Interpretation Internal Literal Golden

8/13/2019 Interpretation Internal Literal Golden

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INTRODUCTION

A "Statute" is the will of the Sovereign Legislature according to which the

Governments function. The executive must act and the Judiciary in the course

of Administration of Justice must apply the law as laid down by the said

legislative will. ery often occasions will arise where the courts will be called

upon to interpret the words! phrases and expressions used in the statute. n the

course of such nterpretation! the #ourts have! over the centuries! laid down

certain guidelines which have come to be $nown as "%ules of nterpretation of

Statutes" .&ore often than not the Statutes contain "Statement of 'b(ects and

%easons" and also a ")reamble" both of which provide guidelines for

nterpreting the true meaning of the words and expressions used in the Statute.

Judges have to interpret statutes and apply them. The (udges fre*uently use this

phrase true meaning or literal or plain meaning. Literal nterpretation of a

statute is finding out the true sense by ma$ing the statute its own expositor. f

the true sense can thus be discovered. There is no resort to construction. t is

beyond *uestion! the duty of courts! in construing statutes! to give effect to theintent of law ma$ing power! and see$ for that intent in every legitimate way!

but first of all the words and language employed.

Statutes are embodiments of authoritative formulae and the very words which

are used constitute part of law.The interpretation or construction means the

process by which the #ourts see$ to ascertain the intent of the Legislature

through the medium of the authoritative form in which it is expressed. +The

law is deemed to be what the #ourt interprets it to be. The very concept of

,interpretation- connotes the introduction of elements which are necessarily

extrinsic to the words in the statute. Though the words ,interpretation- and

-construction- are used interchangeably! the idea is somewhat different.


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LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION

nterpretation of statutes is of two types they can de distinguished as "literal"

and "functional". The #ourts have laid down that the nterpretation of the

statutes must be in accordance with the literal meaning of the words and

expressions read in the light of the "Statement of 'b(ects and %easons and the

)reamble" of the Act". The )rimary %ule of nterpretation of Statutes is called

"Literal nterpretation" or "Literal #onstruction". t is also $nown as ")lain

%ule of interpretation". n this form of interpretation the "words" used in the

statute are construed according to their "literal" meaning or according to the

popular and dictionary meaning of the term! in other words its plain sense.#hief Justice Jervis in Abley v Gale has explained the expression -literal

meaning-. /e points out that "if the precise words used are plain and

unambiguous! in our (udgment we are bound to construe them in their ordinary

sense even though it too leads in our view of the case to an absurdity or

manifest in(ustice. The words of a statute are to be first understood in their

natural! ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed

according to their grammatical meaning! unless that leads to some absurdity or

unless there is something in the context! or in the ob(ect of the statute to suggest

the contrary. The tendency is that by doing so! the courts give effect to the

intention of the )arliament and the presumption is that the words themselves

do! in such a case it is best to declare the intention of the law giver.

t is a rule of construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical

sense of the word is to be adhered to. The words of a statute must prima faciebe given their ordinary meaning. 0here the grammatical construction is clear

and manifest and without doubt! that construction ought to prevail unless there

be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary. n other words the best

possible interpretation of a statute would be to give its plain meaning. 0hen the

language of the statute is clear and unambiguous it is not necessary to loo$ into

the legislative intent or ob(ect of the Act. t is when the language is vague that

the legislative-s intention is to be ta$en into consideration. There is no room for


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construction if there isn-t any ambiguity. f the language of a statute is clear and

unambiguous the court must give effect to it and it has no right to extend its

operation in order to carry out the real or supposed intention of the legislature.

0hen the language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning the tas$ of

interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The duty of the court of law is simply

to ta$e the statute as it stands! and to construe its words according to their

natural significance. f the words of the statute are in themselves precise and

lucid! then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their

natural and ordinary sense. A restrictive and exhaustive definition should be

expanded or made extensive to embrace things which are strictly not within themeaning of the word as defined.

