Introduction “Y - Wilson Center · his essay’s title.Thus, the Special Report suggests a ... Agawa points out that while anti-Americanism exists in Japan,it is less prevalent

The People vs. Koizumi?Japan-U.S. Relations and Japan’sStruggle for National Identity

NO. 119 FEBRUARY 2004

A S I A P R O G R A M S P E C I A L R E P O R T

“You’re the pride of the Japanesepeople, the pride of the nation,”Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba

told his troops on January 16.1 Amid a flurry ofmedia attention, the first members of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) left for Samawa, Iraq.According to plan, a total of one thousand willbe deployed for non-combat tasks such ashumanitarian assistance, building of schools, andinfrastructure improvement.The controversialmission, which has no UN mandate and couldlead to the first Japanese casualties since WorldWar II, is a milestone in Japanese foreign affairs.

Japan’s participation in the Iraqi occupationillustrates the robustness of Japan-U.S. ties onthe official level. The positive relationshipbetween President George Bush and JapanesePrime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, reminiscentof the “Ron-Yasu” friendship of the 1980s, isechoed down through the ranks of both gov-ernments. But public surveys show that manyJapanese citizens are uneasy about what they

perceive as U.S. aggressiveness. Last December,those Japanese who “do not trust the UnitedStates” topped those who “trust” on a percent-age basis for the first time.2 Half of Japaneseremain opposed to sending SDF to Iraq, and 84percent complain that Koizumi has not beenfully accountable to the public on the issue.3

What will be the consequences of this per-ception gap between elites and ordinaryJapanese? Will public attitudes shift in the gov-ernment’s direction, as in the case of the 1992peacekeeping operations law—now popular,but originally approved by only 20 percent ofthe public? Or will difficulties, casualties orJapanese use of firearms (only to be fired underattack) cause a new upsurge of anti-militariza-tion and anti-Americanism?

The three essays in this Special Report, a fol-low-up to a Wilson Center seminar late lastyear, focus on Japanese involvement in Iraq, butalso explore much wider issues of national iden-tity. How is Japan’s identity shaped by the devas-tating defeat of World War II? What has beenthe effect of the North Korean threat? And howwill public attitudes affect the future of theJapan-U.S security relationship?

INSIDE

NAOYUKI AGAWA

Japan-U.S. Relationsand the JapanesePublic

page 7

MASARU TAMAMOTO

A Nationalist's Lament:The Slippery Slope ofKoizumi's Foreign Policy

page 10

TOSHIO NISHI

Japan’s Last Stand inthe 21st Century

page 16

ABSTRACT: Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has pleased Washington by deployingSelf-Defense Forces (SDF) in Iraq. But half the public remains opposed. How serious is the gapbetween Koizumi and the Japanese people on security affairs? This Special Report includes threevery different perspectives, and extends beyond the immediate question of SDF deployment tosuch issues as Japan’s role in the world, the lingering legacy of World War II, and how Japan canbest contribute to stability in Asia as well as the Middle East. Naoyuki Agawa of the Japaneseembassy argues that the Japanese people will continue to support expansion of the SDF underthe U.S. wing. According to Masaru Tamamoto, the prime minister has pushed the publicfarther than it wants to go in the direction of militarization—casualties in Iraq could bring downthe Koizumi government. Toshio Nishi argues that increased national pride will prompt Japantoward a more independent and assertive foreign policy.

IntroductionAmy McCreedy

ASIA PROGRAM

Amy McCreedy is program associate in the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program.

The perspectives included in this report differmarkedly.At first glance, the essays seem to representthree distinct groups: 1) the Koizumi administration,2) left-leaning non-militarization, and 3) right-lean-ing nationalism. However, a closer examinationreveals similarities as well as differences. Each con-tributor supports the Japan-U.S. security treaty inthe name of Japan’s own interests. Each applauds, atleast in some form, the idea of Japanese nationalpride—interestingly, even Masaru Tamamoto, whodecries militarization, calls himself a “nationalist” inhis essay’s title.Thus, the Special Report suggests awide diversity of opinion in Japan that resists easylabeling.

Each of the three contributors observes a differ-ent direction of public opinion—each explicitlyclaims to connect with the Japanese zeitgeist.Naoyuki Agawa, a government official, asserts that a“realistic” public is coming around to the primeminister’s position of supporting U.S. overseas activ-ities.Tamamoto sees Japanese skepticism of milita-rization continuing—even deepening—in responseto misguided U.S. arrogance. In Toshio Nishi’s opin-ion, Japan is experiencing a “sea change” in thedirection of constitutional revision, military expan-sion and hawkish self-sufficiency.Which contributoris right about the course of public opinion? Theanswer, in part, depends on the safety, luck, conduct,and success of the Self-Defense Forces camped onthe barren stretch of land near Samawa. It depends,too, on the leadership skills of both Japanese andU.S. governments in resolving the standoff with

North Korea.Whether due to Koizumi’s persuasive-ness or to media fanfare, support for the Iraqi mis-sion has grown since these essays were written—butit could easily fall again if the SDF encounters diffi-culties or casualties.

THREE VOICES

Naoyuki Agawa, public affairs minister and direc-tor of the Japan Information and Culture Center atthe Japanese Embassy in Washington, makes a casefor expanding Japanese involvement overseas underthe U.S. wing. For him, the important point is todefend the prime minister’s sending troops to Iraqand otherwise assisting the Washington-led coalitionin the face of public reluctance. Agawa argues thatthe Iraqi mission makes sense in the wider contextof the Japan-U.S. alliance, which has a broad base oflongstanding public support. In a sense, he agreeswith the credo attributed to Tom Landry, the famousAmerican football coach: “Leadership is gettingsomeone to do what they don’t want to do, toachieve what they want to achieve.”

However, Agawa also makes the case thatJapanese resistance to sending troops is milder thanothers (such as Tamamoto, later in this SpecialReport) claim. Japanese people, Agawa maintains,“are aware that the world is becoming increasinglydangerous” and understand Koizumi’s position inwanting to support the nation’s closest ally.Though“isolationism” will not disappear overnight, reasonwill prevail in an increasingly complex world wherethe line between individual self defense and collec-tive self defense is becoming increasingly blurred.According to Agawa, the Iraqi mission is the nextstep for Japan’s gradual assumption of “standard—but still limited—actions to benefit peace in theglobal community.” Such actions are the responsibil-ity of a large, prosperous country in an importantgeopolitical location.“Japan is no superpower, but itis not Switzerland or Denmark either,” Agawaasserts. Thus he makes an appeal to the public’s“realism,” as did Koizumi on January 6: “The logicof leaving dangerous work to the United States is nolonger acceptable.The public will understand whyJapan needs to send its troops.”4

Agawa points out that while anti-Americanismexists in Japan, it is less prevalent than in Europe. Forexample, only 35 percent of Japanese dislike the

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ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

THE ASIA PROGRAM

The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposi-tion that only those with a sound scholarly grounding can beginto understand contemporary events. One of the Center’s oldestregional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historicaland cultural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’scapital. In seminars, workshops, briefings, and conferences,prominent scholars of Asia interact with one another and withpolicy practitioners to further understanding of the peoples, tra-ditions, and behaviors of the world’s most populous continent.

Asia Program Staff:Robert M. Hathaway, DirectorGang Lin, Program AssociateAmy McCreedy, Program AssociateWilson Lee, Program AssistantTimothy R. Hildebrandt, Program Assistant

spread of American ideas and customs, compared to50 percent of Britons and 71 percent of French.Agawa believes that much of Japanese anti-U.S. sen-timent is a result of frustration and fear amid eco-nomic and political malaise.While many Japanesecontinue to protest against U.S. military bases onJapanese soil, the Japanese community is generallyhospitable, Agawa maintains. Anti-U.S. demonstra-tions make the news, but quiet cooperation does not—“such is the nature of news.” Moreover, he insiststhat assisting the United States does not make Japana “lapdog.” Japan can influence U.S. actions andworld affairs far more easily by participating than bysitting on the sidelines, he contends.

Masaru Tamamoto, senior fellow (resident inJapan) of the World Policy Institute, sees a muchgreater gap between prime minister and public thandoes Agawa. Koizumi, he argues, has expanded therole of the Self-Defense Forces “with surprising easeand swiftness” by strengthening the SDF’s ability torespond to domestic emergencies as well as to assistU.S.-led coalitions abroad.Tamamoto’s main point isthat Koizumi is more concerned with pleasingWashington than with representing the desires ofthe Japanese people or guarding the safety ofJapanese troops (who, according to the SpecialMeasures Law for Iraq, can only be deployed in“non-combat” areas). In Tamamoto’s view, Koizumihas taken advantage of public fears over the 1998 fir-ing of a North Korean test missile over Japan topush the public farther than it wants to go.

