INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THREATS ON NATIONAL PEACE

AND STABILITY AMONG SELECTED DIVISIONS IN

KAMP ALA DISTRICT

UGANDA

BY:

ATUHEIRE CALEB

MIR/24342/141/DU

A Thesis

Presented to the College of

Higher Degrees and Research of

Kampala International University

Kampala, Uganda

In Paitial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the A ward of the

Master's Degree in International Relations and

Diplomatic Studies

NOVEMBER, 2015

DECLARATION

I, Atuheire Caleb declare that the work presented in this Thesis entitled "International

Terrorism Threats on National Peace and Stability among Selected Divisions in Kampala

District Uganda" report has never been submitted for any other degree award to any other

university or institution of higher learning before. Therefore all work contained herein is

original unless otherwise stated.

Signature:

Date:

ATUHEIRE CALEB

MIR/24342/141/DU

APPROVAL

This is to certify that this Thesis entitled "International Terrorism Threats on National Peace

and Stability among Selected Divisions in Kampala District Uganda" has been submitted in

partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the Master Degree of International

Relations and Diplomatic Studies with the approval of my university supervisor .

Signature: ... ~9..~ ~t~~~~;.!'.:S .................................. . (SUPERVISOR)

Date

ii

DEDICATION

This piece of work is dedicated to my children and encourages them to study and aim higher,

my wife and my parents for their persistent prayers that enabled me achieve my goal.

Ill

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My first appreciation goes to my supervisor Dr. Otanga Rusoke who guided and corrected me

during my research. This paper could not be emphasized and finalized without their valuable

and important advices and guidelines, and the professional support received from them during

all the phases of this thesis.

Sincere thanks goes to Mr. Bogere Ronald and Mr. Odong Mark Paul who would allow

me a duty leave to concentrate on my studies, my workmates who would generously represent

me while away for classes.

Thanks go to individuals who contributed in one way or the other during my research.

I cannot forget my lecturers of International Relations and Diplomatic Studies at Kampala

International University whom I passed through, all my studies to achieve a Master Degree!!

Their contribution and input are now being felt. Fellow students whom we have been sharing

views with, may God bless you.

Lastly but not least, in a special way I thank my wife Kyomuhendo Evace, my parents

Mr. Jackson Kamara Ssalongo and Jolly Kamara Nalongo who would be at all times on their

knees praying to God for me. May their blessings extend to others.

Finally, life is precious, time is to see. I thank the almighty God for enabling me finalize my

course.

IV

ABSTRACT [his research study was canied out in three divisions of Nakawa, central and Makindye in Kampala listrict, to find out the existing international tenorism threats on national peace and stability in Uganda. it ,;as guided by three objectives; (i) To establish the existing international tenorism threats on national ,eace and stability in Uganda. (ii) To assess the achievements and possible failures of security state tgencies, in Promoting national peace and security in Uganda. (iii) To establish whether there is a :ignificance relationship between International Terrorism Threats on National Peace and Stability. The :tudy comprised of a target population of 200 as a sample size of 100 was used with respondents' form nilitary officers, police officers, communities, victims of terrorism and suspected terrorists targeting the livisions of Nakawa, Central and Makindye in Kampala district. The data collection instruments were nainly self-administered questionnaires, which comprised of open and close-ended questions on addition o interviews. The researcher used both random and purposive methods in sampling. The findings ndicated that most respondents were male with (54%), ranged between 20-39 years of age with (66%), ,ver (50%) had bachelors' in education and majority (60%) had a length of experience between 6-10 rears. The findings on Level of International Terrorism Threats indicated that four ( 4) constructs were neasured and rated as follows: Political stability (average Mean=3.05), Trade (average Mean=2.94), ravel and tourism (average Mean=2.99) Human life threat (average mean =3.08) with an overall mean of 1.02 which was rated high. The findings revealed that the majority of people getting involved in ntemational terrorism were as a result of ideological perspective (40%) followed by equal percentage of ,sychological perspective and strategic perspective 30%-30% respectively. Regarding existing nternational te1Torism threats on national peace and stability in Uganda the findings reveal that, Security Lgencies (Army/Police) 24%, Somalis community (16%), other authorities (60%). The findings on -.rational Peace and stability revealed that four items were measured and rated as follows: Poverty average Mean=3.0l); Inforrnation Sharing (average Mean=2.94); National Border control (average v:lean=2.93); training and technology (average Mean=3.03); with an overall mean of 2.98. it was ecommended that; Carrying out regular surveys and inspections of vital installations and establishments 'or purposes of upgrading security measures; Community policing through mobilization and public Lwareness can1paign against terrorism; Building capacity through acquisition of specialization equipment md training; Target hardening of vital national infrastructure/installations; Effecting deployments foundation security, domination of venues of major events and foot and motorized patrols); Improvement ,f boarder security through integrated computerized boarder management systems for example the ,ersonal identification secure comparison and evaluation systems; Improvement of the passport and egistration for the national identity cards; Terrorism in all fonns and manifestations constitute one of the nost serious threats to international peace and security any acts of te1Torism are criminal and unjustifiable egardless of their motivation, whenever and by whosoever committed. A trend towards reinforcing ntelligence capabilities need to be underlined both at national level and at that of international ,rganizations; there is a need for strong region cooperation both in the political sense and in the sense of olidarity and also at the operational level. Terrorism poses a real and serious threat to the security and afety of the alliance and its members; need for regional training in modem counter terrorism techniques ike in the fight against chemical biological attack and cyber war first among others and need to enhance he regional forensic laboratory to capacity; In this sense, the researcher recommends that no government hould make concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. Justice is exercised to terrorists. Isolate and ,pply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior and bolster the :ounter terrorism capabilities of countries that work towards against terrorism. Increase publicity of the ,ctivities of state sponsor and countries that support terrorism in conjunction with first world states for :xample U.S. Both International relations theory of Ole RudolfHolsti (1881) and the Classical realism of kown, Chris (2009) which is a state level theory were proved right, state seek to increase their power.

V

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration ..................................................................................................................................... .i

Approval ........................................................................................................................................ ii

Dedication .................................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................................ .iv

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... v

Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... vi

List ofTables .................................................................................................................................. x

List of Figure ................................................................................................................................. xi

Acronyms .................................................................................................................................... xii

CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ............................................................................................ 1

1.0 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... !

1.1 Background ...................................................................................................................... ......... I

1.1.1. Historical Background ......................................................................................................................... 1

1.1.2. Theoretical Background ................................................................................................... 3

1.1.3. Conceptual Background .................................................................................................. .4

1.1.4. Contextual Background .................................................................................................... 6

1.2 Problem Statement ................................................................................................................... 6

1.3 Purpose of the Study ................................................................................................................ 8

1.4 Objectives of the Study ............................................................................................................ 8

1.4.1 General Objectives ............................................................................................................ 8

1.4.2 Specific Objectives ............................................................................................................ 8

1.5 Research Questions .................................................................................................................. 8

1.6 Hypothesis ................................................................................................................................ 9

1.7 Scope ........................................................................................................................................ 9

I. 7. I Content Scope ................................................................................................................... 9

1.7.2 Geographical Scope ........................................................................................................... 9

1.7.3 Time Scope ........................................................................................................................ 9

1.8 Significance of the Study ........................................................................................................ 9

1.9 Operational Definitions of Key Terms .................................................................................. 10 vi

CHAPTER TW0 ........................................................................................................................ 12

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE ............................................................................... 12

2.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 12

2.1 Theoretical Review ................................................................................................................ 12

2.1.1 Conceptual framework .................................................................................................... 15

2.2 International Terrorism Threats ............................................................................................. 16

2.1.1 Political stability .............................................................................................................. 18

2.1.2 Trade ................................................................................................................................ 21

2.1.3 Travel and tourism .......................................................................................................... 24

2.3 National Peace and stability ................................................................................................... 29

2.3.1 National peace and stability ........................................................................................... 31

2.3 .2 Information sharing ......................................................................................................... 34

2.3.3 National Border control. ................................................................................................. .35

2.3.4 Training and technology .................................................................................................. 36

2.4 Related studies ........................................................................................................................ 38

CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................................................... 41

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................. .41

3.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 41

3.1 Research Design ..................................................................................................................... 41

3.2 Research Population .............................................................................................................. .41

3.3 Sample Size ........................................................................................................................... .41

3.4 Sampling procedure ................................................................................................................ 43

3.5 Data collection methods ........................................................................................................ .43

3.5.1 Interviews ....................................................................................................................... .44

3.5.2 Questionnaires ................................................................................................................ .44

3.6 Validity and Reliability ......................................................................................................... .45

3.7 Data gather Procedures .......................................................................................................... 46

3. 7. I Before data gathering ..................................................................................................... .46

3 . 7.2 During data gathering ..................................................................................................... .4 7

3. 7.3 After data gathering ........................................................................................................ .4 7

3.8 Data Analysis and presentation ............................................................................................. .48 Vil

3.9 Ethical considerations ............................................................................................................ 48

3.10 Limitation of the Study ....................................................................................................... .49

CHAPTER FOUR ...................................................................................................................... 51

DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS ..................................... 51

4.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 51

4.1 Description of Respondents ................................................................................................... 51

4.2 International Te1TOrism Threats ............................................................................................. 53

4.3 National Peace and stability ................................................................................................... 64

4.4 Relationship between International Terrorism Threats on National Peace and Stability ...... 77

CHAPTER FIVE ........................................................................................................................ 79

DISCUSSIONS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............... 79

5.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 79

5 .1 Discussions of Findings ......................................................................................................... 79

5.1.1 Profile of the respondents ................................................................................................ 80

5.1.2 International Terrorism Threats ....................................................................................... 80

5.1.3 National Peace and Stability ........................................................................................... 83

5.2 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 85

5.3 Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 92

5.3.1 International Te1Torism Threats ....................................................................................... 92

5 .3 .2 National Peace and Stability ........................................................................................... 93

5.4 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 95

5.5 Areas for fmiher research/studies ......................................................................................... 98

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 99

APPENDICES .......................................................................................................................... 103

Appendix IA: Introduction letter from the college of higher degrees and research ................... 103

Appendix IB: Acknowledgement letter from the respondents ................................................... 104

Appendix II: Background information about the respondents for the security organs/agencies105

Vlll

Appendix III: Questionnaire to determine national peace and stability ..................................... 108

Appendix IV: Background information about the respondents for the Ugandan

community/authorities ......................................................................................... 109

Appendix v: The adopted Time Frame of the Study .................................................................. 113

Appendix Vi: Sketch Map of Uganda showing the location of Kampala District (Study Area)l 14

ix

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Sample size distribution ...................................................................... .42

Table 3.1.2: showing the approach sample size and methods of data collection ................. .43

Table 3. 1.3: Validity of the data analysis ............................................................ .45

Table 3.1.4: A cronbach alpha of coefficients for reliability instrument. ........................ .46

Table 4.1: Profile ofrespondents (n=l00) ............................................................. 52

Table 4.2: Level oflnternational Terrorism Threats (n=lOO) ........................................ 54

Table 4.3: Level of National Peace and stability (n=lOO) ........................................... 67

Table 4.4: Significant relationship between the International Terrorism Threats on National

Peace and Stability among Selected Divisions in Kampala District Uganda ............. 78

X

LIST OF FIGURE

Figure Page

Figure I: Conceptualization of variable ................................................................. 16

XI

ADF

AFIS

AMISON

AML

AU

CAR

CCTV's

CIA

CID

COMESA

CT

DRC

E.G

EAC

FBI

FIA

H.E

ICGLR

!DP

!GAD

INTERPOL

IR

IRA

JAT

LRA

LTTE

NGOs

NRM

SOP

SSA

ACRONYMS

Allied Democratic Force

Automated Fingerprint Identification System

African Mission in Somalia

Ant money Laundering Act

African Union

Central African Republic

Closed Circuit Televisions

Central Intelligent Agency

Criminal Investigations Department

Community of East and Central South Africa

Counter Terrorism

Democratic Republic of Congo

Example

East African Community

Federal Bureau oflnvestigations

Financial Intelligence Authority

His Excellence

International Conference on Great Lakes Region

Internally Displaced Persons

Intergovernmental Authority on Development

International Police

International Relations

Irish Republic Army

Joint Ant- Tetrnrism

Lords Resistance Army

Liberation Tigers ofTama!Ealam

Non Governmental Organizations.

National Resistance Movement

Standard Operational Procedure

Special Air service

XII

TPB Te1Torism Prevention Branch

UN United Nations

UPDF Uganda people Defense Force

UPF Uganda Police Force

us United States

USSR Union Soviet socialist republic

VECM Vector Error Correction model

WOT War on Terror

WWII World War Two

Xlll

1.0 INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

This chapter highlights the background of the study, problem of the study, purpose of the

study, objectives and research questions. The scope of the study and significance of the

study are also explained in this chapter.

1.1 BACKGROUND

This section presents historical, theoretical, conceptual and contextual backgrounds of the

study.

1.1.1 Historical Perspective

On and off, the use of terrorism can be traced to the present day. International terrorism

increased rapidly during the late 1960s and early 1970s; after a brief lull in activity, the

1980s began and ended with terrorist violence. By the end of the decade, terrorism had

become commonplace (D'Amore and Anuza 1986; Richter and Waugh 1986).

Comparatively fewer terrorist incidents have been recorded for the first half of the 90s;

however, their nature and magnitude are not easily comparable to those of past years'

events as indicated by the US Department of State, the overall threat of terrorism remains

very serious, 'the threat of terrorist use of materials of mass destruction is an issue of

growing concern' (US Depatiment of State, 2013:1). There are many external influences

on the tourism industry and on the flow of tourists; many of them have a significant

impact, such as natural and human-caused disasters. However, the possibility of potential

threat that accompanies terrorism causes a more severe reaction. For some countries,

however, persistent terrorism tai·nishes the destination's positive image and even

jeopardizes its entire tourism business. Tourism suffers in particulai· when prolonged

terrorist attacks affect tourist perceptions and when terrorist organizations specifically

target the travel and tourism industry.

I

Ever since time immemorial, international terrorism threats have been a vice

against the rights of communities in the entire world, and due to the nature and effects the

victims are exposed to by the perpetrators, the fate in Uganda is no exception either. This

research focused on Uganda who is stake holders of peace and stability (Aldis et al.,

2007). During the study the researcher looked at the world view and the African

perspective respectively as well (Aldis et al., 2007). The topic of terrorism is both

complex and emotive. It is complex because it combines so many different aspects of

human experience, including subjects such as politics, psychology, philosophy, military

strategy, and history, to name a few. Terrorism is also emotive because experiences of

ten-orist acts arouse tremendous feelings, and because those who see terrorists as

justified, often have strong feelings concerning the rightness of the use of violence (Aldis

et al., 2007). Without a doubt, terrorism evokes strong feelings whenever it is discussed.

A key challenge of understanding terrorism is both acknowledging the moral outrage at

terrorist acts, while at the same time trying to understand the rationale behind terrorism

(Africa over view, 2003).

The estimated number of deaths from terrorism worldwide rose from 3,361 m

2000 to 17,958 in 2013, according to a 2014 analysis by the Institute for Economics and

Peace. Largely because of deteriorating conditions in Syria, that figure rose about 60%

between 2012 and 2013 alone. Some 80% of all deaths in 2013 took place in five

countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria and the majority of incidents

claimed were attributed to just four groups: The Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL), Boko

Haram, the Taliban and al-Qaeda. However, 87 countries saw at least one terrorist

incident in 2013. Commentators have frequently speculated about the nature and

characteristics of terrorism, including the role of technology and social media in

perpetrating terrorist acts. Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a great deal of discussion

about the root causes of terrorist violence, but fewer rigorous empirical assessments have

been attempted. In terms of the link between economic growth and ten-orism, the existing

evidence is inconclusive: Some authors claim there is a positive link; others suggest there

is an inverse association; and some have found no statistically significant relationship.

Some of the latest evidence in this debate comes from a 20 I 5 study published in Oxford

Economic Papers, "Economic Growth and Terrorism: Domestic, International and

2

Suicide," which is based on a cross-national, time-series data analysis of 127 countries

for 1970-2007. The information for economic growth, as annual percentage growth in

GDP per capita in 2005, was obtained from the World Bank's World Development

Indicator 2013. Data measuring terrorism violence is from the Global Terrorism Database

(GTD). The author, Seung-Whan Choi of the University of Illinois, Chicago, also

controls for a number of variables, such as income inequality, democracy, state failure,

population and a variable designating Post-Cold War conditions.

Violence in opposition to a government is often targeted against soldiers and

those who govern. Terrorism, however, is characterized by the use of violence against

civilians, with the expressed desire of causing terror or panic in the population. Terrorism

is not unique to the 20th and 21st centuries. Terrorism existed in 18th century

revolutionary France during the reign of te1rnr, as well as among the Zealots of Palestine

in opposition to Roman rule some 2000years ago. Today, terrorist activities and

operations can be found in Israel, Kenya, Somalia ,Nigeria, Djibouti, Pakistan Uganda, to

name a few. Of particular concern here are the September 11 2001 suicide attacks against

the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the attempted attack that resulted in the

plane crash in Pennsylvania, the jolly 2010 attack in Uganda, the recent terrorist attacks

in Kenya, etcetera (Africa over view, 2003).

1.1.2. Theoretical Background

This study adopted the International relations theo1y of Ole Rudolf Holsti 1881. It is the

study of international relations from a theoretical perspective; it attempts to provide a

conceptual framework upon which international relations can be analyzed. Ole Holsti

describes international relations theories as acting like pairs of colored sunglasses that

allow the wearer to see only salient events relevant to the theo1y; example an adherent of

realism may completely disregard an event that a constructivist might pounce upon as

crucial, and vice versa. The three most popular theories are realism, liberalism and

constructivism.

The study also adopted a Classical realism is a state level theory that argues that all states

seek power. That is the first and last principle of state behavior. States seek to increase

their power; they seek to decrease the power of their enemies; and everything they do is

3

in the name of amassing power. States see other powerful states as rivals because power,

when it is not in your hands, is threatening. People are greedy, insecure, and aggressive,

so the states they govern will have those same characteristics. This doesn't mean war,

however. There can be peace, but a durable peace is based upon a stable balance of power

- the big players in the international systems are roughly equal in power resources, so

therefore no one thinks they can win a war. If you don't think you can win a war, you

generally don't start one (Aldis et al., 2007).

The element of risk as a component of tourist decisions has received limited attention

(Um & Crompton 1992; 1990; Sonmez & Graefe 1998b ). Potential tourists are often

exposed to media coverage of international political violence. The volatile relationship

between tourism and terrorism is magnified by the media in a manner to cloud actual

probabilities of being targeted by terrorists. To date there has been no theory of terrorism,

and of course its complicity with the media and tourism (Korstanje, 2010; Korstanje &

Clayton, 2012; Korstanje & Skoll, 2012; 2013). As a result, perceived risk may outweigh

reality in forming attitudes toward destinations. Travel risk should be studied in terms of

real and perceived risk and in relation to destination image and tourists attitudes, because

it is crucial for destination marketers to understand perceptions and attitudes in order to

devise promotional strategies to address concerns and to alter negative and reinforce

positive perceptions. Although previous studies have not explored perceived risk in

relation to Cohen's tourist typology, several studies have identified other factors that vary

among individuals and can influence perceived risk.

1.1.3. Conceptual Background

According to this study the independent variable is international Terrorism threat which

involves the ruthless, pre-meditated use of military weapons or forces to generate

multiple casualty incidents, in which random, innocent, defenseless and unrelated

civilians are the victims, or, the destruction of select physical assets of a State's

infrastructure, including cultural sites."Terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force

to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted." (Walter Liqueur)

"Terrorism is defined here as the recurrent use or threatened use of politically motivated

4

and clandestinely organized violence, by a group whose aim is to influence a

psychological concession from third parties !mown as targets, usually governments.

Tenorism is usually carried out under the political shelter of some sort of

proclaimed agenda in which the terrorists portray themselves as acting for virtuous or

popular interests. Ordinary egotism and wide crimes stem mostly from need, greed, or

passion. In contrast, most tenorism is compelled neither by need (since there are no poor

tenorists), nor passion (since most terrorist acts are clinically calculated in several

distinct phases).

The political cover that terrorists adopt in trying to justify their actions behind a

shield of virtue, is plainly absurd and hypocritical, since innocent and defenseless victims

are maimed and murdered in the name of furthering social justice and fighting

oppression. Neve1iheless, tenorists are able to win a certain number of heaiis and minds,

whatever the nature of their group or cause, uncomfmiably giving credence to Hitler's

Minister for propaganda who said "tell a lie that is big enough and repeat it often enough

and the whole world will believe it. "

Terrorism was frequently used throughout history by tyrants against the

oppressed, and by the oppressed against tyrants, but it now seems exclusively used by

tyrants and oppressors against the innocent (Burchill 2005). What is common to all forms

of tenorism is that they involve use of force or the threat of it; there are always victims

and targets; terror ( or extreme anxiety in the modern meaning of the word) is always

deliberately invoked, and all forms of terrorism are illegal. Society's oppressed or some

other worthy sounding cause, many are proud of their actions and indulge in self­

admiration. Under this harmer of altruism they conveniently satisfy a vai·iety of

personality and behavior disorders such as cruelty and power seeking; whereby vices

become virtues and cowardice becomes heroism. What many terrorists seek to pass off as

altruism is in reality, a perversion of egotism (Aldis et al., 2007)

Terrorists share many of the symptoms from which psychopaths suffer, including

the ability to convince to an extraordinary degree, great cunning and ai1 overwhelming

justification and rationalization of their actions. Like psychopaths, tenorists are often

obsessed with oppression and control of others. Altruists do not commit brutal murder,

the worthy sounding political causes professed by terrorists ai·e often paii of delusions

5

(and propaganda), in which they reconcile these lofty political ideals with their

personality or behavior disorders, as an attempt to legitimize brutal violence and

misconduct. Delusions can be very potent, Many terrorists eventually come to believe the

deception that they continually live out. Terrorism could be considered as the ultimate

expression of egotism or selfishness (Aldis et al., 2007). Most terrorists, especially their

organizers, take great pains to escape and avoid accountability for their actions. An

example of this is Osama bin Laden, who fled in late 200 I, soon after the invasion of

Afghanistan to remove his Al Qaida-dominated Taliban regime.

Most of society traditionally rejects terrorists and sees them for just what they are,

from a medical viewpoint; terrorists are irrational and mentally unhealthy, exhibiting the

symptoms of psychopathic disorder. From a moral or social point of view, terrorists

appear cowardly, vicious and anti-social. From a legal point of view, terrorist acts are

plainly criminal.

1.1.4. Contextual Background

This study was confined to Kampala District. The city's five divisions are: (a) Kampala

Central Division (b) Kawempe, ( c) Lubaga division, ( d) Makindye Division and ( e)

Nakawa division. The division comprises the central business district of the largest city in

Uganda and includes the areas of old Kampala, Nakasero and Kololo. These areas are the

most upscale business and residential neighborhoods in the city. The division also

incorporates low income neighborhoods including Kamwookya, Kisenyi and Kampala's

Industrial Area.

