Interpreting Mullā Ṣadrā on Man and the Origin of Thinking

OriginalpaperUDC1(045)Ṣadral-DĪnShīrāzī,MuḥammadibnIbrāhīmdoi:10.21464/sp35212

Received:23March2020

Anthony F. [email protected]

InterpretingMullāṢadrāonMan and the Origin of Thinking

AbstractThis paper explores key aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā’s understanding of man’s being in the world, where the embryo of perception and thinking is said to emerge under the unique conditions of man as the articulate social being. The same being who can speak also speaks to himself and about himself. But since man’s “true reality” finds its root in the divine knowing and being in a twofold existentiation, at the heart of his being in the world lies intellect by which he “returns” from materiality to his origin in the divine, where all knowing and being begin and end. The problem of knowing and being – also expressible in terms of the one and the many – dates back to the Presocratics. To situate Ṣadrā’s understanding of it, other philoso-phers are discussed, including Kant, the rationale of whose arguments surrounding the “I” were noted in Heidegger’s critique. This is not primarily an epistemological problem for Islamicate philosophy or bereft of wider interest in the social animal called “man” (insān).

KeywordsMullā Ṣadrā, Martin Heidegger, Immanuel Kant, Qūnawī, Abū Naṣr al Fārābī, HadiSabzavari,IbnʿArabi,Shahābad-Dīn”Suhrawardī,metaphysics,philosophyoflanguage

Introduction

Maniscentraltothephilosophyofbeing,whichṢadrā1 expounded with great originality but also in keeping with the larger tradition. This paper explores theideaofman’sbeingintheworldaccordingtowhichṢadrāseestheem-bryoofthinking–distinctfrom“activeintellect”–emergingundertheuniqueconditionofmanasthearticulate social beingand,byextension,thebuilderofcivilisation.2

1 Muḥammadb.IbrāhīmṢadral-Dīnal-Shīrāzī(d.1635/6)–henceforthṢadrā.

2 AnumberofstudiesonṢadrāinEnglishandFrenchbearonoursubject,mostnotablyHen-ryCorbin’sseminalessay,“Introduction”,in:Le livre des pénétrations métaphysiques,Ver-dier,Paris1988,whichcontainsvaluablelexi-calinsightsintotheunfoldingofknowingandbeing; Fazlur Rahman’s now classicalwork,The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra,SUNYPress,Albany 1975; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “MullaSadraandtheDoctrineoftheUnityofBeing”,Philosophical Forum4 (1972),pp.153–161;Henry Corbin, En Islam Iranian, four vol-umes,Gallimard,Paris1972,ageneralwork;

andmore recently, but rather incompetently,Ibrahim Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mulla Sadra on Existence, Intel-lect, and Intuition, Oxford University Press,NewYork 2010,which anyway ismuch toointerpretative.Arelativelymorefocusedanal-ysis is presented by Maria Massi Dakake,“Hierarchies of Knowing in Mullā Ṣadrā’sCommentary on the Uṣūl al-kāfī”,Journal of Islamic Philosophy 6 (2010), pp. 5–44, doi:https://doi.org/10.5840/islamicphil201062. Therearesignsofseriousmisconstructionin:HosseinSheykhRezaee,MohammadMansurHashemi, “Knowledge as aMode of Being:Mulla Sadra’s Theory of Knowledge”, So-phia Perennis 4 (Autumn 2009), pp. 19–42;

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35212

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https://doi.org/10.5840/islamicphil201062

486SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA70(2/2020)p.p.(485–505)

A.F.Shaker,InterpretingMullāṢadrāonManandtheOriginofThinking

Inasense, then,thesamebeingwhocanspeakalsospeakstohimselfandabouthimself.3Unlikeasoliloquyorclosedsolipsism,thishumantraitdrewphilosopherstotheunfoldingexterior(ẓāhir)andinterior(bāṭin)ofknowing,whichunfoldingtheylikenedtobranchingfromaroot.Thetypeofrelational-ity they had in mind was thought to permeate speech (supersensible meaning conveyedthroughperceptiblewords),theself’snoeticfaculties(intellectandtheexternalandinternalsenses)andGod’sself-manifestation(existentiationofeverythingfromabsolutehiddennessasdivinespeech).Ḥaqīqat al-insān (the reality of man)–likeallotherrealities–finds itsrootinteriorlyintheknowledgeofGod,notinthe“worldoftheflesh”.ṢadrādescribesGod,whoalonearticulatesknowingandbeinginasingleexistentiation,asal-Fāʿil al-ḥaqīqī (real cause)of theemergenceofallcreatedbeings,first originatingtheir“beginnings”andthenmakingtheirgoalthereturntoHimbywayofintellect,soul,natureandmatter.4

He means this return in the philosophic sense that existence begins and ends withintellect,betweenwhichliemanylevelsandwaystations,5 without this havingtoimplythatintellectisidenticalwithGod,whoisaboveeverything.AtthecentreofHiscreationstandsthearchetypalMan(al-insān al-kāmil,lit.the Perfect Man).The preoccupation with knowing and being traces back to at least the Preso-cratics,butthedebateabouthowthehumanknowerfaresintheirunfoldingcametoaheadintheḤikma6tradition,beginninginearnestintheninthcen-tury. Since antiquity, the problemhas been considered amenable to analy-sisintoonenessandmanifoldness,aconflictofopposites(muqābala means opposition, not contradiction) thatḤikma began to apply to every joiningtogether (jamʿ)–includingthatofthecommunity(ijtimāʿ)ofbeings,mean-ingfulutterance,everyperceptionthroughthefacultiesofthenafs (self,soul),andthedivineself-manifestationthatjoinseverything.Thinking (fikr)figures in this schemeof thingsasaquwwa rūḥāniyya (lit. spirital7 faculty),asṢadrāandQūnawīagree IbnSīnā (Avicenna,d.1037)originally described it.8 It is the fourteenth of thirty terms associatedwithknowledge thatṢadrā listsbeginningwithperception.9Hedefines itas theself’smovement by judgment and conceptualisation toward apprehensionsbased on what apprehensions are already given about a thing.10 This is stand-ardforthethinkingnormallyassumedbyalearnedpersontoproceedfromtheknown(premises)totheunknown(themiddletermonwhichaconclusionisdrawn)bywayofsyllogism.Ṣadrāmeanthisdefinition toencompassthethinkingofwhichallhumanbeingsarecapabletovaryingdegrees,however,anditisonthisbasisthathediscussedfactorsinternalandexternaltotheselfthat contribute to actualisation at a higher plane than the material potentiality ofthehumanintellectatbirth.Thoughtsarethemodalitythatpreparesthesoul (kayfiyya nafsāniyya)forintellectivebeholding(li-mushāhada ʿaqliyya)and the telling (ḥikāya)ofthething’suniversalreality(i.e.,whichuniversalityentersintothementalgraspofthings).11 Intellectual actualisation embarked thehumanbeinguponthepathofreturn to his or her beginning in the divine throughstagesofknowingandbeing,sothereismuchmoretoallthisthanjustcogitation.Inhislist,Ṣadrāidentifiessixmeaningsofintellect.Themostbasicissaidofsomeone ʿāqil (reasonable)andabletograsptheusefulnessandharmfulnessofactionsandworldly things.12 Another is that which he says the philoso-phersunderstandfromtheBook of Demonstration,whereIbnSīnādividesthe



knowledge acquired through thought (al-fikra),inthemannerofṢadrā’sdefi-nitionabove:judging(throughreasoning,fikrī)andconceptualising(withoutreasoning).13Thisisfollowed–amongothers–bytheethicist’spracticalin-tellectandtheintellectfamiliarinthe“scienceofthesoul”.Inthatlast,intel-lecthasfouraspects:potentiality(materialintellect),preparation(intellectby

andSajjadRizvi’searlierattempttopinpointconceptual equivalences between Ṣadrā’sand “Western” philosophies (Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics: The Modulation of Being,Routledge, London 2009). Also, ChristianJambet’s otherwise nuanced, influential andintellectually engaging L’acte d’être,Fayard,Paris2002,itshouldbenoted,remainsahigh-ly interpretive work. Cécile Bonmariage, Le Réel et les réalités: Mollâ Sadrâ Shîrâzî et la structure de la réalité,Vrin,Paris2008,offersa necessary corrective, perhaps, especiallyto the epistemological bias running through manycontemporarystudies.InFarsi,Sadra’sontologyanditsSufielementsaremasterfullyexplained in Jalal-al-DinAshtiyani,Hastī az nazar-i falsafa va ʿirfān,Intishārāt-iNahzat-iZanan,Tehran1980;Maʿād-i jismānī: Sharḥ-i Zād al-musāfir-i Mullā Ṣadrā, Intishārāt-iAmīrKabīr,Tehran1981,whichdealsspecif-icallywiththeAfterlife,acentraltheme.ThelateDr.MahdiHaʾiriYazdi,aḥawza seminar-ian who was also trained in Analytic Philoso-phy,wroteḤarām-i hastī,InstituteofCulturalStudies andResearch,Tehran 1981.ReadersofFarsimaywanttoconsultHasanzadaAm-uli, Al-Nūr al-mutajallī fī’l-zuhūr al-zillī,Maktabatal-Iʿlāmal-Islāmī,Tehran1995,onthe question of mental existence; Muham-mad FanaʾiAshkivari,Maʿqūl thānī: Taḥlīlī az anvāʿ-i mafāhim-i kullī dar falsafa-yi is-lāmī va gharbī, Imam Khomeini Institute,Qum2008,acomparisonofsecond-intentionconcepts like “universal” across traditions;and H. Hamid, “Para-yi ʿanāṣir-i Anaksi-mandres [Anaximander] dar nazariyya-yi vujūd-i Mullā Ṣadrā”, Iranshenasi 6 (1995),pp. 817–832, focused on certain Presocraticelements in Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Among theArabicsources,see:ʿAbdal-MajīdRiḍā,Ḥi-wār al-falāsifa: Aṣālat al-wujūd wa’l-māhiya bayna Mullā Ṣadrā wa’l-falsafa al-ishrāqiyya,Al-Dāral-Islāmiyya,Beirut2003,onṢadrā’s crowningthesis,the“primacyofexistence”.

