Intro to Rhetoric of Sincerity Chpt 5

8/4/2019 Intro to Rhetoric of Sincerity Chpt 5

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EDITED BYErnst van Alphen,Mieke Bal ,AND Carel Smith

THE RHETORIC OF SINCERITY

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESSSTANFORD, CALIFORNIA


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S t a f l f o rd Un iv e rs i ry PressS t an fo r d , Ca l if o r ni ae t099 br t he B o ar d of ' tnlSteesof t he L e la n d SmnJOld Ju IUQI 'U l i i v , e r s i c y . .AU ' [( g lu t r e se r v ed ,No p ar e o f t hi s b o ok m a y b c re p ~o d i. l( ;; cd .o r t r an sm i r t ed i r 'I : 1J l y fo r ll l o r by,any means, eleerronicor mechanical, j'udading,pho(ooopying and record-in,g, or in an)' in.fmllJat ion 5!Or : : lgeor JCtr ie' lging-i 'i l-PLIbliCllt joJ) DataTherhetor ic o hi nc cr iw I. et] j( 'e d b y Ernsr V!Ul Alphen, Miek,( : B a I, a n d C a re l S m i th .

p. e m. - .(C ul:cura l m em ory in the present)I n c lu de s b i bl iog r aph ic a l r c f c t e : r u x r s an d index.lS.BN 978'0.1)047-5827'7 (d0lh ; . : 1 L 1 c . paper)

l. Si1lci!l'ii:y in literature, 2. Siucel'i,ty-Poli rid a s . p e c , F S . J.. Sincerity-Social~p~ tS, . 1 . A tp he n, E rm a v an . Il. Ba l , M i c k e, 194'6- TIr . Smirh, C . E . (CareLE,)rv . Ser ies . .l 'NS6;S57'R44 200;!809 '. 93j.JJ--tI~2 2

T ype s er b y B [ uc e ~u .n d :q u is .t i n u hS .5 A d ob e G al :a m on d

Contents

List 0 / C . o 1 1 - t r i b t t t o l ' sIntroduction

Ern st ' /I a nA l p hd l atlti Mi'ekc BatPART J. SINCERITY AS SU,DJBCTIV1TY EFIlECl'

r *W hy d o :y ou [e ar rn eIro rn M y se lf?": T or tu re , T ru rh,a nd . t he A rts o f r he Councsr -Reformar ion] rm : e T '4 y la r

' 2 . . Melody an d M(1n0Wne: P erf or m ln g S in ce ri ty inR t pu b Jk a ri F r an c e1{a.tb~/ ' i~tee r g e r o n ,

3 The Irreconcilability ofHypocrisy a n d S i nc e ri tyP r an s W i l lem K a r s t e n .

4 The Rhetoric of JLlstincacio}l: The Preponderance ofD e cis io ns o ve r RulesCareLSmith

5 M:t:!sxWe (N O T) M ean W hat We S . a y ? Ser iousnes s an dSinter! ty in theWQrk of J . . Austin and Stanley Cave l lM e rit d e : vr ie s

6 C an the S ubalte rn C on fes s? P aso lin i, Gramsd, Foucaul t,a nd th e D eplo ym en t o f S ex ua lityCesar e Ca sar ln o

IX

r

44

60

78:

121


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Must We (NOT) Mean What We Say?SERIOUSNESS AND SINCERITY IN THE WORK OFJ. L. AUSTIN AND STANLEY CAVELL

H en t d e V rie s

Stanley Cavell speaks of his persenal enco '., ith J- L' .Willi ' ' unter WI. ,. AUstin'!955 , ~mJames Lectures at Harvard, which would beU :bl1shed ' Shumously tn 1962 as How, to D o Thintn: w ith W o ~d s }. J pOSt - .. , . "",-, ,115 uotru ng ess thanconverSIon expencllce.",1 H e ties this "experience" "h ' h . 1 ,a " " , > W ,Ie seem s ll.O onger~ylJ ~ :e~g()~.ned ~Y~ules or criteria, to me theme of "seriousness" and~,el1SI0n" slQ.cerlty: "

AusrjJl'S reaching was the occasion for me on wb ' h " k ' '_ L I . . , tc [0 as I somenow dl.ffetentYbro.nlJlI jjnywalY inwhich I had been able to as k it before, wJlerher I Was s'l!riol'~II our p 1osop Jy noe . - db' ,'", , - , quite as m.easure, y its imporrance (totlle . Idto In y Soelery , , ' ) b ' ' wor ,o r, , o r to m e , u t a s measured b 'y a question I c oe J ' a n o> fidin b . bl ' ' , n, ..w con enccelng a, e to pose myself, and which it self posed quesrions, since i t was as

o~cure~. rr ~as fcrvcar.1tprc$emcd irself as the question whether I could s p e a kp o~~p lea r a,nd.n~eal1' every word I said. Is this.asensible test in choosing ac~reCJ. .. . And does l~ mean char I have-before I speak.-to ask whether 1amuncere JlI m y words, whe the r r want a n of dlelr .whar scrurin ) Wh ..IL . . ' consequences, pm to no matter6 . 6' y. ? wouk say anythm~ un de r suc h conditions? (Cavel l 19965"9- 0" rst emphaSIS'added), "" ,Does Cavell indirectly confess or prophesy here that whi (. e cannot say any-t Illg or at least anything meaningful) under conditions where serious-

S e ri ou sn e ss a n d S in c e ri ty 91,d sj l1Gerrry are f u l ! ; y realized or realizable? And is this a lesson that

I I c S ~ ~rIbas raughr us, albeit indirectly, unintentionally, and only when(\!15tH) gillS! the grain? 1 8 seriousness-and, by extension, sinceri ty-not,dag ",' 1 elari 0 ". "d"""tl -' ib J e r e st Inuunan I',' anon s r rare senousness an slllcenty'SCf)S " "( 1 "sensibl " ), A d h]' jlQropen to a test at east not a sensi e one. n ow canj I1tP 'f . 10 " I " 1 "C " if '1.j uestlOnS oe at once 0. )SClUe yet a so rervent, 1 not necessan y~~,1 ;~[ant"? Ho\Y -does one speak philosophically and sti ll mean every

I J 1 lP , H if this i h C 1 do-c-if we "(hac one says! ow, 1 lIS1S Wat we ree we mus t 0-1 we mustIv o r 1 1what w e s~y'i-couJd we ever avoid or escape and disengage fromJ l 1 e l J a k i o g seriously O r Sincerely? How, if this is what we feel we o ug ht to do,5P~ld ,w e begin doing so, LIl w ord a nd deed?C O Of course, we do say some things, and we do so all the time. "[L]otsofdlingswill have been done," Austin says, even where a performative-al.l" a c e of speech') ( 1 96 2. ,2 0 ) c o b e d is ti ng u is he d from a statement of truthor fa lsehood-is infelic itous, which never means "without consequences,, [csuh s e f fe c ts " (17). A s Auscin shows, "saying something is sometimes,doing something" (Cavell If)94, 8S ) rather than, say, reporting or describ-ing something. Moreover, saying something, even when and where we arecompetent users of a language, is often doing something inadvertently,unwitt ingly, unintentionally, with a slippage or side-effect of sorts .

Austin adds that there are cases in which to say and do things is tob e subject-that is to say, exposed or vulnerable-to "possible ways andvarieties of n o t e x ac tl y d o in g t hi ng s" ; in other words, of "not quite doing (orsaying) something" (1962,93; cf. 92). He suggests that this may be so evenwhen and where we had intended our words to have an opposite effect(or sincerely thought and genuinely felt they might). This can happen inseveral ways, and everyone of these unsuccessful utterances or infelic it iesneeds to be clarified , he claims, "if we are ever to understand p roper l y whatdoing things is" (271).

Cavell agrees with this overall diagnosis of the perils no less thanthe chances of speech, but he contests Austin's implication that there isa way of doing-or, for that matter, of understanding-things "prop-erly." The possibili ty of misunderstanding, of "infelic ity," "misfir ing," or"abuse," belongs to the heart of the matter, he claims. But in what sense,precisely?