1.2 Problem Statement

International terrorism tlu·eats cut across borders and Uganda has been a victim of those

threats especially originating from Al-Shabaab terrorists group. A person's psychological

makeup certainly will play a role, but to what extent is unclear. Some may come to

tenorism not of any love for violence but rather to further their ideological goals. Others

may be motivated to use terror simply because it appears to be a useful strategic

alternative or may further the states objectives. Indeed, terrorism may occur for

psychological, ideological and strategic grounds all or once.

6

Somalia's Al-Qaeda linked terror group Al-shabaab claimed credit for the near

simultaneous twin bombings that ripped tlu·ough the Uganda capital Kampala July 11,

2010 killing 76 and injuring at least another 85 at Ethiopian restaurant and rugby club.

Al-shabaab had made numerous threats against Uganda and it has targeted Uganda troops

in Somalia which form much of the African Union Mission in Somalia Force in the horn

of Africa country. The attack demonstrated Al-Shabaab capability to follow up its threats

to strike internationally and its desire to remove barriers to its central of South and

Central Somali. Al-shabaab has long identified Uganda as a target. The group has killed

at least dozens of Uganda soldiers in Mogadishu since the start of 2010 using suicide

bombs; road side improvised explosive devices and mortar attacks. Al-shabaab selection

of its international target was well thought out and meticulously timed. The group's

primary objective was to influence the Uganda policy of support for AMISOM and to

provoke Uganda to withdraw its troops.

The causes of this movement of people include economic hardship due to various

natural calamities such as earthquakes, droughts, famine and floods, as well as economic

hardship due to lack of income. Political instabilities represent a central factor that is

forcing the population movements at both national and international level. According to

P. BronlS (2001 ), a state's national interest is not necessarily associated with international

welfare. But far from it, in most of the cases we see a different reality; if international

security is enhanced, so is national security. However, the phenomenon of migration is

perceived as being a greater challenge in the field of security towards failure states, rather

than it might affect any welfare postindustrial states. Nowadays we are facing a more

globalized security environment, the fact that is actually providing other states with the

possibility to create a better security for their own nations. In order to gain this security

inununity, the states should be able to enforce and protect the migration policies within

international security.

In spite of the fact the AU has tried to enforce its principles of 'legitimate

intervention' as enshrined in the Constitutive Act, there are still overt controversies as to

how it can effectively amass the required resources and the commitments that all member

states have pledged so far to offer for the realization of African security as in one way

through counter balancing security tin-eats and enabling a 'failed' member state like

7

Somalia to build up a government capable enough to restore order and peace. Moreover,

the issue of legitimacy of its operation has become a critical one.

Despite all the efforts put by both international and national actors to combat the

terror threats and operations, there are still terrorism threats on national peace and

stability in Uganda. It upon this background that the researcher took a more thorough

investigation to identify whether there is significant relationship between international

terrorism threats on national peace and stability in Uganda

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to establish the role played by the state security agencies in

Uganda in promoting national peace and stability, the challenges involved, mechanism

that are in place to address the challenges and possible recommendations.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.4.1 General Objectives

The general objective was to assess the international terrorism threats on national peace

and stability in Uganda.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

(i) To establish the existing international terrorism threats on national peace and stability

in Uganda.

(ii) To assess the extent of National Peace and security state agencies, in Promoting

national peace and security in Uganda.

(iii) To establish whether there is a significance relationship between International

Terrorism Threats on National Peace and Stability

1.5 Research Questions

(i) What are the existing international terrorism threats in Uganda?

(ii) What are the achievements and possible failures of security state agencies, 111

Promoting national peace and security in Uganda

(iii) What is relationship between International Terrorism Threats on National Peace and

Stability?

8

1.6 Hypothesis

This study was guided by a null hypothesis that states that, there is no significance

relationship between International Terrorism Threats on National Peace and Stability in

Kampala District, Uganda

1.7 Scope

1.7.1 Content Scope

The study was can-ied out with the intentions of examining the international terrorism

threats on national peace and stability in Uganda.

1. 7.2 Geographical Scope

The study was carried out from Uganda Police Force (UPF) especially from the

departments of counter terrorism, criminal and intelligence department and the

International Police (INTERPOL) Directorate. The study was also extended to Uganda

peoples defence forces (UPDF) especially from the units of Joint Ant-terrorism (JAT)

and chieftaincy of military intelligence (CMI). The researcher fmiher investigated from

Somali Community and authorities covering three divisions of Kampala, namely Nakawa

Division, Central Division and Makindye Division. The extraction of information was

limited to respondents from the above three Divisions.

1.7.3 Time Scope

The research considered the International terrorism threats, on national peace and

stability for the years between 1998 to 2015.

1.8 Significance of the Study. A study into the international terrorism threats on national peace and stability will

probably be of benefit to the state and all the concerned institutions, non government

organizations (NGO's), individuals, donors and other actors in the international arena.

The study probably highlight and inform the government and state security agencies in

specific on the challenges, strength and weakness of their activities in promoting peace

and stability in Uganda and prepare them for various expectations in future. The research

would also enable them to assess and establish new roles, principles and policies in

9

accordance to the dynamics of instability. The significance of the study would probably

equip students, researchers, conflict resolution actors with the skills and lmowledge about

the role of state security agencies in international tenorism threats which would probably

shift from solely ensuring peace and stability to encompass humanitarian activities and

promotion of human political rights.

Furthermore the importance of the study would probably address problem solving and

creating an enabling process involving both the making of proper policies that levels

peace and stability ground for all Ugandans.

The study would probably intend to analyze and give solutions to the changing range of

social problems arising from international terrorism threats, with the objective of

improving the conditions oflife of individuals who compose the society.

The study would probably act as the basis for other researchers who intend to carry out a

study in the same field of international relations and diplomacy in security studies, the

role of Uganda security agencies in promoting peace and stability.

Lastly, the study was carried out to meet the requirements of the disse1iation paper

necessary for the award of Master Degree in International Relations and Diplomatic

Studies.

1.9 Operational Definitions of Key Terms

Terrorism is commonly defined as violent acts (or threat of violent acts) intended to

create fear (terror), perpetrated for a religious, political, or ideological goal, and which

deliberately target or disregard the safety of non-combatants it refers to political,

ideological or religious violence by non-state actors including acts of unlawful violence

and war.

Terroristic Threats; A tenoristic threat is a crime generally involving a threat to commit

violence communicated with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a

10

building, or to cause serious public inconvenience, in reckless disregard of the risk of

causing such terror or inconvenience. It may mean an offense against property or

involving danger to another person that may include but is not limited to recklessly

endangering another person, harassment, stalking, ethnic intimidation, and criminal

mischief.

Peace; Peace is an occmTence of harmony characterized by lack of violence, conflict

behaviors and the freedom from fear of violence. Commonly understood as the absence

of hostility and retribution, peace also suggests sincere attempts at reconciliation, the

existence of healthy or newly heated interpersonal or international relationships,

prosperity in matters of social or economic welfare, the establishment of equality, and a

working political order that serves the true interests of all.

Stability; Situation in which things happen as they should, and there are no harmful

changes whether in political, economical or social stability. The ability of something to

remain balanced and not fall or shake.

11

2.0 Introduction

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents a review of relevant literature of this study. In order to investigate

the relationship between International TeITorism Threats and National Peace and

Stability, This chapter also highlights the conceptual framework, and related literature on

International TeITorism Threats and National Peace and Stability. Terrorism threats

especially in Uganda have existed for many years and the information about the teITorism

tlu-eats among the Uganda security agencies have failed to address the problem. The

research was carried out from a wider perspective, a lot more was discovered and

recommendations was made to curb the problem country wide. In this respect the

research examined the historical background of international terrorism tln·eats specific to

state security agencies in the three divisions of Kampala district and how they can be

rectified.

2.1 Theoretical Review

The survey of the relevant literature indicates that this study necessarily required the use

of a significant array of sources focusing on various equally pe1tinent issue-areas and

drawing from a number of sub-disciplines and cross disciplines. The primary issue-areas

in the literature upon which this paper builds are constructivist theory and constructivist

contemporary international terrorism (Aldis et al., 2007)

Contemporary constructivist thought in IR is influenced by a rather small number of

seminal texts- most notably of Wendt (1987), 1992, 1995, 1998, 1999), Kratochwil

(1989) and Onut (1989)- each of which provides a some what unrefined and disjointed

account of the perspective. That being said there is a wealth of refined and coherent

retrospective accounts of the tradition's emergence development and division by authors

such as price and reus-smit (1998) Hopf (1998), Risse and Sikkink (1999), Finnemore

and Sikkink (2001), Barkin (2003) and Philips (2007). With the benefit of hind sight,

these texts provide more straight forward understandings of the utility and limitation of

constructivism in enquiry. This overview of constructivism in IR is also implemented by

12

a broader understanding of the emergence of construcitivism in the philosophy of science

provided by authors such as Kukla (2000).

As contemporary transnational terrorism is a complex and popular issue-area, there are

myriad texts, focusing on all facets of the phenomenon from various disciplinary

orientations. Relevant somce texts range from terrorist typologies (Rapoport, 200 I, 2002,

2004; Whittaker, 2003; Cronin, 2003) to multi-disciplinary article collections on political,

social and psychological factors motivating new terrorist action (Bjorgo, 2005;

Richardson, 2006 Pedahzur, 2005), to counter terrorism texts by security scholars

(O'heil, 2003; Simon, 2003; Aldis and Herd, 2007), to broader overviews of

contemporary terrorism in general (Pettiford & Harding, 2003; Manhan & Grisel, 2003).

While there is individual focus upon achieving a better understanding of terrorism

motivation and upon potential avenues towards effectively combating new terrorist

action, seldom are these pursuits coherently and meaningfully coupled in a single text, as

this paper in part, aims to achieve (Schlagheck 2007). In order to fully appreciate the

significance and uniqueness of the constructivist approach, as well as its inherent

utilityand value in analyzing contemporary international terrorism threats, it is necessary

to both place within a disciplinary context and to fully expand upon its core tenets.

The most essential trait of international political activity is its non-static nahire

(Phillips, 2007:60). Despite its comparative youth as an academic tradition, myriad

theoretical ebbs and flows within the IR discipline reflect this elementary characteristic of

global politics (Gettleman, 2009). Theories have repeatedly proclaimed to have unearthed

essential, universal truth regarding global political interaction and functioning, only for

the structure and content of the international system upon which they have predicated to

suddenly, due to some water shed event, mutate in character, thereby crippling their

broad-spectrum analytical utility (Walker, 2007:28, Barber, 1999:33-35).

The phenomenon is perhaps most famously encapsulated in the disciplinary

fallout following the unprecedented conclusion of the cold war, where the bipolar,

rational self interested, state centric world order which neo-realist theory-the dominant

13

voice in IR at the time. So thoroughly accounted for, ceased to exist in reality (Price &

Reus-Smit, 1998:265).

The contemporary era of global politics is one in which the international system is devoid

of a concrete status quo (Schlagheck 2007). The ultimately unknown consequences of

globalization, unipolarity, state failure, the erosion of state sovereignty and prominence

of anti-communitarian non-state entities including transnational tenorist groups, preclude

traditional IR theories from providing an adequate disciplinary exemplar (Phillips,

2007:60; Smith, 2001 :225). It is in this climate that an approach to IR such as

constructivism which rejects the statistic determinants of traditional theories, which

stresses the inherently volatile nature of global political reality and which does not

concern itself with law like universal generations regarding such a reality is endowed

with substantial utility and worth. (Wedt, 1992:392-393; Finnermore & Sikkink,

2001 ;394;Philips, 2007:60).

Somewhat fittingly, the most convenient starting point for an exposition of

constructivist theory in IR is found in the writings of one of its most famous pioneers,

Alexander Wendt. It is simple asse1tion that "Anarch is what states make of it" (Wendt,

1992:391), has become the Mantra of all constructivist analysis in IR. Wendts Maxim

reflects the essential nature of the constructivist perspective the assertion that the

international system, as posited by positivist theories, is falsely presented as a natural

arrangement of political activity and that, rather, such an anangement, and its

characteristics of anarchy and hierarchical distribution of capabilities are but inter

subjectively established social constructions (Wendt, I 992:394, Finnermore & Sikkink,

2001: 392-393; Hopf: 173-174).

Drug trafficking, owing to its links with illicit international networks, has become

a key factor with regard to threats against international security. In its recent report the

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime revealed the role that drug trafficking plays in

funding, not only the insurgency in Afghanistan, but also extremist groups in a number of

countries in Central Asia. The terrorist networks finance their activities partially through

drug trafficking, without the drug traffickers themselves necessarily being aware of it.

The international community recognized the link between drugs and international

14

security in the political statement adopted at the 52nd session of the Commission on

Narcotic Drugs (March 2009). Drug trafficking is a global problem; it is not enough just

to look at its economic and social consequences, it must be addressed by the institutions

responsible for international peace and security. As underlined by the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime in its 2008 annual report, the international community must

make global measures to tackle the cross-cutting threats of drug-trafficking, organized

crime, corruption and terrorism a key priority.

2.1.1 Conceptual framework

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework National Peace and Stability (DV) International Terrorism Threats

(IV) -' ' Intervening ' ' ' variables Poverty ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' .:. Information Sharing

- Political stability

- Trade ,.. .. - Travel and Tourism Policies and National Border control

Human Life Threats , Regulations --

• Source: Field assessment (2015)

Training and Technology

Source : Field assessment (2015)

Figure 1: illustrate the relationship between the independent variable (International

Terrorism Threats) and (National Peace and Stability). Terrorists would have to become

vastly more capable of inflicting damage than they have so far shown themselves to be.

International Terrorism threats create roots for the development of regional and global

tensions. Drug trafficking and related transnational organized crime encourages money

15

laundering and makes possible the financing of non-governmental armed groups.

Organized crime networks threaten effective state control on borders and territories. They

undermine the authority of states, spread co1Tuption and weaken economic development.

Therefore, they pave the way for radicalisation processes that can lead to violent

extremism and terrorism. Insurgents and criminals develop close ties to profit from this

instability and in some cases create the conditions for such instability.

As a matter of fact, transnational threats are a destabilizing factor in every crisis where

the United Nations operates. They take advantage of the weakness of states in conflict

situations and make the return to peace and economic development a more protracted and

more difficult process for those states. However, in the last decades, advances in

technology, open borders and open markets created greater cross-border oppo1tunities for

criminal groups. As a result, organized crime has diversified, gone global, and has

reached macro-economic prop01tions (Muthuma, G. 2007a). It developed even closer links

with drug trafficking, corruption and terrorism. It poses a greater threat to national and

global security than when the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was

adopted. No pa1t of the world is immune. Paiticularly vulnerable are post-conflict

regions, areas where the rule of law is weak and countries that suffer from under­

development.

2.2 International Terrorism Threats

The concept of terrorism is used to cover many phenomena. Despite the fact that

te1mrism recently seems to be equated with violence that is justified by the Islam, the

origins of terrorism lie in a period long before 9/11/2001. Giddens for example states that

the word 'terrorism' has its origins in the French Revolution of 1789. Also in the 20th

century and 21 st century the world has experienced terrorism on large-scale. Nazi

Germai1y being the most notorious exainple, a more recent exainple of terrorism would

be the terrorist methods that were used by separatist movements like the Basque

Euskadita Askatasuna (ET A) and the terrorist attacks by the A I shabaab.

terrorism is neither a political philosophy nor a movement, nor is it a synonym for

political violence in general. It is a special means or method of conflict, which has been

employed by a wide variety of factions and regimes. It is premeditated and systematic,

16

and aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror. The modern word terror and

terrorism are derived from the Latin verb terrere, to cause to tremble, and deterre, to

frighten from. Terrorism and terrorist did not come into use until the period of the French

Revolution in the l 790's. The term was used by Edmund Burke in his polemic against the

French Revolution, and came to be used to denote those revolutionaries who sought to

use terror systematically either to further their views or to govern, whether in France or

elsewhere.

A key feature of terrorism is that it is directed at a wider audience or target than the

immediate victims. It is one of the earliest forms of psychological warfare. The ancient

Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, conveyed the essence of the method when he wrote, 'kill

one, frighten ten thousand'. An inevitable corollary is that terrorism entails attacks on

random and symbolic targets, including civilians, in order to create a climate of extreme

fear among a wider group. Terrorists often claim to be carefully selective and

discriminating in their choice of targets, but to the communities that experience the

terrorist campaign the attacks are bound to seem arbitrary and indiscriminate. In order to

create the wide spread sense of fear he seeks, the terrorist deliberately uses the weapons

of surprise and disproportionate violence in order to create a sense of outrage and

insecurity. As Raymond Aron observes:' an action of violence is labelled "te1Torist"

when its psychological effects are out of all proportion to its purely physical result. The

lack of discrimination helps to spread fear, for if no one in particular is a target than no

one can be safe' It is this characteristic which differentiates terrorism from tyrannicide

and individual political assassination

International terrorism disregards any concept of delimited areas of combat and has little

respect for neutral territory. Accordingly, terrorists have repeatedly taken their often

parochial struggles to other, and sometimes very distant, third paiiy countries and there

deliberately involved people including tourists completely unconnected with the

terrorists' cause or grievances in violent incidents designed to generate attention a11d

publicity.

17

Generally it is true that ten-orist groups that constitute real threats to a society cannot be

created in countries where there are no major causes for complaint and no dissident

groups have appeared. Of course, events such as recessions, globalization and

modernization and wars will generate sufficient dissatisfaction for some residents of

many societies, and potential dissidents can then find plenty of people to draw upon for

recruits and support in attacks (Lutz and Lutz, 2008), this has been evident in the cun-ent

Syrian conflict which has spread into Iraq. In general, scholars have concluded that

religion, is neither the chicken nor the egg when it comes to creating ten-orists. Rather,

religion is one of many factors in the explosive brew of politics, culture and psychology

that leads fanatics to target the innocent and take their own lives in the process.

Likewise, there is no evidence that poverty is linked with ten-orism in any systematic way

even though it obviously is a factor in some circumstances (Horgan, 2005; Maleckova,

2005). Terrorism exists because the politically weak and disenfranchised have no other

means by which to realize their objectives since they will not be taken seriously by the

normal population. Terrorism, therefore, can place political change on the agenda

(Crenshaw, 1998). Violence can also be fuelled by the lack of opportunity for political

participation in a society (Crenshaw, 2003). There are some factors that have been shown

to contribute to the occurrence of terrorist violence in many circumstances.

2.1.1 Political stability

Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (pp. 8-98) provides a succinct

definition. "Political stability is the ability of a people's government to share, access, or

compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective

benefits and services of the state (Gupta et al.,2004). This rests on four necessary

conditions to achieve: provision of essential services, stewardship of state resources,

civic participation and empowerment, and political moderation and accountability (Frey

et al., 2004). Political stability refers to an end state where the state provides essential

services and serves as a steward of state resources. Government officials are held

accountable through political and legal processes. The population can participate in

governance through civil society organizations, an independent media, and political

18

parties (Blomberg et al,. 2004). Stable government is the mechanism through which the

basic human needs of the population are largely met, respect for minority rights is

assured, conflicts are managed peacefully through inclusive political processes, and

competition for power occurs nonviolently. national and sub-nation government

institutions may work with a range of non-state paiiners to provide some of the

government functions. "(Gupta et al.,2004)

International terrorism and tourism are paradoxically connected via their mutual

characteristics such as both crossing national borders, both involve citizens of different

countries, and they both utilize travel and communications technologies, (Schlagheck,

1988; cited in Sonmez & Graefe, 1998b ). The relationship between tourism and terrorism

first gained international notoriety in 1972 during the Munich Olympic Games. The

Palestinian attack on Israeli athletes left eleven people dead and introduced a global

television audience of nearly 800 million viewers to terrorism (Sonmez and Graefe

1998a). Since then, international tourists have been acutely awai·e of this relationship.

Despite a series of terrorist incidents, since 9/11 the total number of people worldwide

that have been killed by terrorists is about the same as the number of those who have

drowned in bathtubs in the U.S (Bobbitt, 2008).

The impact of 9/11 on travel and tourism flows to the United States has been evaluated in

several studies. Lee et al.(2005), for exainple, evaluate the initial impact of the 9/11

attacks on the demand for air travel to the United States using a time series intervention

model and found a significant overall drop in demand. Similai·ly, Blunk et al.(2006)

evaluate whether post-9/11 US airline travel volume returned to its pre-9/11 trend and

found that it had not by 2004. A more disaggregated analysis is provided by Bonham et

al.(2006) who quantify the initial impact of 9/11 on tourist aiTivals to Hawaii and their

subsequent recovery using a Vector Error Correction model (VECM). The results

indicate that substitution away from foreign arrivals and towards US citizen arrivals took

place in Hawaii and that the positive shock to US citizen aiTivals offset the negative

shock to foreign arrivals. By 2003, the Hawaiian tourism industry had fully recovered

from the initial 9/11 shock. In addition to assessments of air travel, studies have also

19

quantified the costs of 9/11 due to substitution away from air travel. Blalock et al.(2009),

for example, quantify the increase in the number of auto driving fatalities due to

substitution away from airline travel after 9/11. Despite the well-documented decline in

foreign arrivals to the United States after 9/11, the negative post-9/11 trend in arrivals

eventually began to rebound during the 2002 to 2007 period.

