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Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project supported by the European Community www.trilogy-project.org

Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

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Page 1: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

Internet cost transparencymending value chain incentives

Bob BriscoeChief Researcher, BTSep 2009

This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project supported by the European Communitywww.trilogy-project.org

Page 2: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

2

capacity sharing

• raison d’etre of the Internet• not just core & regional backhaul• shared access: wireless, cable, optical

• anyone can take any share of any link in the Internet• fantastic ideal• but when freedoms collide, what share do you get?

Inte

rne

t to

po

log

y vi

sua

liza

tion

pro

du

ced

by

Wa

lrus

(C

ourt

esy

of

Yo

ung

Hyu

n,

CA

IDA

)

2

Page 3: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

3

how to share Internet capacity?

• the invisible hand of the market, whether competitive or regulated• favours ISPs that share

capacity in their customers' best interests

• since 1988 misplaced belief in TCP alone as the sharing standard

• ISP's homespun alternatives have silently overridden TCP• ad hoc application-specific

blocks and permits• deep packet inspection• nailed up capacity• …

3

sour

ce:

Ella

coya

200

7(n

ow A

rbor

Net

wor

ks)

5%

45%

15%

27%

20%16%

20%

8%

40%

4%

BroadbandUsage Distribution

% of subscribers % traffic

Page 4: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

4

how Internet sharing ‘works’

TCP-fairness

bandwidthbandwidth22

bandwidth1capa

cit

y

time

(VoIP, VoD)unresponsive flow3

• voluntarily polite algorithms in endpoints• pushes until congested• equalises rates of data flows

a game of chicken – taking all and holding your ground pays

or start more ‘TCP-fair’ flows than anyone else (Web: x2, p2p: x5-100)

or for much more data than others (video streaming or p2p file-sharing x200)• net effect of both (p2p: x1,000-20,000 higher traffic intensity)

Page 5: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

5

ISP’s homespun alternativeshave silently overridden TCP

1. equal bottleneck flow rates(TCP)?

2. access rate shared between active users, but weighted by fee (weighed fair queuing, WFQ)?

3. volume capstiered by fee?

4. heaviest applications of heaviest usersthrottled at peak times by deep packet inspection (DPI)?

5

bit-rate

time

bit-rate

timebit-rate

timebit-rate

time

Page 6: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

6

no current solutionharnesses end-system flexibility

• light usage can go much faster• hardly affects completion time of

heavy usage• doesn’t have to shift into night

• BitTorrent & Microsoft have protocols to do this

but... punished by #2, #3 & #4

NOTE: weighted sharing doesn't imply differentiated network service• just weighted aggressiveness of end-system's rate response to congestion

bit-rate

time

bit-rate

time

bit-rate

time

1. TCP

4. deeppacketinspection(DPI)

weightedTCPsharing

bit-rate

time

2. (weighted) fairqueuing

bit-rate

time

3. volume caps

simpler & better...

Page 7: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

7

closing off the future

• becoming impossible to deploy a new use of the Internet• must negotiate arbitrary blocks and throttles en route

• two confusable motives• fairer cost sharing• competitive advantage to own services

• how to deconfuse? how to encourage fairer cost sharing?• make cost of usage transparent

• fixing Internet technology should avoid need for legislation 7

Page 8: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

8

the missing link

Q. what is the marginal cost of a customer’s usage?

A. each customer’s contribution to congestion congestion-volume

• unforgivable for a network business not to understand its primary marginal cost

Page 9: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

9

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

1000000

10000000

100 1000 10000 100000 1000000 10000000100000000 1E+09

'Co

st':

Con

gest

ion-

Vol

ume:

Tot

al T

CP

Los

s [B

yte]

Initial resultsmeasured on Naples Uni netEach point is a usercorrelation coefficient: 0.43

Volume: Total TCP Traffic Volume [Byte]

100%

WARNING:

Requires validation

with more sample data

volume

congestion-volumeuser’s contribution to congestion

isn’t volume a good enough cost metric?

