International Viewpoint IV381 September 2006

IV381 - September 2006

INTERNATIONALVIEWPOINT

News and analysis from the Fourth International

Lebanon/Israel

Reproductive Rights

Brazil

LebanonAgainst resolution 1701, against the sending of NATO troops - Gilbert Achcar 3

IsraelThe Limits of Might - Michel Warschawski 4

United StatesElections and Regime Crisis - Against the Current 6

Reproductive Rights USAJumping Through Hoops - Dianne Feeley 8

Femicide in Latin AmericaA Tale of Two Cities - Kathy Lowe 10

Aids CrisisTime to Deliver! - Julia Barnett 11

SwedenNarrow victory for the Swedish right - Anders Svensson 12

BrazilFor an alternative in Brazil - Left Front 14

Review Liberation, Then What? - John Saul on South Africa reviewed - Jeffery R Webber 17The revival of a political tradition - Celia Hart's new book reviewed - John Lister 20

Our HistoryAlain Krivine and Algeria - Alain Krivine 22

FI Youth Camp 2006Pasta, politics and parties - Thomas Eisler , Penelope Duggan 26

European Anti-Capitalist LeftCall for Anti-G8 mobilisation in Rostok - European Anti-Capitalist Left 27

DebateThe Labor Aristocracy Myth - Charlie Post 29Eleven Theses on the Resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism - Gilbert Achcar 38Twelve comments plus one more,

to continue the debate with John Holloway - Daniel Bensaïd 42

TheoryThe Mole and the Locomotive - Daniel Bensaïd 44The Marxism of Trotsky's "Results and Prospects" - Michael Löwy 49Dialectics and Revolution - Michael Löwy 51The Challenge of Revolutionary Democracy

in the Life and Thought of Rosa Luxemburg - Paul Le Blanc 57Uneven and Combined Development

and the Sweep of History: Focus on Europe - Paul Le Blanc 60

Letter to ReadersInternational Viewpoint needs €3,670 - Chris Brooks 72

International Viewpoint - IV381 - September 2006

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Lebanon/Israel - Reproductive Rights - Brazil

IV381 - September 2006

INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINTis a review of news and analysis publishedunder the auspices of the Executive Bureau

of the Fourth International. IV appears online at

www.internationalviewpoint.organd in a monthly pdf version.

Editorial office: PO Box 112, Manchester M12 5DW UK

ISSN 1294-2925

It would, moreover, require an extraordinarydose of naivety to believe for a single instantin the attachment of the permanent membersof the SC to the sovereignty of any state otherthan their own. Resolution 1559 - and the factthat it was adopted in 2004, and not before,amply demonstrates it - fits in an obviousfashion into the US action against Iran in thecourse of their occupation of Iraq, targetingboth of Teheran’s allies: the Syrian regimeand Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006 is everybit as flagrant in this respect. It was adoptedafter several weeks of stonewalling of the SCby Washington to allow Israel time to pursueits aggression. Its iniquity is blatant inasmuchas it fails to condemn Israel’s criminalaggression, mentioning only “Hezbollah’sattack on Israel” and the “hostilities inLebanon and in Israel” (sic).

It shows a flagrant hypocrisy in demandingthat Israel "cease its offensive militaryoperations” without even demanding theimmediate lifting of the blockade it isimposing on Lebanon - as if a blockade wasnot an eminently offensive militaryoperation.

The iniquity is just as flagrant when the newUNIFIL - which, remarkably, is deployedonly on the territory of the occupied countryis supposed to ensure that its zone ofdeployment is not used for “hostile activitiesof any kind”. Resolution 1701 does not say aword on the protection of Lebanese territoryagainst the repeated aggression by Israel,occupying power in Lebanon for 18 years(without speaking of the portion of territoryoccupied since 1967).

To get an idea of the very biased character ofthe vision of UNIFIL upheld by the Europeanstates that will provide its backbone, read theinterview given to the newspaper Le Monde(August 31, 2006) by Jean-Marie Guéhenno,head of the UN’s peacekeeping operations. Itrequires no commentary.

“Could you be brought to use force againstHezbollah? We could be brought to do it withrespect to any element that would hinder ourfreedom of movement or would represent athreat to the population or to peace. [...]

"What would UNIFIL do in the case of a raidby the Israeli army on the Lebanon?

"Unhappily, since the cessation of hostilities,there have been more Israeli violations thanviolations by Lebanese armed elements. [...]Could it be brought to use force against Israelin this case? I think that Israel wantsinternational law to be upheld, and given thatresponsibility and sovereignty hand in handin Lebanon, would assume its responsibilitiesin respecting international law.”

Resolution 1701 is filled with deliberatelyambiguous formulations that raise theprospect of a combat mission coming underChapter VII of the Charter, whichWashington and Paris invoked directly intheir draft resolution distributed on August 5and rejected by Hezbollah and the Lebanesegovernment. Before these objections,Washington and Paris abandoned the idea ofa new international force in Lebanon,contenting themselves with the UNIFIL forcealready in position.

Nonetheless, the mandate of this latter hasbeen profoundly altered, not only in the senseindicated above, but also as to its zone ofactivity, with UNIFIL II authorised to deployalong the Lebanese-Syrian border and controlLebanon’s aerial and maritime access.

In sum, the spirit of this resolution is to treatLebanon as if it was the aggressor! In thissense it represents an attempt to continue theIsraeli war in the Lebanon in another fashion,which could imply war operations in theshort or medium term. That is why it shouldbe vigorously denounced and rejected byanybody who upholds the spirit of the UNCharter.

That does not mean rejecting the presence ofUNIFIL along the Lebanese-Israeli frontier.

UNIFIL has been in place since 1978 and isaccepted by all the Lebanese political forces.In spite of its obvious ineffectiveness as tothe protection of Lebanon against Israeliencroachments on its sovereignty, and itsinaction in the face of the invasion ofLebanon by Israel in 1982 and its occupationof south Lebanon for 18 years, it is a preciouswitness to these violations of sovereignty.

What is important is 1) to reject the profoundand dangerous change in the UNIFILmandate represented by resolution 1701, and2) to oppose the use of UNIFIL II and the UNcover in order to continue the war for thecommon objectives of Israel, Washington andParis in Lebanon. What is developing is therehearsal of a practice symptomatic of thenew era: the use of the UN as fig leaf formilitary operations led by Washington withNATO and other allies, as is the case inAfghanistan since December 2001.

In good logic, an intervention force should bemade up of troops from neutral countries. YetWashington and Paris are in no way neutral inthe Lebanese conflict. No force allied to theUS will be considered as neutral in a conflictbetween one of Washington’s principal alliesand another state. That is why all those whodesire peace in the Middle East and areconcerned by the US projects in this part ofthe world should energetically oppose thesending to and presence in Lebanon of troopsfrom NATO member countries.

A protest movement in this sense has begunin the countries in question, from Germany toTurkey, via France, Italy and Spain. The taskis all the more necessary in that Israel givesitself the “right of the strongest” to reject theparticipation in UNIFIL of troops fromcertain Muslim countries, on the pretext thatthey are not neutral in the Israeli-Arabconflict.

Gilbert Achcar grew up in Lebanon and teachespolitical science at the University of Paris-VIII. Hisbest-selling book The Clash of Barbarisms just cameout in a second expanded edition and a book of hisdialogues with Noam Chomsky on the Middle East,Perilous Power, is forthcoming.


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Lebanon

Against resolution 1701, against the sending of NATO troopsGilbert Achcar

Lebanon has, in recent years, been a privileged terrain for the shift brought about bythe ending of the very specific system of “balance of powers” mutually necessary forthe two Cold War superpowers until 1990. Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004)on the subject of the Lebanon is both the most flagrant violation of the UN Charterand a monument to hypocrisy. Adopted without any submission to the SC from theLebanese government, it proclaims its attachment to the sovereignty of Lebanon whileinterfering in its internal affairs in violation of article 2, point 7, of the Charter, whichprohibits any intervention “in matters which are essentially within the domesticjurisdiction of any state”.


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It is not yet what a majority ofIsraelis, and more and moresenior politicians are demanding- a national independent inquirycommission, having juridicalpower, like after the 1973 war orthe massacres of Sabra andShatilla, in 1982. Last week,60,000 civilians, led by reservesoldiers and officers who havefought in Lebanon, made thisdemand loud and clear, and onecan expect that such acommission may still beestablished.

If one had still doubts about thepathetic failure of the Israelimilitary offensive in Lebanon,the decision of the PrimeMinister put the things straight:33 days of colossal use ofmilitary force didn’t bring anysubstantial result, exceptmassive destruction and horriblemassacres. Haaretz editorial isunambiguous on the failure ofthe Israeli offensive: “There isno room for mistake: despite theattempts of the Prime Ministerand the IDF generals to count theIDF achievements, towards itscoming end, the war is perceivedin the area and in the world, butalso in the eyes of the Israelipublic, as a painful defeat, withnegative far reachingimplications...” [1]

Political as well as militaryinitiatives are usually evaluatedaccording to their initialobjectives. A first problem weare confronted with, is the lackof clearly defined objectives, or,more precisely, the fact that thestated objectives of the war havechanged many times. First, thedeclared aim was to release theIsraeli prisoners of war capturedby Hezbollah. Then, few daysafter the beginning of the Israelioffensive, PM Olmertannounced that the objectivewas to eradicate Hizbollah, notless! The method suggested bythe Israeli High command wascharacteristic of the narrow-mind of military seniorpersonnel and their inability tolearn anything from history,including their own one:massive terror operations againstLebanon, in order to “teach theLebanese government andpeople” what is the price ofletting Hezbollah act fromLebanese territory. The result ofundiscriminating destructionsand killings in Lebanon(including Beirut airport, morethan hundred bridges, powerstations etc) was to create amassive pro-Hizbollahsentiment among the Lebanesepeople, including large sectorsof the Christian population.

Confronted with the growingsympathy towards Hizbollah andhis sensational ability to hit theheart of Israel with hundreds ofrockets, the declared objectivewas reduced to “destroy theability of Hizbollah to sendrockets on the Israeli territory.”Two weeks after the colossal airstrikes on Hizbollah, the numberof rockets hitting Israel, andprovoking serious damages to allthe northern part of the countryis even bigger than before!Another failure. Finally - fortoday - the objective has onceagain been enlarged: to restorethe Israeli capacity of dissuasionand its image as a local militarysuper-power.

Israel

The Limits of MightMichel Warschawski

This morning (13 Sept. - ed) the Israeli newspapers headlinesannounced that Israeli PM, Ehud Olmert, agreed to theformation of a fact-finding commission, headed by a seniorjudge, in order to evaluate all the aspects, political as well asmilitary, of the Israeli war in Lebanon. This commission isreplacing the various non-independent inquiry commissionspreviously established by the PM and the army.

himself... why after more than150 killed in the last threeweeks, they are still trying oneQassam, one more rocket. Whythe logic of the IDF, whichcalculates its strength by thequantity of steel at its disposal,why this logic doesn’t work onthem...”

The fact that the Israeli army hasnot been able to achieve evenone objective, and that after amonth Hizbollah is still able tostrike hundreds of rockets onIsrael is perceived in Israel as anational tragedy. “Does someonethink we have won?” asks YoelMarcus, “who believe that thepromises of Ehud Olmert at the

The fact that after a month Hizbollah is stillable to strike hundreds of rockets on Israel is

perceived in Israel as a national tragedy.This objective too has not beenachieved, on the contrary. AsZwy Barel, Haaretz expert forthe Arab world explains: “Whywould someone in Lebanon bedissuaded, when he is witnessingits houses destroyed, thechildren of its neighbors andtheir parents killed by hundreds,and having almost no chance tostart school-year on time? He isnow convinced that the war isnot anymore against Hizbollahonly, but against Lebanon,against himself, whether he isChristian, Druze or Shiite.” [2]In his article, Barel suggests tothe Israeli leaders to try to learnsomething from the Palestinianexperience: “Whoever doesn’tunderstand the formula can ask

beginning of the war to eradicateHezbollah and to finish with thethreat of rockets on Israel, wasfulfilled?” [3]

But the conclusion drawn by themilitary high command, most ofthe Israeli leadership and manyIsraeli commentators was still toincrease the offensive, tomobilize more reserve units, totry to invade and occupy parts ofLebanon. The same YoelMarcus, signor commentator inHaaretz, concluded his article onthe total failure of the Israelioffensive with the followingappeal: “It is now clear that thefight is not on Lebanon. We arenot confronted with a localorganization, but the arm linked


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Israel

and acting on behalf Iran andSyria., Al Qaeda and thefollowers of the path whichstarted with the Twin Towers.Israel is not only defendingKiryat Shmoneh, Hedera andmay be Tel Aviv; it became,against its own will, a partner inthe war against Islamfundamentalism, what Bushnames “the axis of evil”, in thispart of the world... Theconclusion must be to take a bigbreath and to initiate a fight withall the might we have at ourdisposal, in the air and in theground, until we are able toneutralize Hezbollah, as amilitary militia on our borders.We must reach a cease-fire whenwe are the winning side, to showthem that even the small Satanhas teeth... ” [4]

Finally, after more destructionsand killings - according tointernational organizations,more than 80% of the bombswere thrown in the last week ofcombat - and many morecasualties in the Israeli army,Olmert has been obliged toaccept the UN Security Councilresolution calling not for acease-fire, but for a “stop tohostilities”. The Israeli army isstill active in Lebanon, but it isdefinitely an army which hassuffered a defeat.

Often, during demonstrations inthe Palestinian occupied

territories, and witnessing themassive use of force and thebrutality of the Israeli soldiersagainst civilians, we use to tellthem: “Big heroes! Your war isagainst unarmed women andchildren, and you dare calling it“confrontation or even “abattle”! The kind of wars you arestrong at is wars against helplesscivilians! But when you will beconfronted with real fighters,you will not know how to fight,and you will either die or runaway like rabbits!” And indeedIsraeli soldiers are experiencinga war with well trained and wellmotivated fighters, and provingto be completely un-efficient.The number of casualties ishuge, compared to the relativelysmall quantity of Hizbollahfighters, and one should askwhat it may be if Israel dare toattack Syria, not only from theair, where definitely Israel hastremendous superiority.

The Israeli experience isobviously reminding the USexperience in Iraq: a powerfularmy, but too powerful, too self-confident, too arrogant and toospoiled to be able to fight withthe efficiency that the hugemeans at its disposal may haveled to expect they willdemonstrate.

The Israeli political as well asmilitary establishment is, rightnow divided; between those who

Peace demonstrators clash with police in Tel Aviv

want an immediate revenge, inorder to show to the world, andto the US neo-conservativeleadership, that it has still itscapacity of deterrence, and canplay the role allocated to the IDFin the global non-endingpreemptive war, and those whobelieve that Israel needs first tore-organize its armed forces, inorder to be able to win. Thedemand for a reaches and a newopportunity to how what theguys are “really able to do” isvery strong; the demands to putorder in the Israeli mess, isstrong too.

In the next few months, we willknow which of these currentswill win, depending amongother, on the conclusions of thevarious fact-finding and inquirycommissions. But in both cases,

there will be a second round, ifonly because it is part of the neo-conservative strategy of globalnon-ending preemptive war forthe re-colonization of the worldand the establishment of a“Great Middle East” under fullUS hegemony. And we too shallprepared for this next round.

Michel Warschawski is a journalistand writer and a founder of theAlternative Information Center (AIC) inIsrael. His books include On theBorder (South End Press) andTowards an Open Tomb - the Crisis ofIsraeli Society (Monthly ReviewPress).

NOTES

[1] Haaretz editorial, August 8

[2] Haaretz, August 6, 2006

[3] Haaretz editorial, August 8

[4] idem

The Israeli army is still active in Lebanon,but it is definitely an army which has suffered

a defeat.


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The November election willhighlight, as usual, two sets ofquestions - the sound-and- furyones that generate most of thecampaign rhetoric and mediaspeculation; and the crucialissues that will be generally beignored, except for the one thatsimply can’t be skipped over: thewar and American defeat in Iraq.Meanwhile, the new Middle Eastwar - Israel’s assault on Lebanon- has proven what the Democratsare: as rabid a war party, ascynical and careless (especiallywith other nations’ lives) asanything the Republicans haveto offer.

The superficial mudslingingdebates will feature such topicsas whether the Democrats are“soft on terror” or theRepublicans “incompetent” infailing to find bin Laden orletting North Korea go nuclear;which is the party of“irresponsible spending” onsocial programs or tax cuts;who’s best at “securing theborder;” which politicianspromote “traditional values” andwho’s most corrupt (betweenwhich there is, admittedly, astrong positive correlation), andvarious other rubbish.

The issues to be debated poorly-or-not-at-all involve theexplosive health care crisis, theimmediate prospect of acatastrophic wider war withIran; the hemorrhaging ofdecent- paying jobs in the U.S.economy; catastrophic climatechange, which proceeds apace asour rulers wage endless war for

the oil-fuelled empire; electoralrigging and the stripping away ofvoting rights; the step-by-stepreplacement of democratic rightsby presidentialist decree with theassent of Congress and thecourts - in short, most of thequestions that shape realpeople’s lives.

There’s no doubt thatmainstream national politics inAmerica is polarized, bitterlydivided and incredibly vicious.At the same time, it’s almostdevoid of substance, except for afew issues like preserving thebadly shredded fabric ofabortion rights, where theDemocrats remain underpressure from the women’smovement. Underlying thegeneral triviality of the officialdebate is a dual reality: thecollapse of public confidence inthe Bush regime, accompaniedby the extreme decay of theDemocratic Party as ameaningful opposition party, i.e.a force that can seriouslyconfront the political drivetoward the far right (to thedegree it even wants to do so).

Some historical perspective: Thelast time a Republicanpresidency was so discredited bya failed war, revelations ofcriminal conspiracy and globaleconomic uncertainty was thecrisis of the Richard Nixonregime in 1973-4 at the height ofthe Watergate scandal. Thedifference between then and nowlies above all in the relativestrength of social movements -antiwar, civil rights and above

United States

Elections and Regime CrisisAgainst the Current

WILL THE DEMOCRATS “regain control of Congress”? WillJoseph Lieberman change parties? Will Hillary Clinton be theDemocratic frontrunner for 2008? How much does any of thismatter?

all labor - in that period,compared to the present level ofstruggle, above all the incipientcollapse of the U.S. labormovement after three decades ofa corporate and governmentoffensive against working classpeople in America.

Nixon’s fall, however, thatsegment was moving into theRepublican column where it hasnow become firmly planted.Despite this, Nixon’s failures inwar, domestic crimes and theonset of economic crisisappeared to be propelling theDemocratic Party to the stature

Iraq war: ’bleeding the Bush regime to death’

Underlying the general triviality of the officialdebate is a dual reality: the collapse of publicconfidence in the Bush regime, accompanied

by the extreme decay of the DemocraticParty as a meaningful opposition party,

The Democrats retain anenormous electoral apparatus,but their social base is highlysegmented. Organized labor,such as it is, remainspredominantly in theDemocratic fold although thissupport is somewhat eroded;African-American voters areoverwhelmingly Democratic,which is why rightwing voterfraud and intimidation isdirected principally againstthem; Republican inroads intothe Latino vote are likely to beblunted by the sheer viciousnessof the right wing’s anti-immigrant crusade. But much ofthe Democrats’ base is now inthe white suburban “sociallyliberal, fiscally conservative”sector, whose loyalties are fickleand diluted.

Before 1968, to be sure, theDemocrats’ hegemony inCongress still rested on the mostrotten of foundations, the racistDixiecrat South. By the time of

of a hegemonic national party -an opportunity that came in withthe 1974 midterm election andquickly passed after 1976 withthe debacles of the Jimmy Carteradministration. Above all, as aloyal party of Americancapitalism, the Democrats fullyparticipated in the restructuringthat attacked the working classand set in motion the destructionof the movement that was theparty’s main base.

The Democratic Partyestablishment today is fracturedover the Iraq war - with JohnKerry (“I opposed the war beforeI voted for it, before I votedagainst it”) having finally gottenaround to opposing it, after afashion, while Senators HillaryClinton and Joseph Liebermancontinue to be so committed tothis failed imperial venture thatthey are being challenged fromthe party’s base, which hates thewar, and in Lieberman’s caseactually dumped by Democratic


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United States

primary voters. In any case,unlike their voters, theDemocrats do not want to stopthe Iraq war - cynically, theywant the Bush administration toabsorb the blame for “bungling”it and for the ongoing carnage;and the congressionalDemocrats’ foaming-at-the-mouth performance during thedestruction of Lebanon showsthey hope to share the “credit”for lining up support for warwith Syria and Iran.

If the Democrats aren’t opposingthe war, what then are theyarguing about? An importantNew York Times article byRobin Toner gives some of theanswers (“Optimistic,Democrats Debate the Party’sVision. Seeking Big Goals and aClear Alternative toConservatism,” May 9, 2006:A1, A18). The party’s “analysts,both liberals and moderates, areconvinced that the Democratsface a moment of historicopportunity...But some of theseanalysts argue that the partyneeds something more than apastiche of policy proposals. Itneeds a broader vision, anarrative, they say, to return topower and govern effectively -what some describe as anunapologetic appeal to the‘common good,’ to big goals likeexpanding affordable healthcoverage and to occasionalsacrifice for the sake of thenation as a whole.”

A variety of ideas are out there.Thomas Friedman, the Times’designated apostle ofglobalization, proposesfinancing economic renovationand reviving national purpose bytaxing gasoline up to $4 a gallon.Others suggest a return to

muscular Cold War liberalism,represented by The NewRepublic, where Democratswould promote tough foreignand military (but multilateralist)policies while reviving socialprograms at home. On the right,The Third Way and itsideological cousin theDemocratic Leadership Councilpromote a centrist “middleclass” perspective in place offighting for “special interests”like labor and people of color.On the liberal wing of thespectrum stands MichaelTomasky of The AmericanProspect, whose views aresummarized by Robin Toner:

Mr. Tomasky argues that theDemocratic Party needs to standfor more than diversity andrights; it needs to return to itsNew Deal, New Frontier andGreat Society roots and run asthe party of the common good -the philosophy, he says, thatbrought the nation SocialSecurity, the Marshall Plan, thePeace Corps and civil rightslegislation. After years of whathe calls “rapacious socialDarwinism” under Mr. Bush,Mr. Tomasky argues that thecountry is ready for the idea that“we’re all in this together -postindustrial America, theglobalized world and especiallythe post-9/11 world in whichfree peoples have to unite tofight new threats - together.”

Tomasky’s liberal enthusiasmevades at least two fundamentalquestions. First: What is meantby the “new threats” that “freepeoples” have to fight“together”? Is it the “threat” ofIran? Of immigrants? Somethingelse from outside? Or is the mainthreat from inside: the assault on

democracy, civil liberties andworkers’ rights mounted by theBush regime, the right wing andcorporate America, the USAPATRIOT Act and domesticspying, to say nothing ofGuantanamo, Abu Ghraib andsecret renditions, on which mostDemocrats have nothing to say?

Second: What about the war?Just because it may convenientlybleed the Bush administration todeath doesn’t mean the questionwill go away for the Democrats.It’s not just that American voterswill want to know, not only in2006 but also 2008, what theDemocrats actually think aboutthese issues. The fact that theDemocratic Party will notdemand ending the war meansthat any promises it makes to fixa broken society are lies, whichcannot be kept. A party thatdoesn’t oppose the current war,and the next one, has no claim torepresent the antiwar movement- or to lead the country. The factthat the Democrats intend toinherit power as the Bush regimefalls apart from its own imperialarrogance and incompetencedoesn’t mean they can or willclean up the mess it leavesbehind.

Our purpose here, in any case, isnot to advise or salvage apseudo-opposition party that hasessentially given up on reform,ceded the ideological initiativeto the Republican right wing,and pretty much allowed theBush gang to get away with

anything. For our part, we’relooking for an escape from thequicksand of a rotten two-partysystem. At a time whenorganized labor is at its weakestsince the 1920s, we look to thepromise represented by theexplosive new immigrantworkers’ rights movement. Themagnificent self-organization ofthis past spring’s immigrantrights mobilizations shows thatthe situation is rather precariousfor both parties.

First and foremost, it’s socialmovements like this thatrepresent a hopeful future - andsecond, initiatives that can givethem an organized politicalexpression. That’s the potentialrepresented by Green partycampaigns, some of which wecover in this issue, in states likeCalifornia, Wisconsin andelsewhere. We need the kind ofparty these campaigns pointtoward - a party that will begenuinely independent ofcorporate power, with nocommitment to America-as-world-ruler, loyal to the realneeds of real people instead ofthe elites and the militarymachine.

It’s no longer about a lesser evil.It’s about the politics we needfor human survival.

Against the Current is the magazine ofSolidarity, a radical socialistregroupment in the United States.

Hillary Clinton with Joseph Lieberman (far right)


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another $38 million in matching funds. Fifty-one percent of sex education programsrequire abstinence to be portrayed as thepreferred option for adolescents, althoughinformation about contraception is permitted,and 35%, including half of all the districts inthe South, require an abstinence-onlyprogram.

Not only are these programs out of step withthe effective evidence about how to teach sexeducation, but they are out of step withreality.

Restrictions on Abortion

Since the 1973 Roe v. Wade decisionlegalizing abortion, the right wing has soughtto prevent hospitals from performing theprocedure, restricted clinics with a range ofregulations and harassed medical personalboth at the clinics and at their homes. On thefederal level, the government excludesabortion from medical coverage for womenin the military, denies the procedure to mostwomen receiving public assistance and, bothat home and abroad, has defunded familyplanning programs that provide abortionservices.

Given that abortions are not available in over90% of all the counties throughout the UnitedStates (and never have been), women in ruralareas are forced to travel several hours to aclinic. While 35% of women between 15-45obtain an abortion at some point in theirreproductive life, one third live in thecounties where there are no clinics. Lack ofaccess means a woman is unable to obtain theabortion as early as she would like in herpregnancy cycle. It can even mean a moreexpensive, second-semester abortion, raisingthe possibilities of medical complications.

In 1992 the Supreme Court placed significantrestrictions on abortion rights. In PlannedParenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v.Casey the court ruled that states had the rightto pass laws that don’t recreate an “undueburden.” Both supporters of women’s rightsand their opponents saw the case as asetback-the right wing was hoping foroverturning legal abortion while mostsupporters of women’s reproductive freedom

Yet in 2006 opponents of reproductive rightshave continued to move on several differentfronts:

In March the South Dakota legislature passeda law, subsequently signed by GovernorMike Rounds, banning abortions in the state.In defiance of the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision,this law includes no provision to protect thehealth of a pregnant woman. Before theintervention of activists who opposed the banthe law was scheduled to take effect July 1.

This summer the Jackson Women’s HealthOrganization, Mississippi’s lone remainingabortion clinic, has faced two waves of anti-abortion protests.

By a lopsided 65 to 34 vote, the Senaterecently passed a bill to make it a federalcrime for any adult to take a pregnant minoracross state lines for an abortion without herparents’ consent. The House ofRepresentatives passed an even stricterversion last year so if the two houses canagree on a compromise bill, President Bushwould gladly sign it into law.

On August 1 the Food and DrugAdministration (FDA) announced its plans tomake the morning-after pill known as Plan Bavailable over the counter for women 18 andolder. This is the first time the FDA everproposed a separate age status for a non-prescription drug. Plan B, which containsconcentrated amounts of the hormoneprogestin, is the most common form ofemergency contraception. Available in someEuropean countries for more than 20 years,Plan B can prevent a pregnancy within 72hours of intercourse, but is most effectivewithin the first 24. As an over-the-counterdrug with an age restriction, chances are thatit will only be available where pharmacistsare present.

In each case supporters of reproductivefreedom have organized to oppose theseactions.

In the case of South Dakota, 38,000 peoplesigned a petition to prevent the anti-abortionlaw from taking effect and demanded that theissue be placed on the ballot for a vote thisNovember. Oglala Sioux Tribal PresidentCecelia Fire Thunder announced at the time“I will personally establish a PlannedParenthood clinic on my own land, which iswithin the boundaries of the Pine RidgeReservation where the state of South Dakotahas absolutely no jurisdiction.” [1]

The Jackson clinic has gathered a network ofsupporters to defend the right of women toseek abortions.

Letters to the editor in hundreds ofnewspapers across the country have debatedthe issue of criminalizing adults who aidpregnant minors, with the vast majoritypointing to the reality that most teenagers dotell at least their mothers. The handful ofthose who don’t have good reason not to tell-they may have seen what their parents did toan older sister and want to shield themselvesfrom abuse.

Both medical professionals and networks ofreproductive rights supporters have opposedthe FDA’s age restriction on Plan B.

Years ago the right wing decided the best wayto attack sex education was to demand thatsuch programs teach abstinence as the onlyeffective birth control method. They insistcondoms lead to venereal disease whileabortion raises one’s risk of breast cancer andinfertility. Despite the lack of any evidencefor such claims, several states have legislatedthese sex “education” programs. For manyyoung women, especially in conservativestates like Mississippi, there are fewalternative sources for birth controlinformation.

Although U.S. educational policy isdecentralized, the priority set by federalfunds has a big impact on local schoolboards. Washington currently earmarksapproximately $80 million to promoteabstinence-only education and states provide

Reproductive Rights USA

Jumping Through HoopsDianne Feeley

It’s clear that women can make intelligent decisions for their lives when they aresupported in their goals and encouraged to consider their full range of options. Thisbegins with reproductive freedom, but needs to include access to education and healthcare, the right to a decent and meaningful job, the right to have a family and raise it ina safe environment. It includes quality day care for parents who need it, as most do.No matter how many obstacles the radical right attempts to put in front of women,women have an objective need to circumvent them.

“If you’re old enough to getpregnant, you’re old enough

to decide that you don’twant to be pregnant.”

realized the battle over which restrictionswould be considered “undue” had just begun.

Within the last year approximately 500 anti-abortion bills were introduced in statelegislatures and a couple dozen were signedinto law. More have been introduced thisyear. All this harassing legislation has animpact on clinics; there are nowapproximately 10% fewer clinics than adecade ago.

Today 32 states and the District of Columbiaprohibit the use of state funds except whenfederal funds are available; 46 allowindividual health care providers to refuse toparticipate in an abortion and 43 allowinstitutions to refuse to perform abortions.Twenty-two states require parental consentfor a teenager seeking an abortion. Only tworequire the signature of both parents; mostprovide for an additional mechanismwhereby the teenager can seek a bypass.Eleven states require parental notification;seven others have passed legislation but it ispermanently enjoined. (95,000 women 18 oryounger had an abortion in 2000.)

Twenty-eight states mandate a woman mustbe given “counseling” before an abortion thatincludes: the supposed link between abortionand breast cancer (3 states), the ability of afetus to feel pain (4 states), long-term mentalhealth consequences for a woman (3 states)or the availability of services and fundingshould the woman decide to carry thepregnancy to term (26 states). Twenty-fourrequire a one-day waiting period. This is aparticular problem for women traveling anydistance-recent statistics indicate that 25% ofthe women obtaining abortions travel morethan 50 miles; 8% travel more than 100miles.

Clinic Blockades

These institutional strategies accompany theright wing’s in-your-face actions at clinics.Twenty years ago they were able to mobilizeweek-long protests of several thousand;supporters of women’s rights organizedcounter pickets. The radical right didn’t justpicket. They attempted to “save” womenfrom abortions, stalked medical personnel,traced the license plates of any cars going tothe clinic, and put out wanted posters. In theend Congress was forced to enact legislationprotecting the clinics, but not before themurders of doctors performing abortions-

Drs. George Tiller (Witchita, KS), BarnettSlepian (Buffalo, NY) and David Gunn(Pensacola, FL), and Gunn’s escort, JohnBritton.

This summer both Operation Save America(descendent of Operation Rescue) and OhSaratoga picketed the Jackson Women’sHealth Organization, which stayed openthroughout. The protesters, ranging from 25-100, brought their signature blown-up fetusphotos. Operation Save America protestersalso targeted the neighborhood of the clinic’sgynecologist, Dr. Joseph Booker. They wentdoor to door, telling his neighbors thatBooker was “a baby killer.” Throughout theprotests Dr. Booker, a 62-year old AfricanAmerican, had a police escort. But like otherabortion providers, he took it all in stride.

A number of feminist organizations, mostnotably NOW and the Feminist Majority,organized to support the Jackson clinic,holding rallies in defense of women’sreproductive healthcare and fundraisers forthe extra expenses the clinic faced.

Restricting the Emergency Pill

Like abortion, the right wing has madeemergency contraception a battleground. Theright opposes it because it represents a“slippery slope.” Some even claim it worksthe same way an abortion does and thereforeis “taking a life.”

In December 2003 the FDA’s advisory panelvoted 28-0 that Plan B was “safe for use in anonprescription setting,” voting 23 to 4 infavor of granting it over-the counter-status.But following the 2003 vote, Dr. W. DavidHager, a Christian conservative and Bushappointee to the panel, stated his fear that ifPlan B were freely available, it wouldincrease sexual promiscuity amongteenagers.

In May 2004 the FDA denied the drugmanufacturer’s application, citing some ofHager’s reasoning. Two months later the

manufacturer reapplied for permission to sellit to women ages 16 and up. When, in August2005, the FDA announced it would delaymaking a decision, Dr. Susan F. Wood,director of the Office of Women’s Health atthe FDA, resigned in protest.

In response to this foot dragging, theMorning-After Pill Conspiracy, a grassrootscoalition of feminist groups, has beenengaged in civil disobedience. Over 4,000women have signed a pledge to distribute thepills to those who need them, period. AnnieTummino, lead plaintiff in a suit filed againstthe FDA stated, “If you’re old enough to getpregnant, you’re old enough to decide thatyou don’t want to be pregnant.”

According to a 2006 study by the GuttmacherInstitute, there are 6.4 million pregnancies ayear in the United States, 3.1 million ofwhich are unintended and 1.3 million thatend in abortion. In the seven years since thelast such study, the overall unintended-pregnancy rate (about half of all pregnancies)has remained unchanged-but women belowthe poverty level were four times as likely tohave an unplanned pregnancy and five timesas likely to have an unplanned birth. The ultraright, however, has a one-size-fits-allsolution: poor women who aren’t marriedshould be encouraged to get married!

While most of the right-wing’s rhetoricagainst women’s bodies has revolved aroundrestricting access to abortion and attackinglesbians and others regarded by the right assexually deviant, their agenda is much larger.They seek to reestablish the “traditionalfamily” as they imagine it so that “values”and “stability” will cover over the social andeconomic problems that confront Americanstoday. That ideology just isn’t in synch withreality.

NOTES

[1] Fire Thunder was subsequently impeached by theTribal Council for allegedly soliciting donations on behalfof the tribe for a proposed clinic without the council’sapproval. She is challenging her impeachment.


9

Reproductive Rights USA

Pro-choice activists on the march


10

In Ciudad Juarez, according to human rightsorganizations, over 400 women have metviolent deaths since 1993. Hardly a weekgoes by without another body beingdiscovered dumped in the desert or on wasteground behind the town. The murderedwomen are nearly all young and poor -students, domestics, or factory workers fromthe local foreign-owned assembly plantsknown as maquiladoras. Most have beenraped and tortured to death.

The picture is almost identical in GuatemalaCity. Guatemala’s femicide has claimed thelives of nearly 2,200 women and girls since2001. In the lawless capital women live inconstant fear of being snatched from thestreets by gangs or forced off buses atgunpoint into empty lots.

A dawn police patrol regularly recovers fromalleyways and rubbish dumps bodies oftenunrecognizable due to torture and sexualmutilation. In the killers’ methods there arestrong echoes of ferocious attacks on womenused by US-backed government troops anddeath squads in Guatemala’s long civil warthat ended in 1996. Most of the perpetratorsof those wartime crimes are still at large.

In both Guatemala City and Cuidad Juarezthe dead women’s families and advocacygroups have themselves been threatened asthey have tried to seek justice. Says AmnestyInternational: ‘Turning to the police is oftennot a safe option as so many officers havethemselves been implicated in corruption andviolent crimes.’

The Juarez outrages have provoked nationaland international protests, a stream of humanrights reports, condemnation by the UNHuman Rights Commission and delegations

to the Mexican President. Actors Jane Fondaand Sally Field are among the celebrities whohave made solidarity visits. Hollywood, itseems, even plans a film starring JenniferLopez as a reporter investigating themurders.

NGOs and human rights activists have helpeddistraught relatives of the slain Guatemalanwomen to publicise their cases. The motherof Maria Isabel Véliz, murdered in 2001 atthe age of 15, brought her case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights(IACHR) in January 2005. And in March thisyear the Organization of American Statesheard testimonies from a number of families.

The Guatemalan government set up aNational Commission on Femicide withsenior officials and politicians. In Mexico toothe chamber of deputies created a SpecialCommission on Femicide and the attorneygeneral established a prosecutor’s office forviolent crimes against women.

Yet there have been few arrests and evenfewer convictions. The women go on dying.

The Mexican and Guatemalan governmentsblame gang violence, drug-trafficking andcorruption. These problems of lawlessnessaffect everyone, they argue, not just women.

But while acknowledging that the number ofmen killed is much higher than women inGuatemala, the UN Special Rapporteur YakinErturk concluded after a 2004 investigationthere that the female cases “have a differentdimension”. This, she said, was due to theway in which women are being killed. “Theyare raped, mutilated, and this has a terribleimpact on women and society in general.”

Some Mexican women’s groups argue thatthe sight of young single women migrantsfrom the poor south of the country working inJuarez factories and living independentlymay have made them a particular target in aprofoundly misogynist society.

Women’s lives come cheap suggests YanetteBautista, Amnesty International’sinvestigator of violence against women. Lastyear, at a presentation of Amnesty’sinvestigation of the killings of women inGuatemala, she argued: ‘The atmosphere oftolerance by the (Guatemalan) state andsocietal indifference toward all forms ofviolence against women contribute to thefeminicide’.

Clearly in these neo-liberal metropolitanwastelands with their social disintegrationand, in the case of Guatemala, a recenthistory of war, there are few brakes on themost ferocious expressions of machismo. Bycontrast in Venezuela, Bolivia, and parts ofBrazil, where the left has not been defeatedand class solidarity is strong, women arehelping to lead inspiring struggles. Violenceagainst them may not have been eliminatedbut where they are respected and valued asequals by men and able to organizethemselves to articulate their demands, theyare in a much stronger position to pursuetheir liberation.

Kathy Lowe is an author and journalist, and asupporter of Socialist Resistance in England andWales.

Femicide in Latin America

A Tale of Two CitiesKathy Lowe

“Femicide” is the new word in Latin America. A new word for an old crisis. It refersto an epidemic of rapes and murders of women in the region that for years have goneunsolved and unpunished. Violence and sexual abuse against women remain rifeacross Latin America. But they have reached horrific extremes in Guatemala City andin Mexico’s bleak, free trade town of Cuidad Juarez across the border from the US. Inthese two notorious centres of femicide the abduction and brutal killings of womenhave become almost routine.

AIDS activists who are entering the seconddecade of activism in North America are tiredand those who are still alive continue to holdthe banners and demands of those who havedied. Unlike most social movements theAIDS movement has grown and expanded inmany ways that has created a genuine globalresponse.

Another crucial factor is the numbers of thosebecoming infected world wide at the rate ofclose to 40 million while thousands dieeveryday. If this conference did anything itgave a space for activists to make the globaldemands necessary to strategize, and fightback.

It has been gay men and lesbians for the mostpart who have been in the forefront of themovement in North America who createdclear, and non compromising demands fromthe State for prevention materials, access totreatment and care, and human rights throughcomprehensive AIDS strategies from bothgovernments and other institutions on aninternational basis and have won on manyfronts.

Many of these leaders in the movement havefor the most part died. However, new voicesfrom developing countries and voices ofwomen and youth that did not have a voice inthe past are emerging, and as a result, we arelearning and making links as never before.

Although the media hype was focused on“the two Bill’s (Bill Clinton and Bill andMelinda Gates) and celebrities, those of usworking, living with and activists in theAIDS movement became even moreconvinced that the demand forcomprehensive AIDS strategies that links thismovement to a broader anti - globalizationframework is crucial if we are to stop thespread of HIV in the decades to come.

One AIDS activist said it a long time ago“AIDS is like a lens of the world around us.AIDS reflects and manifests itself as it existsin the world.” It crosses societies throughinterconnecting and by multiple forms ofoppressions based on racism,sexism/misogyny, class, the suppression ofgender identities, the oppression of sexualpractices/desires and various forms of druguse and draconian drug policies.

The contradictions spu out while capitalisthegemony by the pharmaceuticals andthrough government inaction that breedsneglect, stigma, red tape, and miss guidedpolicies and practices increases on a dailybasis.

The international AIDS Conference focusedon the theme of Time to Deliver. Whileresearchers debated and shared papers onnew vaccines and new promising treatmentsand other scientific data, demonstrationswere held on ARV’s (HIV treatment) accessto developing nations immediately withoutpharmaceuticals or funders interference andat a cost for countries to develop their owngeneric medicine and dispensing rather thanstay dependent on the corporations that holdthe patens.

The largest demonstration was the Women’sand girls March and rally on the Mondaymorning of the opening day not only didspeakers focus on the numbers of womentesting positive around the world atdisproportionate rates than men but on thefundamental need for women to have controlover our own reproduction, access to generaland reproductive health care at no cost, theright to education, job training (beyond beadmaking NGO initiatives) and viableeconomic independence from men and theend to both male violence against women andboth State sanctioned and individual rape ofwomen and girls.

“Women’s rights are human rights” as one ofthe major demands were chanted. Anothersignificant demonstration organized duringAIDS 2006 was by Sex Workers and theirsupporters from over 21 countries demandingtheir own place not only at the conference,but also within their own countries. Theydemanded that sex work be recognized as aform of work that should include healthinsurance, paid vacation, and job security. Aswith all women, Sex trade workers demandedhuman rights and workers rights, and to betreated with respect as they are key people inthe fight for AIDS prevention strategieswithin all communities around the world.

Here, within the Canadian State The HarmReduction Movement has grown from theearly epidemic when we first began passingout clean sterile injecting equipmentincluding syringes to injection drug users to amore current comprehensive strategy thatincludes safer crack use equipment andNarcan distribution to heroin users to preventoverdose and through advocating for drugpolicy reform. We have seen since the 1980sthe drug policy reform and Harm Reductionmovements growing not only through out theCanadian State but internationally except forin the U.S.

The most recent demonstration during theInternational AIDS Conference reflected thisstruggle on a Federal Level. From Quebec toVancouver activists gathered to demand thatthe first North American safe injection site“Insite” remain open. It is under imminentthreat of closure pending a decision by theConservative government Health Minister toexempt the site from Federal legislationunder The Controlled Drugs and SubstancesAct section 56 in order to remain open.

Over 600 injection drug users frequent thesite on a daily basis. Hundreds of people haveprevented overdose, HIV infection, Hepatitis

Aids Crisis

Time to Deliver!Julia Barnett

The 16th International AIDS Conference Time to Deliver heldin Toronto Canada from August 13-18 has ended only to raisemore questions, more political demands, and a whole new senseof urgency for those living and dying from AIDS on a globallevel.


11


12

One reason for the big success for theConservative party is the Social-democratsthemselves. For 12 years they have been ingovernment and during this time they havebeen privatising, cost-cutting and generallyhave pursued a neo-liberal agenda, thoughcarefully and slow. The unemployment ratein Sweden during these years has grown to beamong the highest in Europe, much higherthan in the other Nordic countries.Throughout the election campaign the Social-democrats denied this and put forward claimsthat everything in the country was all right.This gave the Conservative party and theiralliance an opportunity to act as the morecredible alternative for creating more jobs.The deprivation of resources to the publicdomain including hospitals etc by the Social-democrats together with the Greens and theLeft-party created a paved road for theConservative alliance to follow. Thus theneo-liberal policies of the Social-democraticgovernment made it possible for theConservative alliance to win the election withan even worse neo-liberal agenda.

In some local elections the Social-democratshas made a better result than in the nationalelections. This is especially noteworthy when

it comes to the second city of Sweden,Gothenburg (Göteborg) where the Social-democrats got 7% more votes locally thannatinally. The local Social-democrats inGothenburg has been criticizing the social-democratic government for some years and inthe election campaign they criticised thefocus on ”everything is alright” and wantedthe campaign to focus on how to create morejobs and take better care of immigrants andrefugees. Due to this the local Social-democrats, with their popular local leaderGöran Johansson, stayed in power inGothenburg city.

The Left-party is another reason for the lossof power of the Social-democrats. Unable tocreate a left alternative to social-democracyand nearly always supporting the social-democratic government, even when it comesto privatisations they have been noalternative for the Swedish working class.Parts of the working class instead havesupported the racist Sweden-democrats inthis election.

Just as worrisome as the conservative victoryis the success in the local elections for theSwedish far-right, the racist party Sweden-

C, and have obtain drug treatment, and healthcare services by accessing Insite. This wasonly one of many demands and politicalpressure the AIDS movement has placed onthe conservative government led by StephenHarper who didn’t even show up to theconference.

As the disparity between developingcountries and the West are more apparentday-by-day and where the most vulnerablemembers of most communities on both sidesof the world are hardest hit by the AIDSPandemic. The rising contradictions ofglobalization unmask itself within the AIDSpandemic.