Cavell speaks of seriousness and sincerity as being, philosophicallyspeaking, un fa t homab l e , that is, immeasurable in terms of any worldly,


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92 Ren t d e V r ie ssocial, or even subjective importance- and ' ,normative or' '1 ' ,lfredllcLble to an y, eXlstentla regIster h " . COr ,. , , ;room fi d bOW ose cntena o r r ul es would l' '0"ti...~. or ou t, n the comrary the Ii sid f' "eave tis 'Ity is anxiety about rhei b ' P . e 0 SCl' Iousncss an.d ' ' 1 1 0elf a sence, a horror of posru " Sll1cand, perhaps, a l so a terror at their presence rh oS,turmgh aad l_nasqUerll;t.,upon us, whose consequences we canno ".at IS, at t e c la ll n. s the, ~;seq{lCmceswe know O r s u s t f~r~see or whose foreseeabl., Y I~ y

. , ' pect we are unwIll.ing_ . 1 ' . , . C0n.In the IJ~uiredspace Ihav hI" toowea


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94 Hent de Vriesalthough it w as heralded by some as th e first serious enCbUllCel' b er wso-called an aly tic and con tin en ta l ph i io sophy , h ave in fa ct "dol1e ill~ I ! . I : !harm than good ." For One thing, it e sta bli sh ed o r .served as an alibi~t~a susficious view~f D~rida' s th0~11t in pro .~essio l ilal . pl~loS0Phy (::least ill r ep re se n ta n ve p hi lo se ph y departments ill m e En glislH pea.ki .world) a nd , in th e w ak e o f D err id a's in cre as in gin BU eJ \c e in litera~Yti~lSory, allowed a roo-resruictive reception ofAustin's actualrhought. A U th :" -Cave l l 11,0 [S, "has helped perpe~uate the rhough~ that ~llstin, undeI:Writ~;some idea that language conrains a general unified dimension of effectthat can b e c a ll ed one of pe rfo rm a nc e.a n d th at h e a dv an cs a g e ne ra l COI)_trast between ordinary language an d literary language." Y et "these i d e ' l Salone," Cavell conrinues, "are su f60 ien t to destroy any conr .r ib l' lDOI l A l lS_t i n 's d i s ti n c ti v e n es s might l end in such d i sc u ss io n s" ( 1 99 4, 6r),

C a ve ll's o w n a ss es sm e nt ef A u sc in 's "c on tr ib uti on " a nd "distinctive_ness" intends to shift th e discussion in an a l toge the r diEferent-and fa tmore "diff icult"-rurecti.0n, .one that would bring our h is c e nt ra l COAC1 ' nw i th s e ri o us n es s and s in c er it y w h os e a ll -t oo . ..n d ir ec t b u t crucial li1 1 k withr r agedywould need [0 b e b r ou g he far mor e forcefuLly.than has been hith-erto realized, In Cavell 's words: "My own feeling is that while Derridafound Austin philosophically interesting, even congenial, and Searle hadfound Austin useful and worth defending against Derrida's treatment ofhim, neither really felt that Austin's is a (philosophical) voice whose signa-ture isdifficult to assessand important to hear out in its difference, Ifwhateither of them saysabout Austin's ideas oflanguage isright, then my ques-tion of seriousness, forced upon me by those ideas, is not only difficult toarticulate, but pointless" (r994, 6r),

Interestingly, Cavell goes on to explain that his reservations withrespect to Derrida (and Searle) reiterate the ones voiced in his earliestdefense of Austin (against Benson Mates's views) in the opening essayof Must We Mean What We Say?His unease over the conditions of seri-ousness and sincerity that are obscured in the early and recent assess-ments ofAustin's work thus cuts across the divide ofwhat seem to be twoopposed schools of thought, whose "styles or voices or signatures" Cavelldoes not wish to regard as alternative or surmountable positions, Instead,more interestingly, he regards them "as forming the contesting, all butexhaustive, senses of the present, hence of the foreseeable future, of phi-losophy," ashe notes in the foreword to Shoshana Felman's The Scandalof

Seriousnessand Sincerity 95rak ingBody (2003, xii), And the discomforc ~n ~av:ell's pa,r~ seems, f i t 51 . avated by the receprion of Austin's work m literary, crit ical, orI aggr . . 1 - _ ' . ' fo f !. o a :n a 1 yt ic (more precisely, Lacan ian ) theory; a s s ee n In t te WHang o

f1S) '~edgwick. J ud ith B utle r, a nd othel's.. ., W e B u t then could this debate between schools of thought that fe_edon, -an d it s e ems must of necessirv do so-ever be senously'u,ca!!Ol ,... , '/ . 'd i S ! sincerely reso lved by reasonable argument? Cavell su .gges r s It canno t .

a ll e rhaps uninrenricnally, no on e demonstrated th is m ore com pel-I \rld , P '_1. 1.' 1 1 ' , I t: _ th 0 'I. _ . f f J [hall Aus t in Wi' li ll . L1I_Se IpOca r e r e r ence [0. e ag c .1)II5:'YThe Tragic Hint: Rethinking AustinBut what would it require to live without the representationalist

d criptivist or verist) metaphysical backup, no longer using it as an( es I ' '1 or "cover"?WTouldit allow or force us to rv e more senous y orexcuse , vv I, ely no longer living our knowledge and ignorance, do's and don'ts,Sincer , , ,I'k and dislikes theoretically (as the representationalist stance wouldIes ined iblto imply) but instead in a more thoughtful, examme , responsl e,seem , , d ?d therefore lived (andwho knows, more lively)way?Could this be one,O r isdoing (or letting) not the mode and mood in which sincerity-and,b implication, seriousness-is found or founded? Is its mode and moo,d,lnat motif, perhaps far more tragic (or, in philosophical terms, aporetic)thanthe philosophy of ordinary language (Austin), not to mention sp~echacttheory (Searle) and their deconstructive detractors (notably Derrida),seemsto suggest?

Cavell suggests that Derrida's scholadY,o~issions (beyond, the le,c-tures on speech acts) in taking stock of Austin s How to Do Thmgs toithWords"might not have been so costly had Derrida taken up the appear-ance,in the opening chapter ofthat book, ofthe citation-uniquely thereinGreek, asif calling attention to itself-from Euripides' Hippolytus. Notthatany other reader I know ofHow toDo Thingswith Wordsstops to w~n-der at it either" (Cavell 1994, 52-53),2 In fact, Cavell confesses to havmginitially overlooked or under appreciated the literary citati~n hims~lf, Andnoreference to it can be found in yet another deconstructive reading thathecritically yet sympathetically engages with, Felman's book on ~ustin,Ashe ponders the reasons behind this near-total forgetfulness and, indeed,


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H en t d e V rie sproposes the. affect o f " w o nd e r" as th e mo s t appropriate-that is , Se~i,and sincere-response to [he obliv ion of the citation, Cavell im agit) ,e,s \ 4 8mean ing im u st n av e had fo r Allstin himsel f , Perhaps :w e ca n C O l 1 l p r e h e r h ~th e neglect of th e passage if we realize that ic-almosr " se em s to m a ke tl(!sell.~eto . s~y that the d~liberately superficial, wic ry , m~cking Austill WO\J~~be inscribing the relation ofhis w or k o n p er fo rm a ri ve utterances to tlrealm of the rragio" (Cavell1994,53). le

[ w ill fbGU'S here on Cavell's ( and , a lb e it o n ly in d irec tly , on D er ..n ,da' s) reading of Austin in the second chapter of Cavel l ' s A P itc h o jP h iL oso ,phy, and its parallel sttldyi.1l Pbilosophicat'passllges. Borhculminan- in th ein rerprerar ion of a l ine from Euripides' H i p p o / : y t t I S (Line 6n)-ignotedC:veH c l a ims , by even , th~ mo s t s o phi s ti c a te d J:eadel'so~HO'tIl to D o T J ;i~ ~wlth WOrd r such asDerrida and.Felma.?-whlchAuStll1 translates as " I l l Ytongue swore co, but m y heart did not.

This line, as discussed by Cavell, .helds .chekey to a be t te r undtlt_standing of the rhetoric of sincerity; a c O ll ce pr whose imp l ica t ion s forma constant point of reference in his other work as well, mosr-notably Th eClaim o f R e t i s o r , J . , 3 Not th e least of the promises of Euripides' Line is tha_t itenables Cavell to explore in more detail what it means ro "speak philosoph_ically and mean every word" one say s ; it enables us to address, if not fullyto answer, the question whether " I have-before I speak-co ask whetherI am s i n cere in mywords, whether I want all oftheir consequences, put tono matter what scrutiny" (Cavell 1 99 6, 6 0; emphasis added).