t doesn-t loo$ beyond the written words. f the words given in the statute are

lucid and explicit! it is not for the (udges to go beyond that language or words

to try and establish what the legislative might have meant by using that word. t

is also $nown as "Grammatical nterpretation" .The #ourts have to follow this

principle even if it results in irrationality or even if it is contrary to the policy or

intention of legislature. t doesn-t loo$ beyond the litera legis which means

letter of legislation. t (ust loo$s at what law says. 0ords and phrases are to be

construed by the courts in their ordinary sense! and the ordinary rules of

grammar and punctuation have to be applied. f! applying this rule! a clear

meaning appears! then this must be applied! and the courts will not in*uire

whether what the statute says represents the intention of the legislature. n order

to determine the literal meaning of a statute the courts have to ascertain theordinary meaning of a word in a statute by referring to a dictionary or scientific

or any other technical wor$s where the words have been used. This rule is also

widely followed in ndia.

t is an elementary principle of the construction of statutes that the words have

to be read in their literal sense. Thus! generally spea$ing! words and

expressions would be given their plain and ordinary meaning which cannot be

cut down or curtailed unless they in themselves are clearly restrictive. f the


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words of the statute are clear and unambiguous! it is the plainest duty of the

court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in provision.

0hen the meaning of the words is plain! it is not the duty of #ourts to busy

themselves with supposed intentions .t! therefore! appears inadmissible to

consider the advantages or disadvantages of applying the plain meaning

whether in the interests of the prosecution or accused. n constructing a

statutory provision! the first and the foremost rule of construction is the literary

construction. All that we have to see at the very outset is what that provision

says. f the provision is unambiguous! and if from that provision! the legislative

intent is clear! there is no need to call into aid other rules of construction ofstatutes. Absoluta sentantia expositore non indigent1 plain words need no

exposition. Such language best declares! without more! the intention of the law1

giver! and is decisive of it.


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GOLDEN RULE:

Argument on hypothetical considerations should not have much weight in

interpreting a statute. /owever! if the language so permits! it is open to the

#ourt to give to the statute that meaning which promotes the benignant intent

of the legislation. A #ourt has the power to depart from the grammatical

construction! if it finds that strict adherence to the grammatical construction

will defeat the ob(ect the Legislature had n view. 2o doubt! grammar is a good

guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate.

34 The law goes so far as to re*uire the courts sometimes even to

modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words! if by doing

so absurdity arid inconsistency can be avoided4

54 The #ourt should not be astute to defeat the provision of the Act whose

meaning is! on the face of it! reasonably plain. 'f course! this does not

mean that an Act or anypart of it! can be recast. t mustbe possible to

spell the meaning contended for! out of the words actually used6

+4 7nless the words are without meaning or absurd! it would be safe to

give words their natural meaning because the framer is presumed to

use the language which conveys the intention+and it would not be in

accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give

effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to

give them their ordinary meaning leads to conse*uences which are

not in accord withthe notions of propriety or (ustice entertained by the

#ourt.

The following observations in this regard of en$ataram a Ayyar! in Tirath

Singh v. Bachittar Singh' clearly underscore the desirability of the above

indicated course of action in the given situation of textual inade*uacy of a

given provision 81

"t is argued that if the language of the enactment is interpreted in its literal


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and grammatical sense! there could be no escape from the conclusion

that parties to the petition are also entitled to the notice under the

proviso. 9ut it is a rule of interpretation well1established that where

the language of a statute- in its ordinary meaning and grammatical

construction leads to a manifest contraction of the apparent purpose of

the enactment! or to some inconvenience or absurdity! hardship or

in(ustice! presumably not intended! a construction may be put upon

which modifies the meaning of the words! and even the structure of the

sentence.:

t is also well1recognised principle of construction that while construing a

statute! the courts have to so read the provision of the Act as to steer clear of

the vice of unconstitutionality.;

Violence to the lanuae use!

The court! if necessary! does some -violence to the words- to achieve the obvious

intention of the Legislature and produce a rational construction 1 Ajit

Investment #o.Ltd v.K.G. Malvandkar ?@ = T% ?B C9orn.4. n State ofTamil ad!v. Kodaikanal Motor "nion #$.% Ltd AIR 3=DB S# 3=>+! the

Supreme #ourt observed as under 8

"The courts must always see$ to find out the intention of the Legislature.

Though the courts must find out the intention of the statute from the

language used! but language more often than not is an imperfect instru1

ment of expression! of human thought. As Lord Eenning said! -it would

he ideal to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with

divine prescience and perfect clarity-. As (udge Learned /and said!