It is no wonder that governments findmillions of dollars and build their armies andspend it on war or occupation abroad ratherthan keeping essential services or resourcessuch as health care and treatment or waterpublic. It is also no surprise that we have tocontinue the struggle against the spread ofHIV and the care of those living with,affected, and stigmatized by this disease withlittle or scarce resources, it is no surprise thattrying to access funding and or having tocontend with bureaucracy at disproportionatelevels that the very lives of people living withHIV/AIDS are at stake.

As one woman AIDS activist put it “how canwe care for the orphans of HIV/AIDS if wecan’t give support, treatment, and a voice forthe women/the mothers of these children?”“How can we tell people to use a condomwhen there isn’t any and when there isn’teven clean or free water in the wholevillage?” For that matter it is no surprise thatthe future of humanity is at stake and as suchthe struggle contues.

Julia Barnett is an AIDS activist in Toronto for over adecade and has been a Sexual Health, AIDS andHarm Reduction Educator for over 16 years and amember of the New Socialist Group and supporter ofthe 4th International.

Sweden

Narrow victory for the Swedish rightA commentary on the Swedish election

Anders Svensson

The Swedish election resulted in change of power. For the first time in 30 yearsSweden will have a right majority-government. But the election victory for theconservative alliance was a narrow one. They only got two percent more votes thanthe left-parties, 48% against 46%. The number of parliamentary seats ended 178 forthe conservative alliance against 171 for the left wing bloc. Biggest party, despite theworst election result since 1928, is still the Social-democrats (Socialdemokratiskaarbetarpartiet, SAP) with 130 seats. The Social-democrats lost 14 seats whereas thebiggest party in the conservative alliance, the Conservative Party (Moderaterna) won42 which makes it the next biggest party with 97 seats. This is the best election resultfor the Conservative Party since 1928. A marginal gain for the greens (2 seats) and aloss of 8 seats for the Left-party only confirm the bad election results for the left-bloc.

The neo-liberal policies of the Social-democratic governmentmade it possible for the Conservative alliance to win the

election with an even worse neo-liberal agenda.


13

Sweden

democrats. Due to the fact that the social-democrats have been unable to create morejobs and to do anything at all about theunemployment, the Sweden-democrats havebeen able to use racism as a way to success.It’s easy to blame the high unemploymentrates on the immigrants and refugees. Theydid not make it to the national parliament thistime, but if nothing happens inside the leftand segmented extreme left in Sweden theracist Sweden-democrats will probably makeit to the national parliament next time. In thelocal elections however, they have won seatsin many local councils. Especially they gotvery high results in South Sweden, in areasclose to Denmark. In the national election inSouth Sweden they got around 10%,compared to only 3% nationally. In localelections in the same area they got up to morethan 20%.

The third party that supported the social-democratic government was the Greens.Although they have never gained a strongsupport in the working class and are not seenas an alternative in these groups.

The second biggest party outside theparliament is the new party, FeministInitiative, a feminist party led by an oldchairman of the left-party, Gudrun Schyman.They got 1% in the national elections. Mainlyvotes from traditional left-wing votersdespite the fact they claim to stand outsidethe left-right scale and also despite the factthey have no class oriented agenda at all.Their election result is definitely adisappointment for them. Just as the result forthe main victor of the last Europeanparliament elections in Sweden, Junilistan, isalso a big disappointment for his EU-criticand bourgeoisie party. They got only 0,5% inthe national election compared to 14% in thelast election to the European parliament.

There have been a strong right wing turn inthe Swedish elections. The Conservative

class probably will experience a harsh four-year period with big cuts in public spending,for example in the payment to theunemployed. There will also be moreprivatised schools. Most of the possiblyprofitable hospitals will be privatised as wellas most of the state-owned corporations. Thelegislation to protect a worker from gettingsacked will be weakened, especially foryoung people. The Conservative alliance willintroduce legislation that will force womenaway from the job market and legislation thatwill make life more difficult for refugees.The bourgeosisie right wing government willalso lower the property tax in such a way itwill primarily benefit the very rich. Thecompany taxation, already one of the lowestin Europé, will be even lower and the samegoes for the tax on big fortunes. All this willprobably lead to higher prices, lower wagesand increased segregation.

Anders Svensson is a member of the EC of theSocialist Party in Sweden and also a member of theFourth International’s International Committee.

party seem to have won a lot of votes in themiddle-class from the Social-democrats butalso some working class votes. They nowhave stronger support in the working classthan the Left-party. We have also seen asignificant number of working-class votesgoing to the extreme right, especially in localelections.

The extreme left did not have good electionresults and probably gained nothing takentogether. The two small stalinist groups lost 6seats together whereas the two parties withtrotskyist orientation gained 6 seats. TheCWI-section (Rättvisepartiet Socialisterna)thus has most local councillors (totally 8, 3new seats) of all Swedish extreme leftgroups. Socialist Party (Socialistiska Partiet),the Fourth International section probablygained 3 seats and now has 4 local councilseats in 4 different cities. Compared to thenumber of local seats (more than 200) for theextreme-right this is really nothing.

With the victory for the right-wingbourgeoisie parties the Swedish working-

Swedish election results, national electionsConservative Alliance (Alliansen) 178 seats Conservative Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet) 26.2% 97 seats Liberal Party (Folkpartiet liberalerna) 7.5% 28 seats Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) 6.6% 24 seats Center Party (Centerpartiet) 7.9% 29 seats

Left Bloc 171 seatsGreen Party (Miljöpartiet) 5.2% 19 seats Social Democratic Workers Party (Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet) 35.0% 130 seats Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) 5.8% 22 seats

Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) 2.9% Feminist Initiative (Feministiskt Initiativ) 0.7% Pirate Party (Piratpartiet) (a party formed around anti-copyright groups) 0.6% June List (Junilistan) 0.5%


14

INDEPENDENCE BYBREAKING WITH

IMPERIALISM ANDFINANCE CAPITAL

The economic policy of thegovernment is oriented aroundthe goal of satisfying theinternational markets, with lowinterest rates, free circulation ofspeculative capital and therepatriation of profits of foreigncompanies which make Brazilan exporter of capital to richcountries.

The foreign debt continues tobleed the national resourceswhite. Nearly 40% of thenational budget is consumed bythe payment of interest on thepublic debt, leaving less than 5%for investment.

We support the demand ofJubilee South against the debt;suspend the payment of theforeign debt and carry out anaudit. In relation to the internaldebt, we support an auditconforming to what is laid downin the Constitution of 1988 aswell as the analysis of itsstructure so as to identify thespeculators and the bigcompanies to whom we proposeto no longer pay anything.

Foreign multinationals make useof strategic economic sectorsfrom which they repatriate theprofits to their countries of

bankers who govern really, thatthey daily make use of thecorruption in the government.But the right is not only in thePSDB-PFL, it is also in the Lulagovernment. The banks haveobtained more profits with thePT government than at the timeof FHC. It is not then by chancethat they offered 7.9 million réisto the PT and 4.3 millions to thePSDB during the 2004 elections.

Lula will pay the bankers nearly520 billion réis of interest on thepublic debt. But 70% of thismountain of money will go intothe accounts of Brazil’s 20,000richest families. During thistime, the government spent 5.5billion réis per year for theFamily Purse, a programme ofsocial assistance used above all

Brazil

For an alternative in BrazilAgainst the bankers, imperialism and the corrupt!

Left Front

Just as the resistance of theslaves and a strong abolitionistmovement were necessary to putan end to slavery in the past,today, in order to suppressmodern slavery and create a justand sovereign country, workers,peasants, the middle classes,intellectuals, artists, Brazilianyouth and poor people shouldalso arise and mobilise.

The Brazilian people cannotcondemn themselves to choosebetween Lula and Alckmin, twocandidates who defend the sameneoliberal programme and thesame political practice ofcorruption which undermine theNational Congress and thegovernment. The candidacy ofHeloísa Helena is a realalternative for the Brazilianpeople faced with thesecandidates supported by thebankers.

The Left Front wants to liberatethe country from the clutches offinance capital and imperialism.Inside this front, workers, theunemployed, the millions of menand women who are in theinformal economy, living withdifficulty from their labour,workers’ political and socialorganisation, independentactivists, all have their place. Aswell as all the Braziliansrevolted by corruption andsubmission in the face of bigfinance capital and the bankers.

We will struggle together in thestreets and in the massorganisations to win the electoralsupport of the workers againstthe two blocs of the dominantclass, PT and PSDB-PFL [3].

THE PT AND THE PSDBGOVERN FOR 20,000

FAMILIES

The electoral battle is part of thestruggle of the people. In theelections, we will show that thebankers and the big bosses,represented by the politiciansand the conservative parties, arein power and do not represent analternative for Brazil. We willpresent a new alternative facedwith the governmental bloc ofthe PT and the bourgeois“opposition” of the PSDB-PFL.

Neither Lula, nor Alckmin! Heloísa Helena President!

We reproduce here the Manifesto of the Left Front, founded at the appealof the PSOL, PSTU and PCB.

We launch this appeal from Quilombo dos Palmares, inspired by thestrength of the struggle of Zumbi [1], so as to build the Left Front andproclaim the candidacy of Heloísa Helena for the Presidency of theRepublic. [2]

The Left Front wants to liberate the countryfrom the clutches of finance capital and

imperialismThese groups only oppose eachother to occupy more politicalspace, to see who will occupythe governmental machine, butthey are agreed on the essentials;on the neoliberal economy andfor the defence of institutionsmarked by corruption. It is onlya struggle to see who will benefitfrom the privileges of power.

The PSDB and PFL have alreadyshown with FHC [4] that it is the

as an instrument of electoralclientelism.

To fight the concentration ofwealth, defend the people andchange Brazil, the Left Frontpresents a series of proposals,makes an appeal to struggle andrequests your vote.

TO CONQUER REALSOVEREIGNTY AND

NATIONAL


15

plan which would allow the 4.5million landless families to settleat a cost of 17,000 réis each. Wecould also double the nationaleducation and health budget. Allthese initiatives, which arequalitative so as to resolve thesocial problems of the country,would cost 394.5 billion réis, orvery much less than the absurdquantity of money that Lula hasoffered to the bankers.

FOR NEW GENUINELYDEMOCRATIC

INSTITUTIONS WHICHREPRESENT A NEWPOWER UNDER THE

DIRECT CONTROL OFTHE WORKERS AND OF

THE PEOPLE

The Lula government is at thecentre of a political crisis which,as none before, has shown topublic opinion the real face ofthe regime of false democracy ofeconomic power and ofcorruption. Scandals havebrutally revealed thedecomposition of its institutions.From the Presidency and theExecutive to the judiciary via theNational Congress and thepolitical parties, the maininstitutions of the Republic arehenceforth assimilated withoutappeal as instruments of thedominant classes in the serviceof corruption and theexploitation of the people.

Lula and Alckmin arerepresentatives of this corruptionwhich reigns in the country. It isnot true that the public thinksthat in some way “everyone islike that”, because the majorityof people do not. The corruptionof the politicians and elites is thecharacteristic of the capitalistsystem.

Brazil

origin. These sectors - like oil,telecommunications, energy,steel - should be placed underthe control of the Brazilianpeople.

The proposal of a newalternative economic and socialproject demands structuralchanges that Braziliancapitalism has never realised andwhich, in the framework ofneoliberal globalisation, aremore inaccessible than ever for itbecause they cannot be obtainedwithout a rupture withimperialist domination.

The elimination of financialtyranny, speculation and the debtburden, the control of capital, therecuperation of the capacity ofintervention and state regulation,the extension of public servicesas well as the redistribution ofwealth, the creation of jobs,agrarian and urban reform, thepreservation of the environment,are so many indispensablemeasures to finish with thepoverty known by the majorityof the Brazilian population andto satisfy the historic demands ofthe workers and of the people.

With 520 billion réis of debtsthat Lula has paid to the bankersduring his term of office, itwould have been possible toeffect a great national changeand resolve very serious socialproblems. We can build forexample 16 million popularhouses (which is the size of thehousing deficit in the country) ata unit cost of 12,000 réis andthus offer jobs to the masses ofunemployed in the countrythrough the effort ofconstruction.

This sum would allow also tofinance a real agrarian reform

The presentation of a proposal ofradical democratisation of theregime and of political actionshould be done, always andsystematically, by articulatingthe denunciation of the decadentdemocracy of money and ofcorruption with its opposite; thereal democracy of theparticipation of the workers andof the people. The necessity ofradically democratising theregime, by changing its classcontent, should be repeatedforcefully as being a firstcondition for the application ofan emergency programmecapable of bringing the countryout of crisis and resolving theproblems of the majority of thepeople.

We want the voters to be able torevoke the mandates of thosewho have been elected and whodo not fulfil their promises. Wedemand the imprisonment andthe confiscation of the goods ofthe corrupt and the corruptors.We desire a radicaltransformation of popularrepresentation and its mandates,through an exclusive publicfinancing of the electoralcampaigns, the democratisationof schedules for electoralpropaganda in the media, therevocability of mandates and ofthe suppression of the barrierclause [5] which renders difficultthe representation of parties andcandidates without economicpower.

These measures should radicallyattack corruption, decreeing alsothe end of privileged forums, ofbanking and fiscal secrecy, byestablishing the wage ofparliamentarians and those whogovern through a referendum

public works toreduce

unemployment

reduction ofworking time

without loss ofwages

double theminimum wage

profound agrarianreform under

workers control

abrogation ofneoliberal reforms

no to reform of thelabour market andtrade union rights

the immediateabrogation ofprivatisations

immediatewithdrawal from thenegotiations on the

FTAA

creation of crèchesfor children from 0

to 6 years

against all forms ofracial or sexualdiscrimination

severe taxation ofthe banks and big

companies


16

Brazil

and with as basis of departurethe minimum wage.

With the project of conqueringreal popular sovereignty inBrazil, the Left Front announcesthat, in the government ofcomrade Heloísa Helena, theBrazilian people will be called,through an intense day ofmobilisations, to decide and togive the last word on: relationswith imperialism (IMF, FTAAand so on); the foreign andinternal debt and the necessity ofa real national independence;agrarian and urban reform and anew statute on land ownership;the amount of the minimumwage and budget priorities; thecriteria of preservation of theenvironment and so on.

A NEW ABOLITION ISNECESSARY TO PUT ANEND TO THE MODERN

SLAVERY

An immense sector of theBrazilian people still lives in asituation of semi-slavery. Tobegin with the slavery of poorlypaid waged labour anddismantled social rights.

Twenty two million Brazilianslive with a minimum wagewhich is one of the lowest in theworld. Data from the IBGEshow that 46.7% of familiessuffer from hunger, a rate whichreaches nearly 70% in theNortheast. During this time, the5,000 richest families in thecountry (0.01% of the totalfamilies) concentrate a wealthequivalent to 46% of all thewealth generated every year inthe country (GDP).

If Lula or Alckmin are elected,the situation will only get still

worse. Lula is alreadycommitted to leading a labourreform which will represent aterrible blow for the historicconquests of the workers. Theso-called “Super Simples”project, in discussion currentlyin the National Congress andwhich affects the rights of theworkers in small and mediumenterprises is an anticipation ofthis reform.

A RADICAL POLICY SOAS TO CONFRONT

SUPEREXPLOITATIONIN BRAZIL, SOURCE OFUNEMPLOYMENT ANDOF THE INCREASING

INSECURITY OF WORK

GUIDELINES OF THE LEFTFRONT’S PROGRAMME:

We want a plan of public worksso as to reduce unemployment,at the same time as the reductionof working time, without loss ofwages. We want to double theminimum wage immediately.For a profound agrarian reformunder the control of the workersof the countryside. We demandthe abrogation of neoliberalreforms, starting with the reformof social welfare. No to reformof the labour market and of tradeunion rights by the governmentand the IMF. No to the reform ofprivatisation of the university.We desire the immediateabrogation of the privatisationsof public enterprises, startingwith that of Vale do Rio Doce.Cancellation of the partialprivatisation of Petrobras. ForBrazil’s immediate withdrawalfrom the negotiationsconcerning the FTAA (FreeTrade Area of the Americas).

In defence of the workingwoman, we demand the creationof crèches for children from 0 to6 years. We fight against allforms of racial or sexualdiscrimination.

Moreover, we recommendsevere taxation of the bigfortunes and profits of the banksand big companies. The publiccontrol by workers andconsumers of the production ofessential goods is a necessity sothat the redistribution of wealthis a reality and to put an end tothe enormous inequalities whichare the shame of our country.

From Quilombo de los Palmares,we call on the workers to revolt,once again, against slavery. Thedignity of workers commencesby their right to a job and adecent wage. Audacity,creativity and novelty arenecessary. And the novelty is theLeft Front.

Internet links

www.heloisahelena50.com.br/

http://www.psol.org.br/

http://www.pstu.org.br/

http://www.pcb.org.br/

Left Front was founded at the appealof the three parties in Brazil: PSOL,PSTU and PCB. The PSOL (Party forSocialism and Liberty) was founded in2004 after the expulsion from theWorkers’ Party (PT) in December2003, of the senator Heloísa Helenaand the deputies Babá, LucianaGenro and João Fontes for theiropposition to the counter-reform ofpensions carried out by the Lulagovernment and more generally theirdemand for the respecting of thehistoric commitments of the PT by theLula government. The PSTU (SocialistParty of United Workers) is aTrotskyist organisation of the so-called“Morenist” current LIT-CI, foundedwhen this current decided to leave the

Workers Party in 1994. The “historic”PCB (Brazilian Communist Party),which was pro-Moscow, is today asmall left party.

NOTES

[1] Zumbi Dos Palmares was one of themost significant warrior leaders of theautonomous kingdom of the Palmares,founded in the 17th century by insurgentslaves in the northeast of Brazil. Heremains an icon of the anti-slavery andanti-colonialist movement, and a hero forthe Afro-Brazilian community, Brazil andLatin America in general

[2] The Left Front supports the candidacyto the presidency of our comrade HeloísaHelena (member of the FourthInternational’s International Committee),senator and leader of the PSOL. Somerecent polls indicate a possible electoralbreakthrough for this candidacy. In somestates she is in second position, behind theoutgoing president Lula supported by theWorkers Party, but ahead of GeraldoAlckmin, the candidate of the rightopposition (PSDB-PFL). Thus in BahiaLula is first with 55.9%, followed byHeloísa Helena with 15% and Alckminwith 9.7%. In the state of Alagoas, Heloísais second with 18%, according to a pollcarried out on August 18- 20. An IBOPEpoll on August 18 in Rio de Janeiro showsHeloïsa second with 18%, ahead ofAlckmin with 12%. Finally in the state ofRio Grande do Sul, from July to AugustHeloísa increased her poll ratings from9.9% to 16.8%, but she remains thirdbehind Alckmin (30.5%) and Lula (28.8%).

[3] PSDB-PFL: Currently the main rightopposition force, a coalition between theparty of Brazilian social democracy andthe party of the Liberal Front

[4] Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a leaderof the PSDB, was president of Brazil from1995 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003. Hewas behind the alignment of Brazilianeconomic policy on the ultra neoliberalmodel

[5] the 500,000 signatures required toobtain recognition as a party

IN A LUCID contribution to our understanding of contemporary Africa, David Seddonand Leo Zeilig recently charted that continent’s two waves of popular protest and classstruggle over the last 40 years, as well as pointing to signs of a nascent third wave.

Political Economy of Africa (1973), co-edited with Giovanni Arrighi, and The Stateand Revolution in Eastern Africa (1979).Mid-career books include The Crisis in SouthAfrica (1981), co-authored with StephenGelb, and A Difficult Road: The Transition toSocialism in Mozambique (1985).

Two of his most recent works areRecolonization and Resistance: SouthernAfrica in the 1990s (1994); and Developmentafter Globalization: Theory and Practice forthe Embattled South in a New Imperial Age(2005).

Growing out of this deep body of work, TheNext Liberation Struggle is a collection ofessays written over the last decade whichseeks to understand the Thirty Years War forSouthern African liberation, 1960-90, in aneffort to contribute to a fuller, moremeaningful liberation of Africa today.

That Thirty Years War, fought on many frontsand in different forms from country tocountry, was a war against colonialoccupation and white minority rule. Whilemuch of the book is devoted to exposing the

Review

Liberation, Then What?John Saul’s recent book on post-apartheid South Africa reviewed

Jeffery R Webber

Figures in round brackets refer to book page numbers.Endnotes are in square brackets

The first wave - often referred to as the “IMFriots” - took off in the late 1970s with itscharacteristic “strikes, marches,demonstrations and riots.” The protests, writeSeddon and Zeilig, “usually involved avariety of social groups and categories anddid not always take place under a workingclass or trade union banner or with workingclass leadership - if this term is used in itsnarrow sense.”

The broad base of popular forces involvednot only challenged the immediate austeritymeasures being introduced as part of moregeneral neoliberal structural adjustmentpolicies, “but also the legitimacy of thereforms themselves and even, sometimes, thegovernments that introduced them. They alsofrequently identified the internationalfinancial institutions and agencies that ledthis concerted effort to further enmesh ‘thedeveloping world’ and the ordinary peoplewho live there, into the uneven process ofcapitalist globalization in the interests ofmajor transnatioanal corporations and thestates that gain most from their operations.”

A second wave, from the late 1980s and intothe 1990s, was characterized by greaterpolitical coherence and objective. In thesenew protests, “The charge that nationalgovernments had broken the implicit socialcontract to safeguard not only the materialwelfare of the people, but also their politicalrights, led to growing demands fordemocracy and political change.”

Finally, a third wave, yet to have clearlyemerged but breaking onto the horizon in thepresent day, is one with which Seddon andZeilig urge activists to engage while drawinglessons from the past 40 years of struggle:“(T)he future success of social protest as thebasis for far-reaching progressive social,economic, and political change will dependon serious re-engagement by activists and

political movements in Africa in bothanalysis and action at the grass roots. Thiswill encompass both the practical andstrategic needs of ordinary people andexploration with them/by them of new formsof active engagement in the determination oftheir own futures, as well as with the debatesand discussions of the ‘anti-capitalistmovement’ in its other manifestations [acrossthe globe]. South Africa has demonstratedsome of the ways that this dual engagement ispossible.” [1]

The Revolutionary Prospect

In The Next Liberation Struggle, John S. Saulmakes such a re-engagement in ways that areprovocative and stimulating, while alsocareful and analytical. In the best tradition ofscholarly activism Saul seeks to drawhistorical lessons from past decades ofliberation struggle to inform and foment astronger third wave, or as he thinks of it, “thenext liberation struggle.”

“My central intellectual preoccupation,”writes Saul, “remains now, as it was in the1960s, the revolutionary prospect in Africa.Indeed, it continues to take as a starting pointthat a ‘revolution’ - both in post-apartheidSouthern Africa and in the rest of Africa - isboth necessary and possible on thatcontinent.” (7)

Saul has been studying and engaging withrevolutionary activity in Africa since the mid-1960s. He spent seven years teachinguniversity in Tanzania, as well as shorterstints teaching in post-liberationMozambique and post-apartheid SouthAfrica. While back in Canada Saul was animportant member of the Toronto Committeefor Southern Africa, as well as an editor andfrequent contributor to the committee’sjournal, Southern Africa Report.

During forty years of such engagement Saulhas published a large number of books,including classics such as Essays on the


17


18

Review

limits of the victories which dismantled thetwin prisons of colonial occupation and whiteminority rule, Saul is nonetheless too carefulan observer to miss the indelible significanceof those earlier popular efforts:

No amount of concern as to the deeplycompromised nature of the outcome of thewar for Southern African liberation shouldblind us to just what was achieved, bothwithin the region and by Africa as a whole, inrealizing the basic precondition - that is, theremoval of white minority rule - of anymeaningful freedom there. (5)

At the same time, to see clearly the wayforward for popular struggle today, we needto return again to the parameters of thatcompromised outcome, and understand howblack majority rule has not meant an end tocapitalist exploitation and marginalization,nor to imperialist impositions on Africawithin the world order. On this, it is useful toquote from Saul at some length:

In the end, then, the positive implications ofthe removal of white minority rule have beenmuted for most people in the region: extremesocio-economic inequality, desperatepoverty, and disease (AIDS most notably)remain the lot of the vast majority of thepopulation. Unfortunately, too, the broadergoals that emerged in the course of theliberation struggles - defined around theproposed empowerment and projectedtransformation of the impoverished state ofthe mass of the population of the region -have proven extremely difficult to realize....In now writing of the Thirty Years War forSouthern African liberation I hope that agreater consciousness of the shared war willhelp to remind Southern Africans of its heroicdimensions and help rekindle some sense oftheir joint accomplishment - and that this willprovide a positive point of reference fromwhich they can work to once again fire theflames of joint resistance in the newmillennium. (6)

That next wave of resistance, envisioned bySaul as the necessary and possible “nextliberation struggle,” consists of “a struggleagainst the savage terms of Africa’s present

incorporation into the global economy and ofthe wounding domestic social and politicalpatterns accompanying it...” (6).

Well aware of the tremendous obstacles -both global and local - to socialisttransformation in Africa, Saul neverthelessmaintains a “strong sense that a new stage ofrevolutionary activity is slowly but surelybeing born in post-apartheid South Africaitself as elsewhere on the continent...” (11)

Why African Socialism Failed

The book is divided into three parts. Part I,“Continental Considerations,” first deals withSub-Saharan Africa’s position within theglobal capitalist system, in a chapter co-authored with Colin Leys [2] This part of thebook also sketches some of the contours of“African socialism” as it played itself out inthe Tanzania of Julius Nyerere’s TanzaniaAfrican National Congress (TANU) in thelate 1960s and early 1970s, and inMozambique under the Frelimo movement,led first by Eduardo Mondlane and then bySamora Machel. Frelimo first commandedstate power in 1975.

In a very different way, African Socialism isexamined through the lens of South Africa’sliberation struggle. In the latter case, theanalysis is more of “what the situationseemed to promise.” As Saul notes, “If therewas ever a dog that did not bark in the nightfor latter-day Sherlocks to reflect upon, it isthe absence of a socialist vocation on the partof both the South African liberationmovement leadership and, perhaps moreimportantly, that country’s apparently well-developed and assertive working class onceapartheid had been defeated.” (41)

The chapter on African Socialism isessentially geared towards learning how andwhy it failed in its various manifestations in

order to better forge a new future forsocialism on the continent. Toward the sameend, the last chapter of Part I juxtaposesreally existing “liberal democracy” to Saul’spreferred “popular democracy” in the contextof Sub-Saharan African politics.

Part II, “Southern Africa: A Range ofVariation,” presents chapters on the causesand consequences of war and peace inMozambique, and official “forgotten history”in contemporary Namibia, a situation inwhich the SWAPO (South West AfricaPeoples Organization) government is pittedagainst the Breaking the Wall of SilenceMovement (BWS).

BWS is seeking to force investigations intoallegations of human rights abuses bySWAPO leadership against innocent cadreswhile the movement was in exile, inparticular at the SWAPO-run detention centreat Lubango, Angola during the 1980s.

This chapter is also co-authored by ColinLeys. Another, co-written with RichardSaunders, presents a Gramscian analysis ofMugabe’s Zimbabwe and popular strugglesemerging against that regime. [3] Finally, anentire chapter is devoted to Julius Nyerere’sproblematic socialism in Tanzania.

Part III, “South Africa: Debating theTransition,” is devoted exclusively to ananalysis of different stages of South Africa’stransition from apartheid to post-apartheidneoliberal democracy. The essays, originallywritten between 1994 and 2004, growincreasingly cutting in their criticisms of thepost-apartheid African National Congress(ANC) government, in correspondence withthe ANC’s deepening capitulation to thedictates of capital, both global and local.

The Hard Questions

Among the many positive things I could sayabout this excellent book, I think the mostimportant is the simplest: Saul confronts thebiggest and most difficult questions facingsocialists within the African context, and hetakes his answers seriously.

“the positive implications ofthe removal of white

minority rule have beenmuted for most people in

the region”


19

Review

power-plays in Africa, and the obstacles andopportunities for the next liberation strugglein the post-Cold War international scene.

On the one hand, there are surely “long-termbenefits of the passing of the Soviet bloc andthe discrediting of its bankrupt legacy (bothin theory and in practice) to the freeing up ofspace for the renewal of radicalism in Africa.Yet “the present world-wide context - of neo-liberal market mania and monolithiccapitalist globalization - is at least as hostile(if in novel ways) to progressive aspirationsin Africa as was the old Cold War world.” [4]

While the international left lends its attentionto the Middle East, with the ongoingoccupation and to Latin America, with theproliferation of inspiring struggles againstcapitalism, I urge us to stay informed (orbecome informed) of struggles in Africa. Forthose of us based in North America, suchknowledge will draw our attention to newareas to which we must add our anti-imperialist energies. Saul’s latest book is animportant tool for advancing this struggle.

Jeffery R. Webber is an editor of New Socialist and aPhD candidate in Political Science at the Universityof Toronto. He is currently in La Paz.

NOTES

[1] David Seddon and Leo Zeilig (2005), “Class andProtest in Africa: New Waves,” Review of AfricanPolitical Economy No. 103: 9-27.

[2] Colin Leys is another important long-timecommentator on African affairs. He is author, perhapsmost famously, of Underdevelopment in Kenya: ThePolitical Economy of Neo-Colonialism (1975). Morecontemporary works of Leys’ include, The Rise and Fall ofDevelopment Theory (1996) and Market Driven Politics:Neoliberal Democracy and the Public Interest (2003).Currently he is co-editor, along with Leo Panitch, ofSocialist Register.

[3] Richard Saunders teaches at York University inToronto. He is the author of Dancing Out of Tune: AHistory of the Media in Zimbabwe (1999).

[4] David Finkel takes up this question of the transition ofCold War to post-Cold War geopolitics in terms of itsimportance for progressive aspirations world-wide in animportant recent article. David Finkel (2006), “TheLegacies of National Liberation,” New Socialist 55 (Feb-March): 12-17.

The Next Liberation Struggle represents anattempt to be realistic without being passiveor cynical, to be a revolutionary socialistperspective while avoiding the mererhetorical flourishes of ultra-leftism, and tobe cognizant of the dramatic obstacles in theway of socialism in Africa while alwaysseeking to highlight the popular forces frombelow whose growth might help shift thebalance of forces in ways more favourable tothe realization of socialism.

While recognizing the difficulties for asocialist alternative, Saul convincinglydemonstrates the irrationality of seeing incapitalism a future for meaningful and justdevelopment. He shows how the World Bankand the International Monetary Fund (IMF)continue to follow a dogmatic marketliberalism which they promote in Africathrough aid conditionality; how theseinstitutions have failed to respond inmeaningful ways to demands for debt relief;and how the United States and otherimperialist states - including his own, Canada- continue to make independent Africaninitiatives vulnerable through a whole host ofinterventionist mechanisms.

From the perspective of capital, there is“optimism, even excitement,” in the “oil,natural gas, and minerals industries” becauseAfrica’s resources remain “substantiallyuntapped, with many existing discoveries yetto be developed and many new ones still tobe made.” (19-20) As Saul and Leys argue,however, “Africa’s development, and thedynamics of global capitalism, are no longercongruent, if they ever were.”

An economic profile of Africa drawn fromthis [global capitalist] perspective would payrelatively little attention to countries orstates, except as regards the physical securityof fixed investments and the availability ofcommunications and transport facilities.Instead it would highlight a group of largetransnational corporations, especially miningcompanies, and a pattern of mineral deposits,coded according to their estimated size andvalue and the costs of exploiting them (coststhat technical advances are constantly

reducing) - and a few associated Africanstock exchanges worth gambling on. (20, 21).

Democracy is another theme that runsthroughout The Next Liberation Struggle. Onthe one hand, Saul provides a searing critiqueof liberal democracy, and the essentialimpotence of normative claims about“democracy” in Africa so long as thecontinent and its people are both exploitedand marginalized within global capitalism.

At the same time, Saul sees the lack ofdemocratic practice and theory historically inthe African socialist experiments as one ofthe roots of their failures. Among the failuresof African socialist practices with regard todemocracy, Saul underlines “the intellectualarrogance of newly ascendant elites; thecumulative precedents of nationalistmovement practices elsewhere in thecontinent...; the inherited hierarchies deemednecessary to movements and liberation forcespreviously engaged in intense struggles,sometimes armed, against colonial masters;and the ‘progressive’ vanguardist discourseslearned from overseas parties in the‘successful’ Marxist-Leninist tradition.”

For Saul, the cases of Tanzania,Mozambique, and South Africa illustrate “thepattern of smothering (however often ‘withthe best of intentions’) the kinds of masspolitical activism that could have helpedsustain the democratic and socialist chargerepeated over and over again.” (52).

After the Cold War

Conscious of the imperialist dynamics of theglobal order, Saul charts the effects onnational liberation movements of Cold War

While recognizing thedifficulties for a socialist

alternative, Saulconvincingly demonstratesthe irrationality of seeing in

capitalism a future formeaningful and just

development


20

When George Bush latched on tothe illness of Fidel Castro, andthe temporary handing of powerin Cuba to Castro’s brother Raul,as a pretext to urge regimechange, on the island, he revivedmemories of a long andinglorious history of USintervention in the affairs ofLatin American countries.

In no instance during more thana century of involvement has theUSA sided with popular,democratic forces against amilitary dictatorship: instead,time and again, the US hasdispatched troops or pulledstrings to repress any movementthat might unseat vicious,corrupt, but pro-US, regimes.

In the case of Cuba, the historyof US intervention goes back tothe end of the 19th century. In1895 the US made a bid to buythe island. Three years later,after defeating Spain in war, theUS took over Puerto Rico, Guamand the Philippines. AndAmerican troops occupied Cubafor three years. In that time theytook the opportunity to alter theconstitution with the 1901 Plattamendment, giving the USperpetual rights to intervene inCuban affairs, and limiting itsindependent action.

Only when Cubans elected apresident to the liking ofWashington was the US militarypresence scaled down in 1902,but US Marines were back forthree years from 1906 to

The fact that Celia Hart can now write freely about Trotsky andTrotskyism, and discuss many of the historical crimes ofStalinism appears to reflect a much more relaxed attitude fromthe Cuban CP leadership which is now freed from any shacklesof Moscow control.

Cuba book review

The revival of a political traditionCelia Hart’s new book of writings reviewed

John Lister

suppress riots. The country wasrun by a succession of brutal anddictatorial regimes, culminatingin a coup in 1934 led by formersergeant Fulgencio Batista,whose blend of authoritarianism,violence and brazen corruptionestablished him as the militarystrongman and dominant figurein Cuban politics for 25 years.

Batista was shrewd enough torecognise the potential benefitsto him of legalising the(Stalinist) Communist Party in1938 (then embroiled in thecollaborationist politics ofbuilding Popular Fronts with so-called democratic bourgeoisformations) and trade unions in1939, and was rewarded by CPendorsement of his electioncampaign in 1940.

In 1942 two leading Staliniststook office as ministers inBatista’s government. But theother key prop to Batista’s rulewas the USA, and especially thefinancial groups which grabbedthe chance for rich pickings fromCuban investment, and the USMafia, which stepped up itsoperations on the island with thearrival of top mobsters includingthe Mafia’s banker, MeyerLansky, who lived in Cuba from1937 to 1940, establishing agrowing empire of casinos andhotels. When Batista handedover the presidency in 1944 tothe corrupt leaders of theAutentico party, the Mafia wasalready well established in thetop circles of power.

By 1948 the Presidential palaceopenly took a share of the hugeprofits from selling cocaine,skimming the National Lotteryand milking the country’sCustoms revenues. While USbanks and corporations hadlargely sewn up the profits frommonopoly control of Cuba’ssugar and extractive industries,transport, telephones, energy andinfrastructure, the Mafia had bythe early 1950s achieved adominant role in tourism,casinos, nightclubs, prostitution,drug traffic, gambling, trade inprecious stones, smuggling,money-laundering, import andexport businesses, finance andbanking, and had extensiveinfluence in the Autentico partyand with Batista and his circle ofsupporters.

The US government, andespecially the CIA had workedclosely with the Mafia during theWar, and many links remained inplace afterwards. Even the highprofile expulsion of mob boss“Lucky” Luciano from Cuba in1947 as a result of US pressurewas in fact a means to divertattention from the boomingMafia business, involving topUS-based mobsters, which hadbeen set up before his arrival andcontinued to flourish on theisland after his enforceddeparture.

For the US government, whichhad already sidelined theembarrassing revelations of the1950 Kefauver report into mobactivities in the USA, theMafia’s Cuban empire was seen,if anything, as an additionallever of control over the politicalregime. However the blatantcorruption of Autentico

presidents led in 1952 to the realdanger than the oppositionOrtodoxo party (whoseradicalising membershipincluded Fidel Castro) could winthe elections: twelve weeksbefore polling day, Batistastaged a bloodless preemptivecoup which had been widelypredicted in advance, and withevident acquiescence fromWashington.

It is worth recalling that this wasa period at the height of the ColdWar, with war still raging inKorea, and heightened US fearsof popular movements whichlater brought CIA-backedmilitary coups against radicalnationalist leaderships in Iran(1953) and then Guatemala(1954). The Batista dictatorshipdeepened its alliance with theMafia, while escalating itsrepression of popularmovements. It sealed off anynormal avenue of opposition.

The paralysis of bourgeoispolitics triggered Castro’s nowfamous attack on the Moncadabarracks in Santiago on July 261953, backed by about 150supporters, including twowomen. The raid itself wasabortive and some of the rebelswere killed: others were put ontrial and jailed, but not beforeCastro, defending himself, hadput forward the accusingstatement- cum-manifesto“History will absolve me”,which called for action to breakup the holdings of the biglandowners, nationalisation ofelectricity and telephonecompanies, and a variety ofdemocratic and other reforms.


21

Review

are still constraints and it is notaccurate to claim that the Cubanleadership was Trotskyists inpractice.

Che may have been the one tofree the imprisoned CubanTrotskyists on his return fromAfrica, and may well have readPermanent Revolution and hadTrotsky’s History of the RussianRevolution in his knapsack inBolivia (p25), but his guerrillaexploits in Latin America,however heroically inspired,never set out to lead a process ofpermanent revolution in whichthe working class would take thelead. But as a treasure trove ofideas and neglected facts pastand present, and a reminder ofthe historic legacy that helpedgive us the Cuban Revolution,Celia Hart’s writings are veryimportant. We also need to seehow these ideas can be furtherdeveloped in the context of theCuban political situation in theclosing years of Fidel’s rule.

Released from jail early under anamnesty in 1955, Castro wentinto exile in Mexico. He securedsupport and funding from avariety of oppositional anddisgruntled forces. includingsidelined former AutenticoPresident Prio Socorras, whosedonation purchased the Granma,the boat in which Castro’s RebelArmy, with its ramshacklepolicies, sailed on November 241956 to fight a 3-year guerrillawar based in the Cubancountryside.

The eventual success of what attimes seemed a tenuous battle bysmall numbers of rebels againstan apparently large and ruthlessarmy rested both on the popularsupport for any genuineopposition to Batista, and on thedisintegration of the dictatorialregime itself, which by themiddle of 1958 had lost theconfidence and support of theUSA.

decisive military intervention insupport of the Angolanliberation struggle, which in turnhelped weaken and overturnapartheid in South Africa. Afterthe heavy-handed repression andincarceration of the small bodyof Cuban Trotskyists in theimmediate aftermath of the 1959revolution, we have waited over40 years for a specifically Cubancritique of the politics ofStalinism.

The emergence of such writingsat this time, in a new volume byCelia Hart offers tremendousbasis for optimism that asCastro’s physical strength ebbsaway there is a core ofcommitted and critical Marxistswithin the Cuban CP willing tofight in defense of the gains thathave been made and against aCIA orchestrateddemocratisation. by a viciousMiami-based expatriaterestorationist mafia.

over the many years in whichthey uncritically endorsed aCuban regime which excludedtheir current from politicaldebate: why was it forbidden forso many years to put LeonTrotsky in relation to the CubanRevolution? (p21).

Celia insists that she has notmanaged to find out - but theanswer is not too difficult touncover. Castro’s July 26Movement, which had foughtand defeated Batista in the teethof opposition from the Stalinistsof the Popular Socialist Party.,was strong enough to oust theold regime, but was not based inthe working class and did nothave enough links or expertise inthe trade unions to secure stablecontrol over the whole economy.

And Castro’s new regime,immediately under pressurefrom the USA, felt that it neededinternational economic andmilitary support. For its part therelatively new Sovietbureaucracy under Khrushchevwas looking to strengthen itshand against the USA: dealswere done in which the July 26Movement merged with theStalinist party, with the Castrobrothers in overall control, butconsiderable political influencehanded to the Stalinists.

In exchange the USSR extendedmilitary and economic supportto Cuba. Moscow was preparedto allow Castro a degree ofleeway in nationalising theCuban economy, and for someyears ignored Cuban efforts toexport its model of revolutionarychange by endorsing guerrillastruggles and left currents inLatin American countries.

But the new Kremlin regimeunder Brezhnev took a harderline. and from the late 1960suntil the collapse of the USSR inthe early 1990s Castro’s Cubawas required to operate withinthe boundaries of Soviet foreignpolicy. The fact that Celia cannow write freely about Trotskyand Trotskyism, and discussmany of the historical crimes ofStalinism appears to reflect amuch more relaxed attitude fromthe Cuban CP leadership whichis now freed from the shackles ofMoscow control. However there

We have waited over 40 years for aspecifically Cuban critique of Stalinism.

The emergence of such writings by CeliaHart offers tremendous basis for optimism

that there is a core of committed and criticalMarxists within the Cuban CP willing to fightin defense of the gains that have been made

Selected writings by Celia HartEdited by Walter Lippmann.Published by SocialistResistance. £5.50 inc postage(cheques payable to Resistance)from PO Box 1109 London N42UU. International buyers canget the book from amazon.co.ukor the suppliers listed atresistancebooks.blogspot.com.

John Lister is a long-time leader of theISG in England and Wales, and aneditor of Socialist Resistance. He isalso an expert in the politics ofhealthcare and the Director of LondonHealth Emergency. His book of theworldwide neoliberalisation ofhealthcare, "Health Policy Reform - Driving the Wrong Way?" waspublished by Middlesex UniversityPress in 2005.

When Batista and his cronies ranfor the planes and fled thecountry on New Year’s Eve,Castro’s forces were welcomedinto Havana by a massivegeneral strike. RevolutionaryCuba has since been a beacon formany revolutionaries of variouspolitical traditions: but for over20 years from the late 1960s tothe early 1990s its economic andmilitary dependence upon theSoviet Union resulted in avisible avoidance by many of itssupporters of any explicitdiscussion of the politics ofStalinism, and some highlyquestionable policy statementsby Fidel Castro. such as backingthe invasion of Czechoslovakia,endorsing the grisly Ethiopiandictatorship, and opposing thetrade union movement inPoland.

However the same period alsosaw Cuba break ranks from theKremlin’s policy, to mount the

Celia first discovered thewritings of Trotsky whilestudying in East Germany in the1980s and the essays and articlesin this volume show herincreasing awareness of thecorrosive effects of Stalin’stheory that it was possible tobuild “socialism in a singlecountry” and the Stalinistrejection of Trotsky’sinterpretation of the concept of“permanent revolution” (i.e.uninterrupted and international)first put forward by Karl Marx inthe 1850s.

Celia argues that the corerevolutionary concepts inTrotsky’s approach were close tothose of early Cubanrevolutionary Julio AntonioMella, and also embraced byChe in his quest tointernationalise the revolution.She also poses the questionwhich we might have expectedmore Trotskyists to have posed


22

Alain Krivine, one of the best-known leaders of the FourthInternational, is about to publish his political memoirs,covering 50 years of political activism. He began his politicallife as a young Communist militant. It was in that capacity thathe was sent to the World Youth Conference in Moscow in 1957,where he met with representatives of the Algerian FLN. Thismeeting was to be the turning point in his political life. When I returned to France, if I hadn’t totallybroken with the Party, I was at leastscandalized by its attitude. From that point onI took the decision to aid the FLN and to talkabout it with those around me, consideringthat it was absolutely necessary to “dosomething.” But I didn’t know how to makecontact.

And it was here that family relationsintervened: I had brothers who had beenaiding the FLN for a long time. They weren’tStalinists and they had hidden their activitiesfrom me since I was a [little] “Stalinistleader.” But seeing how unhappy I was to notbe able to do anything for Algeria theyintervened, telling me that perhaps we couldhelp the Algerians.

So they put me in contact with the groupJeune Résistance (Young Resistance),through which I began my support activities.Within the framework of the CommunistYouth (JC) I had begun to carry on a fight forthe Algerians, notably demanding that MmeAudin [1] be invited to a meeting of the JC.They answered me: “You’re nuts. We’re notgoing to invite her to a meeting.”

Just to finish off these stories, which showpretty clearly the mind set of the party, the JChad distributed a tract that invited people, onthe occasion of a student congress, to a dance“For peace in Algeria.” The words: “We’lldance and we’ll...” were added to it. I was adelegate to the National Congress. Still naïveI went up to the tribune to declare that wedidn’t seem to be aware of the situation, thatthere were people who were dying there andthat I thought it disgusting that we wouldallow these kinds of festivities on the subject

Our History

Alain Krivine and AlgeriaAlain Krivine

of Algeria. Everyone started to chant:“Virgin, Virgin...”