According to Tamamoto,Americans and Japanesewho want to expand Japan’s military role are notthinking strategically in the long term. For example,why does Japan,which is under U.S.military protec-tion, need aircraft carriers that will provoke Chinato acquire its own carrier fleet? How will addinganother arms exporter onto the world scene con-tribute to world peace or to Japanese or U.S. nation-al security? For Tamamoto, Japan’s most productiverole is to continue demonstrating the viability ofconstitutional pacifism to developing nations.Tamamoto calls himself a nationalist because he isproud of what he calls the “cheerful” role that Japanhas played since World War II. Japan has accom-plished an important task by demonstrating thateconomic growth and middle-class prosperity are—or can be—the business of government. In thisregard, he argues, Japan has exerted a positive influ-

ence not only on small nations such as those ofSoutheast Asia, but on China as well, contributing toAsian peace and stability.

Toshio Nishi, research fellow at the HooverInstitution and professor at Reitaku University, deliv-ers a third opinion.For him, to send troops is laudablebut should be accompanied by constitutional amend-ment.While Tamamoto feels the activity should bechanged to coincide with law, Nishi feels law shouldbe altered to permit the activity. Japan should help theUnited States militarily as well as financially, hewrites—but a government that sends troops abroad to“fight and die for peace and justice” should do solegitimately. Otherwise Japan will repeat history byallowing a “clique of all-knowing men with extra-constitutional powers” to decide the nation’s course.The “political acrobatics” necessary to keep reinter-preting the war-renouncing Article 9 only engenderdisrespect from within and without, Nishi complains.

But would the Diet and two-thirds of the publicratify a constitutional amendment? Nishi offers nodirect opinion, but he maintains that the public isstarting to weary of an environment that prohibits“healthy” expression of national pride. Nishi writesextensively of the occupation period, of what Japanhas gained and lost in its stunning rise to prosperity.According to Susumu Nishibe, a well-known right-wing commentator, the role of conservative thoughtis to “check and confirm what is lost and to examinewhat values and norms of the nation are to be pro-tected” (discipline, the “family,” ingenuity at com-bining Western and Chinese ideas, or whatever elsethe writer values).5 Nishi is within this tradition. Inhis view, national identity—including “pride, digni-ty and guiding conviction”—has been mostly dis-carded in Japan’s drive for wealth.

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THE PEOPLE VS. KOIZUMI? JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS AND JAPAN’S STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY

Will public attitudes shift in the govern-ment’s direction, as in the case of the1992 peacekeeping operations law? Orwill difficulties, casualties or Japaneseuse of firearms cause a new upsurge ofanti-militarization?

According to Nishi, an economically strappedJapan wearies of paying 19 percent of the UnitedNation’s annual budget (the United States, withdouble Japan’s GNP and a seat on the UN SecurityCouncil, pays 22 percent) while still suffering criti-cism over World War II. Japan realizes its “duty andresponsibility” for maintaining world peace, butwants more credit for the exemplary role it hasplayed for the past six decades.

END GOALS

Though the Cold War has ended and the riotousdemonstrations against the Japan-U.S. security treatyare more than four decades in the past, a split in atti-tudes toward the United States remains—as thisSpecial Report makes clear.While none of the con-tributors opposes the security treaty, each wants tobuild upon it to achieve different ends.

Tamamoto speaks of pacifist Japan’s “willful inno-cence,” a phrase that suggests not ignorance of alter-natives but deliberate action. He does not deploreU.S. military strength or the alliance’s lopsidednature, at least insofar as the security umbrella makesJapanese non-militarization possible. He does, how-ever, decry that (in his view) “the treaty stands abovethe constitution, presumably the highest law of theland,” inviolable like the prewar emperor. He wantsJapan to defy U.S. pressure to participate in “ill-con-ceived” and “extra-constitutional” activities like theIraqi mission. In other words, he favors resisting theUnited States in the short term while continuing torely on it in the long term.According to Tamamoto,Japanese fears of abandonment by the United Statesare unfounded.Why would Washington walk awayfrom a situation that benefits it by allowing a strongU.S. presence in Asia? Neither Japan nor the UnitedStates would profit from Japan’s becoming a “normalnation” with collective defense capabilities,Tama-moto asserts. U.S. and Japanese officials are foolish tofix what is not broken.

Nishi’s position is somewhat the opposite—hespeaks positively of the alliance in the short term,but ultimately wants to do away with it, or at least itsnecessity. He calls the United States Japan’s “closestally in the world” and firmly believes that Americaholds the moral high ground in Iraq and the waragainst terrorism.“We Japanese should help as muchas we can,” he writes. In the long term, however, he

wants Japan to be “a proud nation that can defenditself without anybody’s help, even that of our closestfriend across the Pacific.”

Pleasing the United States in Iraq is not Nishi’sonly, or even primary, concern. His clear choice is toamend the constitution before sending troops over-seas. Even if the Diet and the majority of theJapanese population are already prepared to ratify anamendment, the process will take considerable time,and the United States wants “boots on the ground”as quickly as possible to improve the internationalcredibility of its coalition.

The heat of the militarization debate is evidentfrom the tone, as well as the substance, of Tamamotoand Nishi’s arguments. Each sees himself as a hard-nosed surveyor of the facts, while criticizing oppos-ing views as unrealistic in the extreme.Tamamotodenounces the “romantic and emotional” militariza-tion movement while Nishi decries those on the leftwho “ignore ugly reality” and are “addicted to thepurest grade of pacifism.” According to Tamamoto,to dismiss China’s concerns about Japanese milita-rization (and thereby destabilize China-Japan rela-tions) is “stunningly” naïve. Nishi writes that molli-fying China is “absurd.”

And what of the Koizumi government? Of thethree essays, Agawa’s is the most straightforwardlysupportive of the United States.The government hasshown its strategy to be one of “act now, ratifylater”—and Agawa’s essay does not suggest any hintthat the interests of Tokyo and Washington maydiverge. Critics of Koizumi’s Liberal DemocraticParty claim it is using the curtain of the alliance (as ofthe UN) to expand the SDF’s role.6 However,Agawagives no hint that Nishi’s goal—a Japan that “candefend itself without anybody’s help”—is worth thecost of achieving it. Instead, he writes of increaseddefense integration between the U.S. military andthe Japanese SDF in a world where “allies must shareand act upon information instantly.” Similarly,Akihiko Tanaka of Tokyo University calls Japan’sstrategy the “Yoshida doctrine plus,” emphasizingcontinuity in Japan’s reliance on the United States(begun under Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida).Tanaka contends that Koizumi, like his predecessors,is “reactive” in his diplomacy—he’s just better at itthan they were.7 According to Victor Cha, the gov-ernment is following the strategy of “defensive real-ism”—increasing Japan’s relative power moderately

4


and carefully steering between strength (to discour-age influence-seeking by other countries), and weak-ness (to avoid inciting regional suspicions and anti-Japan balancing coalitions).8

THE JAPANESE PUBLIC

Which of these contributors is correct in represent-ing the views of the Japanese public? Agawa claimsthat the Japanese people will gradually rally aroundthe prime minister, because of basic underlying sup-port for the U.S.-Japan alliance. His position is rein-forced by the fact that approval of Japanese activitiesin Iraq has risen.9 However, the main reason givenfor approval is not that “Japan’s bilateral relationshipwith the United States is important” (6 percent andfalling), but that “Iraqi reconstruction is necessary”(53 percent).10 Therefore the public may be readierto think and act outside the framework of thealliance than Agawa admits.

Does that mean that the Japanese public wants acountry that can go its own way without U.S. assis-tance, as Nishi proposes? Nishi speaks of a “deepsea change of emotions” in Japan, and many com-mentators observe a mainstream surge of national-ism. For example, the national anthem andHinomaru flag are gaining wider acceptance. Butthe movement called “nationalism” is perhaps toofragmented to influence national policy. Nishi’sconservative intellectual colleagues are splitbetween pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. factions, lesseningtheir impact,11 and many business-oriented nation-alists are focused on reforming and growing theeconomy rather than footing the bill for majormilitary expansion. Japan is most likely to be joltedinto militarization if a major shock, (such as a ter-rorist attack or perceived betrayal by Washington)occurs. Meanwhile, according to a study by theCenter for Strategic and International Studies,many Japanese leaders are concerned about a lackof national identity in Japan, especially among theyoung.12 Nishi’s contention that national pride isgrowing is not easily proved.

Tamamoto’s claim that the Japanese public is“simply not ready to see their soldiers return inbody bags” is supported by opinion polls—morethan half of the respondents think Japan shouldwithdraw the SDF from Iraq if casualties are sus-tained. As Tamamoto points out, Japanese troops

have neither engaged in combat nor suffered casual-ties since World War II, and the government canoffer no guarantees that Iraq is safe. However, if gov-ernment officials are “following their own agenda atthe expense of what most Japanese want” asTamamoto argues, why is Koizumi not already inpolitical crisis? Where is the public outrage?