-we must not ma$e a fortress out of the dictionary but remember that

statutes must have some purpose or ob(ect! whose imaginative

discovery is (udicial craftsmanship-. 0e need not always cling to

literalness and should see$ to endeavour to avoid an un(ust and absurd

result. 0e should not ma$e a moc$ery of legislation. To ma$e senseout of an unhappily worded provision! where the purpose is


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apparent to the (udicial eye! -some- violence to language is

permissible. #See K.$. &arghese v.IT at pp. BF? to

BFB A% 3=D3 S# 3=55 at p. 3=5> and 3=5D! andL!ke v. M()*+,- ?

T% BD5 C/L4."

0herever strict interpretation of the statute gives rise to un(ust situation or

results! the (udges can ensure their good sense to remedy it by reading words in! if

necessary! so as to do what )arliament would have done had they had the

situation in mind. The meaning of the same words in a statute may he

amended! enlarged or restricted in order to harmonise them with the legislative

intention of the entire statute. The spirit of the statute should prevail over the

literal meaning #(/.S.(. Ltd v. S!0hash (handra Bose A% 3==5 S# >+4.

The Legislature could not be presumed to have intended an absurd or anomalous

result! if literal construction suggests any. "An intention to produce an

unreasonable result!" said Ean$werts L.J. in Artemion v. $roco1io! D C#A4 CDDD4! "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other

construction available." 0here to apply words literally would "defeat the

obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result"

"we must do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention

and produce a rational construction Cper Lord %eid inL!ke v. I2() 3=B?@ ? T%

B=5 C3=B+4 A# > where at p. >! he also observed 8"t his is not a new problem!

though our standard of drafting is such that it may emerge4.

Omissions an! a"s su""lie!

n the realm of (udicial interpretation! the departure from normal maxim

of literal interpretation can be made to effectuate the intention and purpose of

the enactment. n the course of vitalising the intent or purpose! the omissions or

gaps can be bridged and extended meaning can he given and details can be

appended within the contours facilitating full1fledged sway of the provision.

The intention of the Legislature must be discovered from the words employed

in the statute and the provision should be interpreted in a manner to further the

intent and ob(ect. n certain situations the modification of the language! or


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enlarged interpretation to highlight the meaning implicit in the provision is nut

eluded to s*uare with the intention and advance the purpose.-

t is often said that the function of the #ourts is only to expound and not to

legislate! a theory which has in the recent past invited dissent in the sense! gaps

in the legislation may call for (udicial filling up with a view to dealing with

situations and circumstances that may emerge after enacting a statute! not within

the imagination of the Legislature! when its application may be called for 1

Shirish 3inance and Investment $. Ltd. v. M. Sreenivas!l! 2edd4 + A# 5=B the words "some other material evidence"were read as "material evidence admissible" and the /ouse of Lords while

interpreting to that effect held that the extension is implicit in the words employed

by the statute. n "nited Slates v. 5illiam 3reeman8 C3D?+1 ?B4 ?? 7S ?+8 +

/ow B! the Supreme #ourt in the context of giving an interpretation to an

extended meaning held as follows 81

"The meaning of the Legislature may be extended beyond the

precise words used in the law! from the reasons or motive upon which

the Legislature proceeded! from the end in view! or the purpose which

was designed the limitation of the rule being! that to extend the

meaning to any case! not included within the words! the case must be

shown to come within the same reason upon which the law ma$er

proceeded and not a li$e reason."

The #ourt while construing a provision should not easily read into it words


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which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in

which a provision appears and the ob(ect of the statute in which the provision is

enacted! the #ourt should construe it in a harmonious way to ma$e it

meaningful.

Arm chair rule + ,u!es ste""in into shoes of leislatures

n the modern trend of interpretation of statutes the archaic concepts of

interpretation adhering to strict rules of grammar are not absolute and what has

become firmly anchored as a proper manner of interpretation is the contextual

one! so that the attempt is made to discover elusive words necessary to

materialise the purpose of the rule. t is for such reason that whenever it

becomes absolutely necessary! and without doing violence to the expressed

words of the statute! a creative and innovative approach is to be

adopted. n Bangalore 5ater S!11l4 9 Sewerage Board v. A. 2aja11a

A% 3=>D S# ?D! #hief Justice 9eg dealing with necessity of such exercise

by #ourt observed 8

)erhaps! with the passage of time! what may be described as an extension

of a method resembling the "arm chair rule- in the construction of

wills! Judges can more fran$ly step into the shoes of Legislature

where an enactment leaves its own intentions in much too nebulous or

uncertain State.-

0henever strict interpretation gives rise to un(ust situation or results! the

Judges ensure their good sense to remedy it by reading words if necessary! soas to do what )arliament would have done had they had the situation in mind

#(/S.: Ltd. v. S!0l;as (handra Bose A% 3==5 S# >+4.