3 This is suggested by the widely quoted max-im attributed to Protagoras of Abdera (ca.490–420BCE) thatwasfirst popularisedbythe Falāsifa, who passed it down as: “Manmeasures every thing and is themeasure ofeverything.”

4 Mullā Sadrā, Al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya,Būstān-eKitābQum,Qum2003or2004,p.276.

5 Ibid.,p.277.

6 Insteadof“Islamicphilosophy”,weshalluseḥikma,whichmeans bothwisdomandwhatweshallrefertohereasthesystematicquestfor wisdom, as the term philo-sophia con-notes. The Ḥukamāʾ (philosophers) had nopressingneedforan“Islamic”labelateveryturninanextendedperiodofhistorybasicallydefinedbyIslamicatecivilisation.Theiropenphilosophical inquiry, consequently, cannotsimply be relegated, as it generally is in aEurocentricworldview, to thestatusof localtraditionor“religiousapologetics”.Asatra-dition,Ḥikma includes ʿIlm al-ḥikma,Ḥikma ilāhiyya,Ilāhiyyāt,Falsafa,al-Falsafa al-ūlā,ʿIrfān,Taṣawwuf,etc.Cf.AnthonyF.Shaker,Modernity, Civilization and the Return to His-tory,VernonPress,Wilmington2017, pp.10–15,224.Eachhasitsown,iflooselydefined,scope and aims. However, modern scholarsoften feel obliged to make perfunctory ref-erences to the more elementary division be-tweentheexperientialmysticismdefendedbyS.H.Nasr,HenryCorbin,andJamesW.Mor-ris, among others, and the purely discursivephilosophy emphasised by Fazlur Rahman,Hossein Ziai, John Wallbridge, etc. Whilerightly discarding anachronistic neologisms like“theosophy”,thelatterapproachtakesthetechnical jargonofPeripateticphilosophyasits principal yardstick. This division has led to sharp disagreements about how the very pur-poseofphilosophisinguptoṢadrā’stimewasunderstood (cf. Carl W. Ernst’s interestingreflections, “SufismandPhilosophyinMullaSadra”,paperpresentedatWorldCongressonthePhilosophyofMullāSadrā,Tehran,Iran,23–27May1999).Fewifanycontemporarywritershavereflectedontheissuespresentedin this paper in the light of the broader tra-ditionorthethreadsofthinkingthatenabledhim to produce a full-fledged philosophy ofbeing. The technical language he assimilated frompredecessorshadreached,atleastbythetime of Qūnawī (student and son-in-law ofIbnʿArabī),aplateauofsophisticationonthemore fundamental question of the unfoldingofknowingandbeing.Weforgetthatcentraltothisunfoldingisman.

7 “Spirital”issomewhatarchaic,butIuseittoavoid“spiritual”,whichhasaccumulatedtoo



habitus),perfection(intellectin actu)andwhatis“aboveperfection”(active intellect,al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl).14Everythingbeyondperfectioncomesunderthedivine science (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī)andmeta-physics (lit.“whatliesbeyondna-ture”,mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa),whereintellectisasubstanceseparatefrombodiesandstatesbyessence,attributesandactions.15

Ṣadrāanalysedtheseissuesinminutedetailthroughouthiswritings.Whenfacedwiththis thicketofarguments, thehistorianofphilosophycaneasilylose sightof their purpose and larger significance. So, insteadofplungingheadlongintothemechanicsofhisproofs,weshallpresentthegeneralcon-toursofideasandbroadenourdiscussiontootherfiguresfromḤikma,togeth-erwithafewmeasuredcomparisonswithKantandHeidegger.Ḥikmafacedformidablechallengestryingtoclarifythemodalitiesofknowingtherealities of things (ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ),acommonexpressionthatquicklyacquiredatechnicalconnotationinphilosophy.TheeffortdrewinaspectsofexistencewhichearnedṢadrā’sconstantreminderthattheoryalonefailedtosecureaplenaryknowledgeoftheserealities.Farfromjustanotherdiscipline,philo-sophywas treasuredas thinkingopen tobeing inall itsdimensions, ratherthan viewed exclusively through the prismofmental analysis or honed toquestionsconnectedempiricallytothemanifoldofbeing’sappearances.OnehastokeepinmindthatḤikmaisthetraditionthat,fromtheveryoutset,consciouslybroughtintoitsfoldman’ssocialandcivilisedexistence(ʿum-rān,madaniyya).Itisstillpopularlysupposed,becauseHumanismenabledwesternEuropeanintellectualsfromtheearlymodernperiodleadinguptotheFrenchEnlightenmenttorecastman’splaceintheuniverse,thatnooneelse–exceptperhapstheancientGreeks,owingtothetwentieth-centuryclassi-cists’viewofthem–hadgivenseriousthoughttotheLeitmotifof“man”.Notonlyisthisnottrue,butWesternhistoriansthemselveswereattheforefrontincrowningIbnKhaldūn(d.1406)thefatherofthestudyofcivilisationandsocialscience,thatmost“modern”ofthehumanities.Itsohappensthatthe“special science” he established for that purpose figured among themajorbranchesofknowledgewenowtakeforgrantedbutthefoundationsofwhichwere laid largely in Islamicate civilisation down to algorithmic reasoning,which proved indispensable then and which we need to run our precious com-puters.Thephilosophicalinnovationsthatbeganinearnestwithal-Fārābī(d.951)andIbnSīnāhelpedcreatetheontologicalspacefortherapidprolifer-ationoflearningandscientificexploration,whichwereunparalleledinscaleand driven by extensive institutional networks over the centuries. They help explaintheaffinitiesofIbnKhaldūn’spurposewiththeprevailingparadigm(unmūzaj)thatṢadrālaterelucidated.16 Central to philosophy was the quest forwisdom(ḥikma)where thewherewithalof technicalsciencehad toad-vancethewell-beingofhumanbeingsinthisworldinexpectationofthenext.We shall not concern ourselves with where exactly the philosophy thatgrounded the positive sciences placed them within this civilising enterprise. ThepointisthatifḤikmadidnotapproachmaninthesamewayasmodernphilosophersorwiththenarrowrangeofsocialscience,thiscouldnotimplymarginalinterest.For,standingontheshouldersofmanygenerations,Ṣadrādrewattentionspecificallytoaparadigmforman“onearth”.17There,percep-tionwouldbeofidleuse(muʿaṭṭalan),hewrote,hadGodplacedinmanthehighest intellectualattainmentsandperceptions,bywhichheperceivedthethingsthatconductedtohisperfection,withoutalsocreatingthenaturalpre-



dispositionandthedesireforitthatimpelhimtomovement.18 The question is wherethinkingfiguresinthismovementandtowhatend?

The Emergence of Thought

ṢadrādeclaresthatGod’sgreatestwisdomwiththecreationofmanistohaveplacedinhimtheelementsforlinguisticexpression.19Manspeaksoutofanaturalurgeforcooperationintheconductofhisaffairs,whichrequiresthepower toconvey thingsoutof theoutersenses’ reach.Asingle individual,totallyisolatedfromotherindividualsofhisspeciesandkindwouldquicklyperish or his livelihood deteriorate.20Hislivelihoodderivesfrommorethanwhatnatureprovides,sincehehastopreparefoodandmanufactureclothes.However,noonealonecanproduceeverythingnecessaryforsustaininghu-manlife.Therefore,heneedsafacultytocommunicatetoapartnerinatrans-actionwhatis“insidehim”throughanoutwardsignandlearnacraft.These are the immediate reasonswhy the faculty of intellect dominates aparadigmregardedbyṢadrāasthemostfitting formanintheworldofper-ceptionandarguesforbasedonthesenseorgans’utilities.21Bythisparadigm,

manymodernconnotations tobeusefulasatechnical term.

8 As stated in Al-Shawāhid, p. 299, and Ṣadral-DīnQūnawī, Iʿjāz al-bayān fī tafsīr Umm al-Kitāb, Muʾassasseh-ye Bustān-e Kitāb-eQom,Qom1423AH,p.30.

9 Mullā Ṣadrā,Mafātīḥ al-ghayb,The IslamicIranianAcademyofPhilosophy,Tehran1984,pp.131ff.

10 Ibid.,p.138.

11 M.Ṣadrā,Al-Shawāhid,p.271.

12 M.Ṣadrā,Mafātīḥ,p.135.

13 IbnSīnā,“Al-Burhān”,in:Al-Shifāʾ,al-Idāraal-ʿĀmma li’l-Thaqāfa, Cairo 1956, v. 9, p.51.

14 M.Ṣadrā,Mafātīḥ,pp.135–136.

15 Ibid.,p.137.

16 IbnKhaldūnsetoutsystematicallytoexplainthe rise and fall of societies – after carefulstudyofphilosophy–forthesakeofposterity,inhiswords.Therangeofmeaningsandusesassociated with unmūzaj, originally a Farsiword, closely resembles that of παραδειγμα(grammatically,model or likeness of an ex-

isting thing). Plato’sparadeigma referred totheMaker’spatterningoftheworldaccordingtowhat is unchangeable, roughly the “com-ing-to-be”relativeto“being”(Timaeus,28c);Aristotlefurthermeantanargumentorprooffrom example (Prior Analytics, 2.24). Ṣadrāhas both these meanings in mind when dis-cussing theparadigmforman’sbeing in theworld,thoughnotuniformlysoineverycon-text. However, all differ radically from theepistemological and social scientific senseThomas Kuhn and his critics attached to the theory of the historical development of sci-ence,basedonacyclicorspiralphasemodel.