So I found myself in a network that was ledby Trotskyists. My brothers were Trotskyistsand of course they hadn’t told me this, sinceas a good Stalinist I hated the Trotskyists.The first question I asked one of them was: “Iagree to join into your Jeune Résistancenetwork, but only on condition that there notbe any Trots there!” He asked me why I saidthis and I answered: “Because they’re cops,and I know that in this kind of thing there areTrotskyists.” He assured me that thereweren’t any and asked me what I had againstTrotsky. “Nothing! All I know is that he wasa cop and a fascist!”

So I worked with Jeune Résistance, whichabove all worked at stopping the trains ofdraftees. Then I went into the Union desétudiants communistes (UEC), where I was amember of the leadership, whileclandestinely being a member of JeuneRésistance. During demonstrations we triedto start up chants for independence and towave FLN flags, while the rest shouted“Peace in Algeria!” There was also activitywithin the army; this is what most interested

me. So there was the stoppage of trains ofsoldiers who were leaving. Signals weresabotaged. In this way we stopped dozens oftrains, and this made a lot of noise.

During most of the war the Party had as itsslogan “Peace in Algeria,” and itsinstructions were not to have relations withthe Algerians, which would have been toodangerous for the Party. When the hierarchyfound members supporting the FLN theywere expelled. A comrade from Billancourtwho aided the FLN, who we called “Benoit,”was immediately chased out of the Party (infact, he was a clandestine Trotskyist).

The Party was also equally opposed todesertion and insubordination. It explainedthat a young Communist should go into thearmy, but following Lenin’s schema, in orderto introduce revolutionary ideas there.Nevertheless, the PCF didn’t organize thedraftees at all, and none of the youngCommunists who went had any instructions.Unfortunately, many of them became racists,since there was no counterweight to theideological pressures of military life.

So the PCF opposed all initiatives. It wascompletely against the stopping of trains, thesabotage against “our comrade railroadworkers.” The movement had considerablydeveloped, since we were as many as 900 inJeune Résistance, which is a lot for aclandestine organization (in a way it was thebeginning of the extreme Left). YoungCommunists refused to be insubordinate forfear of going to prison... There were somesons of members of the Central Committeewho carried out courageous actions, but itwas too late. The leadership of the PC had itsfew martyrs in order to later say to the

French troops confront rioters, Algiers 1960

During most of the war the(Communist) Party had as

its slogan “Peace inAlgeria,” and its instructionswere not to have relationswith the Algerians. When

the hierarchy foundmembers supporting theFLN they were expelled.


23

Our History

Algerians and public opinion “Our Party, too,had its martyrs.”

So in the last two years of the war about 20young Communist soldiers refused to be sentto Algeria. But when you look at their namesit was often the sons of leaders, like the sonof Léandre Letocard, or of members of theCentral Committee who did refuse to go toAlgeria and were sent to prison. But this wasat the end. In 1956 Alban Liechti was the firstto refuse to go to Algeria, but the Party didn’tsupport him: he was absolutely alone [2].

My two brothers were directly involved inthe support networks, in liaison with theFederation de France of the FLN. Theyhandled the transporting of money. Fromtime to time I gave them some help. For themost part I took care of transports in Paris:when cars full of cops closed off certainneighborhoods you had to put people at theintersections to be sure there weren’t anycheckpoints set up. Our friends sent ussignals permitting cars transporting FLNmilitants to cross Paris without hindrance. Idid this many times.

And then we took “initiatives” concerningprisons. Notably, I participated in an attemptto liberate some women. This was at Fresnes.A group of comrades had flown over theprison with a small plane, which wasprohibited, and had taken some pictures. Bythe way, they were sick as dogs in the plane,which had had to perform aerial acrobatics.We kept track of the changing of the guardamong the police and the CRS around theprison in order to learn their itinerary, howmay they were, and when the guard waschanged.

We were right up against the walls. Littlehills permitted us to hide. We were a fewcouples who relieved each other, each coupleremaining there four and a half hours.

We transmitted the information to peoplewho had pseudonyms, and whose identity Idon’t know. They were at “a higher level.” It

was pretty well organized. The networkswere a good school. Some participated for“humanist” reasons, because they werescandalized by the torture of Algerians. Thisis both good and normal. But for others thesenetworks were a good political school. Theybecame true internationalists. They acquireda form of political practice, which is alwaysuseful.

Afterwards, in political organizations, werealized that a good part of the nucleus of thefuture extreme Left had its origins in the aidto the Algerian revolution. It was a matter of“practical” internationalism, and not one ofdiscourse. It could concretely be seen how arevolution inspires sympathy, politicizesyoung people, and makes militants of them.This was truly a school of practical labor.

The attitude of the leadership and theCommunist students in relation to the war inAlgeria was to be one of the reasons for theopposition that was born and explodedamong them. Algeria, along with Hungary,are the two elements of the crisis; the betrayalof the Algerian people by the PCF and thesupport given by the latter during the Sovietinvasion of Hungary, which was alsoconsidered a betrayal - of the Hungarianpeople.

feeding and radicalizing a portion of theYoung Communists, including in “practicallabour.”

All of these elements were to contribute toour radicalization, but in contradictory ways.So when it came to the army, in principle Iwas attached to the Leninist tradition, i.e.,that it was necessary to go into the army andfight there by denouncing colonialism. Iadmired those few soldiers who went over tothe other side, lock, stock and barrel. For me,as I was beginning to de-Stalinize myself, thehero was officer cadet Maillot. What he didwas like the “mutineers of the Black Sea”with André Marty [3]: “We are in solidaritywith the revolution on the other side. We jointhem with our arms, we’re joining the otherside.” The enemy was French colonialism.Maillot and Iveton [4] were truly heroes: theact of solidarity was capital.

Knowing that the PCF was doing nothing, inthe army we completely supportedinsubordination and desertion. This allowedthe carrying out of political provocation, apolitical gesture to shake up the French. Itwas better than doing nothing. Since thosewho left for Algeria couldn’t be educated,many became racists.

You know what a colonial war is: "ourbuddies are being killed", the young soldiersare completely caught up in the machine. Itwas better that they not leave at all. ThoughLeninists on the army question, we were thusin support of insubordination: it was the mosteffective way to lead people to obtainconsciousness and to participate, in howeverslight a way, in a small sabotage of theFrench military apparatus.

Torture, too, was an important element in ourchoice. There were newspapers thatspecialized in the distribution of forbidden

Alain Krivine (second right) with RudiDutschke (third right) with the JCRcontingent, Berlin Vietnam demo,February 1968

a good part of the nucleusof the future extreme Lefthad its origins in the aid tothe Algerian revolution - itwas a matter of “practical”

internationalismThe “clandestine” militants in solidarity withAlgeria, who were members of the UEC,were to play a very important role in the birthof a “Left Opposition” to Stalinism. Thisopposition was to be born beginning in 1960-61 and would end with the expulsion of all ofthem in 1965. The transition was neverthelessto take five years. Before the war in Algeriaended, the OAS affair was to be asupplementary element in nourishing,


24

Our History

nabbed them and interrogated them (withoutbeating them) for a whole night in anapartment until they confessed.

We found on them a list of 50 officers anddozens of keys. Afterwards we didn’t knowwhat to do with these people. We turned themover to the cops, with the maps of the Figarothat they had. The cops were furious that itwas “Leftists” who gave them these bombers.Three of these OAS members were placed inan internment camp.

The next day the Figaro, very much put out,had to talk about this. This was really anevent. But the newspaper still said that it was“perhaps” a question of the bombers of theFigaro. The OAS people did about two orthree years in an internment camp (there werevery few of these camps for fascists, butmany for Algerians.)

works (like La Question by Henri Alleg).This was the case with Temoignages etdocuments, which denounced all the dirtywork of the French in Algeria. I worked a lotfor this last publication.

The denunciation of torture played a largerole. For example, when the general secretaryof the Algiers Prefecture in 1957, PaulTeitgen, said: “Torture is our way ofgoverning,” he didn’t go much further, butthis was already more than mere“humanism.” We managed thus to be “forcedto respond,” as we say today, on the verynature of the combat that the French carriedout in Algeria. This had an important politicalmeaning.

After this, the OAS was also an importantcause of political turmoil, because there itwas a matter of fascism. For a whole periodAlgeria was very far away for people, sopeople didn’t really give a damn, and anywayit had to do with the “Arabs.” The mass of thepopulation began to get interested in Algeriawhen tens of thousands of their sons had beenthere and then told about their war when theygot back. Besides this, there were thousandswho didn’t come back, or were wounded; theFrench population then began to askquestions.

At the beginning of the war, aside fromintellectuals, the Left slept. But with theOAS, that is, with fascism, the people of theLeft began to wake up, there were anti-fascistreactions. It became a “French phenomenon,’with the skinheads, the strong-arm men of theright...people began to be afraid. Then therewere the attacks, Delphine Renard... As forme, my flat was firebombed by the fascists.

The third “interesting” experience: at thetime when the OAS was carrying out theseattacks, we felt that among young peoplethere was something bigger than just the warin Algeria itself that was happening, and theFront universitaire antifasciste (UniversityAnti-fascist Front- FUA) was created. Wemanaged to create a true mass combat

organization that brought together thousandsof students in Paris and the provinces. ThePCF was against us and we, Communists,were at the head of the FUA.

In opposition to the Stalinists, we managed todemonstrate that it was possible to have aunitary, non-sectarian combative reaction,since it was the organization that had decidedto chase the fascists from the Latin Quarter.Every day there were hundreds of studentswho, at the call of the FUA, gathered in theLatin Quarter with flying squads. As soon asthere was a distribution of fascist leaflets wewent out and broke it up. We know thatpeople like Duprat, [5] who was pro OAS andhas since died, were never able to penetratethe Institut de Geographie... Recently therewas still an inscription on the walls of thatInstitute: “Duprat will not enter.” We reallycleaned up the Latin Quarter, not in an ultra-Left way, but with the mass of studentswho’d been mobilized. There wereChristians, PSU (United Socialist Party, a leftcentrist group - ed) members, theunorganized and us, the Communist“opposition.”

The Party leadership called me in, along withsome others, to tell us to stop, that we werebehaving like “ultra-Leftists.” This was to bea good experience, for we were quickly givena kind of “democratic cushion” to protect us:150 intellectuals, with Jean-Paul Sartre andSimone de Beauvoir at the head of the group,signed a text that was more or less the sameas that of the FUA. This was the creation ofthe FACUIRA [Front d’action et decoordination des universitaires etintellectuals pour un rassemblementantiraciste]. So we now had this anti-OASstructure guided by intellectuals, and theorganization of high school and collegestudents, the FUA.

This was a very rich experience. We had ourown spy service: it was in this way that weacquired credibility. We were able to arrestthose who bombed Le Figaro, a kind ofoperation that the cops never handled. We

And then there was October17, 1961, when hundreds of

Algerians were killed...The OAS alienated a good part of publicopinion, especially after the attack aimed athe apartment of André Malraux, which costlittle Delphine Renard her eye. This was aturning point in the war in Algeria. Peoplesaid: “It’s a total mess here. If there’s adanger of attacks on the streets, well, let’s putan end to this...”

And then there was the Paris demonstrationof October 17, 1961, when hundreds ofAlgerians were killed their bodies throwninto the Seine. Public reaction was miserable;what happened had never before been seen.But there was so much racism among thepublic that everyone contented themselveswith finding the repression shameful.Information about it came out little by little.

Today we know what happened, but at thetime not much was known; we wereconstantly lied to. For many people it wasonly a that “there was an enormous demo offilthy Arabs that the cops attacked.” The


25

public reacted to this benign version of thefacts, and racism had free rein here. It wasn’tFrench people who were attacked and, bydefinition, the Algerians were frightening.We like the neighborhood Arab grocer, theone who’s open all night, but when they’retogether on the street they’re scary. So therewas, on the one hand, fear of that mass ofAlgerians and a little regret because therewas talk that there had been a lot of deaths.This explains the paralysis of opinion.

I saw the horrible scene on the GrandsBoulevards. I was warned of it, and it wasabsolutely horrible: it’s a memory I’ll neverforget. What’s more, it was raining, whichgave it an even more gloomy aspect. Therewere no cars on the Grands Boulevards,traffic was blocked. It was 11:00 at night andthe massacre had already taken place.

There’s finally today a rehabilitation of thetruth, but we had to wait for it almost till theend of the century. All kinds of committeeshave tried to do something. In manyinterviews it was asked of Communists if it’strue that the curtain of L’Humanité hadremained closed before of the demonstrators.They answered that this was the case, but thatthey couldn’t do otherwise, that they had toensure the security of the newspaper, etc.Always the same arguments, it’s terrible.

All of this represents the beginning of thebreak between the world of labour and thePCF, the beginning of the latter’s decline.From a certain point of view, the formation ofthe “cadres” of 1968 and the “new extremeLeft” with the Trotskyists, the Maoists andsome of the ecologists - everything that goesbeyond the traditional parties, in short, agood part of the militants today in theirfifties, were politicized, radicalized,revolutionized and de-Stalinized by theirsupport for the Algerian Revolution.

In 1962 the independence of Algeria was agreat joy; we had worked for years to thisend. There were no manifestations of joy inFrance. It was difficult...But it wasextraordinary for all the solidarity militants.You could look yourself in the mirror afterhaving contributed if not a stone, at least agrain to that Algerian independence. Thecombat was victorious and we wereabsolutely happy.

Afterwards there were debates: what is thisgoing to lead to? Some were more confidentthan others, more optimistic. But we said toourselves: “At least this is it. The country isindependent, the cause for which people weremassacred. Torture has stopped. Whateverthe regime, the primary objective has beenachieved, the Algerians have their ownhome.”

In conclusion, I’d like to say that you have totry to understand that an entire generationmaintains particularly close ties with theAlgerian people since that time. If I go to

Tunisia, to Morocco or Albania it’s not thesame as when I go to Algeria. There’ssomething there that remains. This is whywe’re very demanding if something’s notright in Algeria. “They don’t deserve this,”we think.

Source: Jacques Charby, Les Porteursd’Espoir. La Découverte, Paris, 2004;Translated: for marxists.org by Mitch Abidor.Alain Krivine’s new book Ca te passera avecl’âge (You’ll Grow Out of It) is published atthe beginning of October by Flammarion.

Alain Krivine is one of the main spokespersons of theFrench Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire

NOTES

[1] Josette Audin, widow of Maurice Audin, an AlgerianCommunist professor who was arrested by Frenchparatroopers, tortured and executed in secret.

[2] He was sentenced to two years in prison forinsubordination.

[3] André Marty led a mutiny in an attempt to stop theFrench Navy intervening against the BolshevikRevolution in 1917. Tried and imprisoned, Marty waseventually released in 1923. Marty immediately joined theCommunist Party and eventually became a member of itsCentral Committee. He was also appointed to theexecutive of the Comintern and was involved inestablishing the International Brigades that took part in theSpanish Civil War. Marty was in the Soviet Union on theoutbreak of the Second World War. He later moved toAlgiers where he attempted to direct the activities of theFront National and the Frances-Tireurs Partisans, themilitary wing on the Communist Party. After the D-daylandings took place Marty wanted the Communists to takepower. However, under instructions from Joseph Stalin inthe Soviet Union, Maurice Thorez and other leadersrefused to cooperate. In 1952 Marty and Charles Tillonwere both expelled from the Communist Party. AndréMarty died in 1956.

[4] Maillot was an Algerian Communist who was killedwhile transporting arms stolen from the French army.Iveton, too, was a Communist, guillotined after a failed actof sabotage.

[5] Extreme Right-wing militant, later co-founder of theFront National. He was killed under mysteriouscircumstances in 1978.

Our History

With Daniel Bensaid (left) and OliverBesancenot in 2002.

...The worst was in front ofthe offices of L’Humanité, its

iron shutter down and infront of it a mass of

Algerians, wounded ordead: an image like this one

is unforgettable.The Boulevard was flooded, gloomy, black;no cars, not a sound: total silence. And themounds of Algerians - and there’s no otherwords for it - every 50 meters before thedoorways. You didn’t know who was dead.There was blood. They didn’t move, theydidn’t cry out, they didn’t say anything.Mounds of Algerians in the darkness, andcompanies of CRS, clubs in hand, whoweren’t hitting anyone anymore, who walkedback and forth.

The worst was in front of the offices ofL’Humanité, on the boulevard Poissonière,its iron shutter down and in front of it a massof Algerians, wounded or dead, who werebleeding and were there, in front of the closedshutter: an image like this one isunforgettable.


26

The presence of the comradesfrom Mindanao in thePhilippines brought home to theparticipants the reality of aconstant struggle againstmilitary occupation by thePhilippines government, backedby the US. “We were saddened,yet inspired, after speaking withthe Filipino comrades, whoshared their experiences of staterepression, armed resistancemovements and comrades beingbrutally murdered by Maoistguerrillas, ” wrote James Nesbittin Scottish Socialist Voice in hisaccount of the camp.

The participation of 12 Scottishyouth was also a big stepforward in relations with theScottish Socialist Youth eventhough they are facing a crisis inthe SSP. The Greeks were alsomuch more numerous than inany previous camps due to thegeographic proximity as well asa growth in youth membership inthe OKDE-Spartakos. Theyfound the experience verypositive and will put mobilisingfor the camp as a high priority ontheir agenda for next year. ThePortuguese delegation was backafter having giving priority tothe Left Bloc youth camp in thelast couple of years.

Under the shadow of war

The question of war became amore central theme thanpredicted in the planningbecause the camp took placewhile Israel was in the midst ofits attack on Lebanon. The campwas a chance to enhance the

understanding of the MiddleEast and discuss how to improvesolidarity work with the peoplesof Lebanon and Palestine. A“permanent workshop” toexchange experiences andcoordinate the activitiesthroughout the week was addedto the programme. The plannedcentral forum on internationalresistance to imperialism andwar was strengthened by theparticipation of a youngPalestinian comrade as well as ayoung woman from the SpanishState arriving directly fromsolidarity work in Gaza.

“A new generation for a newEurope - building the anti-capitalist left” The experiencesof building radical anti-capitalistparties in Europe was anothercentral point on the agenda ofthe camp. The exchange ofexperiences between thecomrades involved in suchprojects were a central themeboth of forums and workshopsand of the bilateral inter-delegation meetings wherecomrades could discuss face toface their experiences, successesand failures whether they hadalready a relative longexperience such as in the LeftBloc of Portugal, the Red GreenAlliance in Denmark, theScottish Socialist party or withinthe party of CommunistRefoundation (PRC) in Italy ornewer experiences such as theWASG-Linkspartei in Germanyor Respect in Britain.

FI Youth Camp 2006

Pasta, politics and partiesThomas Eisler , Penelope Duggan

More than 550 young participants met at the youth camp thisyear near the Umbrian town of Perugia in the largest FI youthcamp since 1995. This was thanks to an impressivemobilisation by the youth of Sinistra Critica in Italy whobrought 230 Italians to the camp. The 130- strong delegationfrom France and 70 from the Spanish State made it a camp witha strong Latin language dominance. It was of course a pleasantinternationalist atmosphere that made the smaller delegationsfrom Belgium, Britain, Scotland, Denmark, Germany, Greece,the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and thePhilippines feel “at home”.

Crucial moment for anti-capitalists in Italy

The camp was an importantoccasion for the young people ofthe FI and the left currentSinistra Critica insideRifondazione. Several of thedissident Rifondazioneparliamentarians had a chance toexplain the situation. TheRifondazione majority haddecided to be in favour of theItalian troops in Afghanistan incontradiction with its earlierposition. They wanted toinfluence the military presenceto make it less harmful. “Buthow do you make war and killpeople in a less harmful way”,asked Franco Turigliatto, one ofthe dissident senators. The twosenators from the FourthInternational section could havethe decisive vote in toppling thegovernment and bringing backBerlusconi because it was madea vote of confidence. In the endthe dissident senators voted infavour of a motion thatprolonged the Italian troops inAfghanistan. But they alsopresented an ultimatum backedby 16 senators which made itclear that at the next time in sixmonths they will not save theProdi government if it insists onmaintaining the troops inAfghanistan.

From the movements tothe camp

The camp was full of enthusiasmand there was a rich exchange inexperiences due to the recentmovements in various countries.

In several countries the studentshave mobilised against austerityand commodification ofeducation. The withdrawal of theCPE (first job contracts) inFrance after a broadmobilisation was an inspirationfor others. “After themobilisation against the CPE anenormous student movementstarted in Greece. ... Thestudents, to state that they weregoing to win, said they would“talk French” to the government.We discussed the lessons we hadlearnt from our differentmobilisations, knowing that inGreece they won thepostponement of their reform.”(Rouge-France)

Revolution in the 21stcentury

Another constant thread was theneed for a new generation ofpolitical activists to look at theworld as it is today and build thepolitical instruments necessaryfor the fight to change it withoutforgetting to learn from pastexperiences. The camp is animportant moment forming thatnew generation to take forwardthe revolutionary struggle in the21st century.

Thomas Eisler is a member of thenational leadership of the Red-GreenAlliance as well as the leadership ofSAP - Danish Section of the FourthInternational.

Penelope Duggan is a member of theexecutive bureau of the FourthInternational.


27

“Learned a lot, hadfun”

The Fourth International seemsto have worked to recognise thecrucial nature of class issuessuch as LGBT liberation,internationalism, women’sliberation and Marxist ecology.In particular, they make nobones about their commitment tofeminism, something whichwould undoubtedly becontentious in the SSP. Ourdelegation came home satisfied,having learned a lot, had fun andmade important new contacts.The FI is not the only show intown on the international far-left, but SSY were glad to havebeen involved and grateful to theorganisers and delegations fortheir friendliness, hospitality andsolidarity. I would stronglyrecommend young membersattend next year and to learnmore about the FI, their historyand their current perspectives.

(Scottish Socialist Voice)

”A mini dreamworld”

The experiences of the camphave had a profound effect onthose that went. Tamir Nasrallahfrom London says “The campwas like a mini dream world, itwas a platform for the young toexpress themselves politicallyand allowed us to break thebarriers of the capitalist systemand question things in a highlycritical way.”

Run by the youth, the camp isable to instil knowledge andconfidence in a socialiststructure. “The FourthInternational youth campsamples a utopian society andcreates a microcosm of asocialist civilization where theclass war is won, gender isindifferent and equality isabsolute” comments JamieSmith (Sheffield, South BankUniversity).

(Socialist Resistance,England & Wales)

The red thread...

It was interesting to meethistorical fighters like theFrench philosopher DanielBensaid sitting down with agroup from a younger generationexchanging impressions, takingthe temperature of the newrebellious youth, and,undoubtedly, remembering hisown and never renounced fightsas a “sixty-eighter” . Becausenot all the rebel students fromthat era have been integrated intothe system as the mass mediawould like us to believe in anirreversible logic that one isradical left at 20 but inevitablyrightwing at 40 (...) Theeducationals and the informalconversations in the camp are anecessary transmission ofmilitant experience, they tie theknot firmly in the red thread thatlinks the different generations.

(Espacio Alternativo,Spanish state)

The G8 symbolises more thanany other internationalinstitution the economic andpolitical order of capitalism. Agroup of industrial states whichgovern only 13% of the world‚spopulation sets the agenda forthe other internationalinstitutions in secret meetingsand assumes it can just dominatethe rest of the world. These areprecisely the countries where thebiggest financial centres areconcentrated, where mosttransnational companies arebased, the most billionaires liveand insatiable greed for naturalresources dominates.

A broad European counter-movement to this summit isnecessary to protest against thecruel policies of this self-appointed elite and developsocial alternatives to the dictatesof capital. The Assembly ofSocial Movements decided atthe European Social Forum in

European Anti-Capitalist Left

Call for Anti-G8 mobilisation inRostokEuropean Anti-Capitalist Left

The next G8 summit will take place in June 2007 in the Balticcoastal resort of Heiligendamm, near Rostock, after summits inEdinburgh and St Petersburg. Poverty, debt, environmentaldestruction, war, social cuts and attacks on our democraticrights - this is the catastrophic balance-sheet of the neo-liberalpolicies of the leaders of the eight most powerful countries thatmeet up every year.

Athens to turn the G8 summitinto a huge Europeandemonstration of socialopposition.

The parties and groups organisedin the European Anti-CapitalistLeft are part of a broad socialalliance at European level toprotest against the G8 and theirpolicies as effectively andvisibly as possible. But our aimis not just to oppose these attackson our rights, living conditionsand future, but to develop analternative society based onpeace and not war, on solidaritynot competition, on equality, notdiscrimination.

WE CALL ON THE WHOLEEUROPEAN LEFT ANDPROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATSTO JOIN US IN THEACTIVITIES ANDDEMONSTRATIONS INROSTOCK IN JUNE 2007!

EACL Secretariat


28

1 One year after, the EuropeanUnion faces challenges

The French and Dutch “No” endedup being a fatal blow to the project ofthe militarist, antidemocratic andneo-liberal constitution for theEuropean Union (EU). This victoryis first of all a defeat for neo-liberalism. Workers and youth don’taccept capitalism as the end ofhistory for humanity any more. In acontext of globalization, ofdelocalization and privatization, thevalues of the market and competitionare definitely not ours.

The rejection of the constitution is asanction against the autocratic powerof the ruling elite. They cannotindefinitely ridicule universalsuffrage and all our democraticgains, the fruits of two centuries ofstruggle.

Finally, the results of the French andDutch referendums express a deepaversion to war and imperialism, atthe time of the Iraqi mire and themilitarization of Europe through itssubordination to NATO. We opposeany imperialist war against Iran.

2 From the No of the ballot tothe No on the streets

The French and Dutch “No” havebeen a tremendous lever for all thesocial struggles in Europe those pastfew months. The rejection of neo-liberalism in the ballot has beentranslated into powerful Europeansocial movements on the streets. TheLisbon and Barcelona strategies,with their antisocial effects havebeen massively rejected. In January2006, thanks to their Europeanmobilization and the pressure theyput on the European Parliament,dockers have defeated the directivewhich liberalizes port services forthe second time.

With their European demonstrations,social movements and unions havepushed back the Eurocrats on thecountry of origin principle in theBolkestein directive. The strugglegoes on for its total rejection and forthe improvement of workingconditions in all the countries ofEurope and legislation offeringworkers the highest degree of

protection. Being challenged inStrasbourg and Brussels, thestrategies of Lisbon and Barcelonahave been challenged with a newdimension in many Europeancountries, after several decades.

Germany’s biggest strike in 20 yearshappened while the governmentwanted to increase working timefrom 38.5 to 42 hours in regionalpublic services. In Great Britain toothe biggest strike since 1926 tookplace in transport and municipalservices, with more than 1.5 millionworkers on strike for 24 hours. InDenmark over 100,000demonstrated on 17th May againstthe right-wing government’s plan toattack the welfare system. Finally, inFrance, after the movement of thepoor suburbs in autumn 2005, a long,massive and powerful socialmovement took place among youthand the working class against theCPE (“First Job Contract”), whichlegalized contingent work for youthunder the age of 26. On 8th Marchand 4th April, more than 3 millionpeople demonstrated against theFrench government’s policy.

Across Europe with more or lessintensity, new generations ofdemonstrators realise the need for analternative to neo-liberalism.

3 Preparing politicalalternatives

As participants of the EuropeanAnti-Capitalist Left, we haveparticipated in those social and unionmovements with all our strength. Wefavour the unity of all progressiveforces against neo-liberal projects,be they launched by conservative,social-democrat or neo-liberal labourgovernments.

Our goal is not only to resist theattacks on our rights, livingconditions and our future, but also tohelp develop an alternative societyfounded on peace not war, onsolidarity not competition, onequality not discrimination, onenvironment not pollution. It’s basedon this programme of political,democratic and social breakthroughthat we stand in elections. We rejectracism, sexism, homophobia and allkinds of discrimination. We reject

European Anti-Capitalist Left

immigrants themselves intocriminals. This hatred and fear iscoming from above. That’s why we,the parties of the EACL are taking upa two-pronged battle for hearts andminds: for peace and equal rights forimmigrants.

6 Towards a new social andpolitical force across Europe

The rejection of the EuropeanConstitution made the 450 millioncitizens aware that the fight againstthis Europe is a common fight. TheSocial Forum of Athens, which hasjust come to an end, leads the waytowards this new Europe, therebyfollowing on from the previoussocial forums. Enhanced by thesenew struggles, new experiences andnew generations, it is up to us in theEuropean Anti-Capitalist Left todeepen our cooperation and ourlinks, beyond our different historiesand cultures. We support the effort tobuild a new social, political andpluralist force across Europe able tooverthrow neo-liberalism. This is thecommitment we are making.

Saint-Denis, the 19th of May 2006

Bloco de Esquerda(Portugal),

Esquerra Unida i Alternativa,(Catalunya)

Espacio Alternativo (Spain)

Deutsche KommunistischePartei (Germany)

Ligue CommunisteRévolutionnaire (France),

Özgürlük Dayanisma Partisi(Turkey),

Red/Green Alliance(Denmark),

Respect (Great Britain),

Scottish Socialist Party(Scottland),

SolidaritéS (Switzerland)

The European Anti-Capitalist Leftbrings together a range of broadparties from across Europe to co-ordinate policy discussions andpractical actions.

any compromises which would leadto capitalism being stabilised on theback of workers, youth, women andimmigrants.

4 Against the role ofMultinationals in Europe andin Latin America

The legitimate nationalization of theoil and gas industry by the Boliviangovernment has met with an angryresponse from right-wing Europeangovernments and multinationalcorporations. It forces us, the partiesand movements involved in theEACL, to support campaigns indefence of the rights of the Bolivianpeople and other oppressed peoplesof Latin America to use their ownnatural resources as they want. This,we believe is, the main task of theanticapitalist left in Europe in thestruggle against the transnationals inour own countries.

5 Against War anddiscrimination of immigrants

Social struggles and the anti-warcampaign are very closely linked. Anew stage of imperialist war is on thehorizon. The US government hasdeclared its new aim ofoverthrowing the mullahs’ regime inTeheran. That means the disputeabout nuclear power in Iran is centraland the EU, in particular the British,French and German governments,are playing the role of a useful idiotin a murderous strategy which is nolonger under their control.

Anti-war mobilisation must return tothe streets. Solidarity with thePalestinian people and the rejectionof cynical European cessation of aidis an urgent necessity.

The renewed peace movement isconfronted with a brutal anti-immigrant and islamophobiccampaign aimed at those sections ofsociety which are most susceptible toracism and xenophobia. TheEuropean governments are directlyresponsible for creating thisatmosphere. All across Europe theyare proposing new discriminatorymeasures. On the borders of FortressEurope they are pursuing a shamefulpolicy which is turning immigrationinto a national security issue and the

European Anticapitalist Left declaration

One year after saying NO to the European Constitutional Treaty

The reality of the last century seems tochallenge these basic Marxist ideas. Despiteoccasional mass militancy and even proto-revolutionary struggles, the majority of theworking class in the developed capitalistcountries have remained tied to reformistpolitics - a politics premised on thepossibility of improving the condition ofworkers without the overthrow of capitalism.

While living and working conditions forworkers in the “global North” havedeteriorated sharply since the late 1960s, theresult has not been, for the most part, thegrowth of revolutionary consciousness.Instead we have seen reactionary ideas -racism, sexism, homophobia, nativism,militarism - strengthened in a significantsector of workers in the advanced capitalistcountries. Since the late 1970s, nearly one-third of U.S. voters in union households havevoted for right-wing Republicans. [1]

This paradox poses a crucial challenge forrevolutionary Marxists. However, we need toavoid “mythological” explanations, imaginedexplanations for real phenomena, whether tointerpret natural events or to explain thenature of society. Unfortunately, one of themost influential explanations within the leftfor working class reformism andconservatism - the theory of the “laboraristocracy” - is such a myth.

Theory of the “Labor Aristocracy”

Frederick Engels first introduced the notionof the “labor aristocracy” in a number ofletters to Marx stretching from the late 1850sthrough the late 1880s. [2] Engels wasgrappling with the growing conservatism ofthe organized sectors of the British working

class. He argued that those British workerswho had been able to establish unions andsecure stable employment - skilled workersin the iron, steel and machine makingindustries and most workers in the cottontextile mills - constituted a privileged and“bourgeoisified” layer of the working class, a“labor aristocracy.”

British capital’s dominance of the worldeconomy - its industrial and financial“monopoly” - allowed key employers toprovide a minority of workers with relativelyhigher wages and employment security.Engels saw the resulting relative privilege,especially when compared with the mass ofpoorly paid workers in unstable jobs, as thematerial basis of the growing conservatism ofthe British labor movement.

The contemporary theory of the laboraristocracy is rooted in the work of V.I. Leninon imperialism and the rise of “monopolycapitalism.” Lenin was shocked when theleaders of the European socialist partiessupported “their” capitalist governments inthe First World War. The victory of what hecalled “opportunism” (his term forreformism) confounded Lenin, who haddismissed the development of “revisionism”(Edward Bernstein’s challenge to classicalMarxism in 1899) as the ideology of sociallyisolated, middle-class intellectuals. Leninbelieved the “orthodox Marxist” leadershipof the socialist parties and unions had longago vanquished the revisionist challenge.

Lenin had therefore expected that theEuropean socialist leaders would fulfill theirpledge, ratified at numerous congresses ofthe Socialist International, to oppose theirruling classes’ war drive with strikes and

social disruption. By 1915, Lenin had begunto develop his explanation for the victory ofopportunism in the socialist and labormovements. In his article “The Collapse ofthe Second International,” Lenin argued:

“The period of imperialism is the period inwhich the distribution of the world among the‘great’ and privileged nations, by whom allother nations are oppressed, is completed.Scraps of the booty enjoyed by the privilegedas a result of this oppression undoubtedly fallto the lot of certain sections of the petty-bourgeoisie and the aristocracy andbureaucracy of the working class.” [3]

This segment “represents an infinitesimalminority of the proletariat and the workingmasses” whose “adherence... with thebourgeoisie against the mass of theproletariat” was the social basis ofreformism.

Lenin located the economic foundation of thelabor aristocracy in the “super-profits”generated through imperialist investment inwhat we would today call the “third world”or “global South.” According to his 1920preface to Imperialism: The Highest Stage ofCapitalism:

“Obviously, out of such enormous superprofits (since they are obtained over andabove the profits which capitalists squeezeout of the workers of their “own” country) itis possible to bribe their labor leaders and anupper stratum of the labor aristocracy. Andthe capitalists of the “advanced” countries dobribe them: they bribe them in a thousand


29

Debate: On working class consciousness

The Labor Aristocracy MythCharlie Post

THE PERSISTENCE OF reformism and outright conservatismamong workers, especially in the imperialist centers of NorthAmerica, Western Europe and Japan, has long confoundedrevolutionary socialists. The broadest outlines of Marxisttheory tell us that capitalism creates it own “gravediggers” - aclass of collective producers with no interest in the maintenanceof private ownership of the means of production. The capitalistsystem’s drive to maximize profits should force workers tostruggle against their employers, progressively broaden theirstruggle and eventually overthrow the system and replace itwith their democratic self-rule.

Well paid Boeing workers listenrespectfully to Democrat SenatorBarbara Boxer


30

different ways, direct and indirect, overt andcovert.”

“This stratum of bourgeoisified workers or“labor aristocracy,” who have becomecompletely petty-bourgeois in their mode oflife, in the amount of their earnings, and intheir point of view, serve as the main supportof the Second International [the reformistsocialists - CP] and, in our day, the principalsocial (not military) support of thebourgeoisie. They are the real agents of thebourgeoisie in the labor movement, the laborlieutenants of the capitalist class, the realcarriers of reformism and chauvinism.” [4]

The theory of the labor aristocracy remainsan important explanation of working-classreformism and conservatism for importantsegments of the far left in the industrializedcountries. While the mainstream CommunistParties generally distanced themselves fromthe notion of the labor aristocracy as theymoved toward reformist politics in the late1930s, [5] certain left-wing opponents of theCommunist Parties continue to defend thetheory.

Thus, in the “New Communist Movement”of the 1970s and 1980s, various currentsdefended the notion that a layer of U.S.workers shared in the “super profits” ofimperialism and monopoly capitalism. MaxElbaum (the author of the influentialRevolution in the Air [6] and Robert Seltzer,then leaders of the prominent “newcommunist” group Line of March, publisheda three part explication and defense of thetheory of the labor aristocracy in the early1980s. [7]

More recently, Jonathan Strauss of theAustralian Democratic Socialist Party (DSP),one of the larger revolutionary organizationsin the English-speaking world whose origins

lie in Trotskyism, has published a series ofarticles in the DSP sponsored journal Links[8] that elaborates upon Elbaum and Seltzer’sdefense of the theory of the labor aristocracy.

Important groups of activists, in particularthose working with low-wage workers, arealso drawn to the theory of the laboraristocracy. Four members of the PeopleOrganized to Win Employment Rights(POWER), a workers’ center organizingmostly “low-wage/no-wage” workers ofcolor in the San Francisco area, argued that:

“Another feature of imperialism thatdistinguishes it from earlier eras of capitalismis the imperialist powers’ creation of a “laboraristocracy.” The dominant position of theimperialist nations allows these nations toextract super-profits. The ruling elite ofimperialist nations use some of the super-profits to make significant economic andpolitical concessions to certain sectors of thatnation’s working class. Through higherwages, greater access to consumer goods andservices and expanded social wage such aspublic education and cultural institutions, theimperialist elite are able to essentially bribethose sections of the working class...

“For a contemporary example of this, all wehave to do is look at the 2004 presidentialelections. Statistics show that working classwhites in the United States votedoverwhelmingly for George W. Bush in anelection that could be read as a referendum ofthe empire’s war on the Iraqi people. Ananalysis that solely focuses on class wouldsuggest that working class whites had andhave an interest in opposing a war that, ifnothing else, is costing them billions indollars. But clearly that ain’t what happened.Working class whites voted overwhelminglyin support of the war on the Iraqi people. Themajority of working class whites, despitetheir own exploitation, tie their own interests

to white supremacy and the dominance of“America” in the world.” [9]

Most current versions of the labor aristocracythesis recognize some of the grave empiricalproblems (see below) with Lenin’s claimsthat higher wages for a significant minorityof workers in the imperialist countries comesfrom the super profits earned from theexploitation of lower paid workers in Africa,Asia and Latin America. [10] Instead, theytend to emphasize how the emergence of“monopoly capitalism” allows largecorporations that dominate key branches ofindustry to earn super profits, which theyshare with their workers in the form of secureemployment, higher wages and benefits.

Contemporary defenders of the laboraristocracy thesis argue that prior to the riseof large corporations in the late 19th andearly 20th centuries, capitalism was in its“competitive” stage. Under competitivecapitalism most branches of industry saw alarge number of relatively small firmscompeting with one another through pricecutting.

If any particular firm or industry began toexperience higher than average profitsbecause of the introduction of newmachinery, it was relatively easy for itscompetitors to either adopt the newtechnology or shift investment fromindustries with lower profits to industrieswith higher profits. Through this process ofcompetition within and between branches ofproduction, new technology was rapidlydiffused and capital easily moved betweendifferent sectors of the economy, resulting inuniform technical conditions within anindustry and equal profit rates within andbetween industries.

According to Elbaum and Seltzer, Marx’sanalysis of the equalization of the rate ofprofit [11] applied to the “competitive” phaseof capitalism:

“In the era of competitive capitalism, profitsabove the average rate, i.e. surplus profits,were generally spasmodic and temporary.They were usually derived as a result oftechnological advances that enabled acapitalist to reduce costs below the industryaverage, or entrepreneurial skills that openednew markets. However, an abnormally highrate of profit by an individual firm, or in aparticular branch of industry, was soonundermined by an inflow of capital seekingthe higher rate of profit or by the relativelyrapid adoption of cost-cutting innovations bycompetitors.” [12]

The rise of large scale corporations in the20th century create “institutional or structuralrestrictions of this process” which “result inmonopoly super profits.” [13] “Monopoly”or “oligopoly” - where a small number of

Debate

Boeing workers on strike


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firms dominate a given industry - replacedcompetition. Specifically, the enormous costof new capital’s entering these industries(auto, steel, etc.) - the barriers to entry —allow these firms to limit competition andsustain above average profits in several ways.

These barriers to entry prevent the rapiddiffusion of new methods of productionacross industries, creating what ErnestMandel called “technological rents” or super-profits [14] for these monopoly corporations.These barriers also prevent capital frommoving from low profitability to highprofitability industries, blocking theequalization of profit rates. Finally, barriersto entry and restricted competition allowcorporations to raise prices above their pricesof production, securing super profits for thelargest firms in the economy. [15]

In this view competition does not disappearunder monopoly capitalism, but tends tooperate primarily in those sectors of theeconomy where large numbers of relativelysmall firms continue to predominate. Cut-throat competition and the rapid depressionof above average profits to the average ratepersist in the “competitive” sectors (garment,electronics, etc.) of the economy. There thesmall scale of investment necessary to start acompetitive firm lowers barriers to entry andallows a large number of small firms tosurvive.

The result is a “dual economy,” with twodistinct profit rates:

“In the monopoly stage of capitalism, thetendency to form an average rate of profitstill exists, since monopoly doesn’t obliteratecompetition in the system as a whole. But itis modified by monopoly power. Therefore,the surplus value of society is distributedboth according to size of capital throughinter-industry competition (which yieldsequal profit on equal capital as in competitivecapitalism); and according to the level ofmonopolization (which yields monopolysuper profits). Monopolies receive both theaverage profit and monopoly super profit.Consequently, there arise the phenomena of arelatively permanent hierarchy of profit ratesranging from the highest in the strategicindustries with large-scale production and thestrongest monopolies, to the lowest in weakerindustries with small-scale production,intense competition and market instability.”[16]

According to Strauss, Elbaum and Seltzer,monopoly super profits become the primarysource of the “bribe” for the contemporarylabor aristocracy. The monopoly industries’higher than average profit rates allow thesefirms to provide higher than average wagesand benefits and secure employment to theirworkers. By contrast, competitive industriesearn average (or below average) profit rates

and doom workers in these industries tobelow average wages and benefits andinsecure employment.

From this perspective, effective unions areonly possible in the monopoly sector of theeconomy, where the absence of competitioncreates super profits and allows corporationsto “bribe” workers with higher wages andmore secure employment. Given the realitiesof racism and national oppression, “white”workers tend to be overrepresented in thehigher paid sectors of the economy, whileworkers of color tend to be overrepresentedin the lower paid sectors of the economy.

The labor aristocracy, as today’s theorists seeit, is no longer made up primarily of skilledmachinists and other industrial workers, aswas the case in the early 20th century. Today,the more highly paid workers in theunionized monopoly and public sectorconstitute a labor aristocracy whose higherwages derive from the super-exploitation ofworkers in the competitive sectors of theadvanced capitalist economies. [17]

Despite its intellectual pedigree andlongevity, the labor aristocracy thesis is not atheoretically rigorous or factually realisticexplanation of working-class reformism orconservatism. This essay undertakes anexamination of the theoretical and empiricaleconomic claims of the labor aristocracythesis.

We will first evaluate the claim that superprofits pumped out of workers in the globalSouth underwrite a “bribe” in the form ofhigher wages for a minority of the workingclass in the global North. The essay thenevaluates the claim that limits on competitionflowing from industrial concentration in keysectors of the economy produces differentialprofits rates and wages. We will conclude ourcritique of the theory of the labor aristocracywith an analysis of the actual history ofradical and revolutionary working-classactivism in the 20th century.

Finally, I will present an alternativeexplanation of the persistence of workingclass reformism and conservatism - onerooted in the necessarily episodic character ofworking-class self-organization and activity,the emergence of an officialdom(bureaucracy) in the unions and pro-workingclass political parties, and the inability ofreformist politics to effectively win or defendworking-class gains under capitalism. [18]

Investment, Wages and Profits

Imperialist investment, particularly in theglobal South, represents a tiny portion ofglobal capitalist investment. [19] Foreigndirect investment makes up only 5% of totalworld investment - that is to say, 95% of total

capitalist investment takes place within theboundaries of each industrialized country.

Of that five percent of total global investmentthat is foreign direct investment, nearly three-quarters flow from one industrialized country- one part of the global North - to another.Thus only 1.25% of total world investmentflows from the global North to the globalSouth. It is not surprising that the globalSouth accounts for only 20% of globalmanufacturing output, mostly in labor-intensive industries such as clothing, shoes,auto parts and simple electronics.

Data for profits earned by U.S. companiesoverseas do not distinguish betweeninvestments in the global North and globalSouth. For purposes of approximation, wewill assume that the 25% of U.S. foreigndirect investment in labor-intensivemanufacturing in Africa, Asia and LatinAmerica produces profits above those earnedon the 75% of U.S. foreign direct investmentin more capital-intensive production inwestern Europe, Canada and Japan. It isunlikely, however, that more than half of theprofits earned abroad by US companies areearned in the global South.