The mechanical approach to construction is altogether out of steps with the

modern positive approach. The modern positive approach is to have a

purposeful construction! that is! to effectuate the ob(ect and purpose of the

Act #Administrator< M!nici1al (or1oration v. 6attatra4a 6ahankar A*2

3==5 S# 3D?B4 Calready discussed4.


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n Seaford (o!rt /states Ltd v. Asher


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be welcomed #2attan (hand 7ira (hand v. Askar awa; =!ng AIR $##$

S#0 ?=B4. 7ndisputably! the court cannot usurp the power of legislation in the

guise of finding defects in draftsmanship and incorporate its views. A cas!s

orniss!s can in no case be supplied by a #ourt of law for that would be to ma$e

law. 9ut! is there a total prohibition to supply essentials which have been

inadvertently omitted so as to ma$e the Act effective and meaningful or

whether the #ourt can add or supplant this omission6 /ere comes the cruxto

go by letter or to give effect to legislative intent.

There is a clash of (udicial debate on this aspect 1 one view is that court cannot

usurp the powers of Legislature and other is that it is permissible under certain

circumstances to read into the Act something which is not there so as to ma$e

it effective and meaningful. s law static or moderately progressive6

The controversy is discussed in the following paragraph8

(o!rt's com1etence in s!11l4ing omissions > According to the former

view! the court is not competent to proceed upon the assumption that the

Legislature has made a mista$e. The #ourt must proceed on the footing that theLegislature intended what it has said. Iven if there is some defect in the

phraseology used by the Legislature the court cannot aid the Legislature-s

defective phrasing of an Act or add and amend or! by construction ma$e up the

deficiencies which are left in the Act. Iven where there is casus omiss!s8 it is

for the courts to remedy the defect4 Addition to or modification of words used

in statutory provisions is not generally permissible There is no scope for

importing into the statute! words which are not there. Such importation would

be not to construe! but to amend! the statute. E/en if there be cas!s omiss!s8

the defect can be remedied only by legislation and not by (udicial

interpretation.

The other view is that the general rule that addition to or modification of

words should not be made can be departed from by the court to avoid a

patent absurdity. t is well1recognised that if a statute leads to absurdity!hardship or in(ustice! presumably not intended! a construction may be put


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upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the

sentence.,- 2o doubt it is the duty of the #ourt to try and harmonise the

various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature but it is certainly not

the dutyof the #ourt to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in the

a"s or omissions in the provisions of an Act.- A Judge must not alter the

material of the texture of which the Act is woven! but he can and should iron

out the creases if he come across the ruc$ in the texture. lie must

supplement the written word so as to give force and life to the intention of the

Legislature.

The cold! logical and soulless approach defeats not only (ustice but also the

intention of )arliament. %igid legal thin$ing 1 a temporary aberration of the

&iddle Ages 1 seems to be ma$ing a come bac$ in spite of e*uity! Lord

&ansfield and all others made efforts to humanise The court must!

therefore! strive to interpret the statute as to promoteKadvance the ob(ect

and purpose of the enactment. or this purpose! where necessary! the court

may even depart from the rule that /ain words should be interpreted

according to their plain meaning. There need be no mee$ or mute submis1

sions to the plainness of the language. To avoid patent in(ustice! anomaly or

absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a law! the #ourt would be well (ustified

in departing from the so1called golden rule of construction so as to give effect

to the ob(ect and purpose of the enactment by supplementing the written

word if necessary.- To ma$e sense out of an unhappily worded provision!

where the purpose is apparent to the (udicial eye! "some" violence to thelanguage is permissible! the courts need not cling to literalness but should

see$ to endeavour to avoid un(ust and absurd result! and not to ma$e a

moc$ery of legislation.-

The -literal rule- has now been discarded. n the past! the Judges and the

lawyers spo$e of the -literal rule- by which statutes were to be interpreted

according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word. They too$ the

grammatical and literal meaning unmindful of the conse*uences. Iven if


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such a meaning gave rise to un(ust results which Legislature never intended!