Cavell leavesno doubt that "the cause of the neglect ofAustin's cita-t ion from Euripides is a function of underestimating Austin's, let 's say,seriousness" (1996,181). This, more than anything else, would be the flawin Derrida's (on Cavell's reading) selective, now appreciative, now overlydismissive reception of the theory of performative speech acts and the all-too-implicit allusion to tragedy on which it is based.

More broadly, Austin's sense ofthe tragic would allow us to ask whati t means to live a philosophical theory-more precisely, to live one's the-ory and to do so seriously and thereby s i n cere l y . I am not thinking, inthis context, of the ancient topos of the b i o s t h e o re t ik o s or of the reduc-tion of life to theory, ofl iving theoretically-which would mean, follow-ing ordinary usage, l iving hypothetically, and hence not really living atall . Rather, I assume a connection between the theme of our volume andwhat might turn out to be a specifically modern-though als~ classically

S e r io u sn e ss a n d S in c e r it y 97. _ robJe1l1,S pe cin ca Uy , L would like to ask td what .exrenr living

r(llglC ! r living one'stheory requires a eerrain acceptance (Cavellv:ouldr h e~ '~ l cn o w le d .gm e n ( ) o f [ .r ut h, . trur.hful,ness, [ rust; ,~n~ truS~w0rthll1:ss-;~ ~ 1e e d o f seriousness and s in ce nr y, I n ili~ s.sense of living p hilo so ph y ,a ~Ifld. 's rheoryrather [han merely havmg one, or of a theory sustain, gone ., . "l i v , J 1 l c s e l f only to tiIeexrenr. t h a t it is lived and al ive, Caven's remarkab lelP! \ is an i :nd i pensablegwde,1,/0/

Serious SwearwordsInsincerity is a t the heart o f the question of "infelicities," s om e t im e s

n l l e d " m as qu era de rs ," w h os e "m i su se ," Aust~n~~aysj "en~ende-rs ratherC ecial var ietie of 'nonsense'" ( 1 . 9 6 2 4)' lnfebc.lt~esare failed per~o[_ffi~-sp .rhey indicate the ways in which a petfOfl iuatl \ te utterance, whilenei-e lv e s , U J e . , ' U be, " b " . . , ". rue norfalse report or description, can StL e su 1ecr rocnncism,chelat. . , . . . ('[O( ,example , when I s 'ay"1 promise" bu r do 11 0 intend to do what I sa y 25 ,O . 44 fo r th e reference to "In sin ce rity ") . .'4 ' . . (I " ") thuch a promise, says Austin, IS an utterance or ,ra .tler ,,_t1 l1 t. at"" ,t "unrrue" bu t rather n ot d on e; inthe sense not only of nocimple-IS no . ,. . . . d" d," but also of "g iv en in bad faith" and thereby of ha:v:mgrna e aOlent~, . di .'I'falst move" (1962, n), Such an utterance rnay go wrong 111tWO lsun:(wa s. First, I may not have performed the act of promising correctly, my ff" u:- hi d"0which case the performative "does not come 0 or IS not ,~.c~eve , " r,

nd I may achieve the act but do so in ways that are msincere. Inseco , " . firinz" fotherwords, the infelicity ofour utterance may be one of mrs nng or 0"abuse":in the first case, our perforrnative act and the procedure it invokesare"disallowed" or "botched," rendering the utterance "void" or "withouteffect";in the second case-that ofinsinceri ty-the utterance isjust "pro-fessed,""hollow," "not implemented," or "not consummated" (16),

As he does so often, Austin hastens to add that these distinctions,while necessary, are not "hard and fast" (Austin 1 96 2, 1 6) . They do notcontradict each other, since "we can gowrong in two ways at once." More-over,they "shade into one another" and "overlap" to the point wher~ "thedecision between them is 'arbitrary' in various ways" (23) Interestmgly,though, Austin worries that even his own theory of per~ormative.smig~tseemto imply that m e re ly u tte rin g c er ta in w or ds o n th e n gh t occas ion o r In


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H en t d e Vr ie st h e a p p r o p r ia t e ,c i m t e xt d o e s no t b: y i t s e l f - " wa r r a n t seriousness. But Wll this condition1l( ltiJel-OI is it t rUth- ': t11tdog01U o-e-cerrain requirements of constarive:ra[emems?How does ir holdeven though the p ro m is e re m ain s uonde-scriptive in any direct way (even though felicity and infelicity have noimmediate or strict relation to truth and untruth)?

Austin begins by warning how we should no t understand this rela-tionship between ut tered promises and the feel ings, thoughts, and inten-tions that ought to-indeed, mus t - a c c omp a n y them, and do so a lmo s tfatefully, compulsively, and obsessively (or, as Cavell will say, tragically).Intriguingly, Austin ironically echoes, even parodies, the sacramental lan-guage of the Anglican catechism in stating this erroneous view:weareapt to have a feeling that their [i.e. these promises] being serious consistsin their being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible sign, for convenience orotherrecord or for information, of an inward and spiri tual act: from which it isbuta short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for manypurposes the outward utterance is a description, true orfolse, ofthe occurrence oftheinward performance, (Austin 1962,9)That this is not the case cannot be ' ' p ro ved , ' ' Austin says, bur is "a fact"nonetheless. Performatives, such asthe acts of marrying, betting, bequeath-ing, christening, or, indeed, promising are "at least p re f erab ly ( though notstill accura t e l y ) to be described as s ay in g c e rt ain w o r ds , rather than as per-forming a different , inward and spi ritual, action of which these words aremerely the outward and audible sign" (13).


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roo H en t d e V rie s

Austin notes in a parenthetical aside that t he " cl as si c expl"e .hi iatrer i . . SSIO' t " l'~ ,t l~ atter l~ea can b~, found in line 6 1 2 of Euripides' tragedy Hippo ' ,O fwhich Austin quotes: my tongue swore to, but m y heart (or mind Or . 9 i t u s ;backstage artist) did not" (1962 , 9-10). Othe! ,

Cavell picks up on this citation as a .key moment in 1 1 1 ' S .. '. ,'" 'C1lga_.rnenr WIth Dernda. The line also echoes 'mroughoUt a whole succ .' ge~. . ~~ancient and modern texts that are thereby obHqu!;:ly inscribed in A . of1 I" d i 1 ' Ustill'ecture. t I.Scite. in P ,ato s Sympos i f J rn and Theat e tus j .i nAristopbanes' J : . SFrog~ , and in Ar~stotle s Rheto r i c , a rexrthat, Cave l l Sll.ggescs.,migh t allo:ereading of Austin that would al low O ne general ly to "question: a thea1 hat ni h '. o.rYo6anguage t at pictures .speec. as at .heart a matter of action and blJlyjl1C:j~dental ly a matter of articulating and hence expressing desire" .(e a ve l1 .) Th L b di . . . . .1996159 . e recent ~e ~ inon ofH'lppolytus renders th e line as : "My t on g t, 'swore, ~ut my m~,nd IS not on oath" (Eudpides 1995 , . 1 .8 5 ) ; Y e t anodl;;translation reads My tong~e swore, h ut rn y ra in d is UHSWOl"il~' (Ave '1968). In the even more tellmg French translation of L a b ell es l e tt .. 1 " ) 'fi d " .. ,-1(:S, W(!n : M a L angue fa !ure , m on c oe ur sest absteml ' (Elu'ipides 2003,52). sWhy has the line been so memorable, both in antiquity and since>