Thus, assigning 50% of foreign profits ofU.S. companies to their investments in theglobal South probably biases the data in favorof claims that these profits constitute asignificant source of total U.S. wages. Yeteven accepting such a biased estimate, thedata for the period 1948-2003 supportsErnest Mandel’s assertion that U.S. profitsfrom investment in the global South“constitute a negligible sum compared to thetotal wage bill of the American workingclass.” [20]

Prior to 1995 total profits earned by U.S.companies abroad exceeded 4% of total U.S.wages only once, in 1979. Foreign profits asa percentage of total U.S. wages rose above5% only in 1997, 2000 and 2002, and roseslightly over 6% in 2003. If we hold to ourestimate that half of total foreign profits areearned from investment in the global South,only 1-2% of total U.S. wages for most of thenearly 50 years prior to 1995 - and only 2-3%of total U.S. wages in the 1990s - could havecome from profits earned in Africa, Asia andLatin America.

Such proportions are hardly sufficient toexplain the 37% wage differentials betweensecretaries in advertising agencies and “laboraristocracy” machinists working on oilpipelines, or the 64% wage differentialsbetween janitors in restaurants and bars andautomobile workers. [21]

Does this analysis mean that imperialism -rooted in the export of capital (and capitalistclass relations) across the globe - has noimpact on profits and wages in the global

On Working Class Consciousness


32

North? No - but the impact is quite differentfrom what the labor aristocracy thesispredicts.

In Capital, Volume III, [22] Marx recognizedthat foreign investment was one of a numberof “countervailing” tendencies to the declineof the rate of profit. Put simply, the export ofcapital from the global North to the globalSouth, especially when invested inproduction processes that are more laborintensive than those found in the advancedcapitalist countries, tends to raise the massand rate of profit in the North. There isindeed some evidence that foreign profits -from investments in both the global Northand global South - constitute an importantcounter tendency to declining profits in theUnited States.

Profits earned abroad by U.S. companies as apercentage of total U.S. profits (Table I andGraph I) have risen fairly steadily since 1948,rising from a low of 5.19% in 1950 to a highof 30.56% in 2000. [23] The proportion ofU.S. profits earned abroad jumped sharplyafter the onset of the long-wave of stagnationin 1966, jumping from 6.43% in 1966 to18.36% in 1986.

Even more indicative is the relationshipbetween annual percentage changes indomestic and foreign U.S. profits (Table II).In a number of years (1967-1970, 1972-1974,1978-1980, 1986-1990, 1994-1995, 1997-2001, 2003), the annual percentage changefor foreign profits was higher than the annualpercentage change for domestic profits. Insome of these years (1967, 1969-1970, 1974,1979-1980, 1989, 1998, 2000-2001), totalprofits earned in the U.S. declined while totalprofits earned abroad increased.

Higher profits result in more investmentacross the board in the industrializedcountries. More investment eventually bringsa growing demand for labor (within limits setby investment in newer, more capitalintensive technology), falling unemploymentand rising wages for all workers in theindustrialized capitalist countries.

Put simply, this means that imperialistinvestment in the global South benefits allworkers in the global North - both highlypaid and poorly paid workers. Higher profitsand increased investment mean not only

more employment and rising wages for“aristocratic” steel, automobile, machine-making, trucking and construction workers,but also for lowly paid clerical, janitorial,garment and food processing workers. AsErnest Mandel put it, “the real ‘laboraristocracy’ is no longer constituted insidethe proletariat of an imperialist country butrather by the proletariat of the imperialistcountries as a whole.” [24] That “real ‘laboraristocracy’” includes poorly paid immigrantjanitors and garment workers, African-American and Latino poultry workers, aswell as the multi-racial workforce in auto andtrucking. [25]

Clearly, these “benefits” accruing to theentire working class of the industrializedcountries from imperialist investment areneither automatic nor evenly distributed.Rising profits and increased investment donot necessarily lead to higher wages forworkers in the absence of effective working-class organization and struggle.

During the post-World War II long wave ofexpansion, the industrial unions that hadarisen during the mass strike wave of 1934-37 were able to secure rising real wages bothfor their own members and the bulk of theunorganized working classes. However, since1973, the labor movement in the UnitedStates and the rest of the industrial countrieshas been in retreat.

Real wages for U.S. workers, both union andnonunion, have fallen to about 11% belowtheir 1973 level, despite strong growthbeginning in the late 1980s. [26] Higher thanaverage profits have accrued, first andforemost, to capital, allowing increasedinvestment; and to the professional-managerial middle class in the form of highersalaries.

Nor are the “benefits” of increasedprofitability and growth due to imperialistinvestment distributed equally to all portionsof the working class. As we will see below,the racial-national and gender structuring ofthe labor market result in women andworkers of color being concentrated in thelabor-intensive and low-wage sectors of theeconomy.

Whatever benefits all workers in the globalNorth reap from imperialist investment in theglobal South are clearly outweighed by thedeleterious effects of the expansion ofcapitalist production on a world scale. This isespecially clear today, in the era of neoliberal“globalization.”

Although industry is clearly not “footlooseand fancy free” as some theorists ofglobalization claim - moving from onecountry to another in search for the cheapestlabor [27] - the removal of various legal andjudicial obstacles to the free movement of

capital has sharpened competition amongworkers internationally, to the detriment ofworkers in both the global North and South.

The mere threat of moving production “off-shore,” even if the vast majority of industrialinvestment remains within the advancedcapitalist societies, is often sufficient to forcecuts in wages and benefits, the dismantling ofwork rules and the creation of multi-tieredworkforces in the United States and otherindustrialized countries. Neoliberalism’sdeepening of the process of primitiveaccumulation of capital - the forcibleexpropriation of peasants from the land inAfrica, Asia and Latin America - has createda growing global reserve army of laborcompeting for dwindling numbers offulltime, secure and relatively well paid jobsacross the world.

Put simply, the sharpening competitionamong workers internationally more thanoffsets the “benefits” of imperialism forworkers in the global North. [28]

Monopoly, Super-Profits and WageDifferentials

The claim that monopoly super-profits,resulting from industrial concentration andthe limitation of competition in key sectors ofthe economy, produce higher than averagewages - and a labor aristocracy of unionizedworkers - is also open to empirical challenge.During the long boom of the 1940s, 1950sand 1960s, certain branches of production didseem to enjoy stable higher than averageprofits and wages flowing from the rise ofoligopolies.

However, as that boom turned into the longstagnation beginning in the late 1960s, theseindustries began to face persistently lowerthan average profits and sharpenedcompetition both at home and abroad. By1980, the impact on wages and workingconditions are apparent. According toHoward Botwinick:

“(T)he ‘eternal’ core [“monopoly” industries- CP] was beginning to show more and moreevidence of peripheral [‘competitive’industries - CP] behavior. Industries like steeland auto were experiencing seriousprofitability crunches and were becomingmore and more interested in lowering thewages and working conditions of theirprimary work force. In addition to relocatingto low-wage areas, core firms weresuccessfully extracting serious concessionsin wages and working conditions from theirwork forces. Even more distressing, a‘secondary’ labor market was developingwithin the factory gates of these core firms astwo-tiered wage packages were increasinglyintroduced on a wide scale.” [29]

Debate

Nike factory, Ho Chi Minh City


33

As early as the mid-1970s, statistical studiesof the relationship between industrialconcentration and profit and wagedifferentials began to challenge the centralfactual claims of the monopoly capitalismthesis.

In his 1984 study, Willi Semmler [30]reviewed the existing literature on industrialconcentration and profit rate differentials andcarried out his own statistical analysis for theUnited States and West German economiessince the second world war. He found, first,that while there was evidence of a correlationbetween industrial concentration (monopoly)and profit rate differentials before 1970, healso found that marked profit ratedifferentials existed between and withinconcentrated industries in this period.

In other words, profit rate differentials hadmultiple causes before 1970. Semmler alsofound that when profit rate differentials wereexamined through the 1970s and early 1980s,the correlation between industrialconcentration and higher than average profitrates all but disappeared. Instead,“differentials of profit rates are significantlyrelated to the productivity, capital/outputratios, and unit wage costs of each industry.”[31]

Howard Botwinick’s 1993 study of wage andprofit differentials reviewed the literaturepublished since Semmler’s work wascompleted, and found similar patterns. [32]Industrial concentration, again, could notexplain profit and wage rate differentials. Infact, not only were factors like laborproductivity, capital-intensity of production,and the like more important in accounting forprofit and wage differentials; but many of thehighly concentrated industries that hadexperienced higher than average profits priorto 1970 were experiencing lower thanaverage profits in the 1970s and 1980s.

More recent studies have confirmed theabsence of a strong correlation betweenindustrial concentration and higher thanaverage profits and wages. Instead, profit andwage differentials were rooted in differencesin labor-productivity and capital-intensity ofproduction. [33]

The empirical problems with the monopolysuper profits argument - so central tocontemporary theories of the laboraristocracy - are rooted in the very notions of“monopoly” and “oligopoly.” [34] The notionthat the existence of a small number of largefirms in an industry limits competition,allowing higher than average profits andwages, is derived from neo-classical (non-Marxian) economics’ vision of “perfectcompetition.”

For neoclassical economists, perfectcompetition - which allows instantaneous

mobility of capital between branches ofproduction, uniform technology, equal profitrates and wages - exists only when a largenumber of small firms exist in a market. Anydeviation from this is “oligopoly” - a form of“imperfect competition” that createsobstacles to capital mobility, differenttechniques, and higher than average profitsand wages.

The notions of perfect competition andoligopoly/monopoly are both conceptuallyand empirically flawed. Perfect competitionis an ideological construction - anidealization of capitalist competition thatmakes the existing economic order appearefficient and just.

Real capitalist competition - from the birth ofcapitalism in English agriculture in the 16thcentury, through the industrial revolution ofthe 18th and 19th century to the emergence ofthe transnational corporations in the 20thcentury - has never corresponded to thedream world of “perfect competition.”Capitalist competition is fought through whatMarx called the “heavy artillery of fixedcapital” - constant technological innovation,taking the form of the increasingmechanization of production.

Older investments in fixed capital, even ifthey no longer allow a particular firm toreduce unit costs and raise its profit marginsand rates, cannot be abandoned immediatelyin favor of new and more efficient machinery.According to Botwinick:

“Given the presence of fixed capitalinvestment, however, new techniques cannotbe immediately adopted by all firms in theindustry. Because fixed capital generallyrequires prolonged turnover periods, newtechniques will be adopted primarily by thosecapitals that are in the best position to do so.Thus, although new capitals will enter theindustry with ‘state of the art’ equipment andother existing capitals will gradually begin toreplenish and expand their productivefacilities with the latest techniques, older, lessefficient capitals will also tend to live on formany years. This is particularly true withinprolonged periods of rapid growth... Ratherthan creating identical firms, competitiontherefore creates a continual redifferentiationof the conditions of production.” [35]

Put simply, competition - not its absence -explains the diversity of technical conditionsof production and the resultingdifferentiations of profit and wage rateswithin and between industries throughout thehistory of capitalism. The higher wages thatworkers in unionized capital-intensiveindustries enjoy are not gained at the expenseof lower paid workers, either at home orabroad. Instead, the lower unit costs of theseindustries make it possible for these capitalsto pay higher than average wages. As we

have seen over the last thirty years, however,only effective worker organization can secureand defend these higher than average wages.

Racial and gender inequalities can be bestunderstood in relationship to the profit andwage differentials created through capitalistaccumulation and competition. As race,nationality and gender structure the“employment queue” in capitalist societies,women and workers of color are over-represented in different segments of the“active” and “reserve” armies of labor.

Different industries, with diverse technicalconditions of production, profit rates andwages, thus recruit workers from theseracially and gender defined sectors of theworking class. In general, women andworkers of color tend to be over representedin labor-intensive, low-wage sectors; whilewhite and male workers tend to be overrepresented in the more capital-intensive,higher-wage sectors.

Thus race, nationality and gender do generatea stratified working class as workers aredistributed into branches of production thatcompetition and accumulation - rather thanmonopoly or imperialist super profits -continually differentiate in terms oftechnique, profitability and wages.

PART 2

The “Labor Aristocracy” andWorking-Class Struggles

onsciousness in Flux

WHATEVER THE THEORETICAL andempirical problems with the economics of thelabor aristocracy thesis, its defenders stillclaim that well paid workers have generallybeen more reformist and conservative in theirpolitics than lower paid workers. They pointto the example of mostly white New YorkCity construction workers (“hardhats”)attacking antiwar demonstrators in the Springof 1970; and contrast them with the militancyand progressive politics of some of the recent“Justice for Janitors” campaigns.

A more systematic examination of the historyof workers’ struggles in the global North inthe past century, however, does not bear outthe claim that well paid workers are generallyreformist or conservative, while poorly paidworkers are more revolutionary or radical.

The most important counter-example is theRussian working class in the early 20thcentury. The backbone of Lenin’s Bolsheviks(something he was most definitely aware of)were the best paid industrial workers in theRussian cities - skilled machinists in thelargest factories. Lower paid workers, such asthe predominantly female textile workers,were generally either unorganized orapolitical (until the beginnings of the



34

revolution) or supported the reformistMensheviks. [36]

In fact the mass base of the left, antiwar wingof the pre-First World War socialist partiesand of the postwar revolutionary Communistparties were relatively well paid workers inthe large metalworking industries. Theseworkers led militant struggles againstspeedup and deskilling that became politicalstruggles against conscription and the war.

German Communism became a massmovement when tens of thousands of wellpaid metal workers left the IndependentSocialists and joined the Communists in1921. The French and Italian Communistsalso became mass parties through therecruitment of thousands of machinists wholed the mass strikes of the postwar period.These highly paid workers were alsooverrepresented in the smaller Communistparties of the United States and Britain. [37]

Well paid, although generally deskilled,workers in large scale industry continued toplay a leading role in mass upsurgesthroughout the 20th century. During the CIOupsurge during the 1930s, relatively well paidworkers in the U.S. auto, steel, rubber andother mass production industries, often withskilled industrial workers in the lead,spearheaded the creation of industrial unionsthat united skilled and unskilled, highly paidand poorly paid. Well paid and skilledworkers were, again, over represented inradical and revolutionary organizations in theUnited States during the 1930s. [38]

Well paid workers were also in the vanguardof proto-revolutionary mass struggles inFrance (1968), Italy (1968-69), Britain(1967-75), and Portugal (1974-75).Relatively “aristocratic” workers in trucking,auto, telecommunications, public educationand the postal service were at the center ofthe unofficial, wildcat strikes that shook U.S.industry between 1965 and 1975.

In France in 1995, well paid workers intelecommunications, public transport, postal,health care and education led the publicsector strikes that mounted the firstsuccessful workers’ struggles againstneoliberalism. In the Fall of 2004, autoworkers, some of the best paid in Germany,stood up to layoffs, defying their own unionleaders in an unofficial strike.

In the U.S. working class during the pastdecade, relatively poorly paid workers(janitors, hotel workers, and grocery clerks)have engaged in strike actions much morefrequently than relatively well paid workers.However, better paid workers - from UPSworkers in 1997 to New York City transitworkers in 2005 — have not been absentfrom militant workplace struggles.

Nor is this pattern of militancy andradicalism among relatively well paidworkers limited to the global North. In Chilebetween 1970 and 1973, and Argentinabetween 1971 and 1974, copper miners andmetal workers engaged in industrial strugglesand took the lead in mass mobilizationsagainst the military and the right. In Brazil, itwas the well paid metal workers in the“ABC” suburbs of San Paolo who led massstrikes in the 1970s that created the CUT(United Workers Confederation) andeventually the PT (Workers Party) in theearly 1980s.

Similarly, it was the highest paid Blackworkers in South Africa - in mining, auto,steel - whose struggles in the 1970s createdthe radical and militant FOSATU trade unionconfederation. FOSATU and its successorCOSATU were able to build on workplaceorganization and power in the politicalstruggle against apartheid in the 1980s and1990s.

It is not surprising that relatively well paidworkers have been at the center of the mostmilitant and radical workers’ struggles of thelast century. These workers tend to beconcentrated in large, capital intensiveworkplaces that are often central to thecapitalist economy. These workers haveconsiderable social power when they actcollectively. Strikes in these industries have amuch greater impact on the economy thanworkers in smaller, less capital intensiveworkplaces (garment, office cleaning, etc.)Workers in capital intensive industries arealso often the first targets of capitalistrestructuring in periods of falling profits andsharpened competition.

Explaining Working-ClassReformism [39]

How do we explain the fact that mostworkers, most of the time, do not act on theirpotential power? Why do workers embracereformist politics - support for bureaucraticunionism (reliance on the grievanceprocedure, routine collective bargaining) andDemocratic party electoral politics - orworse, reactionary politics in the forms ofracism, sexism, homophobia, nativism,militarism?

The key to understanding working-classreformism (and conservatism) is thenecessarily episodic nature of working- classstruggle and organization. The necessarycondition for the development of classconsciousness is the self-activity and self-organization of the workers themselves. Theexperience of mass, collective and successfulstruggles against capital and its state in theworkplace and the community is what openslayers of workers to radical and revolutionarypolitical ideas. [40]

The working class cannot be, as a whole,permanently active in the class struggle. Theentire working class cannot consistentlyengage in strikes, demonstrations and otherforms of political activity because this classis separated from effective possession of themeans of production, and its memberscompelled to sell their labor power to capitalin order to survive. They have to go to work!

Put simply, most workers, most of the timeare engaged in the individual struggle to selltheir capacity to work and secure thereproduction of themselves and their families- not the collective struggle against theemployers and the state. The “actuallyexisting” working class can only engage inmass struggles as a class in extraordinary,revolutionary or pre-revolutionary situations.Because of the structural position of wagelabor under capitalism, these must be of shortduration. Most often, different segments ofthe working class become active in thestruggle against capital at different times.

In the wake of successful mass struggles,only a minority of the workers remainconsistently active. Most of this workers’vanguard - those who “even during a lull inthe struggle...do[es] not abandon the frontlines of the class struggle but continues thewar, so to speak, ‘by other means’” [41] -attempts to preserve and transmit thetraditions of mass struggle in the workplaceor the community. However, a sector withinthis active minority, together withintellectuals who have access to culturalskills from which the bulk of the workingclass is excluded, must take on responsibilityfor administering the unions or politicalparties created by periodic upsurges of massactivity.

This layer of fulltime officials - thebureaucracy of the labor movement - is thesocial foundation for “unconditional”reformist practice and ideology in the labormovement. Those workers who becomeofficials of the unions and political partiesbegin to experience conditions of life verydifferent from those who remain in theworkplace.

The new officials find themselves freed fromthe daily humiliations of the capitalist laborprocess. They are no longer subject to eitherdeskilled and alienated labor or the pettydespotism of supervisors. Able to set theirown hours, plan and direct their ownactivities, and devote the bulk of their wakinghours to “fighting for the workers,” theofficials seek to consolidate these privileges.

As the unions gain a place in capitalistsociety, the union officials strengthen theirrole as negotiators of the workers’subordination to capital in the labor-process.In defense of their social position, the laborbureaucracy excludes rank and file activists

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in the unions and parties from any realdecision-making power. [42]

The consolidation of the labor bureaucracy asa social layer, distinct from the rest of theworking class under capitalism, gives rise toits distinctive political practice and world-view. The preservation of the apparatus of themass union or party, as an end itself, becomesthe main objective of the labor bureaucracy.The labor bureaucrats seek to containworking-class militancy within boundariesthat do not threaten the continued existenceof the institutions which are the basis of theofficials’ unique life-style.

Thus what Ernest Mandel called the“dialectic of partial conquests,” thepossibility that new struggles may bedefeated and the mass organizations of theworking class weakened, buttress the laborbureaucracy’s reliance on electoralcampaigns and parliamentary pressure tactics(lobbying) to win political reforms, and onstrictly regimented collective bargaining toincrease wages and improve workingconditions.

The labor bureaucracy’s stake in stablebargaining relationships with the employersand their credibility in the eyes of thecapitalists as negotiators further reinforcetheir conservative ideology and practice.From the bureaucracy’s point of view, anyattempt to promote the militant self-activityand organization among workers must bequashed. At this point, the bureaucracy’sorganizational fetishism (giving priority tothe survival of the apparatus over newadvances in the struggle) produces a world-view that demands the workers’unquestioning obedience to leaders whoclaim they know “what is best for theworkers.”

While the unconditional ideologicalcommitment to reformism grows organicallyfrom the privileged social position of thelabor officialdom, how do we explain theconditional reformism of most workers? Whydo most workers, most of the time acceptreformism? Put bluntly, why is thisconditional reformism the normal state ofworking class consciousness undercapitalism?

In “normal times” - of working classquiescence and passivity - the majority ofworkers come to accept the “rules of thegame” of capitalist competition andprofitability. They seek a “fair share” of theproducts of capitalist accumulation, but donot feel capable of challenging capitalistpower in the workplace, the streets or society.For most workers during “normal times,”mass, militant struggle seems unrealistic;they tend to embrace the labor officialdom’ssubstitution of liberal and reformist electoral

politics, institutionalized collectivebargaining and grievance handling.

However, the continued hold of reformismover the majority of workers requires thatlabor officials “deliver the goods” in the formof improved wages, hours and workingconditions. As Bob Brenner points out:

"(G)iven even a minimum of working-classorganization, reformism tends to be widelyattractive in periods of prosperity preciselybecause in such periods the threat of limitedworking-class resistance - symbolized by theresolution to strike or a victory at the polls -actually can yield concessions from capital.Since filling orders and expandingproduction are their top priorities in theboom, capitalists will tend to find it in theirinterests to maintain and increase production,even if this means concessions to theworkers, if the alternative is to endure a strikeor other forms of social dislocation." [43]

When capitalism enters one of itsunavoidable periods of crisis andrestructuring - like the one that began in thelate 1960s through most of the capitalistworld - the paradox of reformism becomesmanifest. In a world of declining profits andsharpened competition, capitalists throughoutthe world went on the offensive at theworkplace and at the level of the capitaliststate. The restructuring of the capitalistproduction along the lines of lean production,and the neoliberal deregulation of capital andlabor markets, [44] required all-out waragainst workers and their organizationsacross the capitalist world.

At this point, reformism becomes ineffective.Workers can and have made gains againsttheir employers in the past fifteen years - thesuccess of the UPS strike and the “Justice forJanitors” campaigns in various cities cannotbe ignored. However, these victories oftenrequired substantive rank-and-fileorganization and mobilization - includingindependent organizations, like Teamsters fora Democratic Union (TDU).

In fact, the reformist officialdom of theunions and social-democratic partiesembraced realpolitik - adapting to the new“reality” of declining living and workingconditions. As Mandel pointed out:

"(T)he underlying assumption of present-daysocial-democratic gradualism is preciselythis: let the capitalists produce the goods, sothat governments can redistribute them in ajust way. But what if capitalist productiondemands more unequal, more unjustdistribution of the ‘fruits of growth’? What ifthere is no economic growth at all as a resultof capitalist crisis? The gradualists can thenonly repeat mechanically: there is noalternative; there is no way out." [45]

Eschewing militancy and direct action byworkers and other oppressed people, thelabor bureaucracy and reformist politicians inthe West have no choice but to makeconcessions to the employers’ offensive andto administer capitalist state austerity. Thespectacle of reformist bureaucrats shunningthe struggle for reforms has been repeatedacross the capitalist world in the last threedecades, with tragic results.

Again and again, the reformist bureaucratshave surrendered to the requirements ofcapitalist profitability. The ItalianCommunist party embraced austerity in the1970s. The U.S. AFL-CIO officials haveaccepted concession bargaining since 1979,usually without even the pretense of struggle.Social-democratic regimes across Europe(Mitterand and Jospin in France, Blair inBritain, Schroeder in Germany) embracedneoliberal realism - cutting social services,privatizing public enterprises, andderegulating capital and labor markets.

Nor has the reformist retreat been limited tothe imperialist countries. In the early 1990s,the ANC-COSATU-led government in post-apartheid South Africa has embraced whatsome have called the “sado-monetarism” ofthe IMF and World Bank. The debacle of theLula regime in Brazil - attacking workers’rights, opening the agricultural economy totransnational investment and systematicallyretreating from its promise of popular reform- fits the pattern all too well. Today, even themost moderate forms of social-democraticgradualism have become utopian, as the laborbureaucracy across the world has been unableto defend the workers’ past gains much lesswin significant new reforms in an era of crisisand restructuring.

Why Working-Class Conservatism?[46]

The inability of reformism to “deliver thegoods” for most working people also helps usmake sense of the appeal of right-wingpolitics - racist, sexist, homophobic, nativistand militarist - for a segment of workers. Theobjective, structural position of workersunder capitalism provides the basis forcollective, class radicalism and individualist,sectoralist and reactionary politics.

Bob Brenner and Johanna Brenner point out,“workers are not only collective producerswith a common interest in taking collectivecontrol over social production. They are alsoindividual sellers of labor power in conflictwith each other over jobs, promotions, etc.”As Kim Moody put it, capitalism “pushestogether and pulls apart” the working class.As competing sellers of labor power, workersare open to the appeal of politics that pit themagainst other workers - especially workers ina weaker social position:



36

It appears possible for the stronger sectionsof the working class to defend their positionsby organizing on the basis of already existingties against weaker, less-organized sections.They can take advantage of their positions asAmericans over and against foreigners, aswhites over and against blacks, as men overand against women, as employed over andagainst unemployed, etc. In so doing,working people may act initially only out ofwhat they perceive to be their mostimmediate self-interest. But over time theyinevitably feel the pressure to make sense ofthese actions and they adopt ideas which canmake their actions reasonable and coherent.These ideas are, of course, the ideas of theright. [47]

Bruce Nelson’s recent study of steelworkersdetails how relatively white workers in thesteel industry struggled to defend theirprivileged access to better paying andrelatively more skilled work after theestablishment of industrial unionism. Therise of the CIO opened the possibility ofclasswide organization that began to reducethe racial/national segmentation of theworking class.

As the CIO offensive ground to passed itspeak by the late 1930s, and the industrialunions became bureaucratized during thesecond world war, white workersincreasingly moved to defend their privilegedaccess to employment (and with it housing,education for their children, etc.) againstworkers of color. In the steel industries, whiteworkers militantly defended departmentalseniority in promotion and layoffs againstdemands of Black and Latino workers forplant wide seniority and affirmative action inpromotions in the 1960s and 1970s. [48]

As Marxists, we understand that suchstrategies are counter-productive in themedium to long term. Divisions amongworkers and reliance on different segments ofthe capitalist class only undermine the abilityof workers to defend or improve theirconditions of life under capitalism. [49]However, when reformism proves incapableof realistically defending workers’ interests -as it has since the early 1970s - workersembrace individualist and sectoralistperspectives as the only realistic strategy.

This is particularly the case in the absence ofa substantial and influential militant minorityin the working class that can organizecollective resistance to capital independentlyof, and often in opposition to the reformistlabor officials. [50]

Conclusion

Kim Moody has pointed out that everydayworking class “common sense” is not “someconsistent capitalist ideology” but instead:

a clashing collection of old ideas handeddown, others learned through dailyexperience, and still others generated by thecapitalist media, education system, religion,etc. It is not simply the popular idea of anation tranquilized by TV and weekends inthe mall. “Common sense” is both deeper andmore contradictory because it also embodiesexperiences that go against the grain ofcapitalist ideology. [51]

Only through the experience of collective,class activity against the employers, startingat but not limited to the workplace, canworkers begin to think of themselves as aclass with interests in common with otherworkers and opposed to the capitalists.Workers who experience their collective,class power on the job are much more open toclass - and anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-militarist, anti-nativist - ways of thinking.

As Marx pointed out, it is through theworkplace and union struggles that theworking class “becomes fit to rule” -develops the organization and consciousnesscapable of confronting capital. Suchorganization will require a struggle not onlyagainst “backward ideas” among workers,but against the officialdom of the unions andother popular mass organizations that arecommitted to reformist strategies, no matterhow blatantly ineffective.

Workers’ self-organization and self-activityin the workplace struggles is the startingpoint for creating the material and ideologicalconditions for an effective challenge toworking class reformism and conservatism.Clearly, militant workplace struggle is not asufficient condition for the development ofradical and revolutionary consciousnessamong workers. Struggles in working-classcommunities around housing, social welfare,transport and other issues; and politicalstruggles against racism and war are crucialelements in the political self-transformationof the working class.

Successful workplace struggles, however, arethe necessary condition for the developmentof class consciousness. Without theexperience of such struggles, workers willcontinue to passively accept reformistpolitics or, worse, embrace reactionarypolitics.

This does not mean that workers of color,women and other oppressed groups in theworking class should “wait” to fight untilwhite and male workers are ready to act.White and male workers, because of thetemporary but real advantages they gain inthe labor market - preferential access to betterjobs -are not likely to initiate strugglesagainst racism, sexism or homophobia in theworkplace or anywhere else. Self-organization and self-activity of raciallyoppressed groups are crucial to the

development of anti-racist struggles and anti-racist consciousness.

However, a mass working-class audience foranti-racist, anti-sexist and anti-militaristideas will most likely be created in thecontext of mass, class struggles againstcapital. Today, the main audience for the ideathat workers need to stand up to right-wingideas and practices are the small layer of rankand file activists who are trying to promotesolidarity, militancy and democracy in thelabor movement.

Only if these activists, with the help ofsocialists in the labor movement, can succeedin building effective collective fight back willthese ideas - the politics of class radicalism -achieve mass resonance.

Thanks to the editors of Against the Current,Joaquin Bustelo, Steve Downs, Sam Farber,Fred Feldman, Sebastian Lamb, Mike Parker,Jane Slaughter and Teresa Stern for theircomments on an earlier draft of this essay.Special thanks to Kim Moody and AnwarShaikh for their general comments and theirhelp with obtaining data on the weight offoreign direct investment in world and USinvestment (Moody) and on the US profitsearned abroad as a percentage of total USprofits and domestic US wages (Shaikh).

Charlie Post teaches sociology in New York City, isactive in the faculty union at the City University ofNew York, and is a member of Solidarity.

NOTES

[1] New York Times’ compilation of exit polls for theyears 1972-2004 http://www.nytimes.%20com/packages/pdf/politics/20041107_px_ELECTORATE.xls

[2] Jonathan Strauss, in “Engels and the theory of theLabor Aristocracy”, Links: International Journal ofSocialist Renewal, 25 (January-June 2004)www.desp.org.au/links/bank/issue25/Strauss.htm,presents a useful summary of Engel’s writings.

[3] http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/jun/x01.htm

[4] http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/pref02.htm

[5] See C. Post, “The Popular Front: Rethinking theHistory of the CPUSA,” Against the Current 63 (July-August 1996) on the Communist Parties’ evolution intoreformist organizations.

[6] Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin,Mao and Che (London: Verso Books, 2002).

[7] ”The Labor Aristocracy: The Material Basis forOpportunism in the Labor Movement, Part I: The Theoryof the Labor Aristocracy,” Line of March 11 (May-June1982) [home.conexus.net.au/ benj/LOM.htm]; “Part II:The U.S. Labor Movement Since World War II,” Line ofMarch 12 (September-October 1982); “Part III: ThePolemic Within the Communist Movement,” Line ofMarch 13/14 (March-April 1983).

[8] Strauss, “Engels and the Labor Aristocracy” 2004;“Monopoly Capitalism and the Bribery of the LaborAristocracy,” Links: International Journal of SocialistRenewal 26 (July-December 2004).

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[9] J. Browne, M. Franco, J. Negron-Gonzales & S.Williams, Towards Land, Work & Power (San Francisco:POWER: United to Fight, 2005), 46.

[10] Elbaum and Seltzer, “The Labor Aristocracy,” Part I,16-17; Strauss, “Monopoly Capitalism,” 49.

[11] Capital, Volume III (Harmondworth, England:Penguin Books, 1981), Part Two.

[12] Elbaum and Seltzer, “The Labor Aristocracy, Part I”,41 (note iv).

[13] Strauss, “Monopoly Capitalism,” 50.

[14] Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1975),Chapter 3. This is the main economic argument of Strauss,“Monopoly Capitalism,” 50.

[15] Elbaum and Seltzer, “Theory of the LaborAristocracy, Part I”, 41 (note iv).

[16] Elbaum and Selzter, “Theory of the LaborAristocracy, Part I” 41 (note iv). Strauss relies heavily onthe work of Ernest Mandel, which does attempt toreconcile notions of “monopoly” with a classical Marxistconcept of competition. Elbaum and Seltzer do not citeother Marxist and radical economists as the source of theirtheory of “monopoly capitalism.” However, botharguments bear a close relationship to the theories of PaulSweezy and Paul Baran, Monopoly Capital (New York:Monthly Review Press, 1966); and especially the work ofDavid Gordon, Richard Edwards and Michael Reich,Segmented Work, Divided Workers (Boston: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1982).

[17] Elbaum and Seltzer, “The Labor Aristocracy, Part II”presents a fairly detailed discussion of the composition ofthe “labor aristocracy” in the US since the second worldwar, which is very similar to Gordon, Edwards andReich’s discussion of the “primary labor market” under“monopoly capitalism” in Segmented Work, DividedWorkers.

[18] My arguments against the “labor aristocracy”argument owe much to Tony Cliff, “Economic Roots ofReformism,” Socialist Review (Old Series) 6,9 (June1957); Ernest Mandel, “What is the Bureaucracy?” in T.Ali (ed.), The Stalinist Legacy: Its Impact on 20th CenturyWorld Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1984);and Sam Friedman, “The Theory of the LaborAristocracy,” Against the Current (Old Series) 2,3 (Fall1983).

[19] These statistics are drawn from Kim Moody, Workersin a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy(London: Verso, 1997), Part I; and personalcorrespondence May 15, 2002 and October 23, 2004.

[20] Mandel, “What is the Bureaucracy?” 19.

[21] Jane Osburn, “Interindustry Wage Differentials:Patterns and Possible Sources,” Monthly Labor Review(February 2000), Table I (“Mean Hourly Wages ofSelected Occupations in Selected Industries, 1998), 36.

[22] Chapter 14, Section 5.

[23] Clearly, US corporations earn above average or“super”-profits on these investments-the result of thecombination of low wages and labor intensive techniquescommon in the global South, rather than thetransnationals’ “monopolistic” position in the worldmarket.

[24] Mandel, “What is the Bureaucracy?” 19.

[25] Some exponents of the labor aristocracy thesis haveargued that “unequal exchange”-the ability of firms in theglobal North to obtain raw materials, components,consumer goods (clothing, electronics, etc.) and foodstuffsfrom the global South below their value-is the basis of the“imperialist bribe” to the “labor aristocracy” of theadvanced capitalist countries. Specifically, they argue that“unequal exchange” lowers the cost of inputs (rawmaterials, components), elevates profit rates in the Northby lowering the cost of inputs (raw materials,

components); and reduces the cost of food and consumergoods, increasing the living standard of some workers.(See Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study ofthe Imperialism of Trade (New York: Monthly ReviewPress, 1972)

The question of “unequal exchange” in the capitalist worldeconomy involves a variety of theoretical and technicalmeasurement questions which are beyond the scope of thisessay. (See Anwar Shaikh, “Foreign Trade and the Law ofValue, Parts I-II,” Science & Society (Fall 1979 andSpring 1980) Granting the reality of “unequal exchange,”the notion that it produces benefits only for a minority ofworkers in the global North is not tenable. Again, allworkers in the global North-from the most poorly to thebest paid-would benefit from “unequal exchange.” Theywould benefit from elevated profit rates and the resultingincrease in accumulation and demand for all labor-power.Similarly, lower cost consumer goods and food “affectsthe standard of living not only of a minority ‘aristocracy oflabor’ but the whole of the working class of the industrialcountries.” (Cliff, “Economic Roots of Reformism,” 4)

[26] Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and SylviaAllegretto, The State of Working America, 2004/2005(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), Chapter 2.

[27] For instance, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’sinfluential Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 2000), which I reviewed in Against the Current 99(July-August 2002).

[28] See Kate Bronfenbrenner and Stephanie Luce, “TheChanging Nature of Corporate Global Restructuring: TheImpact of Production Shifts on Jobs in the US, China, andAround the Globe,” Submitted to the US-China Economicand Security Review Commission (October 14, 2004)www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2004/cornell_u_massreport.pdf.

[29] Persistent Inequalities: Wage Disparity UnderCapitalist Competition (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1993), 45.

[30] Competition, Monopoly and Differential Profit Rates(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984)

[31] Semmler, Competition, 127.

[32] Botwinick, Persistent Inequalities, 155-170.

[33] David G. Blanchflower, Andrew J. Oswald and PeterSanfey, “Wages, Profits and Rent-Sharing,” The QuarterlyJournal of Economics, 111, 1 (February 1996); Kenneth R.Troske, “Evidence on the Employer- Size Wage Premiumfrom Worker-Establishment Data,” The Review ofEconomics and Statistics, 81, 1 (February 1999); Osburn,“Interindustry Wage Differentials;” (2000); Julia I. Lane,Laurie A. Solomon and James R. Speltzer, “EstablishmentWage Differentials” http://http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/%20410505.pdf Urban Institute WorkingPaper, 2001 all come to similar conclusions on thedeterminants of profit and wage differentials.

[34] Our critique of the theory of “monopoly capitalism”is indebted to Steve Zelluck, “On the Theory of theMonopoly Stage of Capitalism,” Against the Current (OldSeries), 1,1, (Fall 1980); Botwinick, PersistentInequalities; Semmler, Competition; and Anwar Shaikh,“Marxian Competition versus Perfect Competition:Further Comments on the So-Called Choice ofTechnique,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 4 (1980).

[35] Botwinick, Persistent Inequalities, 131.

[36] David Mandel, The Petrograd Workers, Volumes Iand II (London: Macmillan, 1985).

[37] Chris Harman, The Lost Revolution, Germany 1918to 1923 (London: Bookmarks, 1982); Mark Hudson,“Rank-and-File Metalworker Militancy in France andBritain, 1890-1918,” New Politics 9, 3 (New Series)(Summer 2003) http://www.wpunj.edu/%20newpol/issue35/Hudson35.htm

[38] Mike Davis, “The Barren Marriage of Labor and theDemocratic Party” in Prisoners of the American Dream(London: Verso Books, 1986), Chapter 2.

[39] My alternative theory of working class reformism andconservatism is drawn from Mandel, “What is theBureaucracy?” and Robert Brenner, “The Paradox ofReformism: The American Case,” in M. Davis, F. Pfeil, M.Sprinker (eds.) The Year Left: An American SocialistYearbook (London: Verso, 1985); Robert Brenner, “TheProblem of Reformism,” Against the Current (New Series)43 (March-April 1993).

[40] Clearly, successful economic and political strugglesunder capitalism can also encourage the development of a“militant reformist” consciousness among many workers.Some combination of successful self-activity andorganization, which allows workers to experience theircollective power; and the experience of the limits ofstruggles that accept capitalist economic and political ruleare necessary for the development of revolutionaryconsciousness among a minority of workers.

[41] Ernest Mandel, “The Leninist Theory ofOrganization: Its Relevance for Today” in S. Bloom (ed.),Revolutionary Marxist and Social Reality in the 20thCentury: Collected Essays of Ernest Mandel (AtlanticHighlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc. 1994),85.

[42] The process of bureaucratization of trade unions andworking class political parties, and the resultingdevelopment of reformism, goes on in all capitalistsocieties where the labor movement achieves legalrecognition and institutional stability. Put simply,reformism is not limited to the working classes of theglobal North. Thus, it is not surprising that in periods ofdeclining mass struggle, the mass industrial unions andpolitical parties of the Brazilian (CUT and PT) and SouthAfrican (COSATU) working classes have becomebureaucratized and their leaderships embraced reformist-and ultimately neo-liberal-politics.

[43] Brenner, “The Paradox of Social Democracy,” 42.

[44] C. Post and J. Slaughter, Lean Production: Why WorkIs Worse Than Ever, And What’s The Alternative?(Solidarity Working Paper, 2000) [http://solidarity.igc.org/LeanProduction.html]; C. Post, “The Economic Impact ofthe War and Occupation of Iraq,” ATC (New Series) 104(May-June 2003) http://solidarity.igc.org/indexATC.html

[45] Mandel, Power and Money: A Marxist Theory ofBureaucracy (London: Verso, 1992), 236.

[46] I want to acknowledge my debt to the seminal essayby Johanna Brenner and Robert Brenner, “Reagan, theRight and the Working Class,” Against the Current (OldSeries) 1, 2 (Winter 1981).

[47] Brenner and Brenner, “Reagan, the Right and theWorking Class, 30.

[48] B. Nelson, Divided We Stand: American Workers andthe Struggle for Black Equality (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2001), Part Two.

[49] Michael Reich’s Racial Inequality: A Political-Economic Analysis (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1981) presents substantial evidence that a dividedworking class is less capable of defending itself againstcapital. He finds that those areas in the US that had thegreatest racial inequality in wages (an index of workingclass racial division), also had the lowest average wages(an index of working class weakness in relation to capital).

[50] C. Post and K.A. Wainer, Socialist OrganizationToday (Solidarity Pamphlet, 1996)http://solidarity.igc.org/sot.html.

[51] The Rank And File Strategy: Building A SocialistMovement In The US (Solidarity Working Paper, 2000)http://solidarity.igc.org/TheRankAndFileStrategy.html



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1. The extent and diversity of the forms takenby the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism,which has marked the beginning of the lastquarter of the twentieth century, preclude anyhasty, generalized conjectures about it. Itwould be totally mistaken to equate theCatholicism of the Polish workers with thatof Franco’s reaction, though this should notmake us overlook the common features of theagrarian histories of Spain and Poland or thepolitical and ideological content that theirrespective forms of Catholicism share.

Similarly, elementary analytical cautionforbids putting such diverse phenomena asthe resurgence of Muslim clerical and/orpolitical movements in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia,Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, or Senegal, ZiaUl-Haq’s military dictatorship in Pakistan orGaddafy’s in Libya, the seizure of power byIranian Shi’ite clergy or by Afghan guerrillas,etc., all into the same category. Evenphenomena that on the surface appear clearlyidentical, such as the progress made by thesame movement, the “Muslim Brotherhood,”in Egypt and Syria, have different underlyingpolitical content and functions, determinedby their different immediate objectives.

Beneath their agreement on otherworldlymatters, beyond their agreement on problemsof everyday life, when they do agree on suchissues, and notwithstanding their similar,even identical, denominations andorganizational forms, Muslim movementsremain essentially political movements. Theyare thus the expression of specific socio-political interests that are very much of thisworld.

2. There has been no eruption of Islam intopolitics. Islam and politics have always beeninseparable, as Islam is a political religion inthe etymological sense of the word. Thus, thedemand for the separation of religion andstate in Muslim countries is more than .secularist: it is openly anti-religious. Thishelps explain why none of the major currentsof bourgeois or petty bourgeois nationalismon Islamic soil, with the exception ofKemalism in Turkey, have called forsecularism. What is an elementarydemocratic task elsewhere-separation ofreligion and state-is so radical in Muslimcountries, especially the Middle East, thateven the “dictatorship of the proletariat” willfind it a difficult task to complete. It isbeyond the scope of other classes.Furthermore, the democratic classes ofMuslim societies have on the whole shownno interest, or almost none, in challengingtheir own religion. In fact Islam has not beenperceived in the twentieth century as theideological cement of an outmoded feudal orsemi-feudal class structure in these societies.It has been seen instead as a basic element ofnational identity jeered at by the foreignChristian (or even atheist) oppressor. It is noaccident that Turkey is the only Muslimsociety not to have been subjected to directforeign domination in the twentieth century.Mustafa Kemal too was exceptional amonghis peers. He waged his main battle notagainst colonialism or imperialism butagainst the Sultanate, a combination oftemporal and spiritual power (the Caliphate).On the other hand Nasser, however radical abourgeois nationalist, had every interest inidentifying with Islam in his main combatagainst imperialism; all the more so because

this was a cheap way for him to protect hisleft and right flanks.

3. The following theses do not deal withIslam as one element among others, albeit afundamental element, in the ideology ofnationalist currents. That kind of Islam’s timeis up, as with the currents that identify with it.More generally, we shall distinguish betweenIslam used as one means among others ofshaping and asserting a national, orcommunal, or even sectarian identity, on theone hand, and Islam considered as an end initself, a total, general objective, a unique,exclusive program, on the other. “The Koranis our constitution,” declared Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhoodin 1928. The Islam that interests us here isIslam elevated to an absolute principle, towhich every demand, struggle and reform issubordinated-the Islam of the MuslimBrotherhood, of the “Jamaat-i-Islami,” of thedifferent ulemas’ associations and of themovement of Iranian ayatollahs whoseorganized expression is the IslamicRepublican Party.