the grammatical meaning alone was $ept to prevail. They said that it would

be for the Legislature to amend the Act and not for the court to intervene by

its innovation. Euring the last several years! the -literal rule- has been given a

good1bye. The intention of the Legislature or the purpose of the statute is

loo$ed for. The words of the statute are first examined.

f the words are precise and cover the situation in hand! there is no need to

go further. The #ourt expounds those words. 9ut! if words are ambiguous!

uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed! the court puts upon the

language of the Legislature! rational meaning. Ivery word! section and

provision is examined. The Act is examined as a whole. The necessity which

gave ri se to the Act is examined. The mischief which the Legislature

intended to redress is loo$ed at. The whole situation and not (ust

one1to1one relation i s loo$ed a t. 2ot any p rovi sion but the

framewor$ of the whole statute is considered. )rovisions are not

viewed as abstract principles separated from the motive force

behind. )rovisions are considered in the circums tances to which

they owe their origin. They are considered to ensure coherence and

#onsistency within the law as a whole and to avoid unavoidable

circumstances. Such adventure! no doubt! enlarges #ourt-s discretion as to

interpretation. 9ut it does not imply power to #ourt to substitute its own

notions of legislative intention. t implies only a power of choice

wh ere di ffer ing constructions arc possible and different meanings areavailable. The preponderance of opinion is in favour of construction so as to

achieve the legislative intendment. 2ow the opinion has swept in favour of

construction of a statute so as to promote "general legislative purpose" instead

of adhering to "literal rule" of interpreting a statute according to

grammatical and ordinary sense of the words.


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INTERNAL AID OF INTERPRETATION

2T%'E7#T'2

Statute generally means the law or the Act of the legislature authority. The

general rule of the interpretation is that statutes must prima facie be given this

ordinary meaning. f the words are clear! free from ambiguity there is no need

to refer to other means of interpretation.3

9ut if the words are vague and ambiguous then internal aid may be sought for

interpretation.

2TI%2AL AES

Lon title

A long title of a Legislation may not control! circumscribe or widen the scope

of the legislation! if the provisions thereof are otherwise clear and

unambiguous! but if the terms of the legislation are capable of both a wider and

a narrower construction! that construction which would be in tune with the

avowed ob(ect manifested in the preamble or declared in the long title! ought to

be accepted.5

E*em"tions

An exemption clause in a taxing statute must be! as far as possible! liberally

construed and in favour of the assessee! provided no violence is done to thelanguage used.+

Mt is true that an exemption provision should be liberally construed! but this

does not mean that such liberal construction should be made even by doing

violence to the plain meaning of such exemption provision. Liberal

3

&athur! E. 2.! nterpretation of Statutes! 3st Idn.! 5FFB! #entral Law )ublications! Allahabad )g. ?B.57rmila 9ala Easi vs. )robodh #handra Ghosh C3==F4 3D? T% BF? C#al4+#T vs. Eungarmal Tainwala C3==34 3=3 T% ?? C )atna4


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construction will be made wherever it is possible to be made without impairing

the legislative re*uirement and the spirit of the provision.:?

Pro/iso

A proviso merely carves out something from the section itself. A proviso is a

subsidiary to the main section and has to be construed in the light of the section

itself. 'rdinarily! a proviso is intended to be part of the section and not an

addendum to the main provisions. A proviso should receive strict construction.

The court is not entitled to add words to a proviso with a view to enlarge the

scope.

MThe main function of a proviso is to carve out an exception to the main

enactment. t cannot! normally! be so interpreted as to set at naught the real

ob(ect of the main enactment.:B

E*"lanation

Sometimes an Ixplanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and

explain the meaning of the words appearing in the section. Such an Ixplanation

becomes an integral part of the main enactment.

MAn Ixplanation to a statutory provision has to be read with the main

provision to which it is added as an Ixplanation. An Ixplanation appended to a

section or a sub1section becomes an integral part of it and has no independent

existence apart from it. There is! in the eye of law! only one enactment! of

which both the section or sub1section and the Ixplanation are two inseparable

parts. n the absence of anything repugnant in the sub(ect or context! the words

and expressions used in the Ixplanation are to be given the same meaning as

given to them in the main provision itself.:>

?)etron Ingineering #onstruction )vt. Ltd. vs. #9ET C3=D=4 3> T% 5+ CS#4nterpretation of the Statutes!http8KKwww.i(tr.nic.inKarticlesKart53.pdf! accessed on 5K3FK5F3+ on .?+