However, that endowment has not prevented Uganda from suffering terrorist threats and

acts (Alex de Waal, 2004). Local terrorists orchestrated the attacks, while most of the

threats come from international terrorist groups (Rainer Hulsse, 2007). Because of these

actions and threats, the Ugandan Parliament enacted the Anti-Te11'orism Act in 2002,

shortly after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. The Act defined terrorism as "Any act of

violence or threat of violence ca11'ied out for purposes of influencing government or

intimidating the public and for a political, religious, social and economic aim,

indiscriminately without due regard for the safety of others or property." (Cedric de

Coning 2004). It should be noted that most local terrorists in Uganda originated as

insurgents who failed to win the supp01i of the population. Over time, these groups began

resorting to coercing and forcing local people to join them through acts of abduction,

intimidation, and violence (David, 2001)

Acts by the LRA and ADF introduced Ugandans to terrorism situation the fact that they

were supported by Al-Qaeda and Al-shabaab. The LRA says it is fighting because it

wants to rule Uganda according to the Ten Commandments in the Bible, and the group

has been trained and facilitated by external forces like the Alshabaab and including some

sovereign countries. LRA members have committed despicable atrocities against the

people of northern Uganda, including abducting young boys to force them to join their

ranks; taking young girls for sex; cutting off the limbs, ears, and lips oflocal people; and

killing innocent civilians indiscriminately (Rainer Hulsse 2007). If those actions were

not excruciating enough, the LRA has admitted to cooking body parts of the dead and

then feeding those paiis to close relatives of the victim. As a result, many Ugandans were

forced to abandon their villages and live in internally displaced people's (IDP) camps

where the UPDF could effectively protect them. These acts of terrorism by the LRA were

20

not committed only against Ugandans, but also against innocent people in Southern

Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. The LRA

thus was transformed from a local terrorist organization into a regional/international one

since it is operating from beyond the boarders (Global te1Torism, 2002)

The ADF, just like the LRA, received training and facilitation from some external forces

especially the al-Qaida and Alshabaab, one of their main objectives was to rule Uganda

using Shelia law. They operated from the eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of

Congo (DRC), committing atrocities against the people of western Uganda and eastern

DRC raiding and burning down schools and villages, and killing innocent people

indiscriminately (Rainer Hulsse 2007). ADF not only teITorized the rural population, but

they also used clandestine operatives to plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in

commuter taxis, buses, bars, and busy streets in Kampala City. They also abducted and

ruthlessly killed some civilians who refused to cooperate with them (Global terrorism,

2002)

The American embassy in Uganda was on Al Qaeda's list of possible targets when the

U.S. embassies in Nairobi-Kenya, and Dar es Salaam-Tanzania, were simultaneously

bombed on August 7, I 998. Alshabaab continues to threaten Uganda, and being an

Islamist terrorist organization directly linked to Al Qaeda that operates in war-torn

Somalia and wants Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers out of Somalia. Members of Al

Shabaab made several suicide and direct attacks on UPDF bases in Mogadishu, a port

city in Somalia, as well as performing roadside ambushes and also trying on several

occasions to infiltrate into Uganda and attack from within. Indeed, on July 11, 2010, Al

Shabaab used suicide bombers in two separate attacks in Kampala City to kill 76 football

fans watching the World Cup finals. Since then, they have continued to issue threats of

attacks within Uganda and Burundi (Global teITorism, 2002)

2.1.2 Trade

Te1rnrism, as understood by Nitsch and Schumacher, is the "use, or threat of use, of

anxiety-inducing extra-normal violence for political purposes. when such action is

21

intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the

immediate victims and when its ramifications transcend national boundaries. Because

these events are intensely emotional and extremely visual, the loss of life and climate of

fear produced have profound impacts on general human well being. Frey, Luechinger,

and Stutzer (2004) find that the implications on life-satisfaction for populations affected

by terrorist activity far outweigh the economic impacts. In their study of subjective well­

being data, they find that, in the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, individuals would

be willing to pay, on average, 41 % of their annual income for a reduction in terrorist

activity to a level comparable to unaffected parts of the country (Korstanje, et al., 2012).

While it is imperative to recognize the impact political violence has on the family unit,

the aggregate impact of terrorism on domestic economies and international trade flows is

staggering (Blomberg et al,. 2004)

Empirical data suggests that terrorism poses a risk to production as well. Oil producing

nations consistently lose profits from domestic attacks on supply chains, pipelines, and

distribution mechanisms. (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004) In the case of oil exporting

nations, terrorist activity inhibits the central government's ability to properly estimate tax

revenue, limits income from labor in production industries, and increases the insurance

premiums for multinational firms and government owned enterprises operating in the

petroleum sector (Blalock, et al., 2009). Additionally, occurrences of terrorist violence

raise the cost of doing business, thereby influencing the predictability of current account

equilibriums. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) also contend that spontaneous nature of

terrorist action negatively impacts the ability of firms to execute business as their

presence raises the level of uncertainty. In addition, stronger security measures make

international trade more expensive while increased delivery times and higher border

precautions inhibit product mobility. Disruption of supply chain activity results in lower

profitability especially to firms whose products must compete with firms whose supply is

not disrupted.

Events also influence a country's capital account. Eldor and Melnick (2004) conclude

that while terrorist attacks can have a real impact on a firm' s expected profits, their

22

analysis finds that financial markets incorporate the business premiums associated with

ten-orist events even though they find noe.vidence that markets become desensitized over

time (Bruck, 2004). Industrialized countries with liberal economic systems efficiently

respond to terrorist events because monetary autonomy promotes investor confidence.

Gupta and Clements et al. find that prolonged terrorist violence, especially in middle and

low income nations, forces governments to divert investment from economically viable

sectors to military and defense spending (Blomberg et al,. 2004)

Equity markets are also affected in times of terrorist activity. Because information travels

quickly, knowledge of uncertainty in the financial markets can induce decisions rapidly,

exacerbating contagion and spreading investor panic (Roubini, et al., 2005). As investors

access information about specific events, they make assessments about firms' ability to

cope with potential political, societal, and economic changes, discounting the value of

current and future performance (Blalock, et al., 2009). Since stock market indices, and

currency rates for that matter, are representative of all individual equity and currency

portfolios, a market's positive or negative movement is characteristic of the aggregate

portfolios within that market (Frey et al., 2004)

Chen and Siems (2004) assert that while terrorist events tend to trigger a negative

reaction, the degree to which contagion effects domestic capital markets depends on the

financial sector's supply of adequate liquidity. Higher liquidity promotes stability by

buffering against fluctuations in investor confidence (Li et al., 2004). As the preceding

work of Chen and Siems (2004) suggests, policy reactions can dictate the economic

impact of tetTorist events. Following much of the current literature, Blomberg et al.

(2004) find that terrorism is associated with a diversion of spending from investment to

government expenditure (Blomberg et al,. 2004). This necessitates higher borrowing

from foreign governments and institutional investors. For OECD countries with less

volatile currencies, issuing debt does not have many long term implications other than

possibly increasing the volume of foreign bound remittances. For lower income nations,

confronting terrorism through goverrnuent spending requires sale of foreign reserves and

production of domestic cun-ency, increasing inflation (Roubini, et al., 2005)

23

Expansion of government spending due to terrorist events is associated with lower

growth andhigher inflation (Blomberg et al,. 2004). Disruption of economic activities

compromises the stability of the fiscal account by eroding the tax base, lowering the

efficiency of tax administration, and distorting the composition of public spending. Gupta

et al. (2004) find that catastrophic events not only destroy po1iions of the tax base but

hamper a government's ability to collect receipts (Blomberg et al., 2002). Lower fiscal

revenues are exacerbated by the spillover effects of increased government spending. High

defense and security expenditures crowd out resources available to the economy for

private investment and public spending (Blomberg et al,. 2004). However, positive

supply-side spillover of defense spending in non-defense sectors encourages resource

mobilization of savings and investment. Gupta et al. (2004) additionally conclude that

government safeguards that follow terrorist activities provide internal and external

security to endorse private savings and promote foreign investment.

2.1.3 Travel and Tourism

Even its demonstrated economic success does not shield international tourism from the

sinister power of terrorism. While numerous natural and human-caused disasters can

significantly impact the flow of tourism, the threat of danger that accompanies te1rnrism

or political turmoil tends to intimidate potential tourists more severely. Fear of random

terrorist violence is not new, but the attention it has commanded from scholars can be

traced back only a decade. As international terrorism peaked during the mid-80s, its

inevitable effects on tourism became the object of serious concern. More recently, the

1991 Persian Gulf War and the possibility of related global terrorism refocused attention

on the topic. This continues to intensify as a result of te1Torist incidents and political

turmoil which make headlines around the world. The impact of terrorism on the travel

and tourism indust1y can be enormous. It can lead to unemployment, homelessness,

deflation, and many other social and economic ills. The contribution of tourism for many

countries is so great that any downturn in the indust1y is a cause of major concern for

many governments. The repercussions are left in many other industries associated with

tourism like airlines, hotels, restaurants and shops that cater to the tourists and allied

24

services. Terrorism is an enigmatic and compelling phenomenon, and its relationship

with tourism is complex and multifaceted. This paper aims to clarify this relationship and

exan1ines the relationship between selected factors and tourists' decision-making process

for destination choice. Tourists' risk perception associated with tenorism served as a

basis for the analysis (Chen et al., 2004)

International travel and tourism is a significant contributor to economic growth and

development, with worldwide growth in international tourist arrivals outpacing national

income growth one out of every two years over the past 30 years. The growth continues,

one billion tourists have travelled the world in 2012, marking a new record for the

international tourism sector that accounts for one in every 12 jobs and 30% of the world's

services exports (WTO, 2013). Receipts from international tourism in destinations around

the world grew by 4% in 2012 reaching US$ 1,075 billion. This growth is equal to a 4%

increase in international tourist arrivals over the previous year which reached 1,035

million in 20 I 2. An additional US$ 2 I 9 billion was recorded in receipts from

international passenger transp01i, bringing total exports generated by international

tourism in 2012 to US$ 1.3 trillion (WTO, 2013). For many developing countries, travel

and tourism serves as the primary expo1i industry. However, in terms of overall trade

dollars, it is industrialized countries that are some of the largest beneficiaries of inbound

international travel. The major threats to the industry are socio-economic problems

which in most cases lead to an increase in the crime rates but, the threat of terrorism

remains on an even higher alert.

Travel and tourism's demonstrated economic success does not shield it from the sinister

power of terrorism. While numerous natural and human-caused disasters can significantly

impact the flow of tourists, the threat of danger that accompanies terrorism tends to

intimidate potential tourists more severely. However, the fear of random terrorist

violence is not anything new, but the heightened attention it has commanded from

scholars can be traced back to the I Ith September 200 I tenorists attacks in the USA. The

terrorism and tourism literature has several foci: terrorists' motives for targeting tourists

25

or the industry; impacts of terrorism on tourism demand; and possible solutions for

tourists to help minimize their risks.

It is logical to believe that understanding terrorist goals may help untangle the

relationship between terrorism and tourism. Not all may agree on terrorists' motives, but

several studies attempt to explain the nature of the terrorism tourism relationship. It is

evident from the literature that targeting tourists or the industry is quite deliberate and

helps terrorists achieve several goals (publicity, economic disruption, ideological

opposition to tourism). In one of the earliest articles on the topic, Richter (1983)

illustrates the symbolic nature of the terrorism tourism relationship by drawing parallels

between peaceful international tourism and diplomatic relations. She suggests that

tourists are targeted because they are viewed as ambassadors for their countries, as soft

targets, and often because of their "symbolic value as indirect representatives of hostile or

unsympathetic governments" (Richter 1983; Richter and Waugh 1986:235). This concept

was fatally demonstrated during the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro yacht by

Palestinian terrorists. The selection of the only Jewish American on board as the one

passenger to be killed is anything but coincidental. Over the years, terrorist recognition of

the political significance of international tourism has been repeatedly and tragically

communicated. According to Richter, terrorism involving citizens of other countries may

be a response to strict limits on political expression: "terrorism against one's own citizens

may in fact go unmentioned by a media controlled by the hostile government"

(1983:328). The reason is simple and obvious and has been demonstrated by numerous

incidents: when nationals of other countries become involved, news coverage is

guaranteed. This way, terrorists know they will secure media attention while curtailing

their government's ability to censor news content. When tourists are kidnapped or killed,

the situation is instantaneously dramatized by the media, which also helps the political

conflict between terrorists and the establishment reach a global scale. Terrorists achieve

the exposure they crave (Richter 1983) and the media increases its circulation and/or

ratings.

26

I L

Terrorists' goals are classified broadly as revolutionary (narrow or broad,

antigovernment, including overthrow of the regime) or sub-revolutionary (including

policy and personnel changes). More specifically, objectives are classified as ideological,

strategic, and tactical (Richter and Waugh 1986). Ideological objectives are long-range in

nature and may involve a national struggle. Tactical objectives, which are short -range

and motivated by legitimized concerns, often involve robberies and choice of targets

from affluent tourism locations, tourists themselves who are vulnerable to attack, and

res01i areas at which socioeconomic and political elites reside-strongly resembling

everyday criminal activity. R

2.1.4. Human life threat

Wahab (1996) and Tarlow (2005) agree that tourism is targeted by ten-orists because it is

seen as outsiders representing a mode of neo-colonialism or a threat to their social norms,

traditions and religious convictions. One of the most infamous acts of ten-orism against

tourists occurred in Egypt in 1997 when gunmen killed 71 tourists outside of Luxor.

Wahab (1996) fmihermore explains that Egypt's ten-orist attacks against tourists actually

represent their aspiration to revive traditional Islamic societal rules to oppose the

corruption that modernity brings, which is seen as a divergence from traditional Islam.

At the national level, governments can also do much to implement tighter security, more

open visa regimes and to employ intelligent rather than punitive taxation policies. If the

right steps are taken, travel & tourism can be a true force for good. Despite tourism

economic strength, terrorism and political turmoil present major challenges to the

industry. Weimann & Wim1 (1994), in their book, The Theatre of Terror, suggest that

ten-orist activities have a major impact on international tourism of a country and are the

largest economic factor in the equation between te1Tor and foreign tourism. This means

terrorism, no doubt, has an effect on the flow of foreign exchange into a country because

of its negative impact on international tourism (Arana, et al., 2008)

The risk perception of te!1'orism may cause travel anxiety towards a destination

(Korstanje, 2009). Different levels of risk perception together with other internal factors

may determine a tourist's motivation to travel, their awareness of destination alternatives,

27

the level of concern given to safety and terrorism threat, the extent of their information

search, evaluation of alternatives, and therefore their destination choice. Attitude is one

of the main determinants of tourist buying behaviors (Bhattarai, et al., 2005).

An individual with negative attitudes toward a destination due to a ten-orist

incident may exhibit high levels of concern for safety, and this is likely to result in a

negative outcome for the travel decision (Korstanje, 2009). External factors related to

te1Torism, such as media reports about a ten-orist incident or treats, tourism authorized

advisories, the recovery campaign and so on, have an influence on tourists' perceptions

of the affected destinations, their attitude towards travel and their image of the

destinations. Where there were formerly attacks or hijacking which affected individual

tourists, we are now seeing a disturbing trend where ten-orism is directed against tourists

and tourist destinations (Alden, 2008). Terrorists use the tourist system to attract global

media attention through spectacular attacks on tourists or the tourist infrastructure. As a

result, tourists avoid these destinations, which again impacts the travel and tourism

industry. The greatest impact on tourist demand comes from terrorist attacks where

tourists and locals are the direct target or victims of the attack.

Guerrilla warfare or civil insurrections are also not covered by the concept of terrorism,

because these phenomena are not primary aimed at civilians but on military targets

instead."Uganda is truly the pearl of Africa," said Sir Winston Churchill. Many people

would agree with that description, saying this small country in Eastern Africa that lies on

the equator has been blessed with the best nature can offer humanity (Canada Department

of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 1999).

History shows that terrorism has been more effective as an auxiliary weapon in

revolutionary and national liberation struggles. Most of the key modern theorists and

leaders of revolutionary insurgency, such as Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara, have

recognised the dangers of depending on terrorism and have come down against giving it a

major role in the struggle for revolution. The few cases where terrorism played a major

part in bringing about sweeping political change arose in a limited number of colonial

independence struggles against foreign rule. Included in this group would be the

circumstances surrounding the end of the Palestinian Mandate after the terrorist campaign

28

of the Irgun (National Military Organization) and Stern (Fighters for the Freedom of

Israel) and the British decision to withdraw fro the Suez Canal zone base together with

the campaigns which lead to the British to withdraw from Cyprus and Aden, and the

French to withdraw from Algeria. In all these cases special conditions existed which

made terrorism a more potent weapon: (i) due to humanitarian and judicial restraints the

occupying power was unwilling to carry through draconian measures to wipe out the

terrorist organizations; (ii) in each case there were inter-communal power struggles

within the colony which rendered peaceful diplomatic settlement and withdrawal difficult

if not nigh impossible; (iii) the terrorists who succeeded in these conditions (as in Aden

up until 1968) enjoyed massive if not solid suppo1i from their own ethnic groups, and this

created an almost impenetrable barrier for the intelligence branches on which the

government security forces depended on for success, and a vast reservoir of active and

tacit collaboration and support or their terrorist operatives. Even taking into account the

influence of terrorism as an auxiliary tactic in revolutionary and independence struggles

and in the rise of fascism between the First and Second World Wars, the overall track

record of terrorism in attaining major political objectives is abysmal.

2.3 NATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY

Peace and stability are of high impo1iance in promoting economic development of

individuals and society at large and that political stability is the key to progress and

development as it promotes all aspects of security, economic and social development in a

country (Gupta, Rakesh. 1998) The impact of national instability on the security of

communities is evident as societies which are unstable, are experiencing unrest and

security changes. This is because insecurity is an inevitable result of instability (Alex de

Waal, 2004). Man, being political by nature, seeks to live in a humane society where

there's security, stability and harmony, away from conflicts, terrorism threats and wars.

The blessing of security and stability is reflected on economic development, which is a

lifeline for any society. Hence, security and stability have direct, long term effects on the

creation of a sound, competitive economic environment that have positive impacts on

citizenry and society as a whole.

29

some terrorists may be poor students of history and may continue to believe the

they can repeat the success of groups such as EOKA (National Organization of Cyproit

Fighters in Cyprus and the FLN (National Liberation Front) in Algeria, not realising that

their own situations are not truly colonial in this sense, and therefore not comparable; (ii)

some may fully recognise the severe limitations of terrorism as a means of attainting

strategic goals, but may see sufficient tangible short-term rewards from terrorism, such as

huge publicity, the gaining of ransoms, securing the release of fellow terrorists from gaol

etc., to make it worth while to use it as an auxiliary weapon; (iii) some may be motivated

by the expressive value of the activity rather than the instrumental/operational value, and

may wish to continue the campaign primarily because it is a relative quick and easy way

to express their hatred of their opponents and the justice of their cause; and (iv) some

may be addicted to the business of terrorist operations and material gain from extortion

and racketeering and may be unable to kick the habit . Politically motivated terrorism is

generally justified by its perpetrators on one or more of the following grounds: (i) any

means are justified to realise an alleged transcendental end (in Weber's terms, 'value

rational grounds'; (ii) closely linked to number (i) is the claim that extreme violence is

intrinsically beneficial, regenerative, cathartic and enabling deed regardless of the other

consequences; (iii) terrorism can be shown to have 'worked' in the past, and is held to be

either the 'sole remaining' or 'best available' method to achieving success (in Weber's

terms, 'instrumental rational' grounds), (iv) the morality of the just vengeance 'an eye for

an eye, a tooth for a tooth' and (v) the theory of the 'lesser evil' which assumes that

greater evils will befall us or our nation if we do not adopt terror against our enemies.

In Uganda the government's approach to governance has always included an

important role for the Uganda people's Defense Force (UPDF). UPDF plays a role that is

more than conventional army whose purpose is to defend the country from external

threats. It is also the armed living of the NRM regime, and together with the police it has

a role to play in Uganda's internal and external threats. Stability and peace are essential

enablers of sustainable development, just as violence is one of its greatest obstacles.

"According to H.E. Mr. John W. Ashe President of the 68th General Assembly of United

Nations". Many of the broad goals and values that underpin sustainable development

30

assume the existence of stable and peaceful societies, which can address urgent

development issues such as health, education and access to safe water to name a few

(Buzan Barry. 2002). Durable peace needs inclusive development and sustainable

development if it is to take hold and flourish, needs peace, stability and the firm

foundation provided by human rights (Buzan Bany. 2002).

"Peace is the basis of development and development is the basis of peace". The

development and economic growth which are based on clear scientific basis and a

sophisticated strategy can only be strengthened by prevalence of security and political

stability, which is consistent with the requirements of the citizens to get to the privileged

position of development and progress (Henk, D. 2005).

2.3.1 National peace and stability.

Political Differences in some countries, umestrained use of force against opposition is

considered more or less as legitimate and is used and supported by several governments.

In other countries, governmental human rights abuses are so wide-spread, that terrorism

is not viewed as a gross violation of human rights, but as something inconvenient and

impertinent to authoritarianism (Buzan Bairy. 2002). Another type of political impasse is

that one government might condemn a terrorist who is defended by another government

as a freedom-fighter (Cedric de Coning 2004)

During the Cold Wai·, the Soviet bloc and its satellite countries adopted the

position that people who regard themselves as oppressed or exploited have the right to

resort to guerrilla wai-fare (and implicitly tetTorism), and the Union Soviet Socialist

Republic (USSR) openly declared support for all such causes. In 1977, the Tanzanian

Delegate to the United Nations insisted that the UN should recognize the "inalienable

right of freedom fighters to take up arms to fight their oppressors" who could not be

prevented from taking their oppressors hostage if it became inevitable (Hoffman, Bruce

1998).

Existing Definitions; The diverse [random] definitions of tetTorism that follow illustrate

differing perceptions: International Law Commission: i) Any act causing death or

31

grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to a head of state, persons exercising the

prerogatives of the head of state, their hereditary or designated successors, the spouse of

such persons, or persons charged with public functions or holding public positions when

the act is directed against them in their public capacity; ii) Acts calculated to desh·oy or

damage public property or property devoted to a public purpose; iii) Any act likely to

imperil human lives through the creation of a public danger, in particular the seizure of

aircraft, the taking of hostages and any form of violence directed against persons who

enjoy international protection or diplomatic immunity; iv) The manufacture, obtaining,

possession or supplying of arms, ammunition, explosives or harmful substances with a

view to the commission of a terrorist act (Medhane Tadese, 2004)

In Uganda, the Anti-Terrorism Act, No. 14/2002, which came into force on 7'11June 2002,

applies, inter alia, to all financial institutions and their inte1mediaries in Uganda. While

the Act confers no specific powers or obligations on supervisory and other financial

sector authorities to combat (the financing of) te1Torism in Uganda, the Act criminalizes

terrorism and it's financing (Rainer Hulsse 2008). Financial institutions are thus enjoined

together with law enforcement authorities to monitor compliance with anti-terrorism

legislation in Uganda (Cedric de Coning 2004). Financial institutions are now required to

adhere to, and follow, anti-money laundering guidelines aimed at combating money

laundering and tenorism as a predicate offence. Financing terrorism is a crime under the

Anti-Terrorism Act, No. 14/2002 (PartV, Sections 12-16). To avert being party or privy

to this offence, donors, etc, must ensure that funds and resources intended for religious or

cultural purposes are not used to finance terrorism or be dive1ied to other purposes.

(Sanmel Huntington, 1996).

The Anti-Terrorism Act No. 277 of 2002. Section 10 of the Suppression of Terrorism

Law states: "Any person who aids or abets or finances or harbors, or in any other way

renders support to any person, knowing or having reason to believe that the support will

be applied or used for or in connection with the preparation or commission or instigation

of acts of terrorism, commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be sentenced to death."

The Firearms Act 1970 and the Anti-Te1Torism Act 2002 section 7 aim to prevent

32

terrorists from obtaining weapons within or outside its territory, in paiticular small arms

or light weapons. The Anti-Te!Torism Act 2002 also addresses this in sections 8, 9, 10, 1 I

and 12 (Jeffry Simon. 1987).

Section 9 specifically caters for offences relating to the supply of weapons to ten-orists,

while Section 10 tackles those who suppo1i and abet te1Torism. Section 11 addresses the

recruitment of te1Torists and the establishment of ten-orist organizations, with Section 12

devoted to the offence of misprision of terrorism. The sentence prescribed for supply of

weaponry or explosives is death on conviction. So is the sentence for recruiting,

financing, and hai·boring terrorists. Misprision of te1Torism canies a life sentence.

Financing of Terrorism: These issues are dealt with under sections 17, 18and 19 of the

Law against Terrorism. Section 17 of the Suppression of Te1Torism Law states: "(l) A

person who (a) solicits or invites any other person to give, lend or otherwise make

available, whether for consideration or not, any money or other prope1ty; or(b) receives,

accepts from any other person, whether for consideration or not, any money or other

property, intending that is shall be applied or used for the commission of or in fmiherance

of or in connection with acts of te1Torism, or having reasonable cause to suspect that may

be so used or applied, commits an offence (Jackson Richard. 2011).

