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Interview: Felix GuattariAuthor(s): Mark D. Seem and Felix GuattariSource: Diacritics, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 1974), pp. 38-41Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/465111

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If alienation could be seen as a coin, the negativeside would be fragmentation.This is basically the con-cept of alienation as we see it expressed in Marx. Butthere is anotherside to the process of alienation,Deleuzeand Guattari wager,1and that side is multiplicity itself.The audacity of this statement and this strategicalwageris akin to that of Nietzsche, and their first tome of Cap-italisme et schizophrenie might well be seen as a follow-up "in intensity" to The AntiChrist, where negation isturned against a nihilistic enemy.Their basic tone and style, however, is affirmative,decidedly and willfully anti-dialectic,and intensive. Ne-gation is rarely present in their work, and seen as athing to be "forgotten,"that is to say, erased from ourMemories and our bodies. This affirmative tone comesfrom a position which states that there is no such thingas an "individualenunciation,"since all productions ofenonces are collective: a group phenomenon. This is inkeeping with Michel Foucault's own concept of discourseand "discursivepractice."But many have seen in Guat-tari just a person who helped Deleuze with L'Anti-Oedipe, and did not realize that it is Guattariwho, yearsearlier, developed this group concept of multiplicity,when he wrote of the division between "subject-groups"and "subjugatedgroups."Guattari, at that time a militant very involved inthe aftermath activity surrounding May '68, and a psy-chiatrist practicing at the unorthodox La Borde clinic,2became very interested in the way in which groupsmanifested either subversive "desire," or a more au-thoritariantype of desire. He defined subjugatedgroupsas those which were subjugatedto Power at one level oranother, totalized in nature, and global in ideology.Subject-groups,on the other hand, would be those whichare regional, localized, aimed at generatingother actionsrather than totalizing. The former is "molar,"linked toa dynamics of "molar multiplicity"which always oper-ates on the large scale: group activity and Power. Thelatter is linked to an intense dynamics in "molecularmultiplicity,"situated at the libidinally subversive levelof what Deleuze and Guattari jointly term "desiringproduction": subversive collectivity.Guattari'stherapeutictactic in terms of the above,then, becomes one of affirming "mad" libidinal flows,those which exist in subject-groups,and also setting upanalytic agents within such groups capable of delineatingthe different spaces of desiring production, such thatactions in complicity with Power could be seen as suchand denounced, whereas actions in line with desires tocounter Power would be affirmed.In terms of his own practice at La Borde, it mightbe said that his mode of thought is compromisedby hisown position of Power within an institutional set-up,even though it is progressive. Where Guattari is im-mediately radical, though, is when he talks of semiology,the productive processes of signs, in a materialist fash-ion.3 This will become clear in the following interview,and is intensely contained in one sentence from thatinterview: Signs work as much as matter.

Mark D. Seem: The thing most striking to me aboutyour notion of multiplicity, such as it is developedin Psychanalyse et transversalit--in terms of thedistinction which you make between "subject-groups"and "subjugated groups," as well as in L'Anti-Oedipeand articles by you and Deleuze following this book,is precisely the strategical nature of the notion.Would I be incorrect in seeing within the notion ofmultiplicity, a tactical reformulation of the conceptof alienation as Marx develops it? More specifically,it seems to me, for example, that the concept of"molar multiplicity" takes its point of departure inalienation as Marx describes it, but that the notion,or rather thought of "molecular multiplicity" lib-erates, in a more or less Nietzschean and decidedlyaffirmative style, what would be a negative conceptand praxis: "Man is alienated," "Humanity has beenrejected by Nature," "Man lacks." This seems to beaccomplished by a game, a network, a whole inter-play of affirmation of libidinal forces, intensities orpowers which are produced by, and circulate at thevery margins of the alienated and alienating Powerof Capital. Is your strategy in such a thought ofmultiplicity, as well as the direction of what youterm schizoanalysis, that of seeing within the pro-duction of alienation itself not only a symptom ofCapitalism, but also, more essentially and affirma-tively, potential forces of dissension?Felix Guattari: If you give me the answers at thesame time as asking the questions, things will bemuch easier . . . Yes, in fact . . . you have situatedthe problem very well. What I would be able to addis that, in essence, what is really important is tobreak apart the Marxist pseudo-dialectic which de-pends, in my opinion, constantly on a dualism: adualism between production on the one hand, andrepresentation on the other. The third element withinall that remains an object of an Hegelian nature,such as the State: the State, the problem of a take-over of State power, the party which would be sus-ceptible of assuring this takeover, the party repre-