Perhaps all three contributors to this SpecialReport could be charged with overestimating thepublic’s concern with Japan’s overseas role, asopposed to domestic issues (such as the economyand employment) that affect people’s daily lives.Ikuo Kabashima, one of Japan’s leading public opin-ion analysts, maintains that SDF casualties may notbe enough even to affect the upper house election,13

much less spur major changes in national policy.Sheldon Garon of Princeton University argues thatthe average Japanese has responded to economicstagnation by “embracing a less ambitious and moresocially minded national identity”14 that is less pre-occupied with Japan’s “role” than any of these threeessays. For better or worse, many Japanese are moreconcerned with employment than deployment,more worried about the economic ramifications ofthe aging population than about the World War II

legacy.The Wilson Center Asia Program hopes thatthese essays will serve as a springboard for a discus-sion of the complex formation of Japanese postwaridentity that is closely entwined with—but notdefined by—the U.S.-Japan alliance and the SDF’sexpansion.

ENDNOTES

1. Isabel Reynolds, “First Japanese soldiers to leavefor Iraq,” Reuters, January 16, 2004.2. Yomiuri-Gallup public opinion poll, YomiuriShimbun, December 15, 2003, 1. Forty-one percentof the Japanese respondents answered they trust theU.S., showing a decrease of 8 points.

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For better or worse, many Japanese aremore concerned with employment thandeployment.

3. Those for and against SDF Iraq dispatch are eachat 47 percent. Public opinion poll, Mainichi Shimbun,January 26, 2004, 1.4. “Three questions about GSDF advance unit toIraq,” Asahi Shimbun, January 9, 2004, 3.5. Noriyuki Ueda, “What is ‘Conservatism’? TheSeparation between Real Politics and Philosophy,”Monthly Review, September 1999, 2.6. Katsuyuki Yakushiji, “Japan’s Evolving SecurityPolicy” (paper presented at Henry L. StimsonCenter, March 7, 2002), 3.7. Akihiko Tanaka, “Koizumi’s Diplomacy: NewDevelopments in Japan’s Foreign Policy?” (paperpresented at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation,October 10, 2003).8. Victor Cha, “Defensive Realism and Japan’sApproach toward Korean Reunification,”Perspectiveson the Future of the Korean Peninsula, NBR AnalysisVol. 14, No. 1 (June 2003), 9-10.9. Public opinion poll, Mainichi Shimbun, January 26,2004, 1.The anti-dispatch figure dropped 7 percent-age points from 54 percent in the last survey con-

ducted in December last year, and the pro-dispatchfigure increased 12 points from 35 percent.10. Ibid.The percentage of pro-dispatch responderswho cited the reason “Because Japan should cooper-ate with the United States” was down 4 points sinceDecember.11. Yasushi Watanabe, “The Loci of ‘America’ inJapan Today” (unpublished manuscript), 29. Forexample, Kanji Nishio, a longtime critic of theUnited States, has turned more sympathetic, to thedismay of his collaborators Yoshinori Kobayashi andSusumu Nishibe.12. Generational Change and its Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations, (The Center for Strategic andInternational Studies: 2002), 11.13. “Interview with Tokyo University Prof. IkuoKabashima: Upper house election—Koizumi effectweakening further,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January15, 2004, 2.14. Sheldon Garon, “Japanese National Identity inHistorical Perspective” (unpublished manuscript), 9.

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The warm relations between PresidentGeorge Bush and Prime Minister JunichiroKoizumi are truly remarkable, perhaps

unprecedented. Everything I hear confirms that therelationship involves a frank exchange of views—Mr. Koizumi talks as much as he listens, departingfrom the typical behavior of prime ministers withU.S. presidents.

The health of Japan-U.S. ties goes beyond the topleaders’ personal friendship. Under Koizumi, Japanhas improved security relations by deploying aMaritime Self Defense Force fleet to the IndianOcean to assist the U.S.-led war against terrorism.The overall relationship has matured, and there areno major trade conflicts, as during the 1980s. Nowthe Koizumi government plans to support U.S.efforts by dispatching Self-Defense Forces (SDF) toIraq, as soon as the situation proves stable enough.

But what of the Japanese public? How robust areJapan-U.S. ties at the grassroots level? Is the situationmore accurately described as “The People Vs.Koizumi” or “The People with Koizumi”? This isboth a short- and long-term question. In this paperI argue that while most Japanese currently oppose,or are at least cautious about, sending troops to Iraq,they support and value the Japan-U.S. alliance.While pacifist sentiments are still strong in Japan,people understand the Koizumi government’s posi-tion of wanting to support the nation’s closest ally.

Regarding the Iraq situation, it is clear that theJapanese public is reluctant to send troops and iscritical of U.S. actions. A poll conducted by theMainichi newspaper on Nov. 29-30 shows that 43percent of respondents were opposed to the govern-ment’s plan to dispatch SDF to Iraq, regardless oftiming. Another 40 percent expressed caution, say-ing Japan “should dispatch SDF personnel after see-ing stability in the Iraqi situation.” Only 9 percentsupported an early dispatch.1 Moreover, many anti-U.S. articles have appeared in the left-of-centerAsahi newspaper, as well as right-wing magazinessuch as Hatsugensha and Seiron.

On the other hand, the vast majority—73 per-cent, according to a survey by the Cabinet Office inJanuary 2003—expressed support for the Japan-U.S.alliance. 80 percent have a positive impression of theSDF.2 While isolationism persists in Japan, people areaware that the world is becoming increasingly dan-gerous, particularly close to home on the Korean

peninsula.They are realistic in recognizing that theUnited States’ presence is crucial to Asia’s stability,and this realism reduces their reluctance to sendtroops to Iraq for fear of casualties.

Will the Japanese public continue to support thealliance for years to come? What is the long-termfuture of the relationship? On the one hand, theJapanese seem to share Europeans’ concern about

7


Japan-U.S. Relations and the JapanesePublic

NAOYUKI AGAWA

Naoyuki Agawa is minister of public affairs and director of the Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy ofJapan,Washington, D.C.

Supporting the United States does notmake the Japanese “lapdogs,” but ratherincreases their influence on U.S. actionsand thereby on world events.

American unilateralism.The sole-superpower statusof the United States makes many people uneasy, andthis contributes to a vague, sometimes unconscious,anti-Americanism on both the left and the right.Much of anti-Americanism, however, is notprompted by U.S. actions but by Japan’s domesticsituation—it is an expression of frustration againstthe current economic and political malaise. Asrecently pointed out by Fouad Ajami in his article“The Falseness of Anti-Americanism,”3 resentmentagainst the United States predated the current Bushadministration, and often stems from fear of change.Ajami’s analysis of France, Germany, Greece andMuslim countries can be applied to Japan as well.

The truth is that Japan is much less vehementlyanti-American than Europe or the Middle East, ascan be seen in the Pew Research Center’s WorldValues Survey, published last January. For example,only 35 percent of Japanese dislike the spread ofAmerican ideas and customs, compared to 50 per-cent of Britons, 67 percent of Germans, 71 percentof French, 73 percent of Indonesians and 84 percentof Egyptians. Only 27 percent of Japanese dislikeAmerican ideas about democracy, a smaller propor-tion than in European countries such as Britain (42

percent), Germany (45 percent), or France (53 per-cent). In Japan, 88 percent feel that the world wouldbe more dangerous if another country matched theUnited States militarily, compared to 64 percent inFrance.4 There is, it seems, a great reservoir of pro-American feeling in Japan.

What of protest against U.S. military bases? Is thisnot strong evidence of anti-Americanism? In fact,the Japanese community is generally hospitable—that is why the bases remain year after year. Anti-U.S. demonstrations make the news, but quiet coop-eration does not. Such is the nature of news.To besure, the situation will never be trouble-free, andOkinawa suffers from hosting a disproportionatenumber of troops. But Okinawa’s problems must be

seen in the overall context of the reciprocal alliance.The very fact that the United States restoredOkinawa—territory won by blood in war—to Japanin 1972 is astonishing from a historical perspective.The Americans returned Okinawa because they val-ued the Japan-U.S. relationship strategically andotherwise, and the U.S. military manages to coexisttolerably with the wider population. AdmiralRobert Chaplin, ex-commander of navel forces inJapan, once told me that he has seen Japanese pro-testers sweep the streets after demonstrating in frontof U.S. bases. That image tells you a lot about thestrength of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

My personal observation is that Japanese peoplehold a wide variety of opinions on the UnitedStates. For example, every time I write a pro-American article, I get one positive letter for everynegative.The positive letters, which enthusiasticallypraise America as a great country, are usually frompeople who have lived in the States or have someother kind of personal relationship with Americans.The negative letters question my sanity for likingsuch a terrible country.