(2) A person who-(a) Gives, lends or otherwise makes available to any other

person, whether for consideration or not, any money or other prope1iy; or (b) Enters into

or is otherwise concerned in an arrangement, by which money or other property is or is to

be made available to another person, ( c) Knowing or having reasonable cause to suspect

that it would or may be applied or used as mentioned in subsection (!), commits an

offence." Section I 8 defines the offence committed by persons who contribute to the

resources of terrorist organizations, while section 19 deals with the offence of assisting in

the retention and control of terrorist funds. The penalties for these offences ai·e: Forfeiture

of the money or property, Imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, and A large punitive

fine.

Support for terrorist activities: The Suppression ofTe1Torism Act addresses this in

Section 9, IO, I 1 and 12. Section 9 specifically handles offences relating to the supply of

weapons to te1Torists, while Section 10 tackles those who support and abet terrorism.

33

Section 11 addresses the recruitment of terrorists and the establislnnent of ten-orist

organizations, with section 12 is devoted to the offence of misprision of terrorism. The

sentence prescribed for supply of weaponry or explosives is death on conviction. So is

the sentence for recruiting, financing, and harboring ten-orists. Misprision of ten-orism

can-ies a life sentence under the Act. Of Section 13 of the Suppression of Terrorism Act,

in addition to the sections mentioned above, defines the offence when committed by

persons who neglect to prevent acts of terrorism. This offence attracts a sentence of five

years on conviction, along with a hefty and punitive fine. The law in the Second Schedule

also contains a list of ten-orist organizations, which the Minister for Internal Affairs may

update from time to time. This updated list must include those that have been adopted

under various United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. It is an offence

under the laws of Uganda to be a member, whether passive or active, of a te1Torist

organization. It carries a sentence of I 0years imprisonment (Jackson Richard. 2007)

2.3.2 Information sharing

Since the 1990's it has become clear that a very important link exists between peace,

stability, security and development when it come to fo1mulating national and

international policies. Poverty, extreme inequality, rapid population growth,

environmental degradation, poor governance and other problems make society more

vulnerable and susceptible to conflict and breakdown. Once instability increases and

violence erupts, the options for achieving sustainable peace are reduced considerably.

Situations of instability therefore must be given appropriate international attention. For a

country to sustain stability, it needs to uphold the rnle of law, uses its public sector for

equal distribution of social services delivery to its citizens and is therefore ultimately

perceived as legitimate government (Katzenstein et al .. 2003).

The state holds the monopoly on violence using democratically controlled

security forces that are able to guarantee the security of its citizens throughout its territory

and are capable of holding threats from external actors. Economic development, natural

resource management and basic social services (health care, education etc) are provided

for social economic development (Laqueur Walter. I 999).

34

2.3.3 National Border control.

By international standards the police are the most visible manifestation of

government authority performing the most obvious, immediate and intrusive tasks to

ensure the well being of individuals and communities alike. The main duties of the police

are to maintain public tranquility, law and order; to protect the individual's fundamental

rights and freedoms particularly life, to prevent and detect crime, to reduce fear and

provide assistance and services to the public (Laqueur Walter. 1999).

Democratic police develop and implement their activities according to the needs

of the public and the state and emphasize assistance to those members of the community

in need of immediate help. The police must be responsive to the community as a whole

and strive to deliver their services promptly and in an equal and unbiased manner.

Through their activities the police should be part of society's common efforts to promote

legal protection and sense of security . When intervening in conflict, the police must be

guided by the principle that "everyone shall be subject to such limitations as are

determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the

right and freedom of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order

and the general welfare in a democratic society. The police can therefore be considered

the gate keepers of equality, integration and cohesion in a time of rapidly changing

composition of the population in most major cities (Lynch Marc. 2006)

Everywhere the police are under pressure to counter rising crime and the threats

to international and national security including those resulting from international

terrorism. However, the police must at all times operate in accordance with domestic law

such as constitution, criminal codes and police acts and international law enforcement

and the human rights standards and demonstrate commitment to the rule of law in

practice.

While the police and other entities of the criminal justice sector must form

interrelated entities with functional relationships to ensure lawful, due, effective and fair

criminal proceedings in respect of detained suspects, the police shall as a general rule,

have no judicial functions and should be deprived of their judicial powers wherever these

35

exist (David et al., 2001). The police must strictly respect the independence and the

impartiality of judges. In countries where police are placed under the authority of the

public prosecutor or the investigating judge, the police shall receive clear instructions

about the priorities governing criminal investigations, policy and the progress of the

criminal investigation in individual cases. The police must intervene in situations where

and when the law and order are endangered even if the police officers are off duty always

must be within means to do so (Lynch Marc. 2010)

In Uganda, Uganda police force follows the international standards to some

extent. Article 212 of the 1995 constitution of the republic of Uganda, the police is

charged with advancement and enhancement of peace, stability, order and adherence to

the rule oflaw. It provides that the Uganda police must protect life and property, preserve

law and order, prevent and detect crime and cooperate with the civilian authority and

other security organs established under the constitution and with the population in general

(Lynch Marc. 20 I 0)

2.3.4 Training and technology.

The U.S. government rates Uganda as Critical for crime, High for terrorism, and

Medium for political violence. While faced with issues associated with crime and

terrorism, Uganda continues to improve its security situation by focusing efforts toward

combating these types of activities. The Uganda Police Force (UPF) maintains heavy

police deployments in metropolitan areas, including Kampala, to thwart criminal and

terrorist activities. However, the UPF's effo1is to improve road safety have been minimal

at best and Regional terror organizations continue to threaten Uganda and the region. The

government of Uganda has demonstrated an increased capability to combat terrorist and

criminal threats (Lynch Marc. 20 I 0)

The Govermnent of Uganda effectively collaborated with U.S. counterterrorism

efforts, has showed increased political will to apprehend suspected terrorists and disrupt

terrorist activity in Uganda. Unfo1iunately, resource limitations, porous borders, and

co1Tuption hampered increased counterterrorism measures have continued to leave

Uganda vulnerable to attacks by terrorist groups, particularly al-Shabaab. Uganda passed

counterterrorism legislation in 2002, but this legislation does not include key provisions

36

on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing (David et al., 2001). Although Uganda

significantly improved its ability to investigate terrorist acts, additional training and

resources are still needed. The Ugandan Police Force (UPF), for instance, needs a modem

criminal records management system to replace the outdated system of fingerprint cards

police use to identify criminal and terrorist suspects (National Commission on

Terrorism,GPO, 2000)

There is strong political will to arrest and prosecute te1rnrists in Uganda.

However, a legal challenge in the Constitutional Com1 over jurisdiction, extradition, and

treatment. The UPF Counterterrorism Directorate (CT) is the lead Ugandan law

enforcement entity charged with investigating, disrupting, and responding to terrorist

incidents. While Ugandan law enforcement officers assigned to this directorate are highly

motivated, the UPF overall has limited capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist

incidents due to lack of manpower, resource limitations, and poor infrastructure (David et

al., 2001 ). Moreover, the bulk of the CT police and other law enforcement elements are

centrally located in the capital, which limits the effectiveness of law enforcement in the

border regions and all areas outside Kampala (OAU, 1999)

The ant money laundering Act AMLA attempts to strengthen the country's ability

to monitor and regulate remittance services and wire transfer data by establishing a

Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA), which the government aims to start its

implementation. Financial institutions will need to report any suspicious activity to the

FIA. Currently, the Bank of Uganda asks local banks to rep011 "suspicious" transactions,

but there is no clear implementation mechanism for enforcement or investigation of

potentially suspicious activity. The Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the UPF

continues to be responsible for investigating financial crimes. However, the CID remains

understaffed and poorly trained, with only limited ability to investigate and prosecute

money laundering violations. The CID and other directorates within the UPF have also

been plagued by allegations of corruption (Rainer Hulsse 2008)

Following the Westgate terrorist attack in Nairobi, the UPF conducted a critical

examination of its operations to ensure intelligence cooperation among various Ugandan

government elements should an attack occur in Uganda. The UPF also lacks basic

37

technology, such as secure computer networks, to conduct comprehensive terrorism

investigations in the most effective manner, a lesson discovered after the 20 IO terrorist

attacks in Kampala (Pisanni, Francis, 2000)

2.4 RELATED STUDIES

Accordingly, terrorism involving citizens of other countries may be a response to strict

limits on political expression: 'terrorism against one's own citizens may in fact go

unmentioned by a media controlled by hostile government' (1983:328). The reason is

simple and obvious and has been demonstrated by numerous incidents: when nationals of

other countries become involved, news coverage is guaranteed. This way, terrorists know

they will secure media attention while cmiailing their government's ability to censor

news content. When tourists are kidnapped or killed, the situation is instantaneously

dramatized by the media, which also helps the political conflict between terrorists and the

establishment reach a global scale. Terrorists achieve the exposure they crave (Richter &

Waugh, 1983) and the media increases its circulation and/ or ratings.

Modernization can also disrupt social structures by de-emphasizing old patterns of

respect and social interaction as new economic and social elites develop (Lutz and Lutz,

2008). The importance of modernization and globalization in contributing to terrorism

has been demonstrated by the fact that any symbol of modernization becomes a

legitimate target of attack such as the World Trade Center Twin Tower -New York. A

further factor involved in facilitating outbreaks of rampant terrorism in the Middle East

and sub-Saharan Africa, for example, has been the presence of weak governments and

failed states (Cilliers 2003: 102). Wealc states often means ineffective law enforcement

and such circumstances make it easier for terrorists to operate (Schmid, 2005).

Bobbitt (2008) argues that terrorism exists because it is a negative externality of our

borderless world. Modern terrorist organizations are thus, a natural response to the end of

the era of the nation state. The new terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, mimic and are a

product of the decentralized, outsourced, privatized, globalized, networked world of what

Bobbitt labels the new 'market state'. Market states are wealthier and offer more

38

opportunities than traditional nation states. However, they are more vulnerable, and paii

of their vulnerability lies in the 'commodification' of and trade in Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD). The new terrorist groups know their enemy. They have no interest

in national identity or territory; they have a 'global' ideology; and their aim is to disable

the market state by causing mass deaths and creating terror ainong the civilian

populations

Terrorists' goals are classified broadly as revolutionary (narrow or broad,

antigovernment, including overthrow of the regime) or sub-revolutionai·y (including

policy and personnel changes). More specifically, objectives are classified as ideological,

tactical and strategic (Richter and Waugh 1986). Ideological objectives are long-range in

nature and may involve a national struggle. Tactical objectives, which are short-range and

motivated by legitimized concerns, often involve robberies and choice of targets from

affluent tourism locations, tourists themselves who are vulnerable to attack, and resort

areas at which socioeconomic and political elites reside, strongly resembling everyday

criminal activity (Blunk et al., 2006). Richter and Waugh suggest that te1Torists target

tourists to achieve strategic objectives and that attacking them can provide errorists with

instrumental advantage by disrupting industry and assuring publicity. Thus, terrorists

gravitate toward inter-national tourists and facilities to satisfy their own resource needs.

Large groups of foreign-speaking and -looking tourists provide cainouflage and safety

while offering various opportunities and choice of targets. (Richter & Waugh 1986).

The influence may begin with the decision-making process (Cook 1990; Sonmez

and Graefe 1998a). Studies have found that tourists modify their behavior, a type of

protective measure during travel (Hartz, 1989); substitute risky destinations with safer

choices (Gu & Martin 1992; Enders and Sandler, 1991; Enders, Sandler and Parise, 1992;

Mansfeld 1996); attribute terrorism risk to neighboring countries not directly affected

(Enders, Sander and Parise 1992); demonstrate a delayed reaction to terrorism (Enders

and Sandler 1991; Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992); and exhibit cultural differences in

their reactions to risk (Hurley 1988; Tremblay 1989; Wall 1996). Some tourists who

perceive terrorism risk in one country tend to presume the entire region to be risky and

attribute risk of terrorism to neighboring countries which are not directly affected by

39

terrorism. More recently, Drakos and Kutan (2003) concluded that although following a

terrorist attack, neighboring countries may be considered as immediate destination

substitutes, there is always a negative impact on tourism demand for the wider region.

Seddighi et al.(2001) and Stafford et al.(2002) state that the effects of terrorist attacks

might cause political instability, which leads to the decline or disappearance of tourist

arrivals in some tourist destinations The literature and statistics all confirm that terrorist

attacks alter tourism demand patterns, indicating an increasing demand to cancel travel or

holiday plans paiiicularly just after the 9/11 terrorist attack (Chen and Noriega, 2004;

Floyd, Gray and Thapa, 2003; Kingsbury and Brunn, 2004). Even prior to 9/11, exainples

demonstrated the impact of terrorism on tourism, with Enders and Sandler (1991)

concluding that a typical ten-orist incident in Spain resulted in the reduction of 140,000

tourists. A further exainple is evidenced in 6 million Americans visiting Europe in 1985.

At the time, it was projected that 7 million would visit in 1986. However, as a result of

increased terrorist activity at the time, 54% cancelled their reservations. That year, a

Gallup poll reported that 79% of Americans would avoid overseas destinations that

summer (D' Amore and Anuza, 1986). In that same year the World Tourism Organisation

attributed a loss of $ I 05 billion in tourism receipts to terrorism, (Sonmez & Graefe,

1998c).

Bottom-Up perspective: Consent Theory; It is a philosophical construct developed

by Hobbes as early as the 17th century. Hobbes constructed his analysis first

understanding the establishment of a political contract. For him, such a contract is

brought about when individual members of a society relinquish their sovereign rights to a

political authority. In contrast to governmental contract theories, consent theo1y does not

assume the contact reflects the relation between rulers and the ruled which is state­

centred approach. It rather has a society-centred view in the sense that it depaiis from the

main dynamics within the society in a sense that agreements are reached between

individuals in a society to form a political society but with no need specifying the original

agreement in whom that authority is to be vested or how it is to be imposed.

40

3.0 Introduction

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter covers the research design, population of study, sampling design, techniques

and procedures that were used in the research study, data collection methods and

instruments, data quality control and procedures, data presentation and analysis, ethical

consideration and lastly limitation to the study.

3.1 Research Design

The research design was a case study which was used to explain the international

tenorism threats on national peace and stability in Uganda. The research used both

qualitative and quantitative data techniques with qualitative being the major source of

data collection. Qualitative method was used to cross check the actual findings. The

qualitative method was mainly attained through secondary data collection like books,

internet and newspapers among others. The quantitative method attained from primary

data sources like interaction with authorities, members of the public, victims of terrorism,

security forces commanders and as well as suspected terrorists. In exploring a novel

confluence of areas of international relations study, a novel research design was required

by this study. The application of constructivist enquiry to international tenorism requires

the use of a case study for appropriate analysis.

3.2 Research Population

The study comprised of a target population of 200 as a sample size of I 00 was used with

respondents military officers, police officers, communities, victims of tenorism and

suspected terrorists targeting the divisions ofNakawa, Central and Makindye in Kampala

district.

3.3 Sample Size

While there are several ways of determining sample size, the researcher used, The

Slovene's formula is used to determine the minimum sample size of 100 respondents, as

indicated below:

41

n= N l+N(el2

•

Where:

n = the required sample size

N = Known population size

e2 = Margin of e1Tor at 0.05 level of significance.

n= 200 11 =200 X 0.0025 = 0.5

I +200 (0.05)2

n= 200 1 + I

n= 200 2

n =100 respondents

Table 3.1: Sample size distribution

Categories of respondents Accessible Population Sample size

Military officers 60 30

Police officers 40 20

Victims of terrorism 40 20

Community member 60 30

Total 200 100

source: Researcher's Field Survey, (2015)

Percentage

30.9%

20.6%

20.6%

30.9%

100.0%

The researcher selected three divisions in Kampala district to represent Uganda due to a

couple of factors which included headquarters (HDQ's) of counter terrorism, military

police HDQ's , police HDQ's, Somali community, Chieftaincy of military intelligence

(CMI) and various and busy activities. The three divisions also command a sizeable

number of people with different cultural, religious and ideological background. The three

divisions make up part of Kampala district one of the most populous districts in Uganda­

with l.5million people compared to small town councils with less than 5.000 people

according to provisional census results from Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) of the

42

2014 census. The three divisions are located in the central centre of Kampala district the

Capital City of Uganda which accommodates people who are both nationals and aliens.

This means that many different people from the world come in and go.

Table 3.2.2: showing the approach sample size and methods of data collection

Approach Sample selection Sample type/size Method of collection

I Quantitative Random sampling. IO police officers Questionnaire

Purposive. 40 Somalis community Interview guide IO Military officers Questionnaire 5 suspected tenorists Interview guide 5 tenorism victims Interview guide 30 community Interview guide

2 Qualitative - - -Total 100 people

Source: Primary Data (2015)

3.4 Sampling procedure.

The researcher used both random and purposive methods in sampling. The researcher

used purposive sampling method to get information from particular people in various

security organs and community like the police, military and individuals with knowledge

about the issue under study. Simple random sampling method was equally incorporated

for wider and in-depth information from various respondents in the field. Groups of 40

respondents were chosen from the Somali community in Central Kampala known as

Kisenyi. This was because the area is densely populated with Somalis who have known

the background of Al-Shabaab terrorists. The respondents who were purposively selected

from police and military were done so because they are equally responsible for ensuring

national peace and stability against the international tenorism threats.

3.5 Data collection methods

The data collection instruments were mainly self-administered questionnaires, which

comprised of open and close-ended questions on addition to interviews that require

respondents to answer all the questions to the best of their knowledge and options given

to avoid deviating from the variables under the study.

43

3.5.1 Interviews

Interviews were conducted during data collection from which the researcher asked

questions and respondents answered. An interview guide was used especially with the

general International Tenorism Threats on National Peace and Stability among Selected

Divisions in Kampala District Uganda which led the interviewer to the respective

respondents. The researcher carried a face-to-face interview with these interviewees.

The researcher collected information usmg semi structured interview methods,

documents analysis and use of self administered questionnaires to collect data. The semi­

structured interviews helped to gather information from those people who would give

information but either do not know how to write or do not have time to fill the

questionnaires.

Document analysis in the same vein helped the researcher to get information about the

problem from what other people have done and talked about the same.

The questionnaires were filled by respondents who were representative of the population

to give detailed information about the problem of the study.

3.5.2 Questionnaires

These are an efficient data collection tools when the researcher knows what was required

and how to measure the variable of interest. Only closed ended questions with liker! scale

were given to the cross section of respondents which in turn facilitated effective data

gathering. The researcher adopted this type of questionnaires because questions asked in

it are easy to complete, analyze quantitatively and responses obtained through the use of

this kind of questionnaire can be compared easily to different items hence making it easy

for the researcher to detect a trend just by glancing at the responses. One set of

questionnaires were administered to 10 police officers; 40 Somalis community; 10

Military officers; 5 suspected tenorists; 5 tenorism victims; 30 community. This strategy

is anticipated to create possibilities to collect adequate information and opinions from the

respondents within a short period of time.

44

In using questionnaire method of data collection, the researcher had to include this

method in order to get the views that the respondents felt could not be voiced out before

other people for fear of victimization by military authorities and their spies. The

researcher was able to get more information through this method of data collection as

comparnd to all other methods used especially on information about the military

operations in terms of security.

3.6 Validity and Reliability

In order to ascertain the validity of instruments, expert opinion were sought from the

independent assessors, supervisor, lecturers, and peers on face, content and format of the

questionnaires, interviews and group organization. Consultations with the supervisors,

other security personnel and peers helped identify errors and offer the opportunity to

modify and improve the instruments. Also to ascertain the validity and reliability of the

research instrument, a pilot study was done in the three divisions within the Kampala

district that did not participate in the actual study. Following the pilot study, more errors

were identified in the instruments. Drawing on the expert opinions from the supervisors,

lecturers, head chieftaincy, and peers, appropriate corrections were made on the

instruments. Thereafter, all instruments were administered by the researcher and collected

immediately.

Table 3. 1.3: Validity of the data analysis

Items Valid Items Total Items Validity

International Te1Torism Threats 20 19 100%

National Peace and Stability among 20 20 100%

Selected Divisions m Kampala District

Uganda

The results in table 3 .. 1.3 indicate that 19 items were used (International Terrorism

Threats) and 20 items were used on the International Terrorism Threats and National

Peace and Stability among Selected Divisions in Kampala District Uganda valid based on

the contents of the instrument.

45

Content Validity Index (CVI) = the number of relevant questions the total number of questions

Table 3.1.4: A cronbach alpha of coefficients for reliability instrument

items Cronbach's Alpha

National Peace and Stability among Selected

Divisions in Kampala District Uganda 0.810

Guide:

Item-Total statistics

Number of items

30

Cronbach alphas of 0.8110, which indicates a high level of National Peace and Stability

among Selected Divisions in Kampala District Uganda for our scale with this specific

sample

3. 7 Data gather Procedures

3. 7.1 Before data gathering

1. An introduction letter was secured from the College of Higher Degrees and Research

to conduct the study after which permission from Kampala International University

Authority, were sought. The researcher used the letter to introduce himself in the

Ministry of Defense and Internal Affairs which are in charge of the military prison and

police respectively

2. There were actual interviews on appointment and questions collected with or without

response. Permission to conduct the research was upon approval of the Thesis

proposal.

3. The researcher appointed and briefed his research assistants on the sampling and data

gathering procedures.

4. The questionnaires for actual distribution were prepared and coded accordingly.

5. The non standardized instruments were tested for validity and reliability (Table 3.1.3).

46

3.7.2 During data gathering

I. The respondents were requested to answer the questionnaires as objectively as

possible and not to leave any option unanswered.

2. More emphasis was put on picking of the questionnaires after five days from the date

of distribution.

3. During the picking of the questionnaires, all returned questionnaires were checked to

verify whether all are fully answered.

4. Due to the nature of work and busy schedule of some potential respondents, through

the administrators appointments were drawn for conveniences of the respondents or

by their work schedule. Thus there necessary explanations were sought.

5. A pilot study was conducted before the actual research in order to check the

feasibility of the research study, so that the research design could be improved or

adjusted where necessary to avoid wasting time. The study also made use of

secondary data by reviewing Various books, magazines, journals and news papers

with information on international teJTorism threats and the roles of various actors

like the non-governmental organizations both local and international, individual

actors, the military and other state institutions were consulted. This was

supplemented by data from various websites and the internet although they were

minimal.

The researcher was able to access the military officials, police officials and prison

upon agreeing the study could not compromise their security or of the state. Using

the same letter, the researcher was able to access Luzira Prisons and interviewed the

suspected teITorist detainees who requested not to be mentioned. The letter also

introduced the researcher to Somalis community in Kampala and thereafter findings

were made.

3.7.3 After data gathering

After one week, primary data was collected through questionnaires which respondents

returned and data was analyzed. Completed Self-administered questionnaires were coded,

edited, categorized and entered into a computer for the Statistical Package for Social

47

Scientists (SPSS) generate, frequency tables, means, average mean and overall means as

well as relations and regression analysis.