IG. Deleuze, F. Guattari. Capitalisme et schizophrenie:L'Anti-Oedipe.Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1972; F. Guat-tari. Psychanalyseet transversalit6.Paris:Maspero, 1973.'Founded by Jean Oury, an orthodox Lacanian. Ouryand Guattari are at opposite poles currently;Guattari isconsidereda rebel from the ecole freudienne.'For a discussion of Guattari'swriting-practice, ee De-leuze's preface "Trois problemes de groupe," to Psych-analyse et transversalite.

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sentative of the working class, itself representativeof the popular masses . . . Here, therefore, there isalways a cut separating production-the productionof desire, "desiring production"-from representa-tion, a break between use-values and exchange-value, a binary opposition of classes, cities versusthe country . . . a whole series of dualisms whichare only mediated within the realm of representation.Either the representation of different modes ofknowledge and learning, or the representativity ofthe Party which represents the masses. This of courseis a move from classical thought, but neverthelessthe move was only from a mental representation toa social representativity. I believe that Marxist dia-lectics procedes from a similar Manichean break, asdoes Judeo-Christian thought. The mode of thoughtof multiplicity, then, is something else altogether.Here, we do not oppose the One and the Multiple,nor the representation of the One and the Multipleto the "thing-in-itself." For here, it is maintainedthat in multiplicity there is no break between pro-duction and representation. Within the domain ofmultiplicity, there is not a Subject before an object,there is not a machine of representation or expres-sion opposed to a machine of production. There isa collective arrangement or set-up (agencement), ofsemiotic flows, certainly, but also material and socialflows, flows of all kinds. Signs work as much asmatter. Matter expresses as much as Signs. There istherefore not a cut between subject/object, and rep-resentation/production. It follows immediately, then,that the thought of multiplicity, a collective set-upof enunciation, is a type of thought unattributable toa given individual or cast which must assure therepresentation of the interests of the masses. Thereis therefore not a particular semiotic link, whichwould be the prop for a content. There is no avant-garde, no social assembly, which is the prop for theexpression of the interests of the masses. There areso many (productive) set-ups, arrangements whichthemselves produce their own systems of semiotic orlinguistic reference. It is for that reason that, inL'Anti-Oedipe, we use the image of a chain intowhich signifiers, as well as Daddy's mustache or acamel passing through the desert, as well as all sortsof other things-of different natures-enter intoplay. This image is used to criticize the limiting no-tion of a signifying chain, and to show that signify-ing elements, semiotic elements, only exist along withother, material, elements. There is a collective set-upof a chain, but we can't even say of production orrepresentation, but rather, and this is the term weare trying to develop, a chain of transduction. Therewould no longer be a discursivity of expression, buttranscursion. There is polyvocity of expression. Nolonger production, but transduction: transduction isthe idea that, in essence, something conducts itself,something happens between chains of semiotic ex-pression, and material chains.MDS: It is precisely the implicit combat within sucha thought of multiplicity-a liberation of difference,which seems at several points to join together thetarget to be attacked which Foucault terms the"monarchy of the signifier," which Deleuze calls the"Regime of Signs" in his current courses at Vin-cennes, and which you, in turn, call the "dictator-