The common denominator of these differentmovements is Islamic fundamentalism, thatis, the wish to return to Islam, the aspirationto an Islamic utopia, which incidentallycannot be limited to a single nation but mustencompass all Muslim peoples if not thewhole world. In this spirit, Bani-Sadrdeclared to the Beirut daily An-Nahar in 1979that “Ayatollah Khomeini is aninternationalist; he is opposed to IslamicStalinists who want to build Islam in onecountry” (sic!). This “internationalism” isalso visible in the way that all these

Debate : Marxism and Religion

Eleven Theses on the Resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism Gilbert Achcar

Given the renewed discussion, we are producing this 1981document, which stands the test of time. The “theses” werecirculated widely and have been translated into manylanguages. Their success was due to the fact that they gave aMarxist analysis of a phenomenon that was then still relativelynew. The current resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism datesfrom the 1970s, and reached its first crescendo, after years ofunderground activity, with the Iranian revolution of 1979.

movements go beyond the borders of theircountries of origin and/or maintain more orless close relations with each other. They allreject nationalism in the narrow sense, andconsider nationalist currents-even those thatclaim to be Islamic-rivals if not adversaries.They oppose foreign oppression or thenational enemy in the name of Islam, not indefense of the “nation.” The United States isthus not so much “imperialism” forKhomeini as the “Great Satan”; SaddamHussein is above all an “atheist,” an”infidel.” For all the movements in question,Israel is not so much a Zionist usurper ofPalestinian land as “the Jewish usurper of anIslamic holy land.”

4. However progressive, national and/ordemocratic the objective significance ofcertain struggles carried on by variousIslamic fundamentalist currents, it cannotmask the fact that their ideology and theirprogram are essentially, by definition,reactionary. What sort of program aims toconstruct an Islamic state, faithfully modeledon the seventh century of the Christian era, ifnot a reactionary utopia? What sort ofideology aims to restore a thirteen-century-old order, if not an eminently reactionaryideology? Thus it is wrong and even absurdto define Islamic fundamentalist movementsas bourgeois, whatever the extent to whichsome struggles they wage align them with allor part of their countries’ bourgeoisies, just aswrong as to define them as revolutionarywhen they happen to come into conflict withthese same bourgeoisies.

In terms of the nature of their program andideology, their social composition, and eventhe social origins of their founders, Islamicfundamentalist movements are pettybourgeois. They do not hide their hatred ofrepresentatives of big capital any more thanof representatives of the working class, ortheir hatred of imperialist countries any morethan of “communist” countries. They arehostile to the two poles of industrial societythat threaten them: the bourgeoisie and theproletariat. They correspond to those layersof the petty bourgeoisie described in theCommunist Manifesto:

The lower middle class, the manufacturer, theshopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all thesefight against the bourgeoisie to save fromextinction their existence as fractions of themiddle class. They are therefore notrevolutionary, but conservative. Nay more,they are reactionary, for they try to roll backthe wheel of history. Petty bourgeois Islamicreaction finds its ideologues and leadingelements among the “traditionalintellectuals” of Muslim societies, ulemasand the like, as well as among the lowerechelons of the bourgeoisie’s “organic

intellectuals,” those coming from the pettybourgeoisie and condemned to stay there:teachers and office workers in particular. In aperiod of ascendancy Islamicfundamentalism recruits widely atuniversities and other institutions thatproduce “intellectuals,” where they are stillmore conditioned by their social origins thanby a hypothetical and often doubtful future.

5. In countries where Islamic fundamentalistreaction has been able to become a massmovement and where it now has the wind inits sails, the labor force includes a relativelyhigh proportion of middle classes, accordingto the Communist Manifesto definition:manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans andpeasants. Nevertheless, any outbreak ofIslamic fundamentalism mobilizes not only alarger or smaller layer of these middleclasses, but also layers of other classes newlyspawned by the middle classes under theimpact of capitalist primitive accumulationand impoverishment. Thus parts of theproletariat whose proletarianization is veryrecent, and above all parts of the sub-proletariat that capitalism has dragged downfrom their former petty bourgeois level, areparticularly receptive to fundamentalistagitation and susceptible to being caught upin it. This is Islamic fundamentalism’s socialbase, its mass base. But this base is not thenatural preserve of religious reaction, theway that the bourgeoisie relates to its ownprogram. Whatever the strength of religiousfeeling among the masses, even if thereligion in question is Islam, there is aqualitative leap from sharing this feeling toseeing religion as an earthly utopia. In orderfor the opiate of the masses to become aneffective stimulant once more in this age ofautomation, the peoples must truly have noother choice left but to throw themselves onGod’s mercy. The least one can say aboutIslam is that its immediate relevance is notobvious!

In fact, Islamic fundamentalism poses moreproblems than it solves. Although Islamiclaw is several centuries younger than Romanlaw, it was produced by a societyconsiderably more backward than ancientRome. (The Koran was largely inspired bythe Torah, just as the Arabs’ way of life wasfairly similar to the Hebrews’.) And besidesthe problem of updating a thirteen-century-old civil code, there is also the question ofcompleting it. In other words, the mostorthodox Muslim fundamentalist is incapableof responding to the problems posed bymodern society with exegetical contortionsalone, unless the contortions become totallyarbitrary and therefore a source of endlessdisagreements among the exegetes. There arethus as many interpretations of Islam as there

are interpreters. The core of the Islamicreligion, which all Muslims agree on, in noway satisfies the pressing material needs ofthe petty bourgeois, quite apart from whetherit can satisfy their spiritual needs. Islamicfundamentalism in itself is in no way themost appropriate program for satisfying theaspirations of the social layers that it appealsto.

6. The social base described above is notablefor its political versatility. The quotation fromthe Communist Manifesto above does notdescribe a fixed attitude of the middleclasses, but only the real content of their fightagainst the bourgeoisie when there is a fight,when they turn against the bourgeoisie.Before fighting against the bourgeoisie, themiddle classes were its allies in the fightagainst feudalism; before seeking to reversethe course of history they contributed toadvancing it.

The middle classes are first and foremost thesocial base of the democratic revolution andthe national struggle. In backward, dependentsocieties such as Muslim societies the middleclasses still play this role as long as the tasksof the national and democratic revolution arestill more or less uncompleted and on theagenda. They are the most ardent fans of anybourgeois leadership (and even more of anypetty bourgeois leadership) that championsthese tasks. The middle classes are the socialbase par excellence of the Bonapartism of theascendant bourgeoisie; they are in fact thesocial base of all bourgeois Bonapartism. Sothe only time when large sections of themiddle classes strike off on their own andseek other paths is when bourgeois or pettybourgeois leaderships that have taken onnational and democratic tasks run up againsttheir own limits and lose their credibility.

Of course, as long as capitalism on the riseseems to open up prospects of upward socialmobility for the middle classes, as long astheir conditions of existence are improving,they do not question the established order.Even when depoliticized or unenthused, theynormally play the role of “silent majority” inthe bourgeois order. But if ever the capitalistevolution of society weighs on them with allits force-the weight of national and/orinternational competition, inflation and debt-then the middle classes become a formidablereservoir of opposition to the powers that be.Then they are free of any bourgeois control,and all the more formidable because theviolence and rage of the petty bourgeois indistress are unparalleled.

7. Even then the reactionary option is notunavoidable for the petty bourgeoisie,downtrodden though it is by capitalist societyand disillusioned with bourgeois and petty


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bourgeois democratic-nationalist leaderships.There is always another option, at least intheory. The middle classes are faced with thechoice between reaction and revolution. Theycan join the revolutionary struggle against thebourgeoisie, as the Communist Manifestoforesaw:

If by chance [the middle classes] arerevolutionary, they are so only in view oftheir impending transfer into the proletariat,they thus defend not their present, but theirfuture interests, they desert their ownstandpoint to place themselves at that of theproletariat.

In the backward and dependent societies thatthe Communist Manifesto did not take intoaccount, however, the middle classes haveabsolutely no need to abandon their ownviewpoint in order to place themselves underproletarian leadership. Quite the contrary, bytaking up the middle classes’ aspirations,notably national and democratic tasks, theproletariat can manage to win them overthem to its side.

But for the proletariat to win the middleclasses’ confidence, it must first of all have acredible leadership itself, a leadership thathas proved itself politically and practically. Ifon the other hand a leadership with a majorityin the working class has discredited itself onthe level of national democratic politicalstruggles (while maintaining its majorityposition because of its trade union positionsor simply the lack of an alternative), if itproves politically flabby in face of theestablished order, or if even worse it supportsthe established order, then the middle classeswill really have no choice but to lend theirears to petty bourgeois reaction-even if it is asinscrutable as Islamic reaction-and possiblyrespond to its calls.

8. In all the countries where Islamicfundamentalism has gained considerableground, particularly in Egypt, Syria, Iran andPakistan, all the conditions described aboveexist. In all these countries middle classliving standards have manifestly deterioratedover the last few years. Although some ofthese countries are even oil exportersthemselves, the only effect the massive oilprice increases have had on most of theirmiddle classes has been unbridled inflation.In addition, bourgeois and petty bourgeoisdemocratic-nationalist leaderships aregenerally discredited in these countries. In allfour countries, democratic-nationalistleaderships have undergone the test of statepower.

All of these leaderships had had virtuallyunanimous middle class support at certainmoments in their history as they were trying

to implement their national democraticprograms. Some went a long way in thisdirection, notably in Egypt and countriesunder Egyptian influence, where Nassertowered over the political landscape.Nationalists were able to stay in power for along time, or are still in power-in the lattercases because they owe their power to thearmy. In Iran and Pakistan, where thenationalists formed civilian governments, thearmy soon swept them away; Mossadegh andBhutto came to sad ends. In all fourcountries, in any case, the progress made sofar in carrying out the national democraticprogram, even within the framework andlimits of a bourgeois state, ranges from verylittle to almost none. Even in Iran where theMossadegh experience was a very short one,the Shah took it on himself (on his US tutors’advice) to bring about with his own pseudo-Bismarckian methods what the combinedefforts of Robespierres and Bonapartesaccomplished elsewhere. On the other hand,the only noteworthy working class politicalorganizations in the whole region areStalinist parties.

These, when they amount to anything, havetotally discredited themselves with a longhistory of selling out popular struggles andmaking deals with the powers that be. Sowhen middle class discontent began tosurface these past few years in the fourcountries mentioned, no working class orbourgeois or petty bourgeois nationalistorganization was able to capitalize on it. Theway was wide open for petty bourgeoisIslamic fundamentalist reaction.

By contrast, in Algeria, Libya and Iraq, wherethe enlightened despotism of a bourgeois orpetty bourgeois nationalist bureaucracyallowed broad middle class layers to benefitfrom the oil manna, Islamic fundamentalismcould be contained.

9. While Islamic fundamentalism has madenotable gains in Egypt and Syria as well asIran and Pakistan, the forms and extent of itsgains differ greatly from one country toanother, as do its political content andfunction. In Syria, the fundamentalistmovement is the main opposition to thedeclining Bonapartism of the Ba’athistbourgeois bureaucracy, and engaged in a life-and-death struggle against it. Syrianfundamentalists have profited from the factthat the Ba’athist ruling elite belongs to aminority faith (Alawi).

The outrageously, purely reactionary natureof the Syrian fundamentalist movement’sprogram reduces its possibilities of seizingpower on its own to almost nothing. It cannoton its own, on the basis of such a program,mobilize the forces needed to overthrow the

Ba’athist dictatorship. Still less can it run,alone, a country whose economic andpolitical problems are as thorny as Syria’s.The Syrian fundamentalist movement is thuscondemned to co-operate with the Syrianpropertied classes (bourgeois andlandowners). It is not, and cannot be, anymore than their spearhead. In Egypt too, forthe same reasons, the possibility of anindependent seizure of power by thefundamentalist movement is very limited, allthe more so because it has less influencethere than in Syria. In both these countries along struggle against progressive regimes hashardened the fundamentalist movement, thushighlighting its reactionary character.Moreover, the very scope of Egypt’seconomic problems makes thefundamentalists’ bid for power even lesscredible.

The Egyptian bourgeoisie is perfectly awareof this fact and is thus very obliging towardthe fundamentalist movement. Thefundamentalists constitute in its eyes an ideal“fifth column” inside the mass movement-aparticularly effective “antibody” to the left.That is why it is not at all worried aboutEgyptian fundamentalist movement’s tryingto outbid the left on the left’s two favoriteissues: the national question and the socialquestion; any gains made by Islamic reactionon these two issues mean equivalent lossesfor the left. The Egyptian bourgeoisie’sattitude toward the fundamentalist movementresembles that of any bourgeoisie faced witha deep social crisis toward the far right andfascism. Pakistan is different from Egypt inthat the Pakistani fundamentalist movementhas consolidated itself mainly underreactionary regimes. It has therefore beenable to reclaim some elements of the nationaldemocratic program for long periods of timeand thus form a credible opposition to theestablished order. But during these same longperiods, bourgeois democratic- nationalisttendencies were themselves in opposition,and more credible and thus more influentialthan the fundamentalists were.

Only when Bhutto, skipping the stages of aNasser-type evolution in an impressivehistorical shortcut, rapidly alienated themasses by getting entangled in his owncontradictions was the way opened up for theextreme right dominated by thefundamentalist movement (given that thePakistani far left was insignificant). Bhutto’sbankruptcy was so glaring that thefundamentalists managed to mobilize a hugemass movement against him.

The army’s coup d’état was meant to forestallthe “anarchy” that could have resulted hadthis mobilization led to Bhutto’s overthrow(as in Iran!). To win the fundamentalists’

Debate

sympathy, Zia Ul-Haq’s reactionarybourgeois military dictatorship took overtheir projects for Islamic reforms and usedthem to its own advantage. Today it iscounting on the fundamentalist movement toneutralize any “progressive” opposition to itsregime, including the late Bhutto’s party. Inthe three cases analyzed above, thefundamentalist movement has proved itself tobe nothing but an auxiliary for thereactionary bourgeoisie. But Iran is different.10. In Iran the fundamentalist movement,represented mainly by the fundamentalistsamong the Shi’ite clergy, was forged in along and bitter struggle against the Shah’seminently reactionary imperialist-backedregime. The sad historical bankruptcy ofIranian bourgeois nationalism and Stalinismis too well known to describe here. Becauseof this exceptional combination of historicalcircumstances, the Iranian fundamentalistmovement managed to become the solespearhead of the two immediate tasks of thenational democratic revolution in Iran:overthrowing the Shah and severing the tieswith US imperialism.

This situation was all the more possiblebecause the two tasks in question were inperfect harmony with the generallyreactionary program of Islamicfundamentalism. So as the social crisismatured in Iran to the point of creating thepreconditions for a revolutionary overthrowof the Shah, as the middle classes’ resentmentof him reached fever pitch, thefundamentalist movement personified byKhomeini managed to harness the immensepower of the embattled middle classes andsub-proletariat and deal the regime a series ofbody blows.

The fundamentalists were almost suicidal intheir determination to remain unarmed, a featthat only a mystical movement is capable of.The Iranian fundamentalist movementmanaged to carry out the first stage of anational democratic revolution in Iran. But itsfundamentalist character very quickly got theupper hand. In a sense, the Iranian revolutionis a permanent revolution in reverse. Startingwith the national democratic revolution, itcould under proletarian leadership have“grown over” into a socialist transformation.Its fundamentalist petty bourgeois leadershipprevented that, pushing it on the contrary inthe direction of a reactionary regression. TheFebruary 1979 revolution was astonishinglysimilar to February 1917-two identical pointsof departure ushering in diametricallyopposite processes. While October 1917enabled the Russian democratic revolution togo to its logical conclusion, in Iran thefundamentalist leadership betrayed therevolution’s democratic content.

The Russian Bolsheviks replaced theConstituent Assembly, after having struggledto have it elected, with the eminentlydemocratic power of the soviets; theayatollahs replaced the ConstituentAssembly, which they too had placed at thehead of their demands but never allowed tosee the light of day, with a reactionarycaricature: the Muslim “Assembly ofExperts.” The fate of this demand common tothe two revolutions eloquently sums up thecounterposed natures of the leaderships, andthus the opposite directions they took.

As for the democratic forms of organizationthat arose in the course of the IranianFebruary, the Islamic leadership co-optedthem. The shoras were a far cry from thesoviets! On the national question, while theBolsheviks’ proletarian internationalismmade possible the emancipation of theRussian empire’s oppressed nationalities, theayatollahs’ Islamic “internationalism” turnedout to be a pious pretext for bloodyrepression of the Persian empire’s oppressednationalities. The fate of women in the tworevolutions is just as well known. Thefundamentalist Iranian leadership onlyremained faithful to the national democraticprogram on one point: the struggle againstUS imperialism. But it stayed true to thisstruggle in its own peculiar way. Describingthe enemy not as imperialism but as the“West” if not the “Great Satan,” Khomeinicalled for throwing out the baby with thebathwater, or rather the baby before thebathwater. He attributed all the political andsocial gains of the bourgeois revolution,including democracy and even Marxism,which he considered (correctly) a product of(supposedly “Western”) industrialcivilization, to the hated “West.”

He called on Iranians to rid their society ofthese plagues, while neglecting the mainlinks between Iran and imperialism: theeconomic links. The US embassy affair, theway it was managed, gained Iran nothing. Inthe final analysis it proved very expensive,profitable in the last analysis to US banks.However the fundamentalist dictatorshipevolves in Iran from now on, it has alreadyproved to be a major obstacle to thedevelopment of the Iranian revolution.

Moreover, its evolution is very problematic.Beyond the exceptional combination ofcircumstances described above, there is afundamental difference between Iran and thethree other countries mentioned earlier: Irancan afford the “luxury” of an experiment withan autonomous, petty bourgeois,fundamentalist regime. Its oil wealth is theguarantee of a positive balance of paymentsand budget. But at what price and for howlong? The economic balance sheet of two

years of fundamentalism in power is alreadyvery negative compared with earlier years.On the other hand, the inconsistency of thefundamentalist “program” and the greatvariety of social layers who identify with itand interpret it according to their own lightsare manifest in a plurality of rival andantagonistic centers of powers. OnlyKhomeini’s authority has made it possible sofar for them to keep up a façade of unity. 11.Islamic fundamentalism is one of the mostdangerous enemies of the revolutionaryproletariat. It is absolutely and under allcircumstances necessary to fight against its“reactionary and medieval influence,” as the“Theses on the National and ColonialQuestion” adopted at the Second Congress ofthe Communist International said many yearsago. Even in cases such as Iran, where thefundamentalist movement takes on nationaldemocratic tasks for a time, the duty ofrevolutionary socialists is to fightintransigently against the spell it casts on thestruggling masses.

If not, if they do not free themselves in time,the masses will surely pay the price. Whilestriking together at the common enemy,revolutionary socialists must warn workingpeople against any attempt to divert theirstruggle in a reactionary direction. Anyfailure in these elementary tasks is not only afundamental weakness, but can also lead toopportunist wrong turns. On the other hand,even in cases where Islamic fundamentalismtakes purely reactionary forms, revolutionarysocialists must use tactical caution in theirfight against it. In particular they must avoidfalling into the fundamentalists’ trap offighting about religious issues. They shouldstick firmly to the national, democratic, andsocial issues. They must not lose sight of thefact that a part, often a big part, of the massesunder Islamic fundamentalist influence canand must be pulled out of its orbit and won tothe workers’ cause.

At the same time revolutionary socialistsmust nevertheless declare themselvesunequivocally for a secular society, which isa basic element of the democratic program.They can play down their atheism, but nevertheir secularism, unless they wish to replaceMarx outright with Mohammed!

February 1, 1981: First published in Englishin International Marxist Review vol. 2 no. 3(Summer 1987)

Gilbert Achcar grew up in Lebanon and teachespolitical science at the University of Paris-VIII. Hisbest-selling book The Clash of Barbarisms just cameout in a second expanded edition and a book of hisdialogues with Noam Chomsky on the Middle East,Perilous Power, is forthcoming.


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2. For Holloway [1] history is ‘the greatexcuse for not thinking’. Does he mean that itis impossible to think historically? And thenwhat do we mean by ‘thinking’? - an oldquestion that, always getting in the way.

3. Spit ‘also on the concept of Stalinism’,which absolves us of the ‘need to blameourselves’ and constitutes a convenient ‘fig-leaf, protecting our innocence’. No one todayimagines that the revolution of the 1920s,luminous and immaculate, can becounterposed to the dark 1930s on which wecan dump every sin. No one has emergedunscathed from the ‘century of extremes’.Everyone needs to methodically examine hisor her conscience, including us. But is thissufficient reason to erase the discontinuitiesthat Michel Foucault was so fond of?

To establish a strict genealogical continuitybetween the revolutionary event and thebureaucratic counter-revolution? Topronounce an evenly balanced verdict of‘guilty’ on both victors and vanquished, boththe executioners and their victims? This isnot a moral question but rather a politicalone. It determines whether it is possible to‘continue’ or ‘begin anew’.

The darkness of non-history, in which all catsare grey (without for all that catching thetiniest mouse) is the preferred landscape forneoliberals and repentant Stalinists to holdtheir reunions, hurriedly wiping out the tracesof their past without thinking about this pastthat makes it so hard for them to pass.

4. ‘Spit on history because there is nothing soreactionary as the cult of the past.’ So be it.But who is talking about a cult? Doestradition weigh like a nightmare on the brainof the living? Definitely. But what tradition?Where does this singular tradition comefrom, in the singular, in which so manycontrary traditions vanish away? WalterBenjamin by contrast, whom Holloway citesso eagerly (appositely or not), demands thatwe rescue tradition from the conformism thatalways threatens it. This distinction isessential.

5. ‘Break history. Du passé faisons tablerase.’ The song rings out proudly. But thepolitics of the blank page (which ChairmanMao was so fond of) and the blank slateevokes some rather disquieting precedents.Its most consistent advocate was none otherthan a certain Pol Pot. Gilles Deleuze speaksmore wisely when he says, ‘We always beginin the middle.’ (“we always restart from themiddle”) ?

6. ‘Spit on history’? Nietzsche himself,certainly the most virulent critic of historicalreason and the myth of progress, was subtler.He did admittedly recommend learning toforget in order to be able to act. He tookexception to any history that would be ‘a kindof conclusion to living and a final reckoningfor humanity’. But while he implacablydenounced ‘monumental history’,‘antiquarian history’, ‘excess of historicalculture’ and the ‘supersaturation of an age inhistory’, and history as such as ‘a disguised

theology’, he maintained nonetheless that‘living requires the services of history’: ‘Tobe sure, we need history. But we need it in amanner different from the way in which thespoilt idler in the garden of knowledge uses it... for life and action, not for a comfortableturning away from life and action....’Nietzsche thus defended the necessity of a‘critical history’. At least he claimed tocounter ‘the effects of history’ not with apolitics of emancipation but rather with anaesthetic: the ‘powers of art’, or the ‘”super-historical” ... powers which divert the gazefrom what is developing back ... to art andreligion’. Myth against history?

7. ‘We live in a world of Monsters of our owncreation’. While commodities, money, capitaland the state are fetishes, they are not ‘mereillusions, they are real illusions’. Exactly.What follows from this, in practical terms?That abolishing these illusions requiresabolishing the social relations that make themnecessary and fabricate them? Or, asHolloway suggests, that we must be contentwith a fetish strike: ‘Capital exists becausewe create it.... If we do not create ittomorrow, it will cease to exist’?

In the aftermath of 1968 there were Maoistswho claimed that ‘driving out the cop’ in our

Debate: Revolutionary Strategy

Twelve comments plus one more, to continuethe debate with John HollowayDaniel Bensaïd

1. ‘Spit on history’, John Holloway answers us . Why not? But on which history? Forhim apparently there is only one history, a one-way history, the history of oppressionthat even contaminates the struggle of the oppressed. As if history and memory werenot themselves battlefields. As if a history of the oppressed - often an oral history(history of the exploited, women’s history, gay history, the history of colonisedpeoples) - does not also exist, just as we can conceive of a theatre of the oppressed ora politics of the oppressed.

John Holloway


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minds would be enough to get rid of the realcops too. Yet the real cops are still with us(more than ever), and the tyranny of the egois still secure even in the best regulatedminds. So would refusing to create capitalsuffice to lift its spells? Magical behaviour(conjuring away in our imaginations animaginary despot) would only bring about aliberation just as imaginary. Abolishing theconditions of fetishism in reality meansoverthrowing the despotism of the marketand the power of private property andbreaking the state that ensures the conditionsof social reproduction.

8. No doubt this is all an old story. But whereare the new stories? The new must always bemade (at least in part) with the bricks of theold. Holloway defines the revolution as ‘thebreaking of tradition, the discarding ofhistory..., the smashing of the clock and theconcentration of time into a moment ofunbearable intensity.’ Here he is recycling theimagery that Benjamin used in describing therebels in 1830 who fired on the faces ofpublic clocks. The symbolic destruction ofthe image of time still confuses the fetish oftemporality with the social relationship onwhich it rests: the ‘wretched’ measurement ofabstract labour time.

9. Holloway blots out with his spit thecriticisms that Atilio Boron, Alex Callinicos,Guillermo Almeyra and I have made of hiswork. He reproaches us with envisaginghistory as ‘something unproblematic’,instead of opening it up to theoreticalquestions. This is a gratuitous accusation,backed up neither with arguments nor withserious evidence. All of us have on thecontrary devoted much of our work tointerrogating, revising, deconstructing andreconstructing our historical worldview.History is like power; you cannot ignore it.You can refuse to take power, but then it willtake you. You can throw history out the door,

but it will kick over the traces and came backin through the window.

10. There is ‘something fundamentallywrong with the power-centred concept ofrevolution’. But what? Foucault passed thisway a long time ago. More than 25 years agoI wrote a book entitled La Révolution et lePouvoir (‘The Revolution and Power’),around the idea that the state can be brokenbut the ‘relations of power’ must still beundone (or deconstructed). This is not a newissue. It reached us by way of libertariantraditions and May ’68, among other ways.Why, if not out of ignorance, does Hollowaymake a show of radically innovating (stillmaking a clean sweep) instead of situatinghimself in discussions that have - a (long)history!

11. ‘The accumulation of struggle is anincremental view of revolution’, saysHolloway. It is a positive movement, whereasthe anti-capitalist movement ‘must be anegative movement’. Criticising illusions ofprogress, the stockbroking sprit, Penelope’sweaving their electoral skeins (stitch bystitch, link by link), interest piled on interest,and the ineluctable march of history as ittriumphs over regrettable skids, detours anddelays - all this criticism is itself an oldtradition (represented in France by GeorgesSorel and Charles Péguy, who had so muchinfluence on Benjamin).

But just the same, is the absolute interruptionof a scream without a past or a sequel enoughto outweigh the continuities of historicaltime? Benjamin takes exception to thehomogenous, empty time of the mechanics ofprogress, and with it to the notion of anevanescent present, a simple, evanescenthyphen, absolutely determined by the pastand irresistibly aspiring to a predestinedfuture. In Benjamin’s work by contrast thepresent becomes the central category of a

strategic temporality: each present is thusinvested with a feeble messianic power ofreshuffling the cards of past and future,giving the vanquished of yesterday andforever their chance, and rescuing traditionfrom conformism. Yet for all that this presentis not detached from historical time. As inBlanqui’s work it maintains relations withpast events, not relations of causality, butrather relations of astral attraction andconstellation. It is in this sense that, to useBenjamin’s definitive formulation, from nowon politics trumps history.

12. ‘Using History as a pretext’, Hollowaysays, we want to ‘pour new struggles into oldmethods’: ‘Let the new forms of struggleflourish.’ Just because we are constantlywelcoming a portion of newness, history (!)exists rather than some divine or mercantileeternity. But the historical dialectic of old andnew is subtler than any binary or Manicheanopposition between old and new, includingmethodologically. Yes, let the new flourish;do not give in to routine and habit; stay opento surprise and astonishment. This is alluseful advice. But how, by what standard, canwe evaluate the new if we lose all memory ofthe old? Novelty, like antiquity, is always arelative notion.

Screaming and spitting do not amount tothinking. Still less to doing politics.

Daniel Bensaïd is one of France’s most prominentMarxist philosophers and has written extensively. Heis a leading member of the LCR (French section ofthe Fourth International).

NOTES

[1] This articles replies to John Holloway’s "Drive yourcart and plough over the bones of the dead"


44

The nineteenth century experienced historyas an arrow pointing in the direction ofprogress. The Destiny of the ancients anddivine Providence bowed down before theprosaic activity of a modern human species,which produced and reproduced theconditions of its own improbable existence.

This sharpened sense of historicaldevelopment was born of a long, slowmovement of secularisation. Heavenlymiracles were lost among earthlycontingencies. Rather than illuminated by thepast, the future now offered justification forthe present. Events no longer seemedmiraculous. Where before they had beensacred, now they were profane.

The railway, the steamship, the telegraph allcontributed to a feeling that history wasspeeding up and that distances were gettingshorter, as if humanity had built up enoughspeed to break free. It was the era ofrevolutions.

There was the revolution in transport andtravel: in scarcely a quarter of a century,between 1850 and 1875, the great railwaycompanies, the Reuter’s agency and the Cookagency all emerged. The rotary pressmultiplied circulation figures. From now onit would be possible to travel around theworld in eighty days. That hero of modernity,the explorer, heralded the air-conditionedexoticism of the tour operators.

There was the revolution in materials: withthe triumph of the railway came the reign ofcoal, of glass and of steel, of crystal palacesand metallic cathedrals. High-speedtransport, architectural transformations, the

engineering of public health, altered the faceof the city and transformed its relation to thesuburbs.

There was a revolution in knowledge: thetheory of evolution and developments ingeology changed the place of man in naturalhistory. The first murmurings of ecologyexplored the subtle metabolic interactionbetween society and its environment.Thermodynamics opened up newperspectives in energy control. Theblossoming of statistics furnished calculatingreason with an instrument for quantificationand measurement.

There was a revolution in production: the“age of capital” saw the furious circulation ofinvestments and commodities, theiraccelerated turnover, the great universalexhibitions, mass production, and thebeginnings of mass consumption with theopening of the first department stores.

It was also a time of frenzy on the stockexchange, of speculation in real estate, offortunes quickly made and equally quicklylost, of scandals, of affairs, of crashingbankruptcies, the time of the Pereires, theSaccards, the Rothschilds and theBoucicauts. And it was the era of empires andcolonial divisions, when armies carved upterritories and continents.

There was a revolution in working practicesand social relations: mechanised industryusurped the workshop. The modernproletariat of the factories and the cities tookover from the artisan class of tailors, joiners,cobblers, weavers. From 1851 to 1873, thisgrowth in capitalist globalisation gave birth

to a new workers’ movement, which gainednotoriety in 1864 with the creation of theInternational Working Men’s Association.

This prodigious quarter of a century also sawthe industrialisation of the arms trade,foreshadowing the “slaughter industry” andtotal war. It was the era of the social crime,“which does not seem like murder, becausethere is no murderer to be seen, because thevictim’s death appears natural, but which isno less a murder.” [1] Between Edgar AllanPoe and Arthur Conan Doyle, the appearanceof detective fiction, the development ofrational modes of enquiry, and the scientificrefinement of detection methods sum up themindset of this period with its urban“mysteries”: the loot passes from one hand toanother, and all trace of the guilty party is lostin the anonymity of the crowd.

The railway was the perfect symbol andemblem of this rush towards technology andprofit. Launched into a conquest of the futurealong the tracks of progress, theserevolutions appeared to be the roaringlocomotives of history!

The last quarter of the twentieth centuryoffers a number of analogies with the thirdquarter of the nineteenth century, albeit on acompletely different scale.Telecommunications, satellites and theinternet are the contemporary equivalents ofthe telegraph and the railway. New sources ofenergy, biotechnologies and transformationsin working practices are revolutionisingproduction in their turn. Industrial

The persistence of revolution

The Mole and the LocomotiveDaniel Bensaïd

Translation of Daniel Bensaïd’s introduction to his book: "Résistances. Essai de taupologie générale", Fayard,Paris 2001.

‘Well said, old mole. Canst work I’th’earth so fast? A worthy pioner.’ (Shakespeare,Hamlet I:5).

Our old friend is short-sighted. He is a haemophiliac as well. Doubly infirm anddoubly fragile. And yet, patiently, obstinately, from tunnel to passage, he cheerfullycontinues his mole’s progress towards his next invasion.

Daniel Bensaid

manufacturing techniques increasingly makeconsumption a mass phenomenon. Thedevelopment of credit and of mass marketinglubricates the circulation of capital. Theresult is a new gold rush (in the field ofcomputers), a fusion of the upper echelons ofthe state with the financial elites, andrelentless speculation with all its attendantMafia scandals and spectacular bankruptcies.

The new era of capitalist globalisation isseeing the commodification of the world anda generalised fetishism. The time has comefor a seismic overturning of national andinternational boundaries, for new forces ofimperial domination which are armed rightup to the stars. Yet the dream of this twilightera has already ceased to be one of infiniteprogress and great historical promises.Condemned to go round in circles on thewheel of fortune, our social imaginationwithdraws from history and, from Kubrick toSpielberg, escapes into space. The weight ofdefeats and disasters reduces every event to adusty powder of minor news items, of soundbites which are skipped over just as soon asthey are received, of ephemeral fashions andof faddish anecdotes.

This world in decline, prey to theinconsolable desolation of a faithlessreligiosity, of a commercialised spirituality,of an individualism without individuality,prey to the standardisation of differences andto the formatting of opinions, no longerenjoys either “magnificent sunrises” ortriumphant dawns. It’s as if the catastrophesand disappointments of the past century haveexhausted all sense of history and destroyedany experience of the event, leaving only themirages of a pulverised present.

This eclipse of the future imperils tradition,which is now seized by the conformism ofremembrance commemorations. The past,notes Paul Ricoeur in La Mémoire, l’histoire,l’oubli, is no longer recounted so as to set usa task, but rather so as to institute a “piety ofmemory,” a devout remembrance and aconventional notion of right-thinking. [2]This fetishism of memory claims to steeraway from collective amnesia an eracondemned to the snapshots of an eternalpresent.

Detached from any creative perspective,critical recollection turns to tired-out ritual. Itloses the “unfailing consciousness ofeverything which has not come to pass.” [3]

The postmodern labyrinth is thus unaware of“the dark crossroads” where “the dead return,bringing new announcements.” History,which is no longer “pushed towards the statusof legend,” no longer appears to be“illuminated by an internal light,” contained“in the wealth of witnesses who look forwardto the Revolution and the Apocalypse.” [4] Itcrumbles into a dust of images or into thescattered pieces of a puzzle which no longerfits together.

The train of progress has been derailed. In thesaga of the railway, sinister cattle trucks haveeclipsed the iron horse. Already for WalterBenjamin, revolution was no longercomparable to a race won by an invinciblemachine, but rather to an alarm signal, firedso as to interrupt its mad race towardscatastrophe.

That said, just as the reed outlives the oak, sothe mole prevails over the locomotive.Though he looks tired, our old friend is stilldigging away. The eclipse of the event hasnot put an end to the hidden work ofresistance which discreetly, when everythingseems asleep, prepares the way for newrebellions. Just as the Victorian era’s “growthwithout development” gave rise to the FirstInternational, just as the muted social warexploded in the uprising of the Communards,so too are new contradictions brewing in thegreat transformations of the present time.

However limited they might seem, themarginal conspiracies and plots active at anygiven moment are also fermenting the greatrages of days to come. They herald newoutpourings. They are the place of that “hard-fought advance” Ernst Bloch speaks of, “aperegrination, a ramble, full of tragicdisturbances, seething, blistered withfissures, explosions, isolated engagements.”[5] It is a stubborn advance made up ofirreconcilable resistances, well-directedramblings along tunnels which seem to leadnowhere and yet which open up into daylight,into an astonishing, blinding light.

Thus the underground heresies of theFlagellants, the Dolcinians and otherBeguines paved the way for the likes ofThomas Münzer (1490-1525) to appear withhis “apocalyptic propaganda calling foraction,” before his execution sealed thelasting alliance between the reformed priestand the country squire. After the egalitarianrevolt of the Levellers, the great fear of the

propertied classes cemented the puritan holyalliance between the bourgeoisie andaristocracy of England. After the creativeupheaval of the French Revolution cameThermidor’s period of restoration. After thegreat hope of the October Revolutionfollowed the time of bureaucratic reaction,with all its trials and purges, its falsificationsand forgeries, its disconcerting lies.

This recurrence of Thermidor has alwaysbolted the door of possibility whenever it hasbeen opened just a fraction. However, its“dull peace with the world” has never quitemade its way to the obstinate mole, who isforever born anew from his own failures. Ittook no more than thirty years for the flamesof 1830 or 1848 to rekindle the embers keptglowing by various hidden groups. It tookonly a few years for Jacobin radicalism toresurface, laden with new concerns, with theLuddites, and then with the Chartistmovement of the English working class. [6]Less than twenty years after the bloodysuppression of the Commune and the exile ofits survivors, the socialist movement wasalready being born again, as if a timelessmessage had spread from generation togeneration down a long line of conspiratorialwhispers.

Whether they be failed or betrayed,revolutions are not easily wiped from thememory of the oppressed. They areprolonged within latent forms of dissidence,spectral presences, invasive absences, in themolecular constitution of a plebeian publicspace, with its networks and passwords, itsnocturnal assignations and its thunderingexplosions. “One might imagine,” warned anastute observer after the collapse ofChartism, “that all is peaceful, that all ismotionless; but it is when all is calm that theseed comes up, that republicans and socialistsadvance their ideas in people’s minds.” [7]

When resignation and melancholy follow theecstasy of the event, as when love’sexcitement dulls under the force of habit, itbecomes absolutely essential “not to adjustyourself to the moments of fatigue.” Weshould never underestimate the power, not ofthat daily fatigue which leads to the sleep ofthe just, but of the great historical wearinessat having spent too long “rubbing historyagainst the grain.” Such was the weariness ofMoses when he stopped on the threshold ofCanaan to “sleep the sleep of the earth.” Theweariness of Saint-Just, walled up in the


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The persistence of revoultion


46

silence of his last night alive. Or theweariness of Blanqui, flirting with madnessin his dungeon at Taureau.

Such too was the heavy fatigue which fell, inAugust 1917, upon the shoulders of theyoung Peruvian publicist José CarlosMariategui: “We wake up ill from monotonyand ennui. And we experience the immensedesolation of not hearing the echo of the leastevent that might liven up our minds and makeour typewriters rattle. Languor slips intothings and into souls. Nothing remains butyawning, despondency and weariness. Weare living through a time of clandestinemurmurings and furtive jokes.” [8] A fewmonths later, this avid chronicler ofresurrectional events came to find them atfirst hand in the old world of Europe, then inthe throes of war and revolutions.

In reactionary times, obstinate progressbecomes “a long, slow movement, itselfpatient, of impatience,” a slow, intractableimpatience, stubbornly at odds with the orderthat then reigned in Berlin, and that was soonto swoop down upon Barcelona, Djakarta orSantiago: “Order reigns in Berlin, proclaimthe triumphal bourgeois press, those officersof the victorious troops, in whose honourBerlin’s petty bourgeoisie waves itshandkerchiefs and shouts hurrah. Who here isnot reminded of the hounds of order in Paris,and of the bourgeoisie’s bacchanalian feaston the corpses of the Communards? ‘Orderreigns in Warsaw! Order reigns in Paris!Order reigns in Berlin!’ So it is that theproclamations made by the guardians oforder spread from one centre to another of theglobal historic struggle.” [9]

We are confined to the prosaic managementof a fatalistic order, reduced to an infinitefragmentation of identities and communities,condemned to renounce all programmes andplans. An insidious rhetoric of resignation isused left, right and centre to justifyspectacular U-turns and shameful defections,regrets and repentances [13]

And yet! A radical critique of the existingorder braces itself against the tide, inspiredby new ways of thinking resistance andevents. In the vicious spiral of defeats, thoseengaged in defensive resistance sometimesharbour doubts about the counter-attackwhich is so long in coming; the hope of aliberating event then falls away fromeveryday acts of resistance, retreats from theprofane to the sacred, and ossifies in theexpectation of an improbable miracle. Whenthe present drifts without past or future, andwhen “the spirit withdraws from a given era,it leaves a collective frenzy and a spirituallycharged madness in the world.” [14]

When it loses the thread of earthly resistanceagainst the order of things, the desire tochange the world risks turning into an act offaith and the will of the heavens. Then comesthe tedious procession of smooth-talkingpotion sellers and charlatans, fire-eaters andtooth-pullers, pickpockets and cut-throats,relic-sellers and fortune-tellers, New Agevisionaries and half-believers.

This is what happened after 1848, when thequarante-huitards of A SentimentalEducation turned to commerce or looked totheir careers. This is what happened after1905, when disappointed militants became“seekers after God.” This is what happenedafter May 1968, when certain faint-heartedprophets took it into their heads to play atangels, having played too much at monsters.In such situations, religious revivals andkitsch mythology are supposed to fill the gapleft by the disappointment of great hopes.

Against renunciation and its endlessjustifications, those involved in the politics ofresistance and events never give up lookingfor the reasons behind each loss of reason.But the disjunction of a fidelity to events withno historical determination from a resistancewith no horizon of expectation is doublyburdened with impotence.

In a sense, resistance can take on an infinitevariety of forms, from a concrete critique of

Theory

Rosa Luxemburg

Then there begins the time, not for a passingreduction of speed, but for “inevitablerevolutionary slowness,” for maturation andripening, for an urgent patience, which is theopposite of fatigue and habit: the effort topersevere and continue without growingaccustomed or getting used to things, withoutsettling into habit or routine, by continuallyastonishing oneself, in pursuit of “thisdesirable unknown” [10] which always slipsaway.

“At what moment in time could truth returnto life? And why should it return to life?,”wondered Benjamin Fondane in the veryheart of darkness. [11] When? Nobodyknows. The only certainty is that truthremains “in the rift between the real and thelegal.”

For whom? There are no designated heirs, nonatural descendents, just a legacy in search ofauthors, waiting for those who will be able tocarry it further. This legacy is promised tothose who, as E. P. Thompson puts it, willmanage to save the vanquished from “theenormous condescension of posterity.” For“heritage is not a possession, somethingvaluable that you receive and then put in thebank.” It is “an active, selective affirmation,which can sometimes be reanimated andreaffirmed, more often by illegitimate heirsthan by legitimate ones.”

The event is “always on the move,” but“there must be some days of thunder andlightning” if the vicious circle of fetishismand domination is to be broken. The morningafter a defeat can easily lead to anoverwhelming feeling that things mustforever begin again from scratch, or thateverything is suspended in an “eternalisedpresent.” When the universe seems to repeatitself without end, to keep on marking time,nevertheless the “chapter of changes”remains open to hope. Even when we are onthe point of believing that nothing more ispossible, even when we despair of escapingfrom the relentless order of things, we nevercease to set the possibility of what might beagainst the poverty of what actually is. For“nobody can easily accept the shame of nolonger wanting to be free.” [12]

After twenty years of liberal counter-reformand restoration, the market-based order nowseems inescapable. The eternal present nolonger appears to have any future, andabsolute capitalism no longer any outside.

existing reality to an abstract utopia with nohistorical roots, from an active messianism toa contemplative expectation of a Messiahwho never comes, from an ethical politics toa depoliticised ethics, from propheciesseeking to avert danger to predictionsclaiming to penetrate the secrets of the future.

As for events whose political conditionsseem evasive and compromised, it is all tootempting to treat them as moments of purecontingency with no relation to necessity, oras the miraculous invasion of repressedpossibilities.

Thermidorian times, as everyone knows, seea hardening of hearts and a weakening ofstomachs. In such circumstances, manypeople find nothing to oppose to theassumption that everything is likely to turnout for the worst, other than their willingnessto settle for the lesser of the evils on offer;when this happens, the “flabby fiends” [15]congratulate each other, share a wink and pateach other on the back. Then the outgoingTartuffe, “the old Tartuffe, the classicalTartuffe, the clerical Tartuffe,” takes the“second Tartuffe, the Tartuffe of the modernworld, the second-hand Tartuffe, thehumanitarian Tartuffe, at any rate the otherTartuffe” [16] by the hand. This alliance of“two Tartuffe cousins” can last for a verylong time, with “the one carrying the other,one fighting the other, one supporting theother, one feeding the other.”

The veneration of victors and victories goeshand in hand with compassion towards thevictims, so long as the latter stick to their roleas suffering victims, so long as they are notseduced by the idea of becoming actors intheir own version of history.

However, even in the worst droughts andmost arid places there is always a stream -perhaps barely a trickle - which heraldssurprising resurgences. Again, we mustalways distinguish between the rebelliousmessianism which will not give in, and thehumiliated millennialism which looks insteadtowards the great beyond. We must alwaysdistinguish between the vanquished and thebroken, between “victorious defeats” andunalleviated collapse. We must avoidconfusing the consolations of utopia withforms of resistance that perpetuate an “illegaltradition” and pass on a “secret conviction.”

There are always new beginnings, momentsof revival or renewal. In the dark times ofchange and transition, worldly and spiritualambitions, reasons and passions, combine toform an explosive mixture. Attempts tosafeguard the old are mixed up with the firststammerings of the new. Even in the mostsombre moments, the tradition on the rise isnever far behind the tradition in decline.There is never any end to the secretcomposition of the uninterrupted poem of“probable impossibilities.”

This obstinate hope is not to be confused withthe smug confidence of the believer, or withthe “sad passion” driven out by Spinoza. Onthe contrary, it endures as the virtue of“surmounted despair.” For “to be ready toplace hope in whatever does not deceive,”you must first have despaired of your ownillusions. Disillusioned, disabused, hope thenbecomes “the essential and diametricalopposite of habit and softening.” Such hopeis obliged constantly to “break with habit,”constantly to dismantle “the mechanisms ofhabit,” and to launch new beginningseverywhere, “just as habit everywhereintroduces endings and deaths.” [17]

To break with habit is to retain the ability toastonish yourself. It is to allow yourself to besurprised.