Can the United States ultimately share not onlyinterests but also values with the Japanese? LastJanuary, The Economist quoted an interesting studyby the University of Michigan on two types of val-ues: “survival” and “self-expression.” “Survival” val-ues involve economic and physical security, while“self-expression” values include tolerance of diversi-ty, inclination to civic protest, liberty aspirations, andso on. Of all Asian countries, Japan is the closest tothe United States in terms of self-expression values.Surprisingly,Taiwan, China and South Korea are allstill on the “survival” side of the spectrum. However,in terms of “secular” versus “traditional” values,which was discussed in the same MichiganUniversity study, Japan scores quite differently thanthe United States. Japan is closer to northernEuropean countries in de-emphasizing such tradi-tional authorities as religion, family and country.5

One can draw a variety of conclusions from thesesurveys. Ultimately, however, I am of the view thatshared values come out of common experiences.The more common experiences people have, themore values do they share. We, the Japanese andAmericans, have indeed shared much in the past halfcentury. By supporting each other, we can becomeeven closer. My hope and belief is that the United

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Japan is no superpower, but it is notSwitzerland or Denmark either.

States and Japan will move in the same direction,sharing more experiences and sharing more values.

Eventually, I hope that the Japan-U.S. alliance canbecome stronger and more reciprocal.There will bechallenges. Will the warm personal relations thatexist between individuals in the U.S. military andJapanese SDF (about which I have written else-where,6) continue to help cement the alliance? Whateffect will the “revolution in military affairs”—theastonishing advance in military technology andorganizational methods—have? Will the linebetween individual self-defense and collective self-defense become increasingly blurred, as allies mustshare and act upon information instantly? After all,the whole Japan-U.S. security relationship is basedon, and therefore restrained by, the fact that Japandoes not exercise its right to collective self-defense.

If these challenges can be met, the interests ofJapan will be served. History has shown that Japancan impact U.S. policy more by committing itself tosecurity matters than by staying out of the picture.The United States will never regard Japan as a com-plete equal, but will see it as a vital friend.That is,supporting the United States does not make theJapanese “lapdogs,” but rather increases their influ-ence on U.S. actions and thereby on world events.The United States values the contributions that itsally has been making over the past 10 years.That iswhy we should move gradually toward more stan-dard—but still limited—actions to benefit peace inthe global community, if we feel the aims are wor-thy and justified.

A certain amount of responsibility comes alongwith Japan’s size, prosperity and important geopolit-

ical location—with being in a certain part of theworld at this point in history. Japan is no superpow-er, but it is not Switzerland or Denmark either. Norwill it ever resemble Japan of the 1930s, since that isthe last thing Japanese people want. Japan has a cer-tain power, certain position, and certain relationshipwith the United States that helps to determine itsposition in the world. I believe that a lot of Japanesepeople are realizing the importance of its role.

ENDNOTES

1. Mainichi Newspaper, December 1, 2003, 1.2. Opinion Poll on the Self Defense Forces andSecurity Matters conducted by the Cabinet Office,January 2003.3. Fouad Ajami, “The Falseness of Anti-Americanism,” Foreign Policy, September/October2003, 52-61.4.“What the World Thinks in 2002,”The PewGlobal Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center forthe People & the Press, December 4, 2002, 62-65,http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165.5. University of Michigan World Values Survey,http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/, quoted in “AmericanValues: Living with a Superpower,” The Economist,January 2, 2003,6. See Naoyuki Agawa, Maritime Friendship:A Historyof the Relationship between the Japan Maritime DefenseForce and the United States Navy (Tokyo:Chuokoron-sha, 2001).

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Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has prom-ised to send troops to Iraq, and Americanofficials are declaring that the U.S.-Japan

security treaty is in superb shape. Koizumi’s Japanseems bent on transforming itself into a realAmerican ally—Japanese soldiers fighting alongsideAmerican GIs in far off lands. For more than half acentury, the security treaty has made the Japaneseislands into an U.S. military base. Now, if Koizumihas his way, the treaty will encompass much more.

This cynic sees Koizumi trying to turn Japanesesoldiers into “America’s Gurkhas” at the expense ofwhat most Japanese want. There is a wide percep-tion gap between the Japanese people and Koizumi’splan for Japan’s strategic role in the world. In a pub-lic opinion poll, 70 percent opposed sending troopsto Iraq.1 While winning American goodwill hasbeen a sure-plus for Japanese prime ministers,Koizumi finds himself playing a perilous balancingact this time. If he falls in this act, so may his govern-ment. He could easily end up upsetting and alienat-ing both U.S. officials and the Japanese people.

Iraq should have been pacified by now.As thingsstand, Koizumi hopes to dispatch Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq and bring them homesafely after a short period, with none experiencingcombat or being attacked.Another positive (thoughunlikely) scenario for Koizumi would be a publicdeclaration by Washington that the United Statesdoes not require the assistance of Japanese troops butappreciates Japan’s loyal and thoughtful offer; thegenerous package of grants and loans for Iraqireconstruction is more than sufficient.

The White House asserts, quite diplomatically,that allied governments must decide for themselveswhether to send troops. Behind the scenes, however,the Pentagon presses for 1000 Japanese combattroops and helicopter gun ships. But the special(limited-time) Iraq legislation that Koizumi passedthrough parliament limits the SDF to non-combatduties, such as providing medical services, transport-

ing goods, and constructing facilities. Moreover,troops can be sent only to “safe areas.” Can Koizumiplease both the Japanese people and U.S. officials?

The Japanese are simply not ready to see theirsoldiers return in body bags. The enduring andpowerful memory of soldiers’ “dog’s deaths” inWorld War II has helped to shape contemporaryJapanese national identity.After that disastrous war, anagging yet obviously unanswerable refrain went,“What do we who survived say to the dead?” Now,what do we say if our soldiers fall in Iraq?

The Japanese people now know that theAmerican cause of war was dubious and based onfalse pretenses—there was no substantial linkbetween Baghdad and Al-Qaeda, and there was nocache of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.Saddam’s regime was certainly evil, but the U.S.occupation policy proves ill-conceived. There issimply no convincing and worthy reason whyJapanese soldiers should risk their lives.

Koizumi’s cabinet spokesman is visibly uncom-fortable as he mutters about the fight for freedomand democracy—reduced to mimicry of Americansloganeering.The spokesman, an astute politician,

A Nationalist’s Lament: The Slippery Slopeof Koizumi’s Foreign Policy

MASARU TAMAMOTO

Masaru Tamamoto is a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute.

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must certainly know that such talk does not resonateamong the Japanese people. Lacking moral clarityand authority, the government fails to persuade.

Money has become the solution to too manyproblems in Japanese society, and questions ofmorality and principle are reduced to secondaryconsideration.This is an unattractive side of Japanesenational identity today. How much is a deadJapanese soldier worth? The price has risen in stagesduring these fall months, to 100 million yen (about$900,000) for the bereaved.According to the consti-tution, Japan cannot be at war and Japanese soldierscan fight only in territorial defense, so death in bat-tle is not recognized legally.A dead Japanese soldierin Iraq would be considered the same as any nation-al civil servant in Tokyo dying of overwork or anaccident on the job. The government has simplyraised the level of compensation by creating dubiousofficial categories. But can the bereaved really bebought? Is the public so cynical as to let the govern-ment buy a soldier’s life for 100 million yen for adoubtful cause?

Koizumi would rather not find out the answersto these questions.When asked in parliament wherethe “safe areas” in Iraq are, he retorted,“How shouldI know?”The moment was one of rare honesty in anotherwise convoluted Japanese debate. That wasearly autumn. Thereafter, Koizumi was slippery.Mindful of the general election he was about to call,he skirted any serious discussion.

A chorus of pundits has Koizumi losing his holdon government if Japanese soldiers die in Iraq—noJapanese soldier has marched to battle since WorldWar II. Koizumi would not be able to hide thecoffins and avoid the funerals as President George W.Bush has been doing with America’s fallen.

Koizumi has not retracted his promise to Bush tosend troops.At the same time, however, he has curt-ly and repeatedly stated that troops will be sent onlywhen conditions are right and that no decision onthe timing has been made. In this regard, Koizumi isa more agile politician than British Prime MinisterTony Blair, who has shown himself to be too princi-pled for his own political good in providing legiti-macy to the American war.Thus Koizumi’s LiberalDemocratic Party (LDP) won the lower house elec-tion held on November 9.

Somewhat surprisingly, Iraq did not become aserious issue in the election, due in large measure to

Koizumi’s slippery tactics. Two minor parties, theSocial Democratic Party and the Communist Party,took a principled stand for constitutional pacifismand fared miserably; their futures as parliamentaryactors are now in serious jeopardy.The DemocraticParty of Japan (DPJ), the major opposition party,declared its objection to the Iraq expedition onlydays before the election in a last ditch effort to winvotes. But the Democrats failed to explain how theywould maintain good relations with the UnitedStates and could not rally the electorate in any seri-ous way. Still, after the election, popular support forKoizumi’s cabinet began to decline; the standingpromise to Washington to send troops is taking itstoll. Within a month, the popularity rating wentdown 6 percentage points to 44 percent. Not since1972, when Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka wasmired in the Lockheed bribery scandal (and indict-ed soon after) has a cabinet lost popularity immedi-ately following a lower house election.