ship of the Signifier." What would be the relation-ships between a semiological machine, and thedifferent machines of Power?FG: First of all, I think we have to get out of acatastrophic confusion between the different modesof what I call encodage. I would propose the follow-ing classification. Let's first of all distinguish whatare the a-semiotic encodages . . . these being all the"natural" codings which are not set up according tothe semiotic stratifications as Hjelmslev means it. Togive a better idea of this, take the example of agenetic coding arrangement. There can be equivalentsystems of signs, but we must cease speaking of aor the system of signs! The different systems existand intermingle in a transversal fashion, as differentrelative "totalities," without there ever being oneoriginal, ultimate Totality. Secondly, let's delineatethe semiological encodages, which constitute auton-omous levels of expression and introduce systems oftranslatability. Then, inside the signifying semiol-ogies, I think we could distinguish presignifyingsemiologies, which are those which function at thelevel, for example, of primitive societies, of child-hood, of madness etc., and which put different sub-stances of expression into play which are not cen-tered, some in relation to the others. For example,a substance of (gestual) expression, of verbal ex-pression, of inscriptions on the body, of dance, ofposture systems, etc. Next, within the signifyingsemiologies, there would be the semiology of lan-guage. That is to say, the system which leads to allthe stratas of expression being surcoded by a par-ticular system, which is that of the dominant ecriture(Writing/Scripture) system. This dominant "scrip-tive" system inscribes itself at the level of writtenlanguage too, and in particular, the incidence ofwritten language in economic and legal systems.Take this simple example: in a primitive society, togive your word has meaning; to give your word ina Capitalist society has no meaning, it makes nosense-there what counts, is the legalized signature,the ecriture of the Law. In the latter, one is engagedwhen one has signed, when one has written some-thing. One is not engaged when one has given his orher word. In the same fashion, everything whichenters into the order of Economy and the Law, getsplayed at the level of ecriture. There is a certainusage of writing/scripture-ecriture-which sur-codes all the strata of signifying semiological ex-pression: that, in a sense, is the dictatorship of thesignifier. Next, I would propose distinguishing athird order, what I would call a-signifying semiotics,sign machines which operate independently of anyand all production of meaning. There, a body, acouple signified/signifier might exist, but the sig-nified is not retained as such, nor is the signifier.What counts is the arrangement or set-up of sys-tems of signs which, in a sense, produce anotherorganization of reality. The machines of mathemat-ical signs, musical machines, or revolutionary col-lective set-ups might in appearance have a meaning.But what counts, in the theory of physics for ex-ample, is not the meaning to be found at a givenlink in the chain, but rather the fact that there iswhat Charles Sanders Peirce calls an effect of dia-grammatization. Signs work and produce within

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what is Real, at the same levels as the Real, withthe same justification as the Real. And, for example,in contemporary physics, a-signifying semiotics aresuch that what is the real object cannot be dis-tinguished from what is the machine of signs. In thephysico-theoretical experimental complex, a distinc-tion cannot be drawn between what would be amachine of signs at the heart of a physico-chemicaltheory of a treatment of signs in the computer, atreatment of signs in the experimental complex, andbetween, finally, a reality which would be, or whichwould correspond to the referent of the signs underconsideration. In other words, what is real and whatis sign shortcircuit systems of representation, systemsof mediation, let's call them systems of referentialthought, whether they be called "images," "icons,""signified" or "mental representations," there's littledifference. And finally, I would propose a distinc-tion of mixed semiotics, semiotics which participatein both systems-a-signifying semiotics, and signify-ing semiologies. For example, there are audio-visualsystems, which put into play machines of a-semioticexpression, such as cinema or television, which alsoput all sorts of materials of expression into play,independently of a production of meaning. For ex-ample, there is an overlapping of the semiotic of theimage, a semiology of speech, a semiology of sounds,of noises, semiotics of corporal expression and then,on another side, these mixed semiotics are also sig-nifying semiologies. That is to say that Power, themany different power systems, pull all these towardsthe side of a semiology of the dominant values,whereas they tend to function, from the point ofview of their own constitution, as semiotics of de-sire. Which all shows that these machines which Iterm mixed are much more important for Authoritythan the machine of ecriture, since writing boresstudents, it appears as an obvious sort of despoticimposition in school, whereas machines of mixedsemiotics, such as television, cinema etc., capture thedesires of the masses and put these to the uses ofthe signifying machines of Authority. Therefore,with these categories, we see that the operation ofstructuralism, which has a tendency of mixing upall these modes of encodage, is an operation of mys-tification! In the case of mixed semiotics, Authorityutilizes signifying semiologies in order to capturethe desires of the masses. For desire, it is clear, islinked to a mechanism of a-signifying semiotics, aswell as to chains of "figures," and chains of all thatwhich organizes the world within directions of de-sire and desiring production, independently of thedominant semantic redundancies. But if Power usessignifying semiologies for the masses, it utilizes, it-self, a-signifying semiotics in order to function. Itmakes use of the semiotics such as science, monetaryeconomy, audio-visual systems . . . precisely becausethese are the only ones which are effective. Thesealone are capable of putting to the use of the systemof Power, the metabolism of signs, within the econ-omy of material flows. Therefore, on one handPower has a public image for its expression, foralienation, which is an image of a signifying econ-omy; but from the viewpoint of its real productiveforces, it works in terms of a-signifying semiotics.Here, the distinctions would need to be made to