These untimely invasions, during which thecontingency of events cuts a path throughinsufficient yet necessary historicalconditions, make a breach in the unchangingorder of structures and of things.

Crisis? What crisis is there today? There is ahistorical crisis, a crisis in civilisation, astretched and prolonged crisis which drags onand on. Our ill-fitting world is bursting at theseams. As H.G. Wells predicted, the riftbetween our culture and our inventions hasnot stopped growing, opening up at the veryheart of technology and knowledge adisturbing gap between fragmentedrationalities and a global irrationality,between political reason and technicalmadness.

Does this crisis contain the seeds of a newcivilisation? It is just as pregnant with unseenbarbarities. Which will prevail? Barbarity hastaken the lead by a good few lengths. It isbecoming more difficult than ever to separatedestruction and construction, the death throesof the old and the birth pangs of the new, “for

barbarity has never before had such powerfulmeans at its disposal to exploit thedisappointments and hopes of a humanitywhich has doubts about itself and about itsfuture.” [18] We fumble our way through thisunsettled twilight, somewhere between duskand dawn.

Is it a simple crisis of development? Orindeed, rather than a sort of discontent withincivilisation, is it a sorrow that gives rise to“myths which make the earth shake with theirenormous feet”? If a new civilisation is toprevail, the old one must not be entirely lost,abandoned or scorned. Not only must it bedefended, but it must also be ceaselesslyreinvented.

The stubborn old mole will survive thedashing locomotive. His furry, round formprevails over the metallic coldness of themachine, his diligent good nature over therhythmic clanking of the wheels, his patientsmile over the sniggering steel. He comesand goes, between tunnels and craters,between burrows and breakouts, between thedarkness of the underground and the light ofthe sun, between politics and history. Hemakes his hole. He erodes and heundermines. He prepares the coming crisis.

The mole is a profane Messiah.

The Messiah is a mole, short-sighted andobstinate.

The crisis is a molehill which suddenly opensout.

* * * * *

“People turn to soothsayers when theyno longer have prophets”(Chateaubriand).

François Furet concludes The Passing of anIllusion with a melancholy verdict. “Thedemocratic individual, living at the end of thetwentieth century, can only watch as thedivinely sanctioned order of history tremblesto the core.” To a vague anticipation ofdanger is added “the scandal of a closedfuture,” and “we find ourselves condemnedto live in the world in which we live.” [19]Capital seems to have become the permanenthorizon for the rest of time.

There will no more afterwards, no moreelsewhere.

Death of the event.


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The persistence of revoultion


48

End of story.

End of history.

Unhappily ever after.

But in fact there is always conflict andcontradiction, there is always discontent inthe midst of civilisation and crisis in themidst of culture. There are always thoserefuse servitude and resist injustice.

From Seattle to Nice, from Millau to PortoAlegre, from Bangkok to Prague, from theorganisation of the unemployed to themobilisation of women, a strange geopoliticsis taking shape, and we don’t yet whichevents will follow in its wake.

The old mole burrows on.

Hegel draws our attention to that “silent andsecret” revolution which always precedes thedevelopment of a new way of thinking.Through the unreasonable detours of history,the cunning claws of the mole dig their ownpath of Reason. The mole is in no rush. Hehas “no need to hurry.” He needs “longperiods of time,” and he has “all the time heneeds.” [Note missing in text] If the moletakes a backward step, it’s not in order tohibernate but to bore through anotheropening. His twistings and turnings allowhim to find the place where he can break out.The mole never disappears, he only headsunderground.

Negri and Hardt say that the metaphor of themole is a figure of modernity, they say that hehas been surpassed by postmodernity.“We’ve come to suspect that the old mole isdead”: his digging gives way to the “infiniteundulations of the snake” and other reptilianstruggles. [20] But such a verdict smacks ofthat chronological illusion wherebypostmodernity is supposed follow on after amodernity that has since been consigned tothe museum of ancient history. For the moleis ambivalent. He is both modern andpostmodern. He bustles discreetly about inhis “subterranean rhizomes,” only to burstthunderously forth from the craters he makes.

On the pretext of giving up on history’smetanarratives, the philosophical discourseof postmodernity lends itself to mystics andmystagogues: when a society runs out ofprophets it turns to soothsayers instead. Thisis the way it goes, in periods of reaction andrestoration. After the massacres of June 1848and the 18th Brumaire of the younger

Napoleon, the socialist movement waslikewise seized by “Christolatry.” “Look atthese offspring of Voltaire,” wrote one formerCommunard, “these former scourges of thechurch, now huddled together around a table,hands clasped in pious union, waiting hourupon hour for it to rise up and lift one of itslegs. Religion in all its forms is once againthe order of the day, and has become so very‘distinguished.’ France has gone mad!” [21]

Pierre Bourdieu was right to distinguishmystical affirmation or divination from theconditional, preventive and performativestance of prophecy. “Just as the priest is partand parcel of the ordinary order of things, sotoo is the prophet the man of crisis, ofsituations in which the established ordercrumbles and the future as a whole is throwninto question.” [22]

The prophet is not a priest. Or a saint.

Still less a soothsayer.

To ward off disaster, it’s not enough to resistfor the sake of resistance, it’s not enough towager on the possibility of a redemptiveevent. We must seek both to understand thelogic of history and to be ready for thesurprise of the event. We must remain open tothe contingency of the latter without losingthe thread of the former. Such is precisely thechallenge of political action. For historydoesn’t proceed in a vacuum, and whenthings take a turn for the better this neverhappens in an empty stretch of time, butalways “in time that is infinitely full, filledwith struggles.” [23]

And with events.

The mole prepares the way of their coming.With a measured impatience. With an urgentpatience.

For the mole is a prophetic animal.

Daniel Bensaïd is one of France’s most prominentMarxist philosophers and has written extensively. Heis a leading member of the LCR (French section ofthe Fourth International).

NOTES

[1] Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Classin England (Moscow and London, ProgressPublishers/Lawrence & Wishart: 1973) 121 (translationmodified).

[2] Paul Ricoeur, La Mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli (Paris:Seuil, 2000).

[3] Paul Ricoeur, La Mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli (Paris:Seuil, 2000).

[4] Ibid.

[5] ibid.

[6] See Edward P. Thompson, The Making of the EnglishWorking Class [1963] (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd,1980).

[7] Henry Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor:A Cyclopaedia of the Condition and Earnings of ThoseThat Will Work, Those That Cannot Work, and Those ThatWill Not Work, 4 vols. [1861-1862] (New York: A.M.Kelley, 1967).

[8] José Carlos Mariategui, in El Tiempo (Lima) 16August 1917.

[9] Rosa Luxemburg, “Order reigns in Berlin” (written on14 January 1919, several days before her murder by theFreikorps despatched by a social democrat Minister of theInterior).

[10] Dionys Mascolo, Le Communisme (Paris: Gallimard,1953).

[11] Benjamin Fondane, L’Écrivain devant la révolution(Paris: Paris-Méditerranée, 1997).

[12] Jacques Derrida with Marc Guillaume and Jean-Pierre Vincent, Marx en jeu (Paris: Descartes et Cie,1997).

[13] Michel Surya, Portrait de l’intellectuel en animal decompagnie (Tours: Farrago, 2000) 11; see also Surya, Del’argent (Paris: Payot, 2000) 122.

[14] Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: AnIntroduction to the Sociology of Knowledge [1936](London: Routledge, 1960) 192-196, quoted in E. P.Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class419.

[15] “les monstres mous”

[16] Charles Péguy, Clio (Paris: Gallimard, 1931) 99.

[17] Charles Péguy, Note conjointe (Paris: Gallimard,1942) 123.

[18] Georges Bernanos, La Liberté pour quoi faire? [1953](Paris: Gallimard, 1995).

[19] François Furet, The Passing of an Illusion. The Ideaof Communism in the Twentieth Century, trans. DeborahFuret (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

[20] Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000) 57.

[21] Gustave Lefrançais, Souvenirs d’un révolutionnaire(Paris: La Tête de feuille, 1971) 191.

[22] Pierre Bourdieu, “Genèse et structure du champreligieux,” Revue française de sociologie 12 (1971) 331.

[23] Hegel, Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie (Paris:Folio Essais, 1990).

Theory

By rejecting the idea of separate historicalstages - the first one being a «bourgeoisdemocratic» one - in the future RussianRevolution, and raising the possibility oftransforming the democratic into aproletarian/socialist revolution in a«permanent» (i.e. ininterrupted) process, itnot only predicted the general strategy of theOctober revolution, but also provided keyinsights into the other revolutionaryprocesses which would take place later on, inChina, Indochina, Cuba, etc. Of course, it isnot without its problems and shortcomings,but it was incomparably more relevant to thereal revolutionary processes in the peripheriaof the capitalist system than anythingproduced by «orthodox Marxism» from thedeath of Engels until 1917.

In fact, the idea of permanent revolutionappeared already in Marx and Engels,notably in their Address of the CentralCommittee to the Communist League, fromMarch 1850, while the German Revolution of1848-50 - in an absolutist and backwardcountry - still seemed to unfold. Against theunholy alliance of the liberal bourgeoisie andabsolutism, they championed the commonaction of the workers with the democraticparties of the petty bourgeoisie.

But they insisted on the need of anindependent proletarian perspective : “whilethe democratic petty bourgeoisie want tobring the revolution to an end as quickly as

possible...it is our interest and our task tomake the revolution permanent until all themore or less propertied classes have beendriven from their ruling positions, until theproletariat has conquered state power anduntil the association of the proletarians hasprogressed sufficiently far - not only in onecountry but in all the leading countries of theworld - that competition between theproletarians of these countries ceases and atleast the decisive forces of production areconcentrated in the hands of the workers”. [1]

This striking passage contains three of thefundamental themes that Trotsky would laterdevelop in Results and Prospects : 1) theuninterrupted development of the revolutionin a semi-feudal country, leading to theconquest of power by the working class ; 2)the need for the proletarian forces in power totake anti-capitalist and socialist measures ; 3)the necessarily international character of therevolutionary process and of the new socialistsociety, without classes or private property.

The idea of a socialist revolution in thebackward periphery of capitalism - althoughnot the terms “permanent revolution”- is alsopresent in late Marx writings on Russia : theletter to Vera Zassoulitsch (1881) and,together with Engels, the preface to the 1882Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto: “If the Russian revolution sounds the signalof a proletarian revolution in the West so thateach complements the other, the prevailing

form of communal ownership of land inRussia may form the starting point for acommunist course of development”. [2]

With the exception of Trotsky, these ideasseem to have been lost to Russian Marxism inthe years between the end of the XIXthcentury and 1917. If we leave aside the semi-Marxists in the populist camp, such asNicolaion, or the “legal marxists”such asPiotr Struve, there remain four clearlydelimited positions inside Russian social-democracy :

I) The Menshevik view , which consideredthe future Russian revolution as bourgeois byits nature and its driving force would be analliance of the proletariat with the liberalbourgeoisie. Plekhanov and his friendsbelieved that Russia was a backward,“Asiatic”and barbarous country requiring along stage of industrialism and“Europeanization”before the proletariatcould aspire to power. Only after Russia hasdeveloped its productive forces, and passedinto the historical stage of advancedcapitalism and parliamentary democracywould the requisite material and politicalconditions be available for a socialisttransformation.

II) The Bolshevik conception also recognizedthe inevitably bourgeois-democraticcharacter of the revolution, but it excludedthe bourgeoisie from the revolutionary bloc.


49

Permanent Revolution

The Marxism of Trotsky’s "Results and Prospects"A decisive break with the mechanical Marxism of the 2nd International

Michael Löwy

Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, as sketched for thefirst time in his essay Results and Prospects (1906), was one ofthe most astonishing political breakthroughs in Marxistthinking at the begining of the XXth century.

Kamenev (left) with Lenin and Trotsky


50

According to Lenin, only the proletariat andthe peasantry were authenticallyrevolutionary forces, bound to establishthrough their alliance a common democraticrevolutionary dictatorship. Of course, as weknow, Lenin changed radically his approach,after the April Theses of 1917.

III) Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, whileaknowledging the bourgeois character of therevolution in the last instance, insisted on thehegemonic revolutionary role of theproletariat supported by the peasantry. Thedestruction of Czarist absolutism could notbe achieved short of the establishment of aworkers’ power led by social-democracy.However, such a proletarian governmentcould not yet transcend in its programmaticaims the fixed limits of bourgeois democracy.

IV) Finally, Trotsky’s concept of permanentrevolution, which envisaged not only thehegemonic role of the proletariat and thenecessity of its seizure of power, but also thepossibility of a growing over of thedemocratic into the socialist revolution.

Curiously enough, Trotsky does not mention,in Results and Prospects, any of the abovementioned pieces by Marx and Engels. Heprobably ignored the Address of March 1850: the re-edition of 1885 in Zurich, in German,was not well known in Russia. His immedatesource for the term “permanent revolution” in1905 seems to have been an article by FranzMehring on the events in Russia, “DieRevolution in Permanenz”, published in theNeue Zeit, the theoretical organ of GermanSocial-Democracy. Mehring’s article wasimmeditaely translated in 1905 in Trotsky’spaper Nachalo in Petrograd and in the sameissue appeared also the first article in whichLev Davidovitch used the term “permanentrevolution”: “Between the immediate goaland the final goal there should be apermanent revolutionary chain”.

However, a close reading of Mehring’s pieceshows that the German Marxist used thewords, but was not really a partisan ofpermanent revolution in the same sense asTrotsky in 1905-1906. The vital kernel of thetheory, its concept of the ininterrupted going-over of the democratic towards the socialistrevolution, was denied by Mehring. This waswell understood by Martov, the greatMenshevik leader, who, in a work writtenmany years later, recalled Trotsky’s piece asa disturbing "deviation from the theoreticalfoundations of the Programm of RussianSocial-Democracy". He clearly distinguishedbetween Mehring’s article, which heconsidered acceptable, and Trotsky’s essay,which he repudiated as “utopian”, since ittranscended “the historical task which flows

from the existent level of productiveforces”.[3]

The ideas suggested in various of Trotsky’sarticles in 1905 - particularly in his prefacefor the Russian translation of Marx’s writingson the Paris Commune - were thendeveloped, in a more systematic and coherentway, in Results and Prospects (1906).However, this bold piece of writing remainedfor a long time a forgotten book. It seems thatLenin did not read it - at least before 1917 -and its influence over contemporary RussianMarxism was desultory at best. Like allforerunners, Trotsky was in advance of histime, and his ideas were too novel andheterodox to be accepted, or even studied, byhis party comrades.

How was it possible for Trotsky to cut thegordian knot of Second InternationalMarxism - the economicist definition of thenature of a future revolution by “the level ofproductive forces”- and to to grasp therevolutionary possibilities that lay beyond thedogmatic construction of a bourgeoisdemocratic Russian revolution which was theunquestioned problematic of all otherMarxist propositions ?

There seems to exist an intimate link betweenthe dialectical method and revolutionarytheory : not by chance, the high period ofrevolutionary thinking in the XXth century,the years 1905-1925, are also those of someof the most interesting attemps to use thehegelo-marxist dialectics as an instrument ofknowledge and action. Let me try to illustratethe connexion between dialectics andrevolution in Trotsky’s early work.

A careful study of the roots of Trotsky’spolitical boldness and of the whole theory ofpermanent revolution, reveals that his viewswere informed by a specific understanding ofMarxism, an interpretation of the dialecticalmaterialist method, distinct from thedominant orthodoxy of the SecondInternational, and of Russian Marxism.

The young Trotsky did not read Hegel, buthis understanding of Marxist theory owesmuch to his first lectures in historicalmaterialism, namely, the works of AntonioLabriola. In his autobiography he recalled the“delight”with which he first devouredLabriola’s essays during his imprisonment inOdessa in 1893. [4] His initiation intodialectics thus took place through anencounter with perhaps the least orthodox ofthe major figures of the Second International.

Formed in the Hegelian school, Labriolafought relentlessly against the neo-positivistand vulgar-materialist trends that proliferatedin Italian Marxism (Turati !). He was one of

the first to reject the economisticinterpretations of Marxism by attempting torestore the dialectical concepts of totality andhistorical process. Labriola defendedhistorical materialism as a self-sufficient andindependent theoretical system, irreducible toother currents ; he also rejected scholasticdogmatism and the cult of the textbook,insisting on the need of a criticaldevelopment of Marxism. [5]

Trotsky’s starting-point, therefore, was thiscritical, dialectical and anti-dogmaticalunderstanding that Labriola had inspired.“Marxism”, he wrote in 1906, “is above all amethod of analysis - not analysis of texts, butanalysis of social relations”. Let us focus onfive of the most important and distinctivefeatures of the methodology that underliesthe Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution,in his distinction from the other RussianMarxists , from Plekhanov to Lenin and fromthe Mencheviks to the Bolcheviks (before1917).

1. From the vantage point of the dialecticalcomprehension of the unity of the opposites,Trotsky criticized the Bolsheviks’ rigiddivision between the socialist power of theproletariat and the “democratic dictatorshipof workers and peasants”, as a “logical,purely formal operation”. This abstract logicis even more sharply attacked in his polemicagainst Plekhanov, whose whole reasoningcan be reduced to an “empty sillogism”: ourrevolution is bourgeois, therefore we shouldsupport the Kadets, the constitutionalistbourgeois party. Moreover, in an astonishingpassage from a critique against theMenchevik Tcherevanin, he explicitlycondemned the analytical - i.e. abstract-formal, pre-dialectical - character ofMenchevik politics : “Tcherevanin constructshis tactics as Spinoza did his ethics, that is tosay, geometrically”. [6] Of course, Trotskywas not a philosopher and almost never wrotespecific philosophical texts, but this makeshis clear-sighted grasp of the methodologicaldimension of his controversy with stagistconceptions all the more remarkable.

2. In History and Class consciousness (1923),Lukacs insisted that the dialectical categoryof totality was the essence of Marx’s method,indeed the very principle of revolution withinthe domain of knowledge. [7] Trotsky’stheory, written twenty years earlier, is anexceptionally significant illustration of thisLukacsian thesis. Indeed, one of the essentialsources of the superiority of Trotskys’srevolutionary thought is the fact that headopted the viewpoint of totality, perceivingcapitalism and the class struggle as a worldprocess. In the Preface to a Russian edition(1905) of Lassalle’s articles about therevolution of 1848, he argues : “Binding all

Theory


51

countries together with its mode ofproduction and its commerce, capitalism hasconverted the whole world into a singleeconomic and political organism (...) Thisimmediately gives the events now unfoldingand international character, and opens up awide horizon. The political emancipation ofRussia led by the working class (...) willmake it the initiator of the liquidation ofworld capitalism, for which history hascreated the objective condition”. [8] Only byposing the problem in these terms - at thelevel of “maturity”of the capitalist system inits totality - was it possible to transcend thetraditional perspective of the RussianMarxists, who defined the socialist-revolutionary “unripeness”of Russiaexclusively in terms of a national economicdeterminism.

3. Trotsky explicitly rejected the un-dialectical economicism - the tendency toreduce, in a non-mediated and one-sided way,all social, political and ideologicalcontradictions to the economic infra-structure - which was one of the hallmarks ofPlekhanov’s vulgar materialist interpretationof Marxism. Indeed, Trotsky break witheconomicism was one of the decisive stepstowards the theory of permanent revolution.A key paragraph in Results and Prospectsdefined with precision the political stakesimplied in this rupture : “To imagine that thedictatorship of the proletariat is in some wayautomatically dependent on the technicaldevelopment and resources of a country is aprejudice of ‘economic’ materialismsimplified to absurdity. This point of viewhas nothing in common with Marxism”. [9]

4. Trotsky’s method refused the un-dialectical conception of history as a pre-determined evolution, typical of Menchevikarguments. He had a rich and dialecticalunderstanding of historical development as acontradictory process, where at everymoment alternatives are posed. The task ofMarxism, he wrote, was precisely to“discover the ‘possibilities’ of the developingrevolution”. [10] In Results and Prospects, aswell as in later essays - for instance, hispolemic against the Mencheviks, “Theproletariat and the Russianrevolution”(1908), he analyzes the process ofpermanent revolution towards socialisttransformation through the dialecticalconcept of objective possibility, whoseoutcome depended on innumerablesubjective factors as well as unforeseeableevents - and not as an inevitable necessitywhose triumph (or defeat) was alreadyassured. It was this recognition of the opencharacter of social historicity that gaverevolutionary praxis its decisive place in the

architecture of Trotsky’s theoretical-politicalideas from 1905 on.

5. While the Populists insisted on thepeculiarities of Russia and the Mencheviksbelieved that their country would necessarilyfollow the “general laws”of capitalistdevelopment, Trotsky was able to achieve adialectical synthesis between the universaland the particular, the specificity of theRussian social formation and the worldcapitalist process. In a remarkable passagefrom the History of the Russian Revolution(1930) he explicitly formulated the viewpointthat was already implicit in his 1906 essays :“In the essence of the matter the Slavophileconception, with all its reactionaryfantasticness, and also Narodnikism, with allits democratic illusions, were by no meansmere speculations, but rested uponindubitable and moreover deep pecularitiesof Russia’s development, understood one-sidedly however and incorrectly evaluated. Inits struggle with Narodnikism, RussianMarxism, demonstrating the identity of thelaws of development for all countries, notinfrequently fell into a dogmaticmechanization discovering a tendency topour out the baby with the bath”. [11]Trotsky’s historical perspective was,therefore, a dialectical Aufhebung, able tosimultaneously negate-preserve-transcendthe contradiction between the Populists antthe Russian Marxists.

It was the combination of all thesemethodological innovations that madeResults and Prospects so unique in thelandscape of Russian Marxism before 1917 ;dialectics was at the heart of the theory ofpermanent revolution. As Isaac Deutscherwrote in his biography, if one reads again thispamphlet from 1906, “one cannot but beimpressed by the sweep and boldness of thisvision. He reconnoited the future as one whosurveys from a towering mountain top a newand immense horizon and point to vast,uncharted landmarks in the distance”. [12]

A similar link between dialectics andrevolutionary politics can be found in Lenin’sevolution. Vladimir Illitch remained faithfullto the orthodox views of Russian Marxismtill 1914, when the begining of the war ledhim to discover dialectics : the study ofHegelian logic was the instrument by meansof which he cleared the theoretical roadleading to the Finland Station of Petrograd,where he first announced “All the power tothe soviets”. In March-April 1917, liberatedfrom the obstacle represented bypredialectical Marxism, Lenin could, underthe pressure of events, rid himself in goodtime of its political corollary: the abstract andrigid principle according to which "TheRussian revolution could oniy be bourgeois,

since Russia was not economically ripe for asocialist revolution.”

Once he crossed the Rubicon, he appliedhimself to studying the problem from apractical, concrete, and realistic angle andcame to conclusions very similar to thoseanounced by Trotsky in 1906 : what are themeasures, constituting in fact the transitiontowards socialism, that could be madeacceptable to the majority of the people, thatis, the masses of the workers and peasants ?This is the road which led to the OctoberRevolution...

Michael Löwy is Research Director in Sociology atthe CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research)in Paris. He is the author of many books, includingThe Marxism of Che Guevara, Marxism andLiberation Theology, Fatherland or Mother Earth?and The War of Gods: Religion and Politics in LatinAmerica.

NOTES

[1] In Marx, Engels, The Revolutions of 1848, Penguin,1973, p. 323-4.

[2] Marx, Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe,London, 1953, p. 217.

[3] Martov, Geschichte der Russischen Sozialdemokratie,Berlin, 196, pp. 164-165.

[4] Trotsky, My Life, New York, 1960, p. 119

[5] See A.Labriola, La concepcion materialista de lahistoria (1897), La Habana, 1970, p. 115, 243.

[6] Trotsky, “The proletariat and the Russian revolution”,and “Our Differences”in 1905, London, 1971, p. 289 ,306-312.

[7] G.Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, London,1971, ch. 1.

[8] Quoted in Results and Prospects, London, 1962, p.240.

[9] Results and Prospects, p. 195.

[10] Ibid p. 168.

[11] Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, London,1965, vol. I, p. 427.

[12] I. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, London, 1954, p.161

Permanent Revolution

May Day 1976. DRV tank crewwelcomed into Saigon.


52

Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, assketched for the first time in his essay Resultsand Prospects (1906), was one of the mostastonishing political breakthroughs inMarxist thinking at the beginning of theXXth century. By rejecting the idea ofseparate historical stages - the first one beinga “bourgeois democratic” one - in the futureRussian Revolution, and raising thepossibility of transforming the democraticinto a proletarian/socialist revolution in a“permanent” (i.e. uninterrupted) process, itnot only predicted the general strategy of theOctober revolution, but also provided keyinsights into the other revolutionaryprocesses which would take place later on, inChina, Indochina, Cuba, etc.

Of course, it is not without its problems andshortcomings, but it was incomparably morerelevant to the real revolutionary processes inthe periphery of the capitalist system thananything produced by “orthodox Marxism”from the death of Engels until 1917. Now, acareful study of the roots of Trotsky’spolitical boldness and of the whole theory ofpermanent revolution, reveals that his viewswere informed by a specific understanding ofMarxism, an interpretation of the dialecticalmaterialist method, distinct from thedominant orthodoxy of the SecondInternational, and of Russian Marxism. Theyoung Trotsky did not read Hegel, but hisunderstanding of Marxist theory owes muchto his first lectures in historical materialism,namely, the works of Antonio Labriola. In hisautobiography he recalled the “delight” withwhich he first devoured Labriola’s essaysduring his imprisonment in Odessa in 1893.[1]

His initiation into dialectics thus took placethrough an encounter with perhaps the leastorthodox of the major figures of the SecondInternational. Formed in the Hegelian school,Labriola fought relentlessly against the neo-positivist and vulgar-materialist trends thatproliferated in Italian Marxism (Turati!). Hewas one of the first to reject the economisticinterpretations of Marxism by attempting torestore the dialectical concepts of totality andhistorical process. Labriola defendedhistorical materialism as a self-sufficient andindependent theoretical system, irreducible toother currents; he also rejected scholasticdogmatism and the cult of the textbook,insisting on the need of a criticaldevelopment of Marxism [2].

Trotsky’s starting-point, therefore, was thiscritical, dialectical and anti-dogmaticunderstanding that Labriola had inspired.“Marxism”, he wrote in 1906, “is above all amethod of analysis - not analysis of texts, butanalysis of social relations”. Let us focus onfive of the most important and distinctivefeatures of the methodology that underliesthe Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution,in his distinction from the other RussianMarxists, from Plekhanov to Lenin and fromthe Mensheviks to the Bolsheviks (before1917).

1. From the vantage point of the dialecticalcomprehension of the unity of the opposites,Trotsky criticized the Bolsheviks’ rigiddivision between the socialist power of theproletariat and the “democratic dictatorshipof workers and peasants”, as a “logical,purely formal operation”. This abstract logicis even more sharply attacked in his polemicagainst Plekhanov, whose whole reasoningcan be reduced to an “empty syllogism”: our

revolution is bourgeois, therefore we shouldsupport the Cadets, the constitutionalistbourgeois party.

Moreover, in an astonishing passage from acritique against the Menshevik Tcherevanin,he explicitly condemned the analytical - i.e.abstract-formal, pre-dialectical - character ofMenshevik politics : “Tcherevanin constructshis tactics as Spinoza did his ethics, that is tosay, geometrically” [3]. Of course, Trotskywas not a philosopher and almost never wrotespecific philosophical texts , but this makeshis clear-sighted grasp of the methodologicaldimension of his controversy with stagistconceptions all the more remarkable.

2. In History and Class Consciousness(1923), Lukacs insisted that the dialecticalcategory of totality was the essence of Marx’smethod, indeed the very principle ofrevolution within the domain of knowledge[4]. Trotsky’s theory, written twenty yearsearlier, is an exceptionally significantillustration of this Lukacsian thesis. Indeed,one of the essential sources of the superiorityof Trotsky’s revolutionary thought is the factthat he adopted the viewpoint of totality,perceiving capitalism and the class struggleas a world process.

In the Preface to a Russian edition (1905) ofLassalle’s articles about the revolution of1848, he argues : “Binding all countriestogether with its mode of production and itscommerce, capitalism has converted thewhole world into a single economic andpolitical organism (...) This immediatelygives the events now unfolding andinternational character, and opens up a widehorizon. The political emancipation of Russialed by the working class (...) will make it the

Trotsky, Lenin, Lukacs

Dialectics and RevolutionMichael Löwy

There seems to exist an intimate link between the dialectical method andrevolutionary theory: not by chance, the high period of revolutionarythinking in the XXth century, the years 1905-1925, are also those of someof the most interesting attemps to use the hegelo-marxist dialectics as aninstrument of knowledge and action. Let me try to illustrate the connexionbetween dialectics and revolution in the thought of three distinct Marxistfigures : Leon D. Trotsky, Vladimir I. Lenin and György Lukacs.

initiator of the liquidation of worldcapitalism, for which history has created theobjective condition” [5]. Only by posing theproblem in these terms - at the level of“maturity” of the capitalist system in itstotality - was it possible to transcend thetraditional perspective of the RussianMarxists, who defined the socialist-revolutionary “unripeness” of Russiaexclusively in terms of a national economicdeterminism.

3. Trotsky explicitly rejected the un-dialectical economism - the tendency toreduce, in a non-mediated and one-sided way,all social, political and ideologicalcontradictions to the economic infra-structure - which was one of the hallmarks ofPlekhanov’s vulgar materialist interpretationof Marxism. Indeed, Trotsky break witheconomism was one of the decisive stepstowards the theory of permanent revolution.A key paragraph in Results and Prospectsdefined with precision the political stakesimplied in this rupture : “To imagine that thedictatorship of the proletariat is in some wayautomatically dependent on the technicaldevelopment and resources of a country is aprejudice of ‘economic’ materialismsimplified to absurdity. This point of viewhas nothing in common with Marxism” [6].

4. Trotsky’s method refused the un-dialectical conception of history as a pre-determined evolution, typical of Menshevikarguments. He had a rich and dialecticalunderstanding of historical development as acontradictory process, where at everymoment alternatives are posed. The task ofMarxism, he wrote, was precisely to“discover the ‘possibilities’ of the developingrevolution” [7].

In Results and Prospects, as well as in lateressays - for instance, his polemic against theMensheviks, “The proletariat and the Russianrevolution” (1908), he analyzes the processof permanent revolution towards socialisttransformation through the dialecticalconcept of objective possibility, whoseoutcome depended on innumerablesubjective factors as well as unforeseeableevents - and not as an inevitable necessitywhose triumph (or defeat) was alreadyassured. It was this recognition of the open

character of social historicity that gaverevolutionary praxis its decisive place in thearchitecture of Trotsky’s theoretical-politicalideas from 1905 on.

5. While the Populists insisted on thepeculiarities of Russia and the Mensheviksbelieved that their country would necessarilyfollow the “general laws” of capitalistdevelopment, Trotsky was able to achieve adialectical synthesis between the universaland the particular, the specificity of theRussian social formation and the worldcapitalist process. In a remarkable passagefrom the History of the Russian Revolution(1930) he explicitly formulated the viewpointthat was already implicit in his 1906 essays :“In the essence of the matter the Slavophileconception, with all its reactionaryfantasticness, and also Narodnikism, with allits democratic illusions, were by no meansmere speculations, but rested uponindubitable and moreover deep peculiaritiesof Russia’s development, understood one-sidedly however and incorrectly evaluated.

In its struggle with Narodnikism, RussianMarxism, demonstrating the identity of thelaws of development for all countries, notinfrequently fell into a dogmaticmechanization discovering a tendency topour out the baby with the bath water” [8].Trotsky’s historical perspective was,therefore, a dialectical Aufhebung, able tosimultaneously negate-preserve-transcendthe contradiction between the Populists antthe Russian Marxists.

It was the combination of all thesemethodological innovations that madeResults and Prospects so unique in thelandscape of Russian Marxism before 1917 ;dialectics was at the heart of the theory ofpermanent revolution.

As Isaac Deutscher wrote in his biography, ifone reads again this pamphlet from 1906,“one cannot but be impressed by the sweepand boldness of this vision. He reconnoiteredthe future as one who surveys from atowering mountain top a new and immensehorizon and point to vast, unchartedlandmarks in the distance” [9].

Until 1914, Lenin used to consider himself,on the theoretical and philosophical level, asa faithful follower of the orthodox Marxismof the Second International, as represented byfigures such as Karl Kautsky and G. V.Plekhanov. His main philosophical workfrom the early years, Materialism andEmpiriocriticism, is much influenced by thekind of Marxism represented by the leader ofthe Menshevik faction. His philosophicalthinking began to change radically after1914, when he saw - and at first could notbelieve - that German Social-Democracy(including Kautsky) voted the war credits forthe Kaiser’s government in August 4, 1914 -a choice reproduced in Russia by Plekhanovand several of his comrades.

The catastrophe of the Second Internationalat the outbreak of World War I was, forLenin, striking evidence that something wasrotten in the state of Denmark of official“orthodox” Marxism. The politicalbankruptcy of that orthodoxy led him,therefore, to a profound revision of thephilosophical premises of the Kautsky-Plekhanov sort of historical materialism. Itwill be necessary one day to retrace theprecise track that led Lenin from the traumaof August 1914 to the Logic of Hegelscarcely a month after. The simple desire toreturn to the sources of Marxist thinking ? Ora clear intuition that the methodologicalAchilles’ heel of Second InternationalMarxism was the absence of dialectics ?

Whatever the reason, there is no doubt thathis vision of Marxist philosophy wasprofoundly changed by it. Evidence of this isthe text itself of the Philosophical Notebooks,but also the letter he sent on January 4, 1915,shortly after having finished reading Hegel’sThe Science of Logic (December 17, 1914) tothe editorial secretary of Granat Publishers toask if “there was still time to make somecorrections [to his Karl Marx entry ] in thesection of dialectics." [10]

And it was by no means a "passingenthusiasm" : seven years later, in one of hislast writings, On the Significance of MilitantMarxism (1922), he called on "the editorsand contributors" of the party’s theoreticaljournal (Under the Banner of Marxism) to"be a kind of Society of Materialist Friends of


53

Trosky, Lenin, Lukacs


54

Hegelian Dialectics." He insists on the needfor a "systematic study of HegelianDialectics from a materialist standpoint," andproposes even to "print in the journalexcerpts from Hegel’s principal works,interpret them materialistically and commenton them with the help of examples of the wayMarx applied dialectics." [11]

What were the tendencies of SecondInternational Marxism which gave it apredialectical character?

1. Primarily, the tendency to ignore thedistinction between Marx’s dialecticalmaterialism and the "ancient," "vulgar,""metaphysical" materialism of Helvetius,Feuerbach, etc. Plekhanov, for instance,could write these astonishing lines: "InMarx’s Theses on Feuerbach . . . none of thefundamental ideas of Feuerbach’s philosophyare refuted; they are merely amended ... Marxand Engels’ materialist views wereelaborated in the direction indicated by theinner logic of Feuerbach’s philosophy" ! [12]

2. The tendency, that flows from the first, toreduce historical materialism to mechanicaleconomic determinism in which the"objective" is always the cause of the"subjective." For example, Kautskyuntiringly insists on the idea that "thedomination of the proletariat and the socialrevolution cannot come about before thepreliminary conditions, as much economic aspsychological, of a socialist society aresufficiently realised." What are these"psychological conditions"? According toKautsky, "intelligence, discipline and anorganisational talent." How will theseconditions be created? "It is the historicaltask of capitalism" to realize them. The moralof history: "It is only where the capitalistsystem of production has attained a highdegree of development that economicconditions permit the transformation, by thepower of the people, of capitalist property inthe means of production into socialownership." [13]

3. The attempt to reduce the dialectic toDarwinian evolutionism, where the differentstages of human history (slavery, feudalism,capitalism, socialism) follow a sequencerigorously determined by the "laws of

history." Kautsky, for example, definesMarxism as "the scientific study of theevolution of the social organism." Kautskyhad, in fact, been a Darwinian beforebecoming a Marxist, and it is not withoutreason that his disciple Brill defined hismethod as “bio-historical materialism”...

4. An abstract and naturalistic conception ofthe "laws of history," strikingly illustrated bythe marvelous pronouncement of Plekhanovwhen he heard the news of the OctoberRevolution: "But it’s a violation of all thelaws of history!".

5. A tendency to relapse into the analyticalmethod, grasping only “distinct and separate"objects, fixed in their differences: Russia-Germany; bourgeois revolution-socialistrevolution; party-masses; minimumprogram-maximum program, etc. There is nodoubt that Kautsky and Plekhanov hadcarefully read and studied Hegel; but theyhad not, so to speak, "absorbed" and"digested" him into their theoretical systems,grounded on evolutionism and historicaldeterminism.

How far did Lenin’s notes on (or about)Hegel’s Logic constitute a challenge topredialectical Marxism?

1. First, Lenin insists on the philosophicalabyss separating "stupid," thatis,"metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude"materialism from Marxist materialism,which, on the contrary, is nearer to"intelligent," that is, dialectical, idealism.Consequently, he criticizes Plekhanovseverely for having written nothing onHegel’s Great Logic, "that is to say, basicallyon the dialectic as philosophical knowledge,"and for having criticized Kant from thestandpoint of vulgar materialism rather thanin the manner of Hegel [14].

2. He fully grasps the dialectical conceptionof causality : "Cause and effect, ergo, aremerely moments of universal reciprocaldependence, of (universal) connection, of thereciprocal connection of events. ..." At thesame time, he praises the dialectical processby which Hegel dissolves the "opposition ofsolid and abstract", of subjective and

objective, by destroying their one-sidedness[15].

3. He emphasizes the major differencebetween the vulgar evolutionist conception ofdevelopment and the dialectical one : "thefirst, [development as decrease and increase,as repetition] is lifeless, pale and dry; thesecond [development as a unity of opposites]alone furnishes the key to the ’leaps,’ to the’break in continuity,’ to the ’transformationinto the opposite,’ to the destruction of theold and emergence of the new." [16]

4. With Hegel, he struggles "against makingthe concept of law absolute, againstsimplifying it, against making a fetish of it"(and adds: "NB for modern physics!!!"). Hewrites likewise that "laws, all laws, arenarrow, incomplete, approximate." [17] 5. Hesees in the category of totality, in thedevelopment of the entire ensemble of themoments of reality, the essence of dialecticalcognition [18]. We can see the use Leninmade immediately of this methodologicalprinciple in the pamphlet he wrote at thetime, The Collapse of the SecondInternational (1915) : he submits to severecriticism the apologists of "nationaldefence"-who attempt to deny the imperialistcharacter of the Great War because of the"national factor" of the war of the Serbsagainst Austria-by underlining that Marx’sdialectic "correctly excludes any isolatedexamination of an object, i.e., one that is one-sided and monstrously distorted." [19]

Against the isolation, fixation, separation,and abstract opposition of different momentsof reality, Lenin insists in dissolving themthrough the category of totality, arguing alsothat "the dialectic is the theory which shows .. . why human understanding should not takecontraries as dead and petrified but as living,conditioned, mobile, interpenetrating eachother." [20]

What interests us here most is less thediscussion of the philosophical content ofLenin’s Notebooks of 1914-15 "in itself" thanthat of its political consequences : thesocialist-revolutionary conception developedby the Bolshevik leader in his “April Thesis”from 1917. It is not difficult to find the redthread leading from the category of totality to

Theory

the theory of the weakest link in theimperialist chain; from the inter-penetrationof opposites to the transformation of thedemocratic into the socialist revolution; fromthe dialectical conception of causality to therefusal to define the character of the RussianRevolution solely by Russia’s "economicallybackward base"; from the critique of vulgarevolutionism to the "break in continuity" in1917; and so on.

But the most important is quite simply thatthe critical reading, the materialist reading ofHegel had freed Lenin from the straitjacket ofthe pseudo-orthodox Marxism of the SecondInternational, from the theoretical limitationit imposed on his thinking. The study ofHegelian logic was the instrument by meansof which Lenin cleared the theoretical roadleading to the Finland Station of Petrograd,where he first announced “All the power tothe soviets”.

In March-April 1917, liberated from theobstacle represented by predialecticalMarxism, Lenin could, under the pressure ofevents, rid himself in good time of itspolitical corollary: the abstract and rigidprinciple according to which "The Russianrevolution could only be bourgeois, sinceRussia was not economically ripe for asocialist revolution." Once he crossed theRubicon, he applied himself to studying theproblem from a practical, concrete, andrealistic angle: what are the measures,constituting in fact the transition towardssocialism, that could be made acceptable tothe majority of the people, that is, the massesof the workers and peasants ? This is the roadwhich led to the October Revolution...

The philosophical work that best gaveexpression to the dialectics of revolution afterOctober 1917 was probably György Lukacs’History and Class consciousness (1923). Bydissolving the reified moments in thecontradictory process of the historicaltotality, and by emphasizing the unitybetween the subjective and the objective inthe revolutionary praxis, Lukacs was able todialectically supersede (Aufhebung) thetraditional oppositions between “ought” and«being”, values and reality, ethics andpolitics, final goal and immediatecircumstances, human will and material

conditions. Since this opus magnum ofMarxist dialectics in the XXth century is wellknown, I would like to add a few commentson another piece by Lukacs, only recentlydiscovered, Chvostismus und Dialektik .

For many years scholars and readerswondered why Lukacs never answered to theintense fire of criticism directed againstHistory and Class Consciousness (HCC)soon after its publication, particularly fromCommunist quarters. The recent discovery ofChvostismus und Dialektik - probablywritten around 1925 - in the former archivesof the Lenin Institute shows that this“missing link” existed : Lukacs did reply, in amost explicit and vigorous way, to theseattacks, and defended the main ideas of hishegelo-marxist masterpiece from 1923. Onemay consider this answer as the lastrevolutionary/marxist writing of theHungarian philosopher, just before a majorturn in his theoretical and political orientation- the philosophical “reconciliation withreality” proposed by his essay on Moses Hessfrom 1926 [21].

Chvostismus und Dialektik - Englishtranslation : Tailism and Dialectics - may beconsidered as a powerful exercise inrevolutionary dialectics, against the crypto-positivist brand of “Marxism” that was soonto become the official ideology of the Sovietbureaucracy. The key element in thispolemical battle is Lukacs’ emphasis on thedecisive revolutionary importance of thesubjective moment in the subject/objecthistorical dialectics.

If one had to summarize the value and thesignificance of Tailism and dialectics, Iwould argue that it is a powerfulhegelian/marxist apology of revolutionarysubjectivity. This motive runs like a redthread throughout the whole piece,particularly in its first part, but even, to someextent, in the second one too. Let us try tobring into evidence the main moments of thisargument. One could begin with themysterious term Chvostismus of the book’stitle - Lukacs never bothered to explain it,supposing that its - German ? Russian ? -readers were familiar with it. The word wasused by Lenin in his polemics - for instancein What is to be done ? - against those

“economistic Marxists” who “tail-end” thespontaneous labour movement. Lukacs,however, uses it in a much broaderhistoriosophical sense : Chvostismus meanspassively following - “tailing” - the“objective” course of events, while ignoringthe subjective/revolutionary moments of thehistorical process.

Lukacs denounces the attempt by Rudas andDeborin to transform Marxism into a“science” in the positivist, bourgeois sense.Deborin - an ex-Menshevik - tries, in aregressive move, to bring back historicalmaterialism “into the fold of Comte orHerbert Spencer” (auf Comte oder HerbertSpencer zurückrevidiert), a sort of bourgeoissociology studying transhistorical laws thatexclude all human activity. And Rudas placeshimself as a “scientific” observer of theobjective, law-bound course of history,whereby he can “anticipate” revolutionarydevelopments. Both regard as worthy ofscientific investigation only what is free ofany participation on the part of the historicalsubject, and both reject, in the name of this“Marxist” (in fact, positivist) science anyattempt to accord “an active and positive roleto a subjective moment in history”. [22] Thewar against subjectivism, argues Lukacs, isthe banner under which opportunism justifiesits rejection of revolutionary dialectics : itwas used by Bernstein against Marx and byKautsky against Lenin. In the name of anti-subjectivism, Rudas develops a fatalistconception of history, which includes only“the objective conditions”, but leaves noroom for the decision of the historical agents.In an article in Inprekor against Trotsky -criticised by Lukacs in T&D - Rudas claims


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Trosky, Lenin, Lukacs

György Lukacs


56

that the defeat of the Hungarian revolution of1919 was due only to “objective conditions”and not to any mistakes of the Communistleadership; he mentions both Trotsky andLukacs as examples of a one-sidedconception of politics which overemphasizesthe importance of proletarian classconsciousness [23]. While rejecting theaccusation of “subjective idealism”, Lukacsdoes not retract from his voluntaristviewpoint : in the decisive moments of thestruggle “everything depends on classconsciousness , on the conscious will of theproletariat” - the subjective component. Ofcourse, there is a dialectical interactionbetween subject and object in the historicalprocess, but in the crucial moment(Augenblick) of crisis, it gives the directionof the events, in the form of revolutionaryconsciousness and praxis. By his fatalistattitude, Rudas ignores praxis and develops atheory of passive “tail-ending”, consideringthat history is a process that “takes placeindependently of human consciousness”.

