = The Main Focus is Education Policy (Public Education Funding, No Child Left Behind) 8 = The Main Focus is Civil Rights Policy (Busing, Desegregation, Women’s Rights) 9 = The Main Focus is Crime and Punishment Policy (War on Drugs, Mandatory Sentences, Death Penalty) 10 = The Main Focus is Environmental Policy (Climate Change, Global Warming, Conservation) 11 = The Main Focus is a Social Issue. (Prayer in Public Schools, Gun Rights, Abortion, GLBT Issues) 12 = The Case’s Main Focus is on a Public Policy or Issue Position is not described by the previous categories.

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Party Mentions 29. Case’s Direct Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party

0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party 1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Party Mentions (Continued) 30. Case’s Direct Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party - #

31. Case’s Direct Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party

0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party 1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party

32. Case’s Direct Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party - #

33. Case’s Direct Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party

0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Party 1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Party 34. Case’s Direct Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party - #

35. Case’s Direct Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party

0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate(s) Party 1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Party

36. Case’s Direct Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party - #

37. Case’s Indirect Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party

0 = There are no Indirect, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party 1 = There are Indirect, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party

38. Case’s Indirect Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party - #

39. Case’s Indirect Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party

0 = There are no Indirect, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party 1 = There are Indirect, Spoken Mentions of the Sponsoring Candidate’s Party

40. Case’s Indirect Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Party - #

41. Case’s Indirect Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party

0 = There are no Indirect, Spoken Mentions of the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Party 1 = There are Indirect, Spoken Mentions of the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Party

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Party Mentions (Continued)

42. Case’s Indirect Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party - #

43. Case’s Indirect Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party

0 = There are no Indirect, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate(s) Party 1 = There are Indirect, Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate(s) Party

44. Case’s Indirect Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Party - #

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Personal Characteristic Mentions

45. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Personal Characteristic Mentions

0 = There are no mentions of Personal Background Characteristics (Prior Political or Work Experience or Biography) 1 = There are mentions of personal Background Characteristics (Prior Political or Work Experience or Biography)

46. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Personal Characteristic Mentions - #

47. Case’s Opposing Candidate(s)’ Personal Characteristic Mentions

0 = There are no mentions of Personal Background Characteristics (Prior Political or Work Experience or Biography) 1 = There are mentions of Personal Background Characteristics (Prior Political Or Work Experience or Biography)

48. Case’s Opposing Candidate’s Personal Characteristic Mentions - #

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Valence Issue Mentions

49. Case’s Direct, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Valence Issues

0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith) 1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith)

50. Case’s Direct, Spoken Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Valence Issues - #

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Valence Issue Mentions (Continued)

51. Case’s Direct, Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Valence Mentions

0 = There are no Direct, Textual Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith) 1 = There are Direct, Textual Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith)

52. Case’s Direct, Textual Mentions of Sponsoring Candidate’s Valence Issues - # 53. Case’s Direct, Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Valence Issues

0 = There are no Direct, Spoken Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith) 1 = There are Direct, Spoken Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith) 54. Case’s Direct, Spoken Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Valence Issues - #

55. Case’s Direct, Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Valence Mentions

0 = No Textual Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith) 1 = Any Textual Mentions of Valence Issues (i.e. Patriotism, Family, Faith)

56. Case’s Direct, Textual Mentions of Opposing Candidate’s Valence Issues - #

57. Case’s Sponsoring Candidate’s Valence Issues – Main Focus

0 = There are no Mentions of Valence Issues as advocated by the Sponsoring Candidate. 1 = The Valence Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate involves Patriotism or Nationalism. 2 = The Valence Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate involves Faith or Religion. 3 = The Valence Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate involves Home or the Family. 4 = The Valence Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate involves Ethics or Morality though not necessarily Faith or Religion. 5 = The Valence Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate is a Valence Issue that is not described by the previous categories.

Sponsoring & Opposing Candidates’ Valence Issue Mentions (Continued)

58. Case’s Opposing Candidate(s)’ Valence Issues – Main Focus 0 = There are no mentions of Valence Issues as advocated by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the Opposing Candidate(s)’. 1 = The Valance Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Patriotism or Nationalism. 2 = The Valance Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Faith or Religion. 3 = The Valance Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Home or Family. 4 = The Valance Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the Opposing Candidate(s)’ Ethics & Morality though not necessarily their Faith or Religion. 5 = The Valance Issue being advanced by the Sponsoring Candidate concerning the Opposing Candidate(s)’ involves an issue category that is not described by the previous categories.