3.8 Data Analysis and Presentation

All the information from the questionnaires was entered into Microsoft excel

spreadsheets and SPSS. The SPSS and the Microsoft excel program was used to generate

descriptive statistics, and frequency tables charts. The qualitative data was analyzed into

themes and concepts. Based on the grounded theory plausible relationships among

themes and concepts were identified (Strauss et al., 1998). The International relations

theory was very ideal for this study as it involves inductive data analysis, which

according to Ary et al (2002) type of data, analysis could lead to fonnation of a new

theory.

Data was presented quantitatively using tables of frequency and percentages to indicate

statistics in form of frequencies and percentages. The findings from the study were

presented qualitatively using description and analysis of major existing views about the

problem of the study.

3.9 Ethical considerations

To ensure confidentiality of the information provided by the respondents and to ascertain

the practice of ethics in this study, the following activities were implemented by the

researcher:

(1) The respondents and initials were coded instead of reflecting the names.

(2) The researcher considered the respect of persons, beneficence and justice. The

researcher made sure that the respondents received full disclosure of the nature of the

study

(3) The researcher obtained an introductory letter from the College of Higher Degrees

(Appendix IA) and Research of Kampala International University that introduces

him to the concerned authorities for permission to collect data for this study

(Appendix I B).

( 4) Solicited permission through a written request to the concerned officials of the

selected division and was included in the study.

48

( 5) The researcher made sure that nothing caused physical or emotional harm to the

subjects.

(6) There was consideration to persons with diminished autonomy that is to say, persons

entitled to protection for example prisoners, students, children etc, were not coerced

to participate in a research rather there was willingness and informed consent.

(7) Respondents were requested to sign in the Information Consent Form.

(8) Acknowledge the authors quoted in this study through citations and referencing.

(9) The findings were presented in a generalized and acceptable manner.

3.10 Limitation of the Study

While canying out the study the researcher encountered various constraints. The

researcher had a difficult time convincing the security officials that the research was not

meant to expose any of their confidential infonnation but basically for study related. The

researcher faced a problem of language baiTier; some of the respondents knew little

English and broken Kiswahili in addition to their mother tongues which were unfamiliar

to the researcher. The use of translator had to be incorporated.

Complexity in accessing the respondents due to their busy schedules; however,

the researcher used multiple skills like call backs, re-aiTanging appointments and

extensive mappings.

The study were limited by time because there was a lot of information to be

gathered, sieved for knowledge and analyzed.

The reseai·cher also faced a problem of financial adjustments due to the fact tlmt

the research study required movement from one place to anotl1er and more so from one

country to another as well as documentation. The researcher further faced a problem of

not getting enough information from security agents because at time they do not want to

disclose some information in the naJ11e of "security reasons".

49

Some respondents voluntarily can refuse to respond to some questions fearing that

management may victimize them. However, this was minimized by the researcher via

cultivating and instilling a sense of trust in the minds of respondents and assuring them

confidentiality.

Lastly, considering the nature of the study, the respondents wondered why the

researcher was interested in the study. They felt the researcher was a spy being used by

the government to get those who are against it. However, the researcher was able to get

their confidence and carried out the research to completion.

50

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the study presents and discusses the characteristics of the sample selected,

finding of the study basing on the collected data from the respondents linking it with the

review of the related literature. In presenting the findings, percentages and tables were

used to quantify and present the findings. This chapter discusses the existing international

terrorism threats on national peace and stability in Uganda, achievements and failures of

state security agencies in promoting national peace and stability in Uganda, examine the

possible challenges faced by state security agencies in promoting peace and stability in

Uganda, establish what is being done to overcome the challenges and possible

recommendations.

During the study, questionnaires were distributed to 10 police officers, 40 to Somalis

community, 10 to the military officers, 30 to the community/social workers and interview

guide was made to 5 suspected terrorists and 5 to terrorism victims from different areas in

the divisions of central, Nakawa and Makindye in Kampala district. This made 100

respondents (100%). The responses obtained were presented quantitatively using tables

and qualitatively using texts to show findings which were analyzed from the objectives of

the study.

4.1 Description of Respondents

In this study, respondents were described according to gender, age, educational

qualification designation in the organization and number of years of experience in

security activities. In each case, respondents were asked to declare their respective profile

information in order to enable the researcher classify them accordingly. Close ended

questionnaire were employed by the researcher in ascertaining information about their

personal profiles and analyzed their responses using frequencies and percentage

distributions as summarized in table 4.1 below.

51

Table 4.1: Profile of respondents (n=lO0)

Profile Frequency Percentages(%) Gender Male 54 54 Female 46 46 Total 100 100 Age 20-39 66 66 40-59 32 32 60and above 2 2 Total 100 100

Educational Qualification 50 50

Bachelors

Diploma 26 26

Certificate 20 20

Masters 4 4

Total 100 100

Length of experience 6-10 years 60 60 1-5 years 25 25 11 and above 15 15 Total 100 100

Source: Field Data, (2015)

Results from Table 4.1 indicate that most of the respondents were male that is to say

(54%) and minorities were females with (46%). Therefore, males dominated in this

sample.

Pe1iaining age (66%) respondents were in the age bracket of 20-39, (32%) were in the

age bracket of 40-59 of age and 2 were 60 and above. It can therefore be deduced that

though all age categories were represented, the youth respondents monopolized in this

study. This is true because organizations prefer employing youths who have the potential

to work towards development.

Regarding the educational qualification of respondents 50% had bachelors, 26% diploma,

20% had ce1iificates and 4% had masters, therefore respondents with bachelors

dominated in the sample.

52

Concerning the length of experience in division, (60%) of the respondents had served for

a period of 6-10 years, followed by (25%) 1-5 years and above 11 years (15%)

respectively. This indicates that majority of the respondents are experienced,

knowledgeable about the International Terrorism Threats on National Peace and Stability

among Selected Divisions therefore are able to give perfect information.

4.2 International Terrorism Threats

The first objective of sought to determine International Ten-orism Threats. On this, the

researcher wanted to establish the impact of National Peace and Stability among Selected

Divisions in Kampala District using Pearson linear correlation coefficient, as indicated in

table 4.2 below:-

Key for interpretation of means

Mean range Response mode Interpretation

3.26-4.00 strongly agree Very high

2.51-3.25 Agree High

1.76-2.50 Disagree Moderate

1.00-1.75 Strongly disagree low

Political stability ; the findings (Table 4.2) on this construct reveals that five (5) items

were measured and the results showed that one item was rated Very high that is to say;

we have terrorists in Uganda (mean=3.32) and other rated high for instance; Ugandans

involved in International terrorism (mean=3.24) There are militia groups in our division

as a result of te1Torism (mean=3.10) There are increased open rebellion against the

government (mean=2.91) The challenge of illegal drugs has increased (mean=2.71) with

an average mean of 3.05. This implies that, stability means a predictable political

environment, which in turn attracts investment, both internally and from outside. The

resulting virtuous circle of pove1ty reduction, job creation, increased state revenues and

investment in welfare and education bring benefits to all in society such that a return to

violence or chaos is in no-one's interests.

53

Table 4.2: Level oflnternational Terrorism Threats (n=lO0)

categories Mean Interpretation Rank

Political stability

we have terrorists in Uganda 3.32 Very high l

Ugandans involved in International terrorism 3.24 High 2

There are militia groups in our division as a result of terrorism 3.10 High 3

There are increased open rebellion against the government 2.91 High 4

The challenge of illegal drugs has increased 2.71 High 5

Average mean 3.05 High

Trade

Poverty is also a serious threat to national security 3.10 High l

The distribution of wealth in our division has been skewed in 3.06

High 2 favor of a wealthy minority

Investors are scare ways from business establishment in our 3.00

High 3 division

I was once a victim of terrorist attack in Kampala 2.88 High 4

Customers have reduced, due to terror threat 2.68 High 5

Average mean 2.94 High

Travel and Tourism

Graft and corruption has become another threat to our national 3.27

Very high 1 security that scared away tourists

Ethnic, religious and cultural conflict pervades many regions 3.07

high 2 and nations, including our own

Threats have limited access to resources 3.00 High 3

We lack of national integration and international issues 2.88 High 4

Nuclear materials and technologies are 2.76

Low 5 more accessible now than at any other time in history

Average mean 2.99 High

Human Life Threats

Transnational organized crime has proliferated in the era of 3.24

High I globalization.

Death rates has increased 3.20 High 2

Mental disorder has increased as a result of terrorist threats 3.10 High 3

You can not easily identify the terrorist 3.08 High 4

Poverty has been an important factors for the recruiting groups 2.80

Low 5 in our division

Average mean 3.08 High

Overall mean 3.02 High

Source: Field Data (20 I 5)

54

So, to conclude, political stability is no doubt key to growth, for a given and highly

paiiicular vision of what stability means. But, while the governance agenda underlying

this view is undoubtedly important, it needs to be tempered with an appreciation that

other types of politics the messy, murky, complex and local kind cannot be wished away,

and ai·e remarkably robust. This is obvious for those states where local politics reward

conuption and growth is a distant dream; for the donor darlings of recent years it may be

hidden under a carapace of progress that can look all-too convincing from the cab of a

white 4x4. Attitudes and policy towards Africa needs to be rooted in understanding that

goes beyond the seductive simplicity of governance and growth.

A nation that is constantly having political coups or revolutions or civil wars would be

said to have very low political stability, since there would be very low levels of respect

for the existing political order, constitution, ai1d government institutions by key political

players like politicians, judges, and army officers. One could not take it for granted that,

say, the president would be in power ( or perhaps even alive) within a year, regardless of

how long he was supposed to rule, simply because the political culture would be so

chaotic and disrespectful basically any assumption, custom, or convention would have a

high likelihood of being ignored or undermined for any number ofreasons.

A nation with high political stability would be one where politics was extremely

predictable. For example, an extremely oppressive totalitai·ian dictatorship that had been

ruled by the same fainily for ten generations. There'd be no question about who was

running the show, or who would be running the show in the future, or whose orders

everyone was going to obey in a system like that. But a country that's been a safe and

peaceful democracy for more than a century like say the United States, Canada, or

Sweden would be very stable as well, since their history would help foster enormous

public reverence for respecting the traditions of elections and resolving political disputes

within the well-understood rules and precedence of the constitution.

Totalitarian governments are probably the most stable, followed by established

55

democracies, then mid-to-long te1m dictatorships, then countries that have only recently

embraced either democracy or dictatorship, then so-called "failed states" that have been

wracked by years of internal political violence or severe economic/natural disaster. But

every government has the seeds of some instability. Sometimes a totalitarian dictatorship

doesn't have a clear succession plan. Sometimes a long established democracy is

confronted with a "constitutional crisis" that introduces a problem for which there is no

understood tradition for addressing. And sometimes nations have their stability

threatened by other countries who hope provoking war could help address their own

stability deficit.

Trade; the findings on this construct reveals that five (5) items were measured (Table 4.2)

and the results showed that all items was rated high that is to say; Poverty is also a

serious tlrreat to national security (mean=3.10), the distribution of wealth in our division

has been skewed in favor of a wealthy minority (mean=3.06), Investors are scare ways

from business establishment in our division (mean=3.00), I was once a victim of terrorist

attack in Kampala (mean=2.88), Our Customers have reduced, due to terror threat

(mean=2.68) with an average mean of2.94.

Terrorism, as understood by Nitsch and Schumacher, is the "use, or threat of use, of

anxiety-inducing extra-1101mal violence for political purposes. When such action is

intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the

immediate victims and when its ramifications transcend national boundaries. Because

these events are intensely emotional and extremely visual, the loss of life and climate of

fear produced have profound impacts on general human well being. Frey, Luechinger,

and Stutzer (2004) find that the implications on life-satisfaction for populations affected

by terrorist activity far outweigh the economic impacts. In their study of subjective well­

being data, they find that, in the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, individuals would

be willing to pay, on average, 4 I% of their annual income for a reduction in te1TOrist

activity to a level comparable to unaffected parts of the country. While it is imperative to

recognize the impact political violence has on the family unit, the aggregate impact of

terrorism on domestic economies and international trade flows is staggering.

56

Empirical data suggests that te1Torism poses a risk to production as well. Oil producing

nations consistently lose profits from domestic attacks on supply chains, pipelines, and

distribution mechanisms. (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004) In the case of oil exporting

nations, terrorist activity inhibits the central government's ability to properly estimate tax

revenue, limits income from labor in production industries, and increases the insurance

premiums for multinational firms and goverrunent owned enterprises operating in the

petroleum sector. Additionally, occurrences of terrorist violence raise the cost of doing

business, thereby influencing the predictability of current account equilibriums. Nitsch

and Schumacher (2004) also contend that spontaneous nature of terrorist action

negatively impacts the ability of firms to execute business as their presence raises the

level of uncertainty. In addition, stronger security measures make international trade

more expensive while increased delivery times and higher border precautions inhibit

product mobility. Disruption of supply chain activity results in lower profitability

especially to firms whose products must compete with firms whose supply is not

disrupted.

Events also influence a country's capital account. Eldor and Melnick (2004) conclude

that while terrorist attacks can have a real impact on a firm's expected profits, their

analysis finds that financial markets incorporate the business premiums associated with

terrorist events even though they find noe-vidence that markets become desensitized over

time. Industrialized countries with liberal economic systems efficiently respond to

terrorist events because monetary autonomy promotes investor confidence. Gupta and

Clements et al. find that prolonged terrorist violence, especially in middle and low

income nations, forces governments to divert investment from economically viable

sectors to military and defense spending.

Tourism; the findings on this construct reveals that five (5) items were measured (Table

4.2) and the results showed that one item was rated high that is to say; Graft and

corruption has become another threat to our national security that scared away tourists

(mean=3 .27) Ethnic, religious and cultural conflict pervades many regions and nations,

57

including our own (mean=3.07), Threats have limited access to resources (mean=3.00)

We lack of national integration and international issues (mean=2.88) Nuclear materials

and technologies are more accessible now than at any other time in history (mean=2.76)

with an average mean=2.99.

The impact of te1Torism on the travel and tourism industry can be enormous. It can lead

to unemployment, homelessness, deflation, and many other social and economic ills. The

contribution of tourism for many countries is so great that any downturn in the industry is

a cause of major concern for many governments. The repercussions are left in many other

industries associated with tourism like airlines, hotels, restaurants and shops that cater to

the tourists and allied services. Te!Torism is an enigmatic and compelling phenomenon,

and its relationship with tourism is complex and multifaceted. This paper aims to clarify

this relationship and examines the relationship between selected factors and tourists'

decision-making process for destination choice. Tourists' risk perception associated with

te1Torism served as a basis for the analysis.

Travel and tourism's demonstrated economic success does not shield it from the sinister

power of te1Torism. While numerous natural and human-caused disasters can significantly

impact the flow of tourists, the threat of danger that accompanies te1Torism tends to

intimidate potential tourists more severely. However, the fear of random te1rnrist

violence is not anything new, but the heightened attention it has commanded from

scholars can be traced back to the 11th September 2001 terrorists attacks in the USA. The

terrorism and tourism literature has several foci: te1Torists' motives for targeting tourists

or the industry; impacts of terrorism on tourism demand; and possible solutions for

tourists to help minimize their risks.

The findings also points out that, the risk neutral group did not consider tourism or their

destination to involve risk. The functional risk group considered the possibility of

mechanical, equipment, or organizational problems as the major source of tourism related

risk. The place risk group perceived vacations as fairly risky and the destination of their

58

most recent vacation as very risky. Although no attempt was made to link these

categories with Cohen's tourist role typology, an interesting similarity is evident. The risk

neutral group emphasized more of a need to experience excitement and adventure when

on vacation than the other two groups.

Even though authors describe terrorism objectives differently, they agree that terrorists

have much to gain by targeting tourists. When tourism symbolizes capitalism and, if it is

state-sponsored, then the attack on the industry is an attack on the government as well.

Because this trade represents a significant economic activity, terrorist attacks on tourists

cause foreign exchange receipts to decline, thereby allowing te1Torists to impose indirect

costs on the government and to gain political advantage over the officials (Hall and

O'Sullivan 1996; Richter and Waugh 1986). According to Edgell (1990), tourist decisions

to stay home or choose "safer" destinations are translated into significant losses for the

industry of the country suffering from terrorism.

Egypt's 43% drop in tourism receipts as a result of terrorist attacks, which began in 1992,

is sobering proof of how terrorists can damage a country's economy (Wahab

1996).Several studies offer logical socioeconomic and cultural explanations of the

terrorism-tourism relationship (Aziz 1995; Lea 1996; Richter 1983; Wahab 1995, 1996).

According to Richter, tourism can "spawn divisive conflicts among proponents and

opponents of tourism development" (1983: 18-19). She fmiher points out, foreign

business travelers and tourism facilities might become "legitimate" targets for terrorists

who oppose the control socioeconomic and political elites exert over the industry. The

perception that tourism development does not really benefit locals can provoke violence

when it is blamed for "exploiting and destroying indigenous industries and cultures ... "

(Richter and Waugh 1986:237). Lea's statement that "a failure on the paii of tourist

[developers] to design, locate, and manage their projects in a way that ensures

community support will ultimately lead to community opposition and likely violence"

(1996:124) supports this proposition. It is possible that local frustration with the tourism

industry can ultimately lead to opposition followed by violent action (Lea 1996).

59

In his discussion of terrorism in Egypt, Aziz (1995) counters the misconception that

Islam is simply against foreign tourists with a socioeconomic explanation. According to

Aziz, tourists and locals in Egypt are separated by language barriers as well as economic

and social gaps. When poverty stricken locals are forced to co-exist with international

tourists enjoying luxuries, friction is inevitable. Aziz's explanation supports Richter's

(I 983) earlier suggestion that travel styles can be representative of ideological values,

class behavior, and political culture of tourists and their countries. As a result, tourists

may be targeted because of their tourism styles which may demonstrate conspicuous

consumption ( demonstration of money or credit cards; flashy photography equipment;

expensive clothes, jewelry, and luggage). Resentments which build against tourism can

thus ignite into dangerous expressions of bitterness. Friction between host and guest can

also result from clashing cultures or values. Certain tourist behaviors (i.e., consumption

of pork and alcohol; gambling; Western dress; codes of behavior incongruent with

Islamic tradition) incongruent with Islamic cultural values are also suggested as a

possible explanation for the Egyptians' frustration (Aziz 1995). Wahab concurs by

suggesting that sometimes terrorism specifically targets tourism because it is seen as a

movement of " 'alien' visitors representing a form of neo-colonialism or a threat to well­

established societal norms, traditions, value-systems, and religious convictions"

(1995:85). Wahab's explanation that Egypt's terrorist attacks against tourists represent

their desire to revive classic Islamic societal rules to resist the corruption of modernity

(perceived as deviation from Islam) supports Richter and Waugh's earlier implication that

discord could result when tourism is blamed for the "contamination of culture due to

simple contact" (1986:237). More conservative locals or Muslim activists may feel they

need to take drastic action to prevent what they perceive as a threat to their national

culture, tradition, and religious beliefs (Wahab 1995). Regrettably, in extreme cases, the

desire to protect sacred beliefs manifests itself in terrorism.

Human life ; the findings on this construct reveals that five ( 5) items were measured

(Table 4.2) and the results showed that all items was rated high that is to say;

Transnational organized crime has proliferated in the era of globalization (mean=3.24),

Death rates has increased (mean=3.20) Mental disorder has increased as a result of

60

terrorist threats (mean=3.10); You can not easily identify the terrorist (mean=3.08);

Pove1ty has been an important factors for the recruiting groups in our division

(mean=2.80) with average mean=3.08) as well as an Overall mean=3.02.

Even though risk perception theory has gained considerable acceptance within cognitive

psychology and has developed for more than 40 years, it was only after September 11,

200 I that scholars in the tourism field showed increased interest in the topic. Defining

risk as an exposure to certain threats or dangers (Reisinger and Mavondo, 2005),

considering safety in travel is enrooted in the belief that the decision-making-processes at

the time of choosing a destination are manifold. Seven different types of risks can be

identified: a) financial, b) social, c) psychological, d) physical,e) functional, f) situational

and finally and g) travel risks. Risks associated with travel are often related to health

concerns, terrorism, crime, or natural disasters at tourist destinations (Weber, 1998; Hall,

2002; 2003; Dominguez, Burguette & Bernard, 2003; Kuto & Groves, 2004; Aziz, 1995;

Castano, 2005; Robson, 2008; McCartney, 2008; Schluter, 2008; Floyd & Pennington­

Gray, 2004; Paraskevas & Arendell, 2007; Sackett & Botterill, 2006; Essner, 2003; Arana

& Leon, 2008; Bhattarai, Conway & Shrestha, 2005; Dolnicar, 2005; Goldblatt & Hu,

2005; Tarlow, 2003; Grosspietsch, 2005; Reichel, Fuchs & Uriely, 2007; Floyd,

Pennington-Gray & Thapa, 2003; Yun & Maclaurin, 2006; Prideaux, 2005; Kozak, Crotts

& Law, 2007; Yuan, 2005; Lee, 2008).

Korstanje has written extensively about the sociology of dangers, threats and risks

(Korstanje, 2009; 2010; 2011; Korstanje & Tarlow, 2012), noting that scholars have long

asked the question: how do we define the notion of threat and what determines that

something ( or someone) is a risk? Defining threats and risk is not a simple matter.

Authors have long sought to define the concept and to determine when and how a risk

becomes a threat. To further complicate the issue, Korstanje evidences that threats carry

risk and risks may produce threats. Thus, there is a symbiotic interaction between risk

and threat. Furthermore, there is no agreement on what conditions produce a risk. With

the advent of the Internet, our highly complex world composed of real, partial and false

infonnation both the scholar and the tourists are rarely sure of reality.

61

Peace is a global ideal, but arotmd the world people face violence terrorism on a regular

basis. From Nmihern Ireland to Israel, Palestine, and other points on the globe, many

individuals face the threat, uncertainty, and fear of terrorism every day. Newspaper

headlines will report a bombing or a hijacking, quote official statements, and print

pictures of the devastation, but the people who pick up their lives from the rubble around

them must continue to catTy on long after the media stories are written, the cainera lights

have faded, and the world's attention has turned. What is it like to live with terrorism as a

regular presence in one's life and what are its effects?

Social; Social norms change for people living with a consistent presence of terrorism in

their lives. Conversation, daily concerns, and living with the heightened risks of sudden,

violent injury or death can change people's expectations, actions, outlooks, and

interactions with one another.

Psychological; People living under conditions of regulai· violence must develop coping

mechanisms in order to adapt to their situation. In an enviromnent of prolonged violence,

the unusual or unacceptable can become acceptable and "normal." Political; Frequent

acts of terrorism in a society create political problems as govermnents struggle to

maintain a semblance of order and legitimacy ainidst the chaos of terror. When a terrorist

attack occurs, newspaper headlines and television news stories relay the facts, show the

pictures, and report government response. Survivors of an attack may be interviewed to

relay their experiences, but what about life beyond that moment? In many parts of the

world, violence be it warfai·e or terrorism is an all too familiar occmTence. For the people

who live with the specter of sudden violence as a daily presence in their lives, the media

headlines only highlight a lai·ger pati of their everyday experiences.