One commentator asks, "Why was this line so shocking?" and specul '.I . b ". ates.s It ecause It seemed to indicate that men could swear oaths with .1 ." ( Inter-na reservations] Avery 1 968 , 2 1) , Or does the line more broadly. . " sum-marrze the phIlosophical, rel ig ious, and existential "contrast and conR'b . letetween inner truth and outer appearances . . , the enormous distancebetween ~h.at one actually is and what one appears to be" (25 )? It thereby, :ou~~ a~tl::pate not on ly . the Platonic-Socratic concern with "contradic-tion, Wth the c.on~ue being safe from refutation, but the heart not beingsafe from refutation (Plato 2004, 39), but also the debates and argumentsc?n:~emjng "private language" in Wittgenstein's Ph i Lo so p h ic a L I n v e s ti ga-t tons: It s e~hoes even reve~berat~ in Hollywood's cinematic rendering ofthe liberating as well as disturblOg observation that "the Matrix cannottell you who you are.". Hippolytus's line is uttered, of course, by an actor on stage, in a the-

atn~al ~lay, a dramatic genre Austin "deliberately" excludes from consid-erat~on '" elabor~, ting the theory of performatives and illocutionary force,leavmg It up to a more general account" to situate all utterances moreproperly, including staged ones." The line expresses Hippolytus's terrifiedresponse to the revelation, by her nurse, of his stepmother's adulterous and

S e r io u sn e s s a n d S in c e r it y 10 1.si-incestllous desire fb r hirn-c-afrer the nurse has first obtained his sol-

qlla oach under 1 1( )c ir cu m st an ce t o reveal the secret that he is about totI11 .f 'l al I c. "unh ". hi d[old, The line se s u s rate as an un appy man III ISown eyes, anh i l a "seducet,",wj~~ barely masqueraded "holy manner," in the eyes of his~. he, :- .Both of [hem are unaware of rhe extent to which they are merely:Wlls j ,na hapless game cha t th e gods-Aphrodite and Artemis and,. moref dire.trly, Zeus and Poseidon-c-are playing with each other accordmg toI : ic r and strangely noninterventionist rules (Euripides 1 99 5, 2 27 ). The~[ati.on is important for several. reasons.. First, th e e xa m pl e o f g iv in g o n e s wo rd - o f swearing, taking an oath,

but especial ly promising-is Austin's privileged i llustration of what is atstake in, what captures the essence and informal logic of, a performativet out co ur t , what he calls an "explic it performative." Cavell agrees withthewidespread sense, and claim, that the act and concept ofpromising isnot justonemore among performative utterances ... but that promising-even especial-ly the promise to marry-is somehow privileged in.Austi.n's view, nami.ng.as itwer e the fact ofspeech itself . .. [ I]n How toDo Thmgs wzth Words Aust in Iden-tifiesspeaking as g iv in g o n e' s w o r d, asifan 'Ipromise' implicitly lines every act ofspeech,of intelligibility, as it were a condition of speech assuch. (Kant held that'I think' issuch a lining). (Cavell 2003, xii)Second, the quote is important in that Austin glosses Euripides' line asclaiming that, in Hippolytus's invocation, the utterance "I promise to ... "amounts to an internalized and self-imposed act of obligation and henceport rays "my" promise as putting "on record," Austin says, "my spiritu-al assumption of a spiritual shackle." Austin's impl ication is, of course,that this is n ot how the promise-or, for that matter, any per formative-should be viewed, at least if we wish to block an immoral "let-out" (1962,ro) that undermines its very undertaking, aim, and effect.

An insightful commentator, Espen Hammer, notes that, in Cavell' sreading of this gloss, "Hippolytus enacts Austin's suspicion that meta-physics can be used 'to get out of the moral of the ordinary, out of ourordinary moral obligations.?" Or, as Cavell adds further in the passage towhich Hammer refers: "Austin uses this distinction between tongue andheart as a type of the philosophical use of profundity (call it metaphysics)to exempt yourself, or exclude yourself, from the everyday responsibilitiesor accountabili ties that make civilized life possible" (1994, 62).


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102 He nt d e Vr iesBut.how does Hippolyrus 's taternent "M y tongue swore to, Ollt

heart did not" render the absolute ~Kallt would say "categorical") im : r n , } ,. f' bev i fu lfill ' , . b 1 th ,P~t-auve or 0 .eyl.ng or .111g one s promise to e mere Y eoretical

"hypccher ical ," rhus supposedly condemning it tobeing no longer a p ro at~seat aU? Al :1~6ngives an e sp lan a ti o n based upon. a'moral lesson, an."e~~-lCS of speech :I t is g ra df yi ng to o bs erv e i'l th is very e xa m ple h ow excess o f pr o fW:l d iry , 0.1' r:itlso le mnity , a t on ce pave s [he w ay fo r immorality. FO.t someone w ho s ay s "prOIll~~ring is not m ere ly a m a tte r o f u tte rin g words! It is all i nw a rd a nd ~ pi .r it ua l a c t! "': 'ap t to app~r as II solid mora lis t standing out a;gail1sr a generation o f sU PC J


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104 Hent de Vriesconstructing, some metaphysical discovery as a COS[lJi'c excuse for 'cruseling,as in hi s example that takes a 'remark of Euripides' Hippo~OI'a l'M y tbngue.swme but my heart di d not,' as.away 0ut'ofkeeping apr:t~;, , , ~ a1 ,1excuse f o r hav ing :f a i led in a given, case to do he best Oue l l1 .~ ! .~~havedone under rhe eircnmscances" (xv). Y et Austin is , Cavel] o'ith t, " har t: Iel iernberi H' J' '1 b J ' P I,tsut, pel' aps ra ts y re rn ern e rm g lPpO yrus s a rer . e l aV I(;)( ',".Fo r .,

J . al -r J . J " 'I ," 1 : . 1 ' ' I el L al l.us mor -n,l1eraplySIC


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106 H en t d e V rie sPa r en the t ic a ll y , Cav e l l establ ishe a further pa r al le l : "Tha t ,there a~aFks or tokens . , . b y which to distinguish the genuine, at real fr~~~ 11 Uf als e o r fa ke is a way o f putting-"~7Ittgenstein's discovery, . , that rher [hI!not what he calls criteria. for discinguishing real ity and dream, 0 1 " , Ie a r~an imate and in an im ate , o r sincerity o r s e ri o us n es s and ho1 l0wnes add ,treache?, hence no w~ o E b~ocki'ngth.e t~reat of sk ep t ic i sm" (1996, ':0:~d

Hippo ly rus promIses withour k now in g b efore ha nd w ha t th e prO I .'1 h "- d b il ,1 _ t: b e i , ' n l s ~entai s; e IS entice to _,e s -ent I,},C10rC eing rold what it IS that h e rn _re m ai n s iJ e? t a bo ur , a p ro rru ;e , he compl a in s , that he makes " of f g u a ~~ 'and by which he n0W feels trapped through oath by the gods," whi, Ialone keeps him from "telling tills who l e story to [his] father" (EUrip'dl! 1, 1 ~'1 9 95 , l in e 6 5 5) .One wonders wh y he lets things get this f ar . C o ul d he havoided this predicament? But chen, Cavell seems to suggest.does 0 ' ne aV e

' - " L__ rt0f~lways let th ings go too [a r?O r, a s Derrida might have glossed, is a pro lY l_rsenot always-and,- from the momen t one speak s , a lways alreadY-ruad"ff d." har i in l h e_ guat" t ar JS to say, In es s tr an complete awareness of ir s l:riean_ing (including its accompanying rhoughrs, feeii+Lgs, and j n r e m i t : _ m . s ) ; , tosay- nothing of i t s c o n s eq u en ce s ? Moreover, is one none the l es s not alwaysbound b y an absoluteness an d caregoricalness for which being ". trapped'iby nothing less than the "gods" is not such a bad metaphor after all? Whocould-or would want to -be always on .guard? Or g ive his or her wordunder the condit ion of complete transparency of "normal concomitants; 'guarameed by saturated COn t e x t s and fu llyes . tablished conventions'?" ,

If we do too much hmowing or calculating, thinking O r feding-.in short" incending--we will be good O,[ nothing, ,C0IUe to nothing, beavailable fOll nothing, III order to promise-s-or, more broadly and s imp ly ;to speak and write, 01' even be aad act at : aU-we must for conceptual noless than existential and metaphysical reasons not Duly not (!) necessarilymean wha t we say) we must necessar ily not (I) mean what w e say, Moreprecisely still: in . o rder to "mean" what we say, w e must not (fully andexclusively or transparently) mean w hat w e say.