show the relationship which exists between a-semi-otic encodages and what I term post-signifying semi-otics, or a-signifying semiotics. For it can be seen,in effect, that there is a certain relationship, thatmachines of a-signifying semiotics, in which semioticand material flows intermingle, play on, interveneinto, and transform the a-semiotic encodages of the"natural" order. There, then, the break betweenNature and semiotics is totally relative. I introduceit nevertheless, so that we don't mix up the differentplanes, or introduce under the illusion of a universalcategory, something which would be the Signifier,and which would impregnate, in fact penetrate, intoNature, into all social set-ups, into meaning and itsproduction, into Mass Media, etc. For in that case,we would be in the process of contaminating all thedifferent registers-nature, production, machinism-with meaning. And what Meaning at that, precisely,if not the dominant meanings, the meanings whichorganize redundancy, Habit and the repetitions ofRepresentation of the dominant "reality"?MDS: Underneath all my questions, this one wascentral, and specifically strategical in nature. If thereare indeed, as you show, libidinal, desiring, intensiveproductions capable of breaking through the wall ofSigns, of Subjects, and of subjugated bodies, in orderto liberate bodies, groups, theoretical as well as prac-tical activity etc., there must also be real risks in-volved in such a struggle of liberation, or opening-up. These would seem to me to be the risks of anyexperience of escape, of limits, of Becoming orChange-becoming Wolf, becoming inhuman as De-leuze says: the risks of all experiences of BecomingMarginal. The two extreme cases, as you point out,would be the schizophrenic and inactivity on the onehand, and the militant and the intensity of action onthe other. What, basically, would be the relation-ships between "mad" productions, and those of amilitant nature? Is there a form of madness at workin dissension, as well as a force of contestation inthe production of madness? Lastly, for you, whatwould be the strategy, the essential plan for that per-son which I will term the politicized intellectual forwant of a better term, for an activity directed againstall forms of Power ... a struggle which would gainstrength from "mad" flows of desire, at the sametime as never falling, once and for all, into autismand inactivity? How do we turn passivity into action?FG: My first comment would be that we must not,in my view, oppose on the one hand the paranoiaceconomy of the libido, to the schizo-revolutionaryeconomy of the libido on the other hand. At anyand every level, on the large or the small scales, arevolutionary micro-politics of the libido might exist,a type of system of escape or evasion which placesdifferent orders in connection, as well as differentsemiotics: but there can also always be a recovery,a totalitarian politics of the libido which can, bas-ically, characterize the paranoiac economy, itselfpart of a molar organization. In other words thestruggle, as we have never stopped saying, is notsituated in a privileged way at one particular level.The revolutionary struggle exists both on a largescale, as well as on the level of what goes on con-stantly in school, in prisons, in psychiatric hospitalsor even at the level of the family, the Ego .. what,