Page 10: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

10

congestion is not evilcongestion signals are healthy

• no congestion across whole path is evil• for data transfer to complete ASAP, must fill bottlenecks

the trick signal congestion just before impairment• explicit congestion notification (ECN)

• 2001 update to IP: as a queue builds mark more packets

• then tiny queuing delay and tiny loss for all traffic

time

bit-rate

time

bit-rate

Page 11: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

11

measuring marginal cost

• user’s contribution to congestion= bytes marked

• can transfer v high volume• but keep congestion-volume v low • similar trick for video streaming

bit-rate

time

congestion

time

10GB

0.01% marking

1MB

1% marking

1MB

300MB100MB

3MB

Page 12: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

12

congestion-volume metric

dual demand & supply role

• a resource accountability metric1. of customers to ISPs (too much traffic)

2. and ISPs to customers (too little capacity)

1. cost to other users of my traffic

2. the marginal cost of upgrading equipment• so it wouldn’t have been congested

• competitive market matches 1 & 2

• customer tells ISP which demand is worthy of capacity investment

note: diagram is conceptualcongestion volume would be accumulated over timecapital cost of equipment would be depreciated over time

Page 13: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

13

root cause

• by Internet design • end-systems manage congestion

• fine, but ISPs need to see it too• “cost transparency”

• ISPs cannot see primary business metric• packet loss can certainly be measured locally• but not a robust contractual metric – an absence & an impairment

• lacking visibility of congestion, ISPs:• punish nice and nasty volume equally• block light usage from going fast, even momentarily • require high cost apps (VoD, etc) to seek permission

bit-rate

time

congestion

time

Page 14: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

14

just deploy ECN and we’re done?unfortunately not

• can only count ECN received, not sent• sender controls how much congestion receiver receives• consequence of Internet’s one-way datagram model

• incentives would all be backwards• for receivers & for receiving networks

Feedback path

Data packet flowSender Receiver

11Routers

Networks

1. Congested queue marks some packets

2. Receiver feeds back marks

1

2

Page 15: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

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summary so farthe problem

• everyone thought fairness goal was equal flow rates• didn’t take account of

range of users’ data activity over time

• ISPs trying to pull system to a different allocation• lacking visibility of the

marginal costs• resorting to means

confusable with non-neutrality

Page 16: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

16

Internet cost transparency

proposedsolution

Page 17: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

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proposed solution

• mechanism & incentive• for sender to reveal congestion to network• so ISP can count contribution to congestion

as easily as volume

• easy to build accountability models on top• accountability of customer to ISP• ISP to customer• ISP to ISP

• should greatly simplify operational support systems

Page 18: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

18

Diffserv

ECN

RE

IPv4

head er

Feedback path

Data packet flowSender Receiver

-1+1-1+1+1+1 Routers

Networks

1. Congested queue debit marks some packets

2. Receiver feeds back debit marks3. Sender re-inserts feedback (re-feedback)into the forward data flow as credit marks

4. Outcome:End-points still do congestion controlBut sender has to reveal congestion it will causeThen networks can limit excessive congestion

5. Cheaters will be persistently in debtSo network can discard their packets(In this diagram no-one is cheating)

1

23

54

one bit opens up the futurestandard ECN (explicit congestion notification)

+ re-inserted feedback (re-feedback) = re-ECN

no changes required to IP data forwardingno changes required to IP data forwarding

Page 19: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

19

status – IETF

• since 2006 IETF support for TCP capacity sharing has collapsed to zero• thought leaders agree TCP dynamics correct, but sharing goal wrong

• many support our new direction – not universally – yet!