17 Afterdiscussingthedivineequalisationintheearth’screationobservable“outsidethebodyand the soul”, hewrites: “Having learned aparadigm [unmūzaj]of thebenefits onearth,now raise your head to the heaven and see and ponderthemodalityoftheheavens’creation(…).”–MullāṢadrā, Al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāli-ya fī’l-asfār al-arbaʿa, Dār al-Maḥajja al-Bayḍāʾ,Beirut2011,v.3,p.99.

18 Mullā Ṣadrā,Al-Mabdaʾ wa’l-maʿād, Impe-rial IranianAcademy of Philosophy, Tehran1976,p.213.

19 M.Ṣadrā,Al-Ḥikma,v.3,p.535.

20 Ibid.,v.3,p.535.

21 M.Ṣadrā,Al-Mabdaʾ,pp.204–214;Mafātīḥ,pp.504–520;Al-Ḥikma,v.3,pp.86–99,319–337;Al-Shawāhid,pp.285–99.



heintendsthatwhich“makesplaintheranking[tartīb]ofeverythingtodowiththeperceptionthatGodputinmanwithrespecttothefacultiesofsense,imaginationandintellect”,whichfacultiesconstituteonetypeofangels(inal-ternativereligiousparlance)“madesubservient”totheproperorganisationofhisaffairscommensuratelywithperception.22Hepointsout,forinstance,thatmanreliesonhearingtoperceivespeech;indeed,hisdependenceonhearingisallthegreaterforit.Becausesoundisfacilitatedbyhisneedtobreathe,its“shapes”occurwithouthimbeingoverlyawareofthem.Theinchoatewhole-nessofthesoundemittedfromthemouthmultipliesintoletterseffortlesslyput together in myriad combinations to complete what the person intends to communicate.23Forthisreason,humansoundsareextremelydetailedintheirsignifications,givingusanalmostlimitlesscapacityforexpression.Ourabil-itytoseeallowsusinadditiontouselettersandsymbols,thoughtheutilityofsightaloneismerelytomakevisiblewhatisimmediatelypresentbeforeour eyes.24And,despiteourcapacitytounderstandspeechandtoknowwhatlieshiddenfromthesenses,wereitnotalsoforthesenseoftaste,wewouldscarcelybeableto“perceive”thatsomethingingestedmaybeharmful.Thisaccountofutilitiespermitshimtodrivehomethepointthatthesenseorgansaresointerlinkedthroughtheintellectastoaccountforman’sunique-ness. It is not the common sense (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak),thefacultythatas-semblessensationsintotheirfirstunity,thatproperlydistinguishesmanfromotheranimals.Peoplecanbuildhouseslikenobirdcanitsnestorbeeitshive;theyperceive the“subtlestof things”andhave thepeculiarityof taking tolaughter.25Theverycooperationthatenablesthemtoperformthesefeatsis,further,conditionalupontheinterdictionofcertainactsandtheenjoiningofothersbyforceofaninspiration(ilhām)propertotheirspecies.Inhisview,suchinspirationisthehumanequivalenttowhatbeckstheflightwithwhichother animals respond to danger.26Thus,peoplefearcertainthingsandhopeforothers,inthefuture,becauseofauniquepowertorecollectthingsbeyondtherangeoftheirminds’immediateperception.Ṣadrāadducesthisevidencetoshowuptheirabilitytoconceivegeneralmeaningsseparatelyfrommatterand thus to know things.Whileinternaltotheperson,thinkinghenceopensupvistasofcooperativeac-tivitywithoutwhichnoonecouldfulfilhisdestinythroughtheworldwithoutsuccumbing to that world. But rarer than all those abilities taken together is the coincidence with the divine world (al-ʿālam al-ilāhiyya).Thehumansoulinsuchastateisnolongerpresenttoitself(i.e.,totheothernessofitsself);yetitsurvives.Atthishighestofstations,whichṢadrādescribesastakhalluq (moulding)inGod’smanner,Godbecomestheperson’shearing,sight,handandfoot.27Itisessentiallywhatdivineself-manifestationmeansfortheper-son,andwithouttheperson,theconceptsofhumanityandsocietywouldbevacuous.Thereisnoneedtoinferfromthecreationofmanasa“singleself”,astheQurʾāninpartdescribeshim,thatthecommunityofpersonsisitselfasubstanceoraliveinthemannerofaperson.28 Language is how man becomes human in actuality because it gains him access to his causal source in a higher world he knows intelligibly.InhisphilosophicalcommentaryontheQurʾān,ṢadrāobservesthatGodde-scribesHimselfastheexteriorandtheinterior,butalsoasthespeaker(mu-takallim) even though in theword “Him-self”, the “self”which is said tospeakisunlikethatofanycreatedbeing.29ThewordsofGodare,onthecon-trary,theexistentsthatemanatefromHisessencethroughHisessencewith-



outtheintermediaryofmatter,placeorpredisposition.Yet,theyresemblethelettersandwordscreatedbymanandintowhich“theairfromhisinteriorisshaped”.Speechflowsaccordingtoexteriorityandinteriority,andthisisthepatternofman’sbeinginaworldwhere“man”isconsequentlyunderstoodtoconsistofoneandmany,universalandparticular,activeandpotential,etc.30 Allthesame,soulandbodyoccurastwoexistentswithinasingleexistence,as if they were (kaʾannahumā)asinglethingwithtwoextremities.31

BythisṢadrāmeansthatwhereastheexteriorbodyischanging,ephemeralandfunctionsasthebranch,theinteriorsoulenduresliketheroot.So,whentheselfisperfectedwithinthesingularityofitsexistence,thebodybecomespurerandsubtler,itsconjunctionwiththesoulstronger,therebymakingtheunity between them stronger.32Furthermore, it is intellectiveexistence thatrenderstheselftheonethingchangedbynothing.Here,the“suprasensibleworld”indicatedbythetermmaʿnawī(derivedfrommaʿnā,meaning)istheclosest linguistic analogy to the “intelligibleworld”.Meaning is conveyedthrough material syntax according to their respective interiority and exteriori-ty,justasthe“worlds”–intelligibleandsensory–aretwoemergencesinthesingleexistentiationsignaledbyGod’scommand,Kun (Be!).33

Humancivilisation–basically,man’smodeofbeingintheworld–blossoms,then,thanksbothtoman’scapacitytoarticulatehisthoughtsandtothearticu-lationofallbeingaccordingtotwoemergencesinasingleessentialexistence.TheconnectionbetweenthesetwoarticulationsissorudimentarythatṢadrā’smajorworksoftenbeginbylayingdownitsprinciples.Whateverisarticulat-edclearlyexhibitsonenessandmultiplicity, though theabstractoppositionofoneandmanyisonlyonewaytostatethematter.TheimportantthingtoṢadrāisthatsingularbeingsdifferfromeachotherandthemselvesessentiallybythedegreeofexistence.Aformalaccountingbasedontheattributes,prop-erties,quantities,etc.,ofsomethingwouldserveanotheranalyticalobjectivealtogether. Modulated being (tashkīk) ishowhesees theselfcome into itsownbecause–notinspite–ofamovementhedescribesasperfection-by-sub-stance (ḥaraka fī’l-istikmāl al-jawharī),basedonhisfamoustheoryofmo-

22 M.Ṣadrā,Al-Mabdaʾ,p.213.Hedistinguish-es this type from the “faculties formoving”andman’sdesireforthatwhichheisnaturallypredisposed, mentioned above, for withoutthese the deeper apprehensions every per-ceptionrelatingtohisperfectionwouldbeinvain.


24 M. Ṣadrā,Al-Mabdaʾ, p. 212;Mullā Ṣadrā,Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-karīm,Dāral-Taʿārufli’l-Maṭbūʿāt,Beirut1998,v.2,p.17.


26 Ibid.,v.3,p.538.

27 Ibid.

28 The Qurʾān affirms the singleness of man’sselfout of which God created him as a pair andamultitude(Q.4.1,7.189).

29 This is because God knows Himself as Heis in Himself, while beings come to lightthrough this knowledge (Tafsīr,v.2,p.17).


31 Ibid.,v.3,p.549.

32 Ibid.,v.3,p.550.

33 Inter alia,ibid.,v.1,p.32;M.Ṣadrā,Tafsīr,v.2,pp.153–154.



tion-in-substance (al-ḥaraka al-jawhariyya).34With that theory, which weshallnotdiscusshere,heleavesbehindPeripatetics’simmovablesubstance.35

Exteriority as Otherness

Whenmarking a point about quiddity’s relation to existence, Ṣadrā oftenspeaksof theworld “outside” themindwhere things exist in their naturalconcretenessratherthanasmentalimages,quiddities(māhiyyāt),orforthatmatterinthedivinefullnessoftheirintelligible realities(nottobeconfusedwithobjectsofsense).There,theyaresubjecttojudgmentsastotheirtime,place,mode,etc.36