)&B#T vs. )yarilal Nasam &an(i O #o. 3=D T% 33F C'ri.4>(IT vs. 2e!nion /ngineering (o. #$% Ltd. #*++-% ?:- IT2 ?@ #Bom.%
http://www.ijtr.nic.in/articles/art21.pdfhttp://www.ijtr.nic.in/articles/art21.pdfhttp://www.ijtr.nic.in/articles/art21.pdf


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The purpose of an Ixplanation is not to limit the scope of the main

section. An Ixplanation is *uite different in nature from a proviso the latter

excludes! excepts and restricts while the former explains! clarifies or subtracts

or includes something by introducing a legal fiction.D

MAn Ixplanation may be appended to a section to explain the meaning

of the words used in the section. There is no presumption that an Ixplanation

which is inserted subse*uently introduces something new which was not

present in the section before. 'rdinarily! an Ixplanation is inserted to clear up

any ambiguity in the section and it should be so read as to harmonise it with the

section and to clear up any ambiguity in the main section.:=.

MThe normal principle in construing an Ixplanation is to understand it

as explaining the meaning of the provision to which it is added the

Ixplanation does not enlarge or limit the provision! unless the Ixplanation

purports to be a definition or a deeming clause if the intention of the

Legislature is not fully conveyed earlier or there has been a misconception

about the scope of a provision! the Legislature steps in to explain the purport ofthe provision such an Ixplanation has to be given effect to! as pointing out the

real meaning of the provision all along.:3F

Non+o)stante clauses

MA non1obstante clause is usually used in a provision to indicate that the

provision should prevail despite anything to the contrary in the provision

mentioned in such non1obstante clause. n case there is any inconsistency or a

departure between the non1obstante clause and another provision! one of the

ob(ects of such a clause is to indicate that it is the non1obstante clause which

would prevail over the other clause.:33

DSingh! Avtar! ntroduction to nterpretation of Statutes! 5nd Idition %eprint 5FF>! 0adhwa and

#ompany! 2agpur.=

(IT vs. &oltas Ltd. #*++% ?: IT2 ,+ #Bom%3F(IT vs. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi 5orks *+- IT2 @@ #Kar%33$aras!ramaiah vs. Lakshamma AI2 *+, A$ ??:.


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&arinal notes an! hea!ins

MThe marginal note to a section cannot be referred to for the purpose of

construing the section but it can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift

of the section or to show what the section is dealing with. t cannot control the

interpretation of the words of a section! particularly when the language of the

section is clear and unambiguous but! being part of the statute! it prima facie

furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the section.: 35.

M&arginal notes are not decisive in interpreting a substantive provision

of law! but! in case of doubt! they can be relied upon as one of the aids for

construction.:3+

Pream)le

The Act Starts with a preamble and is generally small. The main ob(ective and

purpose of the Act are found in the )reamble of the Statute. M)reamble is the

Act in a nutshell. t is a preparatory statement. t contains the recitals showing

the reason for enactment of the Act. f the language of the Act is clear the

preamble must be ignored. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the interpretation

of an ambiguous act.3?

nKashi $rasad v State*!the court held that even though the preamble

cannot be used to defeat the enacting clauses of a statute! it can be treated as a

$ey for the interpretation of the statute.

Punctuation

MThere are three activities serially set out in that sub1clause! namely!

construction! manufacture or production. A comma is! therefore! legitimately

and as per the rules of grammar! re*uired after the first activity to separate it

from the second activity of manufacture. Since the second activity is followed

by the word Mor:! no comma is re*uired after the second activity to separate it

from the third activity. Therefore! punctuation is put as grammatically re*uired.

35K.$. &arghese vs. IT *-* IT2 +@ #S(%3+2.B. Shreeram 2eligio!s 9 (harita0le Tr!st vs. (IT #*+CC% *@? IT2 -@- #Bom%3?