In speech acts such as promising (but promises, we found, reveala more general truth concerning petionnative utterances as such) "pre.cis ion ," in terms ofa pretended t tna lnbigui ty of meaning, is thus 'il.eitlietgivf!nTlor to b e a sp ir ed to , This unarniguity of meaning is JUSt like makingexpl icit ," which, Austin say s , is the "torce;" of how 011~'S words are e f f e e -tively taken by others. As imagined ideals, precision and explicitness-

S e r io u sn e s s a n d S i nc e r it y 10 7er than, say, the l i terary and the theatr ical or [he masquerade-mtlsr

( o l dlJi:duded 1:omAusri n's analysis as l e s s [han pertinens to th e under -bee~li:tl.gcf ser iousness an d sincer ity . P ar ad ox ic al ly , i n matters of se r ious-S~~'Mld sincerity, one can f ind precision an d appropriateness oilly in( andr e s ' u g h ) I m p re c is io n a n d i na p pr op ri at e [} e ss~lrD This is the "aporia of sincerity" ( a s J e a n -Lu c Marion t e rms it in a

Mk a b le e s sa y , a n al yz il lg chetccuden ('I love you ," which is a "pas-( i ! J . 1 l . te utterance" and "per locudor i" [Marion 20_01. 124, lab, 1 3 : 1 . ] if there'011 ,1 - .$1. waSone): it s groundlessness even , i l ' ; 1 . th e face-or on t he v e ry b a si s- e-:;e~roun~s. orreaso~,s .given~al~eic,inn.i[e. in ~.um~eJ.)' This.is als,o its'"~J1in(eUIglblebond, 1[S u n e m s J . c . h t r . g e Verbmdbthkett, as Ado rno said ofrheJl1or ; a 1 imper a t iv e , well beyond it s Kanrian form ,. " . .What: remains, then, for Cavell's reference to Euripides H t p p o i d tus ISrha t the pl~ "m ay be thought of precisely as a uagedy of ~incerity that is

saYi E lf the in ab il ity to b e i m i l l , C e r e , an inabillty flr)tro be Slgri:ed onto your'~~ordsand deeds" ( 19 96 , 6 1) , It .is as ifone's sincer ity (like one's serious-ness)were a matter of being "glued ," neither to the w o r l d not to others, buttooneself, to the "scandal" of one 's being oneself, more precisely of beingcaught (indeed, "trapped, .. by the gods") in each of one's words (albeitthose given "off guard," which amounts to most if not all of them), Putdifferently, it is as if, in principle and in fact, we have nothing else to callfor.We are fateful ly stuck with (or to) ourselves, not so much in the senseofunconsciously coinciding externally with some solemn internal ( that isto say, spiri tual-mental) deliberation in the depth of our soul, f or o i nt e rn o ;but, more fundamentally, of being always already too late to reflect, toregret, to withdraw, to moderate, and, indeed, to be insincere.

Word-World GlueI take the metaphor of being "glued to" ourselves-bound to our

word-from Michael Fried's suggestive interpretation of the Wittgenstein-ian-Cavell ian motif of "the everyday" (which is our being "glued" to theworld) in M e nze l's R ea lism : A rt a nd E m bo dim e nt in N in ete en th -C e ntu ryBer l i n . Sincerity and seriousness, for all their tragedy and aporia, would, inthis view, seem the most ordinary thing in our lives. While the context ofHippolytus 's utterance is utterly dramatic and theatrical , i t thus illustrates


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108 Hent de Vriesa mode of enunciation that, as it were, happens everywhere everyday .which we are fully absorbed (to borrow Fried's terminology) aUowj~ IQtotheatricalization and, indeed, no "escape," even if we tr y (which we g fT O_ 1ll.u -no less fatefully, for the same concepcualand ontological reasons). St,

One is further reminded of Emmanuel Levinas 's conceptionresponsibili ty in his second major book, ,~l1tided A1 ,~ t l' emen; tq t t ' e tr . e au ofdela de l 'essence (Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Be'ing). Lev inas e v o k l < ~. "d " I h ." d " . f' . ' < !sIts rama no ess t an Its come y in te rm s a one s carrying the I_ _ Otlenot so much under but at-and as-one's skill . The s k il l , is ':glued" to rbeyond my initiat ive and consciousness, against my "interest" ill a 11 :C ,C I I . d ( L ' , "ob . .," t-~ata , near-c.ompu srve, an . as evinas sar:1 0 sesslve,o:aumatic:' aI le!m any case inescapably tragic manner. ThIS makes the skin like the tu .. . - _ n legIVen by the centaur Nessus, which managed, after all the heroic labors'He~cules co~pleted, to be the very rhjr:lg char did him ill. ik e Hippol) '.tus s fate, this reveals yet another element o f the bond that O U r woi'dsimpose on us, one that Cavell stresses over and .over : the [act , that thci'rtragic nature is, for us mortals , unbea rab l e .

Cavell notes that Austin himself seems eager to forget that Hip-polytus apparently does not use the line ("my tongue swore to, but illheart did not") as an excuse at all, and in fact, as far as we can tell, h~at no point seems to break his word on stage. On the contrary, Cavellobserves, Hippolytus expresses terror and implores pi ty, both of which are"some function of the knowledge that the most casual of utterances maybe i rretrievable: so my tongue swore without my heart-nevertheless I ambound" (Cavell 1994, 62). And, lest we forget, even the gods-in Eurip-ides' play, explici tly Poseidon-are supposed to keep their promises, evenwhen they'd rather not to, since the promise's original intent i s derailed.

More precisely, Hippolytus must stick to an oath about which onewonders whether he was ever at liberty to refuse to take it (steered as theentire course of action seems in this play by deus ex machina: first Aphro-dite, then Artemis, at the opening and at the end of play, respectively) . It i san oath that he can only forsake by sinning against at least one of the gods.He can only protect his integrity-his sopbronein, moderation or chastity(line 731)-by violating or casting suspicion on it at the same time. That isthe aporia of his sincerity. Or, as Avery has it: "once he has taken the oathHippolytus knows that he cannot explain his inner purity in any convinc-ing way and that he has to let himself be judged by outward appearances.

Seriousness and Sincerity 109fh es e, a lth ou gh . ~ e d oe s n o~ know. i t" ~et, b av e~ ee n rig ge d by Aph.~odi~e

b J'i n: g a bo ut h .1 Sd es tru cti on . H i s d ile m m a IS That he must m am t amI~eseou tward appearances to p re se rv e rh e inward purity (part of which: \11s respec;t -sebas-for the god s ) . His s ta temen t is m ean t 1:0 be a cry ofIS aU ish at rhe r ecogn i t ion of his dile mma' (Avel'y 1968, 25).~ t J t > cl d


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lIO H en t d e V rie sAnd is it not, precisely, m e "Iaughcer" and "anxiety" at this alte .I . d . h'" l . rnatn,oosenmg an ngnrerung t rat tend to undermine morality and desir e. "bl"" d" 1 ' e, thaIS to say, 0 iganon an P easure"] t

Dead SeriousWhether we like ir or nor, or know it or not, there is adead-s .

and quasi-mechanical if' quasi-aueomaric quality. a neat l i t e ~ a I 1 1 : : 1 0 l l . smateria li ty and inertia, in ' the things to which we have become answ ,s b 01'The~efore, C . R v e l l reads Austin "not as denying thar Lhave to aband~:~ j~~words, create so many orphans but as affirming-rhat am abandoned .t h em , as to th ie ve s, o r conspirators, tak ing m y breath away, which met tophysics seeks, as it were, todeny" (Cavell 1994, 63). a

This absoluteness has a temoeral dimension one chat consisr, "cr "'" ,paradoxically, if ) denying its passage or rather in makinginfini re its m O Ii1 el and momentum: "the. price of having once spoken at remarked. t k It.' ". ,,' , " a, ellSomer h Ing as .remarkable .. , ISco have spoken,forevel~ to have encered [h e~rena of the inexcusable, to have taken on the responsibility for speak.ll lg further, the unend i ng responsibility of responsiveness, of answerabl.ity" (Cavell I994, 65; emphasis added). This element of infinity at t~every heart of human finitude, Cavell concludes, is nothing but the con.dition of intel ligibili ty, of making oneself intelligible to others as well asto oneself.