This “outside”happens tobe theworld towhich themodern agehas alsoconsigned social relations. Although Hikma did not regard relation as real (ḥaqīqī), and as externalonly asdeterminedby the essence,Ṣadrāhadnoreasontoquibblewiththeideaofapersonatonceexistingasanindividualinhis own right and unable to survive in totalisolationfromothersofthesamespecies.Thus,socialrelationsmayevincesomethingirreducibletoanyobjectperceivable by the sensory organs without these relations having themselves tobe“real”inthesamesense.Weordinarilyassumethatthesocialother–relativetoself–standsforsomeoneorsomethingoutsideourperson.Howev-er,anyonewhocanthinkwillperceivehimself,also,asanother.Inthisform,hemaybeasdistantorestrangedfromhisessenceashewouldfromthatofafellowhumanbeing.Dependingonitsdistance,othernesscanrelativisethetruthconcerningthatsingle essence to the point of rupture,where no coincidencewith the ob-ject possessing this essence can be expected. Sabzavārī (d. 1878 or 1881)quotesal-Fārābītotheeffectthattruthmayrefertothreethings:thestatementcorrespondingtowhatitinformsaboutwheneveritcorrespondstoit,totheexistent that occurs in actu (al-ḥāṣil bi’l-fiʿl),andtotheexistentwhichcannotbefalsified.37TheseholdsimultaneouslyonlyinthecaseofGod,whoissaidto be the truth (ḥaqq)inrespectofthatwhichisinformedaboutHimandinrespectofexistence,such that there isnomeans tofalsifyHim.38Whereasnootherbeingcanpossiblymeetalltheseconditions,GodspokenofhereisstillOther,thenegationofwhichisthoughttoberequisiteforanyoneeventhinking aboutGod,muchlessclaimingtoknow Him. The other qua object mayrefertoeverythingfromhumanperceptionofitsItothatofacompletelydifferentperson.Thisrangegavewideberthtothephilosophicaldiscussionaboutmanintheworld,especiallywherecause-and-effectreferred–nottoarelationbetweensocialeventsorbasedonatheoryoftruthcorrespondencebut–totherelationalityoftherealitiesofthings.Manwassaidheretobeperfectedbywhatistruestandmostinteriortohim,hisessentialcause.Ṣadrāusesthissenseofcausalitytoclarifyhowtheselfpersiststhroughitsstagesofbodilygrowth,interactionswiththeworldandinternaltransforma-tionsastheselfsamepersonbodyandsoul.Theperfectional“return”tocausalorigingatherseverythingattributedtotheindividualand,presumably,beginstheverymomentheorsheisborn.Heconfesses,though,thatthecustomaryargumentsforpersistence(baqā,orsurvival)donotsatisfactorilyestablishthenatureoflifeintheHereafteranditsconnectiontolifeinthisworld.HisfirstconcernisthustorefuteargumentsthateitherdenythebodyitsplaceinthislifewiththefreeingofoneselffromthemanaclesofmatterorclaimthatitwillbeleftbehindontheDayofReckoning,whichmainstreamreligious



traditioninterpretsas the“return”toGodinbodyandsoul.Herejects, forinstance,thenotionthatwhenitsworldlyexistenceistransformedonthewaytoitsexistenceintheHereafter,thesoulhastocastoffitsbodylikeclothes.39 Suchanotionmerely likens thesoul to thebody,he insists, rendering it a“deadcarcass”orthehairandfurthatfalloffnaturally.Thereal(intelligible)bodyremainsthelightthatpermeatesthebodyofsenseby essence,notbyaccident.Itsrelationtothesoulisthatofradiance(al-ḍūʾ)tothesun.While the single substance of soul and body differs from one “world” toanother,all their“existences”belongto thesameperson.Whenthepersonmovesfromtheexistenceenclosedbytheself(al-wujūd al-nafsānī)tointel-lective existence (al-wujūd al-ʿaqlī)andbecomesintellectin actu,hepersiststhrough this higher existence as an intellective human being endowed with thelimbsoftheintellect.40Thecaveatisthatthisstationderivesfromwhator-ganisedorderthepersonunderstandsabouttheworldinabidtofreehimself(negation)fromthetaintofmatter.Hehastodrawhis“order”insteaddirectlyfromtheworldofintellect.Here,Ṣadrācitestheauthoroftheso-calledpseu-do-Theologia of Aristotle (al-Uthūlūjiyya) to theeffect that the IntellectiveMancastshislightuponaSecondManintheworldbelongingtothesoul,while the Second Man radiates his light upon the Third Man in the lower cor-poreal world.41Divestinghimselfofmatterandmovingfromhis terrestrialabodetothenextworld,mansubstituteshisfirstgenesis–i.e.,asabeinginthefleshandin potentia–withanothergenesis.Whenthesoulperfectsitselfand becomes intellect in actu,itdoessonotbecauseoneofitspowers(suchassenseperception)iswrestedawayandanotherliketheintellectisspared,butbecause its essencerises,therebyraisingtherestofthepowers.42 This quintessentially iswhat themodulation of being purports to show inorder todispel any fragmentationof the self resulting from itsmovement.Theself,notsomethingelseorapartof it, remainsitssolesourceofwill,Ṣadrāsays.Withthe“raising”ofitsexistence,onenessandunificationgaininstrengthandpower.Theeyesofthehigherhumanbeingdifferfromthoseofthelowerbecauseheseesthingsaccordingtoasuperiorandfiner species.43 Hiseyesightisstrongerandgreaterbecauseitdescriestheuniversals–tech-nicallyspeaking–whereasthelowerviewstheparticulars,incapableofany-thingfiner.Withneweyes,thepersonfallsuponnoblerthings,moreevidentand clearer than the body.Thesoulandbodyareonesortcorrelativeinphilosophy;anotheristheoryandpractice.Granted,philosophywasnotmeanttoteachhowtomanufacture


35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.,v.3,p.547.

37 HādīSabzavārī,Sharḥ al-Manẓūma fī’l-man-tiq wa’l-ḥikma,MuḥsinBaydārfar(ed.),Man-shūrātBaydār,Iran,Qom1428AH,1387AS,v.1,p.200.

38 Ibid.,v.1,pp.200–201.


40 Ibid.,v.3,p.549.

41 Ibid.,v.3,p.550.

42 Ibid.,v.3,p.551.

43 Ibid.,v.3,p.549.



practical tools or to build houses. The inquiry into beingness or being-as-such (al-mawjūdiyya, τί τὸ ὄνᾖ ὄν), the subject-matter of theFirst Philosophy,demanded no particular practical outcome at all.44Still,inhiscommentaryonIbnSīnā’sal-Ilāhiyyāt,Ṣadrārecognisesthatthetheoreticalwisdomhecallsaperfectionofthemindis“completed”bypracticalwisdom.45 This recog-nitionispart-and-parcelofhisparadigmforman,bodyandsoul,wheretheactualisationoftruthisconnectedwiththerealitiesofthingsthatmanseekstoattaininmorethanjusttheirabstractions.IbnSīnāheldthatthepracticalsciencesaimatperfectingthetheoreticalfacultyforaconceptualandassent-ingknowledgeofpracticalthings.46ThisstanceinvitedṢadrā’sastutedenialthere was any inconsistency in saying that theoretical knowledge could be attached to the modalityofaction(kayfiyyat al-ʿamal),sincesuchattachmentdid not imply an attachment to any particular action.47Instead,heseesinthemodalityofactionacompensatingfactorforthelimitationsofmortalman,whosemindaffordshimnocompleteviewof–inṢadrā’swords–thefullconsequencesofhisownchoices.Beforethemodernerareplacedallsuchnuanceswithmaterialistconceptsof“actuality”,sensationstoowereviewedasthedisparateactualisationsoftheintellectfirstsynthesisedbythecommonsense,asṢadrāheld.48 The material multiplicityof the sensoryorgans– their respectiveutilities aside–wasafunctionof theirdistancefromtheunitary intellect.Nevertheless,onemayfurtherarguethat,giventhiscentralityofintellecttobeing,thewholesubjectofperceptionhadtohaveservedasaprolegomenontoweightierissues.Thatthe I“persisted”inallitsperceptionsastheself-sameperceiverpresentedagreaterproblemthanthemereactofperceiving,butphilosopherscouldnotsolveitwithoutabettermodelforreasoningthanthatofferedbytheabstrac-tion (tajarrud)oftheuniversalfrommatter.Abstractionasthesheddingofmatterindicatedanegativeoutcome,notsomethingcoterminouswiththeend.Theinstantiationsofauniversalconceptlike“humanity”occurataremovefrom theessencewhile remaining“human”.But if the inductiveenumera-tionof all its instantiations cannot establish the essenceof humanity, thenwhatotherformofreasoningbettermeetstheobjectivesofphilosophy?Asanillustrativedevice,theuniversalnevertranslatedthe“distance”ofitsin-stantiationsintoafull-blownsocial thesis like,say, theoneMarxarguedà l’hégélienneaccordingtowhichthereifiedproductoflabourrepresentedthehuman self-alienation epitomised by the factoryworker’s peculiar relationto themeans of production. Even then, something deeper seemed at play,becausephilosophicallyspeakingthemanifoldnessofreifiedhumanself-ex-pressions(tools,factoryproducts,skills,habits,norms,artworks,andthegen-eralculture)hadsomehowtobereconciledwithanessential,originalunity–asHegelsoughttodoonthecanvasofmetahistoryfortheGeist. Reducing mantohismanifoldnessisunusualintheannalsofhistoryexceptinaveryspecial,minutelydefinedsense,asweshallsee.Ḥikmaconceivedtheunitybetweenknowerandknown,perceiverandper-ceivedastherootcauseofeverythinguniversalandparticular,notsomethingincarnated in man as such.49Any“reconciliation”(i.e.,munāsaba,consonant relation) between the two elements of this unity found its origin inGod’sknowledge ofHimself asHe is inHimself.While no one is privy to thishiddenknowledge,ultimatelynothingcaneitherexistinitsindividualityorbe knownwithout it.Accordingly, Ṣadrā is as keen as his predecessors todemonstrate how every being exists both for itself and for another:unitedat



therootinGod’sknowledgeand–byvirtueofGodquapureexistence,theOneBeingthatisthesourceofallbeing–existingasasingleselfthroughthe two emergences on which its intelligible and earthly worlds are patterned.Thisisnotaneasytrainofthoughttofollow,tobesure,butitshouldbecomeclearerinthecourseofthispaper.Afterall,someofitsimplicationsforman’sbeingintheworld,andthereforetohumanthoughtandcivilisation,cametotheforeanewwiththeearlymodernphilosophers’attempttoworkthereturnoftheselfsameintotheirsystems–thisisespeciallyevidentinKant,HegelandNietzsche.Manexistsandthinksintheworldyetisnotentirelyofthisworld.We shall considerwhatḤikmamadeof this apparentparadoxwithregard to thinkingasweuncovermoreaspectsofselfhoodandbringKantbrieflyintothediscussion.