&athur! E. 2.! nterpretation of Statutes! 3st Idn.! 5FFB! #entral Law )ublications! Allahabad. )g.?D.33=DF 99 #J B35


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t does not disclose any intention of providing for a separate $ind of business

altogether. )unctuation! in any case! is a minor element in the construction of a

statute. 'nly when a statute is carefully punctuated and there is no doubt about

its meaning can weight be given to punctuation. t cannot! however! be

regarded as a controlling element for determining the meaning of a statute.: 3B

Definition clause an! un!efine! 'or!s

0a) Judicially defined words

Mt has long been a well1established principle to be applied in the

construction of an Act of )arliament that where a word of doubtful meaning

has received a clear (udicial interpretation! the subse*uent statute which

incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar context! must be

construed so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning

that has previously been assigned to it.:3>

Mnterpretation of a provision in a taxing statute rendered years bac$ and

accepted and acted upon by the department should not be easily departed

from.:3D

(b) Rule of Ejusdem generis

The maxim e(usdem generis serves to restrict the meaning of a general

word to things or matters of the same genus as the preceding particular words.

t is well recognised rule of construction that when two or more words which

are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together noscitur a sociis!

they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They ta$e their colourfrom each other that is! the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to

the less general.3=

n order to attract the principle of e(usdem generis! it is essential that a

distinct genus or category must be discernible in the words under examination.

3B7ind!stan (onstr!ction vs. (IT #*++% ?:C IT2 ?+* #Bom%3>Barras vs. A0erdeen Steam Trawling and 3ishing (o. Ltd. #*+--% A( :? #7L%3D

(IT vs. Balkrishna Malhotra #*+@*% C* IT2 @+ #S(%3= Singh! Avtar! ntroduction to nterpretation of Statutes! 5nd Idition %eprint 5FF>! 0adhwa and#ompany! 2agpur.


19/22

0here the statute imposes restriction on advertisement! publicity and sales

promotion! the expression Msales promotion: cannot include selling expenses

incurred in the ordinary course of business5F.Similarly! the words Mother

stationary plant: must be construed e(usdem generis with switchgears and

transformers.53

The rule of e(usdem generis is to be applied Mwith caution: and Mnot

pushed too far:. t may not be interpreted too narrowly and unnecessarily if

broad based genus could be found so as to avoid cutting down words to dwarf

siPe.55

1che!ule

The Schedules appended to a statute form part of it. They are generally

added to avoid encumbering the statute with matters of excessive details!

guidelines to wor$ out the policy of the statute! transitory provisions! rules and

forms which need fre*uent amendment and the li$e. &uch importance is not

given to the forms unless they contain re*uirements of a mandatory nature.

INDE2

INTRODUCTION33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333$

LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333334

5F

(IT vs. Statesman Ltd. #*++?% *+C IT2 C? #(al.%53)(IT vs. Anglo India =!te Mills (o. Ltd. #*++-% ?:? IT2 *: #(al.%55".$.State/lectricit4 Board vs. 7ari Shanker =ain AI2 *+@+ #S(% ,


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GOLDEN RULE:3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333335iolence to the language used....................................................................................B

'missions and gaps supplied.....................................................................................>

&eaning of the word may be extended......................................................................D

Arm chair rule 1 (udges stepping into shoes of legislatures.......................................=Judicial legislation....................................................................................................3F

INTERNAL AID OF INTERPRETATION3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333$6Long title..................................................................................................................3?

Ixemptions...............................................................................................................3?

)roviso......................................................................................................................3

Ixplanation...............................................................................................................3

2on1obstante clauses................................................................................................3B

&arginal notes and headings....................................................................................3>

)reamble...................................................................................................................3>

)unctuation...............................................................................................................3>

Eefinition clause and undefined words....................................................................3DCa4 Judicially defined words.................................................................................3D

Cb4 %ule of I(usdem generis.................................................................................3D

Schedule...................................................................................................................3=

Ac7no'le!ment


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have ta$en efforts in this pro(ect. /owever! it would not have been possible

without the $ind support and help of many individuals. would li$e to extend

my sincere than$s to all of them.

am highly indebted to &s. 2ancy &aQam for their guidance and constant

supervision as well as for providing necessary information regarding the

pro(ect O also for their support in completing the pro(ect.

would li$e to express my gratitude towards my parents for their $ind co1

operation and encouragement which help me in completion of this pro(ect.

&y than$s and appreciations also go to my friends and seniors in developing

the pro(ect and people who have willingly helped me out with their abilities.

8I8LIOGRAP9.


22/22

&athur! E. 2.! Inter1retation of Stat!tes8 3stIdn.! 5FFB! #entral Law

)ublications! Allahabad.

Singh! Avtar! Introd!ction to Inter1retation of Stat!tes! 5nd Idition

%eprint 5FF>! 0adhwa and #ompany! 2agpur.

Documents

Interpretation Internal Literal Golden