• rewrite of IETF capacity sharing architecture in process• IETF delegated process to IRTF design team

• early Sep’09• proposed IETF working group: “congestion exposure” (experimental)• >40 offers of significant help in last fortnight

• Microsoft, Nokia, Cisco, Huawei, Alcatel-Lucent, NEC, Ericsson, NSN, Sandvine, Comcast, Verizon, …

• 2 days ago: IESG / IAB allowed agenda time, Hiroshima Nov’09• non-binding vote on working group formation

• not a decision to change to IP – defer until support is much wider

glossaryIETF Internet Engineering Task ForceIESG Internet Engineering Steering GroupIAB Internet Architecture BoardIRTF Internet Research Task Force

glossaryIETF Internet Engineering Task ForceIESG Internet Engineering Steering GroupIAB Internet Architecture BoardIRTF Internet Research Task Force

Page 20: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

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• simple invisible QoS mechanism• apps that need more, just go

faster• only throttles traffic when your

contribution to congestion in the cloud exceeds your allowance

• simple invisible QoS mechanism• apps that need more, just go

faster• only throttles traffic when your

contribution to congestion in the cloud exceeds your allowance

example#1: retail flat fee congestion policing

bulkcongestion

policer

Internet

0.3%congestion

0%

0.1%

2 Mb/s0.3Mb/s6 Mb/s

Acceptable Use Policy

'congestion-volume' allowance: 1GB/month

@ €15/month

Allows ~70GB per day of data in typical conditions

Page 21: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

© British Telecommunications plc

ND

NA

NB

NC

solution

legend:legend:example#2: bulk cost in border SLAs ‘routing money’

re-ECNdownstreamcongestionmarking [%]

bit ratearea =instantaneousdownstream

congestion volume

area =instantaneousdownstream

congestion volume

just two counters at bordermeter monthly bulk congestion-volume

= true marginal cost

without measuring flows

just two counters at bordermeter monthly bulk congestion-volume

= true marginal cost

without measuring flows

0|0|2|7|6|0|5€

Page 22: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

22

openopen

closedclosed

openopen

closedclosed

1995 2009

telco/NGN

Internet

cellular

satellite

cable

bringing information to the control point

Internet

• flat fee policer is just one example... • huge space for business &

technical innovation at the control point• cost based, value-cost based• bulk, per flow, per session• call admission control• policing, charging• tiers, continuous• wholesale, retail

• truly converged architecture• can apply different industry cultures• through policies at the control point• not embedded in each technology

Page 23: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

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main steps to deploy re-feedback / re-ECN

• network• turn on explicit congestion notification in data forwarding

– already standardised in IP & MPLS– standards required for meshed network technologies at layer 2

(ECN in IP sufficient for point to point links)• deploy simple active policing functions at customer interfaces

around participating networks• passive metering functions at inter-domain borders

• terminal devices• (minor) addition to TCP/IP stack of sending device• or sender proxy in network

• then new phase of Internet evolution can start• customer contracts & interconnect contracts• endpoint applications and transports

• requires update to the IP standard (v4 & v6)• started process in Autumn 2005• using last available bit in IPv4 header or IPv6 extension header

summaryrather than control sharing in the access links,

pass congestion info & control upwards

Page 24: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

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summary• the invisible hand of the market,

whether competitive or regulated• favours ISPs that share capacity in

their customers' best interests

• cost (congestion) transparency• customers reveal costs

to providers

• aligns incentives1. primary Internet capacity

sharing mechanism (weighted TCP)

2. ISP policing mechanisms

• encourages diversity in both• ensures whole value chain

accounts for infrastructure costs

content industry, CDNs, network wholesalers & retailers, Internet companies, end-customers, business, residential

• can’t enforce neutrality1. can at least provide the

means to run a viable neutral business in a commodity market

2. for value-based business: reveals currently unknown costs

• joins up broken Internet value chain

Page 25: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

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more info...• The whole story in 7 pages

• Bob Briscoe, “Internet Fairer is Faster", BT White Paper (Jun 2009) ...this formed the basis of:• Bob Briscoe, "A Fairer, Faster Internet Protocol", IEEE Spectrum (Dec 2008)

• Inevitability of policing• [CFP06] The Broadband Incentives Problem, Broadband Working Group, MIT, BT, Cisco,

Comcast, Deutsche Telekom / T-Mobile, France Telecom, Intel, Motorola, Nokia, Nortel (May ’05 & follow-up Jul ’06) <cfp.mit.edu>