Yet this is not all there is to say. Regardless of his "terror" and our"piry," :rippolytus, for all we know, may, in speaking his line, very wellintend or plan to forsake his promise-or at least think and feel he hasinadvertently, done so already-while d e f lu t o keeping it nonetheless and~olding his g~ound ..As the goddess Artemis reveals at the end of the play,He, as was nght, did not fall in with her [Phaedra's] words, nor yet again,godly man that he is, did he break the firm bond of his oath" (EuripidesI995, 247) But Hippolyrus, for his part, seems less sure of this when heresponds to Theseus's anger: "As things stand, I swear by Zeus, god ofoaths, and the earth beneath me that I never touched your wife, never hadthe thought. May I perish with no name or reputation ... and may neithersea nor earth receive my corpse in am guilty" (237). And a little later: "0Zeus, may I no longer live if I am guilty!" (237). But how could he him-self at least, not know?

S e r io u sn e s s a n d S in c e r it y IIIThis much isclear: for allwe know Hippolytus may have never thought

h e w i s ,h . ed (h e d i d ) or knew. he did g i v e n . rh e . fRct t ~ : te leav~~ ep.en ~eDss ib l h~y tha t he m ay b e g uilry afte r a ll, A nd. ye t th e If!a m g uilty , w hichPlgO'i:Srslack of clarity anddecision in this matter, stands next to Hippo ly -.$l. ,I:} " dtllS'searlier assurance tha t to this very t n om en c m y bo y is un ta in ted byJove. I do no r know this act save b y report or seeing it in painting. I am. neeeagerco look at it either , since lhave a ~ir~i.11soul" (Eur ipides 1995) 22I), Ora g a 1n,when be exclaims, "Why) when r a m guilry of no wrong?" (2.53).Ifhe keeps his promise merely d e f a c f ( J and holds his ground, he would

'" f l" K > id iom . b I " . G hUS ac t nor Out 0' (I:):ty, to use anrs.i WID, ut mere y inccntorrruryw i t h it; that is to say. in sync with absolute obligation or ; in his conte xc ,w i th t.hediv~nely monitored oath Iwhich, w e saw, is a curse and a necessity),W o u l d his act thereby be mere l y char ofan actor (as if . even in rherexr and(;Oorexrof Euripides' play, he would be acring a role that is not his own)?W o u ld it be seriousness or insincerity rhar he would lack in this scenario?Moreover, would he himself be able to tell whether he isserious and sincere?Ifwe are to believe Austin as read by Cavell and Derrida, there are no cri te-ria or rules by means of which we would be able to know or tell the differ-encewith a reasonable degree of certainty. "With many procedures," Austinsays, "for example playing games, however appropriate the circumstancesmay be I may still not be playing" (1962, 29). And a li ttle later: "there maybenothing in the ci rcumstances by which we can decide whether or not theutterance is performative [e.g., a promise] at all. Anyway, in a given si tua-tion it can be open to me to take it as e i t h er one or the other" 83).

We could go even one step further. Euripides' play Hippo fy tusand thetelling line quoted from it demonstrate the tragedy and aporia of sincer-ity in that they reveal not just the fatefulness of promising but also-andsimultaneously-the standing possibili ty , the remaining abili ty (perhaps,necessity) to be insincere. One has apparently or in fact has not (fully ornot yet) signed onto one's words and deeds, after all is said and done, andthis regardless of the "bound" and "terror" experienced or expressed.

Sincere DisengagementSeriousness and sincerity require that we indeed grant and indeed

cherish this semantic and ontological "let-out," which is a possibilityfor good and for ill, no mere escape from moral constraints and our


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II2 Re nt d e Vrie sanswerability to others, the world, and ourse lves, For one th.ilg, W .want others to have wanted-that is, fully intended-their promjse e " " t l Ier than having made or even fulfilled it in almost fared, aUtomati~ r'utt.grammed ways. Put in psychological or psychoanalytic tetrns, such' . p r o .would be compuls ive, obsessive, neurotic, r eg re ss iv e, a nd P SY c ho tic ; a y spromise should not be made or fulfilled by the "unconscious," in '0 ~ 'Cwords, by the "body," but, however one spins the word, "spiritually} eti f you l ike, "f reely." I ts affect should be act ive, n ot p as siv e, e ve n th ou gh O ~;can-and must-be "passionate" in the precise rneaning Cavell g i ve s ' to . t l l~Iterm in his attempt to salvage ye t another ancient (this time rhetorical tath ISthan tragic ) moment upon which Austin's text touches only i11 passi.l1g. ~r

All of which leaves yet another, final question unanswered, namel 'are sincerity and insincerity both also thinkable, 01' are they lived as d~"ISengagement, retract ion, disavowal, betrayal, indeed, un~ltindiflg? Austillsomewhat unjustly considers this disengagemem to be merely a, m o r a l"let-out," that is, the necessary possibility of our being no lenge r able, le ralone forced, to give or live up to what is or was a given word, a-done deed,This is as if everything should in principle at all mome n t s stand th e t:estof (still) being willed (tha t is, claimed, acclaimed, or proclaimed) all O V e ragain, a fter all is sa id and done.

Asking what it means that human expressions can be pretended orimita ted, staged or soliloquized, excused and reiterated-and all this eitherseemingly at will or unwittingly and while taken" off guard" -Cavell notesthat this empirica l or metaphysica l given haunts each given word andbetokens, roughly, that human utterances are essentially vulnerable to insincer-ity and that the realization that we may never know whether others are sincere (Ido not exclude the first person) isapt to become unbearable. (We might say thatit returns philosophy's attention to the fact that human life is constrained to thelife of the mind, such as it is). (Cavell 1996, 92)This latter formulation may surprise. For one thing, it can hardly meanthat, for a ll we know, we are captives of our own mind and its "life," which,say, would include its perceptions and ideas (as in solipsistic views of themind or as in Berkeley's idealist conception of human knowledge, not tomention Schopenhauer's convict ion that " the world is my representat ion").In fact, the best explanation of the phrase is-with a decidedly Wittgen-steinian streak-that "human life is constrained" to the life of the body,

S e ri o us n es s a n d S i nc e ri ty II3, . ver _ reminded of the Wittgensteinian dicrum thar this,s ic IS, we are, . .1. . 11}(d iscussed at. ' G l- 1 a.. "ll C " '? ) - , "the best picture of the,W man sou" . _) 1 . 1 ( d Its [e. IS . 1 1 L . 01 : ' 1 : ' b o o Y ~1 1 The Cla i l n o f Ret/son), bur . a l so of the decidec y . a:~a111.a~m '.~

1~i1gthHl C II in the foreword to Felman's book and GIH ! "" .appa:l" ,~l led bY a l. : ' A . e body is sp ee ch a ris in g.a s s uc h" (C av ell 2003', XLVi cf . 65) .: ~ t a p p I 'O V . .a t "5 aaffi

.' fu rther tel ling examples throl lghout bis lectures andAustl-ng1ves rw . , " . - . . sc h ct or,. . ,,h ic a-le ss ay s of th e UllceJ't;atntles IOvo. lved 1~1ever! spec a _.l) h d o s o P , . It. _ ,. .These utterances henee Inevitably include all those, d ina. utterance; . - II" " billdee , ,.. .. . .. '1 ' . :tl~ ,or falsity c ha r Au su n ca s pure, lit, '. la-tements enrat U1g au " . f - 11 dll;o,


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II4 Hent de Vriesthis enunciation is not something [hat JUSt about everyone could pIand responsibly-seriously- and sincerely-make at aU times, i r ( e s ,a U : ' % I ~of location and s i tuat ioJ1, fj'OIn where and towhom theaddl'ess ~sdj~ec i - l ' l 'Austin and his most astute readers have demons,traced that. Why ceC t e q lone tell in advance what will COUntas a greet ing or a n insult,