The impact that living with te1Torism has on individual lives is great. From giving up

personal privacies in favor of greater security from checkpoints, bag searches, and armed

patrols to taking an alternate route to work to avoid traffic backup from the morning

bomb blast, living with terrorism as a next-door neighbor is demanding. These are not the

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demands made by politicians or terrorist leaders as they speak about causes, negotiations,

reprisals, and responsibility. These are the demands of doing the day's grocery shopping,

visiting a relative across town, and getting to work and back without ending up a part of

the week's tragic toll of lives lost in a car bombing, suicide attack, or other incident of

teJTOL

There are many places in the world where terrorism is too common an event, where the

hon-or of sudden, violent attack has become accepted as 1101mal. Beyond the ten-orists

who wage war in the name of one cause or another and the governments who respond

strongly in an attempt to quell the violence and maintain order, there are the people who

just want to live their lives peacefully. As the perpetrators of terrorism change, however,

from primarily politically motivated groups that dominated the 1980s such as the Irish

Republican Army (IRA) into the more ideologically and religiously-focused groups such

as al-Qaeda emerging during the 1990s and early 2000s, the targets of ten-or have also

changed. Walter Lacqueur, formerly of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,

noted in "Postmodern TeJTorism" (Foreign Affairs, September/October 1996) that "The

trend now seems to be away from attacking specific targets like the other side's officials

and toward more indiscriminate killing." What this means is that, wherever there is

teJTorism, there is a growing risk that anyone may be affected.

This stark reality was brought home on September 11, 2001, when terrorists hijacked four

passenger airliners and crashed two of the planes into the twin towers of the World Trade

Center in New York City, and one into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, close to

Washington, DC; the fomth plane crashed in a rural Pennsylvania field apparently after a

passenger revolt against the terrorists before it could reach its intended target. More than

three thousand people American, Chinese, Egyptian, Kenyan, Mexican, and others from

as many as eighty other countries around the world were killed in this indiscriminate

attack. The ten-orists made no demands from governments and stated no purpose for the

attack. It seems to have been motivated purely by the desire to inflict mass casualties and

fear among the American public and, indeed, the world.

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4.3 National Peace and stability

The second objective of sought to determine National Peace and stability. On this, the

researcher wanted to establish the influence of organisation performance using Pearson

linear correlation coefficient, as indicated in table 4.3 below:-

Many politicians, leaders, opinion-makers, scholars, bureaucrats, and ordinary people

routinely hold that the threat presented to the United States by terrorism is existential in

nature. The current international security environment has changed from that of the Cold

War era. While the probability of conflict among major powers is decreasing, regional

conflicts are on the increase. Moreover, threats have intensified, including the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, increases in international

terrorism such as the series of terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India and cases of piracy, as

well as global issues such as those related to pove1iy, the environment, refugees, illegal

narcotics, and infectious diseases. In such a context, in order for Japan to maintain its

territorial integrity, protect the lives and properties of Japanese nationals, and ensure

prosperity and development, it is necessary for Japan to have a multi-faceted security

policy to address not only traditional threats but also non-traditional threats. Specifically,

in addition to developing appropriate defense capabilities and maintaining and

reinforcing the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, it is important to continue to actively

advance diplomatic effo1is to enhance stable international relations with neighboring

countries and efforts towards fostering peace and stability in the international community.

In addition, the threat from extremist organizations worldwide influenced by the

ideology and methodologies of this organization remains high even today. The year 2008

again saw a large number of terrorist attacks around the world, with Japanese nationals

also affected by the threat of international terrorism. Terrorism is an issue affecting more

than the safety of a nation and its citizens. Through its impact on investment, tourism,

and trade, among other areas, it is an issue that has an enormous impact on the economy

of our nation. Japan's fundamental position is that tenorism can be neither justified nor

tolerated for any reason. The activities Japan had been conducting based on the Anti­

Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001) were temporarily suspended when the law

expired, but activities were resumed after the enactment of the Replenishment Support

Special Measures Law in January. Fmihermore, a revised law was enacted in December,

64

extending the law for one year. Japan considers counter-terrorism as its own security

issue, and through a broad range of approaches, such as providing assistance to other

countries and strengthening international legal frameworks, Japan will continue to

actively strengthen its counter-te1Torism efforts in cooperation with the international

community.

Poverty

The findings (Table 4.3) on this construct reveals that five (5) items were measured

(Table 4.3) and the results showed that all items was rated high that is to say; I was

recruited with money influence (mean=3.25), I had no Job by the time of recruitment

(mean=3.20) I was promised a house, car and a good job (mean=3.00), I had no money

for further studies (mean=2.90) I was convinced by one of my colleagues (mean=2.70)

with an average mean=3.0l.

Countries in an intermediate range of political rights expenence a greater risk of

terrorism than countries either with a very high degree of political rights or than severely

authoritarian countries with very low levels of political rights." After the terrorist attacks

of September 11, 2001, politicians and policy experts drew a quick and intuitive line

between te1Torism and poverty. Much of the existing academic literature on conflict

suggested that poverty increased the likelihood of political coups and civil war, so

conflating terrorism with poor economic conditions seemed logical. Indeed, just a few

weeks following 9/11, then U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick spoke out on the

need to liberalize international trade and thus reduce poverty as a means to fight

terrorism.

In Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism Alberto Abadie (2013)

explores this link in greater detail and finds that the risk of terrorism is not significantly

higher for poorer countries, once other country-specific characteristics are considered. In

particular, Abadie finds that a country's level of political freedom better explains the

presence of terrorism.

65

Unlike other recent studies on the causes of terrorism, Abadie's work explores not

only transnational instances of terrorism but also domestic ones. This difference is

telling: In 2003, the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base repmied only 240 cases of

transnational terrorism compared to 1,536 instances of domestic terrorism. Furthermore,

Abadie suggests that the determinants of transnational and domestic te1Torism may differ.

"Much of modern-day transnational terrorism seems to generate from grievances against

rich countries," he writes. "In addition, in some cases terrorist groups may decide to

attack property or nationals ofrich countries in order to gain international publicity.

While many studies have relied on measures of terrorism-related casualties or

terrorist incidences as a proxy for the risk of terrorism, Abadie uses country-level ratings

on terrorist risk from the Gglobal Tterrorism Iindex of the World Market Research

Center, an international risk-rating agency. The index assesses terrorism risk in 186

countries and territories. In order to measure poverty, Abadie uses World Bank data on

per capita gross domestic product as well as the United Nations Human Development

Index and or the Gini coefficient. He also uses Freedom House's political rights index as

a measure of country-level political freedom and employs measures of linguistic, ethnic,

and religious fractionalization. Finally, he includes data on climate and geography, since

it is well known that ce1tain geographic characteristics such as being land-locked or in an

area that is difficult to access may offer safe haven to terrorist groups and facilitate

training.

After controlling for the level of political rights, fractionalization, and geography,

Abadie concludes that per capita national income is not significantly associated with

te1rnrism. He finds, though, that lower levels of political rights are linked to higher levels

of terrorism countries with the highest levels of political rights are also the countries that

suffer the lowest levels of terrorism. However, the relationship between the level of

political rights and terrorism is not a simple linear one. Countries in an intermediate

range of political rights experience a greater risk of terrorism than countries either with a

ve1y high degree of political rights or than severely authoritarian countries with very low

levels of political rights.

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Table 4.3: Level of National Peace and stability (n=l00)

Categories Mean Interpretation Rank

Poverty

I was recruited with money influence 3.25 High I

I had no Job by the time ofrecruitment 3.20 High 2

I was promised a house, car and a good job 3.00 High 3

I had no money for further studies 2.90 High 4

I was convinced by one of my colleagues 2.70 High 5

Average mean 3.01 High

Information Sharing

I can easily deliver messages via internet to our partner 3.26 High I

I always get messages for terror attack from police 3.10 High 2

I report suspicious individuals in our division 2.90 High 3

I can identify who is a terrorist 2.72 High 4

Information given to police and other security organs is kept 2.70

High 5 confidential

Average mean 2.94 High

National Border control

I was asked for my national Identity card 3.14 High I

There is a full time surveillance cameras and all check points 3.09 High 2

You can pay some money and they allow you to enter into another 2.85

High 3 territorial boundary

Machine detectors are used at the check points 2.80 High 4

There are restrictions applied to non citizens 2.77 High 5

Average mean 2.93 High

Training and Technology

Personal at the check points have adequate knowledge on terror tricks 3.25 High I

The security personnel are trained to handle modern equipment like 3.19

High 2 computers, metal detectors among others

Terrorist use high level of technology including watches for detonators 3.15 High 3

I can easily distinguish an explosive from other weapons 2.80 High 4

Dogs are there trained to handle terrorists and their weapons 2.77 High 5

Average mean 3.03 High

Overall Mean 2.98 High

Source: Data Primary (2015)

67

Information Sharing; the findings on this construct reveals that five (5) items were

measured (Table 4.3) and the results showed that all items was rated high that is to say; I

can easily deliver messages via internet to our partner (mean=3.26) I always get messages

for terror attack from police (mean=3.10) I report suspicious individuals in our division

(mean=2.90) I can identify who is a terrorist (mean=2.72) Information given to police

and other security organs is kept confidential (mean=2.70) Average mean=2.94 this

implies that, Protecting the country from ever-evolving, transnational threats requires a

sh·engthened homeland security enterprise that shares information across traditional

organizational boundaries.

Additionally, lack of information sharing is a challenge to security agencies patiicularly

in Uganda. The protection of "sources and methods" has been an obstacle to information

sharing among the security agencies. This has always caused inefficiency towards active

reaction to terrorism threats. In most cases the security agencies have been acting like fire

brigade in which case the public would only be informed of patiicular individuals

(terrorists) when they have already entered in the country. This challenge of information

sharing is not only in Uganda or Africa but it's a common challenge globally. For

example, the Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) has always been slow to pass along

sensitive information to other intelligence agencies because of the risk of releasing

information that could be embarrassing or the tendency to place the needs of counter

intelligence (protecting sources and methods) over the need of counter terrorism. As for

the 9/1 I, in typical fashion, the CIA actually received sensitive information from the

Malaysian Intelligence Service on two hijackers, who then lived openly in San Diego, but

the CIA was slow to pass naines to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). It was

after the hijackers succeeding that the two depaiiments staiied pointing fingers at each

other.

Terrorists and especially the Al-Shabaab have had a presence in East Africa for almost 20

years, although their extent of operations has varied overtime. The regions porous

borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial

institution, pervasive corruption and in some cases, complexity in terrorist activities,

68

combined with the over 20 years absence of control authority in Somalia, have provided

an enabling environment for Al-Shabaab and other extremist group. Some countries in

the region have served at various times as terrorist safe havens, staging areas, or transit

points hence bringing continuous threats to peace and stability especially in Uganda.

Uganda counter terrorism officials assert that the Al-Shabaab threat is becoming more

widely distributed and more geographically and ethnically diversified among affiliates

and among those who are inspired by the Al-Shabaab message. Influence by hardliners

within Al-Shabaab on an apparent willingness and ability to deliver on threats, have

contributed to a renewed focus by policy makers on radicalization throughout East

Africa.

National Border control; The findings on this construct reveals that five (5) items were

measured (Table 4.3) and the results showed that all items was rated high that is to say; I

was asked for my national Identity card (mean=3.14), There is a full time surveillance

cameras and all check points (mean=3.09), You can pay some money and they allow you

to enter into another territorial boundary (mean=2.85) Machine detectors are used at the

check points (mean=2.80) There are restrictions applied to non citizens (mean=2.77) with

an average mean=2.93. National border control which is the lead of challenges, the

respondents showed that Uganda's boarders are porous with no control for intervention of

tenorists attack. A tenorist can get to his target though any means possible for him to

access entry into the country. In fact some respondents said, 'we are only at the mercy of

God" otherwise the Ugandan borders have no control to prevent a te1Torist's movement in

and out. This they said is a big challenge for the Ugandan security agencies to prevent it.

Testimony presented to the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on

Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cyber security, Subcommittee on

Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology.

The respondents interviewed talked of their personal safety especially dealing in matters

related to tenorists. They said some people have been killed by terrorist or collaborates

after being known that they are fighting them (tenorists). Most of the security agencies

are involved in fighting the threat and therefore vulnerable to the tenorists considering

69

the fact that their security is not guaranteed by the government. Working for the

government doesn't mean putting your life at risk. "One respondent said".

Globalization and lack of training and technology has remained yet another challenge to

the security agencies. New facilities of transport, free movement of goods and people,

science and technology progress particularly in information computer technology (ICT)

have influenced the world life. These facilities have allowed and still allow terrorism and

crime to spread in the world. Because of the globalization, these threats also become

international. Threats affecting Asia countries or Latin America are also felt in Africa and

Visa Vasa. Trafficking of illicit goods, terrorism, money laundering is often favored by

globalization. In this context, globalization is an asset for humanity but also a source of

threats to national and international security. These threats especially the international

threats are a handicap for Africa's development.

In the last 17 years, African countries have not only snuggled against domestic terrorism,

they have also been challenged by the emergence of transnational terrorist groups that

have used Africa as a theatre to carry out attacks both domestic and international targets,

as well as to develop and maintain operations. The 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya

and Tanzania, the 2002 bombing of Israel owned hotel and airplane, attacks against UN

buildings in Algeria and Nigeria, the recent attacks at Garrisa University and West Gates

in Kenya, the bombing in Kampala in 2010 by Al-Shabaab and continued terrorism

threats offer just a few examples of terrorists attacks carried out on African soil with a

distinct international dimension.

The past decades has witnessed the transformation of some domestic groups, some of

whom have adopted transnational objectives. The researcher established that in the

1990's the Allied Democratic Forces a rebel group in Uganda comprised of self­

identified religious crusaders from the Muslim Tablic sect with the motivation of AI­

Shabaab carried out terrorist attacks against local civilians and internally displaced

persons. They took the advantage of the terrain and local context by setting up rear bases

in neighboring Congo where they began recruiting and training fighters with the promise

of money and education.

70

In another example in Uganda, the Lords Resistance A1my (LRA) which dates

back to 1987 has carried numerous atrocities directed at civilians in its nearly 25 years

campaign in Uganda. Operating as an ideologically apocalyptic Christian group opposing

the central government, its modus operandi has been to use violence or the threat of

violence to intimidate and instill fear in the Ugandan people. Through its objectives are

not always clear, the decades of indiscriminative violence with political unde1iones have

made the group one of the well known rebel groups using teITorism as a method in their

campaign. Fmihe1more, it has used the structural weakness of its host environment to

diffuse across multiple borders namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South

Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR). Overall the ADF and LRA are examples of

two non state, religiously and politically motivated groups that have caused at least more

than I 0,000 deaths in their respective campaign motivated by Al-Shabaab operations in

Uganda. The respondents that the researcher interacted with showed that terrorism threats

are still there and that they fear anytime they can be attacked. The terrorism threats

according to the respondents originate from Al-Shabaab a terrorist group/organization

originating from Somali and operating in most of the countries in East Africa.

Training and Technology ; the findings on this construct reveals that five (5) items were

measured (Table 4.3) and the results showed that all items was rated high that is to say;

Personal at the check points have adequate knowledge on terror tricks (mean=3.25) The

security personnel are trained to handle modem equipment like computers, metal

detectors among others (mean=3.l 9) TeITosist use high level of technology including

watches for detonators (mean=3.15) I can easily distinguish an explosive from other

weapons (mean=2.80) Dogs are there trained to handle terrorists and their weapons

(mean=2.77 with Average mean=3.03 as well as the overall of the four constructs are

2.98.

Shopping malls, hotels, banks among other places have intensified their security

by setting up closed circuit televisions (CCTv's) inside the malls and ensuring through

check up at entrances. Security guards are always tasked to ensure no one suspicious

enters without having been checked properly. You find at least five policemen or guards

at the entrance of every shopping mall with metal or bomb detectors checking cars and

71

people entering but one wonders, do these guards know what they are doing or they are

just following their bosses' orders. You get out of the car, guards check in dash board,

gear box, order you to open the car boot, meanwhile another guard is moving around the

car with a search mirror. After about 5-7 minutes they tell you to enter and go. But come

to think of it if one wanted to blast a whole mall or bank, would they hide the bomb in the

boot of the car? Most of the security agencies the researcher talked with say they have

always sensitized the security stake holders on how to identify suspected terrorists. One

of the officers in the police said that they have the task to follow up those who are not

complying with their people while checking them and that they advise the guards on

proper checking and owners of the malls to get proper custody of the anns from people.

The findings revealed that the majority of people getting involved in international

terrorism was as a result of ideological perspective (40%) followed by equal percentage

of psychological perspective and strategic perspective 30%-30% respectively. this

implies, Ideological perspective comprise of belief, values and or principles by which a

group identifies its particular aims and goals. Ideological may encompass religion or

political philosophies and program. Examples of terrorism groups motivated by ideology

include Irish Republic Army (IRA), in Sri Lanka the Liberation Tigers of Tamai Eelarn

(LTTE) and the AI-Shabaab Terrorist organization in Somalia.

The IRA is motivated by a political program to oust the United Kingdom from Ireland

and United Ireland under one flag. Similarly Al-Shabaab seeks to change the state to

Shelia belief and a political change to oust the African Peace Keepers in Somalia.

As of Psychological Perspective, people engage in terrorism, may do so for purely

personal reasons, based on their psychological state of mind. Their motivation may be

nothing more than hate or the desire for power. For example in 1893 Anguste Valliant

bombed the French Chambers of deputies. Prior to his conviction and subsequent

execution valiant in terms of hate for the middle classes. Valliant wanted to spoil the

sense of economic and social success, by tainting it with his voice. In many respects this

terrorist is interested in getting attention from others for his or her act, rather than some

grand ideological or strategic goal.

72

As to Strategic Perspective; terrorism is sometimes seen as a logical extension of the

failure of politics. When people seek redress of their grievances through government and

fail to win government attention, to their plight, they may resort to violence. From this

point of view, te1Torism is the result of logical analysis of the goals and objectives of a

group, and their estimate of the likelihood of gaining victory. If victory seems unlikely

using more traditional means of opposition, then one might calculate that terrorism is a

better option. For example in South Africa, the African National Congress only turned to

the use of terrorism after political avenues were explored and failed. Of course, not just

individuals may feel let down by the political process. States may use terrorists groups,

especially when the objectives of the state and the terrorist group are similar. For

example, Libya used terrorists to explode a bomb aboard Pan AM 103 flying from

London to New York in 1988 allegedly in response to U.S and British bombing of Libya.

Another example is when Al-Shabaab terrorists bombed Ethiopian restaurant in

Kabalagala and Rugby Kyandondo in capital city Kampala on 11/7/2010 killing over 70

people in retaliation of the deployment of Ugandan soldiers in African Union peace

keepers in Somalia.

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson called the 2010 Kampala

bombing a "wake up call" for the international community and argued that Al-Shabaab's

ability to conduct suicide bombings outside Somali indicates that threats has risen,

Uganda has charged to court more than 3 0 people in connection with the attacks

including 14 Ugandans, 10 Kenyans, 06 Somalis, 01 Rwandan and 01 Pakistani. The

suspected involvement of a significant number of non-Somali East African nationals in

the bombing suggests that violent extremist organizations are successfully recruiting and

net working in East Africa hence maintaining threats on Uganda's peace and stability.

This implies that adequate facilities needs to be provided but are still lacking which

remains a great threat to national peace and stability. The facilities and gadgets include

equipment that can be used to detect the terrorists and their movement

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More challenges are that terrorist's networks can sustain themselves and attack anywhere,

exploiting freedom of travel, identify theft and free flows of money. So the response has

to be international as well as national. Because a central aim is often to cause mass and

potentially catastrophic causalities, international terrorists have a wide range of targets.

The security agencies needs, which are not in most cases, have an effective part of

intelligence capability which enables them to anticipate attacks before they can be

mounted. Many terrorists are careless of their own lives and therefore security agencies

cannot assume conventional protective measures. Because security agencies want to

preserve the open society which the te1Torists wish to destroy, security agencies are

constrained by the legitimate demands of individual freedom. The security agencies need

to be complemented by policies which discourage extremist and terrorist recrnitment.

Extensive academic literature describes how official and private sector corruption

facilitates organized terrorist. Through bribery, other financial inducements, and the

credible threats of violence can take advantage of corrupt actors to facilitate their

terrorists operations and reduce the likelihood of detection or capture. Corruption actors

may range from border guards, financial regulators. Justice sector officials, high level

policy makers and political figures, to private bankers, small business owners and

industry magnates. This is a big challenge to security agencies to fight the terrorism

threats. Some observers argue that terrorists groups may also reap the benefits of similar

corrupt linkage whether coordinated through or on behalf of criminal groups or

independently from such criminal groups.

The potential for corruption is particularly heightened in vulnerable environments, such

as weak states, post conflict situation, and where gaps in the rule of law and political

legitimacy are extensive. Expanded exploitation of corruption by terrorists has

unde1mined Uganda and international security and economic interests.

On September 21 2014, Kenya faced one of the most challenging experiences that a

country can ever go through after the West gate Shopping Centre in Nairobi was attacked

by terrorists linked to Al-Shabaab, a Somali militant group. The attack created fear across

the region most especially Kenya and Uganda whose soldiers are in Somalia fighting in

74

the union force. The terrorists who claimed responsibility of the attack said it was in

retaliation for Kenya's military involvement in Somalia. To prevent any more damage or

unprepared terror attacks, Uganda has intensified its security forces at the borders,

shopping malls, hotels, and other public places. However the question remains. Is it

prepared enough?

The researcher however noted that armed people still fear depositing the arms because

some malls or public places don't have proper storage of the anns. The spokes person of

the Uganda People's Defense Forces when contacted by the researcher said that they

always sensitize people on what to look out, for example a stranger carrying a strange big

bag. He said when someone is putting on a suicide bag, their bodies tend to exaggerate,

so when you see someone looking suspicions, you should get interested. These te1Torists

buy their equipment to use in setting up bombs from here like iron bars, cylinders,

batteries, fertilizers. So people should look out for such people. It was also noted that

police have a sensitization program which is running on prints, video and adve1is telling

the population what they should do during certain things. Terrorists usually elect to use a

variety of means and weapons and target both official and private interests. They can

attack public transportation systems and other tourist infrastructure. The US Embassy in

Kampala has always cautioned its citizens to be vigilant about visiting crowded areas

saying that the West gate style of attack may also occur in Kampala.