Koizumi, contrary to parliamentary custom,opted to forgo a policy speech in the special sessioncalled to reelect him prime minister. How could heexplain Iraq and emerge unharmed? Instead,Koizumi made sure to leak a conversation with oneof his party leaders in which he never said troopswould be dispatched within 2003.

This leaked statement contradicted what thepeople knew.Without cabinet approval, the primeminister’s office had “unofficially” instructed theJapan Defense Agency (JDA) to prepare for immedi-ate dispatch.The media have been full of detailedreports based on a flood of leaks from the JDA.TheJDA’s normally obscure workings have never beencovered so clearly on the front page of newspapers.Opinion within the JDA is understandably divid-ed—until now, it never had to contemplate going towar. Some JDA officials see Iraq as a opportunity totransform the constitutionally restricted SDF into a“normal” military force, but criticize the special Iraqlegislation as inadequate, since it dangerously curtailsthe troops’ ability to use force even in self-defense.Others in the JDA see folly.They would prefer tolimit overseas activity to participation in non-com-bat United Nations peacekeeping operations andhumanitarian aid.

Koizumi’s government is also divided.The great-est fissure lies between the LDP and its coalitionpartner, the Komeito. Without the Komeito, the

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LDP does not command a majority in the upperhouse, and 81 of the 168 LDP victories in single-seat electoral districts in the recent lower-houseelection hinged on Komeito cooperation. TheKomeito is a creation of the Sokagakai, a disciplinedBuddhist organization that can deliver votes. Sincethe Sokagakai is founded on anti-war principles,there is a limit to how far the Komeito can backKoizumi on Iraq. Komeito counsels caution. IfJapanese soldiers were to fall in Iraq before the nextupper-house election in summer 2004, the Komeitowould be hard put to cooperate with the LDP againand likely would leave the coalition.And with bloodon his hands, Koizumi cannot hope to win a LDPmajority in the upper house.

Parliamentary politics have become important ina new way. The November lower-house electionsaw the beginning of a competitive two-party sys-tem.The DPJ is showing itself as a viable oppositionparty, a real contender for leading the government.The DPJ surpassed the LDP in the proportional-representation count, though it was vanquished (168to 105) in single-seat constituencies. No longer canthe LDP rest assured of its dominance. It will pay forits mistakes, as Koizumi knows.

IT IS NORTH KOREA, NOT IRAQ

Then what makes American officials conclude thatthe U.S.-Japan security treaty is in superb shape,with expectations for an expanded strategic role forJapan? Foremost, Koizumi supported the UnitedStates promptly after 9-11. He passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law that allowed theSDF to support U.S. operations in Afghanistan, mostvisibly by refueling American ships at sea—a boldmove given Japan’s pacifistic limitations. And, when

the United States decided to go to war against Iraq,Koizumi was quick to pass the Special MeasuresLaw for Iraq and promise to send Japanese groundtroops. Also, he passed a set of emergency laws togovern SDF conduct in case Japan is attacked.Before these emergency laws, there existed no legalprovision for military action; strictly speaking, armytanks rushing to meet an invading force would havehad to obey normal traffic rules by stopping at redlights. Overall, Koizumi has facilitated use of theJapanese military with surprising ease and swiftness,pleasing the United States in this way more than anyother previous prime minister.

It was the 1998 firing of a North Korean testmissile over Japan that dissipated the generally paci-fistic public sentiment that would previously haveblocked Koizumi’s moves. The missile did what afew hundred nuclear-armed Soviet missiles aimed atJapan during the Cold War could not—awakened asense of threat and need for action. Japan launchedmilitary spy satellites, empowered the coast guard,sank a North Korean spy ship, and budgeted theconstruction an anti-missile defense system sur-rounding greater Tokyo. Simply put, Koizumi coulddo what he did because of public outrage againstNorth Korea.

North Korea is a real security consideration. Still,the radical change in Japanese public attitude towardmilitary security seems disproportionate to thethreat and somewhat alarming.Much more than justa rational security calculation, the response is strong-ly emotional—“How dare they!”—and stems froma Japanese sense of superiority and ambivalencetoward Asia that was never fully resolved after Japanlost its empire.This superiority is another unattrac-tive side of Japanese national identity.While Japan is(for now) forging positive relations with China andSouth Korea, North Korea manages to strike all thewrong chords.

Then there is the abduction issue. North Koreanleader Kim Jong Il admitted that abductions ofJapanese nationals occurred, and returned five vic-tims without their children. He declared the othervictims dead and the issue resolved—but weJapanese are not satisfied.We are upset at both NorthKorea and our own authorities who did nothing fortoo long. Our government has finally begun toattend to public concerns, but the abduction issue isnot on the agenda for the six-power talks (involving

When asked in parliament where the“safe areas” in Iraq are, Koizumi retort-ed,“How should I know?”The momentwas one of rare honesty in an otherwiseconvoluted Japanese debate.

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Japan, the U.S., China, South Korea and Russia)regarding future relations with North Korea.Washington counsels Japan to settle the matter bilat-erally. For all Koizumi’s efforts to support America’sfights against Afghanistan and Iraq, he cannot getextra consideration in Washington for the one issuethe Japanese people really care about.

THE ALLIANCE

The U.S.-Japan security treaty is the highest sourceof authority in Japan, the functional equivalent andsuccessor to the pre-1945 emperor,“sacred and invi-olable.” The treaty stands above the constitution,presumably the highest law of the land.

The U.S. occupation army recreated the militaryafter drafting Japan’s 1946 constitution, which liter-ally proscribes Japan from possessing an armed force.Underneath, many remain suspicious of an arrange-ment that drags Japan into America’s battles—theIraq war is, in a sense, the treaty’s first serious trial.However, the vast majority of Japanese is contentwith the treaty and with Japan’s “willful innocence”in international politics, accorded by the U.S. mili-tary presence and security guarantee. The overallgoal, for public and elites, is to keep the UnitedStates from abandoning Japan.The Japanese simplydo not want to imagine a world without Americanprotection.

For the Japanese sheltered by this treaty and gov-erned by “constitutional pacifism,” treason has nomeaning. There exists a law against treason, as instates everywhere, but it is valid only in time of war.Japan cannot be at war, since the Japanese people“forever renounce the use of force to settle interna-tional disputes” according to the constitution. Inaddition, the state has neither conscription nor lawagainst espionage—Japan cannot be betrayed andrequires no patriots. The vast majority of theJapanese are content with their “cheerful state.” Inresponse to decades of opinion polls, most youngmen have said they will run away if the country isinvaded.

A voice is growing among the political class thatfinds such cheerfulness abnormal. Koizumi and oth-ers see Japan as a historical aberration, a sort of “halfstate,” and want to bring it back to “normalcy.” Forthem, a normal state has people willing to fight todefend their land, and a military capable of force.

They want to revise the constitution to equalize theU.S.-Japan security treaty and to allow the Japanesemilitary to engage in collective security operationswith the United States. Their imagination of thepossibilities of statehood is limited, and their modelsfor normalcy are either the Japanese Meiji state(1868-1945) or the contemporary United States.Since the Meiji state ended in utter disaster inHiroshima and Nagasaki, the lesson is clear, accord-ing to the normalcy advocates—Japan should stickwith the United States. The Meiji state gainedpower and prestige as long as it remained loyal to itsalliance with Britain, then the world’s dominantpower.The urge for normalcy is what led Koizumito forthrightly support the U.S. war on terrorism—though he did not expect Washington to corner himinto making a decision about going to war in suchshort a time.

The problem with the normal-state argument isthat prestige is, for the most part, romantic and emo-tional. The normalcy idea does not meaningfullyaddress the hard questions of Japan’s national securi-ty.While the normalcy advocates condemn consti-tutional pacifism as inward looking, they fall into thesame trap. In the long run, how will enhancingJapanese military capability affect ties with China—the most important issue for Japan in East Asia?Japan’s militarization will likely become a majorobstacle in China-Japan relations and diminishJapan’s national security as a result.This point is dis-missed by normalcy advocates, who are reluctant tobe “thrown around by China” in their pursuit ofJapan’s “proper rights.”Thus, they miss a fundamen-tal point: national security is a relational matter.Their naivete is stunning. Many in this political classlook down on today’s China while fearing an eco-nomically powerful China of ten years hence. Inshort, the normalcy advocates are dangerouslyunequipped to think comprehensively aboutnational security.