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u6 H ent de Vrie sinappropriate to be applied to penguins, OJ' because there.' .d f b ., . .. - IS no acce ure 0 aptlZlng anything except hum ans> " (A '. . 6 ct'plreddd d) '" .', USUn 1 9 2; 2 '. P foa e ; or, again: Can I baptize a dog, ifitis ad rnittdl ., ,4. e f'l lP h "Th inzlv rhem-: e YJanollaJ~" l i s t ,ese seeming y rhetoncal, unserious and even lens ' '~t)th -) , .' lncere (! 'ey, questions express a fundamental uncertainty tllat' .. )tlt ath 1 heorer i '. matters' tcan mere y t eorctica] or epIstemaiocrical ways "-d "h d. I ll . 1 \ 10, 'd' 11 b ,l'l.U.eya s . rt~un rca y or c,anonically, but also~ccles~ascicaHy, Their ~u'4ike~ nO t j~tdl~st~ates precisely that uncertainty in utterance and acts wh Y 1> L1 b j i l c lgu isn c or not, extends even well beyond rh e ranee of ' ,erhel ' l in.mati d ' h 0 semanrrc~t1.dc omarns t at we, so far, have considered ordinary (con .' Pr~g.natural, norII_tal and, n,o:mative, thinkable and l ivable) , venuOl1al :J.nd

Yet t~~ Imposslbd~ty of answeril~g these questions in any stra'wardly pOSltlve or negatIve way reveals nor J' USt a rragic 1 ,. I g h t f o ( , -iudze wi , . .., . IecesSlty_ .to ju ge WIthout certalllty, without criteria-but also a chan If n a l \ l e ! , yelse, they entail the perspective of further expansi h' ce. f \ O t , h i n gizh ' . . ~ nsion 0 u:man or 'ng ts )~st as t~ey urge us to inquire what the human and an.im a r u m a lboth phdosophIcally (indeed metaphYSJ'callv\ 11' ,a l mean', . '. IJ as we as praCtlca U ' ,everydayne~s of our lives, Perhaps no more se.rious a n d since'Y In:q ecould be raised, re question

Lessons in Exemplarity: Sincerity Come What MayWhat would a lived, living, that is to say "II' C'e" d .h I' , 1C - an at times paps, even ively theory look like as it takes the motifs mod d' er-of'" "d " ' es, an moodsserrousness an sincerity," well, seriously and does so 'now that th' I -assumIngIS no onger comes down to the same-also sincerely?At least two of many possible answers suggest themselves b wa ofe~ailes, I, ta~e them both from Isaiah Berlin's remarkably point:d m:m-

orr 0 ,AustIn '" an essay that would have merited long discussion in itsown ~l~ht, ,In It, Berlin highlights two of his colleague and mentor's mostsurpnslllg Intellectual and personal qualities:w~~~he spoke, th~~eappeared to be nothing between him and the subiect ofhiscfI~lClsm'" exposltlon-no accumulation of traditional commentar/ no spec-t~c es pr~vlded by ~ particular doctrine-he often produced the fe~lin that~le qudestlOn~as bemg posed clearly for the first t ime: that what had s:emedurre , or trrre or a play of 'I fc Ib h d ' conventJona ormu ae in the books had suddenlyeen was e away: the problem stood out in sharp relief , c lear, unanswered, and

S e ri ou sn e ss a n d S in c e ri ty II7t. and the methods used [0 analyze it had a surgical sharpness and were"r tlill .j~lPO 'tit fa5bij~atiugassurance and apparently effortless skill. (Berlin 1973, 5)I IV!' .

1I~~tO phi1osophi~e-aJld to do .so'serio,usly an~ sincer~ly-were first of/1 5 speak on one s own ' account, at one sown risk, unaided by a her me-J II t~ G hOrizon: or methodological apparatus of sorts, then Austin's think-jl~Llr[ouldexemplify how one's words bind or unbind in ways that no rea- g W10 or p):inciple could anticipate, Je t alone regulate or control. It is as ifs t l J l 1 ed I." bi " ." h d d i f:x.'s \Vords wereg u ' co tne su Jee r or question at an an In act~ I J C lied the disappearance of "writing" (to cite a topos that recurs and~;~ifJaCeS j,~~este~ th~ug~lt, from Plato's Phaedrus until its deconstruc-, n in Derndas Dzsmmna twn ) ,

a O d li '1 d b B li in thi . A "he- se \ :Ouqua ry l'e are, y er IIIIn IScontext IS ustm s appre-dari J1 of intellectual rigor and fearL!:ssness as it expressed itself not sole1 1 in a theory without CORtexI' (or without reference to other texts) , but) T 1 I .na theory without content (or, at least, without the content of the theory

m a[ [ e r u l f $ as S lLCh) , After a short-lived admiration for Marx and Lenin,j\UStUl'S "favourite examples of intellectual virtue" were, Berlin remem-~~TS,Darwin and Freud:not because he particularly admired their views but because he believed thatoncea man had assured himself that his hypothesis was worth pursuing at all,heshould pursue it to its logical end, whatever the consequences, and not bedeterredby fear of seeming eccentric or fanatical, or by the control of philistinecommonsense, Iflogical consequences were in fact untenable, one would be abletowithdraw or modify them in light ofthe undeniable evidence; but ifone failedto explore a hypothesis to its full logical conclusions, the truth would forever bedefeatedby timid respectability, He said that a fearless thinker, pursuing a cho-senpath unswervingly against mutterings and warnings and criticism, was theproperobject of admiration and emulation; fanaticism was preferable to coward-ice,and imagination to dreary good sense, (Berlin 1973, 6-7)Should we say that sincerity takes the form here of parhes s ia , as Foucaultmight have said? Are there paralle ls between the analysis of sincerity thatwe have followed here and the one Foucault propounds in Fea r le s s S p e e c h(2001) , in an inquiry that dwells even more extensively than Austin's onEuripides' tragedies, the Hippoly tus among them?

Or should sincerity, as Berlin summarizes Austin's view, be taken, ifnot as madness, then rather as a nearly absurd stubbornness? That Austin


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lI8 H en t d e V rieswas willing to go'quite far in hisadmiradon for this Pursuit o f . ,"whatever [he logical consequences" can be gleaned from a ftlnhS;~tl'~i!l'dote Berlin recounts. Probing r h e l im i r s of ordinary language phi,) a.)I~~.io search for nanirainess and normalcy, B e rl in r ec al ls a:sking~ ustosol'hy'lJl:S up po si ng a c hi ld WeJ" ttJ e xp re ss a w is h to m ee t N apo leon as he w as at t~ bof Austltr li t ,I . ; an d 1 said "It canner be done," and -rhe child said


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Notes to Chapters 3-5 287J. On the historical development of the hypocr i t a into a dissembler and actor,

se e Wikander (2002).4. See, for instance, Smit (1956-1962, 205).5. On Luciforas a dramacical Failure, see King (1979). On the fact that heaven

isa state in Lucifim see Osterkamp -(1979).6. On this, secAnkersrnit (1996,21-63) and Hoogers (1999).7. Some commentators see m e playas an allegorical reflection on politicalp ro bl em s . in t he ~ e.t hc rl an ds in t he las~,~alf of the 1640S. Stern (1999) s e e s in Phai-

(O n the over-ambitious sradrholder \X ' f jUJa1l l n .8. Despotism does not represenrthe absolureopposiraof democracy inthis con-

text.Platoaccused democracy ofbeir lg the dspocism ofthe street, which of courseisalso a form of what A n ke rs rn ie ( r9 9Q ) w O l l J d call mimetic representation.9. On checking political responsibility by asking for an acceunt ofwhat rulers

havedone. nor what they plan C o do, see van Cunsreren (1999).10. Foucault (1997). See also Tina Besley; " F ou c au lt , T r u th T e l li n g and Tech-

nologies of the Self in Schools," J ou rn al o f E du ca tio na l E n qu ir y 6, no. 1 (2005):76 -89.