TABLE 1PARTISAN OWNERSHIP OF AD ISSUE MENTIONS, 1952-2008

Ad Mention Type Owned by Republicans

Owned by Democrats

Not Owned by Either Party

Total

Policy 71 60 56 187

Personal 28 26 77 121

Valence 62 44 123 229

TABLE 2REGRESSION MODELS BY PARTISANSHIP LEVEL, 1952-2008

Strong Democratic Models MainModel

ControlModel 1

Control Model 2

ControlModel 3

Intercept 0.55 (0.58) 6.90 (0.00)** 1.87 (0.06) -0.81 (0.42)Policy Mentions 0.06 (0.96) 1.40 (0.16) 0.02 (0.98) 0.03 (0.98)Personal Mentions -1.49 (0.14) -0.18 (0.86) -1.58 (0.11) -0.50 (0.62)Valence Mentions -0.60 (0.56) 1.59 (0.11) 0.20 (0.84) -0.92 (0.36)% Strong Partisans 2.97 (0.00) ** -2.70 (0.01)* 2.28 (0.02)* 3.39 (0.00)**% Weak Partisans -0.57 (0.57) 6.26 (0.00) ** -1.75 (0.08) 0.76 (0.45)% Independent Partisans -0.54 (0.59) -7.23 (0.00) ** -1.21 (0.23) 0.13 (0.90)GOP Owned Ad Theme 0.52 (0.60) -2.29 (0.02)* -0.37 (0.71) 0.49 (0.63)Dem Owned Ad Theme 0.17 (0.86) -0.08 (0.43) -0.87 (0.39) 0.23 (0.82)% Claim Interest inCampaign

N/A 11.79(0.00) **

N/A N/A

% Attempting to ConvinceOthers to Vote for Candidate

N/A N/A -7.36(0.00) **

N/A

% Watching Campaign on TV N/A N/A N/A 2.30 (0.22)R-Squared 0.69 0.80 0.75 0.71Adj. R-Squared 0.68 0.79 0.74 0.70N 275 275 275 255


Weak Democratic Models MainModel

ControlModel 1

Control Model 2

ControlModel 3

Intercept 4.96 (0.00)** 5.83 (0.00)** 3.99 (0.00)** -7.28 (0.00)**Policy Mentions -2.40 (0.02)* -1.24 (0.22) -2.70 (0.01)** -2.15 (0.03)*Personal Mentions -3.88 (0.00) ** -0.18 (0.86) -4.48 (0.00)** -3.06 (0.02)*Valence Mentions -2.52 (0.01) ** 0.39 (0.69) -1.78 (0.08) -1.88 (0.06)% Strong Partisans 5.16 (0.00) ** -4.34 (0.00)** 4.70 (0.00)** 7.45 (0.00)**% Weak Partisans 5.95 (0.00) ** -2.45 (0.02) * 5.35 (0.00)** 8.09 (0.00)**% Independent Partisans 4.42 (0.00)** -7.06 (0.00) ** 4.32 (0.00)** 6.67 (0.00)**GOP Owned Ad Theme 4.05 (0.00)** 0.99 (0.33) 3.43 (0.01)** 3.58 (0.00)**Dem Owned Ad Theme 1.78 (0.08) 1.11 (0.27) 0.63 (0.53) 1.38 (0.17)% Claim Interest inCampaign

N/A -25.24(0.00) **

N/A N/A


N/A N/A -10.02(0.00) **

N/A

% Watching Campaign on TV N/A N/A N/A -1.93 (0.05)R-Squared 0.25 0.78 0.46 0.32Adj. R-Squared 0.23 0.77 0.44 0.29N 275 275 275 255


Independent Democratic Models

MainModel

ControlModel 1

Control Model 2

ControlModel 3

Intercept 6.86 (0.00)** -4.15 (0.00)** 7.12 (0.00)** 7.78 (0.00) **Policy Mentions 2.11 (0.04)* 0.63 (0.53) 3.05 (0.00)** 1.82 (0.07)Personal Mentions 3.21 (0.00)** 2.51 (0.01)** 4.85 (0.00)** 3.05 (0.01)**Valence Mentions 2.58 (0.01)** 0.62 (0.54) 1.76 (0.08) 1.66 (0.10)% Strong Partisans -7.19 (0.00)** 2.03 (0.00)** -8.55 (0.00)** -8.21 (0.00)**% Weak Partisans -5.73 (0.00)** 3.98 (0.00) ** -5.79 (0.00)** -6.76 (0.00)**% Independent Partisans -6.73 (0.00)** -4.87 (0.00)

**-8.78 (0.00)** -7.89 (0.00)**

GOP Owned Ad Theme -4.38 (0.00)** -1.45 (0.15) -4.27 (0.00)** -3.84 (0.00)**Dem Owned Ad Theme 2.57 (0.01)* -2.83 (0.01)** -1.47 (0.24) -2.08 (0.04)*% Claim Interest inCampaign