What is Leninism, argues Lukacs, if not thepermanent insistence on the “active andconscious rôle of the subjective moment” ?How could one imagine, “without thisfunction of the subjective moment”, Lenin’sconception of insurrection as an art?Insurrection is precisely the Augenblick, theinstant of the revolutionary process where“the subjective moment has a decisivepredominance (ein entscheidendesÜbergewicht)”.

In that instant, the fate of the revolution, andtherefore of humanity “depends on thesubjective moment”. This does not mean thatrevolutionaries should “wait” for the arrivalof this Augenblick : there is no moment in thehistorical process where the possibility of anactive rôle of the subjective moments iscompletely lacking [24]. In this context,Lukacs turns his critical weapons against oneof the main expressions of this positivist,“sociological”, contemplative, fatalist -chvostistisch in his terminology - andobjectivist conception of history : theideology of progress. Rudas and Deborinbelieve that the historical process is anevolution mechanistically and fatally leadingto the next stage. History is conceived,according to the dogmas of evolutionism, as

permanent advance, endless progress : thetemporally later stage is necessarily thehigher one in every respect.

From a dialectical viewpoint, however, thehistorical process is “not an evolutionary noran organic one”, but contradictory, jerkilyunfolding in advances and retreats [25].Unfortunately Lukacs does not develop thisinsights, that point towards a radical breakwith the ideology of inevitable progresscommon to Second and - after 1924 - ThirdInternational Marxism. Another importantaspect related to this battle against thepositivist degradation of Marxism is Lukacscritique, in the second part of the essay,against the views expressed by Rudas ontechnology and industry as an “objective”and neutral system of “exchange betweenhumans and nature”. This would mean,objects Lukacs, that there is an essentialidentity between the capitalist and thesocialist society !

In his viewpoint, revolution has to change notonly the relations of production but alsorevolutionize to a large extent the concreteforms of technology and industry existing incapitalism, since they are intimately linked tothe capitalist division of labour. In this issuetoo Lukacs was well ahead of his time, butthe suggestion remains undeveloped in hisessay [26].

Michael Löwy is Research Director in Sociology atthe CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research)in Paris. He is the author of many books, includingThe Marxism of Che Guevara, Marxism andLiberation Theology, Fatherland or Mother Earth?and The War of Gods: Religion and Politics in LatinAmerica.

NOTES

[1] Trotsky, My Life, New York, 1960, p. 119.

[2] See A.Labriola, La concepcion materialista de lahistoria (1897), La Habana, 1970, p. 115, 243

[3] See A.Labriola, La concepcion materialista de lahistoria (1897), La Habana, 1970, p. 115, 243



[6] Results and Prospects, p. 195.

[7] Ibid p. 168.

[8] Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, London,1965, vol. I, p. 427.

[9] I.Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, London, 1954, p. 161

[10] Quoted in R.Garaudy, Lenine, Paris, PUF, 1969, p. 40

[11] Lenin, Selected Works, vol . 3 p. 672, 667-668.

[12] George V. Plekhanov, Fundamental Problems ofMarxism (London, Martin Lawrence, n.d.) pp. 30-31. Cf.also pp. 21-22 : « Marx’s theory of cognition is directlyderived from Feuerbach’s. If you like, we can even saythat, strictly speaking, it is Feuerbach’s theory...given aprofounder meaning in a general way by Marx ».

[13] Karl Kautsky, The social revolution, Chicago,Charles Kerr, 1903, pp. 185-187 (translation modified)..

[14] Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks, pp. 179, 276, 277

[15] Ibid, pp. 159, 187, 260.

[16] Ibid. p. 360.

[17] Ibid. p. 151

[18] Ibid. pp. 157-158. See also pp. 171, 196, 218.

[19] Lenin, The Collapse of the Second International inCollected Works, vol. 21, p. 235.

[20] Lenin, Karl Marx, in CW, vol. 21, p.33.

[21] On the meaning of this work in Lukacs’s intellectualevolution, I refer to the last chapter of my book GeorgLukacs. From Romanticism to Bolshevism, London, NewLeft Books, 1980.

[22] G.Lukacs, Tailism and the dialectics, London, Verso,2000, pp. 50, 135, 137. Cf. the German original,Chvostismus und Dialektik, Budapest, Aron Verlag, 1996,p.9

[23] As John Ree very aptly comments, Rudas andDeborin stand in drect continuity with SecondInternational positivist/determinist Marxism : “In Rudas’mind, Trotsky and Lukacs are linked because they bothstress the importance of the subjective factor in therevolution. Rudas steps forth as a defender of the‘objective conditions’ which guranteed that the revolutionwas bound to fail. The striking similarity with KarlKautsky’s review of Korsch’s Marxism and Philosophy, inwhich he attributes the failure of the German revolution tojust such objective conditions, is striking testimony to thepersistence of vulgar Marxism among the emergingStalinist bureaucracy”. (“Introduction” to T&D pp. 24-25)

[24] G.Lukacs, T&D pp. 48, 54-58, 62. Cf. Chvostismusund Dialektik p. 16. Emphasis in the original. Of course,this argument is mainly developed in the first chapter ofthe first part of the essay, which has the explicit title“Subjectivism”; but one can find it also in other parts ofthe document.

[25] T&D pp.55, 78, 105.

[26] T&D pp. 134-135.

Theory

Bertolt Brecht once wrote a poem aboutLuxemburg after she had been dealt with byright-wing death squads in 1919:

Red Rosa now has vanished too.

Where she lies is hid from view.

She told the poor what life is about.

And so now the rich have rubbed her out. [2]

And yet, again and again since her death, thespirit and ideas of Red Rosa have returned. Inour own time, however, especially with the20th century’s final decade, there have beenrenewed and incredibly powerful efforts torub out Rosa Luxemburg altogether, as partof a well-orchestrated effort to see thatMarxism itself be made to vanish as a forcethat can be used for understanding andchanging the world.

The only way to bring this wonderfulcomrade to life is to refuse to be content withsimply “honoring her memory” or withdetailing her ideas as if we were placing thecorpses of butterflies in a glass case. Rather,we must embrace - as critically and honestlyas we can - the challenge of her ideas for ourown time. This challenge (and especially thechallenge of revolutionary democracy) ispoignantly relevant to all countries, fromRussia to Poland, from Germany to theUnited States, from Japan to China to India,from South Africa to Cuba to Brazil. RosaLuxemburg and revolutionary Marxism live

to the extent that they are absorbed into ourown thoughts and actions as we struggleagainst oppressive realities of our own time.

Luxemburg stands as a powerful challenge toa number of false conceptions very prevalenttoday regarding both Marxism anddemocracy. Among the most powerful andinfluential ideologists in the world today arethose who tell us that the market economyand democracy (that is, capitalism and ruleby the people) historically and naturallydevelop hand-in-hand, and that it is notpossible, for any length of time, to have onewithout the other. If Rosa Luxemburg werehere today, she would argue incisively andpersuasively - as she did in her own time -that this is a lie. There is also the myth,propagated by pro-capitalist propagandists aswell as all too many would-be Communists,that socialism is something to be broughtabout through authoritarian measures.

We should deal with these two myths one ata time.

The natural development of the marketeconomy, of capitalism (regardless ofwhether one views it as in some wayspositive or “progressive”) is certainlyauthoritarian. It is based upon, and it furtherenhances, inequality of economic power,which naturally generates an inequality ofpolitical power. There is nothing soauthoritarian as a capitalist workplace, whosefunction is to manage the exploitation oflarge numbers of workers, and this is so

regardless of whether that authoritarianismassumes either brutal or benign postures. Andthe capitalist marketplace functions,primarily, not to meet the needs of the greatmajority of the people (the consumers) butrather to maximize the profits of the smallminority that owns and controls theeconomy.[3]

If she were here, Luxemburg would alsofocus our attention on the actual dynamics ofcapitalist development in Central and EasternEurope - the Germany, Poland, and Russiawith which she was so familiar. There, for themost part, the capitalist class, sensing agreater kinship with the elites above themthan with the masses below them, deferred toand intertwined with the traditional elites thatwere inclined to maintain authoritarianism asthe political framework within which themarket economy and industrialmodernization would be allowed toflourish.[4]

Red Rosa would point out to us - as she didin her own day - that democracy can beadvanced only through the struggles of thegrowing working-class majority, onlythrough the self-organization of workingpeople through mass movements for socialand political reform, through strong,independent, democratic trade unions,through democratic mass working-classparties. Historically, it was not the normalfunctioning of the capitalist market, butrather the mass pressure and mass struggle of


57

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The Challenge of Revolutionary Democracy inthe Life and Thought of Rosa LuxemburgPaul Le Blanc

Rosa Luxemburg’s life and intelligence have illuminated thehuman experience and inspired many people who have reachedfor a better world. Many of her insights and inclinations seemto place her in advance, on certain essential matters, of certainco-thinkers or partial co-thinkers who, like her, are also centralto the Marxist tradition - whether Kautsky, or Lenin, or Trotsky.This comes through, I think, in the way she talks about thenatural world, in her sense of kinship with other creatures ofthis planet, in her open and penetrating engagement withhuman dignity and human suffering, in her often luminouslysensual formulations and turns of phrase, and also in herwonderful humor. Her writings are incredibly alive. [1]

Rosa Luxemburg at SPD rally, 1900


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the working class movement and its alliesthat paved the way, step-by-step, for theexpansion of democratic rights, democraticreforms, and democratic politicalstructures.[5]

At the same time, Luxemburg was insistentthat capitalism and democracy areincompatible, that in multiple ways thenatural functioning of the capitalist market-place and of the capitalist class result inproliferating restrictions, manipulations,corruptions, erosions that undermine thegains of the working-class and prevent (andmust always prevent) the blossoming of afully democratic society. And she was critical(and would be critical now) of currents in thelabor and socialist movements which deny orforget that capitalism and democracy areincompatible.

Luxemburg also observed - and brilliantlyanalyzed - the powerful expansionisttendencies of capitalism. These resulted inthe invasion of more and more portions of theglobe, violating the cultures, the quality oflife, and the self-determination ofinnumerable peoples for the benefit ofcapitalist enterprises that were compelled toreach for ever-expanding markets, rawmaterials, and investment opportunities. Thisauthoritarian process of global capitalaccumulation, defined as imperialism, wasalso dependent on the expansion ofexceptionally authoritarian militarymachines. The aggressive expansionism andgrowing militarism would, as Luxemburg socorrectly predicted, result in violentcatastrophes (colonial wars, world wars, andmore) in which the masses of people wouldpay the price, for the benefit of wealthy andpowerful elites. She warned that suchdevelopments might also whirl out of controland threaten the future of civilizationitself.[6]

Against this triumph of authoritarianism,violence, and death, Luxemburg passionatelystruggled for the socialist alternative. In herview, the socialist movement had proved tobe the most consistent force for democracy inthe world - a view which has receivedconsiderable support from knowledgeableand serious historians in recent years. Morethan this, she viewed socialism quite simplyas an expanded, deepened, authenticdemocracy - genuine rule by the people inboth the political and economic life ofsociety. Her notion of a workers’ state (whathas sometimes been called “dictatorship ofthe proletariat”) had nothing to do with a one-party dictatorship ruling in the name of the

people. Rather it meant what Marx andEngels said in the Communist Manifestowhen they spoke of the working classwinning the battle of democracy, what Leninmeant in The State and Revolution, when hespoke of a thorough-going political rule bythe working class. This was in contrast to theauthoritarian political forms that began todevelop all-too-soon in the wake of the1917Russian Revolution. [7]

Luxemburg was an early critic of thisdevelopment, challenging Lenin and theBolsheviks - whom she held in high esteem -to pull back from their dangerouslyexpansive justifications for the undemocraticemergency measures that were adopted in theface of both internal counter-revolutionaryassaults and a global capitalist counter-offensive. “Freedom only for the supportersof the government, only for the members ofone party - however numerous they may be -is no freedom at all,” she insisted. “Freedomis always and exclusively freedom for the onewho thinks differently.” In her propheticwarning she elaborated:

Without general elections, withoutunrestricted freedom of press and assembly,without a free struggle of opinion, life diesout in every public institution, becomes amere semblance of life, in which only thebureaucracy remains as the active element.Public life gradually falls asleep, a few dozenparty leaders of inexhaustible energy andboundless experience direct and rule. Amongthem, in reality only a dozen outstandingheads do the leading and an elite of theworking class is invited from time to time tomeetings where they are to applaud thespeeches of the leaders, and to approveproposed resolutions unanimously - atbottom, then, a clique affair - a dictatorship,to be sure, not the dictatorship of theproletariat, however, but only the dictatorshipof a handful of politicians ... [8]

Luxemburg was also profoundly critical ofauthoritarian developments of a different sortinside her own Social-Democratic Party ofGermany. An increasingly powerful tendencyinside the party and trade union leadershipwas arguing that the gradual accumulation ofreforms - to painlessly erase capitalism’sworst features - would be a better path forachieving socialist goals. Luxemburgresponded that it was not possible to choosedifferent paths to socialism in the same waythat one might choose either spicy sausagesor mild sausages in the market. The reformistpath, she prophetically insisted, would notlead gradually to socialism at all, but to the

gradual accommodation and subjugation ofthe socialist movement to the authoritarianproclivities, the brutal realities, and theviolent dynamics of the capitalist system.Even though vital gains could be won for theworking class through struggles for reforms,this would be like the labor of Sisyphus - thestrong man in the ancient Greek myth whotime after time would roll a heavy boulder upa steep hill, only to have the gods roll it backdown again. So would the natural dynamicsof capitalism time after time outflank anderode the reforms won by the labormovement. [9]

Luxemburg taught that in order to remaintrue to its democratic and socialist principles,and in order to defend the material interestsof the workers and the oppressed, thesocialist workers’ movement - even whilefighting for necessary and life-giving partialreforms - would sometimes find itself inuncompromising confrontation with thecapitalist power structure. What she and herrevolutionary-minded comrades found,however, is that the increasinglybureaucratized structure of their own socialistworkers’ movement was becoming anobstacle to the internal democracy of themovement. The increasingly bureaucratic-conservative leadership of the trade unionsand party more and more sought to containradicalizing impulses of the working-classmembership, to limit the ability of peoplesuch as Luxemburg to present a revolutionarysocialist perspective, to deflect upsurges inthe class struggle into safely moderatechannels. They sought to maintain thereformist strategy that they sincerely believedwas more “practical,” but which was, in fact,entwining the labor movement into theauthoritarian structures and disastrousdirections of the capitalist status quo. [10]

Rosa Luxemburg was quite clear that themajority of the people - and the working classas such - were by no means uniformly orconsistently inclined to go in a revolutionaryor socialist direction. She saw political andsocial consciousness among the masses ofpeople as incredibly deep and diverse,contradictory, shifting and changing, tendingto go in one direction at one point and then ina very different direction soon after. Theoppressive and sometimes horrific nature ofcapitalist development, however, whencombined with the clear and capablearticulation of perspectives of class-struggleand socialism, could sometimes causedramatic upsurges - what she called massstrikes, or mass actions, that would often take

Theory

place outside of existing structures of thelabor movement. She saw this, in part, asessential in the creation of militant new tradeunions and other organizations of the workersand oppressed, although its implications wentfurther. Luxemburg had no desire to deny theimportance of the day-to-day work of theexisting trade unions and of the votes cast bythe socialist representatives elected toGermany’s parliament. But a movementcapable of actually attaining socialism mustgo beyond this. It was essential, she believed,that a proliferation of possibilities be found toengage more and more people in action, inexperience that would deepen their ownunderstanding and commitment and skills,that would enhance their own confidence andcreativity, as well as their ability to inspireand win ever more workers to therevolutionary cause. [11]

And this understanding was central for her asa revolutionary strategist, distinguishing herfrom the dominant leadership of the GermanSocial-Democratic Party. Luxemburg gavegreat weight to so-called “extra-parliamentary” social struggles, and to adynamic interplay between existingorganizations and spontaneous mass action.This frightened her less revolutionarycomrades. She put it this way:

As bred-in-the-bone disciples ofparliamentary cretinism, these German socialdemocrats have sought to apply torevolutions the homemade wisdom of theparliamentary nursery: in order to carryanything, you must first have a majority. Thesame, they say, applies to the revolution: firstlet’s become a “majority.” The true dialecticof revolutions, however, stands this wisdomon its head: not through a majority torevolutionary tactics, but throughrevolutionary tactics to a majority - that is theway the road runs. Only a party which knowshow to lead, that is, to advance things, winssupport in stormy times. [12]

For Luxemburg there was a remarkableconsistency between this revolutionary-democratic strategic perspective and herrevolutionary-democratic vision of socialism.Here is how she put it:

Bourgeois class rule has no need of thepolitical training and education of the entiremass of the people, at least not beyondcertain narrow limits. But for the proletariandictatorship that is the life element, the veryair without which it is not able to exist. ...Only experience is capable of correcting andopening new ways. Only unobstructed,

effervescing life falls into a thousand newforms and improvisations, brings to lightcreative force, itself corrects all mistakenattempts. ... The whole mass of the peoplemust take part. ... Socialism in life demands acomplete spiritual transformation in themasses degraded by centuries of class rule.Social instincts in place of egotistical ones,mass initiative in place of inertia, idealismwhich conquers all suffering. ... The only wayto a rebirth is the school of public life itself,the most unlimited, the broadest democracyand public opinion. [13]

It is obvious that such genuine democracy asRosa Luxemburg believed in cannot bebestowed on a people through charismaticleaders, through well-meaning revolutionaryelites, through single-party dictatorships,through labor bureaucracies, through glitzyelection campaigns financed by big-businessinterests, and certainly not through militaryinvasions from powerful outsiders. It must bewon through the accumulation of experienceand struggles, also the proliferation ofseasoned activists and democraticorganizations, and the consequent rise ofconsciousness and revolutionary-democraticcommitment among the masses of the peoplethemselves, especially the immense majorityof those who labor. [14]

And people such as ourselves, of course,must face the difficult question of whetherwe want to help advance such a process, andif so, how.

Paul Le Blanc has for many years been a teacherand activist in Pittsburgh. His writings include "Leninand the Revolutionary Party" and "A Short History ofthe US Working Class".

NOTES

[1] An exploration of the Marxist tradition, and in part ofLuxemburg’s place within it, is offered in Paul Le Blanc,From Marx to Gramsci, A Reader in the RevolutionaryMarxist Politics (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: HumanitiesPress, 1996), with further elaboration in Paul Le Blanc,Rosa Luxemburg, Reflections and Writings (Amherst, NY:Humanity Books, 1999). Key texts on this and relatedmatters are Paul Frolich, Rosa Luxemburg, Her Life andWork (New York: Monthly Review, 1972) and NormanGeras, The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg (London: Verso,1983). The most recent English-language anthology ofLuxemburg’s writings is also well worth consulting - TheRosa Luxemburg Reader, ed. by Peter Hudis and Kevin B.Anderson (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004).

[2] Quoted in Wendy Forrest, Rosa Luxemburg (London:Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 61.

[3] See, for example, Rosa Luxemburg, “What IsEconomics?” in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. by Mary-Alice Waters (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), 220-249.

[4] Relevant here are Arno J. Mayer, The Persistence ofthe Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (New York:Pantheon Books, 1981), and Peter Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg,Abridged Edition (New York: Oxford University Press,1969), 72-74, 304-305.

[5] The centrality of democracy in Marxism has been well-established for some time - see, for example, MichaelLowy, The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005), Richard N. Hunt, ThePolitical Ideas of Marx and Engels, 2 vols. (Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974, 1984), and August H.Nimtz, Jr., Marx and Engels, Their Contribution to theDemocratic Breakthrough (Albany: New York StateUniversity Press, 2000). On the centrality of Marxist-influenced political movements for the advance ofdemocracy, see Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne HuberStephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Developmentand Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1992), and Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy: The Historyof the Left in Europe, 1850-2000 (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2002).

[6] Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), and “TheJunius Pamphlet: The Crisis and the German SocialDemocracy,” in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, 261-331.

[7] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “Manifesto of theCommunist Party,” in Le Blanc, From Marx to Gramsci,143; Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “The State and Revolution,”in Selected Works, Vol. 2 (New York: internationalPublishers, 1967, 343-345.

[8] “The Russian Revolution,” in Rosa LuxemburgSpeaks, 389, 391.

[9] The points on sausages and Sisyphus can be found inLuxemburg’s “Reform or Revolution” in Rosa LuxemburgSpeaks, 71, 77. Her growing critique of the orientation ofthe Social-Democratic leadership can be seen in “TheMass Strike, the Political Party, and the Trade Unions” inRosa Luxemburg Speaks, 155-218, in the excerpt of“Theory and Practice” in Le Blanc, Rosa Luxemburg, 139-174 (a slightly different excerpt is in The Rosa LuxemburgReader, 208-231), and correspondence to be found inStephen Eric Bronner, ed., The Letters of RosaLuxemburg, Second Edition (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:Humanities Press, 1993), 129, 149, 179, 294-295.

[10] See Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917: The Development of the Great Schism (New York:Wiley, 1955).

[11] These perspectives are elaborated in sources cited infootnote 9 above, as well as in Luxemburg’s “Speech tothe Founding Convention of the German CommunistParty” in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, 405-427.

[12] “The Russian Revolution” in Rosa LuxemburgSpeaks, 374.

[13] Ibid., 389-391. Also see “The Socialization ofSociety,” in The Rosa Luxemburg Reader, 346-348.

[14] One recent effort pushing in this direction is the lateDaniel Singer’s final work, Whose Millennium? Theirs orOurs? (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999). Anothercan be found in materials by Eveline Wittich, Paul LeBlanc, Ottakar Luban, Thomas Deve, and Lindsey Collenin a conference of scholars and activists organized bySouth Africa’s Anti-War Movement and the Johannesburgoffice of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation - Militarism andWar: Rosa Luxemburg Political Education Seminar 2004(Johannesburg, South Africa: Khanya College Publishing,2005).


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Before the “rise of the West” driven by theemergence of capitalism and particularly theincredible engine of the IndustrialRevolution, the more dominant aspect ofworld history seems to have involved aprocess of “Southernization” - involving theextensive diffusion of cultural, economic,social, and political influences from portionsof southern Asia and the Middle East(including throughout Europe). In addition,even after the beginning of the“Westernization” process, the dynamics ofhistorical development in the variouscountries and cultures of the global South aremarked both by a some-time relativeautonomy that challenges Westernconceptualizations. But more, there is anobvious, ongoing, and accelerating impact,influence, and interpenetration of the culturesof the global South with those of “the West”(or North), a global transformative process.

An important conceptual tool for respondingto such dynamics is the theory of uneven andcombined development formulated by LeonTrotsky as a contribution to the rich body ofMarxist analysis. Trotsky’s theory will beelaborated and utilized in this essay, andwhile a European focus is adopted here,consistent with the “Westernization” model,it is seen simply as an initial and incompleteeffort to suggest the general applicability ofTrotsky’s theorization, a theorization mostconsistent with a more rounded account ofglobal history than is proved here.

From the 15th through the mid-19thcenturies, a fundamental transformation tookplace in Europe - a transformation based onthe shift from one economic system toanother, from one mode of production toanother, a shift from feudalism to capitalism.The manner in which this shift took place,and the consequences of the shift, set intomotion a number of historical dynamicswhich shaped the modern world and which -among other things - resulted in calamities ofthe 20th century: the collision ofimperialisms, two world wars thatsandwiched the Great Depression, the riseand fall of fascism, the haunting specter ofCommunism, momentous struggles anddeath camps and labor camps and shattereddreams, with the Cold War threat of nuclearoverkill fading into a new global order. Thisparticular presentation will trace in broadstrokes a general interpretative framework inwhich, hopefully, we can make better senseof the welter of experiences and the swirl ofevents that constitute the history of modernEurope.

1. The Uneven Transition toCapitalism

The concept of the mode of productionconsists of two interlinked elements - theforces of production and the relations ofproduction. The forces of production includesuch things as raw materials, tools, andsources of energy (taken together, thesethings - raw materials, tools, energy sources -

are known as the means of production) plushuman labor-power, that can combine thesemeans of production in such a way that createthe products which make it possible forindividuals and society as a whole to surviveand develop. Those are the productive forces:the means of production (raw materials andtechnology) plus labor. The relations ofproduction are constituted by the economicownership of the means of production, andcontrol over the labor force - and this can bereferred to as the class relations in society.

The old feudal mode of production wasprimarily agricultural, in which the twoprincipal classes were the powerful warriorstratum, the so-called nobility, and thelaboring peasants, who worked the land butwere compelled to surrender to the nobleseither portions of their labor or the product oftheir labor over and above what was neededfor peasant family subsistence. In return, thenobility was expected to provide protectionand assistance to the peasantry. Thetraditionalist ideology that dominated feudalsociety involved a vision of divinely-createdsocial orders, divided between those whoprayed (the clergy), those who fought (thenobility, or feudal lords), and those whoworked (the peasants, who were oftentransformed into serfs - that is, forced to stayon the land under the control of the lords). Inthis organic view of society, the three socialorders (or estates) were mutually supportiveand had defined roles - outside of which noone born or appointed to a particular order

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Uneven and Combined Development and the Sweep of History:Focus on EuropePaul Le Blanc

It is often rationalized that a European bias in the study ofworld history makes sense because in modern times that historycan best be comprehended as a process of “Westernization” -the growing dominance of capitalism in the global economiesof our planet, the gradual and accelerating crystallization of aunified global economy, with accompanying spread of Western(i.e., European) cultural, social, and political models andnorms. While there is a strong element of validity to this, it alsocan introduce substantial distortions of the historical process.

Diego Rivera’s vision of Tenochtitlan, Mayan city of canals on thesite of today’s Mexico City, destroyed by the conquistadors

must step. To do so would be a violation ofsocial stability, of the way things weresupposed to be, and of God’s will.

A transitional period of several centuries sawthe erosion of this system, as internationaltrade created a growing market for productscoming from one or another area. More andmore, goods were produced not simply forimmediate consumption by lords and priestsand peasants, but for the purpose of exchangeat the market place. To facilitate suchexchange, a money economy becameincreasingly important, and the feudal rulingclasses became increasingly caught up in it.The notion of property and property rightstransformed feudal relations, with the noblestransforming themselves into a landowningaristocracy who came to consider their ownprivate property the lands traditionallyoccupied by the peasantry.

There was a growing tendency for thisaristocracy to exploit their peasants moreseverely, through feudal dues and rents, inorder to accumulate greater wealth andluxuries. This generated peasant rebellions insome cases. In other cases, peasants fled theland. Sometimes peasants were driven out bylandowners who sought more profitable usesof the land, such as raising sheep to providewool for the growing textile trade.

New classes began to emerge, particularly ingrowing urban areas (or burgs). The burgers -or bourgeois - were largely what came to beknown as businessmen, or capitalists. Therewere those who invested money in trade (orcommerce, the activity of the merchants) inorder to make a profit, buying productsplentiful in one area to sell for a higher priceto those in need of them in another area.Some of these merchants were able toaccumulate enough money in this way tobecome financiers - financing variousprojects undertaken by merchants andaristocrats, making loans at interest. Othermerchants of more modest means establishedsmall shops, taverns, and inns. Along withthese commercial and financial capitalists,these arose a growing stratum of producers -artisans and craftsmen, stratified intoapprentices, journeymen, and master-craftsmen, and originally organized intoguilds representing various skilled trades.

Less fortunate but increasing in number wereunpropertied and unskilled laborers, blurringinto the destitute mass of the urban poor.With the passage of time, some capitalistsincreasingly shifted from a focus incommerce and finance to manufacturing -hiring craftsmen and laborers to producecommodities that would be appropriated bythe capitalist and sold at a profit. More andmore things became commodities - products

to be sold at the marketplace - includinghuman labor-power.

All of this subverted the feudal order. So didthe new ideas that began to develop.Individualistic, experimental, scientific andrationalist orientations came to compete withthe traditionalist faith-based and supernaturalideologies. This helped to generate, and wasin turn further stimulated by, newdevelopments in knowledge and technology.This trend has been identified with “the Ageof Reason” and “the Enlightenment,”reflecting a different way of thinkingconnected with a different way of life. A newmode of production, and new ideologicalperspectives, were gaining power.

The feudal order evolved under the impact ofall this. Previously, limited communicationsand transportation systems and the localizednature of the feudal economic units hadmeant that effective rule could only beexercised over a relatively small area. Butremarkable changes in technology and theconnection of more and more areas by thecapitalistic marketplace changed this. Notonly had it become possible to rule overincreasingly large areas, but the needs ofcapitalist economic development createdstrong pressures to do so. Certain powerfulsections (or factions) of the feudal nobilitysought to take advantage of the newpossibilities by establishing centralizedmonarchies, consolidating nation-statesunder absolutist rule.

In those sections of Europe where suchmonarchist nation-states took shape, aconsiderable amount of power wasconcentrated into the hands of absolutistmonarchs.

In those sections of Europe where suchmonarchist nation-states took shape, aconsiderable amount of power wasconcentrated into the hands of absolutistrulers. But the result was fraught withtensions between different modes ofproduction, between widely differing socialclasses, between different factions withinthose classes, and between divergentideological orientations. All of this washeightened by dramatic complicationsresulting from the development of the marketeconomy - significant fluctuations in prices,economic rivalry between nations (whichgenerated costly military expenditures andwars), and monetary policies by absolutistrulers that generated debts and taxes at levelsthat would have been unimaginable in earliercenturies.

Increasingly, rival factions within thearistocracy and within the bourgeoisie soughtto enhance their power against each other and

against monarchist absolutism by appealingto and mobilizing the lower middle classes(artisans and shopkeepers) as well as theurban and even rural poor. This greatlycontributed to the ideological ferment - evenmore so when, in some cases, the newly-politicized masses began to slip away fromupper-class influence and develop even moreradical notions of their own. What’s more,the growth of towns and cities, with dynamicurban populations, was to create centers ofsocial, intellectual and revolutionary fermentthat would provide leadership for futuretransformations.

A series of revolutionary upheavals resultedfrom this profoundly unstable situation.Revolutions in the Netherlands and Englandin the 1600s resulted in a new political andsocial synthesis in those countries. Thisculminated in non-absolutist - limited -monarchies and the triumph of the capitalistmode of production.

In France, however, the revolutionaryexplosion of 1789-93 was dramatically moreviolent and far-reaching. The monarchysought the implementation of modest reformsthat would ease social tensions in a mannerthat would help preserve the power of themonarchy. In contrast, an alliance ofaristocrats and moderate bourgeois elements,with support from the peasantry and theurban masses, sought to introduce politicaland social reforms that would ease socialtensions in France while bringing an end tomonarchist absolutism. But thecontradictions in French society were toogreat, and the resulting social crisis toosevere, to be solved by mild reforms and half-way measures. In the face of risingexpectations and deepening radicalization ofthe masses, not only was the authority of thecrown overwhelmed, but the newaristocrat/bourgeois alliance was swept away.The power of the king was smashed, and asuccession of moderately revolutionaryleaderships were violently cast aside in theface of the increasingly revolutionarymomentum of the masses. The mostradicalized and politically conscious sectionsof the masses wanted a thoroughgoingpolitical democracy and a social order inwhich freedom, equality and brotherhoodwould be a living reality.

Although the revolutionary masses of France- covered by the catch-all term “the people” -were uncompromisingly anti-feudal,however, they were composed ofcontradictory class elements, and this made itimpossible for a similar consensus to formaround a clear program that would bringabout a realization of the most radical of theirstated goals. “The people” (that is, peasants,artisans, shopkeepers, laborers, some


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capitalist manufacturers, and more) may havebeen united in their dissatisfaction with theold order, but they had different conceptionsof precisely what would be the virtues of thenew order. This, combined with economicdislocations, civil war, and foreign invasions,paved the way for confusion and murderousin-fighting among the revolutionary leaders.In this context, the radicalizing momentum ofthe French Revolution was cut short, givingway, from 1794 through 1799, to asuccession of rightward-moving and corruptdictatorships, and finally the military coup ofNapoleon Bonaparte.

2. Uneven and CombinedDevelopment to 1850

The French Revolution is often seen as thehigh-point of bourgeois-democraticrevolution. This is defined as a revolutionthat sweeps away the vestiges of the feudalmode of production, clearing the way for thefull development of capitalism, replacingmonarchist-absolutism with a popular andrepresentative form of government.

In the course of the 19th century, thecapitalist mode of production triumphedthroughout Europe. Yet the transformationtook place in a manner that was qualitativelydifferent from the form it took in France - andif we understand why that was the case, we’llalso be able to grasp one of the central keysfor explaining the subsequent history ofEurope.

There is an obvious and simple law of historythat has profoundly important consequences.This is the law of uneven development:different areas and different countries are justthat - different. While all of Europe had beendominated by some variety of feudalism, andwhile all of Europe was affected by thedevelopment of the capitalist market, thedifferent regions had their own particularcharacteristics. For various reasons,technological and cultural and ideologicalinnovations arose first in one area and thenhad an impact on other areas at differenttimes - leading to uneven development in thehistory of Europe as a whole.

This leads to another historical law whichwas expressed most clearly by Russianrevolutionary theorist Leon Trotsky in thisway: “Unevenness, the most general law ofthe historic process, reveals itself mostsharply and complexly in the destiny ofbackward countries. Under the whip ofexternal necessity their backward culture iscompelled to make leaps. From the universallaw of unevenness thus derives another lawwhich, for the lack of a better name, we maycall the law of combined development - bywhich we mean a drawing together of the

different stages of the journey, a combiningof separate steps, an amalgam of archaic withmore contemporary forms.”

This law of uneven and combineddevelopment guaranteed that the dynamics ofthe bourgeois-democratic revolution, and thetransition to a capitalist social order, wouldbe quite different in other parts of Europe andin later periods than had been the case inFrance at the end of the 18th century.

The traditional, aristocratic ruling classes ofCentral, Eastern, and Southern Europe verymuch felt what Trotsky called “the whip ofexternal necessity.” This took several forms.One was the dangerous example of theFrench Revolution that could potentiallybecome a model for their own discontentedclasses. Some traditionalists undoubtedlywanted to deal with this through increasedrepression, pure and simple - favoringreactionary policies that would prevent anychanges in the forms and norms of the oldsocial order. There were, however, threeother “whips of external necessity” whichthwarted such an easy “solution.”

Most important was the Industrial Revolutionthat was unleashed by the capitalist economicdevelopment of Western Europe. Such amighty generator of material wealth andpower could hardly be shrugged off. Relatedto this was the fact that the traditional rulingclasses - despite their feudal origins andinclinations - had themselves, for well over acentury, been inescapably seduced by andentangled in the world capitalist economy.These two interrelated “whips” (the progressof the Industrial Revolution and thetraditional ruling classes’ own involvement inthe world capitalist economy) made itimpossible to return to an earlier feudal“golden age.” The traditionalists were,instead, compelled to adapt to a profoundlychanging social order. A third “whip ofexternal necessity” was provided by theFrench invasions during the Napoleonic warsthat spanned the first 15 years of the 19thcentury.

France’s capitalist economy was moreefficient and dynamic, unencumbered bysemi-feudal restrictions and forged into acohesive national unit. This was alsoreflected in the superior military capabilitiesof Napoleon’s armies - in which the inertia ofaristocratic privilege had been replaced withsweeping organizational, technological andtactical innovations combined withperformance-based incentives offered to allregardless of social station. This had twoeffects. First, Napoleon’s forces overran mostof Europe and instituted social, economic,and political reforms in those areas, reformsthat were designed to facilitate their

absorption into a French-dominated socialorder - Napoleon’s French Empire. Secondly,the traditionalists came to realize that if theywere to cope successfully in the modernworld with a challenge such as that posed byNapoleon, then - at least for military reasons- they themselves would have to initiate some“modernization” reforms in their ownsocieties.

An additional impulse for instituting suchreforms (or for maintaining some of theNapoleonic reforms even after the ultimatedefeat of Bonaparte in 1815) was provided bya desire to de-fuse the kinds of middle-classand lower-class discontents that hadgenerated the earlier revolutionaryexplosions in France.

Even with the old ruling classes’ grudgingadaptation to some aspects of capitalist“modernization,” however, theirdetermination to maintain as muchmonarchist power and aristocratic privilegeas possible was destined to generate a waveof revolutionary explosions throughoutEurope in 1848. But the law of uneven andcombined development ensured that theseexplosions would assume different forms andhave different consequences than had beenthe case during the French Revolution. Tounderstand this, we must grasp the newsociological and ideological realities of the1840s.

The further development of capitalism - andespecially of industrial capitalism - resultedin a growing divergence among the newsocial classes throughout Europe’s cities andtowns. What had been simply “the people” inrevolutionary France became increasingly thesharply defined, self-conscious and oftenopenly antagonistic classes of capitalistemployers on the one hand and proletarianwage-workers on the other. In-between was amiddle stratum of independent artisans andsmall shopkeepers, impelled by the dynamicsof the capitalist marketplace but also on theverge of being ruined by larger capitalistenterprises. This three-layered class structurein the urban areas - bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie, and proletariat - did not form acohesive revolutionary mass such as hadexisted in Paris of 1789, but rather an uneasyalliance in the struggle against semi-feudalabsolutism. In the rural areas there were largelandowners and various peasant strata - theformer more often than not constituting abackward-looking aristocracy, while thepeasant masses (who were a majority ofEuropeans) were often inclined towardtraditionalist values and hostile to urban-capitalist pressures, but also inclined to berevolutionary if this could satisfy their deephunger for land and dignity.

Theory

Three fundamental ideological currents tookshape in the first half of the 19th century:liberalism, conservatism, and socialism.

Liberalism favored the new capitalist orderand sought to eliminate old feudal restrictionsand hierarchies, seeking instead to facilitateequal opportunity for all. In its classical form,and throughout most of the 19th century,liberalism favored economic policies oflaissez-faire, convinced that wealth andprogress would be guaranteed if the state putno restrictions on the decisions of thecapitalists on how to run the economy. (Bythe 20th century the liberal mainstreamwould come to favor a more activeintervention of the state in the economy,presumably to reform and regulate capitalismfor its own good.) Committed to freedom ofthought and expression, and the separation ofchurch and state, liberalism was inclinedtoward Enlightenment rationalism as a guideto political reform, favoring the creation ofconstitutional republics. Throughout much ofthe 19th century, however, a majority ofliberals did not favor a democratic republic -fearing that giving propertyless masses theright to vote would create a “tyranny of themajority” that would overturn capitalistproperty rights. At first, it was only the mostradical fringe of this political current thatfavored moving forward to democracy.

Conservatism accepted the new capitalistorder but resisted impulses toward equalopportunity and the upsetting of traditionalhierarchies. Often counterposing traditionalvalues and cultural norms to the intellectualinnovations of the Enlightenment, itchallenged optimistic notions about thepossibilities of progress and humanbetterment - yet its adherents were mostconcerned about conserving the traditionalpower relations associated with prevailingmonarchs and aristocratic elites. Essentiallyanti-democratic, it often favored freedom ofthought and expression only for the elite, andwas inclined to keep the masses in theirplaces through a combination of restrictiveand benevolent policies by a more or lessauthoritarian central government. Asparliamentary systems and the right to votespread through Europe in the 19th and early20th centuries, of course, forms ofconservatism evolved that more or lessaccepted and adapted to these changes.

Socialism challenged the new capitalistorder, wanting to eliminate both the oldfeudal restrictions and hierarchies and thenew capitalist restrictions and hierarchies. Itheld that equal opportunity would be possibleonly through the collective ownership of theeconomy, and that freedom of thought andexpression could only be guaranteed by aradical democracy that encompassed not only

the politics but also the economic life ofsociety. Some of the earliest theorists ofsocialism imagined a utopian future whoseblueprints they wished to somehow imposeon humanity for its own good. By the mid-19th century, however, it becameincreasingly identified as a goal to beachieved and shaped by society’s laboringmajority. (At various times, conceptions ofcommunism and anarchism tended to beidentified with this broad current.)

Elements from various classes could befound in each political camp, and notsurprisingly, many people of various classbackgrounds - particularly among the hard-pressed lower classes - identified with nopolitical current at all. The fact remains that,roughly speaking, in 19th century Europeliberalism found its most consistent baseamong the rising bourgeoisie, conservatismfound its most consistent base among thesections of the aristocracy that were adaptingto capitalism, and socialism found its mostconsistent base among the working class. Atdifferent times and in different places,elements of the peasantry were drawn to oneor another of these basic currents.

Given this sociological and ideological line-up, it may be easier to understand thedifferences between the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1789 and that of1848. In the case of the latter, I will focus onone major example - that of Germany.

If we examine the events of 1789-93 inFrance, we see - amid an admittedly complexswirl of events - that elements of the risingbourgeoisie helped lead a mass-basedmovement of the urban and rural poor insmashing the remnants of the old feudalorder. Results of the revolutionary triumphincluded: the replacement of monarchy witha constitutional republic; the achievement ofnational unity, with a form of nationalismstrongly tinged with radical-democraticcontent; and a sweeping land reform whichbroke the power of the aristocracy, clearingthe way for a thoroughgoing development ofcapitalism.

If we examine the events of 1848-49 inGermany, we see that the dominant elementsof the already-existing bourgeoisie,frightened by working-class radicalism, drewback from revolution and sought an alliancewith potent remnants of the old feudal order.The results of the defeated revolutionincluded: the preservation of a powerfulmonarchy; the failure to achieve nationalunity for over two decades; the combinedthwarting of democratic political currents anddevelopment of a conservative-tingednationalism; maintenance of power by a

landowning aristocracy; and capitalismbecoming entwined with traditional elites.

The bourgeois-aristocratic, or liberal-conservative, compromise impactedthroughout Europe after 1848, and thisprofoundly affected the economic, political,and cultural history of that entire area. In theface of this hostile alliance, the first upsurgeof self-conscious working-class radicalism(reflected in Karl Marx’s small CommunistLeague, for example, and more massively inEngland’s Chartist movement) was smashedand didn’t fully recover for about fifteenyears. At the same time, the relative politicaland social stability that resulted facilitatedthe dramatic economic expansion ofindustrial capitalism that would set the stagefor an even more dramatic working-classupsurge in the future.

3. Swirling Toward 1914

After 1848, the law of uneven and combineddevelopment continued to assert pressure onthe triumphant conservatives. They feltcompelled to carry out “modernizing”reforms which corresponded to the liberaland radical demands - but in a highlydistorted form that preserved much of thearistocracy’s status and power.

A prime example can be found in the careerof Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Prussia,who initiated policies over more than twodecades after the defeat of the 1848revolution that finally unified different partsof Germany into a powerfully capitalistnation, but as part of a distinctivelyconservative synthesis. In Prussia - which heguaranteed was Germany’s dominantprovince - the parliament consisted of electedrepresentatives, but the election laws dividedthe electorate into three groups: thelandowning aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, andthe laboring population. The votes of the firsttwo sectors were given greater weight thanthe third, ensuring that the upper classeswould get more representatives than thelower classes.

At the same time, the Prussian monarch - theKaiser - exercised far-reaching executivepowers over all of Germany. Social reformsbeneficial to the working class were adopted,but at the same time there were repressivelaws against working class organizations.Although land reforms were promulgated torelieve peasant discontent, the domination bythe big landowners of the countrysideremained intact. In other words, capitalistdevelopment blended with aristocraticprivilege, social reforms blended with upper-class paternalism, concessions to theprinciple of representative governmentblended with continued authoritarianism,


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“modernization” blended with the policies ofrepressive bureaucracies committed tomaintaining the relationships of power andprivilege associated with the old status quo.

This was the pattern throughout much ofEurope, although it unfolded with differentvariations in different countries. In Russia,for example, there had been no bourgeois-democratic upsurge because the indigenouscapitalist class and working class did notexist as a significant force until the last yearsof the 19th century; therefore, theconservatism and authoritarianism of themonarchist system - Tsarism - were muchstronger, and the various “modernizing”reforms comparatively weaker in Russia.

The fact remains that the triumph of thecapitalist mode of production in Europe wasan accomplished fact by the middle of the19th century, and the stage was now set fortechnological and industrial developments sorapid and so profound that they aresometimes said to constitute a “SecondIndustrial Revolution.” Communication andtransportation systems, levels of industrialproduction and productivity, the size andproportional increase of urban populations,the level of knowledge and generaleducation, the relative and absolute size ofthe urban working class, the amount ofwealth produced by society - such thingsincreased spectacularly, qualitativelytransforming the life-rhythms of Europeanculture.

This naturally increased tensions withinEuropean society as a whole, includingtensions between different factions of theruling classes on how to respond to newproblems and possibilities. Divergencesbetween conservatives and liberals onceagain became more pronounced. Bothappealed to the masses for support - offering,in return, reforms extending the right to voteand also increasing numbers of socialreforms (which were easier to grant thanks toeconomic growth).

The consequent resurgence of mass politicsin European life, combined with the growingsize and productive power of the workingclass, led to the regeneration of the Europeanlabor movement. Mass socialist parties, andmass trade union movements under left-wingleadership, arose and became powerful forcesin the political and economic life of Europe.They were able to force important economic,social, and political reforms from the upperclasses - combating authoritarianism andinjustice in society’s political life and incapitalism’s factories.