II. On the first performance of the play, see Smit (1956-1962). On itshistoricalimportance a nd . re ce pc ie n.s ee V an d el (1994b) and Porteman (1988).12. See e sp ec ia ll y K o pp en ol ( 19 99 ). All translations from the play are mine.t , . S e e e s pe c ia ll y v a n $ , ci p: r. ia a n ( 1 9 96 ),14. Of ma j o r importance ar e Heidegg~r (2004) and Schmir r (2004). Heideg-ge l 'd i sc u s se d r h e p a s sag e til his ear l y P r e ibu rg lectures of 1926)-1921, an d Schmitt

i01ptrcidy tookissue with t h e se a l re ad y in hi s book PO i i t i S l ' h q Th(!o jogi~OfT922.On c h is , s ee G rc s sh e ut sc h i (J996). O n th e way ill which, Heidegger deals wirhthe notion in his D er N om os d er E rd e im V olk er re ch t d es J us P ub lic um E ur op ae um(1950),seeVersluis (2006).15. On the importance of Badeloch, see Prandoni (2005).16. See Lefort, E s r a is SUr l e p o l i ti que and L 'i n ue n ti o n d e m o c ra t iq u e (1986,1995).17. The process of mediatization took place especially in Napoleonic Ger-

many.See, for example, Velde (2006).CHAPTER 41. For external and internal points of view, see Hart (1994,89-91).2. Explicitly Dworkin (1977), and, less explicitly (among others), MacCor-

mick (1978)and Peczenick (1990).CHAPTER 51. Interestingly, George Pichrer, in his recollections of Austin's seminars at

Harvard, also uses the term "conversion" to evoke the impression and effect made


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2 8 8 Notes to Chapter 5by the "new philosophy." What to think of a philosophy whose mode of r eceptioseems to be-or cannot but be -"conversion"? II

2. The second chaprerof Cavdl'sAPitcb ojPhil ()sophy;mtided "Counter-Phi_losophy and t he P aw n ofVoiceh (1994. 53-r :Q) . appeared in a shorter version in h 't 'h i lo roph ica / Passages ( 199 ,) , 42 -65 ). Th cl a re e r bookalso c on ra l n s th e transcriptio~of a d i seu ss i cn devo ted to th e s:l.ffi'l}them.:e(1995> 66-9,0),

3. Cavell, T he C la im a /R ea so n: W i ttg en ste in , S ke ptic is m, M o ra lity , a nd T ra ge d(Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press , 1979, reprin t 1999), 310, 362, 373, 391. :Y

4. That is to say, both the "illocutionary force" and the "pe rlocutionary eff ect"of its "locution" must have seriousness-and sincerity-a s their e lement or targetfor the utterance to be felicitous in this respect. Does the "so as to be taken seri,ously' imply that seriousness and sincerity are up to me, up to the "I" of the per-formative after all, even where the effect on others-the perlocution-is at iSsue?Is the "effect" not up to the others, to the "you" whose call it is to decide on theeff ect tha t "my" words take? If so, there would be no distinc tion be tween the per-formative and passiona te utter ance, that is to say, between the illocutiona ry forceand pe rlocutionary e ffect, as Cave ll seems to suggest. We will come to that.

5. Here is the dia logue in which the line appears:Hippolyrus. 0 mother earth, 0 open sunlight, what unspeakable words I have hearduttered!

Nurse. Silence, my son, before someone hears you shout!Hippolytus. I haveheard dread things: I cannot now be silent.

Nurse. Mychild, I begyou, do not break your oath!Hippolyrus, Mytongue swore,but mymind isnot on oath.

6. In addition to the types of infelicities Austin has introduced in passing, hementions "certain other kinds of ill which infect al l utterances ." And these " like-wise," he continues, "though again they might be brought into a more generalaccount, we are delibe rately at present excluding. I mean, for example, the follow-ing: a performative utterance will , for example, be in a p ec ulia r w a y hollow or voidif said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy.This applies in a similar manner to any and every utterance-a sea-change is spe-cial circumstances. Language in such circumstances i s in special ways- in telligi-bly-used not seriously, but in ways paras i t i c upon its normal use-ways whichfall under the doctrine of the e t i o la t i ons of language. All this we are exc lud ing fromconsideration. Our performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be under-s tood as issued in ordinary circumstances" (1975, 21-22).

7. Hammer (2002, 161), quoting Cavell (1994, 75).8. Again : "Our performat ive ut terances, fel ic itous or not, are to be understood

as i ssued in ordinary circumstances" (Austin 1975, 22) .9. In response to the questions "To what variety of 'act' does the notion of

Notes to Chapters 5-6i.nfelicity apply?" and "How w i de sp re a d i s i nf el i. ci ty ?" A u s r i n writes C , b , e follo:;>w-iJlg: " 'i n feH c i ty I s an ill t o w hi ch al l ac ts are h eie which h av e t he g e n~ r- al ~ ar ~c re ro f de li .a !O r q ' :r e nt o_u ja l , all. con .v lm#ona l a cts : n or i nd ee d t ha t eve ry rltU:UIS !tabler oeVer: y f o rm of infelicity (bur [hen nor is evcr}" p c rf o n: n a: d vc u n e ra n ce ) " (1$)62,1 8 - '1 9 ) ' Au s t i ru e f e r s to th e domains of law. and eth ics to s u bs ta n ti at e r h is p oi n r,h]. . l .rhe also leaves no d ou bt t ha t. i nf eli ci ti es a pp ly t o a U cel'ell1Qnialacts, no t mere-Jy v e rb a l o .n e s " ('2.5) :. . _ . . .10. Moxes pc ci H cn ll y; wh il e C a ve L l d eem s m e "eompadson" between AllSM' l !Jld F x_ e_ udo n th es e m a ne rs " un co n rrovers ially w e lc om e ," h e c ri ti ci ze s t he ir inter-pre ta tio n in l igh t o~ ,;,hat he cal ls " i ::o~ [ rov:L 's ia! rheOl: jes , o~ reference:" : a : ' : J ] ' s~dlffe[en.tialr ef er en ti al ' w o ul d he a case In pomr, but s o IS En'ute Benvenistes lin-guiscic [ r ej in t er pr e ra r io r r" o f A , u sd r i' s p :e rf orm at iv e ( C ay -e ll 2.003, xv ). .IJ. 'B ur a c ri t ic al aside m ig ht be _in ( ud ei' h ere ': to we l o ne nor be s en ou s a nd

siJ'Lce.l'e;without pr ima fodl'! b ei ng '( a. r h av in g ) a b : o - d y ; s~y,while QIl. I 'b~ phone ,on line, or represented by "wri t ing" (in the m ost general sense Denida .gives torh e r e Jm ) ? A r e ,t c ch )lO l ag i ca l m edia, as M ac k H ensen .sug gests in b is N il:Y Ph i l o s~(fplly f o r N e w . M . _ r :/ id ; ju st tie d [0 difFctell't fo rm s o~ ernbodimenti 0 : - ar e . th in gs( J lor ecomp l ic : : a. r e 'd , mo r . c l io v e l? And a re the se ser ious, no t (0 menuonsutcere,questions?CHAPTER 6I w o u ld like to thank E rns t v an A lph en , M i ck e B a] K iarin a I (o rd ela:., ar id Bhaskar"Satkar for th eir g en ero us, c ritic al, an d altogether invaluable comments on thiscs~ay , us, wel l as M an hew H ad ley fo r h is r es ea rc h a ss is ta nc e. I w ould like r u s e[0 a ek no wl ed ge t il e e bv ie us : Gayntt i Chakravorty S p . i v a k ' s i n fl u en t ia l e : ss ~ )' " C ant he S ub ,u ce rn S pi'l ak ~" iL1.spireq the title of m y O Wl'! essay; Whereas in th e endt he .a ns w er 1 g iv e t o t he 't it ul ar quest ion of my essay is the very same answer-shegives to t he t it ul ar q t1 es ti ol l a fh er e s ' S $ ! y , .1 d o n ot s ha re h er a ss es sm e m so fG il le sDe leu ze , Michel F6ua tuLt ,ano Jacq.oes De:ul,d;a in tb:H:essay. Se e Spivak , ."Can the 'Suba ltern Speaki" in Mal'xbm'and thelnurpre_tJttiorlofCt~lf: li1V:, eds, C . Nelson-andL. Grossberg (Basings toke: Macmi llan , 1988), 271-313.

1. S p , i . l l 0 1 ; : 1 2,000, 150; translation m o difie d ..1,.. T il ls p re fa ce an d i~ ( o J :n l u: la t ion :s r e gs r di ng s i nc e ri ty -

3 . P o i' a relevW1t d is cu ss io n o f Pasolil1j's d oc um e nt ar y a nd o f P ou ca ult 's t e v r e W ' ,see Scherer (2004) 177-185, and, in par ti cu lar, 183-184.

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Intro to Rhetoric of Sincerity Chpt 5