• Slaying myths about fair sharing of capacity• [Briscoe07] Bob Briscoe, "Flow Rate Fairness: Dismantling a Religion" ACM Computer

Communications Review 37(2) 63-74 (Apr 2007)• How wrong Internet capacity sharing is and why it's causing an arms race

• Bob Briscoe et al, "Problem Statement: Transport Protocols Don't Have To Do Fairness", IETF Internet Draft (Jul 2008)

• Understanding why QoS interconnect is better understood as a congestion issue• Bob Briscoe and Steve Rudkin "Commercial Models for IP Quality of Service Interconnect" BT

Technology Journal 23 (2) pp. 171--195 (April, 2005)• Equitable quality video streaming

• [Crabtree09] B. Crabtree, M. Nilsson, P. Mulroy and S. Appleby “Equitable quality video streaming” Computer Communications and Networking Conference, Las Vegas, (January 2009)

available from the re-ECN & re-feedback project page:http://bobbriscoe.net/projects/refb/

[email protected]

Page 26: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

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Internet cost transparency

Q&A...& spare slides…

Page 27: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

© British Telecommunications plc

partial deployment of re-feedback / re-ECN

• network equipment • both policing & forwarding: each network that wants to see

congestion can deploy independently of others• not all forwarding equipment can do ECN today

fine if it drops instead, esp if not frequently congested

• sender• distinction between re-ECN & non-re-ECN packets• sender can choose which it sends• if network is policing based on re-ECN info

it’s likely to rate-limit non-re-ECN packets

• receiver• works OK with Vista receiver now• upgrade to receiver to work precisely

Page 28: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

© British Telecommunications plc

problems using congestion in contracts

1. loss: used to signal congestion since the Internet's inception• computers detect congestion by detecting gaps in the sequence of packets• computers can hide these gaps from the network with encryption

2. explicit congestion notification (ECN): standardised into TCP/IP in 2001• approaching congestion, a link marks an increasing fraction of packets• implemented in Windows Vista (but off by default) and Linux, and IP routers

(off by default)

3. re-inserted ECN (re-ECN): standards proposal since 2005• packet delivery conditional on sender declaring expected congestion• uses ECN equipment in the network unchanged

1. loss 2. ECN 3. re-ECN

can't justify selling an impairment

absence of packets is not a contractible metric

congestion is outside a customer's control

customers don't like variable charges

congestion is not an intuitive contractual metric

Page 29: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

© British Telecommunications plc

can then be built (and destroyed) over this

value-based session business models

example sustainable business modelfor basic data transport

usage chargecapacity chargedata flow

monthlycapacitycharging

bulk monthlyusagecharging

NA

NB

ND

R2S1

NC

bulkcongestionpolicer

bulkcongestionpolicer

usage flat fee+ capacity flat fee

flat monthly fee

monthlycapacitycharging

bulk monthly usagecharging

NA

NB

ND

S2R1

NC

$ £¥ €

$ $ £

bulkcongestion

policer

bulkcongestion

policer

$ £¥ €

$ $ £

Page 30: Internet cost transparency mending value chain incentives Bob Briscoe Chief Researcher, BT Sep 2009 This work is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project

© British Telecommunications plc

• applications & services

• transport layer on end-points – usage costs currently visible here

• internetwork layer– once usage costs revealed here– ISPs won't need

deep packet inspection for cost control

• link layer– can remove bit-rate limits in shared access:

passive optical, cable, wireless, cellular...

a new chapter of innovation

smooth quality video>2x more videos

QoS mechanism simple – just go faster

novel service & appbehaviours

traffic engin’gintra & inter

QoS interconnecttrivial

hi-speedtransfers

network DDoSnatural protection

server DDoSprotection

shared medium access delegate upwards

low latencyalways

congestionpolicing

simpler access technologies

potential

batteryoptimisation

resilience using multi-paths

access unbundlingat IP layer!

background transfersincentivised

commercially viable interface to Internet layer