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in fact, is the Freudian Superego, if not, after all,this eventuality of a fascist politics within the in-dividual libidinal economy? Once that is clarified, itfollows naturally that there is no way we can makea cut between a space which would be the madnessof the "individual," and then political activity in thelargest social groupings, whether in communes orpolitical actions on a large scale. To the extent thatthere is treatment of madness, it is starting fromdesire at the level of molecular units that we mightbe in a position to analyze the politics of desire inlarge scale organizations.MDS: Are you implying that there is one type of"libidinal" analysis, which exists before and outsideof the events, and the advent of "desiring pro-duction"?FG: Not at all. . . . What I mean is that molecularanalysis, the analysis of the smallest elements whichexist as subversive potential, is itself implied by allmilitant struggles on a large scale. What seems tome most important is that we can no longer say:here is where you should be, this is the right move-ment, the correct Party! We were often told, afterthe publication of the first tome of Capitalisme etschizophrenie . . . well then, what do you propose,what must be done, where must we situate ourselves,how must we act? As for myself, now I would an-swer: be where you want to be! In a Hippie Com-mune, in the Ligue communiste, with the Maoists,in a given undertaking. For in any of these instances,the two politics are both possible, even in the Com-munist Party. Both are possible: a politics of libera-tion of revolutionary flows which are going to changethese large scale organizations, making them enterinto connections, redoing them, revolutionizing them;or a politics which, even in the "best" revolutionarymovements, would lead to a sort of disgusting con-formism, even if well intentioned. I am thinking, forexample, of the attempts to form a People's Dailythat the Liberation newspaper people are doing,where there is a very sad conformism, despite theefforts that are put into it, to place themselves withinrange of a whole series of levels of the Young seek-ing to change themselves. But we can feel that theyare trying to place themselves within range of thatstruggle, which means that in terms of their own

enterprise, they are not doing this revolutionary jobof liberation of desire-of what we term collectiveset-ups (agencements collectifs) of analysis or ofenunciation relative to desire and its production.Therefore, no break between madness and revolu-tionary action . . . Madness is all sorts of things. Ifit is a question of asylums, psychiatric hospitals,. . . then let's speak of this, let's analyze that insti-tution of Power which divides people into madmen,nurses, doctors, etc. But if the madness we are re-ferring to is "mad desire," the very flows of desiringproduction, in that case madness is everywhere, andshould be put everywhere. Madness and rationalitymust not be opposed either. The rationality of Au-thority, the power of the technocrat, or of bureau-cratic organizers, is a type of delirium, and morbid atthat! Whereas the madness of desire, and the flows ofdesire, are the most rational order of the revolution.Therefore, we can't oppose "madness," "confusion,""disorganization," "anarchy," etc., to "organization"and Order. We must instead realize that what is themost "profitable" in terms of struggle, is precisely toliberate the mad flows of desire, the desires of themasses, and that that is what is the most rationalright now! What is totally irrational, is to want toconserve models of morbid rationalism which mas-sacre the desire of the masses, thereby putting a haltto any possible struggle. I therefore refuse, abso-lutely, and strongly object to the opposition whichconsists in keeping "madness" for the weekend, forthe right days, for the days of festivity as it is oftentermed-the "revolutionary festival"-and then tobehave, the rest of the time, as a bureaucrat. Desireconcerns any sequence, any and all links in a revolu-tionary action at whatever level. At the level of anational mot d'ordre, at the level of the behavior ofa bureaucrat, with his allies, with militants, withhimself . . . the fact of forcing oneself to do some-thing, of failing to recognize the fear one mighthave, faced by the cops, or even a more simple fear,the fear of simply speaking in front of a group ofpeople . . . this type of thing is too often neglected.All of these powerful signs which massacre desire. . . well that, precisely, would be the place for arevolutionary politics of desire on a small, but essen-tial, scale.

dicritics/Fal 1974