Man as the Speaking Rational Animal

Thestandarddefinitionofmanwas al-ḥayawān al-nāṭiq (articulate, rational animal),afterthePeripatetics.ThereisbutoneArabicwordfor“rational”and“capableofspeech”–nāṭiq(theλόγονintheGreekexpressionζῷονλόγονἕχονforrationalanimal).Manisnāṭiq because his articulateness is insepara-blefromhisintellect(ʿaql)quareason,theGreekequivalentofwhich,λόγος,alsodenotedspeech,sentence,proposition.AlltheseconsiderationscoalesceintheideaembracedinḤikmaconcerningtheconsonanceofspeechandin-tellectwiththestructureofbeing,inwhichmanparticipates.Neversatisfactory,thedefinitionofmanastherationalanimalneverthelesscameunderclosescrutiny,especiallybySuhravardī (d.1191)andonward.The nafs nāṭiqa (articulate,rational self)transcendedits“parts”inawaythatseemedtobetantalisinglyparalleledbythemodelofdefinition,whichanswe-red the quiddative question (Whatisit?)butwasitselfcomposedofpartsjustastheanimalwascomposedoffaculties,organsandlimbs.The“what”isthatonethingthequiddityconceptuallyfixes inplace.Thetroublewasthatnafs (self,soul)couldnotbetakenonlyasanobjectifiedsubject,likeitwouldbe–asHeideggerarguedhashappenedsinceDescartes–iftherational animal was turned into the rational animal.50

Besides,nafscarriesmorethanonemeaning.Ithastorefertothelifeforcebehindindividuality,notjusttheperceptualfaculties,anditissaidtohavethe“luminosity”ofspirit.Themanystationsandlevelsascribabletoitculminatein the sanctified prophetic self or soul (al-nafs al-qudsiyya al-nabawiyya),thedistinctivemarkofwhichishavingnoneedtolearnfromanotherbeing

44 Aristotle specifies that actions (πράξεις) andproductions (γενέσεις) are concerned withthe individual (Metaphysics, 981a17), notthe universal, through which the particularscannotbedetermined.Forexample,thephy-sician seeks to cureCallias orSocrates, andman only incidentally.

45 M.Ṣadrā,Sharḥ,pp.10–11.

46 IbnSīnā,“Al-Ilāhiyyāt”,inAl-Shifāʾ,v.1,p.4.

47 Mullā Ṣadrā, Sharḥ va taʿlīqāt-e Ilāhiyyāt-e Shifāʾ,Al-KamelVerlag,Freiburg2011,p.18.


49 ThissumsupṢadrā’spositionandthebroaderbackgroundtotheideaoftheintellect’sunifi-cation with what is intellected.

50 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Klett-Cotta,Stuttgart2008,v.2,pp.124–125.



becauseitisitselftheunmediatedsource.51So,evenitsstations,levelsandfacultiesmustnotbethoughtofmerelyaspartsofacompositewhole;Ṣadrāargues indefatigably that thesingleperson insoulandbody isabove themall.52 Nor can the soul thanks to which one is able to act as an individual be apart, unlikewhat IbnSīnāheld– at leastṢadrā’s construalofhim– forthiswouldmakeitoneofitsownfaculties.Onthecontrary,hecharges,IbnSīnā’sownargumentcanonlyimplythatthesoulisthecompletion(tamām)ofall the faculties,whichremainmultipleonly in theworldofseparation,concomitanceanddivision–preciselythetermsunderwhichoperatesana-lyticalthinking–butareconjoinedintheselfundertheepithetofoneness (mujtamiʿa fī dhāt al-nafs alā naʿt al-waḥda).53

Howthesameselfofthehumanbeingsurviveseverymomentofitsshifting(tabaddul dhātihi)andtransformationassociatedwithnaturallife,includinggrowth and ageing,54 rests with its essential oneness. Its potential intellect alonecannotsafeguardthisoneness.Infact,heattributesIbnSīnā’sinabili-tytosolvetheproblemoftheself’ssurvivaltohistheoreticalapproach,onwhich he argues IbnSīnā relied for a representation of the self concoctedbyhisownselfusingsensory,imaginative,estimativeandtheoretical“arbi-ters”.55This,hesays,forcedhimtocarryonasiftheselfendowedwiththesefaculties somehowcounted among them.Man embodies the very thinkingthataphilosopherlikeIbnSīnāhadthentodeployself-reflectivelyandsys-tematicallytountanglethecomplexitiesofknowingandbeing.Ascorrectinhisinstinctmayhavebeen,IbnSīnā’soverrelianceonthetheoreticalmethodismisplaced,asfarasṢadrāisconcerned.Hefoundhiskeyintheideathattheselfmovesby substancefromonemodeto another, which he based, once again, on his theory of motion-in-sub-stance.56Itaccordsperceptionaparadigmaticrolewhich,itshouldbenoted,noepistemology(inmodernparlance)canfully investigate,anymorethancananethicist,forwhomresponsibilityhastobestillassignedtoonepersonnot toaggregateparts.Central toṢadrā’scritiqueof IbnSīnā,which takescognisanceoftherelationofthinkingtobeing,istheparadoxofallthinking:inordertobeproperlyreconciledwiththeminutiaeofitsobjectification(theattributes,properties,etc.,gatheredintheotherofthethinkingself),think-ingwouldhavetotranscenditsrigidlogicandfindself-identityatahigher,existentiallevelofperfection.Giventheunfeasibilityoffacultativelyprede-terminingthiswiththeoreticalprecisionbeforeanactualexistence,heinsiststhat theproblemleastsolubleby thismeans– thesurvivalof theselfsameselfthroughitsphasesandmodes–demands“disciplineandeffort”withaview to obtaining interior unveiling (mukāshafāt bāṭina), secret beholding(mushāhadāt sirriyya)andexistentialinspection(muʿāyanāt wujūdiyya),thistimenot just incontradistinctionwiththinkingbut,awayfromtheworldlygoals and the vain desires on which such goals are based.57 Thesheddingofwordlinessindicatestheentirenegativepaththatleadstoamodeofbeing,notonlytheabstractionfrommatterortheepistemiccorre-spondenceclinchedbetweenperceptionanditsobject.Itwouldhavebeenin-consequentialifṢadrāhadmanspeakingmerelytohimselfortoaninterloc-utor without some higher existentiating amr (command or factor),whichhasseveral important implications. He contends that this amrimplies,attheveryleast,thatthepersonhasfirstbeencreatedandequippedwithwhatpregiven thingsGodplacesinhimbeforehecouldrisetotheworldofintelligibility,theultimatesourceofwhichisthedivinecommand(Be!),theexistentiating



Wordthatcontainseverything.Butsincetheselfexistsbothintheintelligibleanditsearthlyabodesasasinglebeing,theperfectverifierpossessesthelocusofthe“trueeye”thatjoins“thetwolights”representedbytheseworldsand,from there, perceives the two emergences (nashʾatayn) – the first and lastlives–accordingtowhichGodoriginatedHiscreationandwhichpervadeevery created thing.58

Beingsareconceivablethroughtherelationalityofcreation’stwofoldemer-gencefromtheessentialonenessoftheself-knowledgeofGod,whoalonehasno associate (lā sharīk lahu)andisaboveallrelationalityinHisutterhidden-nessandsingularity.HeisproperlytheFirst“beyondperfection”,undergoingno change and receiving neither affection nor intellecting fromanother.59 Sincerelationalityisamentalcategory,notexistential,Ṣadrāreferstothefor-malpreceptthatmustthengovernthementaldistinctionsofallemergencesin a single quiddity60–i.e.,conceivedapartfromanyexistentialconsideration–downtotherational,speakingsoul,which,whileintellectivebyvirtueofahigher(intelligible)worldandearthlyinitsrelationtothebody,hastoremainequallyoneinitsfaculties.61Ofspecialinteresttohiminthisotherwiseneg-ativepathofthinking is that saying the soul has corporeal attachments should notcontraveneits“sanctification”fromthelowermattersthroughtheuniver-sal and to the measureofitsownseparateexistence,whichhecallsthehid-dennessofthesoul’shiddennesses.62This,afterall,istheseparateexistencethatmakesforitsindividuality,thankstowhichthesoul,inturn,cannotforgoitsascentinthepathofperfectioninthefacultativemanneritwascreated.Fromthisperspective,philosophycannotobviatethequestionoftheknowingselfpreciselybecausetheselfis,insomeoverarchingsense,the“measure”.Thismeasuredoesnotconsistofthemattersofitsexistence,asinmodernHumanism,butofthesoulorselfinitsexistenceinahigherintelligibleordercausallyconnectedwiththeorderoftheworld’screationandwithoutwhichthesoulcouldnotevenmoveintheflesh.Insum,therefore,theselffindsitstrueexistencein theintelligibleworld,one,bywayofman’snatureas thespeaking/perceivingsubject;andtwo,duetothepreceptbywhichitpreparesthatthinkingwhichformallyjudgesthatallbeingsemergefromasinglecom-mand,eachdistinctfromtheother.Placingmanattheheartoftheproblemofknowingandbeingbasedonthematerialityofhisfaculties,includingthink-ing,preventsthisthinkingfromclosingthecircleofexistentialself-identityon its own at any level.