In the flurry of actions by Koizumi that have sopleased American officials, there was an unnoticedannouncement (buried amongst and made possibleby other exciting developments): the defense agencyhas announced a plan to construct its first helicoptercarrier ship, which easily converts to carry six orseven Harrier-type vertical takeoff and landingfighter jets. The ship is of dubious military valueexcept to fan the pride of the navy, which dreams of

one day acquiring a full-scale blue water fleet with a“real” aircraft carrier. In an undesirable scenario, theship could easily become China’s justification foracquiring its own carrier fleet. This is one tellingexample of how Japanese thinking is inadequate andfails to fit the parts to the desirable whole. And, inpushing the Japanese military toward a more activerole, the United States ought to consider short-termmarginal benefits in the light of likely long-termdamage to East Asian peace and stability.

The normalcy advocates are too smug in theirdismissal of the Japanese post-1945 experience. It isno small feat in world history that Japan has provedpossible the paradox of reduced international powerand increased economic prosperity. Japan demon-strated the payoff of making economic growth thepriority of government—to Southeast Asian coun-tries after the Vietnam War and to post-MaoistChina. During the Soviet Union’s last days, someSoviet leaders saw Japan as disproving Lenin’s equa-tion of advanced capitalism and imperialism. In asimilar vein, it is possible, if enough political resolvecan be found, for Japan to show the world thecheerfulness of constitutional pacifism, the possibili-ty of a land where treason has no meaning, a worthyvision for statehood in the 21st century.

Detractors will correctly point out that suchcheerfulness in Japan has been made possible onlyby the lopsided American security guarantee.TheU.S.-Japan security treaty is one of the continuinghypocrisies of the Cold War. Still, the two countriesare not about to abrogate it. Japan will remain thelinchpin of American military presence in East Asia,and the United States will act as essential keeper oforder, buying time and breathing space for countriesin the region to work out differences and givecheerfulness a chance. In the long run, as per-capita

income levels approximate, borders will becomeincreasing porous. In Europe, open borders resultfrom sustained political commitment and financialinvestment; in 1945, predictions of a EuropeanUnion would have seemed sheer folly.An East Asianversion of Europe is possible and certainly wouldbenefit the United States, since global capitalismwould be the glue that binds such a union.

Such a project would be a hard sell to Bush’sUnited States, but American commitment is neces-sary.As Sherle Schwenninger argues:

The neo-conservative architects of musculardominance . . . are wrong to make military dom-inance, the war on terrorism, and the Middle Eastthe centerpieces of American grand strategy. . . .There are arguably more important internationalgoals than the reordering of the Middle East:ensuring the peaceful evolution of great powerrelations among China, Japan, and Korea; com-pleting the process of integrating Russia, China,and India into a system of middle-class com-merce and international law; extending the mid-dle-class prosperity that underpins European andNorth American stability to the emergingeconomies of Latin America, Asia, and EasternEurope. . . .All these warrant American effort andattention and arguably are more critical to worldorder and U.S. interests than is an Americanimperial project in the Middle East.2

The November 24 Wilson Center seminar, atwhich I delivered an earlier version of these remarks,began by asking whether the U.S.-Japan securitytreaty is in as superb shape as U.S.officials claim.Thereis a small clique of American defense and diplomaticofficials that works on Japan, and their Japanese coun-terparts make up an even smaller club.These eliteshave a meeting of the minds, and have successfullypursued the narrow agenda of pushing Japan toassume a more active role in military affairs. Japanesepeople see the small clique of “Japan handlers” as fullyrepresenting the American foreign policy establish-ment and little recognize that Japan as a military actoris of secondary consideration in U.S. global thinking.The Japanese public would be served by easing thegrip of the narrow defense cliques and—on bothsides—rethinking bilateral relations more comprehen-sively in a manner such as outlined by Schwenninger.

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Koizumi finds himself playing a perilous balancing act. If he falls, somay his government. He could easilyend up upsetting and alienating bothU.S. officials and the Japanese people.

A NATIONALIST’S LAMENT

On December 9, Koizumi announced a schedule todispatch land, sea and air forces to Iraq. If the sched-ule is carried out, Japan will forfeit its potential toplay the role of honest broker in a region likely tosee tumult for some to come. Japan as part of anoccupation force will mean the end of its possiblysingular status as a great power free of an imperialhistorical burden in the Middle East.

On December 23, Emperor Akihito celebratedhis 70th birthday. It is an irony of history that theemperor stands as the defender of Japan’s constitu-tional pacifism, of the constitution that denies allpolitical power to the emperor. Akihito declared inhis birthday address his wish for world peace andmentioned how the militarists had once led thecountry astray using the name of his father, EmperorHirohito.This is as much as today’s emperor can sayabout the Iraq expedition without mentioning Iraq.But Japanese foreign policy is now made in thename of the American alliance, not the emperor.

On December 26, an advance team of air forcepersonnel departed for Kuwait in preparation forthe dispatch of a full contingent of three C-130medium-sized transport planes—certainly aninsignificant force for Koizumi to play the bigpower game he wants to play.

In the send-off speech, Koizumi finally admittedthat troops are going to a dangerous area. In effect,he owned up to the extra-legality of the scheduledmilitary expedition to Iraq.Whether or not one seeswisdom in the Japanese involvement with Iraq, thereis a prior, more fundamental question. As thingsstand, the dispatch of troops to areas of combat isillegal—both unconstitutional and against the Iraqlegislation.The rule of law is tabled. It is certainlyunwise for the United States, bent on musculardominance or otherwise, to encourage in Japan orany other ally the habit of breaking its laws.

In a fabricated air of emergency, Koizumi seeksto fundamentally transform Japanese national identi-ty, from a state of constitutional pacifism to a statethat can go to war.Alarmingly and amazingly, there

is no serious debate.And, Koizumi and his group areincognizant of the gravity of what they are doingand how they are doing it. Mistakes in judgment canfester and eventually lead to tragic consequences.

On January 1, Koizumi paid his respect at theYasukuni Shrine, where the spirits of Japan’s wardead are honored. If Japanese soldiers fall in Iraq, theshrine will be infused with new life, for no Japanesesoldier has fallen in battle since 1945.But the major-ity of the Japanese do not care about the symbolismof the shrine. The prime minister’s visit elicitedmore than the usually strong protests from Chinaand South Korea. Koizumi brushed off the protestsas something concerning the long-ago past. But theChinese and Koreans are talking about Japan presentand future. It is hard to imagine how angering ourneighbors contributes to national security, whileKoizumi preaches to the Japanese people that theIraq expedition is vital for Japanese national security.The symbolism of the Yasukuni visit and the brava-do associated with the Iraq expedition are not unre-lated.

On January 2, also not unrelated, the secretary-general of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, aKoizumi ally, spoke on television that it is time toreview the long-time Japanese ban on the export ofweapons. How adding another arms exporter ontothe world scene contributes to world peace orJapanese national security is beyond imagination.When one of the real global security concerns isnuclear proliferation, which needs to be addressedby arms control and disarmament, where are Japan’sleaders trying to take the country or the world?

This writer of republican bent almost wishes thatthe emperor held real power, so distasteful is thedirection of Japan today.

ENDNOTES

1. Japan News Network poll, November 11, 2003.2. Sherle Schwenninger, “Revamping AmericanGrand Strategy,” World Policy Journal (Fall 2003), 25-44.

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Japan’s Last Stand in the 21st Century

TOSHIO NISHI

Toshio Nishi is is research fellow at the Hoover Institution and professor at Reitaku University, Japan.

The elation of victory in war, like a shootingstar arcing across the darkness of humanity,lasts only a moment.The misery of defeat

remains like a deep scar.Born in Osaka five days after Pearl Harbor, I

grew up in the terrible aftermath of World War IIand Japan’s first and crushing surrender. Like allother children who survived the war, I knowhunger, poverty, and the burden of my country’sdefeat.

On December 7, 1941, Imperial Japan, presum-ing an imminent attack from the United States,crossed the international dateline and launched amassive offense against beautiful Pearl Harbor. Japancalled it “the preemptive first strike.” The IslandEmpire, seduced by a mirage of eternal glory andunderestimating the enemy, lunged forward withoutknowing its destination.

As the roars of feverish “Banzai!” ricochetedthrough the cold winter streets of Tokyo and Osaka,new battles erupted, one after another, all withoutfront lines. The Japanese and the Americans, whohad enjoyed a long relationship across the Pacific,plunged into a full-scale war of attrition, with all thevehemence of betrayed hearts.America fought backwith a vengeance by firebombing the Japanesearchipelago.

Imperial Japan, fiercely proud, was willing tofight to the last soldier against the strongest nation inthe world. The exhausted Japanese, who had sur-vived blanket bombings by the dreaded “flyingfortress” B-29s and two atomic bombs, could nolonger recall the victorious roars of that firstDecember.Throngs of women and children, whohad inspired the soldiers to kill every enemy, alsodied in the promise of eternal glory.The Empire ofthe Rising Sun sacrificed everything, even its ownsoul, but failed to repel the American forces. In thecollective Japanese mind, being alive in the after-math of battle was tantamount to unbearable shame.