Al-Shabaab has issued several tin-eats to again strike Uganda, unless it withdraws from

Somalia where its troops are fighting as part of the AU peace keeping mission. They

carried out the 2010 bombings in Kampala targeting crowds gathered for the occasion of

the football world cup final. The Uganda police have played a role of encouraging the

public to work with the security forces to fight terrorism by combining the vigilance of

security agencies with popular vigilance. By being consciousness, look out for suspicious

or abandoned items or packages for example, bags, cars, boxes,unexpected gifts, flasks,

mails and parcels, abandoned suit cases, dust bins, electronics and any other items with

loose wires attached and also increase security and safety in all places patronized by

members of the public in big numbers. The respondents shared with, some said that they

75

share intelligence with regional partners to combine efforts in fighting ten-orism. "It is not

easy to deliver total security without partnering with other countries through mechanisms

that are established under the regional organizations". We share information on a timely

basis. They said, for example that if you have suspects tactically trained as terrorists

moving around in the region and you have their photos, you share the news with other

countries so that we can aleti the public. This helps us keep ourselves on the alert and

protect the boarders. The police spokes person when contacted by the researcher said this

time around, everybody in security is on full alert, and we are working jointly with other

sister security agencies. He said yes we were hit in 2010 but probably we would have

been hit even other times but because of our vigilance and continued surveillance, sharing

of information we have been able to deter the reoccun-ence of such actions. He said they

launched a national wide education campaign asking Ugandans to help with information

to prevent any attack. The campaigns he said have been broadcasted on radio, television,

social media platforms as well as officers going into rural communities.

It is easy to assume in the past 9/1 lin US andpost 7/11 in Uganda andseveral

attacks in Kenya that the psychological impact of the continued threats of terrorism

would be considerable. Across the globe, terrorist, kills and maims thousands each year

and cause massive economic damage. Images of the after math bombings and other

atrocities are rarely absent from the media. In such a context it would be natural to expect

that the fear and threats of ten-orism would have a crippling psychological effect on the

society.There have been no terrorists attacks in Uganda since July 2010. Despite the

absence of violence, terrorism has never left the public consciousness and has remained a

high profile political and public issue.

The attacks in Uganda and continue attacks in the region by Al-Shabaab tetTorists

has continued to loom in the minds of the people of East Africa region. Ten-orism affects

the support for democracy, its institutions and practices. International tetTorism poses the

greatest tlu-eat to our national security, global trends indicate that the growing number of

te1Torists groups will become more networked and even harder to identify and track.

Uganda critical infrastructure, valuable resources and geographic location create unique

counter terrorism challenges to national threats.

76

TeITorists often use threats to create fear among the public to convince populations that

government is powerless to prevent te1Torism and to get immediate publicity for their

cause. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including incendiary, explosive, chemical,

biological, radiological and nuclear agents have the capacity to cause death or serious

bodily injury to a significant number of people, thus posing the tlu·eat of a catastrophic

incidents. TeITorism includes the following hazards; Conventional bomb; Biological

agent; Chemical agent; Nuclear bomb; Radiological agent; Arson/incendiary attack;

Armed attack; Agriterrorism; Assault on the infrastructure and electronic information

systems that could result in consequences affecting human life, health and safety.

4.4 Relationship between International Terrorism Threats on National Peace and

Stability

The third objective of sought to determine relationship between the International

Te1rnrism Threats on National Peace and Stability among Selected Divisions in Kampala

District Uganda. On this, the researcher stated a null hypothesis that there is no

significant relationship International TeJTorism Tlu·eats on National Peace and Stability

among Selected Divisions in Kampala District Uganda. To achieve this last objective and

to test the null hypothesis, the researcher correlated the means of all aspects of

International Terrorism Threats on National Peace and Stability among Selected

Divisions in Kampala District Uganda using Pearson lineal' correlation coefficient, as

indicated in table 4.4 below:-

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Table 4.4: Significant relationship between the International Terrorism Threats on

National Peace and Stability among Selected Divisions in Kampala District Uganda

(Level of significance 0.005)

Variables correlated r-value Sig- Value Interpretation Decision on Ho

International .461 000 Positive and Rejected

Terrorism Threats Significant

vs

National Peace and

Stability

Source: Primary Data, (2015)

The results in table 4.4 indicate that the relationship that exist between International

Terrorism Threats on National Peace and Stability among Selected Divisions in Kampala

District Uganda is significantly con-elated, (all sig.<0.05). This means that the more

International Tenorism Threats is given attention, the more the National Peace and

Stability among Selected Divisions in Kampala District Uganda is and the less attention it

is give the, International Terrorism Threats on National Peace and stability.

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CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSIONS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter covers the discussion of the study, finding summary of the study, conclusion

and recommendations for further studies.

5.1 Discussions of Findings

"Fighting terrorism is like being a goal keeper, you can make a hundred brilliant saves

but the only shot that people remember is the one that get past you" Paul Wilkinson.

In most African countries, Uganda inclusive, poverty creates terrorism (Kahn and

Weiner, 2002). The notion that poverty generates tenorism is consistent with the results

of the most of the existing literature on the economics of conflicts. In particular, the

results in Alesina et al (1996) suggest that poor economic conditions increase the

probability of political coups. Collier and Hoeffer (2004) show that economic variables

are powerful predictors of civil war, while political variables have low explanatory

power. Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergentic (2004) show that for a sample of African

countries, negative exogenous shocks in economic growth increase the likelihood of civil

conflict. Because tenorism is a manifestation of political conflict, seem to indicate that

pove1iy and adverse economic conditions may play an important role explaining

tenorism (Walter Laqueur, 1998).

East Africa (EA) is the most vulnerable to terrorism of all regions in sub-sahara Africa

(Bashir, A.H, 2007). Nearly all countries in EA have been victims to tenorist acts. These

acts have either been canied out by and against a country's nationals for a domestic cause

or they have focused on extra-national or extra-regional targets, such as western targets

located in the region (Rosand, Millar and IPe 2009). Examples include 1980 te1Torist

attacks on the Norfolk Hotel in Kenya, the August 1998 simultaneous attacks on the US

embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the November 2002 simultaneous

attacks in Mombasa, Kenya, on another paradise Hotel and on an Israel bound aircraft at

take-off from the Mombasa international Airport, Kenya, the July 20 IO attacks during the

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world cup finals in Kampala, Uganda and the December 2010 bombing of a Kampala

bound bus in Nairobi. Both Local and international communities in the region have borne

the burden of the loss of life and poverty as well as other economic damage from these

attacks (Walter Laqueur, 1998).

5.1.1 Profile of the respondents

The findings indicated that most respondents were male with (54%), ranged between 20-

39 years of age with (66%), over (50%) had bachelors' in education and majority (60%)

had a length of experience between 6-10 years.

5.1.2 International Terrorism Threats

The findings on Level of International TeITorism Threats indicated that four (4)

constructs were measured and rated as follows: Political stability (average Mean=3.05),

Trade (average Mean=2.94), travel and tourism (average Mean=2.99) Human life threat

(average mean =3.08) with an overall mean of3.02 which was rated high. The region has

experienced prolonged and severe intra-and inter-state conflict, leading to instability,

poverty and political isolation that make it vulnerable to te1Torist exploitation.

E.A region including Uganda is vulnerable to te1Torism because countries in the region

experience conflict, weak governance, collapsed state institutions, porous borders

allowing extensive and uncontrolled movement of people and illegal weapons, increased

extremist religious, Religious ideology and radicalization of vulnerable groups. These

factors generally coincide with poor socio-economic conditions and create fertile ground

for the existence of terrorism (Walter Laqueur, 1998).

The growth of Islamic extremism in East Africa and especially in Uganda appears to be

linked to the poor socio-economic conditions of countries in the region where Islamist

groups, deliberately leveraging socio-economic grievances, penetrate East Africa

societies. (Rosand, Millar and lpe, 2009). The use of humanitarian and development

relief, social services, education, training and health care by Islamist groups on one hand

aim at improving living standards of Muslims in East Africa and especially in Uganda.

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However, on the other hand some of these activities are linked to the proliferation of

extremism in the region. (Colonel Gabre Egzaibgher Alemzeed, 2011).

Survey respondents in 14 countries representing 62% of the world's Muslim population

indicate that approval of Islamist ten-or is not associated with religiosity, lack of

education, poverty or income dissatisfaction. Instead it is associated with urban poverty,

Uganda inclusive. The results are consistent with the thesis that Islamist ten-orist obtain

support and recruits from the urban poor, who pursue their economic interests off the

market in politic in collective groups. These groups compete over state rents, so a gain

for one group is a loss for another, making ten-orism of members out of groups rational.

The rise of militant Islam can be attributed to high rates of urbanization in many Muslim

countries in recent decades, which fosters violence as rising groups seek to dislodge prior

groups entrenched in power.

Rising group leaders also compete over new urban followers so they promote fears of out

groups and package in group identities in ways that ring true for the urban poor. Because

many of the urban poor are migrants from the country side, popular packages are those

which identify with traditional rural values and distinguish enemies as those associated

with urban modernity and the secular groups already in power. Imams have an incentive

to preach what audiences want to hear, so a mutated in-group version of Islam-Islamism

struck a chord in several large cities around the globe at the same time. With

globalization of the media, in many developing countries the west is widely (Albeit

Wrongly) perceived as an inimical out group associated with urban modernity. The

political strategy to limit support and recruits for Islamist ten-orist groups is to enhance

the economic opp01tunities available for the urban poor and to provide them the needed

services, such as access to health care and education that many cmTently obtain from

Islamist groups.

Terrorism is a dreadful insensitive crime that can occur anywhere at any time and usually

results in death, destruction and cultivates fear in the communities. The growing level of

the threat of ten-orism coupled with its lethality, the indoctrinated radical activism and the

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possible use of weapons of massive destruction calls for a deliberate well coordinated and

multidisciplinary campaign from all relevant stake holders. Globalization trend and

technological advancement have facilitated the creation of a range of a new and emerging

ten-orism threats and challenges to the law enforcers. Records by State Depaiiment

indicate tenorist attacks increased by 45% in 2013, more than 18,000 people were killed,

more than 33,000 injured and 30,000 kidnapped or taken hostage. Records also read that

in 2014, 3272 people were killed by ten-orists an indicator that the international threat is

on increase.

The need for a strong regional security framework for cooperation is therefore paramount

to prevent and respond to today's terrorism which is organized and transnational in

nature. The need to upgrade and establish a sustainable security architecture that will

address the threats of terrorism. Ten-orism involves the use of indiscriminate,

premeditated, physical and or psychological violence by individuals, groups or states

aimed at influencing or obtaining certain demands that may be political, social, economic

or ideological in nature.

Terrorism is one of the world's greatest threats that transcend borders. It is used as a

tactic and strategy, a crime and a holly duty and at time as a justified reaction to

oppression. Terrorism groups have and continue to pursue several immediate objectives

that include panic, demoralization, fear, intimidation, media attention, emban-assment of

leaders and disruption of services. The major ten-or groups in the world among others

include Al-Qaidaand Al-Shabaab who ai·e also prime threats to East Africa region and

Uganda in paiiicular.

Te1Torism has no universally agreed definition. UN defines tenorism as criminal act

intended or calculated to provoke a state of te1Tor in the general public, a group of

persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstances from doing

any act, or to adopt or abandon a paiiicular stand point, or to act according to ce1iain

principles, or disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public

or to create a public emergency; or create general insun-ection in a state.

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East African Community (EAC) defines terrorism as: (a) any act which is a violation of

the criminal laws of a paitner state and which may endanger the life, integrity or freedom

of or cause serious injury or death to any person, any member or group of persons or

causes or may cause dainage to public or private property, natural resources, environment

or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:-Unjustifiable, whatever the

considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any

other nature that may be invoked to justify them. African Union (A.U) defines te1Torism

as any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and which may

endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any

person, any number or group or causes or may cause dainage to public or private

property, natural resources, environment or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended

to, intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the

general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain, Intimidate, put in fear, force,

coerce or induce ai1y government body, institution, the general public or any segment or

any of these to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt or abandon a particular stand

point or to act according to ce1tain principles, or Disrupting public service, the delivery of

any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency or create general

insu1Tection in a pattner state.

In Uganda the anti-terrorism act 2002 defines terrorism as any act of violence ca1Tied out

for purposes of influencing government or intimidating the public for a political,

religious, social and economic aim indiscriminately without due regard to the safety of

others or property. International terrorism refers to te1Torist acts committed, planned, or

otherwise involving tetTorists transnational.

5.1.3 National Peace and Stability

The findings on National Peace and stability revealed that four items were measured and

rated as follows: Poverty (average Mean=3.01); Information Sharing (average

Mean=2.94); National Border control (average Mean=2.93); training and technology

(average Mean=3.03); with an overall mean of 2.98. The findings on National Peace and

Stability as a dependent variable revealed that, The Al-Shabaab network has not only

explicitly defined its ideological and operational agenda as one directed against Uganda,

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it has also demonstrated a proven capability to effectively mastermind terror operations in

the region. The relationship between Al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups like Al­

Qaeda, and Boko Haram is being manifested through shared ideology, funding,

grievances, future intentions and overt resistance for globalization.

Al-Shabaab is a proxy of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization which intends to establish

an Islamic caliphate from South East Asia via the Arabian Peninsula into N01ih and East

Africa. Al-Shabaab has developed capacity of making suicide bombing because of Al­

Qaeda linkage. The group has continued to recruit Ugandans and youth from the region

or radicalization, indoctrination and training for teITor activities. Some of the fleeing Al­

shabaab have also joined the ADF ranks in East Democratic Republic of Congo to

cooperate in furtherance of their jihadist ideological across the region. Al Shabaab and its

affiliated teITorist networks pose the most intricate and most dangerous threat to security

agencies in the world. The Alshabaab net work has not only explicitly defined its

ideology and operational agenda as one directed against Uganda, it has also demonstrated

a proven capability to effectively mastermind terror operations in the region. The

relationship between Alshabaab and other terrorist groups like Al-Qaida and Boko haram

is being manifested through shared ideology, funding, grievances, future intentions and

ove1i resistance to globalization. They build networks through campaigns of attacks on

government security forces, foreigners, innocent civilians and vulnerable installations

among others.

These attacks are becoming even more deadly as these groups train with one another and

share up to-elate information in order to maximize their objectives. Recent successes by

AMISOM against Al-shabaab, Nigerian security forces against Boko Haram, and the

French intervention into Mali, are forcing Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram to have a more

integrated operational relationship for basic means of survival. The tactic mainly used by

Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram focus on hit and mn attacks mostly and not limited to what

are considered soft targets churches, schools and hospitals. While the death of Goclane

and Bin Laden represents an imp01iant victory in counter terrorism effo1is, it does not

mean a reduced international teITorism threats. The threat from Al-Qaeda affiliates like

Al-Shabaab demonstrates an innovative and sophisticated enemy capable of striking.

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The African region has experienced significant levels of terrorist activity. In East Africa,

the Somalia based te1Torist group Al-Shabaab remains the primary international threat.

Somali security forces and the AU mission in Somalia (AMSOM) continue to make gains

against Al-Shabaab, but inability to undertake consistent offensive operations against the

group allowed Al-Shabaab to develop and carry out asymmetric attacks, including

outside of Somalia. Most notably Al-Shabaab launched attacks against people at Rugby

club and Ethiopian restaurant in Kampala watching football on 11/7/2010. They have

made attack in Kenya including the Garasa University and Westgate mall. The attacks

which targeted innocent civilians were claimed by Al-Shabaab as a response to the

involvement of contributing peace keepers in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has issued persistent

threats to other countries contributing troops to AMISOM. Driven out of major urban

areas, Al-Shabaab has returned to a strategy focused on asymmetric attacks intended to

discredit and destabilize the foreign states. Various East African countries continue to

detect, deter, disrupt, investigate and prosecute terrorist incidents. Enhance domestic and

regional efforts to bolster border security and create integrated and dedicated counter

terrorism strategies. Counter terrorist cooperation across the region picked up following

the Westgate attack and nations began to examine their procedures for responding to

attacks on soft targets.

5.2 Conclusion

Uganda has suffered from acts of terrorism perpetrated by both local and international

terrorist organization mostly the Al-Shabaab and because of the geopolitical issues to the

region. Some local terrorists groups transformed into transnational threats operating from

outside Uganda for example the ADP operate hand in hand with Al-Shabaab. Because of

Uganda's involvement in the peace keeping mission in Somali, the country remains a

prime target to terrorist attacks.

Proliferation of arms or weapons has really posed a great challenge to the maintenance of

law and order in all countries as no country can boast to be 100% free of violent crimes.

The adverse effect of this threat to national and international security has necessitated

giving greater security priority by various governments, initiating unilateral, bilateral and

multilateral approaches and policies to limit the production of weapons particularly those

85

considered capable of causing mass destmction like gas bomb. The world governments

have embarked on integration of defense, development, foreign policy, legal instruments

and multilateral trade arrangement to mitigate the threat of arms/weapons production and

proliferation. The world has become aware of the implications that aims proliferation cai1

have on the world population, particularly those from post conflict societies and

economically weak states like Nigeria, Sudan DRC, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda.

According to the Nairobi Declaration: The problem of the Proliferation of illicit small

arms and light weapons in the region has been exacerbated by internal political strife and

extreme pove1ty, a comprehensive strategy to arrest and deal with the problem must

include putting in place structures and processes to promote democracy, the observance

of human right, the rule of law and good governance as well as economic recovery and

growth (The Nairobi Declai·ation, March 2000).

The proliferation of weapons has really affected the security and peace of the

contemporai-y global system. An average of $2.8 trillion is spent annually on defense, the

bulk of which goes into production and procurement of arm facilities. If such amount of

money is spent on the alleviation of pove1ty annually, I am very convinced that in five

years, there would be no case of pove1ty anywhere in the world, even in the most remote

pait of the world, not even shown on the world map. Despite the debt regime being faced

by most states in Africa, Africa's budget on defense is still very high. This patronage has

attracted more investors into the ai·ea of arms production, posing to national and world

security. The large quantities of small arms and light weapons looted from the Army

armory in 1997, has resulted in the break down of law and order in Albania. But the UN

intervention saved the nation from total political collapse. In 1998, the UNDP developed

a community programme in Gramsch, Albania where illegal arms were smrendered.

The organization embarked on local development projects like road repairs, and

telecommunication build-ups, which were labor intensive, affording the civilians, a great

opportunity to be gainfully employed. The UNDP incentives made the demobilization

process a success. After the end of the civil war in Elvador, an average increase rate of

3 6% was recorded on annual basis in the country on homicide related incidents. This has

86

given the police in the country great concern considering the high risk nvo 1 ved in the

combat of this menace and management of security. It is no surprise that, most foreign

investors usually think twice before investing in the country because of the endemic

insecurity existent. Mozambique is another country where there are over 10 million AK-

147 assault rifles in circulation. An AK-47 riffles in Mozambique s less than $100. This

has made management of security in Southern Africa a great task, as the incidence of

violent crimes has astronomically been on the increase.

In West Africa, the civil wars in Sierra-Leone and Liberia have had some spilling effects

on the neighboring countries. Cote d'Ivoire, a once relatively peaceful country joined the

league of post cold-war civil strife countries in sub region. The country is still trying to

cope with the rebels, achieving a positive peace still remains off sight. The crime rate of

banditry, arson, communal conflict, religious crisis and assassination has gone up in

Nigeria since 1990s, when the war in Liberia became intense. Liberian civil war

contributed to proliferation of small arms and light weapons in neighboring countries

including Nigeria. The same happened in the great lake region because of Somalia

conflict. However, the use of sophisticated and deadly weapons by criminals is

experienced both locally and globally. On international front, the danger that proliferation

of weapon spose to security of lives and property was displayed in several ugly events

like the London bombing, the 'unbomber' incident in the US, Coke Prince operations in

Columbia, bombings in Egypt, the Basque bombings in Spain; among others. Some of the

terrorist organizations in the world have even adopted the use of chemical weapons like

Anthrax against their target population.

The United States of America experienced incident of anthrax attacks on some of its

citizens,just after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US. The initial demobilization

exercise supervised by ECOMOG that took place in Liberia failed because, there were

still many arms in circulation among the civilians and another reason was that the Taylor

ex-combatants were not demobilized, which created a room for suspicion, which later

(among other reasons) resulted in another outbreak of armed conflict in that country. That

development nevertheless thwaiied the effo1is to effectively reconstruct post conflict

87

Liberia for lasting peace and security in Liberia until the end of Taylor's ruler ship.

Somalia is another case study where over-circulation of arms among the people has led to

the collapse of political institutions in that country such that there is unstable government.

The phenomenon of piracy resulting from the activities of several criminal gangs in that

war-tom country has been a source of worry to the world at large. Many ships' owners

and workers have fallen victim of the nefarious activities of the Somali pirates.

There is no doubt that absence of government in true sense since 1991 resulting from the

endless civil war that has been plaguing the country for almost two lecades has

contributed to over-circulation of arms and among the Somali population. There has been

a great challenge on the government (with political power) to ensure security of lives and

property. The Country is experiencing humanitarian crisis and it remains one of the

highest contributors of refugees on the continent of Africa. All efforts by African union

and other peace stakeholders have continued to be fruitless because of the presence of

large number of arms and weapons among the people. It is only when effective

disarmament and demobilization is attained that the security of prope1iy can be

guaranteed in that war-torn country. By and large on issue of distribution pattern, we can

say that distribution pattern of arms duration can either be vertical or horizontal.

Horizontal distribution pattern involves the distribution or access to arms by all states and

non-state actors. Weapons that can be found at this level may include small arms and

light weapons. On the other hand, ve1iical distribution pattern involves large weapons or

weapons of mass destruction like nuclear weapons, which are limited in access and

production. It is the world powers the US, Russia, among others that can produce and

access these weapons due to the very destructive impact that the use of such weapons can

have on the world population and environment. Non-state actors and weak or less

powerful states are also barred from producing or/and accessing it. But, development is

that some other states not officially in the league of nuclear powers have began to embark

on building nuclear plants and there is high suspicion that these countries can either be

careless or reckless in the handling these deadly materials especially if terrorists find

their way into possessing them.

88

Social Constructivism: This is another approach of security, which emerged in the 1990s,

immediately after the collapse of the Berlin Wall (the end of the Cold war). This

approach advocates for more cultural understanding of security studies. In international

relations as well as national .politics, the self- interest of any nation is paramount, and it

is considered as the driving force of its policy directions particularly as it relates to

meeting its security goals.

State actors have now realized the need to pursue regional interest, even above their own

national interests. This approach underscores the emerging interest nations are having

towards collective security. This has created a new understanding in security relations

among states. State actors have begun to show deep concern in the spill-over effect(s) of

any insecurity in their neighboring countries and on their own internal security. One of

the reasons why Uganda intervened and ensured the resolution of the armed conflicts in

the region for instance. South Sudan and Congo crises, was the negative impact that

those violence conflicts would have on her internal security. The civil wars that plagued

south Sudan and Congo generated large amount of refugees in the sub-region, and

Uganda was one of the host countries that accommodated those refugees. Many of the

refugees hosted by Uganda were not properly disarmed. Some of them came in with

arms, which found their way into security imperatives for the people but it is the people

who should have the final say in deciding their own security. So, the state traditional

security measures of coercion and dete1Tence are moribund or outdated. Hence, policy

makers in several countries have adopted this approach as the guiding principle of their

security laws. The consensus of state and non-state actors is now geared towards

appreciating "any security issues, including without limitation, those of a political,

strategic, economic, social, or ecological nature. Nevertheless, the theoretical ingenuity

brought about by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its "Human

Development Report popularized the concept of 'human security' among the scholars and

practitioners in the field of security studies and management (Henk, 2005) We cannot but

agree with the UNDP for reaffirming that: The concept of security has for long been

interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of

89

national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear

holocaust. It has been related more to nation-state than , forgotten were the legitimate

concerns of ordinary people, for many of them, security symbolized protection from the

threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and

environmental hazards (UNDP Human Development Report, 1994: 22).