52 Ibid.,v.3,p.539.

53 Ibid.,v.3,p.540.

54 Ibid.,v.3,p.556.

55 Ibid.,v.3,pp.539–540.

56 Ibid.,v.3,p.557.

57 Ibid.

58 M.Ṣadrā,Al-Shawāhid,p.289.

59 Ibid.,p.243.

60 Ibid.,p.398.

61 Ibid.,p.289.

62 Ibid.



The Structural Manifestation of Intellect

Nowonderthehumancapacitytoknowtherealitiesofthingsbecameaboneof contention.The thirteenth-century correspondence between Ṣadr al-DīnQūnawīandNaṣīral-DīnṬūsī(bothdiedin1274)focusesonpassagesinAl-Taʿlīqāt,IbnSīnā’svaluablenotebook,totheeffectthatmancannotcognisetherealitiesofthings,eitherdeductivelyorinductively,solelybydintofhisthinkingfacultyundertheaegisofthetencategoriesofthought(substance,quality,quantity,relation,etc.).63 UsingtermscommontoIbnSīnā,IbnQūnawīandIbnʿ Arabī(d.1240),Ṣadrātakesituponhimselftoshowinwhatsensetherealitiesofthingsareknownandtowhatends.Consciouslyornot,hekeepslargelytoacausalframingoftheconceptofcommunitythatQūnawīfamiliarised.Qūnawīspokeofthe“ends”realisedineveryperfectionaccordingtooneness-es thatare interlacedwithmanifoldness inamanner typicalofconstructionforms.64Simplerthanthesyntaxofasentence,forexample,theline-formationofpersons standingnext toeachotherhas thepreceptofa single formge-nerically known as an ijtimāʿ (assembly,group,society,conjunction).Fromthisrudimentaryform,heexplainsthe“transformation”thatconductstoev-er-higherstructuralrelationsamongthemembersofawhole(jumla,alsosen-tence) and according to their active-passivemovements toward perfection.Sincenoparticularendcanstandforthehighestperfectionofthewhole,thesemovementsexhibitmorethanoneformofperfection.Technically,thepreceptofthesecretofdivineequalisation(taswiyya ilāhiyya)hastopermeateeveryform–thestable,activeelementthatformsmatter–andeverythingconnectedwithform.Intheend,itisthisdivineequalisationthatconsolidatesthegroup consequentuponthemovementsofperfectionofeachinrelationtotheother.65

Al-FārābīwasfirstinḤikma–andarguablyinhistory–tocentresomesuchinterpersonal causality on the Active Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl), thoughhederivedmanyelementsdirectlyfromPlatoandNeoplatonism.Hesawitinhumannaturetostrivefortherealisationofthehighestlevelsofperfectionandfelicitythroughthecooperation(bi’l-ijtimāʿ)madepossibleinman’scol-lectiveexistence,oral-madaniyya.66

ThisisthenexuswearesearchingforinṢadrā’sparadigmofthinkingman.Thephilosophicsignificanceofman’snaturalabilitytospeak67 is that it points totheintelligibleworldastheprimarycausalrootforboththeindividualandthe community (ijtimāʿ).ButitistheActiveIntellect,whichal-Fārābīsaysistomanasthesunistosight,thatguidesandoverseestheactualisationofman’sintellectfromitspotentialstate.68BytakingtheCityofVirtue(al-madī-na al-fāḍila)astheembodimentoftheActiveIntellect,al-Fārābībringsthesocial and political animal (al-ḥayawān al-insī wa’l-ḥayawān al-madanī)totheforeinphilosophy,thoughwithoutmakingphilosophyitsproperhome.69 Thispolisisintelligible–notamodernutopiaorareificationofsocietyinthehandsofascientifictheory–asQūnawīequallymakesexplicitwithrespectto ijtimāʿ.Foral-Fārābī,theintellectextendslikethearticulationofthewholebodyanditsparts–asṢadrāalsoputit–thatconstitutetheloci,notthetrueorigin,oftheirownfunctions.IbnʿArabīaddsthatintellectisnotonlyintrinsictowhathecallsman’s“cityofhisbody”,butalsogivenoriginally as a whole rather than as a multiplic-ityof senses.70Beforeanyattribution (multiplication),wholenessnormallyservestostabiliseperceptionsaboutanobjectintoasingleentityakintothe



body,butitistheintellectthatregulateseverythingwithinitateverhigherplanes of self-identity.Clearly, the passive reception of information repre-sentsonlyoneconsiderationofthepotentialintellect’sactualisationinman.Inordertogatherthefacultiestogetherinthefirstunityofcommonsense,asindicatedwithrespecttothesheddingofmatter,thesoulhasfirst tobeone,incorporealandnot itself thebody itoverseesas its instrument.71And justas the perceiver is one as a single knowing but manyintheselfasacombi-nationoffaculties,bodilyparts,etc.,sotheobjectofperceptionisonethingyet many in attributes and properties. All these structural relations have to be resolved from the root according to the singularunityofperceiver andperceived.Although“man”maybesaidtobethemanythingsthatexhibithismultiplicity,wherematter is receptive tochangeand thereforequantifiablysmallerorbigger,movingorstationary,72 intellect raises him above his own composition.

The Primordial Singularity of the Self

Let us now retrace our steps by drawing in some more sources concerning self and IinordertocontextualiseṢadrā’sviewofthinking.Suhravardī,whofigureslargeinṢadrā’swritings,contendedeveryhumanbeingknowshehasaself(dhāt,essence)thatknowsitselfandwhosestates–beinginternaltoit–remain hidden to others.73 This awareness does not dissolve a person’s unique selfintoitsownfaculties,instrumentsandeffects,becausetheirmultiplicityisincommensurate–aswesaw–withahigherfactor(amr)thatmakesforhisselfanddistinguisheshimfromotherpersons.Hemaybeasubstancewithextensionasitsproperty(likeanyotherobject),asoulwithawill,andstill,noact(technically,“effect”)attributedtohiminthisworldcanfullyestablishwhatheorsheis.Yet,despitethisshortfall,hegraspsintelligiblethingsandlearns and teaches as a single soul. Man is a single essence in relation to the totalityofalltheaspectsbelongingtohishaecceity(anniyya,thatness,orex-

63 IbnSīnā,Al-Taʿlīqāt,IranianInstituteofPhi-losophy,Tehran2013,pp.71ff,especiallypp.62,71.Ṣadrāquotesapassagefromit(Al-Ḥik-ma,v.1,p.269).Cf.Qūnawī,“Al-Mufṣiḥa”,in: Gudrun Schubert (ed.), Annäherungen: der mystisch-philosophische Briefwechsel zwischen Sadr ud-Dīn-i Qōnawī und Nasīr ud-Dīn-i Tūsī,FranzSteinerVerlag,Beirut–Stuttgart1995,pp.51–53.TosomeIbnSīnā’sdenial seemed inconsistent with what he statesin“Al-Manṭiq”inAl-Shifāʾ,v.4,p.12.

64 Qūnawī, Iʿjāz,p.75.

65 Ibid.,pp.74–75.

66 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-siyāsa al-madaniyya al-mulaqqab bi-mabādiʾ al-mawjūdāt, Al-Maktabaal-Zahrā,n.p.1990,p.69.

67 Ibid.,p.70.

68 Ibid.,pp.32,35.

69 Al-Fārābī,Kitāb taḥṣīl al-saʿāda,Dāral-An-dalus,Beirut1983,p.62.

70 Ibn ʿArabī,Al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya, Dār al-Fikr,Cairo1911,v.1,p.159.


72 Ibid.,v.1,p.33.

73 YaḥyāSuhravardī,Kitāb ḥikmat al-ishrāq,in:Majmūʿeh-ye muṣannafāt,AcadémieImpéri-aleIraniennedePhilosophie,Tehran1977, v. 2,p.111.



istentiality),sincetheynomorethanservetopointtotheessenceofhumanity.Onceagain,theyaresimplyaspectsthatdistinguishthispersonfromanotheraccordingtoheight,colour,etc.,noneofwhichcanchangetheessence.If this is so, Suhravardī rhetorically asks, how then could someone referself-awarenessback tohimself solelyby intellecting thewhole through itsparts.74 Self-awareness (shuʿūruhu bi-dhātihi) persists separately from anyawarenessofthebodilyparts,anditcannotbeobtainedthroughanimageofoneselfposingasI-ness(anāʾiyya).75 It belongs to the entire person that no partialimagecouldfullyrepresent.ThoughanimageoftheI is distinguish-ablefromtheacting,self-awareI–nolessthanfromtheessenceofanyhe (whethertheobjectifiedheofanotherpersonortheI as the other)–itstillbelongs to one’s ownI-ness,notsomeoneelse’s,evenasahe-representation.Thisisastandardargumentthatotherslikeal-Jīlīproffered,aswell.Thepointisthatwhileaparticularself-perceptioncannotbehigherthantheperceiver’sself, it remainsamanifestationof this self,not thatofanentityabstractedfrommatter external to the self, as Suhravardī understood thePeripateticsto be trying to say.76Thisisbecausethingnesscannotsimplybesuperadded,hesays,leastofalltotheoneaware(shāʿir)ofhisselfthroughhimself.Theperson stays the selfsamepersonmanifested invariousways tohimself, alightuntohimselfandthusalso“apurelight”.77Perceivingtheothernessofathing,whateverthatthingis,maybeposteriortohisself,butbyassuminghimself tobe“anexistenceperceivingitsself”he is liablefurther to infer,falsely,thattheself–beingpriortotheperception–mustthenbeunknown.78 Suhravardīobjectsthatthesentientpersonisthelightthatappearsaccordingtoitsownreality,butwhatmakesmanifestitsotherthroughitselfasthatveryselfdependsonahigher,preponderantfactor(murajjiḥ)foritsexistence:thebeginningofallexistencesisaliving,existingGiverofperception(anniyya ḥayya darrāka),themostperfectofexistentsand“secondtonone”.79