I remember leaving Osaka with my mother forthe mountainous countryside, where she, a wealthylandowner, employed many tenant farmers. Thewindows of our train were painted black to hidefrom B-29s, which rained incendiary firebombs oneverything visibly moving in the night. Even withthat precaution, our train crawled. Soon afterward,Osaka was reduced to smoldering charcoal. I heardadults whispering that the smoke smelled of decay. Itwas the pungent odor of a dying empire.

Emotional liberation, which might have helpedthe Japanese ease their anguish, did not materializeat the cessation of killing. Only emptiness crept intotheir hearts, and the agony of the unconditional sur-render was deep and relentless, as was hunger.

President Harry S.Truman assigned the illustri-ous U.S. Army general, Douglas MacArthur, to theunprecedented task of changing militant Japan to apeace-loving nation. We, conquered and starving,thought the tall, handsome, and charismaticMacArthur was “the missionary of democracy.” Hetold us he was. He was also a fervent Christian and

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tried his best to convert the pagan Japanese to whathe proclaimed “a higher spirituality.”The JapaneseChristians, a very small minority in a land of numer-ous indigenous gods and deities, welcomed him asthe “second Jesus Christ.”

My mother lost her agricultural land and forestsbecause MacArthur said that absentee landlords likeher were feudalistic and responsible for the growthof militarism. He ordered her land, which her fami-ly had owned for hundreds of years, confiscated andgiven to the tenants, free. She believed for a longtime that MacArthur must be a Communist.

On August 30, 1945, Douglas MacArthur landedon Atsugi Airfield (a kamikaze training ground) toteach the Japanese the virtues of peace and democ-racy. Standing on the pinnacle of devastated Japan,MacArthur said that Japanese society was “four hun-dred years behind the West.”The Japanese had nowillpower left to argue with the American Caesar.MacArthur’s devoted staff interpreted the Japaneseacquiescence as a natural result of the General’s“brilliant appraisal of the Oriental mind.”

As a precondition for democracy, MacArthurordered the Japanese to search out all militarists andjingoists—those who were once called “true patri-ots.”All conspicuous promoters of the war, who hadnot yet committed honorable suicide, were easilycaught (they did not hide) and hanged or impris-oned after the Tokyo Military Tribunal. MacArthur’sterm for cleansing the undesirable Japanese was“moral disarmament.” Words like “armament” or“military preparedness” became immoral, dirtywords in the defeated nation. Such a concept wasalien to the legendary land of martial arts.

MacArthur’s most urgent task was to make sureJapan would never again threaten the United States.The future Japan must be physically incapable offighting, as MacArthur put it, “even for preservingits own security.” His determination resulted in thefamous (and notorious) Article 9 of the Japaneseconstitution that his staff drafted in English in sixdays. Its first three words are:“We the People….”

MacArthur lectured on the difficult art of buildinga utopia to every Japanese pupil (me included). Hisstaff censored all textbook manuscripts and deletedsuch unacceptable words as “patriotism.” MacArthur,a great American patriot, preached to the Japanesethat patriotism implies wanting to fight for one’scountry and thus contradicted Japan’s new “pacifism.”

Even now, sixty years since the end of WorldWar II, the word “patriotism” is taboo in Japan.Even I, a Japanese patriot, hesitate to voice theword in public.

Postwar Japanese have become addicted to thepurest grade of pacifism, chanting a mantra of peaceand harmony, and feeling superior to warringnations, like an idealist who ignores ugly reality.

Peaceful or not, Japan cannot defend itself. Japan,an island nation smaller than California and the sec-ond largest economic power in the world, actsscared. Consequently, the Japanese depend upon the40,000 American soldiers stationed in Japan todefend them. The price tag for such bodyguardsamounts to $5 billion per year. Perhaps this militaryarrangement benefits the United States more thanJapan, enhancing American prestige and revealingJapan’s subservience.

But Japan, facing a new global war against terror-ism, has realized its duty and responsibility for main-taining a peaceful world, which is the foundation forJapan’s prosperity. I say that Japan should help, finan-cially and militarily, the United States to win thewar on terrorism.The United States is Japan’s closestally in the world.Whatever happened to Japan’s leg-endary courage, its famous martial spirit?

The United States occupied Japan for seven yearsand successfully changed the fierce regime to apeace loving,America-friendly, pacifist nation. Japanhas become a shining showcase for U.S. foreign pol-icy, a great accomplishment by any standard any-where in the world.

For four decades beginning in the 1950s, Japan,with the national slogan of “catching up withAmerica,” climbed out from the miserable pit ofdeprivation to an enviable height of affluence. Infact, Japan has considered none but the UnitedStates as a nation worthy of emulation. And evennow, despite suffering an incomprehensible decade-

If the present Japanese government nolonger honors the spirit and letter ofArticle 9 of the constitution, it shouldamend it.

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long recession, Japan is one of the wealthiest nationsin the world, second only to the United States.

The American success in Japan, however, hasraised serious questions for the Japanese people.Thatis, for a working democracy and prosperity that wewholeheartedly enjoy, have we traded somethingpriceless and unrecoverable that we should havekept at all costs? Have we lost something spiritually“Japanese,” something invisible but discernable likepatriotism, while pursuing hard currency anddemocracy, two assets that victorious America toldus were most desirable in life?

We have achieved the status of wealth and are theworld’s leading donors of money to ease globalpoverty and strife. But we still don’t feel “proud.” Ismaterial wealth the price we have paid for losingour legendary courage, dignity, confidence, and self-reliance? Have we forsaken our 2000-year history as“shameful and barbaric” just because MacArthurcalled it so?

A relatively brief duration of war, from the 1931invasion of Manchuria to the 1945 defeat inHiroshima, does not represent the texture of ourbrilliant cultural heritage. In comparison, theVietnam War lasted longer than our wars withChina and the United States.

Our Asian neighbors complain of Japan’s everymove, chipping at the pillar of Japanese confidence.They scrutinize each and every line of our schoolhistory textbooks, and declare that we distort factsto justify our past expansion into Asia.They con-clude that we Japanese have not come to a trueunderstanding of the objective history of the pastone hundred years.They demand that we “rewrite”our textbooks and apologize to them once again(every year) and to the rest of the world for the Asia-Pacific war.We must remember that three millionJapanese also died in that war. The number ofAmericans who died in the European and Pacifictheaters was 405,399, and the number of Chinesewas five million.

When Japan offers foreign aid to its neighbors,sharing its prosperity with a staggering $10 billion ayear, they take it as acknowledgement of guilt.

Historical objectivity is inescapably subjective.But how has the Japanese government beenresponding to its neighbors’ vociferous condemna-tion? Tokyo, with haste bordering on recklessness,apologizes, suggesting to our neighbors that their

accusations are correct.Worse yet, because we apol-ogize readily, they now doubt our sincerity.To illus-trate the absurdity of this guilt somersault, imaginethe British government examining American schooltextbooks and demanding rewrites on the War ofIndependence.

Asian countries and some European nations venttheir envy or resentment over Japan’s present pre-eminence by magnifying Japan’s war of sixty yearsago. Japan, by a reflex that would outperformPavlov’s dog, offers more money as if to buy theirsilence for a while. Japan’s foreign aid of the past tenyears has amounted to $150 billion dollars, morethan the United States has given.

Still, nobody forgives us Japanese—and ourmoney has run out. Our national budget is writtenin bright red, while our taxes climb like there is noceiling. Is the end of money the end of friendship? Ihope so. Japan does not need the friendship onlymoney can buy.

My generation and those younger feel neitheraccountable nor responsible for the war. My gener-ation knows only the misery, hardship, and hungerof defeat and has witnessed the immense sacrificeour older generation (now only seven percent ofJapan’s population) made for rebuilding the nationfrom the ash of defeat to the splendor of wealth. Ido not have the faintest desire to blame the genera-tions who died for the empire. We the livingJapanese should express publicly our deep apprecia-tion to them as the generation who sacrificed theirlives for the country. Otherwise, there will be noclosure within to our agony of the terrible war. Inthe United States, the same generation is calledwith profound respect and admiration “the greatestgeneration.”

Yes, I wished many times that Japan did not fightthe war in China, did not bomb Pearl Harbor, ortried even harder to repair the crumbling friendshipacross the Pacific.

We Japanese value history as our national treas-ure, like our cultural DNA for future generations.But we are not the prisoners of history.We do notlive in an iron cage of war guilt.We are not hostageto our past wars, to the glory of victories and thebitterness of defeat. Rather, it seems to me that therest of the world has been entrapped within thefolds of time and keeps bashing the Japanese empirethat vanished almost sixty years ago.