Since the 1990s, this approach has not only become the priciest bride among the state

actor but also among several non-state actors including the Nongovernmental

Organizations (NGOs) that have acted spontaneously in that popularization of human

security as an approach to security. One of the leading NGOs advocating for the global

adoption of this approach is the Human Security Network, This organization has been

championing the need to 'energize political processes aimed at preventing or solving

conflicts and promoting peace and development" (humansecuritynetwork.org/network­

e.php)

It is no news that several nations have articulated the relevance of human security

approach in the formulation of their security policies. South Africa defined its national

security in its "White Paper on Defence", which was published in 1996. As contained in

the Paper: In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a

predominantly milita,y and police problem. It has broadened to incorporate political,

economic, social, and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a

paramount concern with the security of people. Security is an all-encompassing condition

in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace, and safety; to participate fully in the

process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to

resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit art environment which it is not

detrimental to their health and well-being. (South African Department. of Defence,

1996). Similarly, Canada has also incorporated human security approach into its foreign

policy formulation process (es).

The country has redefined the concept of security from the traditional one to that which

guarantees safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats characterized by

90

freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives

(Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada, 1999:5). The country has also backed its new

commitment with expending huge national resources in the promotion of human security

worldwide especially inform of aids. Before the collapse of Berlin Wall, scholars and

practitioners in security had been the problem of identifying which of the available

approaches was the best in the management of security nationally and internationally.

Basically various traditional approaches have focused exclusively on the security

relations among state actors, relegating relevancy of individual people in security affairs.

The traditional coercion and deterrence techniques are becoming moribund and

ineffective in security management.

Non state actors are becoming more visible in national and international theah·es of

violence, such that some individuals or groups have become more powerful than the

state. A good example is Hezbollah (militant group) that is considered in several quaiters

as more powerful than the government of Lebanon. One of the reasons is that its

(Kezbollah's) membership extends beyond Lebanon. Members of this militant group

scatter across and beyond the whole Middle East. Al-Qaeda taught the whole world that

commercial planes could be used as weapon of mass deshuction in the 9/1 lincident

where thousands of people were massacred by crashing planes at the World Trade centre

and the Pentagon. There is need for world governments to adopt the new non-traditional

approach, human security to address the structural security threats that bedevil most

countries in the world.

The issues of hunger, poverty, proliferation of weapons, landmines, authoritarianism,

environmental pollution and degradation, social iajustice, political exclusion, crime,

human rights abuse, illiteracy, economic deprivation, militarism and maladminish·ation,

which human security seeks to solve, must be critically addressed in making security

decisions. Thank God that several states have started adopting this approach.

91

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS.

5.3.1 International Terrorism Threats

National level; at national level, Uganda should employee a holistic approach involving

the use of legal and institutional measures that employ both kinetic and non kinetic

interventions. These effotis include;

(a) CaITying out regular surveys and inspections of vital installations and

establishments for purposes of upgrading security measures.

(b) Community policing through mobilization and public awareness campaign against

terrorism.

(c) Building capacity through acquisition of specialization equipment and training.

(d) Target hardening of vital national infrastructure/installations.

(e) Effecting deployments (foundation security, domination of venues of major events

and foot and motorized patrols).

(f) Improvement of boarder security through integrated computerized boarder

management systems for example the personal identification secure comparison and

evaluation systems (PISCES).

(g) Improvement of the passpoti and registration for the national identity cards.

(h) TeITorism in all forms and manifestations constitute one of the most serious threats to

international peace and security any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable

regardless of their motivation, whenever and by whosoever committed. There is

therefore a need for trends in counter-terrorism approaches in tenns of public policies

and operational methods. A trend towards reinforcing intelligence capabilities need to

be underlined both at national level and at that of international organizations.

(i) There is a need for strong region cooperation both in the political sense and in the

sense of solidarity and also at the operational level. TeITorism poses a real and serious

threat to the security and safety of the alliance and its members. It is a global threat

that knows no border, nationality or religion, a challenge that the international

community must tackle together.

92

(j) Need for regional training in modern counter te1Torism techniques like in the fight

against chemical biological attack and cyber war first among others and need to

enhance the regional forensic laboratory to capacity.

(k) In this sense, the researcher recommends that no government should make

concessions to te1Torists and strike no deals. Bring te1Torists to justice for their crimes

and make a quick trial to avoid a denied justice. Isolate and apply pressure on states

that sponsor te1Torism to force them to change their behavior and bolster the counter

terrorism capabilities of countries that work towards against terrorism. Increase

publicity of the activities of state sponsor and countries that support te1Torism and

possible sanctioning. This can be done in conjunction with first world states for

example U.S. Educate and sensitize more of the dangers of terrorism targeting the

rural community especially those who share borders.

(I) Lastly but not least the researcher recommends that teITorism be put on academic

structure in Uganda and be taught in schools as a subject for generations to

understand the dangers of terrorism. This will enable the growing generations to

know and be able to encounter terrorism activities worldwide.

(m)Lastly, the government needs to put in a system that enables a neighborhood watch

practice into play. The government of Uganda had a local council (LC) system that

was perfect and active when it comes to crime prevention but such system has since

phased away or it's no longer effective because of the legal challenges. Such as a

system will be able to check and balance especially on movements of people coming

in and out of places including registering every person that comes in as a new entrant.

The government also should vet and scrutinize the companies that import the bomb

detectors.

(n) Most of the detectors that are used by security agencies at check points or entries to

the malls and schools are either fake or substandard and therefore used as Scareclaws,

a situation that is dangerous to the public and a soft landing for the terrorists.

5.3.2 National Peace and Stability

(a) First, I contend that, more than any solution, priority must be given to the political

settlement, after which UN peacekeepers will have a vital, traditional monitoring role

93

to play. The internal dynamics of the Ugandan socio-cultural fabric is crucial as to

identify a lasting solution to the problem therein. There is no guarantee however that

a political settlement is achievable but they are still the security organs themselves

that could save their country. The timing is vital. They should work hand-in-hand

amongst themselves to resolve their problems in peaceful manner than resort to armed

struggle which so far taught everyone that there are no gains at all.

(b) Requires protective measures such as regularly assessing facilities for weaknesses and

finding ways to reduce them, and making sure state and local government employees

are trained to handle ten-orism threats

( c) Requires government agencies to review and update emergency response procedures

and communications systems, as well as provide the public with necessary

information.

( d) Regional inter-agency cooperation m information sharing, joint operations among

others.

( e) Includes increasing surveillance of critical locations, coordinating emergency plans

with nearby jurisdiction and implementing contingency and emergency response

plans.

(f) Requires coordinating necessary security efforts with armed forces or law

enforcement agencies, taking additional precautions at public events preparing to

work at an alternative site or with a dispersed work force and restricting access to

essential personnel.

(g) Include assigning emergency response personnel and setting up special trained teams,

monitoring, redirecting personnel to address's emergency needs.

(h) Harmonizing laws among the East African Community especially of expedition.

(i) Observance of rule oflaw.

(j) Neighbourhood watch-community engagement in the fight against ten-orism.

(k) Joint acquisition of security equipment at common boarders such as scanners.

(I) Joint boarder security management.

(m)The utility of constructivism, then, in providing an appropriate understanding of

ten-orism and its inherent ideationally informed character, extends beyond the realm

of theory and into realm of real world policy.

94

(n) Understanding the nature of Al-Shabaab te1Torists and its non material determinants

of action, then, while of value in and of itself, has potentially profound consequences

of future counter-terrorist policy, redressing the pitfalls inherent in adopting a

narrowly positivist outlook.

( o) Any given terrorist organization will have its own set of group norms which require

response to discredit.

(p) It is crucial to note though that, due to the largely exploratory nature of this study, the

avenue towards future effective counter terrorist policy suggested here remains

nothing more than a rough recommendation based upon the findings of the

investigation.

5.4 Conclusions

In response to the growing international threats that terrorism has posed in East Africa

and in particular Uganda, African governments and region organizations have joined the

U.S. led "war on terror". But, ideologically-charged a Sword that cuts both ways at once

catalyzing and supporting peace processes and undermining democracy and stability in

weaker states. Governments are utilizing terrorism to breathe new life into old security

paradigms that priotize regime survival and state security rather than human security.

While the extensive use of terrorist attacks by local extremist groups has intensified

insecurity, the trend to willy-nilly pin the terrorist label on these groups is blurring the

line between international te1rnrism and the parochial dynamics of localized resistance

and struggle for power and prestige, thus complicating the search for peaceful solutions

conflicts. Further the present military-heavy counter terrorist strategies have eclipsed the

need for soft options including robust poverty eradication measures to forestall the spread

ofislamists ideas and terrorism. Old style high handed approaches associated with global

factors undermine human rights and imperil weak democracies

Coordination between national, regional and international counter-terrorist initiatives is

needed to ensure that these initiatives do not undermine on a heavy fragile security

situation in Uganda and Africa at large. Governments in the region must re-commit

themselves to counter-terrorism by strengthening counter-terrorism laws, police and

95

intelligence, tightening boarder controls, coastline surveillance and Anti-money

laundering measures to detect, deter and diffuse te1Torist threats, strike a health balance

between these measures and the values of democracy and human rights. Governments

should also refrain from underhand manipulation of tenorism in ways that undermine

peace processes. African institutions, particularly the AU, IGAD, EAC and COMESA

must unwaveringly pursue a counter-tenorism campaign within the broader framework of

the emerging continental peace and security agenda. They should continue working with

international paiiners to boost regional abilities to deal effectively with the security

threats posed by terrorism, always ensuring greater coordination between African effo1is

and those of international prayers like the U.S otherwise, the parameters of the war on

terror will continue to be set by the imperatives of global insecurity with little attention to

local security realistic (Aldis et al., 2007)

Tenorism continue to adapt to meet the challenges of emerging forms of conflict, exploit

developments in technology and has demonstrated increasing abilities to adapt to counter

tenorism measures across the world. Terrorists are developing new capabilities of attack

and improving the efficiency of existing methods. Te1Torist groups have shown

significant progress in escaping from subordinate role in nation-state conflicts and ai·e

becoming prominent as international influences in their own right. They are becoming

more integrated with other sub-state entities such as criminal organizations and

legitimately charted corporations and are gradually assuring a measure of control and

identity with national governments (Aldis et al., 2007)

Despite the unprecedented attention they have both garnered in the literature over the past

decade, constructivist theory and contemporary international tenorism have-due to the

prevailing conservatism in international relations theory and, particularly security studies­

seldom been coupled in any meaningful analysis. As this study set out to show and has

shown, this seems a remarkable oversight, as constructivism proves the most appropriate

lens through which to decipher the unconventional, non-materially informed, non­

utilitarian behavior of new terrorist groups.

96

As chapter two illustrated by occupying a middle ground in the meta-theoretical map of

IR theory constructivism balances the strengths of both positivism and post positivism.

Unlike positivists, constructivists reject the notion that an actor's norms, identity and

interest can be pre-defined and regarded as pennanent. Global political reality, they

suggest is far more nuanced and complex. Actors, they assert, do not always behave in an

objectivity rational manner, but rather will be guided by notions of propriety. Attempts at

establishing universal anticipatory laws in the study of IR, they thus contend, are both

futile and erroneous, unlike post-positivists, however constructivist scholars-or at least

the majority of them are willing to balance this sensitivity for the non-material

complexities of international relations with an acknowledgement of the necessity of

producing research with some pragmatic policy value (Aldis et al., 2007)

Constructivism, then as was highlighted in chapter one and two, is far better suited to the

task of making sense of new ideological terrorism than its more established theoretical

rivals. New terrorism differs fundamentally from previous waves of international teJTor

and thus requires an approach to analysis which differs fundamentally from traditional,

absolute understanding of terrorist behaviors. Constructivism provides just such an

approach (Alex et al.,, 2004).

African Security should be seen in the light of its multi-dimensional scope and essence.

Many analysts attribute a number of factors for lack of security in the continent of Africa.

These factors range from the vulnerable nature of African statehood to the Socio­

economic and political marginalization of ce1iain groups of people and even to the

prevalence of ethno-cultural contradictions in the continent of Africa. The cause and

nature of security challenges vary from countries to countries depending on their

historical as well as socio-political settings. As a result, the impacts of insecurity have to

be assessed from those dimensions.

As most analysts contend the coloniality nature of the African statehood plays a

pivotal role in explaining the security situation in Africa. Most of the factors are both

directly or implicitly related to colonial statehood and its post-colonial impacts in igniting

and fuelling a number of inter-state conflicts between or among newly independent

97

countries. In the immediate aftermath of independence, we have experienced a number of

border wars between Ethiopia-Somalia, Nigeria-Cameroon, Chad-Libya, Morocco­

Algeria, etc. In fact, due to the nature of state fonnation in Africa, inter-state conflicts

later subsided (but with a potential to 'time-bomb') and were superseded by intra-state

conflicts. Africa again has begun to face an ever increasing internal conflicts caused by

the deliberate and distorted statehood fo1mation. This in fact has been caused by the

displacement of two or more ethno-linguistic /cultural identities between two or more

independent states. Since independence the above coupled with other factors have

become the main reasons to instigate many more inter- and intra-state conflicts in Africa

than in any other continent.

5.5 Areas for further research/studies

From the study, there are gaps that need to be addressed. There is an increase of

international terrorism threats and therefore a need to understand more about the global

fate of future peace and stability and human security right from national level to

international level.

98

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102

APPENDICES APPENDIX IA: INTRODUCTION LETTER FROM THE COLLEGE OF HIGHER

DEGREES AND RESEARCH

KAMPALA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Ggaba Road-Kansanga. • P.O. Box 20000, Kampala, Uganda.

Tel: +256-414-266813, +256-414-267634 Fax: +256-414-501974. Cel:+256-706-251084 E-mail: admin@kiu.ac.ug. Website: Www.kiu.ac.ug

COLLEGE OF HIGHER DEGREES AND RESEARCH

May, 28, 2015

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that Atuheire Caleb has taken h;s course of Masters of International Relations and Diplomatic Studi_e,;,1,w,ith the Col!e9,e of Higher Degrees and Research

. ' (CHOR), Kampala International. University (KIU), K2mpala, Uganda. ... ,. ,,

Please ffnd below his relevant -~~cidemic information

1. He was admitted in Janu<;iry, 2014 with re£ism:::2n number MIR/24342/141/DU

2. He has completed ail trfrnesters of study

3. He is expected to Gradu~te in November, 2.013

This certification is issued to .Atuheire Caleb legittmate purpose this may serve him best.

Academic Records Verified by:

103

' 'r,r, -'-t-''""·· :: s re~uest and for whatever

I I I

IU . j

KAMPALA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Ggaba Road-Kansanga. P.O. Box 20000, Kampala, Uganda. Tel: +256-414-266813, +256-414-267634 Fax: +256-414-501974. Cel:+256-706-251084 E-mail: admin@kiu.ac.ug, Website: www.kiu.ac.ug

COLLEGE OF HIGHER DEGREES AND RESEARCH

May, 28, 2015

CER n:FICATJ.ON

This is to certify that Atuheire Caleb has taken his course of Masters of International Relations and Diplomatic Studies with the Colleg_e of Higher Degrees and Research

\ . (CHDR), Kampala International University (KIU), Kampala, Uganda.

Please find below his relevant academic information

1. He was admitted in January, 2014 with registration number MIR/24342/141/DU

2. He has completed all trimesters of study

3. He is expected to Graduate in November, 2015

Academic Records Verified by:

"Exploring Heights"

APPENDIX II: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENTS FOR

THE SECURITY ORGANS/AGENCIES

Sir/Madam

I am Atuheire Caleb a student of Kampala International University cun-ently can-ying out a

research on "International Terrorism Threats on National Peace and Stability in Uganda". Your

insight in this area will greatly be of significant importance in addressing the plight of the people

of Uganda who continue to be susceptible to international terrorism threats. Therefore the

information rendered is for study purposes and remains confidential. I will be grateful for your

participation.

Thank you.

A- Age ( circle the appropriate age bracket)

1. 21- 29 years

2. 30-39 years

3. 40-49 years

4. 50-59 years

B- Gender

1. Male

2. Female

C- Marital status

1. Single

2. Married

3. Divorced

4. Separate

D- Educational level

1. Certificate

2. Diploma level

3. Bachelors degree

4. Masters degree

D D D D

D D

D D D D

105

5. Doctorate Holder (PhD) c=i 6. Others (specify)

E- Occupation

I. Police guard D 2. Military guard D 3. CMI D 4. Interpol D

106

SECTION A: QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE INTERNATIONAL

TERRORISM THREATS Instruction Please kindly indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by circling using the scale given:

Strongly agree Agree Strongly disagree Disagree 1 2 3 4

No categories 1 2 3

Political stability

I we have terrorists in Uganda

2 Ugandans involved in International terrorism

3 There are militia groups in our division as a result of terrorism

4 There are increased open rebellion against the government

5 The challenge of illegal drugs has increased

Trade

6 Poverty is also a serious threat to national security

7 The distribution of wealth in our division has been skewed in favor of a wealthy minority

8 Investors are scare ways from business establishment in our division

9 I was once a victim of terrorist attack in Kampala

10 Customers have reduced, due to terror threat

Travel and Tourism

11 Graft and corruption has become another threat to our national security that scared away tourists

12 Ethnic, religious and cultural conflict pervades many regions and nations, including our own

13 Threats have limited access to resources

14 We lack of national integration and international issues

15 Nuclear materials and technologies are more accessible now than at any other time in history

Human Life Threats

16 Transnational organized crime has proliferated in the era of globalization.

17 Death rates has increased

18 Mental disorder has increased as a result of terrorist threats

19 You can not easily identify the terrorist

20 Poverty has been an important factors for the recruiting groups in our division

Thank you for completing the questionnaires

107

4

APPENDIX III: QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE NATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY

Instruction

Please kindly indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by

circling using the scale given:

Strongly agree Agree Strongly disagree Disagree

1 2 3 4

No Categories 1 2 3

Poverty

1 I was recruited with money influence

2 I had no Job by the time of recruitment

3 I was promised a house, car and a good job

4 I had no money for further studies

5 I was convinced by one of my colleagues

Information Sharing

6 I can easily deliver messages via internet to our pa1iner

7 I always get messages for terror attack from police

8 I report suspicious individuals in our division

9 I can identify who is a terrorist

10 Information given to police and other security organs is kept confidential

National Border control

11 1 was asked for my national Identity card

12 There is a full time surveillance cameras and all check points

13 You can pay some money and they allow you to enter into another territorial

boundary

14 Machine detectors are used at the check points

15 There are restrictions applied to non citizens

Training and Technology

16 Personal at the check points have adequate knowledge on terror tricks

17 The security personnel are trained to handle modern equipment like computers, metal detectors among others

18 Terrorist use high level of technology including watches for detonators

19 I can easily distinguish an explosive from other weapons

20 Dogs are there trained to handle terrorists and their weapons

Thank you for completing the questionnaires

108

4

APPENDIX IV: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENTS FOR THE UGANDAN COMMUNITY/AUTHORITIES.

Sir/Madam

I am Atuheire Caleb a student of Kampala International University cun-ently can-ying out a

research on "International Ten-orism Threats on National Peace and Stability in Uganda". Your

insight in this area will greatly be of significant importance in addressing the plight of the people

of Uganda who continue to be susceptible to international ten-orism threats. Therefore the

information rendered is for study purposes and remains confidential. I will be grateful for your

participation.

Thank you.

A- Age ( circle the appropriate age bracket)

5. 21- 29 years

6. 30-39 years

7. 40-49 years

8. 50-59 years

B- Gender

3. Male

4. Female

C- Marital status

5. Single

6. Married

7. Divorced

8. Separate

D- Educational level

7. Certificate

8. Diploma level

9. Bachelors degree

D D D D

D D

D D D D

109

10. Masters degree C:=J 11. Doctorate Holder (PhD) C:=J 12. Others (specify)

E- Occupation

13. Police guard D 14. Military guard D 15. CMI D 16. Interpol D

INIERVIEW GUIDES

17. Who is a te1Torist?

······································································································

··········································································································· 18. Do we have terrorists in Uganda?

.....................................................................................................

··········································································································· 19. If yes, what do you think are the type of

terrorists? ............................................................ .

········································································································"·

20. What is terrorism?

......................................................................................................

············································································································

21. What do you understand of the international terrorism?

···································································································· .. ············································································································

22. Do we have international terrorism threats in Uganda?

················································································ ........... , ....... .

110

...........................................................................................................

23. If yes, whom do you think is responsible for tenorism threats in Uganda?

······································································································

······································································································

24. Giving an example explain how te1rnrism is practiced in Uganda.

············································································································ ............................................................................................................

25. Which age groups are mostly involved in tenorism?

······································································································

······································································································

············································································································ 26. What causes it? Give reasons for you answer above .

...............................................................................................................................................

············································································································ 27. What happens to those found involved in terrorism in Uganda?

............................................................................................................

············································································································ 28. What do you think are the causes of international terrorism?

······································································································ ..

······································································································ .. 29. What do you think are the effects of international terrorism in Uganda?

······································································································ ..

····································································································· ... 30. How do international terrorism threats affect:

a. Peace ···················································· ....... . b. Stability ·············································"·············· c. Community ········································· .. ··· ... · .. , ....... . d. Development in Uganda ............................................................

111

31. What are the legal procedures for people involved in terrorism in Uganda?

32. How does the law protect terrorists rights in Uganda

········································································································ 33. What are the challenges involved in maintaining peace and stability against

international terrorism threats in Uganda?

..............................................................................................................................................

...........................................................................................................

34. What has been done to overcome the challenges faced by security agencies in

fighting international terrorism threats in Uganda?

······························· .............................................................................................................. .

··········································································································· 35. What do you think should be done to solve the problems of international terrorism

threats in Uganda?

..............................................................................................................................................

········································································································"· 36. Are Ugandans involved in International terrorism?

.............................................................................................................................................. 37. If yes, explain how they are involved?

..............................................................................................................................................

...........................................................................................................

38. Why do people from Uganda get involved in international terrorism?

......... ' .. '' ... '.'.' ... '.' ................................. ' ........................... ' ........................................................ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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APPENDIX V: THE ADOPTED TIME FRAME OF THE STUDY

Thesis proposal submission

revision

Questionnaire designing and pre­

testing

Data Collection

Data Coding & Editing

Data Analysis and interpretation

Report writing

Viva Voce and Report revision

Thesis Rep01t submission and clearance

113

-.

APPENDIX VI: Sketch Map of Uganda showing the location of Kampala Disti'ict (Study Area)

/

DR. cbNGo ,. ...... _./

RWANDA

SUDAN

Kampala District (study area

District boundaries

l 14

KENYA

~ .

,-

TANc.ANIA