Someoftheparadoxesimpliedhereshouldbefamiliartothestudentsofothertraditions.TheywereofconsiderableinteresttoHegelandKantbeforetheepistemologicalandpsychologicalfocioftheirsuccessorsbegantosubmergetheparadigmaticthrustofthedebateonperception.Kantwrites,“I think must be capable of accompanying allmy representations; otherwise, somethingwouldberepresentedinmewhichcouldhardlybethought”.80Inotherwords,the I is the I think which is thought with it in every thought as the condition-inggroundoftheunifyingIconjoined–als der bedingende Grund des eini-genden Ich-verbinde mitgedacht wird.81Atthesametime,experiencecannotestablish the I, if theI isbydefinitionwhatisnotmanifoldassuch(etwas schlechthin Unmannigfaltiges)but,onthecontrary,theverybasisofexperi-ence.Technically,itisthecategoriesthataregroundedintheI and its unity as thepossibleformsofcombinationforthinking,nottheotherwayaround.Hedesignedhisdoctrineofpurereasonaccordinglytoestablishthepossibilityofexperience.Hispositionisthatwhateverisrepresentedastheabsolutesubjectofjudgment–thejudgingsubject,whocannotbedeterminedbyanotherthing–hastobesubstance.I,athinkingessence,amtheabsolutesubjectofallmypossiblejudgments.82Hence,thisrepresentationisapredicatepropertomeand what makes the thinking essence called the soul a substance.ButheconfessesthattherealreasonhecallsitasubstanceisthatonecannotdeducefromtheIthe“Iamathinkingessencepersistingformyself”,neitheroriginating nor perishing by natural means.83Heideggernotedhisjudicious,ifincomplete,efforttocircumventthelogicalconundruminvolved:thatwhich



conditions as such (das schlechthin Bedingende),namely,theI as the original syntheticunityofapperception,cannotbedeterminedwiththehelpofwhatit conditions in thefirst place.84Heoffereda tellingquotationwhereKantexplainsthat“[t]he‘Ithink’expressestheactofdeterminingmyDasein(i.e.,mybeinganexistent)”,whereby“theDasein isthenalreadygiven”butnotthemanner inwhich“Ishouldposit inmethatmanifoldwhichbelongs toit”.85Tothismannerofpositing(thegivingitself)“belongsaself-intuition,atthegroundofwhichliesagivena prioriform–time–whichissensibleandbelongstothereceptivityofthedeterminable”.86 The problem is that without anotherself-intuitionthat“giveswhat determinesinmebeforetheactofde-terminingIrepresenttomyselfonlythespontaneityofmythinking–ofthedetermining–andmyexistence staysdeterminableonly sensoriallyas theDaseinofanappearance”.Kantsoughttocapturewhatunderliesepistemicperceptiontoshowthat“allintuition,allimmediategivingofsomethingmovesintheformsofspaceandtime”.87Thisnarrowingoftheproblemhardlyavoidsepistemologyinfavourofanontology,asHeideggerbelievesKantintendedbutdidnotcompletelysucceedinrealising.Still,failuretoexplainisnoargumentagainstthepossi-bilityofthematterinquestion.ButbeyondwhattheIisnot,Kant’sargumenthasonlymodicumexplanation tooffer.Heideggeravers thatwhilehewas“completelyright”indeclaringthecategories–thegroundconceptsofnatureemployed by the thinking I–inappropriatefordeterminingtheI,giventhatthe I subsumes them, “the impossibilityof anontological interpretationofthe Iingeneraldoesnotfollowfromthisunsuitability.ItfollowsonlyontheassumptionthatthesolepossiblebasisforknowledgeoftheI is the same kind of knowledge that holds for nature”.88 Kant’s solution appeared restrictive toHeideggerpreciselybecausetheprerogativesofascienceofnaturewereneverfaroff.Asthepresentpaperseekstoshow,ontheotherhand,thephilosophicalprob-lemsunderdiscussionhavenotonlytodowithquestionsofscientificknowl-

74 Yaḥyā Suhravardī, Kitāb al-mashāʿir wa’l-muṭāraḥāt, in: Majmūʿeh-ye muṣannafāt, v.1,p.403.

75 Ibid., I.404, and hisKitāb ḥikmat al-ishrāq,v.2,p.111.

76 Y.Suhravardī, Kitāb ḥikmat al-ishrāq,v.2,p.114.

77 Ibid.,v.2,pp.112–113.

78 Ibid.,v.2,p.114.

79 Y. Suhravardī, Kitāb al-mashāʿir, v. 1, pp.403–404.

80 Immanuel Kant,Kritik der reinen Vernunft,Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig 1922, p.178.

81 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Klostermann Seminar,FrankfurtamMain2005,p.204.

82 I.Kant,Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,p.469.

83 Ibid.,p.470.

84 Heidegger,Die Grundprobleme der Phänom-enologie,p.204.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.,p.205.

87 Ibid.,p.206.

88 Ibid.



edge.Inessence,Kanttriedtoreconcileeverythingtowhatpurereasoncon-templates as the other.Tobesure,other–nottheunityoftheintellectwiththeintellectedobject–istheonlymodeofbeingintermsofwhichscienceisqualified toinvestigateitsobjects,andphysicswascertainlyin thebackofKant’smind.The“distance”ofothernessisexactlywhatphilosophersbytraditionconsciouslysoughttoovercome,atleasttheoretically,evenasother-ness is intrinsic to the very thinking they employed. Thinking-about is always object-relatedevenintheabsenceofanobject.ButḤikmaemphasisesthattheselfremainsitsownI through every order in which it subsists and with everyobjectitthinks;andthatonlybelowthisinitsself-awareness,solongas the Iisitsownobjectofthought,itisanother–nevercompletelyidenticalto the essenceofthereal I.Itshouldbeobviousbynowthatthisformulationwasnotthelastwordofphilosophy. The trouble is that historians tend to return the inherent otherness ofthinkingtotheprivateworldofapersonhoodthatmodernpsychologyob-jectifies,therebylosingthethreadofthoughtthatheldsuchparadigmaticin-terestforphilosophers.OverlookingtheboundaryseparatingthespecialisedothernesspropertoscientificreasonfromtheothernessofthinkingmakesithardertodiscernthelimitedpurposethatṢadrā,forexample,assignstothink-ing as the means by which human beings articulate their being in the world. Inthisarticulation,Ṣadrāobserves,thereismorethanonewayinwhichtherealitiesofthingsmanifestthemselves.89Theprimaryfunctionheenvisagesforphilosophicaltheoryistopoint (ishāra),asfeasiblyaspossible,towheretheunitiesbetweenknower andknownfigure forman in theunfoldingofknowingandbeing,whichunfoldingnothoughtcancaptureinitstotality.

The Paragon of Perception

Inthisscheme,however,itisintellect(notthethinkingfaculty)thatmostful-lypreserveswhatṢadrācallstheactivelordlycommandandgiverofpercep-tion (al-amr al-rabbānī al-darrāk al-faʿʿāl)90intheunityofthehumanper-ceiverandhisobject.Thesynonymshereliesontoexplainidrāk (perception)are meeting (al-liqāʾ) and attaining (al-wuṣūl).91Al-Fanārī (d. 1431) aptlyshowedthefullimportofthesesemanticassociationswhenhewrote,“Risetotheperceiverwhoisnotoutsideofyou.”92Irrespectiveofthetypeofpercep-tion,“perceiver”thussignifiesarelationoftheconjoiningofthingsthatbefitsthelevelandtypeofjoining.93Butthehighestconjoiningisthatofperceiver,perceptionandperceived.Itisnottheworldthatcircumscribesthisperceiver,therefore,but the reverse andonly in thisparticular sense. Just as the selfunitesitsfacultiesandinstrumentsbeforeitmaybesaidtoperceiveanything,Ṣadrāsaysinasimilarvein,so“theexistenceofthething[perceived]inthesoul is intrinsically [that thing’s] existence for the self (wujūdahu li’l-nafs)”.94 Giventhatapersonisintellect,soulandbody,therefore,whatlies“outside”themcannot be theoriginal locus for the self’s awareness (mawḍiʿ shuʿūr al-nafs).For,thenaturalrelatednessoftheself(al-ʿilāqa al-ṭabīʿiyya)–withrespect towhateveritperceives–occursproportionately(bi’l-qiyās) to thebodyandfacultiesthatthesouldisposesandgoverns,nottowhatisexternal.Thereisnoneedtoreadmodern-stylesubjectivismintothis.Onehassimplyto keep in mind what intellective actualisation implied. The higher and more activetheperceptionis,theweakerbecomesthemultiplicityofrelationsandcorporeality.Man,who liesatan intermediarypointbetweenGodandHis



creationasthesummitofthiscreation,isthusenjoinedtorisetothelevelofthegiverofperception(al-darrāk),hissource,ratherthantoremainapassiveperceiver (dārik)ofobjectsofsense.Thisrootlevel,contendsṢadrā,where“everyperceptionoccursbywayoftheunificationoftheperceiverandtheperceived”, iswhy“the intellectwhichperceivesall things isall things”.95 The darrākisnotanexternalsubstanceindifferenttothemovementsoftheperson whose intellect is only in potentia. The noetic and existential orders manifestedinman,bodyandsoul,merelypresagethesourceandgiverofper-ception,bywhommanrisesabovethetemporalworldheinhabitstotheple-narylifethatisa priori to his physicality and determines his true destination.Ṣadrāalsospeaksofthe“realfreedom”thatliesinwhatisinnatetothesoul,not thebody,andwhichexcludes the teachingandhabituationofapersonbasedonsomeoneelse’sauthority,however“excellent”theseactivitiesmaybe.96 Insupporthe invokesAristotle’sassertion that freedomis thehabitusthatbelongstoandkeepsvigilforthesoulbysubstance,notartificialdesign.Thus,theweakertheattachmenttothebodyandthestrongertotheintellect,hesays,thegreateristhefreedom;thecontraryspellstheenslavementtothelowerpassions.Theoutcomeofwisdomandfreedom,inshort,isthepowerofmasteryofwhatcomestoman’sknowledgeandaseparationoftheselffrommaterial things. All the human excellences (faḍāʾil)aretraceabletothesetwofundamentalexcellences,hesays.