N/A 30.74(0.00) **

N/A N/A


N/A N/A 19.36(0.00) **

N/A

% Watching Campaign on TV N/A N/A N/A 3.64 (0.00)**R-Squared 0.31 0.85 0.71 0.36Adj. R-Squared 0.29 0.84 0.70 0.34N 275 275 275 255


Independent Republican Models

MainModel

ControlModel 1

Control Model 2

ControlModel 3

Intercept 3.16 (0.00)** -4.66 (0.00)** 2.40 (0.02)* 6.72 (0.00)*Policy Mentions 1.83 (0.07) 0.57 (0.56) 1.85 (0.07) 1.72 (0.09)Personal Mentions 3.78 (0.00)** 3.01 (0.01)** 3.91 (0.00)** 2.32 (0.02)*Valence Mentions 1.58 (0.12) -0.91 (0.36) 1.08 (0.28) 1.59 (0.11)% Strong Partisans -3.34 (0.00) ** 3.74 (0.00) ** -2.83 (0.01) -6.54 (0.00)**% Weak Partisans -2.26 (0.25) 4.69 (0.00) ** -1.58 (0.11) -5.77 (0.00)**% Independent Partisans -1.94 (0.05) * 6.29 (0.00) ** -1.61 (0.11) -4.72 (0.00)**GOP Owned Ad Theme -2.86 (0.01)** 0.02 (0.99) -2.34 (0.02)* -2.69 (0.01)**Dem Owned Ad Theme -0.91 (0.37) 0.08 (0.93) -0.25 (0.80) -0.72 (0.47)% Claim Interest inCampaign

N/A 15.52(0.00) **

N/A N/A


N/A N/A 4.78(0.00) **

N/A



Weak Republican Models MainModel

ControlModel 1

Control Model 2

ControlModel 3

Intercept-6.44 (0.00)** 6.90 (0.00)**

- 6.09 (0.00) ** -6.01 (0.00) **

Policy Mentions 0.04 (0.97) 1.40 (0.16) 0.24 (0.81) 0.16 (0.87)Personal Mentions -1.11 (0.27) -0.19 (0.85) - 1.44 (0.15) -0.92 (0.36)Valence Mentions -0.39 (0.70) 1.65 (0.10) 1.28 (0.20) -0.21 (0.84)% Strong Partisans 7.02 (0.00) ** 1.91 (0.06) 7.65 (0.00) ** 6.28 (0.00)**% Weak Partisans 9.02 (0.00)** 4.32 (0.00) ** 9.98 (0.00) ** 8.25 (0.00) **% Independent Partisans 5.85 (0.00)** - 0.07 (0.95) 6.79 (0.00) ** 5.09 (0.00) **GOP Owned Ad Theme 2.04 (0.04)* - 0.30 (0.77) 0.80 (0.43) 1.82 (0.07)Dem Owned Ad Theme 2.15 (0.03)* 1.64 (0.10) -0.69 (0.49) 1.93 (0.06)% Claim Interest inCampaign

N/A -10.79(0.00) **

N/A N/A


N/A N/A -15.88(0.00) **

N/A

% Watching Campaign on TV N/A N/A N/A -0.70 (0.49)R-Squared 0.30 0.51 0.64 0.31

Adj. R-Squared 0.28 0.50 0.63 0.28N 275 275 275 255


Strong Republican Models MainModel

ControlModel 1

Control Model 2

ControlModel 3

Intercept - 0.55 (0.58) -6.90 (0.00)** 1.87 (0.06) 0.81 (0.42)Policy Mentions 0.06 (0.96) 1.40 (0.16) -0.02 (0.98) -0.03 (0.98)Personal Mentions -1.49 (0.14) 0.18 (0.86) 1.58 (0.11) -0.50 (0.62)Valence Mentions -0.60 (0.56) -1.59 (0.11) - 0.20 (0.84) -0.92 (0.36)% Strong Partisans 2.67 (0.01) ** 8.72 (0.00) ** 3.85 (0.02) * 1.21 (0.23)% Weak Partisans 0.57 (0.57) 6.26 (0.00) ** 1.75 (0.08) -0.76 (0.45)% Independent Partisans 0.54 (0.59) 7.03 (0.00) ** 1.21 (0.23) -0.13 (0.90)GOP Owned Ad Theme -0.52 (0.60) 2.29 (0.02)* 0.37 (0.71) -0.49 (0.63)Dem Owned Ad Theme -0.17 (0.87) -0.80 (0.43) 0.87 (0.39) -0.23 (0.82)% Claim Interest inCampaign

N/A 11.79(0.00) **

N/A N/A


N/A N/A -7.36(0.00) **

N/A


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