At the same time, they inspired millions ofworking people with a vision of a socialist

future, in which the power of the capitalistsand landowners would be replaced by thepower of the working-class majority. Despitethe fact that a majority of these partiesgradually embraced the theoreticalorientation advanced by Karl Marx andcombined into unified internationalassociations (first the InternationalWorkingmen’s Association, later the SocialistInternational), divisions opened up amongthe socialists over how much therevolutionary vision should be compromisedfor the sake of immediate reforms, and overstrategies for attaining socialism. Thesedivisions, and the compromises that spawnedthem, created a fatal indecisiveness that wasto paralyze the socialist movement at thedecisive moment in 1914. The fact remainsthat, up to the First World War, thismovement was seen as a powerful challengeto the status quo.

One of the most effective ideological toolsutilized by conservatives was nationalism.Nationalism had first been a centralcomponent of revolutionary and liberalideology - linking the ideas of popularsovereignty and national self-determination,celebrating the culture and sense ofcommunity of the popular masses.

Conservatives developed forms ofnationalism which were designed to blurclass differences, accentuating traditionalistcultural elements, glorifying authoritariansymbols, blending patriotism with anti-foreign prejudices and with militarism. Theywere able to tap into non-rational longingsand fears that had been intensified by thedramatic transformations, disruptions, andtensions introduced by the new industrialcapitalist order. Liberals and even socialistswere affected in some ways by this variationof nationalist ideology that the conservativesdeveloped so skillfully.

If anything, however, this form of intensenationalism was not a source of socialstability and cohesion, but rather a reflectionof the deep tensions and instability that hadbecome part of the core of modern Europeanlife. This instability had at least threefundamental sources:

1. The uncompleted nature of the bourgeois-democratic revolution - resulting from thearistocratic/capitalist compromise - creatingan ongoing antagonism between traditionalistvalues, expectations and cultural norms onthe one hand, and the newer bourgeoisvalues, practices and culture on the other.This deep cultural conflict was feltconsciously and unconsciously, not onlyamong the upper classes, but within broadsectors of the population.

2. Within the capitalist mode of production,there was a growing contradiction betweenthe forces of production and the relations ofproduction. As we have noted, the awesomedevelopment of the forces of productionencompassed all of society, bringing aboutprofound and rapid changes in the culture andeveryday life of all people in society - butnone of this was under their control, becausethe relations of production involved theprivate ownership of those productive forcesby a small self-interested minority ofcapitalists - and even this minority wasdriven by impersonal market dynamics whichwere not really under anyone’s control. Theimmense changes in society wereexperienced by large masses as arbitrary,alienating, and threatening.

3. The actual dynamics of the economycontained an additional irrational element.The competition between capitalist firmsperiodically resulted in overproduction,which would glut the markets, bringing abouta collapse in prices and a decline inproduction and employment - that is, periodiceconomic depressions. Such problemsnaturally generated greater tensions andinstability.

The development of imperialism provided aneconomic, political and even psychologicaloutlet for all of these tensions. The obviouseconomic outlet was, of course, essential: thecontinents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America(and even North America and vulnerableportions of Europe) offered vital sources ofraw materials, important markets formanufactured goods, and virgin territories forprofitable investments. The traditionalistethos of military glory and authoritariangrandeur also found an outlet, as did popularimpulses toward a super-patriotic national-chauvinism.

At the same time, imperialism - in addition tobeing a brutal and oppressive assault on thepeoples targeted for exploitation - failed toresolve the contradictions of Europeansociety, but simply led to heightened rivalriesbetween different companies and countriesover who would control what areas. Suchrivalry, combined with the rising tide ofnationalism and militarism, created aframework that generated the eruption of theFirst World War in August 1914.

4. Permanent Revolution

The incredible destructiveness of what oneAsian scholar once referred to as “theEuropean civil war” resulted not only in theslaughter of millions of people, but also in adramatic political and cultural transformationon the European continent. A periodcombining revolutionary upheaval and

Theory

counter-revolutionary backlash defined therest of the 20th century. One of the focal-points of this dialectic was Russia, where thetheory of uneven and combined developmentfirst came to be articulated. The patternsalready discussed were dramatically evidentthere.

At the summit of Russian society was thetyrannical ruler, the Tsar, an absolutemonarch. Any opposition to him or to thesystem over which he ruled could meanarrest, and prison or Siberian exile - or death.Only just below him was a powerful layer ofhereditary nobles whose wealth and powerwas secured through the control of Russia’sland and the exploitation of the great majorityof the Russian people, who were peasants.The condition of even the fairly well-to-dopeasants was impoverished, and the greatmasses of peasants were deprived ofadequate land (monopolized by the rich eliteof nobles) and lived in terrible andbrutalizing destitution. All of this wasjustified by the religious hierarchy of theRussian Orthodox Church, which glorifiedthe Tsar as “our little Father” - a god on earth- and persecuted all who did not accept thedoctrines of Russian Orthodoxy. Theoppressive second-class status of womenreceived absolute religious justification, asdid all policies of the tsarist regime.

The Tsars of Russia had conquered manydifferent peoples, and the tsarist empire wasknown as the prison-house of nations.” At thesame time - and most important for Russiandevelopment - the tsarist regime feltcompelled, under the pressure of competitionwith other major powers in the world, tomodernize aspects of their society - todevelop technology and compete in thedynamically growing world market economy.Because of this, it was especially importantfor the Tsars to develop capitalist industry inRussia.

This gave rise to a small but growingcapitalist class of industrialists andfinanciers, a layer of professionals. It alsoresulted in a rapidly expanding class of wage-workers and their families - the proletariat.The labor of this working class created thegreat wealth that flowed from Russianindustrialization, and workers in the factorieswere exploited intensively - laboring longhours, often in unhealthy and unsafeconditions, pushed hard by factory managers,and paid low wages. It was illegal forworkers to organize trade unions to press forimproved pay and conditions. In the growingcities workers and their families lived incrowded and impoverished circumstances.

Such realities as these gave rise to a growingrevolutionary movement, in which Leon

Trotsky became involved. He would becomea theorist and leader of the revolutionarymovement second in stature only to VladimirIlyich Lenin. In the context of intensestruggles, Trotsky developed an analysis ofthe peculiarities of Russian history thatdefined it as “uneven and combineddevelopment,” and flowing from this hecrafted a strategic orientation known as thetheory of permanent revolution.

Trotsky’s theory linked the struggle fordemocracy - freedom of expression, equalrights for all, and rule by the people - with thestruggle for socialism, a society in which thegreat majority of people would own andcontrol the economic resources of society toallow for the free development of all. It alsolinked the struggle for revolution in Russiawith the cause of socialist revolutionthroughout the world. The theory containedthree basic points. One held that therevolutionary struggle for democracy inRussia could only be won under theleadership of the working class with thesupport of the peasant majority. The secondpoint held that this democratic revolutionwould begin in Russia a transitional period inwhich all political, social, cultural andeconomic relations would continue to be influx, leading in the direction of socialism.The third point held that this transition wouldbe part of, and would help to advance, andwould also be furthered by an internationalrevolutionary process.

The first aspect of Trotsky’s theory wasrelated to his understanding that the relativelyweak capitalist class of Russian businessmenwas dependent on the tsarist system, and thatthe capitalists would be too frightened of therevolutionary masses to lead in the overthrowof tsarist tyranny. The struggle for democracyand human rights could only be advancedconsistently and finally won under theleadership of the working class, which wascapable of organizing labor unions andpolitical organizations in Russia’s cities andtowns. Allied with the workers would be thevast peasantry hungry for land, as well asother oppressed social layers - women,oppressed ethic and national groups,religious minorities, and dissidentintellectuals. A victorious worker-ledrevolution would bring the working class topolitical power. In other words, democraticrevolutions in so-called “backward”countries such as tsarist Russia must spillover into working-class revolutions.

The second aspect of Trotsky’s theory wasrelated to the understanding that thevictorious revolutionary working class wouldnot be willing to turn political power over totheir capitalist bosses. Instead, they would -with the support of the peasants - consolidate

their own rule through democratic councils(known in Russia as “soviets”) and their ownpeople’s army. Under working-class rulethere would be dramatic efforts

v to spread education,

v to create universal literacy,

v to make the benefits of culture available toall,

v to provide universal health care to all as amatter of right,

v to ensure that decent housing would beavailable for all,

v to secure full and equal rights for womenand all others oppressed in the old society,

v and to include all people in building anddeveloping an economy that would sustainthe free development of all.

Increasingly, the development of society inthis transitional period would move beyondthe framework of capitalism and in thedirection of socialism.

The third aspect of Trotsky’s theory wasrelated to his understanding that capitalism isa global system that can only be replaced bysocialism on a global scale. It was hisconviction that it would not be possible tocreate a socialist democracy in aneconomically underdeveloped country suchas Russia surrounded by a hostile capitalistworld. In fact, a working-class revolution inone country would inevitably generatecounter-revolutionary responses insurrounding countries - with efforts to repressthe revolution. At the same time, it wouldinspire the workers and oppressed ofcountries throughout the world.

The Russian revolution would be one of aseries of revolutions in country after countrythroughout the world. This would come aboutnot only because of the example ofrevolutionary Russia, but especially becauseof the desire of more and more workers andoppressed people in all countries to end theexploitation and hardship that - Trotskybelieved - are the inevitable result ofcapitalism. The process of socialistrevolution can begin within a single country,but socialism can only be created on a globalscale.

This orientation, was reflected in theorientation not only of Trotsky but - by thespring of 1917 - also of the Russian socialistmovement’s most revolutionary wing, theBolsheviks, led by Lenin. An immenseupsurge of the working-class and thepeasantry, after sweeping away the tsarist


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regime, came under Bolshevik sway,culminating in the establishment of arevolutionary workers’ governmentsupported by the peasantry.

The combination of the First World War andthe Russian Revolution helped to generaterevolutionary upheavals on a global scale.The devastating impact of the war not onlyhad disastrous consequences for thepopulations of Europe (particularly for thecontinent’s working classes), but they alsoundermined the ability of Europe’s “greatpowers” to maintain their colonial empires.The example of Russia’s insurgent workersand peasants inspired masses of people onevery continent to struggle more militantlyagainst oppressive realities. The Russianrevolutionaries led by Lenin and Trotskysought to connect with revolutionaries of allcountries, establishing the CommunistInternational to aid in the spread ofrevolutions.

As it turned out, however, the globalrevolutionary ferment was not able toovercome the resistance of the ruling classesof most countries. Throughout Europe, theruling powers joined to establish a cordonsanitaire to protect their populations fromBolshevik contagion, and to give massive aidto counter-revolutionary elements in Russiawaging a bloody civil war against theBolsheviks. In some countries revolutionaryuprisings and movements were brutallysuppressed, in others dramatic concessionswere made to more moderate (and absolutelyanti-revolutionary) sectors of the social-democratic labor movement to divert theworking-class away from the overthrow ofcapitalism. In some countries, such asGermany, both things happened. The RussianCommunists found themselves isolated in ahostile capitalist world. The Russianrevolution’s isolation led to bureaucratic,authoritarian, and murderous distortions ofCommunism in the Soviet Union and (due tothe influence of the Stalin regime that aroseafter Lenin’s death) throughout theCommunist movements of other countries.

5. Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Inter-War Europe

Those who led their countries into thedevastation of the First World War utilized anunbridled and murderous “patriotism” thatplaced militarism into the center of thenational ethos. Among the masses of peoplewho were swept into intense political life inthe wake of the war, not all were drawn to thebanner of Communism or to the moremoderate appeals of social-democracy.Interpenetrating elements - ultra-patriotic andmilitarist forms of nationalism; aglorification of violence, racism, and

“benign” tyranny rooted in the maintenanceof colonial empires; the searing andbrutalizing experience of the world war;long-standing ethnic tensions; deeply-rootedpatriarchal and authoritarian mores; unevencombinations of horror and fascination andattraction over the challenge of rapidindustrialization and “modernization” totraditional values and ways of life - all fedinto a political culture that culminated in thecrystallization of a new mass politicalmovement that replaced monarchist-absolutism at the extreme right of thepolitical spectrum: fascism.

Fascism involved a strident and militaristicnationalism, employing radical or populistrhetoric, which sought to overcome classconflict (and the threat of left-wingrevolution) through a combination of extremepolitical authoritarianism, a “corporate state”enforcing cooperation between labor andcapital, in practice preserving and reinforcinglarge capitalist corporations while providingat least modest social welfare programs forthe masses. Arising first in Italy under theleadership of Benito Mussolini, it assumedvarious forms, with its German version - theNazi movement of Adolf Hitler - making themost thoroughgoing racism a centerpiece ofideology and policy. It is noteworthy that thisextreme right-wing nationalism evolved intwo countries where, on the one hand, thecrystallization of nation-states had beendelayed until late in the 19th century,involving far-reaching compromises andadmixtures between modern (capitalist) andtraditional (pre-capitalist) upper classes; onthe other hand, where the working-class Leftwas particularly strong.

An essential element in the coming offascism in both Italy and Germany was thefact that there were mass upsurges in bothcountries, arising out of profound politicaland economic crises. It appeared thattriumphant revolutions could have resulted,but weaknesses in revolutionary leadershipblocked such possibilities. Disappointedhopes among masses of people combinedwith extreme fears generated among theupper classes and deepening anxieties amongsectors of the intermediate “middle classes.”This dynamic generated for the rising waveof fascism burgeoning recruits and supportersfrom sectors of the middle and lower classesand, from sectors of the upper classes, aninclination toward both official and informalencouragement, as well as generous materialresources.

The relative isolation of Soviet Russia -transformed into the Union of SovietSocialist Republics (USSR), whoseboundaries corresponded to the old Russianempire - contributed decisively to the

transformation of Communism into agrotesque blend of dogmatized Marxism and“modernized” tsarist absolutism. Under JosefStalin, a conception of creating “socialism inone country” (an industrially-backwardUSSR) both reflected and further contributedto three profound developments:

1. a distancing of the Soviet regime from acommitment to spreading the world socialistrevolution, now deemed unnecessary for thetriumph of socialism in the USSR (leading tothe eventual dissolution of the CommunistInternational);

2. an institutionalization of bureaucraticdictatorship as representing “working-classrule” and as the initiator of a brutalizing“revolution-from-above” designed toovercome economic backwardness throughforced collectivization of the land and rapidindustrialization;

3. the de-linking of democracy and equalityfrom the meaning of socialism (nowredefined narrowly as state ownership andplanning-oriented control of the economy).

“Socialism in one country” helped totransform Communist parties of variouscountries from revolutionary working-classorganizations to vehicles meant to advance orresist revolutionary struggles depending onthe narrow, nationalistically-defined foreignpolicy needs of the USSR. The “revolutionfrom above” required the concentration ofpolitical, economic, social, and culturalpower in a few hands, at the expense of themajority of workers and peasants. Thisconcentration of power, advanced by newtechnologies (and labeled by some as“totalitarianism”), had much in common withdevelopments in Nazi Germany and fascistItaly - with the key difference thatcapitalism’s market economy was replacedby a collectivized “planned economy,” andthat lip-service continued to be paid todemocratic, humanistic, and egalitarianideals repugnant to the likes of Hitler andMussolini.

The brutality associated with Stalinism wasjustified by its partisans as a necessaryelement in dragging “backward Russia” intoa modernized existence that would bebeneficial to the majority of its laboringpopulation (who were already being offeredcertain benefits - the right to education,health care and other social services,employment, etc. - previously unavailable).This would, it was argued, eventuallybecome increasingly democratic, and wouldincreasingly prove to be a powerful examplefor peoples around the world. And to many itseemed to represent a practical, compelling

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alternative to the capitalist status quo and tothe fascist “new order.”

The dramatic economic downturn in theglobal capitalist economy represented by theGreat Depression (1929-1939), with massivebusiness failures and unemployment,generated a sharpening polarization betweenLeft and Right throughout Europe, and alsoan intensified competition between variouscapitalist nations seeking markets, rawmaterials, and investment opportunities on aglobal scale. Related to this, there was agrowing militarism requiring large-scale stateexpenditures which - in the fascist-dominatednation’s first - revived the economy of onecapitalist country after another.

The explosion of the Second World War(1939-1945) resulted, far more than the First,in an incredible trauma, in which differentportions of the global, and different globalrealities, came together in lethal andprofoundly transformative combinations. In asense, this was several different warscombined. One involved a murderousconfrontation between several contendingcapitalist empires, while another involved ano less murderous confrontation betweenNazism and Communism. There was also anideological confrontation betweendemocratic and egalitarian ideals on one sideand idealized dictatorship and racial purity onthe other. For many, the war was a defense oftheir homeland against a ruthless foreigninvader. Among the Allies, there werepartisans of imperialism and anti-colonialrevolutionaries, those reaching for a socialistfuture and those determined to save acapitalist status quo.

The consequences of the war were, of course,devastating for the losers - Germany, Italy,and Japan - and brought extreme discredit tofascism in all its varieties, and broughtdiscredit also to much of the tangledideological sources of fascism (national andethnic chauvinism, anti-democratic thought,racism, militarism). Among the victors, thewar ushered in disintegration and danger, anda new global power struggle that oneperceptive partisan foretold would culminatein “the American Century.”

6. Complexities of the 20thCentury’s Last Half

Here it is useful to remind ourselves thatwhat is presented here corresponds to a“Westernization” conceptual model, whichneeds to be modified by a more complexemployment of the“ Southernization”conceptualization. Nonetheless, the processand importance of Westernization isundeniable.

Throughout the 19th and 20th century, wefind - through a brutal colonialist imperialismas well as an “open door” and “goodneighbor” imperialism - the spread andgrowing predominance of the marketeconomy, with its subordination of more andmore aspects of life to the accumulationprocess and cash nexus, and also with itscrystallization of a very specific socio-economic class structure throughout LatinAmerica, Asia, Africa, and othercapitalistically “underdeveloped” areas(although often intertwined with earliersocio-economic formations andstratifications). To deal with what were oftenprofoundly invasive, violent, and oppressiverealities associated with this economicexpansionism, growing sectors of the nativepopulation utilized various tools forconceptualization and resistance drawn fromWestern experience - notions of nationalism,race and ethnicity, democracy, socialism, etc.(although generally, again, dynamicallycombined with earlier cultural patterns).

Beginning in the wake of World War II (andin large measure due to its destructive impacton European power), a wave of radical anti-colonial and nationalist revolutionschallenged and dissolved the Europeanempires through the 1950s, 1960s, and1970s. This revolutionary wave coincidedand in some areas intersected with a powerfulsurge of Communist expansion.

This Communist expansion in some casestook place through the efforts of indigenousparties that had played central roles inresistance struggles during World War II(China, Yugoslavia, partially in Vietnam andKorea, almost in Greece). To a large extent itcame about due to the central role of theUSSR in defeating Nazi Germany and rollingback Hitler’s legions throughout EasternEurope - and then placing pro-Soviet regimesin power throughout the region. This wascarried out, initially, with the reluctantagreement of its capitalist allies (especiallythe U.S. and Britain) in 1943-45 thanks toStalin’s sincere promise to reign inCommunist parties in other portions ofEurope (particularly in Italy and France,where they had played central roles in theresistance movements and might have movedto take power). Soon the acquiescence turnedinto Cold War hostility, particularly asWestern European regimes sought to checkleftist-influenced anti-colonial insurgenciesand dominant forces in the United Statessought to realize the “American Century.”

The Cold War of 1946-89 involved a globalconfrontation - short of total war, but markedby multiple smaller wars, diplomaticmaneuvering, economic rivalries, coups andcounter-coups, insurgencies, counter-

insurgencies, massive two-way propagandabarrages, espionage, and an arms raceinvolving weapons that could destroy theentire population of the planet several timesover. The diminished power of Europe’scapitalist democracies forced them to acceptU.S. leadership in a “free world” coalition.

It was not necessary for a nation to be free ordemocratic to be part of the “free world”(some were, in fact, ruled by vicious andunpopular dictatorships) - it was necessaryonly to be pro-capitalist, anti-Communist,and accepting of U.S. leadership in the ColdWar. Within the advanced capitalistdemocracies of Western Europe, however,the capitalist economic and political forces(fearing potentially revolutionary working-class militancy and the threat ofCommunism) established far-reachingagreements with the moderate, social-democratic labor movements (both politicalparties and trade unions) for extensive“welfare state” programs providingsubstantial benefits in increased incomes,education, health care, housing, socialsecurity, unemployment insurance, etc. Thesecountries enjoyed a long wave of prosperitythat significantly improved working-classliving standards (as was the case, along withan increasingly robust consumerism,throughout the advanced-industrial capitalistworld). In exchange for these benefits, theleaderships of these labor movements agreedto help preserve capitalism, and in some casealso to support efforts to maintaincolonialism.

Such “welfare state” benefits (minus therobust consumerism) were provided also bythe regimes of the Communist Bloc, alongwith the elimination of capitalist enterprisesand the establishment of state ownership andcontrol over the economy. While this wasdone in the name of the working class and“the people,” however, it was the Communistparties in each of these countries that had amonopoly on political power, maintainedaccording to the bureaucratic-authoritarianStalinist model. While the new Communistregimes were expected to follow theleadership of the USSR in the Cold War andin other matters, in those countries whereCommunist parties had taken power withpopular support (instead of being placed inpower by the USSR), a powerful pull towardindependence began to assert itself - firstwith Yugoslavia, later with China.

A significant number of the newly-independent nations emerging fromcolonialism, particularly those under left-leaning but non-Communist leaders, chose toalign themselves neither with the CommunistBloc nor with the “free world” of their oldcolonial oppressors. Both of the Cold War’s


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contending power blocs sought to increasetheir influence in this sphere, offeringeconomic aid and various alliances designedto bring them closer to one camp or the other.Throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America,however, there was a powerful desire to findpaths of economic development that wouldnurture at least relative independence and“modernization.”

An influential model for economic, social,and political development - “modernizationtheory” - utilized an interpretation of thehistorical experience of Western Europe andNorth America to propose a path for the “lessdeveloped” countries. The development ofcapitalism generated industrialization, whichgenerated greater wealth and new variationsof social differentiation, in turn breakingdown stagnant customs and traditionalhierarchies, generating political pluralism,democracy, prosperity - and all the benefits ofmodernization. Therefore, the solution forAsia, Africa, and Latin America would be forWestern capitalist governments to offereconomic aid, and especially for Westernbusiness corporations to make investments inthese regions, leading to greater capitalisteconomic development, with the consequentmodernization pay-offs in the social, culturaland political realms.

Obviously, “modernization theory” wasconsistent with the open door/good neighborvariants of economic expansionism advancedby U.S. foreign policy, and also increasinglythe foreign policies of the post-colonialistWestern European powers. In fact, it was anideological and policy-making tool in theCold War struggle. Another aspect of thatstruggle was a tendency of the United Statesand other Western capitalist nations to opposede-stabilizing nationalist, anti-imperialiststruggles - especially if in any way taintedwith left-wing and especially Communistinfluences. Often U.S. and Western Europeanpolicy-makers preferred to support unpopularand anti-democratic regimes when they werechallenged by popular insurgencies.

An analysis counterposed to “modernizationtheory” (and consistent with the theory ofuneven and combined development) took theform of what has become known asdependency theory. According to thisanalysis, the path of economic developmentfollowed by such countries as Britain and theUnited States in an earlier historical period isno longer open. The advanced capitalistnations are now determined to maintain theirdominance in the global economy. Anyeconomic aid they give to an“underdeveloped” country will not beallowed to make their economies competitivewith those of advanced capitalist countries,but rather to make them develop in a manner

that is in harmony with the needs of theadvanced capitalist countries - which means,in a sense, to keep them under-developed.The investments of business corporationsfrom advanced capitalist countries, similarly,are not designed to facilitate genuine“modernization,” but rather to maximizeprofits for the businesses of the advancedcountries. They wish to pump wealth out ofthe less developed countries, not tocontribute to progress or rising livingstandards for the populations of theunderdeveloped regions. Nor would thepolicies of governments or corporations fromthe advanced capitalist countries be designedto promote democracy in Asia, Africa, orLatin America. Genuine democracy couldresult in “instability” in the form of popularprotests against and powerful challenges tothe profit-hungry outsiders. This explainedwhy U.S. political and economic interestspreferred repressive regimes that wouldguarantee “stability” and higher profitmargins.

Influenced by such perspectives in the late1950s and 1960s, rebels throughout Asia,Africa, and Latin America initiatedrevolutionary struggles, challengingtraditional elites and also the ostensible“modernizers” whose policies actually led toimperialist entanglements. In many casesbecoming principled opponents ofcapitalism, they gravitated to variants ofMarxist programs and Communistorganization. They often tended to viewpolitical realities from a prism similar to thatof permanent revolution: the democraticstruggle (against imperialism, againstdictatorship, for human rights and equalrights for all, for land reform, for a decent lifefor all) could only be secured through thestruggles of the laboring masses, whoserevolutionary struggle must culminate intheir own political power, which would resultin socialist-oriented economic development.

Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution,however, posited an increasingly successfulwave of working-class revolutions,particularly in advance industrial countries,which would give aid to each other as theycollectively moved forward to create a worldsocialist economy. An attempt to createsocialism in one country, or even in ascattering of economically undevelopedcountries, could not be successful with such aglobal revolutionary socialist expansion. Inthe advanced industrial countries of WesternEurope, however, the largely socialist-oriented workers who identified with laborparties and social-democratic parties, andeven the many workers who were membersof Communist parties, were economicallyrelatively well-off and not inclined to make arevolution. In this situation, the USSR and

Communist Bloc stood as a substitute forinternational socialist revolution as the forcethat could provide for the survival andassistance required for an “underdeveloped”country to embark on a non-capitalist path ofdevelopment. One dramatic example of thisbeginning in 1959 was the Cuban revolution.

This was problematical in more than oneway. The USSR and Communist Bloc wereprepared to lend support not from principlebut from pragmatic and often manipulativeconsiderations in the Cold War powerstruggle. This meant that under certaincircumstances they would be fully preparedto withhold, reduce, or withdraw support.They might also be inclined to imposerestrictions or conditions consistent with theirown narrow foreign policy needs. They werealso inclined to influence revolutionaries ofother lands to adopt attitudes, structures, andpolicies consistent with their own Stalinisttraditions.

In the Communist countries, lip-servicemight be paid to democracy, human rights,and control over the economy by the laboringmasses, but this was far from the reality. Thebureaucratic regimes were increasinglylosing whatever genuine confidence, respectand support they may have once enjoyedamong their own populations. Uprisings ofworkers, students, and others were violentlyrepressed in East Germany (1953), Hungary(1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland(1981) - and gradually many dissidents whomight have argued for “socialism with ahuman face” saw no human possibilities at allin this system called “socialism.” Thecentrally and bureaucratically controlledeconomy - the so-called “commandeconomy” - proved increasingly vulnerableto mismanagement, not to mention theendemic inequalities and corruptions that hadbeen manifest from almost the beginning.Some Communist Bloc countries, seeking toavoid economic stagnation and impasse,dabbled with “market reforms” (whichintroduced elements of incoherence into theireconomic reality) and secured substantialloans from Western capitalist banks (whichhad fatal consequences when a downturn inthe global economy made it impossible forthem to overcome the accumulation ofdebts).

The1960s and 1970s saw ferment,radicalization, and insurgency on a globalscale, most dramatically in Asia, Africa, andLatin America - but also taking the form of ayouth radicalization embracing not onlystudents but also sections of the workingclass of the advanced capitalist countries ofWestern Europe, and also in Eastern Europe.In many cases, the ferment swept past theexisting Communist and social-democratic

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organizations and found expression in aproliferation and expansion of “far left”groups (although ultimately the traditionalorganizations were able to attract much ofthis youthful ferment). In the West, there wasmobilization around anti-imperialism,opposition to bureaucratic and alienatingstructures, anti-racism, feminism, anti-militarism, environmentalism, free speechand more. And sections of the trade unionmovement were impacted as well.

In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, however,there were organizations that developed boththe capacity and the will to take politicalpower through revolutionary struggle. InWestern Europe those organizations havingthe capacity to take power (as opposedsimply to winning elections in order to runthe capitalist state) did not have the will totry. There were many activists, especiallyamong the young, who may have had the will- but they did not have adequateorganizations or sufficient mass support. Andwithin the Communist Bloc, with theremarkable exception of Poland at certainmoments, the repressiveness of the stateapparatus seemed too thoroughgoing to allowfor more than seemingly ineffectual dissent.

In reflecting on the developments as theystood in the 1980s, one is tempted to playwith the formulation “uneven and combineddevelopment” by noting that the three veryunevenly developed sectors of the worldrevolution - the advanced capitalist countries,the Communist Bloc, and the exploitedregions of the global South - whileinfluencing and altering each other inimportant ways, ultimately failed to combineinto a coherent and triumphant challenge tothe status quo.

7. Problems of PermanentRevolution

If treated as a dogma rather than an analyticaltool, the theory of permanent revolutionstands challenged and discredited bydevelopments of the late 20th century. A blocof nations on many continents - for example,Spain, Portugal, Greece, Mexico, Brazil,India, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia,Turkey, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria -appeared to be following the path from“backwardness” to “modernization” (and,more or less, to realization of “democratictasks”) without a worker-peasant revolutionculminating in a workers’ state movingtoward socialism.

The fact is that Trotsky explicitly denied thatthe theory of permanent revolution was aschema or practical recipe applicable equallyeverywhere from Paris to Honolulu. It is,above all, an analytical tool that can inform

political strategies, but that cannot be valid ifit is utilized as an excuse for not actuallystudying the specifics and peculiarities ofeach national and cultural reality. As Trotskydeveloped it, the theory - far from seeking toestablish a closed theoretical-strategicorientation - was part of an “open” andcritical-minded approach to revolutionaryanalysis and strategy. To make sense of thevarious “exceptions,” it is necessary todetermine to what extent they are incompleteexceptions, and to what extent they may beeither exceptions that prove or overturn the“rule” of permanent revolution - a task whichgoes beyond the present paper.

One could argue, however, that, to the extentthat the theory is utilized to provide astrategic orientation, it is consistent with thetraditional revolutionary Marxist orientationarguing that the full human needs and rightsof the working class, of other exploitedtoilers, and of all oppressed sectors of thepopulation can only be realized through athoroughgoing democracy that can only beachieved by the laboring majority takingpolitical power and establishing planfulcontrol over the economy. The struggle fordemocratic demands, if followed all the way,necessary spills over into the struggle forsocialism. (This makes the theory relevantnot only to “underdeveloped” regions, butalso to advanced capitalist nations.)

In the 1980s, another challenge to the theoryseemed to be posed by revolutions in CentralAmerica and the Caribbean, particularly theSandinista revolution in Nicaragua. In thissituation, a popular revolution of the partiallyproletarianized “laboring masses” - led byMarxist-oriented revolutionaries - wasmobilized largely as a democratic revolution,culminating in a regime based solidly onmass support, but that instead of movingforward to socialism (taking “the Cubanroad”), the Sandinistas doggedly sought tomaintain a “mixed economy” with state,cooperative, and private sectors. While somedogmatists accused the Sandinistas of“betraying” the revolution, more realisticanalysts noted that - given the dramaticerosion and increasing disintegration of thepower of the USSR and Communist Bloc inthat period - the “Cuban road” (movingtoward the replacement of capitalism with anationalized planned economy) was not anoption for a small nation hoping to survivewithin the global capitalist economy. Thiswas seen by some as a demonstration thatTrotsky’s theory had proved to be invalid.

A careful examination of Trotsky’s theory,however, indicates that this particular critiqueis based on a serious misunderstanding. Acentral component of the theory of permanentrevolution asserts that when a workers’ state

comes to power, a transitional period opensup that includes the development of preciselysuch a “mixed economy” as came into beingin revolutionary Nicaragua. The theory’scrowning assertion is that such adevelopment can find completion insocialism only as the revolution expands onthe international stage, with workers’ statescoming to power in more and more countries,including industrial advanced countries. Onlyon a global scale can a socialist economycome into being. The eventual defeat of theSandinistas (as a force for socialistrevolution) was inevitable given thestalemate and defeat of the revolutionaryupsurge in Central America, the collapse ofthe Communist Bloc, and the failure ofworking-class revolutions to triumph in othercountries (such as Iran, South Africa, Brazil,etc.).

Setting aside such a specificmisunderstanding, and setting aside theelevation of Trotsky’s theory into a messianicexpression of revolutionary triumphalism,there is an additional argument that could bemade in the theory’s defense. To the extentthat political strategies consistent with thetheory of permanent revolution have failed:

v to that extent have the movements andstruggles of the working class beencompromised, eroded, dismantled;

v to that extent has the promise of “thedemocratic revolution” been compromised,hollowed out, tragically incomplete - despitereal gains made in one or another realm ofsociety;

v to that extent have terrible inequalitiespersisted, deepened, and contributed to theerosion of the integrity and viability of thespecific society (and of the world).

This relates to recent discussions regardingthe possibility of eliminating global poverty.In 2000 the United Nations initiated aMillennium Development Goals campaign.This projected the realization of thefollowing eight goals: 1) eradicate extremepoverty and hunger; 2) achieve universalprimary education; 3) promote genderequality and empower women; 4) reducechild mortality; 5) improve maternal health;6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and otherdiseases; 7) ensure environmentalsustainability; and 8) develop a globalpartnership for development.

These goals, supported by 190 governmentsaround the world, are to be realized by 2015,as an initial step to assuring a decent life forthe world’s peoples, involving very specificsub-goals and practical policy projections.For example, of the world’s six billion


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people, half live on less than $2 per day, but1.3 billion live on less than $1 per day - andthe goal by 2015 is to cut this number of the“most impoverished” in half.

If these goals can be achieved within theframework of global capitalism, and thenprogressively advanced upon, a case can bemade for the final obsolescence of the theoryof permanent revolution. But to the extentthat the goals - which, given existingresources, have been shown to be perfectlyrealizable - prove to be unrealized under thepresent structures of wealth and power,considerable validity must be credited to atleast some variant of Trotsky’s theory.

On the other hand, to the extent that there is adecompositon of the political organizationsand capacities for class consciousness andstruggle on the part of the working class andother sectors of the toiling masses, without anaccompanying recomposition of the actual orpotential power of the laboring majorities ofthe various countries and cultures of ourplanet, to that extent the theory of permanentrevolution will cease to have practicalrelevance.

Regardless of any problems related to thetheory of permanent revolution, the factremains that the overarching theory ofuneven and combined development can beshown to be valid (that is, to be a useful andilluminating analytical tool) for historians,anthropologists and other social scientistsseeking to understand the developments andcomplexities of human existence in Europeand beyond.

8. The Past Flows Into the Future

In the past two decades (1985-2005), unevenand combined development has continued toshape the world in which we live.

One of the most dramatic instances has beenthe decline and collapse of the CommunistBloc. With the failure of working-classrevolution to spread to advanced industrialcountries, the relative isolation of the USSR(and then the bloc of countries under itstutelage) contributed to a fateful combinationof progressive Marxist ideology and goalswith reactionary and repressive traditionsfrom the pre-revolutionary period.Bureaucratic elites were increasingly proneto increasingly prone to compromiserevolutionary principles and goalsinternationally and internally, becoming inmany ways indistinguishable from otherprivileged and oppressive elites.

The glowing promise of human liberationwas increasingly turned into hypocriticalpropaganda and bombast. Popular hopes andexpectations were increasingly transformed

into bitter disappointment, disillusionment,and passive hostility. The increasinglyunstoppable interpenetration of the culturesof Eastern and Western Europe contributedmightily to the collapse of popular support oracquiescence, particularly given the growinginability of the so-called “commandeconomy” - after initial successes inestablishing heavy industry and basic socialprograms - to compete with or resist theincursions of the dynamics of globalcapitalism.

The corrosive impact of Stalinist traditionsand the inadequacies of the “commandeconomy” had a profound impact beyond thecollapsing USSR and Communist Bloc.Particularly as the collapse occurred, rebelregimes of Asia, Africa and Latin Americathat had been dependent on the Soviet modeland on trade and aid from the CommunistBloc found themselves increasingly isolated,vulnerable, and in many cases unviable.There was a powerful tendency toward rapiddegeneration into some of the worst forms oftyranny, compromise and corruption. Somejoined the ranks of the so-called “failedstates” fragmented by internal divisions,often exacerbated by contending outsideeconomic interests. To a growing extent,multi-national corporations from the“developed” North, while distressed overconsequent instabilities, no longer faceddilemmas posed by the threat of left-winginsurgencies.

Communism’s collapse obviously meant anend, for the most part, of Western Europe’slarge Communist movement, whichincreasingly evolved (or collapsed) into thecapitalist-friendly reformism long associatedwith traditional social-democraticorientations. At the same time, WesternEurope (and other parts of the globe) saw aconservative free market assault on thewelfare state and social compact that hadbeen secured in the wake of the GreatDepression and World War II: a seeminglyunstoppable “neo-liberal” wave ofprivatization, dismantling social programs,breaking unions, driving down working-classliving standards - accompanied by soaringcorporate profits, the breaking of unions, andthe dramatic decline of social-democracy andthe collapse of labor reformism.

Triumphant capitalism unleashed similardynamics throughout the world, acceleratedby new technologies and divisions of laborthat - under the banner of “Globalization” -has drawn the diverse cultures and unevenlydeveloped regions of the world into anincreasingly intimate if unstable mix.

This has brought an incredibly violentreaction from some sectors of the world,

exacerbated by increasingly desperateimpoverishment, indignation over violationsnational sovereignty, and rage over thepollution of cultural traditions - with abackward-looking religious fundamentalismcombining with technologies and othercultural influences from the “advanced”West. It is unlikely that the consequentdialectic of terrorism and counter-terrorismwill play itself out in the near future.

In opposition to this lethal dialectic, and tothe overarching reality of corporate-capitalistglobalization, there have been stirrings of aso-called “globalization from below.” Avariety of oppositional forces - fragments ofthe traditional Left from various regions ofdifferent continents blending with vibrantrepresentatives from a variety of new socialmovements and political formations, alsofrom various regions of different continents -have come together in massive andworldwide global justice mobilizations, inthe World Social Forums, and in internationalcampaigns around a number of issues.

In the present historical moment of 2005, wesee the continuing dynamic of uneven andcombined development. On the one hand,European elites seek to a more sweepinglypan-national European Union that mightfacilitate a sharper contestation with U.S.hegemony - even as their economies andcultures entwine ever more intimately withthose of the American Empire. On the otherhand, masses of “ordinary” Europeansinfluence each other across borders with theirvarious struggles to maintain national-cultural identities and decent living standards- saying “NO” to a Europe-wide constitutionthat would undermine national sovereigntyand facilitate the further advance of neo-liberal policies.

The past flows into the future in a never-ending swirl and collision of uneven andcombined developments.

Bibliographical Essay

There can be no question of providing acomprehensive bibliography here, but arelative handful of titles can suggest someuseful sources and what may be fruitful pathsfor further investigation.

My own general orientation, with somediscussion of matters dealt with in this essay,can be found in Paul Le Blanc, From Marx toGramsci, A Reader in Revolutionary MarxistPolitics (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books,1996), and also in my Ph.D. dissertationWorkers and Revolution: A ComparativeStudy of Bolshevik Russia and SandinistNicaragua (University of Pittsburgh, 1989).

Theory

Among the key works by Leon Trotsky thathave special relevance here are PermanentRevolution and Results and Prospects (NewYork: Pathfinder Press, 1978), The History ofthe Russian Revolution, Three Volumes inOne (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936),and The Revolution Betrayed (New York:Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1937). Aserviceable short biography of Trotsky can befound in David Renton, Trotsky (London:Haus Publishing, 2004), whose ideas arediscussed critically but thoughtfully inDuncan Hallas, Trotsky’s Marxism and OtherEssays (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2003).

Still valuable is Michael Lowy’s The Politicsof Combined and Uneven Development: TheTheory of Permanent Revolution (London:Verso, 1981), and also his fine set of essays,On Changing the World: Essays in PoliticalPhilosophy From Karl Marx to WalterBenjamin (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:Humanities Press, 1993). Among the mostimportant interpreters of Trotsky’s ideas wasErnest Mandel, among whose many relevantbooks are Trotsky As Alternative (London:Verso, 1995) and The Meaning of the SecondWorld War (London: Verso, 1986).

Discussing Trotsky’s ideas on uneven andcombined development and permanentrevolution in the larger frameworks ofMarxist economic and philosophical thoughtare M.C. Howard and J.E. King, A History ofMarxian Economics, 1883-1990, 2 vols.(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1992), and John Rees, The Algebra ofRevolution: The Dialectic and the ClassicalMarxist Tradition (London: Routledge,1998).

While not referring to Trotsky’s theories, butentirely relevant, is Teodor Shanin, LateMarx and the Russian Road: Marx and “ThePeripheries of Capitalism” (New York:Monthly Review Press, 1983). Also relevant,and relating to Trotsky’s ideas, are two othervolumes from Shanin - Russia as a“Developing Society” (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1985) and Russia, 1905-07:Revolution as a Moment of Truth (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1986).

Valuable studies relevant to issues in thisessay are Perry Anderson’s Passages fromAntiquity to Feudalism (London: Verso,1978) and Lineages of the Absolutist State(London: Verso, 1979).

Key volumes on transitions from feudalismto capitalism are Rodney Hilton, ed. TheTransition from Feudalism to Capitalism(London: Verso, 1978), and T.H. Aston andC.H.E. Philpin, eds., The Brenner Thesis:Agrarian Class Structure and EconomicDevelopment in Pre-Industrial Europe

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1985).

There are numerous historical studies thatcan be useful in considering mattersdiscussed here, among the most obviousbeing Eric Hobsbawm’s four-volume survey- The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (NewYork: New American Library, 1962), TheAge of Capital, 1848-1875 (New York: NewAmerican Library, 1979), The Age ofEmpire, 1875-1914 (New York: VintageBooks, 1989), and The Age of Extremes,1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books 1996).

A relevant survey of intellectual history isprovided in George L. Mosse, The Culture ofWestern Europe, The Nineteenth andTwentieth Centuries, Third Edition (Boulder:Westview Press, 1988), and suggestive workson social history are provided in GeorgeRude, The Crowd in History, 1730-1848(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964) andE.P. Thompson, The Making of the EnglishWorking Class (New York: Vintage Books,1966). A blend of political science,anthropology, and history that offers aprovocative vision of struggle that spanscenturies can be found in James C. Scott,Domination and the Arts of Resistance,Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1990).

A pioneering comparative study, quiterelevant to this essay, can be found inBarrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy: Lord andPeasant in the Making of the Modern World(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). It is, in someways supplemented and in some wayschallenged by three outstanding works byArno J. Mayer, which provide remarkableaccounts of European history entirelyconsistent with uneven and combineddevelopment (without referring to it): ThePersistence of the Old Regime, Europe to theGreat War (New York: Pantheon Books,1981), Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?The “Final Solution” in History (New York:Pantheon Books, 1988), and The Furies:Violence and Terror in the French andRussian Revolutions (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2000). Important andrelevant volumes making explicit mention ofuneven and combined development areDavid Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, ThePeculiarities of German History: BourgeoisSociety and Politics in Nineteenth-CenturyGermany (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1984), and Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy:The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).Also relevant is Hannah Arendt, The Originsof Totalitarianism (New York: MeridianBooks, 1960).

The “modernization theory” discussed in thisessay refers to that presented by WaltWhitman Rostow in Stages of EconomicGrowth: A Non-Communist Manifesto(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1960).

Discussion on controversies and rival notionsof developmental theory can be found inGilbert Rist, The History of Development:From Western Origins to Global Faith(London: Zed Books, 1997). The conceptionof “Southernization” is introduced in aclassic essay by Lynda N. Shaffer,Southernization (Washington, DC: AmericanHistorical Association, 2002). A sharpcritique of Eurocentrism is offered in J.M.Blaut, Eight Eurocentric Historians (NewYork: The Guilford Press, 2000).

Innovative contributions relevant to mattersdiscussed here are provided in the work ofanthropologist Carol McAllister - forexample, in Matriliny, Islam and Capitalism:Combined and Uneven Development in theLives of Negeri Sembilan Women(University of Pittsburgh, 1987) and Unevenand Combined Development: Dynamics ofChange in Women’s Everyday Forms ofResistance in Negeri Sembilan, MalaysiaReview of Radical Political Economy, Vol.23, Nos. 3 and 4, Fall and Winter, 1991.

Other works by anthropologists relevant tothis essay are Peter Worsley, The Third World(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1964), and - even more - Eric R. Wolf,Europe and the People Without History(Berkeley: University of California Press,1982), who gives some usefully criticalconsideration to Trotsky’s perspective.

Relevant to final comments in the essay are:Manfred B. Steger, Globalization, A VeryShort Introduction (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2003), Jeffrey D. Sachs,The End of Poverty, Economic Possibilitiesfor Our Time (New York: The Penguin Press,2005), Walden Bello, Dilemmas ofDomination: The Unmaking of the AmericanEmpire (New York: MetropolitanBooks/Henry Holt, 2005), Jose Correa Leite,The World Social Forum: Strategies ofResistance (Chicago: Haymarket Books,2005), and Susan Watkins, “ContinentalTremors,” New Left Review 33, May-June2005.

Paper presented at the 27th annual NorthAmerica Labor History Conference, held atWayne State University in Detroit, October20-22, 2005.


71

Theory


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