Concluding Remarks

Thegreatenigmaofmanisthatheshouldbethesamebeingwholives,feels,speaks,reasons,philosophises,knowsandarticulateshisownexistence.Thisprimordialconditionplacesmanatthecentreofhisownthoughtsandactivi-ties,thoughnotforthesamereasonsasintheempiricalsciencesorinmodernhumanism.Beforebecominganobjectofhisownthought,mancannotbutbeanagentinhisownright;else,whoinhisplaceiscontemplatinganythingatall?Earlyon,al-Fārābīdeterminedfurtherthatthingshuman concern phi-losophyonlyinsofarastheirrealisationmakesforthefelicityofnationsandcitiedpeoplesbothintheirfirst,worldlylifeandintheAfterlife97–thetwoemergences.Yet,thehumanthinkingtowhichheanchoredthisrudimentaryrelationwiththegoodisnotasstraightforwardasitmayseemonthesurfaceofthings.ItagreeswiththegeneraldriftofṢadrā’sdiscussionofperception,whichnaturallycannotbeavoidedinthediscussiononthinking,insofarasṢadrā’sunderstandingofperceptionisquintessentiallyparadigmatic.


90 M.Ṣadrā,Al-Mabdaʾ,p.253.


92 Shams al-Dīn Ḥamza al-Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns bayn al-maʿqūl wal-mashhūd,Dāral-Ku-tubal-ʿIlmiyya,Beirut2010,p.182.

93 Ibid.,p.179.


95 M.Ṣadrā,Al-Shawāhid,p.328;cf.IbnSīnā,Al-Taʿlāqāt, Iranian Institute of Philosophy,Tehran2013,p.46,wheretheauthorsaysthatintellect is all things in potential.


97 Al-Fārābī,Taḥṣīl,p.49.



Indeed,Ṣadrāmaybesaid toculminatea long traditiondatingback to theGreeks forwhich thinking is at once an object of analysis and the prima-rymeansbywhichonearrivesatjudgments.Whathaschangedinmoderntimesis,notthisformaldistinctionbut,thepositivisttermsunderwhichitisinvestigated.Narrowing thequestionof thinking to itsexperientialsourceschangeshowphilosophersinterpret theunfoldingofknowingandbeing.Afamiliarexampleofthisreductionism,onewehavenotdiscussedindetail,isthefallacysurroundingtheage-oldproblemoftheworld’screation.Longbeforemodernastrophysics,PlatointheTimaeusunderstoodthefutilityofpondering creation as if one could somehow escape the boundaries of theworld within which one thinks and lives. The universe taken as a whole could notbeexplained in thesamerespectasanyof itscontents,aparadox thatalsodullsthesignificancetophilosophyofthemodernempiric-mathematicalaccountoftheuniverse’sorigin.Ṣadrāappliedhimselftothephilosophicalimplicationsofthisproblemwiththesamealacrityashisfamousteacher,MīrDāmād(d.1631),onethemostformidablephilosophers.Neitherdeniedthatfacultativeperceptionwasex-periential in some sense or other. But they also knew that treating perception asnothingmorethananexperientialeventensconcedtheknowingsubjectinthefluxofhisownmentalstates,cognition,conduct,etc.BeforeJohnStuartMill,mentalstateswerenormallykeptseparatefromjudgmentsaboutlogicalvalidity.Butitwouldbewrongtoinferfromthisstrictlylogicalrequirement,asṢadrāandthewholeḤikmatraditionstandwitness,thatbeing had then to betotallyseparatedfromthinkingandintellection.Contemporaryphilosophyhas,inanyevent,foundwaystogetaroundthisformality.The ideasdiscussed in thispaper, inshort, illustrate theextent towhich thebeingnessoftheknowerimpingesuponknowledge.Farfrommodern,recogni-tionoftheassociationofthesetwo“presences”ineveryactofknowingmeans,attheveryleast,thatnomortalcanknoweverything,letalonetheunknowable,butrather–inthesenseexploredhere–accordingtoman’smeasure.Thatis,tothemeasureofhisintelligible reality.Savefortheprimordial,transcendentalsourceof thisbeing, inṢadrā’swords,mancanneitherforesee the totalityofconsequencesofhisactionsnorhis intellectgrasptherealitiesofthingshe needs to that end. This is what makes thinking about existence at once so perplexingandpregnantwithpossibility.Perhapsmanneedstobeperplexedifheistoavoidtheimmobilityofmentalabstractionandmaintaintheopennessofhisthinkingdespiteitslimitations,asṢadrāclearlyintended.

Anthony F. Shaker

TumačitiMullāṢadrāaočovjekuiizvorumišljenja

SažetakU radu se istražuju ključni aspekti Mullā Ṣadrāova razumijevanja čovjekova bivstvovanja u svijetu, gdje se embrij opažanja i mišljenja pojavljuje u jedinstvenim uvjetima čovjeka kao ar-tikuliranog društvenog bića. Biće koje može govoriti također govori sebi i o sebi. No s obzirom na to da čovjekova »prava stvarnost« nalazi svoj korijen u božanskom znanju i bivstovanju u dvostrukoj egzistencijaciji, u srcu njegova bivstvovanja u svijetu leži intelekt pomoću kojega se on »vraća« iz materijalnosti u njegov izvor u božanskom, gdje sve znanje i bivstovanje počinje i završava. Problem znanja i bivstvovanja – izrazivo u smislu jednog i mnogih – potječe još iz vremena prije predsokratovaca. Da bi se Ṣadrāovo razumijevanje moglo umjestiti, razmatraju se drugi filozofi, uključujući Kanta, čija je logika argumenata okupljenih oko »Ja« naznačena u



Heideggerovoj kritici. To niti je prvenstveno epistemologijski problem islamske filozofije niti je lišen šireg zanimanja za društvenu životinju naziva »čovjek« (insān).

KljučneriječiMullāṢadrā,MartinHeidegger,ImmanuelKant,Qūnawī,AbūNaṣralFārābī,HadiSabzavari,IbnʿArabi,Shahābad-Dīn”Suhrawardī,metafizika,filozofijajezika

Anthony F. Shaker

MullāṢadrāinterpretieren:überden Menschen und den Ursprung des Denkens

ZusammenfassungIn der Abhandlung werden Schlüsselaspekte von Mullā Ṣadrās Auffassung des menschlichen Seins in einer Welt ergründet, in der der Embryo der Wahrnehmung und des Denkens unter den einzigartigen Gegebenheiten des Menschen als artikuliertes Gesellschaftswesen erscheint. Ein Wesen, das sprechen kann, spricht auch zu sich selbst und über sich selbst. Aber angesichts dessen, dass die „wahre Realität“ des Menschen ihre Wurzeln in göttlichem Wissen und Sein in zweiartiger Existenziation findet, liegt im Herzen seines Seins in der Welt der Intellekt, mit dessen Hilfe er von der Materialität zu seiner Quelle im Göttlichen „zurückkehrt“, wo alles Wissen und Sein beginnt und endet. Das Problem des Wissens und des Seins – ausdrückbar im Sinne von einem und vielen – stammt noch aus den Zeiten vor den Vorsokratikern. Um Ṣadrās Betrachtungsweise einordnen zu können, werden andere Philosophen in Betrachtung gezogen, einschließlich Kant, dessen Logik der um das „Ich“ gesammelten Argumente in Heideggers Kritik angegeben ist. Dies ist weder ein zuvörderst epistemologisches Problem der islamischen Philosophie, noch ist es des breiteren Interesses für das soziale Tier namens „Mensch“ (insān) beraubt.

SchlüsselwörterMullāṢadrā,MartinHeidegger,ImmanuelKant,Qūnawī,AbūNaṣralFārābī,HadiSabzawari,IbnʿArabī,Schihabad-DinSuhrawardi,Metaphysik,Sprachphilosophie

Anthony F. Shaker

InterpréterMollāṢadrāShīrāzīsurla question de l’homme et de la source de la pensée

RésuméCe travail recherche les aspects clés de la conception de Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī de l’être de l’homme dans le monde, où l’observation et la réflexion de départ apparaissent dans des condi-tions uniques de l’homme en tant qu’être social construit. L’être qui est doté de la parole se parle également à lui-même et parle de lui-même. Mais compte tenu du fait que « la véritable réalité » de l’homme trouve sa racine dans la connaissance divine et de son être au sein d’une existence double, au cœur de son être dans le monde se situe l’intellect à l’aide duquel l’homme « revient » depuis la matérialité pour aller vers sa source dans le divin, où toute connaissance et tout être commencent et se terminent. Le problème de la connaissance et de l’être – exprimable dans le sens de l’un et du multiple – provient déjà de l’époque qui précède les présocratiques. Afin d’être en mesure de situer la conception de Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, d’autres philosophes sont analysés, y compris Kant, dont la logique d’arguments réunis autour du « Je » est mentionnée dans la critique de Heidegger. Il n’est question principalement ni d’un problème épistémolo-gique de la philosophie islamique, ni d’un problème dépourvu d’intérêt pour l’animal social du nom de « l’homme » (insān).

Mots-clésMollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī,MartinHeidegger,EmmanuelKant, Sadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī,AbūNaṣralFārābī,HadiSabzavari,IbnArabi,Sihabal-DinSohrawardi,métaphysique,philosophiedulangage

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Interpreting Mullā Ṣadrā on Man and the Origin of Thinking