The idea that Japan must earn “forgiveness” fromthe world community is a bizarre notion. Instead,the world should appreciate our enormous contri-bution for alleviating world poverty and suffering.

For instance, Japan pays 19 percent of the UnitedNations’ annual budget, while the United States,with gross national product (GNP) that is doubleJapan’s, gives 22 percent. Japan and the United Statestogether provide nearly one half of the UN annualbudget.That leaves 189 other member countries inthe UN to pay meager amounts while making ego-centric speeches.

The United States, which pays the highest per-centage of the UN budget, is a permanent memberof the Security Council, the five members of whicheach wield the “magic wand” of veto power.ThisCouncil, though recently resembling a debate socie-ty, is the single most important force in the UN.Thefour other permanent members are: France (whichpays 6.46 percent of the UN budget), England (5.53percent), Russia (1.20 percent), and China (1.50percent). In other words, Japan (20 percent),non–Security Council member with no veto powerand hence no respect, pays more than those fourpermanent members combined.

Worse yet, Japan also pays 32 percent of theUNESCO’s annual budget, while the United States,which rejoined the UNESCO in 2002 after 18 yearsof voluntary absence, contributes 22 percent.Again,these two nations finance more than half the budgetof the 188-member UNESCO. For Japan, this isreminiscent of the days prior to the Boston TeaParty—taxation without representation.

Many Japanese, especially recently, have been ask-ing themselves the same question. It is a question ofpride, dignity, and guiding conviction, by which anaggregate of people takes a firm stand to become anation with healthy emotional heartbeats.The prideof a person, of a nation, is something more preciousthan a bowl of steaming rice, more valuable thanhaving the world’s second richest GNP.We shouldnever lose pride, for it is rarely recoverable.Withoutpride there is no national identity.

The American people, who fought for the prideof independence, ought to understand our aspira-tions to free ourselves from the specter of war and toblossom into a proud nation that can defend itselfwithout anybody’s help, even that of our closestfriend across the Pacific.

Japan, as if haunted by the ghost of history, nowfaces the most critical choice of the postwar period.Should Japan send troops from its Self-DefenseForces (262,000 soldiers with an annual budget of$50 billion dollars) to Baghdad and Kabul to help itsfriend the United States?

Japan has a huge stake in the well-being of theUnited States, which cannot afford to lose this warof attrition.We Japanese should help as much as wecan. After all, Japan cannot remain immune fromborderless terrorism. Like it or not, Japan is alreadyin the middle of the war on terrorism; we have seenour citizens perish at the New York Trade CenterTowers and in Iraq.

But Japan should first amend Article 9 of theJapanese constitution that MacArthur wrote.Article9 reads,“Aspiring sincerely to an international peacebased on justice and order, the Japanese people for-ever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nationand the threat or use of force as a means of settlinginternational dispute.”To accomplish this lofty ideal,

“land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war poten-tial, will never be maintained. The right of bel-ligerency of the state will not be recognized.” If andwhen Japan sends its de facto soldiers abroad to fightand die for peace and justice, we will be repeatinghistory if we do not amend Article 9.We will com-mit another horrific tragedy, similar to our 1930sand 40s, during which the clique of all-knowingmen with extra-constitutional powers decided whatwas good for Japan.

The Japanese soldiers going to Iraq andAfghanistan should not suffer from the stigma ofconstitutional illegitimacy. Japan’s Self-DefenseForces should not remain the “bastard” of the U.S.occupation, which ended fifty years ago. TheJapanese soldiers would be defending Japan’s nation-

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Japan pays 20 percent of the UnitedNation’s annual budget . . . For Japan,this is reminiscent of the days prior to theBoston Tea Party—taxation without rep-resentation.

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al interest, which is to wipe out, together with theUnited States, the spores of terrorism spreadingthroughout the world. Fighting alongside theAmerican soldiers is the least that Japan, the secondlargest economy in the world, can and should do.

If the present Japanese government, dominatedby the Liberal Democratic Party for half a century,no longer honors the spirit and letter of Article 9 ofthe constitution, it should amend it. Article 9 hasbeen repeatedly “reinterpreted” to suit political

expediency, but such political acrobatics only hurt usand engender more disrespect from within andwithout.

Japan has been experiencing a deep sea change ofemotions: an emergence of new pride, self-respect,and appreciation for its national heritage.

Now, at the dawn of the 21st Century, is Japan’s“last stand.” It is the first and last chance to preserveits dignity as an independent nation with its ownwillpower.


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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

NAOYUKI AGAWA was appointed minister of public affairs and director of the Japan Information andCulture Center, Embassy of Japan, in August 2002. Previously, he was an associate of Gibson, Dunn &Crutcher. He has been a visiting professor at the University of Virginia Law School and the GeorgetownUniversity Law Center, and a professor at Keio University in Japan. Minister Agawa’s writings on U.S.-Japan relations include Maritime Friendship:A History of the Relationship between the Japan Maritime DefenseForce and the U.S. Navy and Have You Found America? The Post WWII Period. He holds a B.S.F.S. fromGeorgetown University, School of Foreign Service, and a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center.

TOSHIO NISHI is research fellow at the Hoover Institution and professor at Reitaku University inJapan. He has written extensively on contemporary Japanese affairs and the U.S. military occupation ofJapan, including Battle over Japan’s Soul;Wealthy Nation,Weak People; The Invasion of MacArthur; and (inEnglish) Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952, which was reissuedin 2003. In addition to receiving numerous scholarships and grants, he has been a foreign correspondentfor NHK Journal and a monthly columnist for Kokkai News. He received a Ph.D. from the Universityof Washington at Seattle.

MASARU TAMAMOTO is senior fellow at the World Policy Institute (resident in Japan). He is authorof numerous works on Japanese national identity and foreign affairs, including “The Ideology ofNothingness: A Meditation on Japanese National Identity,”“Japan’s Search for Recognition and Status,”and “The Japan that Wants to be Liked: Society and International Participation.” He has taught at theSchool of International Service, American University, and received fellowships from the Center forInternational Affairs, Harvard University; the Center of International Studies, Princeton University; andthe Institute of Oriental Culture,Tokyo University. He holds a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University

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RECENT ASIA PROGRAM PUBLICATIONS

Special Report No. 118 - Cross-Strait Economic Ties: Agent of Change, or a Trojan Horse?Ramon H. Myers,Terry Cooke, Tun-jen Cheng, February 2003

Special Report No. 117 - Japanese Political Reform: Progress in ProcessShin’ichi Kitaoka, Robert Pekkanen, Richard Samuels, Verena Blechinger-Talcott, Michio Muramatsu, Junko Kato, January 2003

Special Report No. 116 - Passing the Mantle: A New Leadership for MalaysiaBridget Welsh, Karim Raslan, M. Bakri Musa, September 2003

Special Report No. 115 - Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China–North Korea RelationsChen Jian, Samuel S. Kim, Hazel Smith, September 2003

Special Report No. 114 - The Evolution of a Taiwanese National IdentityJune Teufel Dreyer, Thomas B. Gold, Shelley Rigger, August 2003

Special Report No. 113 - The U.S.-Japan-China Triangle: Who’s the Odd Man Out?Ezra F. Vogel, Gilbert Rozman, Ming Wan, July 2003

Special Report No. 112 - Fighting Terrorism on the Southeast Asian FrontDavid Wright-Neville, Angel M. Rabasa, Sheldon W. Simon, Larry A. Niksch, Carolina G. Hernandez, June 2003

Special Report No. 111 - China’s Economy: Will the Bubble Burse?Charles Wolf Jr., Thomas G. Rawski, Deborah S. Davis, June 2003

Special Report No. 110 - Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic PoliticsR. William Liddle, Mohamad Ihsan Alief, Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, April 2003

Special Report No. 109 - Durable Democracy: building the Japanese StateJohn W. Dower, Donald L. Robinson, Franziska Seraphim, March 2003

Special Report No. 108 - Crisis in the Hinterland: Rural Discontent in ChinaJean C. Oi, Xiaobo Lu, Yawei Liu, February 2003

Special Report No. 107 - The Demographic Dilemma: Japan’s Aging SocietyPaul S. Hewitt, John Creighton Campbell, Chikako Usui, January 2003

Special Report No. 106 - Toward Oil and Gas Cooperation in Northeast Asia: New Opportunities for Reducing Dependence on the Middle EastSelig S. Harrison, December 2002

Special Report No. 105 - The 16th CCP Congress and Leadership Transition in ChinaS. Shirk, H. Lyman Miller, G. Lin, L. Dittmer, C. Li, D. Shambaugh, R. Baum, September 2002

An electronic copy of any publication can be obtained by visiting the Asia Program’s Web site at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/asia.

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Introduction “Y - Wilson Center · his essay’s title.Thus, the Special Report suggests a ... Agawa points out that while anti-Americanism exists in Japan,it is less prevalent